Online Material
Academic Legitimacy by Patricia J. Gumport (Cover page revised September, 2018)
Tables/Figures
Table 1. Case Study Design Table 2. Institutional Logics in Public Higher Education Table 3. Higher Education Enrollment by Year and Control: 1950, 1975, 2000 Table 4a. Degrees Awarded by Carnegie Classification and Degree Level: 1975 Table 4b. Degrees Awarded by Carnegie Classification and Degree Level: 2000 Table 5a. State Tax Revenues Appropriated for Higher Education Table 5b. State Budget Appropriations to Public Higher Education by Year Table 6. State Appropriations 1976-2000: Case Study Sites Table 7. Enrollments 1975, 1997: Case Study Sites
Appendices
Appendix A. Research Methods and Data Collection Instruments Appendix B. Case Study Site Data Profiles Appendix C. Degrees & Certificates Awarded by Knowledge Area: Case Study Sites by Sector Appendix D. Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area & Degree Level: Case Study Sites Appendix E. Primary Sources Cited by Case Study Site Appendix F. State Policy and Oversight Contexts Appendix G. Bibliography (to add)
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Table 1. Case Study Design Metropolitan Areas Institution Type San Francisco Bay Chicago New York City
University of University of Illinois State University of New Research Universities California, Berkeley at Chicago York at Stony Brook
Comprehensive State San José State Chicago State City College of New Universities University University York
Harry S Truman Borough of Manhattan Community Colleges San José City College College Community College
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Table 2. Institutional Logics in Public Higher Education
Social Institution Industry
Wider Context Societal expectations Market forces
Legacy of Service to Society Multiple: access, economic Contribute to economic development development, education for via skill training to meet employer citizenship, knowledge needs; teaching new ideas; research preservation, discovery, & public applications service
Appropriate Response to Identify, deliberate, & selectively Scan, plan, re-position, make new Changing Demands respond in context of mission & investments, & identify collaborative campus legacies opportunities
Central Value of Knowledge Inherent worth of ideas & original Instrumental value of training scholarship; relevance to society’s workforce in skills; problem-solving; needs both social & economic generating revenue; potential commercialization
Time Horizon Longer-term (reflecting on legacies Short-term and near-term, projecting and future) while attending to future impact short-term needs
Dominant Rationale from Invest in people for society broadly Procure educational services; Perspective of Funders conceived; inquiry, including basic training & research for applications, & applied research; support for economic competitiveness & operating costs of public prosperity of individuals & society institutions
Shapers of Knowledge Disciplines, faculty-driven Markets, demand-driven
Ideal Academic Structure Comprehensive; with continuity; Selective investment; optimizes changes with knowledge; reflects flexibility; changes to keep pace shared governance (academic with demand, opportunities, & content & practices overseen by changes in knowledge faculty experts)
Ongoing Academic Challenges Explicate mission and ideals; Prioritize external interests; manage manage scrutiny, ambiguity, & rising costs; find savings with no tension; maintain educational quality loss; insufficient/uncertain quality within resource constraints; revenue; use resources strategically cover costs of enrollment with for efficiency/productivity; cultivate uncertain resources; garner faculty revenue, allies, & advocates support; cultivate revenue, allies, & externally; avoid jeopardizing public advocates externally; retain trust by lack of alignment between legitimacy in context of complex mission, resources, & activities; divergent pressures, mandates, & retain legitimacy by responding & interests initiating valued activities
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Table 3. Higher Education Enrollment by Year and Control: 1950, 1975, 2000
Years 1950 1975 2000 1950-1975 1975-2000
Control All 2,281,298 11,184,859 15,312,289 390.3% 36.9%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% ------
Public 1,139,699 8,834,508 11,752,786 675.2% 33.0%
50.0% 79.0% 76.8% ------
Private 1,141,599 235,0351 3,559,503 105.9% 51.4%
50.0% 21.0% 23.2% ------
Enrollment Full------6,841,334 9,009,600 ------31.7% time Status ------61.2% 58.8%
Part------4,343,525 6,302,689 ------45.1% time ------38.8% 41.2% ------Source: IPEDS
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Table 4a. Degrees Awarded by Carnegie Classification and Degree Level: 1975
Sector and Carnegie Classification
Public Total
All Public Master's Degree Research Associate of All Colleges & Colleges & Colleges & Universities Arts Colleges Universities Level Universities Universities
1,276,742 408,638 333,753 349,285 1,769,057 Total 72.2% 23.1% 18.9% 19.7% 100.0%
77,082 9,516 2,082 63,118 90,865 Certificates 84.8% 10.5% 2.3% 69.5% 100.0%
319,641 8,117 11,066 286,167 362,607 Associate's Degrees 88.2% 2.2% 3.1% 78.9% 100.0%
639,534 265,078 248,998 0 931,640 Bachelor's Degrees 68.6% 28.5% 26.7% 0.0% 100.0%
First 24,150 16,671 1,022 0 56,219 Professional Degrees 43.0% 29.7% 1.8% 0.0% 100.0%
194,329 89,498 70,542 0 293,640 Master's Degrees 66.2% 30.5% 24.0% 0.0% 100.0%
22,006 19,758 43 0 34,086 Doctorate Degrees 64.6% 58.0% 0.1% 0.0% 100.0% Source: IPEDS
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Table 4b. Degrees Awarded by Carnegie Classification and Degree Level: 2000
Sector and Carnegie Classification
Public Total
All Public Master's Degree Research Associate of All Colleges & Colleges & Colleges & Universities Arts Colleges Universities Level Universities Universities
1,766,485 491,013 419,152 578,295 2,607,941 Total 67.7% 18.8% 16.1% 22.2% 100.0%
191,657 5,929 156,720 230,288 Certificates 9,000 83.2% 3.9% 2.6% 68.1% 100.0%
454,559 7,720 12,613 418,979 543,876 Associate's Degrees 83.6% 1.4% 2.3% 77.0% 100.0%
816,410 326,516 312,244 2,596 1,253,121 Bachelor's Degrees 65.2% 26.1% 24.9% 0.2% 100.0%
First 32,562 20,914 1,746 0 79,578 Professional Degrees 40.9% 26.3% 2.2% 0.0% 100.0%
242,975 103,859 86,089 0 456,260 Master's Degrees 53.3% 22.8% 18.9% 0.0% 100.0%
28,322 23,004 531 0 44,818 Doctorate Degrees 63.2% 51.3% 1.2% 0.0% 100.0%
Source: IPEDS
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Table 5a.
State Tax Revenues Appropriated For Higher Education
State 1973 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
California 7.9% 10.5% 12.0% 10.4% 9.1% 7.5% 7.9%
Illinois 6.8% 6.8% 7.1% 6.8% 7.0% 6.1% 7.9%
New York 4.9% 5.1% 5.4% 5.2% 4.4% 3.6% 3.6%
Sources: Halstead, K. 1998. State Profiles: Financing Public Higher Education 1978 to 1998 Trend Data. 21st Edition. Washington, DC: Research Associates of Washington.
SHEEO. 2004. State Profiles, State Higher Education Finance.
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Table 5b. State Budget Appropriations to Public Higher Education byYear
12% 0.12 California 11% 0.115
0.109 0.108 New York 0.105 10% 0.104 0.1
0.096 0.095 Illinois 9% 0.094 0.091 0.091
0.084 0.084 8% 0.082 0.08 0.079 0.076 0.075 0.074 7% 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.063 6% 0.062 0.061 0.06 0.06 0.059
0.055 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 5% 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.048 0.047 4% 0.044
0.039 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.036 3% 0.031 0.03 0.03 2% 1973 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Sources: Halstead, K. 1998. State Profiles: Financing Public Higher Education 1978 to 1998 Trend Data. 21st Edition. Washington, DC: Research Associates of Washington.
SHEEO. 2004. State Profiles, State Higher Education Finance.
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Table 6. State Appropriations 1976–2000: Case Study Sites
FY 1976 FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 2000
Institution St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE St. Apps.1 % of Tot2 Per FTE
CSU $43,615,564 65.6% $9,780 $46,818,552 68.3% $10,085 $33,652,485 62.1% $6,854 $38,202,408 63.8% $10,258 $33,246,579 49.3% $5,103 $48,592,296 59.3% $9,833
HSTCC $7,977,472 43.8% $3,375 $6,875,347 33.3% $2,331 $7,529,134 50.2% $1,475 $15,679,944 31.5% $2,009 $15,151,634 28.5% $1,891 $12,473,623 28.7% $2,052
BMCC $22,161,303 34.0% $3,206 $22,281,966 34.9% $3,317 $24,167,490 28.4% $2,876 $27,579,984 33.7% $2,953 $33,407,406 29.9% $2,747 $28,910,000 32.1% $2,534
CCNY $80,183,073 39.2% $5,106 $80,448,386 50.5% $7,709 $117,581,202 66.5% $11,980 $130,511,977 74.7% $13,746 $86,723,849 57.3% $8,274 $28,689,000 36.8% $3,857
SJCC $23,966,327 24.8% $3,111 $21,764,030 48.6% $3,665 $14,548,733 54.9% $2,779 $14,347,828 38.7% $3,513 $5,977,428 18.2% $1,367 $9,472,432 13.8% $2,571
SJSU $161,891,200 67.0% $7,761 $171,343,122 65.8% $9,279 $165,130,501 57.9% $9,150 $166,274,996 67.2% $7,963 $118,093,888 49.1% $5,973 $138,792,000 40.2% $6,842
SUNYSB $192,052,813 66.0% $14,741 $263,222,932 68.2% $19,137 $276,233,201 63.3% $21,694 $330,586,055 44.4% $23,765 $316,755,159 33.9% $21,413 $310,089,467 31.3% $19,354
UCB $393,571,381 48.7% $12,996 $454,686,851 50.3% $15,844 $481,103,941 48.5% $16,493 $499,503,695 46.5% $18,231 $347,673,159 33.0% $12,526 $424,423,000 32.8% $14,357
UIC $130,951,155 59.1% $5,852 $131,977,375 58.3% $6,209 $348,185,355 42.0% $17,477 $352,094,415 40.8% $17,822 $337,330,503 30.5% $16,163 $327,369,595 28.2% $15,430
1State Appropriations are in constant 2000 dollars, HEPI adjusted, and include appropriations for hospitals for all years. 1 State appropriations in constant 2000 dollars, HEPI adjusted; including hospital revenue. 2 NSF Webcaspar
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Table 7. Enrollments 1975, 1997: Case Study Sites
Year Headcount % Full-time FTE Students Community Colleges BMCC 1975 9,639 57.6% 6,912 1997 16,141 62.3% 12,080 % change 67.5% 4.7% 74.8% SJCC 1975 14,667 28.8% 7,704 1997 8,052 17.1% 3,603 % change -45.1% -11.7% -53.2% Truman 1975 14,667 28.85 7,704 1997 16,009 23.5% 7,844 % change 9.1% -5.3% 1.8% Comprehensive State Univs Chicago State 1975 6,615 51.1% 4,460 1997 8,722 48.2% 5,710 % change 31.9% -2.9% 28% CCNY 1975 20,388 65.5% 15,705 1997 12,083 52.6% 8,264 % change -40.7% -13.0% -47.4% San Jose State 1975 31,788 48.4% 20,854 1997 26,897 64.0% 20,433 % change -15.4% 15.5% -2.0% Research Universities SUNY SB 1975 16,110 71.3% 13,029 1997 17,831 76.8% 15,079 % change 10.7% 5.5% 15.7% UC Berkeley 1975 34,809 80.5% 30,283 1997 30,290 91.2% 28,521 % change -13% 10.7% -5.8% UIC 1975 25,647 80.9% 22,378 1997 24,921 77.3% 21,157 % change -2.8% -3.5% 5.5%
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Appendix A. Research Methods and Data Collection Instruments
This study takes a distinctive methodological approach, blending my theoretical and empirical sensibilities as a sociologist of higher education. As an historical exploratory analysis of public higher education, this case study seeks to illuminate some dynamics of institutional change. My ambitious aim is informed by the need to understand how change occurs in core social institutions fundamental to the social order of our society, and on whose interdependence the global welfare depends (e.g., education, religion, kinship, health care, law, and government).
Focusing on the interplay between higher education’s knowledge functions and the economy provides a fresh sensibility for analyzing changes in the rationales for what is taught, to who, by whom, and in what form. This analytical lens helps explain shifts in how particular knowledge and skills become regarded as valuable and necessary, as opposed to irrelevant and obsolete.
Neo-institutional theory proposes that environmental forces reconstruct an institutional field at multiple levels, including via internalization by participants as they ascribe meaning to their own aspirations and activities. Distinguishable foundations of legitimacy are evident in regulative processes (conformity to rules is expected to avoid sanctions and acquire resources), normative expectations (value-driven social behaviors that reinforce stability in the social order), and cognitive constructs (taken-for-granted understandings—often preconscious beliefs—as individuals make sense of what is expected) (Scott 2008). Changes in these foundations have far- reaching impact for the institutional field. The core construct of legitimacy is a powerful anchor to show how wider imperatives shape—but do not ultimately determine—incremental local decisions, in normative and cognitive frames for individuals and their organizational leaders, as doing the right things and doing things right evolve through changing logics.
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This study’s research design and methods reflect a set of integrated decisions to explore such changing dynamics within public higher education, with these questions: How have public colleges and universities perceived environmental pressures? How have they responded? With what rationales? In this appendix I explain the rationale for the study’s design, the empirical grounding in data sources, and the analytical approach.
As indicated in Chapter 2, I determined the appropriate timeframe to be the last quarter of the twentieth century, a longer time horizon than is typical in our field. The complexity of public higher education also necessitated studying several sectors, since higher education is a highly differentiated institutional field. The design focused on three campuses within each of three sectors: research universities, comprehensive state universities, and community colleges. The sites were clustered in three metropolitan areas (New York, Chicago, the San Francisco Bay
Area) to see how campuses in similar geographical contexts perceived constraints and opportunities among environmental pressures. This design also enabled me to examine how a campus mission functions as a key filter, rendering some pressures more salient than others, as well as where a founding imprint had staying power. The field research took several years, with successive rounds of data collection and interim data analyses for the nine campuses, resulting in over 200 interviews with administrators and faculty and more than 1,500 archival documents.
Identifying the Case Study Sites
A key decision in case study research is whether to conceal or disclose identity. In studying higher education this pertains to two areas: case study sites and individuals. Researchers in our field have tended toward institutional anonymity, anticipating that interviewees will reveal more. However, this has clear downsides. In order to preserve anonymity, details revealing the site have to be omitted or altered, and findings cannot be a basis for further study. I weighed
12 these considerations, and decided to identify the campuses. Given the theoretical framing, I had to retain particulars, since nuances of language within documents and interviews reveal how individuals—in their role as informants—socially construct change and its consequences.
Disclosing campus identities did have drawbacks. Some administrators and faculty were hesitant at times during interviews, concerned about possible repercussions for their campus, themselves, or others, especially where there was a heightened sense of vulnerability. We agreed to protect informants by not using their names, and instead use identifiers for position category (e.g., senior administrator, campus leader, or faculty member) and specify a department if it is large enough that attribution will not reveal the identity of individuals. (A few exceptions were approved.)
Obtaining Background Data and Preparation for Site Visits
To establish profiles for the sites, we gathered data on each campus dating back to the
1970s—in some cases the 1960s for major defining moments. We compiled financial, enrollment, and degree data from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), its predecessor the Higher Education General
Information Survey (HEGIS), and the National Science Foundation. Community college data were difficult to obtain: San José City College had data missing, and Truman College data had to be extracted from the City Colleges of Chicago system. For indicators of academic change,
IPEDS had limited value since it neither collected nor reported data by academic department.
Instead, we used campus documents, including course catalogs. The result was insufficient faculty data for comparative analysis.
For indicators of academic structure, we followed my unique methodology (Gumport and
Snydman 2002), in examining campus catalogs from 1977, 1987, and 1997 to determine continuity and change in academic programs and degrees. The coding scheme consisted of
13 eleven knowledge areas. The College Blue Book also proved valuable. (See online: Appendix B.
Case Study Site Data Profiles; Appendix C. Degrees & Certificates Awarded by Knowledge
Area; Appendix D. Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level.)
Data on the policy contexts for public higher education in the three states focused on major initiatives by state oversight structures, state coordinating agencies, and multi-campus system offices, especially those foregrounded in the 1980s and 1990s. This served as a backdrop for interviewing and analyzing transcripts. During site visits, we collected documents, such as strategic plans and self-studies, accreditation reviews, academic program reviews, course catalogs, memos and speeches by campus leaders, and faculty senate minutes. (See online
Appendix A. Data Collection Instruments; Appendix E. Primary Sources Cited; Appendix F.
State Policy and Oversight Contexts.)
We interviewed individuals in the same categories at each site. We sought about two dozen people, from administrators with leadership responsibilities and broad perspectives
(president, provost, deans, chief financial officer) to faculty in selected academic departments.
Faculty shared views about their departments as well as about the campus. History and economics departments were selected as common academic disciplines. (Community colleges had fewer faculty in these fields.) Although their views cannot be generalized to faculty in liberal arts disciplines, these faculty provided a base for comparative analysis. We also interviewed individuals knowledgeable about academic partnerships, providing chronologies and anecdotes about how partnerships were initiated, the underlying rationales, and what unfolded. Much of the partnership data is in Academic Collaboration: A Strategic Necessity (Gumport, Under Review).
We designed semi-structured interview protocols to align with a person’s role. The questions sought to draw out perceptions of environmental pressures, organizational responses,
14 the cognitive categories of individuals, and how they viewed their own agency. To probe more deeply into their views, I also included questions about diversity and technology, two imperatives beyond economic conditions, which were much on the minds of individuals in higher education during the 1990s (Chun, Christopher, and Gumport 2000). The interviewees thereby gave accounts of their organization’s ways of doing things: the disposition to respond variably depending on the pressure (whether it was construed as self-evident and necessary or could be ignored); the time horizon for responses (whether it had to be immediate or could be delayed); how the organization ordered its priorities (which if any were seen as competing; what forms and processes were available for collective deliberation); and with what rationales.
Data Collection at the Nine Case Study Sites
My research team and I conducted initial site visits of the nine campuses from 1998 through 2000. Each site was visited for five days; a four-person team was 20 “people days” per site. Follow-up was accomplished by telephone, email, and site visits for more interviews and documents. At some community colleges, their size and faculty composition made it impossible to locate informants in all categories. People at all sites were very generous with their time.
Archives at the University of California, Berkeley were the most extensive, while those at San
José City College and Truman College were most scant.
The research design and methods abided by well-established practices to enhance quality, trustworthiness, and validity (Yin 1984; Miles and Huberman 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
The design included several types and data sources (quantifiable trend data; documents from individuals, archives, system offices, and state coordinating agencies; and interviews). Also, where possible, two researchers conducted each interviewone led with questions, and one took
15 notes—in addition to recording. We also took notes in the field and throughout the analysis, using conventional practices of cross-checking impressions among research team members.
Data Analysis Procedures
We developed a coding scheme for the verbatim transcripts and documents, guided by concepts corresponding with the study’s basic questions, core constructs, and interview protocols. Coding of transcripts was initially structured with these predetermined codes, using
NVIVO’s code-and-retrieve capability and identifying emergent themes. Degree programs were coded into eleven knowledge areas according to decision rules. Archival document coding proceeded in parallel and over later years, revealing how campuses characterized environmental pressures, what became priorities, which initiatives were pursued, and with what rationales.
Open coding was conducted in a systemic multi-stage process for “grounded theory”
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) for both interview data and documents. This iterative process allows for emergent themes that prove critical to findings. For this study, key themes of ambiguity and tensions on campuses emerged. For example, it was evident where official discourse expressed by campus administrators did not align with realities on the ground for some faculty. I examined where there was agreement as well as divergent views, especially what was worth fighting for, and where changes in “how we do business” were identified as necessary. Commentary on what must change and what must not change, as well as on what had changed and how those changes were perceived, became especially important at this phase of open coding; emotional intensity came through in the language used. Subsequent rounds of open coding also enabled me to arrive at higher-level concepts, such as the notion of “a discourse of change” and the distinction between “a logic in use” and “a logic invoked”.
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Most importantly, at a thematic level, open coding illuminated the complexity of academic legitimacy as both a historical touchstone and a dynamic force amid changes. It shed light on individual sense-making—in individuals’ beliefs about mission and values— fundamental taken-for-granteds about what a particular campus should be and do as well as about public higher education more broadly. Legitimacy is like oxygen in that we tend not to notice it unless it is challenged, diminished, lost, or gained. Incidents retold about what had been previously inconceivable or completely inappropriate indicated new parameters for legitimacy.
Since it is often said that budgets, expenditures, and revenues reveal what matters in organizations, I analyzed transcripts for comments on resources, not simply changes in state appropriations. Concerns about them were essential to my findings. This was true as well for professional imperatives (what was expected of faculty) and disciplinary imperatives (what was expected in the disciplines), including when non–tenure track instructors were hired; these signaled losses for some fields in contrast to selective investment that expanded others.
Trustworthiness and Limitations of Data Analysis
The narrative reporting style follows conventions in qualitative inquiry within education and sociology. Several techniques in case study research establish trustworthiness of the data analysis (Yin 1984; Merriam 1988; Miles and Huberman 1994). In addition to my daily involvement with and training of our researchers, five practices were foundational.
First, disclosing the identity of the case study sites enhances credibility. While gaining access is easier if one guarantees anonymity, this project took the more challenging route and negotiated with campus leaders that their college or university would be identified and specific informants would be disguised. Permission was granted post hoc for quotes that are exceptions.
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Second, multiple data sources are used. Rather than relying only upon interviews or upon archival documents, this design includes several data sources: quantitative trend data from national and campus sources; documents from campus archives, public system offices, and state coordinating agencies; and interviews with people in different organizational locations.
Third, triangulation establishes internal validity; that is, using multiple sources of evidence to either confirm or disconfirm emerging findings. This has reduced the likelihood of bias and distortion through the phases of analysis, comparing, and contrasting across case study sites.
Fourth, the data collection draws on the pooled judgment of me and my team of researchers—doctoral students and a postdoctoral research associate from Stanford’s Graduate
School of Education and Sociology Department. We conducted primary data collection activities in the field and examined catalog data. Most interviews had two of us, one asking questions while the other took notes. Coding and data analysis relied on three or more of us to establish inter-rater reliability.
Fifth, data analysis has entailed an iterative process of discerning patterns and verifying findings. This occurs through coding, pattern-matching, establishing a chronological chain of evidence, and searching for disconfirming instances and rival explanations. This minimizes the researcher bias that is inherent in qualitative inquiry.
Cumulatively, the case study design and methods for data collection, analysis, and interpretation meet the gold standard for rigorous qualitative research that seeks to understand what occurred, especially from the participants’ perspectives, with similarities and differences across academic settings.
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However, as with all research of this genre, some limitations are inherent. I designed the project to focus on the perceptions of those on the campuses, and as such did in-depth case studies of these nine campuses. (My approach contrasts with the more comprehensive and complex empirical analysis of healthcare by Scott et al 2000.) I had to limit the number of case study sites and individuals to interview. Other sites would no doubt have yielded different particulars.
My primary objective in this study was to capture the views from the campuses—what they perceived as pressures and the rationales for how they responded. I drew from relevant national data publications about the policy contexts in these metropolitan areas and states to inform the reader about the environmental pressures shaping the institutional dynamics within public higher education. Many books focus exclusively on policy, finance, and governance, while my aim here was to provide just enough contextual information.
Those studied were aware that my research team and I were from Stanford; it was a factor in what they shared. There were pros and cons to this. Some interviewees spoke freely to us as outsiders and explicitly characterized their circumstances, presuming we knew little about public higher education. For a few, our Stanford affiliation hindered rapport. All interviewees knew
(from the consent form) the research was funded by the Department of Education.
In the spirit of keeping this book richly descriptive, I have selected among events and decisions to illustrate patterns at the case study sites. I have also purposefully remained comprehensive in my depiction of the complex dynamics at these sites, in order to convey the tremendous variety of interests and views among those working within public colleges and universities. If I had done only the former, identifying general patterns, the book would have been far shorter. My hope is that doing the latter provides a portrayal that does justice to the
19 multifaceted nature of the enterprise and the nuanced story of institutional change during this defining era.
Works Cited Appendix A
Chun, M, S. Christopher, and P. Gumport. 2000. Multiculturalism and the Academic
Organization of Knowledge. In R. Mahalingam and C. McCarthy (eds.) Multicultural
Curriculum. New York and London: Routledge.
Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) 1994. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Glaser, B. and A. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Gumport, P. and S. Snydman. 2002. The Formal Organization of Knowledge. Journal of Higher
Education 73 (3): 375-408.
Gumport, P. J. 2017. Academic Collaboration: A Strategic Necessity. Unpublished document.
Stanford, CA: SIHER, Stanford University.
Merriam, S. 1988. Case Study Research in Education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Miles, M. and M. Huberman. 1984. Qualitative Data Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Scott, W. R. 2008. Institutions and Organizations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Scott, W. R., M. Ruef, P. Mendel, and C. Caronna. 2000. Institutional Change and Healthcare
Organizations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Strauss, A. and J. Corbin. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Yin, R. K. 1984. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
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Case Study Document List and Interview Protocols
Case Study Document List
We were primarily interested in the period from 1975 to the present. We were also interested in documents that illustrate changes in the departmental organization and undergraduate academic program offerings. We sought the following kinds of documents:
Campus mission/vision statements issued by the campus and by the system Inaugural, convocation and other Presidential addresses that communicate the academic mission, who is served and how, and priorities Strategic planning documents from the campus, system, and governing board Current course catalogs for the campus, including undergraduate programs Self-studies written in preparation for accreditation review Accreditation reports, including site visit summaries; and responses by the campus to the reports; interim accreditation communications and campus responses to them Any institutional “fact books” summarizing campus data Budget / State appropriations reports Enrollment reports Tuition reports Research activity and funding reports Faculty senate minutes concerning key undergraduate academic program changes and departmental reorganization Quantitative data on faculty lines and ranks by department Institutional and, if available, departmental financial data including revenues by source and expenditures by function to compare with IPEDS reports Program proposals and descriptive brochures about academic partnerships with industry Copies of or references to publications relating recent campus history and governance, including prominent media coverage
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Interview Protocols
Academic Legitimacy:
The Ascendance of Industry Logic in Public Higher Education
Standard Introduction for All Interviews:
• Introduce self and the project: “I am the director of the National Center for Postsecondary Improvement and a professor at Stanford University. I am conducting a study of academic program change in public higher education over the past twenty-five years. I would like to talk with you about your experience and perceptions of the nature and types of academic change at [campus name]. I’m interested in how campuses view a whole range of environmental pressures, and how campuses determine whether or not and in what ways they respond.” [If student, say “research assistant” and “we are”.]
• Discuss logistics: Interview will last approximately one hour, interview will be tape recorded and transcribed.
• Discuss confidentiality: Individual names will not be used, but the identity of the campus will be revealed as well as the actors' roles. General terms will be used such as “campus leader,” "senior academic administrator,” and “faculty member in X department,” the latter only if department is large enough that the individual’s identity would not be evident. Exception: You may give consent to use your name and/or identify the specific position, such as the president.
• Ask if there are any questions before beginning interview. Have informant sign Human Subjects Consent Form, after checking for understanding.
• Provide copy of 2-page project description at end of interview, if requested.
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Protocol A
For Institutional Representatives/Officials: Presidents and Chief Academic Officers
Background Information How long have you been here? What positions have you held?
General Information What are the environmental pressures and challenges this institution is currently facing? What are the environmental pressures and challenges this institution has faced over the past 25 years?
Institutional Information Given the environmental challenges discussed above, I'm curious about whether or how you monitor the external environment? (Probe for what they do, whether there have been changes in resources, student demographics, public opinions, workforce needs, governance and oversight—as they are inclined). From where do you get information? What do you do with it? As an academic leader, under what circumstances would you direct a change in the academic mission and/or priorities? Can you give specific examples that help to demonstrate this? (Probe for environmental pressures, including economy, technology, and diversity, changing needs of students, knowledge change—as they are inclined.)
Academic Programs How would you characterize your academic programs (Probe comprehensive, selective) What priorities and/or needs have changed? In what ways? Why? What do you envision about academic programs in the future? In what ways, if any, does the campus plan for academic programs? Who is involved in planning? How are those plans communicated to the community? [Get copies of planning documents the person mentions that might not be in archives.] Over time (e.g., to your knowledge, so anytime within the past 25 years), in what ways have the academic programs changed or remained the same? If there were changes, what are the factors that have shaped such changes? What were the rationales? What actors were affected by these changes? What were their roles and what were reactions to these changes? In what ways do academic program changes affect the allocation of faculty resources? When a faculty position becomes vacant, how is it handled? Who makes these choices? Using what criteria? Do these outcomes and processes vary by department? If so, how? How has the handling of faculty positions changed over time? What has been the biggest challenge in academic planning and academic management on campus in the past five years? What were the biggest challenges of ten or twenty years ago? How would you characterize the differences, if any? How have you handled them? (Probe for internal and external challenges and obstacles as well as views about mission and priorities. Listen for educational values, expectations to serve various societal needs, and whether a managerial or market logic has emerged.) How do you make decisions about allocating resources among academic programs?
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Technology How have issues around emerging computing and telecommunications technology played out on your campus? Specifically, how have these issues played out in your academic programs? Examples?
Diversity What are the ways in which multiculturalism, pluralism, and diversity have played out on your campus? Specifically, how have these issues played out in your academic programs? Examples?
Academic Partnerships What, if any, partnerships have developed between your academic programs and surrounding communities? Examples? To what would you attribute these developments?
Anything Else?
Protocol B
For Director of Institutional Research --and/or person completing IPEDS
Background Information How long have you been here? What positions have you held?
Data Collection and Management What kinds of data do you collect? For how long have you done this? What are the various data sources? After data are collected, what happens? (Probe for who has access, how disseminated.) Who asks for data from your office? What decisions are made using these data? (Probe for how data are used to inform resource allocation or academic program decisions.) In what ways, if any, do you corroborate the data you collect with other data sources? Can you tell us about your experience completing the annual IPEDS survey? What are the ways in which IPEDS data are used locally on campus? Can you discuss the feasibility of gathering unit cost data or similar initiatives to track expenditures and revenues by academic department? How about data on teaching? Are all data collection activities quantitative? Have you ever seen qualitative data collected?
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Protocol C
For Department Chair and Faculty, Adapt for Faculty Senate Chair and Deans
Key strategic point: ask faculty to speak to the unit they know best (their department or program) and then the campus more broadly.
Background Information How long have you been here? What positions have you held? What were your responsibilities?
General What are the major challenges this department has faced over the past 10-20 years, whatever period you are knowledgeable about? How would you characterize the changes in this department, especially over the past twenty to twenty-five years? What has remained the same over these years? What trends do you observe? (Probe for patterns with respect to degree programs offered and curricular emphases.) Were there any key critical incidents or turning points with regard to this department over this period? How are they accounted for? What are the most salient factors determining academic program changes? (probe for changing environment, changing management by campus administrators, and rationale, i.e. internal and external, changes in knowledge.) Probe for examples. Who is involved in decisions? What are the criteria, if any, and the rationales? In what ways do academic program changes affect allocation of faculty resources? When a faculty billet becomes vacant, how is it handled? Who makes these choices? Using what criteria? Do these outcomes and processes vary by department? If so, how? How has the handling of faculty billets changed over time? In what ways, if any, has the campus become more entrepreneurial, what are the rewards, and what has been the range of reactions?
Note: Technology and Diversity each provide a window into how they conceive of environmental contexts, whether as pressures, constraints, opportunities.
Technology What role does technology play here? (Probe for uses of technology in teaching and learning, as an area of study, and its impact on academic program management.) How did this come about? (Probe for perceptions of environmental pressures.) Who were the proponents, the detractors, and the beneficiaries of the program? What were their perspectives or concerns? What were the effects of the program or initiative? Academic Partnerships Involving Technology: To what extent has technology inspired new collaborations between your campus and other organizations? (Probe for other entities: universities, industry, community organizations, government.) How were partnerships initiated or created? Which groups on campus conveyed support? opposition? What were their perspectives or concerns? What has been the impact of these partnerships on campus?
Diversity
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What role does multiculturalism/pluralism/diversity play here? (Probe for whether or not and how multiculturalism has been incorporated in teaching and learning, as an area of study and its impact on academic programs, curricular change, teaching.) How did this come about? (Probe for perceptions of environmental pressures.) Who were the proponents, detractors, and beneficiaries of particular initiatives? What were their perspectives or concerns? For each example, what were the effects of the initiative? Academic Partnerships Involving Diversity: To what extent has multiculturalism/ pluralism/ diversity inspired new collaborations between your campus and other organizations? (Probe for other universities, industry, community organizations, government, etc.) How were these partnerships initiated or created? Which groups on campus supported these partnerships? Which groups, if any, opposed it? What were their perspectives or concerns? What has been the impact of these partnerships on campus? What is the department’s involvement with private companies/industry? How about the campus? (Probe for examples and obtain name of director or contact person for follow-up.)
Future (Focus on department and then campus at large, and proceed as time allows) What do you envision the department will look like ten years from now? The range of academic programs offered by the campus? If the campus suddenly had a 10% increase in funds, in what ways would the academic program change? (Probe for what kinds of programs would be added and why.) If the campus suffered a 10% decrease in funds, in what ways would the academic program change? (Probe for what would be cut or consolidated, and why) What about the mission? Who will be served? How will this be determined? Future needs? Any tensions?
Anything Else?
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Appendix B. Case Study Site Data Profiles Community Colleges Borough of Manhattan Community College
Background Borough of Manhattan Community College was established in 1963. It is among the Associate’s Colleges in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Associate of Arts Colleges in the 1994 Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 9,639 undergraduates, growing by 67% to 16,141 in 1997. Full-time enrollment rose from 58% in 1975 to 62% in 1997. Among all students, 64% were women in 1975, increasing to 65% in 1997. Students of color were 82% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 91% in 1997. FTE enrollment increased by 75% from 6,912 in 1975 to 12,080 in 1997.
Faculty BMCC had 359 full-time faculty in 1975, decreasing to 273 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 34% had tenure in 1975, growing to 63% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $72,061 for 1975 and $63,452 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, Borough of Manhattan awarded 1,084 associates degrees. The top five disciplinary domains awarding degrees were: business 24%, life sciences 13%, health sciences 7%, education 5% and humanities less than 1%. For 1998, 1,977 associate’s degrees were granted. In 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding degrees included business 33%, applied social sciences and professions 10%, education 8%, engineering and computer science 8%, and life sciences 7%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, increased by 25% from $80.640M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $100.801M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student shrank by 31% and has been somewhat variable, with a mean of $9,098, a standard deviation of $1,172, and a coefficient of variation of 13%. Local government appropriations per FTE student dropped by 91%, from $6,502 in 1975 to $606 in 1996. State government appropriations dropped from 35% to 28% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student also steadily decreased by 44%, from $4,335 in 1975 to $2,406 in 1996. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student soared by 4680% from $27 to $1,299. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 5.1% to 3.0% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 5.5% in 1982. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, decreased from 4% of total revenue from 1975 to 2% in 1996, and federal grants and contracts per FTE student dropped by 66% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources—from private gifts, grants, and contracts, and from the endowment—was negligible during the period, far less than 1%. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student rose by 488% from $630 in 1975 to $3,706 in 1996, and
27 for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 5% to 44%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 20%, from $80.6M in 1975 to $96.7M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 59% to 40% during the period. Instruction expenditures per FTE student also decreased, by 55%, from $7,175 in 1975 to $3,242 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, doubled from 9% of all expenditures in 1975 to 18% in 1996.
Harry S Truman College
Background Harry S Truman College was established in 1956. It is among the Associate’s Colleges in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Associate of Arts Colleges in the 1994 Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 14,667 undergraduates, growing by 9% to 16,009 in 1997. Full-time enrollment shrank from 29% in 1975 to 23% in 1997. Among all students, 57% were women in 1975, decreasing to 55% in 1997. Students of color were 48% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 69% in 1997. FTE enrollment expanded by 2%, from 7,704 in 1975 to 7,844 in 1997.
Faculty HSTC had 134 full-time faculty in 1975, decreasing to 129 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 79% had tenure in 1975, rising to 81% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $68,975 for 1975 and $62,618 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, Truman College awarded 520 degrees and certificates. Associate’s degrees accounted for 83% of the awards and certificates 17%. The top four disciplinary domains that awarded degrees were: health sciences 25%, vocational and technical studies 13%, business 4%, and engineering and computer science less than 1%. For 1998, 665 degrees and certificates were granted: 47% associate’s degrees and 53% certificates. The top five disciplinary domains awarding degrees then included interdisciplinary degrees 29%, health sciences 25%, life and physical sciences 11%, business 7%, and engineering and computer science 6%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, increased by 183% from $19.082M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1976 to $54M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student decreased by 9%, however, from $8,072 in 1976 to $7,341 in 1996. Local government appropriations per FTE student grew by 14%, from $2,262 in 1976 to $2,572 in 1996. State government appropriations dropped from 44% to 0% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student also dropped by 100%, from $3,537 in 1976 to $0 in 1996. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student soared
28 by 697% from $322 to $2,565. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 6.8% to 5.9% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 7.4% in 1984. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, decreased from 11% of total revenue from 1976 to 8% in 1996, and federal grants and contracts per FTE student dropped by 31% through the period. No revenue was raised from private sources—from private gifts, grants, and contracts, or from the endowment—during the period. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student rose by 67% from $792 in 1976 to $1,320 in 1996, and for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 10% to 18%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, which exclude Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 149%, from $22.3M in 1976 to $55.6M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 74% to 45% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student also decreased, by 51%, from $6,994 in 1976 to $3,431 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, jumped from 8% of all expenditures in 1976 to 28% in 1996.
San José City College
Background San José City College was established in 1921. It is among the Associate’s Colleges in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Associate of Arts Colleges in the 1994 Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 14,667 undergraduates, dropping by 45% to 8,052 in 1997. Full-time enrollment shrank from 29% in 1975 to 17% in 1997. Among all students, 36% were women in 1975, increasing to 51% in 1997. Students of color were 19% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 81% in 1997. FTE enrollment decreased by 53%, from 7,704 in 1975 to 3,603 in 1997.
Faculty SJCC had 235 full-time faculty in 1975, decreasing to 107 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 89% had tenure in 1975, declining to 85% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $80,367 for 1975 and $58,305 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, San José City College awarded 950 degrees and certificates. Associate’s degrees accounted for 86% of the awards and certificates 14%. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded degrees were: business 9%, vocational and technical studies 8%, life sciences 7%, engineering and computer science 6%, and health sciences 4%. For 1998, 627 degrees and certificates were granted: 51% associate’s degrees and 49% certificates. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding degrees included business 9%, education 7%, vocational and technical studies 5%, engineering and computer science 4%, and health sciences 3%.
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Revenues In 1976, San José City College reported revenues and expenditures for the HEGIS survey and their district did not. In 1996, the San José City College/Evergreen Valley College Community College District reported revenues and expenditures for the IPEDS survey, but the district institutions did not. Evergreen Valley College was established in 1975 and did not report financial data for the 1976 fiscal year. Consequently, the changes in dollar amounts and totals are not strictly attributable to San José City College, although they show change for the district. The shares and amounts per FTE student of various sources of revenue and types of expenditures can be compared, however, with the caveat that the 1976 figures represent one institution, while those for 1996 comprise both institutions of the district.
Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, decreased by 35% from $101.3M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1976 for San José City College to $65.5M in 1996 for the entire district. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student dropped by 37% from 13,155 in 1976 to 8,341 in 1996. Local government appropriations per FTE student shrank by 41%, from $6,559 in 1976 to $3,892 in 1996. State government appropriations provided a stable 25% of the total revenue during the period; however, state government appropriations per FTE student decreased by 36%, from $3,261 in 1976 to $2,096 in 1996. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student grew by 61% from $409 to $660. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 10.5% to 8.4% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 12.0% in 1980. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, decreased from 7% of total revenue from 1976 to 4% in 1996, and federal grants and contracts per FTE student dropped by 63% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources—from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment—was negligible during the period, rising from 0.0% in 1976 to 0.1% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student rose by 383% from $119 in 1976 to $575 in 1996, and for the district, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 1% to 7%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, which exclude Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, decreased by 26%, from $87.1M in 1976 for San José City College to $643M in 1996 for the district. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction grew from 38% to 47% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student decreased by 10%, however, from $4,245 in 1976 to $3,841 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non- library academic support, shrank from 34% of all expenditures in 1976 to 21% in 1996.
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Comprehensive State Universities
Chicago State University
Background Chicago State University was established in 1867. It is among the Master’s Colleges and Universities I in the 2000 and 1994 Carnegie Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 6,615, growing by 32% to 8,722 in 1997. Full-time enrollment of all students decreased from 51% in 1975 to 48% in 1997. Of the undergraduate students, 75% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 and 63% in 1997. Among all students, 59% were women in 1975, increasing to 70% in 1997. Students of color were 70% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 91% in 1997. Overall, FTE enrollment grew by 28%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment also increased, by 34% and graduate by 1%. In 1975 82% of FTE students were undergraduate and 18% graduate students. In 1997, the breakdown was 86% undergraduate and14% graduate.
Faculty CSU had 249 full-time faculty in 1975, increasing to 367 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 58% had tenure in 1975, dropping to 49% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $64,946 for 1975 and $43,742 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded For 1975, Chicago State awarded 1,275 degrees, 77% bachelor’s and 23% master’s, and no associate’s, doctorate or first-professional degrees. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded bachelor’s degrees were: education 58%, humanities 10%, social sciences 8%, business 7%, and vocational/technical studies 1%. For 1998, 1,212 degrees were granted. Bachelor’s degrees decreased to 69% of the total and master’s degrees grew to 31%. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees included social sciences 14%, business 14%, education 13%, life sciences 13% and vocational/technical studies 7%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, which exclude Pell grants, grew 13% from $66.660M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $75.529M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student decreased by 15% and has been somewhat variable, with a mean of $13,167, a standard deviation of $2,059, and a coefficient of variation of 16%. State government appropriations declined from 61% to 54% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student also decreased by 25% from $9,063 in 1975 to $6,811 in 1996, peaking at $10,753 in 1990. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student grew by 20% from $252 to $302. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 6.8% to 5.9% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 7.4% in 1984. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, provided a stable 9% of total revenue from 1975 to 1996, but federal grants and contracts per FTE student decreased by 21% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment barely increased, from less than 1% of all revenue in 1975, to
31 slightly more than 1% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student increased 10% from $2,953 in 1975 to $3,248 in 1996, and for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 20% to 26%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 9%, from $70.2M in 1975 to $76.4M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction increased from 41% to 44% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student decreased by 11%, from $6,342 in 1975 to $5,614 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, declined from 18% of all expenditures in 1975 to 17% in 1996.
City College of New York
Background City College was established in 1847. It is among the Master’s Colleges and Universities I in the 2000 and 1994 Carnegie Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 20,388, shrinking by 41% to 12,083 in 1997. Full-time enrollment of all students decreased from 66% in 1975 to 53% in 1997. Of the undergraduate students, 73% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 and 67% in 1997. Among all students, 41% were women in 1975, increasing to 54% in 1997. Students of color were 63% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 89% in 1997. Overall FTE enrollment dropped by 47%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment decreased 52%, but graduate student enrollment increased by 22%. In 1975 95% of FTE students were undergraduate and 6% graduate students. In 1997, the breakdown was 85% undergraduate and 15% graduate.
Faculty CCNY had 849 full-time faculty in 1975, decreasing to 474 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 56% had tenure in 1975, growing to 82% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $88,608 for 1975 and $75,808 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, City College awarded 3,526 degrees and certificates, 69% bachelor’s and 28% master’s, 2% first-professional degrees (although they report no first-professional students enrolled) and 1% certificates. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded bachelor’s degrees were: humanities 30%, social sciences 21%, engineering and computer science 17%, education 13%, and life sciences 10%. For 1998, 2,105 degrees and certificates were granted. Bachelor’s degrees decreased to 60% of the total, master’s degrees grew to 38% and certificates 2%. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees included social sciences 21%, engineering and computer science 20%, humanities 17%, education 13%, and life sciences 9%.
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Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, decreased by 36% from $228.2M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $146.2M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student increased by 3% and has been among the most stable of the cases for these years, with a mean of $16,102, a standard deviation of $1,564, and a coefficient of variation of 10%. State government appropriations grew from 39% to 55% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student increased by 46% from $5,703 in 1975 to $8,299 in 1996, peaking at $14,410 in 1990. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student grew by 792% from $119 to $1,066. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 5.1% to 3.0% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 5.5% in 1982. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, decreased from 5% of total revenue from 1975 to 1% in 1996, and federal grants and contracts per FTE student dropped by 85% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment increased from 1% of all revenue in 1975, to more than 3% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student increased by 182% from $1,663 in 1975 to $4,695 in 1996, and for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 11% to 31%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, declined by 38%, from $226.6M in 1975 to $140.208M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 60% to 56% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student also decreased, by 6%, from $8,604 in 1975 to $8,046 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, declined from 16% of all expenditures in 1975 to 13% in 1996.
San José State University
Background San José State University was established in 1857. It is among the Master’s Colleges and Universities I in the 2000 and 1994 Carnegie Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 31,783, declining by 15% to 26,897 in 1997. Full-time enrollment of all students increased from 48% in 1975 to 64% in 1997. Of the undergraduate students, 64% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 and 70% in 1997. Among all students, 49% were women in 1975, increasing to 54% in 1997. Students of color were 27% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 63% in 1997. Overall FTE enrollment declined by 2%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment increased by 2% and FTE graduate student enrollment decreased by 17%. In 1975 79% of FTE students were undergraduate and 21% graduate students. In 1997, the breakdown was 83% undergraduate and 17% graduate.
Faculty SJSU had 900 full-time faculty in 1975, decreasing to 769 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 71% had tenure in 1975, growing to 76% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $73,741 for 1975 and $68,370 in 1998.
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Degrees Awarded During 1975, San José State awarded 5,343 degrees, 78% bachelor’s and 22% master’s degrees. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded bachelor’s degrees were: humanities 19%, social sciences 18%, business 18%, life sciences 11%, and education 7%. For 1998, 5,302 degrees were granted. Bachelor’s degrees decreased to 76% of the total and master’s degrees grew to 24%. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees included business 23%, life sciences 16%, engineering and computer science 15%, humanities 12%, and social sciences 11%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, increased by 16% from $210.6M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $243.5M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student rose by 23% but has been somewhat variable, with a mean of $13,249, a standard deviation of $1,915, and a coefficient of variation of 14%. State government appropriations dropped from 69% to 50% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student decreased by 10% from $6,978 in 1975 to $6,277 in 1996, peaking at $10,535 in 1989. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student soared by 1192% from $46 to $622. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 10.5% to 8.4% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 12.0% in 1980. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, decreased from 4% of total revenue from 1975 to 1% in 1996, and federal grants and contracts per FTE student dropped by 71% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment declined from 2% of all revenue in 1975, to less than 1% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student rose by 229% from $1,147 in 1975 to $3,773 in 1996, and for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 11% to 30%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 10%, from $206.3M in 1975 to $227.7M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 59% to 51% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student also decreased, by 2%, from $5,786 in 1975 to $5,906 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, doubled from 10% of all expenditures in 1975 to 20% in 1996.
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Research Universities
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Background State University of New York at Stony Brook was established in 1957. It is among the Doctoral/Research Universities Extensive in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Research Universities I in the 1994 Classification. By 2000, the university referred to itself in campus publications and the website as Stony Brook University.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 16,110, increasing by 11% to 17,831 in 1997. Full-time enrollment of all students increased from 71% in 1975 to 77% in 1997. Of undergraduate students, 90% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 and 89% in 1997. Among all students, 48% were women in 1975, increasing to 53% in 1997. Students of color were 13% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 43% in 1997. Overall FTE enrollment grew 16%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment increased by 12%, graduate by 18% and first-professional degree 175%. In 1975 75% of FTE students were undergraduate, 23% graduate and 2% first- professional degree students. In 1997, the breakdown was 72% undergraduate, 24% graduate, and 4% first-professional.
Faculty, Stony Brook had 803 full-time faculty in 1975, declining to 768 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 56% had tenure in 1975, rising to 64% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $86,357 for 1975 and $71,982 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, Stony Brook awarded 3,245 degrees and certificates, 58% bachelor’s, 37% master’s, 3% doctorates, and 1% first-professional degrees. The top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees were: social sciences 30%, humanities 25%, life sciences 20%, education 11%, physical sciences 4%, and engineering and computer science 4%. For 1998, 3,870 degrees and were granted. Bachelor’s degrees decreased to 58% of the total, master’s degrees also declined to 28%, while doctorates more than doubled, to 7%, and first-professional degrees increased to 3% of all degrees granted. The remaining 4% were certificates. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees included social sciences granting 34%, life sciences 20%, humanities 18%, engineering and computer science 8%, and business 5%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, grew 236% from $281M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $944.2M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student increased by 177% and has been highly variable over these years, with a mean of $45,333, a standard deviation of $13,795, and a coefficient of variation of 30%. State government appropriations declined from 64% to 32% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student increased, however, by 40% from $14,759 in 1975 to $20,635 in 1996, peaking at $26,970 in 1988. For the same period, state government grants
35 and contracts per FTE student grew rapidly, 276%, from $264 to $995. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 5.1% to 3.0% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 5.5% in 1982. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, constituted a steady 11% of total revenue for both 1975 and 1996, but federal grants and contracts per FTE student increased by 168% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment provided 4% of all revenue in 1975, but only 3% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student increased 62% from $3,315 in 1975 to $5,377 in 1996, but for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees decreased from 14% to 8%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 207%, from $295.1M in 1975 to $907.1M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 38% to 17% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student increased by 17%, however, from $9,160 in 1975 to $10,703 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, declined from 8% of all expenditures in 1975 to 7% in 1996.
Research and Development Expenditures Total research and development expenditures, adjusted for inflation, were $33.3M in 1972 and $162.6M in 1999. In 1972, the federal government financed 88% of the total, state and local sources 2%, industry 1%, Stony Brook 0%, and 10% was paid by other sources. In 1999 the federal government share was down to 63%, state and local steady at 2%, but industry was up to 5%, Stony Brook now at 26% and other sources 4%. Stony Brook University ranked 77th among all higher education institutions in federal research and development expenditures in 1972, but rose to 47th in 1988, and 61st in 1999.
University of California, Berkeley
Background The University of California, Berkeley was established in 1868. It is among the Doctoral/Research Universities Extensive in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Research Universities I in the 1994 Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 34,809, declining by 13% to 30,290 in 1997. Full-time enrollment of all students increased from 80% in 1975 to 91% in 1997. Of the undergraduate students, 78% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 and 93% in 1997. Among all students, 39% were women in 1975, increasing to 48% in 1997. Students of color were 27% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 60% in 1997. Overall FTE enrollment dropped by 6%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment decreased by 1% and graduate by 19%, but first-professional degree enrollment increased by 10%. In 1975 70% of FTE students were undergraduate, 26% graduate and 4% first-professional degree students. In 1997, the breakdown was 72% undergraduate, 24% graduate, and 4% first-professional.
36
Faculty UCB had 1,521 full-time faculty in 1975, declining to 1,334 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 72% had tenure in 1975, rising to 74% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $81,412 for 1975 and $87,000 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, Berkeley awarded 9,171 degrees and certificates, 62% bachelor’s, 23% master’s, 9% doctorates, and 4% first-professional degrees. Certificates made up the remaining 3% of awards. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded bachelor’s degrees were: social sciences 31%, humanities 28%, life sciences 15%, engineering and computer science 9%, and business 7%. For 1998, 8,283 degrees and certificates were granted and none of them were associate’s degrees. Bachelor’s degrees increased to 65% of the total, master’s degrees declined to 20%, while doctorates increased to 9% and first-professional degrees increased to 4% of all degrees granted. The remaining 1% were certificates. Of degrees in 1998, the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees included social sciences, granting 25%, humanities 20%, life sciences 15%, engineering and computer science 13%, and business 5%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants, grew 5% from $1,073.7M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $1,124.8M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student, which grew by 15%, has been among the most stable of all the cases over these years, with a mean of $36,008, a standard deviation of $3,449, and a coefficient of variation of 10%. State government appropriations declined from 36% to 32% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student decreased by less than 1% from $12,818 in 1975 to $12,756 in 1996, peaking at $19,636 in 1989. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student grew rapidly, 511%, from $277 to $1,694. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 10.5% to 8.4% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 12.0% in 1980. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, declined somewhat, from 21% to 19% of total revenue from 1975 to 1996, but federal grants and contracts per FTE student increased by 7% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment increased strongly, from 3% of all revenue in 1975, to 12% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student increased 133%, from $3,606 in 1975 to $8,419 in 1996, and for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased from 10% to 21%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 6%, from $1,054.4M in 1975 to $1,119.1M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction increased from 27% to 28% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student also increased, by 22% from $9,180 in 1975 to $11,188 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, rose from 7% of all expenditures in 1975 to 13% in 1996.
Research and Development Expenditures Total research and development expenditures, adjusted for inflation, were $213.8M in 1972 and $492.9M in 1999. In 1972, the federal government financed 76% of the total, state and local
37 sources 1%, industry 1%, UCB 19%, and 2% was paid by other sources. In 1999 the federal government share was down to 42%, but state and local increased to 11%, industry was up to 5%, UCB rose to 33%, and other sources to 9%. The University of California, Berkeley ranked 10th among all higher education institutions in federal research and development expenditures in 1972, but fell to 22nd in 1999.
University of Illinois at Chicago
Background The University of Illinois at Chicago was established in 1896. It is among the Doctoral/Research Universities Extensive in the 2000 Carnegie Classification and Research Universities I in the 1994 Classification.
Enrollment In 1975, total opening fall headcount enrollment was 25,647, decreasing by 3% to 24,921 in 1997. Eighty-one percent (81%) of all students were enrolled full-time during 1975 and 77% were full-time in 1997. Of undergraduate students, 86% were enrolled full-time in the fall of 1975 with the same proportion in 1997. Among all students, 42% were women in 1976, increasing to 54% in 1997. Students of color were 28% of all enrolled students in 1976 and 50% in 1997. Overall FTE enrollment shrank by 5%. Undergraduate FTE enrollment declined by 20%, but the loss was stabilized by increases in graduate (97%) and first-professional degree (27%) enrollments. In 1975 83% of FTE students were undergraduate, 10% graduate and 8% first-professional degree students. In 1997, the breakdown was 70% undergraduate, 20% graduate, and 10% first-professional.
Faculty UIC had 1,111 full-time faculty in 1975, declining to 1,087 in 1998. Of these full-time faculty, 52% had tenure in 1975, rising to 70% in 1998. The average full-time faculty member’s salary (in 2001 HEPI adjusted dollars) was $67,185 for 1975 and $72,619 in 1998.
Degrees Awarded During 1975, UIC awarded 4,327 degrees, with less than 1% of them associate’s, 77% bachelor’s, 13% master’s, 2% doctorates, and 8% first-professional degrees. The top five disciplinary domains that awarded bachelor’s degrees were: humanities 22%, social sciences 21%, life sciences 17%, business 15%, and engineering and computer science 9%. For 1998, 5,243 degrees were granted. Bachelor’s degrees decreased to 57% of the total, master’s degrees more than doubled to 29%, doctorates doubled to 4% and first-professional degrees increased to 10% of all degrees granted. Of degrees in 1998,the top five disciplinary domains awarding bachelor’s degrees changed, with life sciences granting 20%, social sciences 17%, humanities 16%, business constant at 15%, and engineering and computer science 13%.
Revenues Adjusted total current funds revenues, which exclude Pell grants, grew 74% from $642.4M (all dollars are 2001 HEPI adjusted millions) in 1975 to $1,115.2M in 1996. Total adjusted revenue per FTE student increased by 80%, but has been somewhat variable over these years, with a mean of $42,098, a standard deviation of $7195, and a coefficient of variation of 17%. State
38 government appropriations declined from 54% to 31% of the total during the period. State government appropriations per FTE student increased by over 2%, from $16,137 in 1975 to $16,381 in 1996, peaking at $19,760 in 1990. For the same period, state government grants and contracts per FTE student grew rapidly, by 539%, from $161 to $1,026. From 1978 through 1998, the state decreased appropriations for higher education from 6.8% to 5.9% of tax revenue. The appropriation peaked at 7.4% in 1984. Federal grants and contracts, excluding Pell grants, constituted a steady 11% of total revenue for both 1975 and 1996, but federal grants and contracts per FTE student increased by 84% through the period. Revenue raised from private sources, from private gifts, grants and contracts, and from the endowment provided less than 2% of all revenue in 1975, but over 3% in 1996. Revenue from tuition and fees per FTE student increased 125%, from $2,308 in 1975 to $5205 in 1996, but for the institution, the proportion of total adjusted revenue provided by tuition and fees increased only from 8% to 10%.
Expenditures Total adjusted expenditures, excluding Pell grants and non-mandatory transfers, increased by 72%, from $635.9M in 1975 to $1,094.5M in 1996. The proportion of total adjusted expenditures given to instruction declined from 37% to 28% during the period. The amount of instruction expenditures per FTE student increased by 32%, however, from $10,969 in 1975 to $14,525 in 1996. Expenditures for administration, or institutional and non-library academic support, were fairly constant, just over 7% of all expenditures in 1975 and just under 7% in 1996, but they swelled to 20% of total expenditures in 1980.
Research and Development Expenditures Total research and development expenditures, adjusted for inflation, were $39.2M in 1972 and $191.1M in 1999. In 1972, the federal government financed 67% of the total, state and local sources 19%, industry 2%, UIC 6%, and 6% was paid by other sources. In 1999 the federal government share was down to 49%, state and local 3%, but industry was up to 6%, UIC 34%,0 and other sources 8%. UIC ranked 86th among all higher education institutions in federal research and development expenditures in 1972, but rose to 55th in 1999.
39
Appendix C. Degrees & Certificates Awarded by Knowledge Area: Case Study Sites by Sector
Degrees and Certificates Awarded by Knowledge Area: Research Universities
Applied Social SUNY UIC UCB Sciences & 10,000 Professions Biological Sciences
9,000 Business
8,000 Education
Engineering, 7,000 Computer Science & Math Health Sciences 6,000 Humanities 5,000 Interdisciplinary 4,000 Physical Sciences
3,000 Social Sciences
2,000 Vocational/Technical
Other 1,000
0 1977 1987 1997 1977 1987 1997 1977 1987 1997
40
Degrees & Certificates Awarded by Knowledge Area: Comprehensive State Universities
Applied Social CCNY CSU SJSU Sciences & 6,000 Professions Biological Sciences 5,500 Business 5,000 Education 4,500 Engineering, Computer Science & 4,000 Math Health Sciences 3,500 Humanities 3,000 Interdisciplinary 2,500 Physical Sciences 2,000 Social Sciences 1,500 Vocational/Technical 1,000 Other 500
0 1977 1987 1997 1977 1987 1997 1977 1987 1997
41
Degrees & Certificates Awarded by Knowledge Area: Community Colleges
Applied Social BMCC HSTC SJCC Sciences & 2,200 Professions Biological & Physical Sciences 2,000 Business 1,800 Education 1,600 Engineering, Computer Science & 1,400 Math Health Sciences 1,200 Humanities 1,000 Interdisciplinary 800 Social Sciences 600 Vocational/Technical 400 Other 200
0 1977 1987 1997 1975 1998 1977 1987 1997
42
Appendix D. Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: Case Study Sites Source: Catalogs; College Blue Book
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: University of California Berkeley
160 1969 1977 1987 1999
140 Applied Social Science Biological 120 Sciences Business
100 Communications
Education 80 Eng./C.S./Math
60 Health Sciences Humanities
40 Interdisciplinary
20
0 BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD
43
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: University of Illinois at Chicago
90 1969 1977 1987 1999
80 Applied Social Science 70 Biological Sciences Business 60 Communications
50 Education Eng./C.S./Math 40 Health Sciences Humanities 30 Interdisciplinary 20 Physical Sciences
10
0 BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD
44
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: State University of New York at Stony Brook
80 1969 1977 1987 1999
70 Applied Social Science 60 Biological Sciences Business
50 Communications
Education 40 Eng./C.S./Math
30 Health Sciences
Humanities 20 Interdisciplinary
10
0 BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD BA MA PhD
45
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: Chicago State University
45 1969 1977 1987 1999
40 Applied Social Science 35 Biological Sciences
Business 30 Communications
25 Education
20 Eng./C.S./Math Health Sciences 15 Humanities
10 Interdisciplinary
5
0 BA MA BA MA BA MA BA MA
46
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: City College of New York (CCNY)
80 1969 1977 1987 1999
70 Applied Social Science Biological Sciences 60 Business
50 Communications
Education 40 Eng./C.S./Math
30 Health Sciences Humanities 20 Interdisciplinary
10
0 BA MA BA MA BA MA BA MA
47
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: San José State University
80 1969 1977 1987 1999
70 Applied Social Science Biological Sciences 60 Business
50 Communications
Education 40 Eng./C.S./Math
30 Health Sciences Humanities 20 Interdisciplinary
10
0 BA MA BA MA BA MA BA MA
48
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: Borough of Manhattan Community College
25
Applied Social 20 Science Biological Sciences Business
15 Communications Education
Eng./C.S./Math
10 Health Sciences
Humanities
5 Interdisciplinary
0 Cert AA Cert AA Cert AA Cert AA 1969 1977 1987 1999
49
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: San José City College
40 1969 1977 1987 1999
35 Applied Social Science Biological 30 Sciences Business
25 Communications
Education 20 Eng./C.S./Math
15 Health Sciences Humanities 10 Interdisciplinary
5
0 Certificate AA Certificate AA
50
Number of Degree Programs Offered by Knowledge Area and Degree Level: Harry S Truman College
40 1969 1977 1987 1999
35 Applied Social Science Biological Sciences 30 Business
25 Communications
Education 20 Eng./C.S./Math
15 Health Sciences Humanities 10 Interdisciplinary
5
0 Certificate AA Certificate AA
51
Appendix E. Primary Sources Cited by Case Study Site
In addition to primary source documents for each case study (below in chronological order, catalogs first), the following sources were used for financial, enrollment, degree, and academic program data: National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS); its predecessor the Higher Education General Information
Survey (HEGIS); Digest of Educational Statistics; the National Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering Indicators, and The College Blue Book (13th, 16th, 21st, and 27th editions) New
York: Macmillan.
Borough of Manhattan Community College
Borough of Manhattan Community College of the City University of New York. 1976-77.
Catalog. New York.
Borough of Manhattan Community College of the City University of New York. 1987-89, 1996-
98. College Bulletins. New York.
Kibbee, Robert J. 1971. The Chancellor’s Budget Request for 1972-73. CUNY, New York.
Board of Higher Education. 1972. Master Plan for the City University of New York. CUNY, New
York.
Master Plan Steering Committee. 1972. Master Plan: 1972. BMCC, New York.
Borough of Manhattan Community College. 1977-1979. Catalog. BMCC, New York.
Borough of Manhattan Community College 1978. City University of New York Responses to
Comments Contained in the Report of the Evaluation Team Visit. CUNY, New York.
[RESP]
52
Self-Study Committee on Administration. 1978. Middle States Self-Study Committee on
Administration. BMCC, New York. [COA]
Self-Study Committee on Curriculum and Instruction. 1978. Middle States Self-Study Committee
on Curriculum and Instruction. BMCC, New York. [CCI]
Self-Study Committee on Planning and Priorities. 1978. Middle States Self-Study Committee on
Planning and Priorities. BMCC, New York. [CPP]
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1987. Middle States Accrediting Association Self-Study. BMCC,
New York.
City University of New York Five-Year Plan Steering Committee. 1989. Five-Year Plan 1990-
91 to 1994-95. CUNY, New York.
Cohn, Jules. 1989. Letter to Augusta Kappner re: draft version of Final Report of Planning
Committee. BMCC, New York.
Liberal Arts Planning Committee. 1989. Final Report. [Folder 15]. BMCC, New York. [Liberal
Arts]
Office of Institutional Research and Office of Academic Affairs. 1991. Fact Book 1991-1992.
BMCC, New York.
Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Academic Program Planning. 1992. The Chancellor’s
Advisory Committee on Academic Program Planning. CUNY, New York. [Goldstein
Report].
Curtis, Stephen M. 1993. Memo to Chairpersons on the Report of the Chancellor’s Advisory
Committee on Academic Program Planning. BMCC, New York.
Reynolds, W. Ann. 1993. An Open Letter to the University Community re: Academic Program
Planning. CUNY, New York.
53
Borough of Manhattan Community College. 1996-98. Bulletin. BMCC, New York.
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1997. Self-Study. BMCC, New York.
Perez, Antonio. 1998. Inspired by the Mission. [Remarks at Opening Faculty Day.] BMCC, New
York.
Perez, Antonio. 2001. Chronicle of Higher Education’s Colloquy [10/1/01].
https://www.chronicle.com/.
Professional Staff Congress of the City University of New York. 2002. The Clarion. CUNY,
New York. [PSC-CUNY]
Chicago State University
Chicago State University. 1977-79, 1987-89, 1997-99. Undergraduate, Graduate, and
Professional Academic Catalogs. Chicago.
Academy for Educational Development, Inc. Management Divison. 1979. Implementation Plan
for the Administrative Reorganization of Chicago State University. AED, Washington
D.C.
Alexander, Benjamin H. 1981. President’s Report. CSU, Chicago.
Chicago State University. 1981. Planning Statements, Program Reviews, New and Expanded
Program Requests. CSU, Chicago.
Chicago State University Steering Committee for NCA Accreditation and Self-Study. 1982. Self-
Study Report. CSU, Chicago.
Cross, Dolores E. 1990. A Plan for Action: Where We Are and Where We Are Going. CSU,
Chicago.
Chicago State University. 1993. Self-Study Report. CSU, Chicago.
54
Chicago State University. 1994. FY 1994 Productivity Report. CSU, Chicago.
Cross, Dolores E. 1995. [Speech delivered at a campus assembly]. CSU, Chicago.
Hetzner, Amy. 1999. School raising bar for admissions standards. Daily Southtown [July 9].
http://www.dailysouthtown.com/index/dsindex.html.
Chicago State University. 2002. Self-Study Report. CSU, Chicago.
City College of New York
City College of New York. 1977-78, 1987-88, 1997-98. Undergraduate and Graduate Bulletins.
CCNY, New York.
Marshak, R. 1972. Problems and Prospects of an Urban Public University. CCNY, New York.
Middle States Evaluation Team. 1976. Report to the Faculty, Administration, Trustees, Students
of The City College of New York by An Evaluation Team Representing the Commission
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. MSACS,
Philadelphia.
City College of New York. 1981. Periodic Review Report. CCNY, New York.
Middle States Evaluation Team. 1986. Report to the Faculty, Administration, Trustees, Students
of The City College of New York by An Evaluation Team Representing the Commission
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. MSACS,
Philadelphia.
Middle States Steering Committee. 1986. A Closer Look: An Institution Reviews Itself – The City
College of the City University of New York – Self-Study: 1986. CCNY, New York.
Harleston, Bernard W. 1987. The Legacy Affirmed: A Report from the President. CCNY, New
York.
55
Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Academic Program Planning. 1992. Chancellor’s Report
to the Board of Trustees on Academic Program Planning. CUNY, New York. [APP]
City College of New York Review Committee. 1992. Periodic Review Report Presented by: The
City College of New York, CUNY. CCNY, New York.
City College of New York Faculty Senate. 1993. Response of the Faculty Senate of the City
College to the Report of the Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Academic Program
Planning. CCNY, New York.
City University of New York, Board of Trustees. 1993. Resolution on Academic Program
Planning [June 7]. CUNY, New York.
DeCicco, Charles. 1997. Sesquicentennial. CCNY, New York.
Educational Technology Task Force. 1997. Educational Technology at City College. CCNY,
New York.
Moses, Yolanda. 1998. The Year in Review, 1997-1998. CCNY, New York.
Middle States Self-Study Steering Committee. 1998. Self-Study Report. CCNY, New York.
Middle States Evaluation Team. 1998. Report to the Faculty, Administration, Trustees, Students
of The City College of New York by An Evaluation Team Representing the Commission
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. MSACS,
Philadelphia.
The Mayor’s Advisory Task Force on the City University of New York. 1999. The City
University of New York: An Institution Adrift. City of New York, New York.
City College of New York Office of Institutional Research. 2003. City Facts 2003-2004. CCNY,
New York.
56
San Jose City College
San Jose City College. 1976-77, 1986-87, 1996-97. Catalogs. San Jose, CA.
San Jose City College. n.d. History. http://www.sjcc.edu/ADMIN/Default.htm [Accessed March
2, 2003].
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1975. Report of the Accreditation Visit to San Jose City College,
November 17-19, 1970. Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Santa Rosa, CA.
[WASC Accredit Team]
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1980. Report of the Visiting Evaluation Team of the Accreditation
Commission for Community and Junior Colleges. Western Association of Schools and
Colleges, Santa Rosa, CA. [WASC Eval Team]
Goff, R.W. 1986. Report of the Institutional Self-Study for Reaffirmation of Accreditation. SJCC,
San Jose, CA.
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1986. Report of the Visiting Evaluation Team of the Accreditation
Commission for Community and Junior Colleges. Western Association of Schools and
Colleges, Santa Rosa, CA. [WASC Eval Team]
San Jose City College. 1992. Report of the Institutional Self-Study for Reaffirmation of
Accreditation. [Self-Study]. SJCC, San Jose, CA.
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1992. Evaluation Report of the Accreditation Commission for
Community and Junior Colleges. Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Santa
Rosa, CA. [WASC Eval Team]
Accreditation Steering Committee. 1998. Report of the Institutional Self-Study for Reaffirmation
of Accreditation. SJCC, San Jose, CA. [Self-Study]
Gobalet, Jeanne. 1999. Interim Report to the Accrediting Commission. SJCC, San Jose, CA.
57
Visiting Evaluation Team. 2016. External Evaluation Report of the Accreditation Commission
for Community and Junior Colleges [SJCC]. Western Association of Schools and Colleges,
Alameda, CA.
San Jose State University
San Jose State University. 1977, 1986, 1997. Undergraduate Bulletins. San Jose, CA.
San Jose State University. 1977, 1986, 1997. Graduate Bulletins. San Jose, CA.
San Jose State University. 1978. Fifth Year Accreditation Report to the Western Association of
Schools and Colleges. SJSU, San Jose, CA.
Fullerton, Gail. 1979. Inaugural Speech. SJSU, San Jose, CA.
Fullerton, Gail. 1987. Address to Faculty and Administration. SJSU, San Jose, CA.
San Jose State University Academic Senate. 1993. Curricular Priorities; Academic Priorities.
SJSU, San Jose, CA.
San Jose State University Academic Senate 1995. Academic Priorities Planning Process Memo.
SJSU, San Jose, CA.
Broad, M.C. et al. 1998. Cornerstones: Choosing Our Future. CSU, Long Beach, CA.
http://www.calstate.edu/cornerstones/reports/cornerstones_report/index.html.
Caret, Robert L. 1998. A Four Year Review. [Annual faculty and staff address]. SJSU, San Jose,
CA.
The California State University. 1999. Cornerstones Implementation Plan. Long Beach, CA.
San Jose State University Academic Senate. 2003. Policy Recommendation: Library Policy for
San Jose State University. [#S03-5, passed April 21]. SJSU, San Jose, CA.
58
Kawakami, A. and B. Dudley. 2014. San Jose State University Library Self-Study 2008-2013
External Audit Report. SJSU, San Jose, CA.
State University of New York, Stony Brook:
State University of New York–Stony Brook. 1976, 1986, 1996. Graduate Bulletin. Stony Brook,
NY.
State University of New York–Stony Brook. 1977, 1986, 1997. Undergraduate Bulletin. Stony
Brook, NY.
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1973. Stony Brook in Transition – A Report on the Self-Study of
the SUNY @ SB. SUNY, Stony Brook, NY.
Middle States Association Evaluation Team. 1973. Report to the Faculty, Administration,
Trustees of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. MSA, Philadelphia.
Office of the President, Stony Brook. 1975. Letter to Ms. Dorothy P. Heindel, Middle States
Association [November 14]. SUNY, Stony Brook, NY.
Middle States Association Evaluation Team. 1984. Report to the Faculty, Administration,
Trustees of the State University of New York at Stony Brook. MSA, Philadelphia.
Kenny, Shirley Dtrum. 1998. State of the University Address [Presidential address]. SUNY,
Stony Brook, NY.
Richmond, Rollin. 1998. The Entrepreneurial University [Speech]. Kyung Lee University
Executive Vice President’s Conference Provost’s Address. SUNY, Stony Brook, NY.
Stony Brook University. 1999. Something’s Brewing on Long Island: Economic Impact Report.
Center for Regional Policy Studies. SUNY, Stony Brook. NY.
59
University Senate Committee on Academic Planning and Resource Allocation. 1999. Annual
Report 1998-99. SUNY, Stony Brook, NY.
Arnoff, M. 2001. Chair Undergraduate Administration Task Force. Recommendation and Report
to the President. SUNY, Stony Brook, NY.
Stony Brook University Strategic Partnership for Industrial Resurgence. n.d.
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/spir/ [Accessed May 6, 2017]. SUNY Stony
Brook, NY.
Stony Brook University Office of Brookhaven National Laboratory Affairs. n.d.
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/bnl/index.html [Accessed Nov. 29, 2015]. SUNY,
Stony Brook, NY.
Harry S Truman College
City Colleges of Chicago. 1976-77, 1986-87, 1996-97. Academic Catalogs. Listings for each
college including Harry S Truman College. Chicago.
Mayfair College. 1972. 1971-72 Annual Report. Mayfair College, Chicago.
Mayfair College. 1973. Annual Report 1972-73. Mayfair College, Chicago.
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1977. Institutional Self-Study. Truman College, Chicago.
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1982. Report of a Visit to Harry S. Truman College. North Central
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Philadelphia. [NCA]
Appelson, Wallace B. 1989. Annual Report 1988-1989. Truman College, Chicago.
Truman College. 1989. Annual Report and College Plan Implementation 1988-89. Truman
College, Chicago.
Appelson, Wallace B. 1990. Annual Report 1989-1990. Truman College, Chicago.
60
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1990. Self-Study Report. Truman College, Chicago.
Appelson, Wallace B. 1992. Annual Report 1991-1992. Truman College, Chicago.
Visiting Evaluation Team. 1993. Report of a Focused Visit to Harry S Truman College. North
Central Association of Schools and Colleges, Philadelphia. [NCA]
Hastings, Janel. 1999. Truman College Technology Plan. Truman College, Chicago.
Self-Study Steering Committee. 1999. Self-Study Report. Truman College, Chicago.
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Berkeley. 1977, 1987, 1997. General Catalog. Berkeley, CA.
Gilman, D. 1872. Inaugural Address [Nov. 7]. UC, Oakland, CA.
University of California Berkeley Academic Plan Steering Committee. 1969. Revised Academic
Plan 1969-1975. UCB, Berkeley. [ACAD PLAN]
University of California Berkeley. 1969. Progress Report, 1964-1969, to the Commission for
Senior Colleges and Universities of the Western Association of Schools and Colleges.
UCB, Berkeley. [REPORT]
Western Association of Schools and Colleges Evaluation Team of the Accrediting Commission
for Senior Colleges and Universities. 1969. Report of the Visit to the University of
California, Berkeley, November 3-5, 1969. WASC, Oakland.
NADI. 1998. Open Letter. [October]. UCB, Berkeley.
Spear, R. 1998. Academic Senate Minutes [November 23]. Berkeley Division of the Academic
Senate, UCB, Berkeley.
Office of Planning and Analysis. 1998-2014. Cal Profiles. http://opa.berkeley.edu/cal-
profilesprofiles-plus-archived-data. UCB, Berkeley.
61
Christ, Carol, Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost. 1999. The Research University in the 21st
Century [Speech]. UCB, Berkeley.
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and University of Illinois at Chicago
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. 1977. Graduate Study. Chicago.
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. 1977. Undergraduate Study. Chicago.
University of Illinois at Chicago. 1986, 1996. Graduate Study. Chicago.
University of Illinois at Chicago. 1987, 1997. Undergraduate Catalog. Chicago.
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. 1975. The Second Decade. UICC, Chicago.
Academic Affairs Office. 1979. UICC Planning and Development for the 1980’s. UICC,
Chicago.
Strategic Planning Committee. 1987. A Look to the Future: Strategic Plans for UIC. UIC,
Chicago.
Johnson, Johnson & Roy, Inc. 1991. Master Plan Technical Report – University of Illinois at
Chicago. JJ&R, Ann Arbor, MI.
Quem, Arthur F. Chairman of the Illinois Board of Higher Education. 1991. Letter to presidents
and chancellors of Illinois colleges and universities [October 1]. IBHE, Springfield, IL.
Illinois Board of Higher Education.1992. Guidelines for Productivity Improvement in Illinois
Higher Education. IBHE, Springfield, IL.
Standing Campus Priorities Committee. 1993. Preparing UIC for the 21st Century. UIC,
Chicago.
University of Illinois Chicago. 1997. A report to the North Central Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools Evaluation Team [Institutional Self-Study Report]. UIC, Chicago.
62
University of Illinois. 1997. At Your Service 1997. UI, Urbana, IL.
63
Appendix F. State Policy and Oversight Contexts
California
State Oversight Structures in California
In California statewide coordination has been notoriously weak. In 1974, statewide coordination was legislatively delegated to the California Postsecondary Education Commission
(CPEC), an advisory board with the authority to establish a statewide database, review institutional budgets, advise on the need for and locations of new campuses, and review academic programs. Because this legislation really has no teeth, CPEC has mostly just produced reports for the edification of policymakers, which have largely been ignored. Legislators see
CPEC as captive to the campuses, which have little interest in outside coordination. To allay these problems, the California Higher Education Policy Center has murged a stronger coordinating or governing board in California to increase system responsiveness and coordination (Bowen et al. 1997; Healy 1997a). Negligible coordination occurs through the
California Education Round Table, a voluntary group consisting of the three segments’ systems heads, a private college representative, the superintendent of schools, and the head of CPEC. The
Round Table provides an arena to discuss concerns—issues like transfer, articulation, and teacher preparation—and to anticipate enrollment trends (Richardson 1997). The Intersegmental
Coordinating Committee (ICC) was established by the Round Table to assist, advise, and coordinate in accomplishing its goals for intersegmental activities and programs. Membership includes two administrative and one faculty representative from each of the segments as well as a
CPEC representative and three students. The ICC has four sub-committees: K–16 Curricular
Issues; Outreach, Admissions and Transfer; Intersegmental Applications of Information
1
Technologies; and Intersegmental Budget Proposals. While the structure and purposes are laudable, these bodies have functioned mainly as forums for deliberation.
The head of the university system is its president, who has three main functions: to provide a minimal level of coordination among the campuses; to address systemwide issues such as academic personnel, admissions, and the curriculum; and to negotiate the annual budget with the legislature and the governor. Each campus has a chancellor and an academic senate, with numerous committees that generate and oversee implementation of policy. There is a UC–wide
Academic Senate, with an academic council serving as an executive committee. Also, a statewide Academic Assembly meets annually. This multifold structure reveals many units that can initiate organizational and academic changesor resist them.
The UC system is governed by a Board of Regents with twenty-six members: eighteen are appointed by the governor to twelve-year terms, subject to confirmation by the State Senate, and one voting student member is appointed by the regents. There are seven ex-officio members.
Despite the 1990s controversies over affirmative action generated by the regents, their actual power is quite limited. Like most governing boards, the regents are expected to set general policy but not control day-to-day operations, which are left to management. Surprisingly, the regents receive almost no formal assessment information, either on personnel or on institutional performance (Richardson 1997). They do not review curricular matters, and only receive reports on the yearly budget negotiations. Even issues like capital projects and student fees are largely left to management. Although the 1990s saw activist blood among the regents appointed by former Governor Pete Wilson, the board is dominated by the system and the campus administration on many issues. In fact, concern has been expressed that the regents are only
“rubber stamps” for the administration, but so far there has been little change.
2
The California State University (CSU) system is governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the governor for eight-year terms and confirmed by the State Senate. The board’s role is to set general policy and hire and evaluate system personnel, including the chancellor and the campus presidents. In their influence on personnel, these trustees have tended to play a stronger role than the UC Regents.
The system office is headed by a chancellor whose job is to promote information-sharing, coordinate the campuses, and handle collective bargaining. Chancellor Barry Munitz (1991-98) was highly regarded on both the campus and state levels (a rare achievement), but Chancellor
Charles B. Reed, appointed in 1998 (and serving through 2012), had some nasty confrontations with faculty over collective bargaining (Johnstone et al. 1997; Selingo 1999a). The system’s coordinating group, the Executive Council, consists of the campus presidents and the chancellor, and meets ten times per year, convening for two days at each session. Faculty influence is divided between parallel union and academic senate governance systems. The power and authority of each is determined by the state’s Higher Education Employee Relations Act. At the system level, these consist of the California Faculty Association (union) and a system Academic
Senate. It is generally believed that tensions are far lower than they once were in the system, that contract dispute notwithstanding, but the union has been regarded as a stumbling block to change within the system (Richardson 1997).
In the late 1990s, the California State University system completed a strategic planning process that gained national visibility. Entitled Cornerstones (CSU 1998), the report garnered attention especially for its two planning principles: to move towards “demonstrated learning” in awarding bachelor’s degrees, and to develop measures that would increase accountability.
Although the faculty expressed agreement with these items in principle, particularly when the
3 process was being handled by then-chancellor Barry Munitz, more conflict arose as it became clear that Chancellor Reed intended to implement them (Selingo 1999b). The proposed accountability measures included a comprehensive set of performance indicators. Demonstrated learning was identified by an assessment system for every campus program and course, to be determined by faculty. A similar move away from “seat time” assessment of degree progress was already developing at the system’s campus in Monterey Bay, founded in 1994 (Bastedo 2001).
Contrasting the California university systems, the California Community Colleges were supposed to be locally governed and financed, according to the 1960 Master Plan. This was designed to provide local accountability and responsiveness for each campus. Each community college district is governed by a local Board of Trustees; most of these have five members who serve four-year terms. As of 2000, there were 107 campuses in 71 districts, comprising the world’s largest system of higher education. The members are elected from the district and therefore must run campaigns for the position. Collective bargaining is handled at the district level, negotiated between the faculty and the local board of trustees. As a result, the faculty unions pour funds into the campaign treasuries of friendly trustee candidates, virtually assuring their election. In turn, when the time comes for collective bargaining, trustees are not inclined to bargain hard against the union that elected them. At the same time, consultation with higher-ups is required on nearly every local board decision. This is the result of Assembly Bill 1725, a legislative attempt in 1988 to reform community college governance.
Unlike for the UC system or the CSU system, a substantial portion of campus funding for the community colleges has been provided through local taxation. In 1995–96, only 44% of the community college budget was provided by state appropriation (Richardson 1997). However, due to the state’s Proposition 13, which restricted the state’s capacity to raise revenue through
4 property taxes, local tax revenue was cut and capped. This meant that community colleges’ funding from local taxes became extremely limited, and left them more reliant on state funding.
It also has had the paradoxical effect of tying the community colleges less to their local government and more with an eye to lobbying each annual budget cycle in Sacramento.1
The overall system is coordinated by a Board of Governors with sixteen members, five of whom are campus representatives (two campus trustees, two faculty members, and one student).
The board has responsibility for fiscal oversight, monitoring, accountability, program review, and maintaining a management information system, but it has largely failed to exert its authority in these areas (Richardson 1997). The vice-chair of the 1996 Board of Governors, however, called that board “activist” and “hands-on” (Gang of Five 1996). The system is administered by a chancellor, who works for the Board of Governors. At the end of the century, Chancellor David
Mertes was forced to resign by a “Gang of Five” that found him unresponsive to board inquiries.
Chancellor Thomas Nussbaum tried to increase system coordination and accountability, in part to generate increased financial support from the legislature (Archibold 1997).
Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in California
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, California state officials wrestled with changes in the state’s economy and demographics that were pressuring the three systems to adapt, albeit in somewhat different ways. The weakened tax base in California after Proposition
13 has been a fact of life for all publicly funded services, including higher education, and increased competition for state appropriations has also resulted from cost increases in health services, prisons, and energy. Thus not only has the state revenue stream for public higher education been uncertain, at times it looked dismal. In spite of cycles of fiscal constraint, state officials have nevertheless counted on this massive public higher education system to educate the
5 best and brightest in the state, while providing affordable education and training to a population that has grown in size and diversity. Managing growth was of utmost importance to legislators, along with the increased diversity in the population.
Reorganizing the system and differentiating campus missions were also foremost on legislators’ minds. In fact they reevaluated the Master Plan at regular intervals: 1965–1966,
1972–1973, 1987, 1989, and again in 1999–2002. The remarks of two legislators in the late
1960s characterized their thinking: Compared to some legislative remarks cited in Chapter 2, the following comments aligned more closely with what would develop:
Well, I suspect more than in the past that growth is going to have to be accommodated by
larger... but also more effective campuses... I think there is going to have to be a new
reorganization. I don’t think we can continue to simply add new University campuses,
and at each state college four or five new liberal arts programs, and junior colleges. We
are going to have to reorganize this whole system, because this added new growth is
getting to be absurd. (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 179)
The gist of this sentiment was echoed time and again over the next three decades.
The question of “access to what” was emerging even at that time, 1970. The following presages the willingness, if not intention, to back away from a comprehensive scope of program offerings in light of anticipated fiscal constraints. Another California legislator remarked about public higher education:
I think we’re going to have to try to teach certain curricula in certain schools, and not try
to teach a little bit of everything at all the schools, and let these students, to some degree,
seek out the school that they can attend advantageously. I think we have to pool our
resources on this. (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 179)
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Yet during this earlier period, state officials also seemed to acknowledge that they should not control the curriculum. One California assemblyman reflected:
If you start controlling the curriculum, you control the end product. I’d sort of back away
from that... to a certain extent the Legislature should determine to what extent it wants to
finance specialized kinds of education in the professional areas and law schools, medical
schools, that sort of thing. But it should be on a basis of evaluating recommendations
made by the institutions themselves and the Coordinating Council. I think the initiative
ought to come there.” (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 52–53)
In the mid-1970s, “vocational” education was included in CPEC lists of priorities (Education
Commission of the States (ECS) 1975; 1976) but as the decade ended, access and opportunity were the focus, with barely a mention of vocational priorities (CPEC 1979).
As state officials looked to the state’s future needs, the challenges of adapting to student demographic changes were anticipated to be ongoing throughout the 1980s: “There were more dark faces, more women, older students, and more students who entered college without the skills deemed necessary for college work.” (CPEC 1980, 41). The second five-year higher education strategic plan was issued in 1982, called The Challenges Ahead (ECS 1982). In a companion document, The Challenges Ahead: Issues in Planning for California Postsecondary
Education, 1982–87, separate papers addressed faculty issues and the demographic, economic, and socio-political changes in the higher education environment, signaling their awareness of the issues, even if no solutions were forthcoming. David Saxon, on leaving the presidency of the
University of California, was optimistic. “Ten years ago, higher education was regarded as the problem. Now the president of the United States, even Jerry Brown, is talking about higher education as the solution to our problems. That’s a big, big change” (California Higher
7
Education 1982, 18). Reportedly he urged Governor Deukmejian to locate a national technology consortium at UC, but the governor refused to provide any additional funds. The first issue facing higher education, David Saxon said, is “bringing fully into society people who have traditionally been denied that opportunity” (19). The second is that “our society is becoming increasingly technological” (19). The demographics of access, with the all-flexible tool of technology, were clearly on his agenda.
The year 1984 saw a consolidation of the shift in values and language in the California environment towards economic priorities, with industry discourse starkly contrasting David
Saxon’s vision and making that tension explicit. The report Social and Economic Trends, 1985–
2000 highlighted the needs of various industries in California, including the “trend towards an information-based economy” and “increased conservation of resources” (CPEC 1984). It is worth noting that, in the swing towards what could be termed a more politically conservative view, this report evoked the original association with the term conservative, linking it to the needs of the economy—as they imagined it would develop over the next several decades. In an information economy, the report explained, we are more likely to see new kinds of jobs, such as
“aquaculturist,” “neutrino astronomer,” and “shrimp-trout fish farmer” (11). Colleges are to stress technological education and research; and the report noted too that a recent report had concluded that a third of America’s increase in productivity from 1929 to 1969 was the result of
“advances in knowledge,” almost all of which were produced in university laboratories or by university graduates (13). Changes in educational technology were recommended as well.
Economic development further emerged as a major expectation in a 1988 report prepared for an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) review commission,
Preparing for the 21st Century (Condren 1988). Establishing higher education’s impact on the
8
California economy and the increasing competitiveness from the “Pacific Rim,” Condren highlighted “a sample” of ties between the higher education segments and industry (90-94). In the future, his report asserted, “higher education will be engaged in a three-way dialogue with the state and with business as each tries to be mutually supportive of efforts designed to contribute to California’s economic competitiveness” (96). “One goal of that dialogue will be greater understanding by higher education institutions of the educational needs of business and industry on a continuing basis and how those needs relate to institutional missions and goals.” At the same time, changing student demographics were again highlighted as a major issue to be addressed, with the observation that by 2000 California was anticipated to become a “majority minority” state (133)—which it did. Condren’s report recommended new attention to admissions requirements, transfer reform, and “portable” student financial aid (p. 149). These issues were further explored in a 1989 joint legislative report, California Faces… California’s Future:
Education for Citizenship in a Multicultural Democracy (Joint Committee 1989).
Indeed by 1993, in Joint Committee reports evaluating California higher education and the Master Plan, the economic agenda received top billing. Discussion items included a number of possible priorities, such as “declar[ing] that the primary mission of public higher education is to meet the economic and social needs of the state” (Assembly Committee on Higher Education
1993, 5). Further items for discussion included moving more students to community colleges, even consolidating all remedial education in the community colleges. In this same report, eliminating a slew of other “sacred cows” was also up for consideration, such as to remove requirements for terminal degrees for faculty (18), to increase faculty workloads (19), and to use distance learning for community college faculty to teach lower-division courses for students in the other two university systems (44). Although the increase in part-time faculty was examined
9 with alarm in the 1980s (CPEC 1980, 82), it was later considered a viable solution to reduce fixed costs and increase the structural flexibility of the campuses.
The battle cries against inefficiencies and indulgences within higher education continued to resound widely. Another analysis sounding the call against long-held givens in the California system was a paper authored in April 1993 by Christopher Cabaldon published by the State
Assembly Office. Attacking the tradition of local autonomy, he argued: “the decentralized, collegial approach to decisionmaking and planning can lead to extensive (and expensive) program duplication” (Cabaldon 1993, 16). In addition, he noted that faculty are entrusted with a large measure of governance responsibility which “can result in severe inefficiencies as the primary missions collide with group norms and rituals resistant to change, perverse and expensive reward systems out of step with public priorities, and loyalties divided among institution, department, and discipline” (20). Cabaldon held that hiring and tenure should be based only on teaching at the Cal State Universities and the California Community Colleges, and on research at a UC campus. Faculty workloads at UC campuses should be increased to two courses per term, at Cal State Universities to four courses per term (22). Further, “primary responsibility” for training the workforce should be in the colleges and universities, “working in tandem with employers and other public agencies” (27).
Also in the spring of 1993, some state legislators indicated their intentions to increase public scrutiny of public higher education. Three state senators set up an 800-number so that the public could call in to suggest ways for higher education to be more efficient (Almanac 1994).
The continuation of this story is that after large budget decreases in the early and mid-1990s, the state provided substantial increases in the second half of the 1990s, perpetuating the state’s
“boom or bust” trend in funding public higher education. This trend has been heavily criticized
10 for producing instability and inefficiency (Martinez and Nodine 1997; Benjamin and Carroll
1997; Pickens 1997; California Citizens Commission 1998; CPEC 1998). So the century closed on the upswing, only to be met by major budget crises again in the early 2000s.2
Of the sectors, the California State University system arguably has suffered most, with the impossible expectations to cover everything—from vocational study to research. Also, its sheer magnitude has led to an unwieldiness of its own. An administrator told of a bureaucratic snafu—that every purchase had to go through the system office, and a legislative order was required to change that:
Our campus was a pilot for what we call vendor direct pay where we could pay a vendor
directly. And we had a timing on vendor pay that was something like 45 days. I mean,
you didn’t want to do business with us because it would take us so long to pay you. And
now it’s down in the low 20s. That was spearheaded through this quality improvement
steering committee. And we were able to get legislative support to change that.
These are among the disadvantages of one of the country’s largest university systems.
Triggered partly by concerns about the fluctuations in state appropriations to public higher education, a ream of studies have analyzed the impact of California’s demographic trends, with little resulting consensus. Early work by Patrick Callan and David Breneman brought attention to “Tidal Wave II,” the boom of young, largely minority Californians who would soon need access to a higher education system that already had access deficits (Breneman 1995;
Callan et al. 1996). Projections were initially an additional 700,000 students seeking higher education in the state on top of 2.2 million enrolled; 76% of new enrollments were expected to begin in community colleges and then transfer (Bracco and Callan 2002). At the end of the
1990s, earlier analyses regarding Tidal Wave II were reconfirmed (Breneman 1998; Hill 1999;
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CPEC 1999). By the turn of the century, policy analysts posited ways to cope with enrollment growth in the context of state fiscal constraint in imperatives to facilitate more student transfer across segments as well as joint doctorates, and to explore new types of collaboration, such as joint facilities and the California Virtual University (Bracco and Callan 2002). Other solutions included moving to year-round operations to make better use of the facilities (Breedlove 1998 and 1999; Selingo 1999a).
Among the most important studies in this arena was the RAND study, which reviewed all the previous studies, conducting “exploratory modeling” to determine future events based on realistic contingencies (Park and Lempert 1998). The results are charts that show the access deficits in each system contingent upon the level of state funding, improvements in efficiency, and student demand. The authors concluded that enrollment was projected to grow but not of tidal wave proportions; nor would it be unmanageable. California would avoid serious access deficits if the fraction of the state general fund allocated to higher education remained constant, and if productivity increased at faster-than-historic rates. Otherwise, maintaining access would require a high tuition/high aid system of finance. Perhaps most importantly, the authors found that the trends were insensitive to changes in student demand. As a result, determining the extent of student demand was not nearly as important as increasing institutional efficiency and ensuring a state commitment to stable funding during economic downturns.
In California, one example of economic considerations’ clearly superceding egalitarian values occurred at the UC system in the 1990s with the removal of what was designated as remedial courses from the universities to the community colleges—a move that occurred in New
York in the late 1990s as well (see below) Subject A, the UC-wide basic writing requirement, was considered remedial, although for example in the 1990s at UC Santa Cruz, about one-third
12 of each entering freshman class had not yet fulfilled Subject A (Martin 2004). Subject A was subcontracted to community colleges by UC Davis and UC San Diego in the 1990s, as were specific basic math courses also deemed remedial. These courses had always been taught at the university, but in the 1990s climate of accountability, were configured at certain campuses as purely remedial—as were, for example, the most preliminary ESL courses at some campuses— and were therefore designated non-credit. And by legislative statute, no non-credit courses could receive state dollars. At UC campuses where Subject A courses were designated “non-credit,” their costs were covered by discretionary funds. Also, Subject A usually fell within the humanities, which lost favor (and funding) in the 1990s as general education became devalued.
Interesting enough, inasmuch as the legislature became involved in discussions about moving basic courses from the university to the community colleges, which they mostly did not, many tended to take offence at the idea that the university was not educating its own (Martin 2004).
However, a number of UC campuses reconfigured their courses so that students fulfilled these basic requirements in math, writing, etc. (and thereby were brought up to speed) within credit courses, and therefore within the culture of the UC system itself. (Indeed, one significant reason for the failure of transfer in the California system has been the wide difference in cultures across the segments).3 In this case, from the perspective of those opposed to moving the courses to the community colleges, economic and political pressures in the UC system were literally bumping (even busing!) the “majority minority” of bilingual, bicultural, and/or underprepared but UC-eligible and -accepted students to community colleges, for instruction that the universities had always previously considered their responsibility. Moreover, many of the same instructors (often part-time, usually untenured) who had taught these required courses for many years (at considerably lower pay than—and as much as four times the course-load of—their
13 tenured colleagues) were then hired by the community colleges to teach the UC course material at even lower pay. This locates industry logic in full swing in prioritizing savings (albeit minor in the big picture of the higher education state budget) over courses and programs (such as tutoring) for those UC students who were most at risk.
For its part the University of California system, with its uniquely prestigious research universities—not just Berkeley and UCLA but also Santa Barbara, Davis, and Santa Cruz—has been under pressure since the early 1990s from the UC Office of the President to move towards
“one-system thinking”: inter-campus cooperation to reduce duplication and eliminate under- enrolled programs. According to our interviewees, this is “mostly wishful thinking,” and a complete non-starter at the undergraduate level. Coordination within the system and between universities is effected and effective more informally, according to this senior administrator:
There is always a tension between that kind of thinking and every campus’ ambition to be
a comprehensive campus, so I don’t think the Office of the President would have an
enormous programmatic influence on the campuses. I don’t think you would ever get the
campuses buying into some sort of centrally directed model at all, but the campuses enter
into discussions and agreements with each other based on mutual interests. It is a more
informal thing, and it really has to be faculty-driven,
In other words, because of the looser oversight structures within the UC system, more informal mechanisms facilitate coordination among the campuses, as this leader explained:
“There are many inter-campus groups. The chancellors meet basically twice a month. The academic vice chancellors meet regularly. The deans of the various programs meet periodically.
Librarians meet regularly. There is a lot of cross-campus dialogue that goes on...”
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Communication among cohorts rather than top-down directions from the Office of the President allows them to “avoid the kind of duplication that doesn’t make sense.”
As for the technological imperative, throughout this period, faith and confidence in technology as a solution to extending access continued to grow, especially as it envisioned access to students in more geographically remote areas of the state. But technology was equally seen as inseparable from economic progress, of course. For in California, keeping pace with technological advancements was de rigueur, considering that California produced the cutting- edge technology just as it had generated the “high tech” movement in the 1980s. The tremendous success of Silicon Valley became a symbol of the state’s aspirations for intellectual and economic leadership in technology. For the site of the founders and leaders of computing technology—or as it later came to be known, information and communications technology— exemplified the potential of mixing the entrepreneurial spirit with investments in higher education. While Stanford University was often catapulted into the spotlight by Hewlett and
Packard’s garage inventions, the San Francisco Bay region in general became known for extensive collaboration between public campuses and local industry, and for the creation of start- up companies that set the stage for the dot.com era. The pervasive attitude was that technological change is all about opportunity, economic and every other kind, and there were not only precedents but also very visible opportunities for public campuses—their administrators and faculty—to partner with industry in defining this new frontier in hardware, software, and networking.
It was perhaps no surprise, then, that in 1996, Governor Pete Wilson decided not to participate in the Western Governors University being developed by the Western Interstate
Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) on behalf of thirteen western states (Blumenstyk
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1996). Instead California developed its own Virtual University (CVU) that combined online courses already offered throughout the public system. When CVU opened its website in August
1998, it listed more than 1600 courses from 95 accredited California colleges, and included more than 100 certificate and degree programs. In April 1999, however, CVU abruptly ended most of its operations due to lack of funds; the three public segments balked at providing $1 million per year for three years to cover operating shortfalls. According to a board member, Jonathan
Brown, the organization would no longer have any staff, “making the entity even more virtual than it was” (Blumenstyk 1999, A30). Another factor in CVU’s failure were distance education initiatives launched by campuses in all three systems throughout the state.
The infrastructure supporting these instructional initiatives and the use of technology for administrative operations have at times become mired in controversy, much of it to do with the gray area of not-strictly-public technological collaborations between higher education and corporate giants in the new economy. For example, in 1997 the California State University system negotiated a technology deal with Microsoft, Fujitsu, GTE, and Hughes Electronics for which a new company was created called the California Education Technology Initiative (CETI), which would be responsible for administering the system’s technology infrastructure (Young
1997). The plan was designed to promote efficiency and increase user services while reducing costs to the state. Critics charged that the plan, to last for at least ten years, gave too much control to corporations, would eventually create a more business-like atmosphere on campuses, and would be perceived as turning the campuses into a training ground for these companies.
Those and similar concerns were expressed in response to initiatives in the UC system, more than in the California Community College system, as the case studies for this project show.
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These three decades in California thus show the state’s interest in campuses’ adaptation, specifically to unpredictable funding flows, enrollment shifts, changing demographics, and the opportunities afforded and pressures generated by new technologies. Although in different periods the legislature was predisposed to let the campuses determine their academic practices, the trend through the 1980s and into the 1990s was for the representatives to assert more pointed demands for organizational efficiency, and to insist that the campuses demonstrate their direct strengthening of the economy or adding economic value to the state. The paradox here, as elsewhere, is in how the legislative and broader public’s demands for public higher education to change escalated, and their scrutiny of academic practices became more targeted, while their support in the form of public funding became ever less certain—and this trend continued into the twenty-first century. In fact the legislature has encouraged California campuses in all three public systems to cultivate non-state sources of revenue, including stepping up their collaborations with local companies.
In California, we are left with the sense that the legislature, in reflecting the mood of the times as well as real economic downturns in the state, planted the seeds for values to shift, which were then taken under cultivation—even at times re-engineered—by the systems and their campuses. The changes were not smooth, and the turbulence and inconsistencies—and accompanying confusion and waste—are perhaps a function of the vastness of the state, including the widely dispersed, widely varying, and numerous campuses of the three public segments (only about one-eighth of students in higher education in the state attended private institutions as of 2000); the state’s extremely high percentage of minority populations; and—also like New York—its extremes of wealth and poverty.4 And the pressures on California higher education during this period were to absorb and accomplish it all.
17
From the perspective of those we interviewed in the late 1990s on the three California campuses—as is clear in the case studies—funding constraints and uncertainty loomed large among their concerns. As one stated, in reference to then-current as well as anticipated enrollment demands in the state: “The current investment is not sufficient as it is…. Tidal Wave
II is coming ….and there has to be an investment to this new group of students coming through the schools. If not, we are going to suffer.”
These are powerful observations because they point to the state’s investment in public higher education as essential not only to the campuses to fulfill their missions but also to the broader citizenry—their quality of life as well as the economy, especially in such a technology- oriented economy where managerial and professional skills are needed in addition to lower-level skills, and as more citizens want higher education, while the state struggles through each economic recession. Each fiscal crisis has prompted campuses to adapt by cutting and streamlining, but also salaries fell behind the market, academic support budgets suffered (such as libraries), facilities budgets did not keep pace with higher energy costs, and deferred maintenance mounted. Also, as tuition and fees increased with less taxpayer support, expectations rose for quality to be improved.
The state legislature is but one part of the wider terrain of pressures that translated into the fact of “budget crunches,” alongside “demands for increased productivity and insufficient funds to keep equipment or scholarly and/or teaching endeavors up to snuff.” Administrators and faculty alike referred to these as “significant” pressures, especially given the state’s growing enrollment demand, major demographic shifts, and needs to accommodate an increasingly diverse student population, including generational differences (“what students want from their educational institutions has changed”).
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One administrator pointed out that there is already transparency in reporting on all fronts, given the many technological changes, so their operations are clear to the system office, CPEC, and the legislature: “We’re all tied together in the computer world, so it isn’t that we can hide something from them. They can get it. We send them what we call the academic planning database, which gives them a breakdown of all faculty workloads, which tells you just about everything you need to know about the faculty and the students.”
This transparency is particularly challenging on public campuses in the state, where there are strong advocates for diversity and enrollment demand is strong in the diverse population, in an era when affirmative action is not permitted: “I think the larger question is how do we sustain diversity on a campus where we no longer have the tools available to us…. Every way you try to do it and when you know that you are being watched like a hawk, it is very hard, very hard…”
Enrollment-based funding formulae impact the faculty more than legislators may realize.
As state allocations are distributed to each system, they are then allocated among the system’s campuses (presumably through some negotiation between the system’s president and campus chancellors so that the funds can be allocated fairly and effectively), and then allocated internally on each campus. As one faculty member observed, resource allocation practices on each campus may be flexible but questions of fairness arise: “After funds are allocated to campuses, they are free to internally allocate them strategically to departments that have needs, despite the fact that the funding may have been ‘earned’ based on enrollment projections from another department.”
Certainly in times of budget cuts, and in academic areas with declining enrollment, it becomes difficult both to justify allocating funds to underperforming departments, and to reduce the fixed costs of programs (i.e., salaries for tenured faculty). In these matters of internal resource allocation, campus leaders have some measure of autonomy, as they manage each round of
19 budget cuts and undertake planning initiatives that project different scenarios to enable them to prepare for an uncertain future.
Illinois
State Oversight Structures in Illinois
Illinois is a state with a constitutionally strong governor who has strong influence over the state budget. During the Edgar years, the state’s lieutenant governor, Bob Kustra, was very visible on higher education issues. In the legislature, nearly all higher education issues are handled de facto by the Appropriations Committee. The Higher Education Committee, as one legislator put it, “really does not do very much” (Richardson 1997). The state has twelve public four-year universities, overseen by four public university governing boards, as well as forty-nine two-year colleges (governed by their own local boards of trustees who work with the Illinois
Community College Board). It has been referred to as a state with a “system of systems,” by design of Lyman Glenny, who was involved in creating the California system and preferred instead that university expansion be governed by different boards. Illinois’ system was reorganized in the mid-1990s, bringing private higher education into the state’s master planning.
(Alexander and Layzell 2006). Out of 185 colleges and universities in Illinois, 62 are public.
Illinois is one of only seven states where private higher education is integral to the state system.
The state coordinating board, in place since 1961, is the Illinois Board of Higher
Education (IBHE), which has relatively weak statutory authority. The board does not have the power to set tuition or fees, to eliminate or consolidate academic programs, nor to supervise capital construction projects. As a result, with Richard Wagner at its head until 1980, a great deal of emphasis was placed on consensus-building. This resulted in progress that some describe as
“glacial,” but also in generally congenial relations between the institutions and the IBHE, as well
20 as between the state’s elected officials and the IBHE. The major exception to this relative equanimity was the above-mentioned board’s Priorities, Quality, and Productivity (PQP) initiative. This more aggressive accountability effort was decried to varying degrees by campuses, but it helped build credibility for the board in the legislature, particularly among
Republicans (Richardson 1997).
A separate board for the community colleges, technically below the IBHE—the Illinois
Community College Board (ICCB)—has a mix of governing and coordinating powers (unlike
IBHE), including the statutory authority to set tuition and eliminate academic programs
(Richardson 1997). The ICC Board has generally viewed its role, however, as one of setting general policy and principles and then allowing local boards to implement them, depending on the local context. The result of this is that the community colleges are widely perceived to be the most effective system of higher education in Illinois. Their reputation notwithstanding, appreciation of their effectiveness has not translated to increased funding from the legislature.
Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in Illinois
At the state level in Illinois, interest in public higher education was to achieve both democratic and economic aims, with surprisingly little tension between these priorities before the early 1990s. From A Master Plan for Higher Education in Illinois, issued in July 1964:
In addition to providing direct benefit to students, higher education contributed positively
to the cultural and physical well-being of all the people of the State. These goals are
achieved through instruction of both youth and adults, through research aimed at the
advancement of knowledge, and through public service activities which bring the special
competencies of higher education to the citizens in their home communities. (Chambers
1975, 88)
21
No mention of basket-weaving here, but the idealistic vision of edifying the citizenry is evident.
By the end of the 1960s, this mindset shifted to fiscal priorities, although access goals remained prominent throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Signaling the state interest in resource reallocation in 1969, a new executive director was hired at the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), James Holderman, who inaugurated a more intrusive style of governance. Among the directives were instructions to make budgets by selecting “low-priority” units and academic programs for reduction or elimination, with aggregate cuts of 15%, portions of which could be reallocated to “innovative” or high-priority academic programs (Chambers 1975, 91). In other words, in Illinois—as generally across the states—the tradition of comprehensive scope began to be eroded by cost-cutting. During fiscal year 1975, the IBHE made a significant move to require accountability, developing the Resource
Allocation and Management Program (RAMP), a means by which public colleges submit their annual budget requests and supporting data to the IBHE (ECS 1975). This plan specifically required: 1) mission and scope statements; 2) technical plans detailing the activities designed to meet the objectives in the mission and scope statements; and 3) a resource allocation schedule for the planned activities. All new program proposals had to be justified in terms of need, demand, and mission as reflected in their most recent RAMP documents. Doctoral programs had to demonstrate compelling need and not be duplicative of existing programs at public or private colleges (ECS 1975, 53). Nevertheless, during fiscal year 1976, the IBHE approved 46 new academic programs at public colleges (ECS 1976). At community colleges, the IBHE approved
184 new programs, including degree programs, contractual arrangements with proprietary schools, and apprenticeship training programs. Doctoral program reviews were made less stringent as well, giving more discretion to IBHE staff. Thus the state interest in planning for
22 higher education was to prioritize leveraging resources, as much as extending access to an increasingly diverse state population—although nowhere near as diverse as California.
Looking back, there are signs of the state’s accommodating some demographic change.
In 1975 IBHE adopted an affirmative action policy monitoring programs in state institutions, and they included it as part of their own statutory responsibilities (ECS 1975). A legislative proposal to require a strategic plan for the development of a statewide educational television system was considered but not adopted. In October 1975, the IBHE did a scan of existing ETV equipment in
Illinois, and appointed an Educational Television Coordinating Commission (ECS 1976). In
February 1976, the IBHE adopted A Master Plan for Postsecondary Education in Illinois, after two and half years of study by the board and citizens’ commissions (ECS 1976). Faced with increasing enrollments, campuses were urged to continue internal reallocation efforts, to increase productivity, and to better utilize existing facilities. The new Master Plan also suggested some programmatic directions, including expanding certain academic areas such as health professions education, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of affirmative action.
During the mid-70s, precedents led state officials to invest in specific fields of study on the public campuses, and the governor and legislators relied on the IBHE to carry this out. In fiscal year 1977, the IBHE was asked by the governor to address ways to increase health education in the South Side of Chicago (ECS 1977). They recommended increasing enrollment at the University of Illinois medical center, inter alia, and the legislature appropriated over
$200,000 for this program. The university submitted a plan in January 1978 to establish new primary care residencies and ambulatory care facilities in urban areas, and by 1990, to increase minority enrollment in the medical school by 50. Chicago State University established a College of Allied Health and planned to expand its premed program as well, with the legislature planning
23 to appropriate $517,000 for these two programs (ECS 1978). During fiscal year 1979, statewide studies of health sciences and nursing education were conducted (ECS 1980). Revised policies for the health professions were approved in November, 1981 related to medicine, dentistry, podiatry, optometry, allied health, nursing, and veterinary medicine. Ad hoc committees were formed to study specific issues in medical and dental education, including regionalization, student retention, and resource allocation (ECS 1982).
During the mid-1980s, the IBHE master plan focused on five major goals: maintaining diversity, extending educational opportunities, assuring academic excellence, promoting economic development, and improving cost effectiveness (Richardson 1994). Here again,
Illinois’ goals blended fiscal conservatism with access. Accountability was also called for; allocations targeted programs that were vocational (rather than general) and that addressed social needs—by building preparations for the health professions. In 1985 the IBHE articulated goals to improve minority student preparation in high school, graduation rates, and student retention, and in 1989 the IBHE required reporting on progress towards these goals. Of particular interest was improving minority enrollments in math, science, and engineering. By 1994 all public campuses established plans to these ends, including high school articulation and summer bridge programs, remedial services, financial support, and the “creation of supportive campus environments”
(Richardson 1994, 42). Efforts to improve graduation rates focused on improving transfer.
In September 1986, the IBHE adopted the recommendation of the Committee on the
Study of Undergraduate Education proposing that community colleges be the principal site of remediation efforts and reaffirming the IBHE policy of no credit for remedial courses
(Richardson 1994, 45). A series of recommendations about faculty was also issued: that devotion to teaching should be recognized in promotion and tenure reviews; that the best faculty should
24 teach undergraduates; and that campuses should ensure that faculty be prepared to teach and proficient in English. In addition, program reviews should focus on instructional improvement, a sign of what would become a pervasive interest in assessment of student learning outcomes. In
1989 this committee reconvened, reaffirming much of its earlier report, but added a section on transfer and articulation and cut the section on remediation (46).
In terms of Illinois’ growing economic agenda, in the late 1980s the IBHE established an initiative on workforce preparation (Richardson 1994). Emphasizing cooperation with business and other education and training providers, their recommendations included improving basic skills through K–12 and adult education programs, establishing regional technology centers, financing consortia that served small and medium-sized industries, developing technology preparation programs, and establishing information clearinghouses on job training and employment. Performance indicators included an employer feedback system and a process that guaranteed the skills of college graduates to state employers. In 1989 the IBHE established a commission to address the “productivity” concerns of state lawmakers (Richardson 1994).
“Campus leaders were asked to involve entire campus communities in broad-based efforts to align institutional goals and priorities with those articulated by the IBHE” (Richardson 1994,
43). This was later replaced by the PQP initiative, discussed in the main text.
A specific systemwide issue that emerged in 1991 was how to serve the need for graduate and professional education in the Chicago suburbs, where a number of high-technology and science companies were located (including the Argonne and Fermi laboratories). As pressure mounted to link the goals of higher education and industry, tension arose between the public and private schools seeking an active part in that hotbed of growth. The area was primarily served by private colleges, but Northern Illinois University (NIU) and the University of Illinois Chicago
25
(UIC) wanted to extend their presence there, asking the state to build a public facility in the area
(Almanac 1991). This created intense competition between the public and private sectors, especially once the IBHE approved building a new classroom building fifteen miles from
Roosevelt University (Almanac 1992). UIC was later criticized for using its clout to expand its programs, hurting others run by NIU and the Illinois Institute of Technology (Almanac 1993).
UIC also came under considerable criticism for expanding into their surrounding communities in Chicago, specifically the well-known historical Maxwell Street corridor. In characterizing pressure brought to bear, one UIC administrative leader mentioned in an interview both the IBHE and the community as complicating the university’s efforts to expand the campus:
We had the south campus projects before them yesterday and had they not approved them
then we couldn’t sell the bonds to finance the construction. So it is another coordinating
body that you have to take into account. A student advisory committee representative
yesterday gave a resolution against the project on the basis of preserving Maxwell Street.
Meanwhile, the City Colleges of Chicago were notable for moving forward the agenda of democratic and demographic opportunity, garnering respect from state leaders for cutting spending and reducing the number of students taking remedial courses (Almanac 1992). At the same time, student concerns about racism on campuses led the state to require all colleges to include courses on “human relations” in their general education programs (Almanac 1992). The legislature was also concerned about addressing the impediments to student transfer and articulations, since a high proportion of minority students enter the public higher education system through community colleges (Almanac 1993).
In terms of access, the focus of efforts during the 1990s was the Illinois Articulation
Initiative (IAI) (IBHE May 1997, May 1998). IAI’s first move was to create a “General
26
Education Core Curriculum,” consisting of 12 to 13 courses that all institutions in Illinois could agree constituted a lower-division general education requirement. A specific articulation agreement ensures that students transferring anywhere in the system do not have to repeat these fundamental courses. Agreements were also planned for a number of common majors to increase the number of transferable courses.5 Noting the relevance of financial aid, in 1999 Governor
Ryan proposed creating a need-based scholarship program for students in occupational or vocational programs, but the Legislature refused to approve it (Almanac 2000). They did approve a program for students in information technology programs to help meet employer demand in that field. This divergence—and these choices—would seem to indicate the legislature’s stoking IT training even while pulling the plug on financial aid.
Nevertheless opportunities afforded by technological changes were an underlying theme during the 1990s. Illinois took on a major technology assessment project for the entire state system called The Illinois Century Project (Illinois Higher Education Technology Task Force
1998). The task force recommended that the state invest in a $400 million high-speed internet upgrade, connecting the university to local libraries and K–12 schools. The huge project ran into roadblocks, however, from the legislature and the Bureau of the Budget, who weren’t clear on the goals and possibilities of the network, and the seed money for it was in jeopardy. Another major technology project has been the Illinois Virtual Campus, funded by IBHE and the
University of Illinois. The plan was for a “virtual ribbon cutting” to signal the provision of courses statewide from both public and private campuses. Fifteen “student support centers” located throughout the state signaled that the network would extend access to students in geographically remote areas; thirty-five were planned to be functional by 2001. By way of update: “In Spring 2008, Illinois colleges and universities reported a total of 192,277 enrolments
27 in distance education, across 11,501 courses. Courses were delivered by internet (81%), stored media, e.g. CD/DVD (7%), interactive TV (5%), open broadcast TV (3%), and correspondence
(4%). Of 192,277 enrolments, 173,140 were in courses delivered primarily or exclusively online”
(Researching Virtual Education).
In another example of technology’s enabling extended access, “University Center” in
Lake County, in the northern suburbs of Chicago, attracted much attention. University Center provided courses locally through distance education in the region, where residents previously had to travel more than forty-five minutes to attend an upper-level public college. All of the state’s public colleges were able to take part, as well as some private colleges, but the center had no faculty of its own. The center had about 100,000 square feet, housing classes for 3000 to 5000 students (Schmidt 1999). The center’s operating expenses were projected to be about $2.5 million at the time. It was to be locally governed, with residents holding six of the seats on the eleven-member board. The plan was seen as a way to provide a wide variety of educational programs at minimal additional cost to the state. Nearby residents were pleased as well, for a number of cities in Lake County competed for the right to have the site. Competition was so stiff, and the number of constituents so many, that the location proved highly controversial.
The adaptations sought by state officials and the IBHE seemed manageable despite the increased pressures on campuses to demonstrate accountability. In July 1998, the IBHE also approved the “Citizens’ Agenda,” which required surveys of students, employers, and taxpayers to guide college planning processes. Surveys included questions about general attitudes and satisfaction, and the most pressing academic needs of students and employers (Almanac 1998).
The IBHE concluded the decade and century with another accountability initiative: The
Illinois Commitment, part of the “Citizen’s Agenda for Illinois Higher Education” (IBHE
28
February 1999). Each year the state’s colleges and universities must outline “best practices” programs that meet the state’s goals as stated in the Commitment, including promoting economic growth, improving teaching and learning at all educational levels, affordability for students and parents, expanding access and diversity, assuring graduates are prepared for work, and improving productivity. In 1999, campuses presented the first reports to the IBHE. In contrast to the PQP, this accountability initiative did not attract any local media interest.
As an interesting sidebar, at the time of our interviews, Illinois was known as a state with a high degree of exportation of college students, second to New Jersey. In 2000, it was estimated that freshman leaving the state to attend college out of state exceeded the students coming in by
10,000. The outflow of students was of concern, not only for the state’s economic competitiveness but also for the ability of the state to meet the educational needs of its diverse population (Alexander and Layzell 2006).
The perspective from the campuses focuses on IBHE’s role in policy and planning as well as budgeting. Most significant in our interviews was IBHE’s authority to send budgetary recommendations forward. Also what came to be known as “results reporting”–identifying clear performance indictors—was launched in the 1990s and formally adopted in 2003. The campuses—some for the first time, like Chicago State—were expected to do long-range planning, identifying priorities and benchmarking using quantitative measures, and the message was that “planning would be tied to budgeting. Programs will have to prove that they are doing what they are set up to do….”
The upshot is that the IBHE has the authority to approve (or not) proposals from campuses for new programs. Both UIC and Chicago State understood that the proposals had more likelihood of success if there were jobs with that expertise. IBHE’s approval of, for
29 example, new PhD programs, reflected clear oversight, a unity of purpose and a method, however much an individual university might long for more autonomy. One administrative leader narrated:
They just approved a PhD in art history to my great shock and to the shock of the art
history department. Swiftly and with no questions asked. I think it’s because they
differentiated it as we are going to focus on museum curators. Focusing on our strengths,
is what IBHE likes… We just got a PhD in disability studies, the first disabilities studies
PhD in the country. So it is not that the IBHE is anti-PhD programs, but they are anti-
proliferation of PhD programs for which there are no jobs. It’s hard for me to argue that.
Indeed at the time of our interviews, UIC seemed more content with oversight from IBHE than from its university system leaders.
Thus UIC had a PhD program in Disability Studies, the first in the country, as they demonstrated there are jobs to be had with this preparation. By contrast, the proposal for a PhD in political science was held up in review progress. And they were in the process of preparing a proposal for a MA in engineering that would be offered online (“we are simply trying to be entrepreneurial”). Chicago State was in the process of preparing a proposal for a doctorate in physical therapy, which seemed unlikely, yet the accrediting association said that they would no longer accredit baccalaureate programs. According to a senior academic leader, “I will fight that, and I might lose, but this is the way I am trying to deal with doctoral education at CSU, to start with professional doctorates.” After physical therapy, the idea was to go for clinical psychology, and then education. The contrast between the two universities in their respective relationships with IBHE is clear. While Chicago State faced challenges to show effectiveness and “raise the bar” in fulfilling its core mission of undergraduate education (as shown in Chapter 7), UIC had
30 demonstrated success and built on that reputation for quality to make the case for distinctiveness in their advanced degree program proposals (“we’re open to having part-time students in doctoral programs and we’re low cost”). The combination of the IBHE’s authority for program approval with the expectations for reporting on performance indicators tied to budget recommendations gave them unprecedented strength in defining what these campuses were permitted to offer, and where they would have the resources to do so.
New York
State Oversight Structures in New York
Each SUNY and CUNY college has its own chancellor and board of trustees. SUNY has a sixteen-member Board of Trustees, fifteen appointed by the Governor. (One student member is appointed by the student body and serves ex-officio). Each of the SUNY colleges has a nine- member “campus advisory council” as well. Although CUNY was created in 1961, public higher education in New York City began with the Free Academy—later City College—founded in
1847. City College and Hunter College were under the city’s Board of Education, but in 1926 they were placed under a citywide Board of Higher Education until CUNY’s founding in 1961.
The City University of New York (CUNY) Board of Trustees consists of seventeen members, ten appointed by the governor and five appointed by the mayor of New York City. One member is a student and one is a faculty member; both serve ex-officio for a one-year term. The regular trustees serve seven-year terms.
New York’s Governor has been described as the most powerful higher education leader in the state (Callan and Bowen 1997). The governor appoints many of the trustees for the system boards, which is power enough. But the governor also has line-item veto authority over budgets and oversees the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. And of course, all potential
31 laws regarding higher education need his approval, unless his veto is overridden by the legislature. The legislature, somewhat less influential, is bicameral, with a senate and an assembly. During the Pataki years the senate was dominated by Republicans and the assembly by
Democrats. As a result the senate was far more influential with the executive branch; staff members of the Senate Higher Education committee attend governing board meetings to transmit legislative priorities to system trustees and to the administration (Callan and Bowen 1997).
The state’s higher education coordinating agency is the Board of Regents of the
University of the State of New York. It was established in 1784 to govern King’s College
(Columbia University). The sixteen regents are elected by the legislature for five-year terms and are unpaid. The regents lead the state’s Department of Education and appoint its commissioner.
The Department of Education has a sub-office called the Office of Higher and Professional
Education (OHP). The regents are the ultimate authority in academic program approval throughout the state. In addition the OHP coordinates the development of new campuses, accrediting “every curriculum in the state” (Callan and Bowen 1997). The regents do not have budgetary authority, however, since this rests with the governor and the Bureau of the Budget.
Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in New York
State officials in New York have always seen public higher education as a major contributor to enhancing the economic and social well-being of the state. From the 1960s, these twin interests were often intermingled in the political ideologies playing out in the different governance arenas that oversee higher education. New York City can best be understood as a microcosm of the wider society in its aspirations as well as its problems. Poverty and racial conflict were rallying points for the opposing ideologies of both conservatives and the left. The democratic expectation of providing opportunity to the state’s population had a decidedly social
32 cast, along with its economic value. In New York City, public higher education had a legacy of upward mobility: socializing and preparing immigrants for work; cultivating citizenship; and stimulating vital economic strengths, such as the arts, design, advertising, and publishing.
Prior to 1975, a few legislators saw public higher education as becoming more practically oriented, trying to solve contemporary social problems. According to one legislator in the 1960s:
“I think... higher education is going to deal more and more with social problems in our complex society, trying to meet these problems in addition to just raising the standard of the economic product, so to speak” (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 184).
State-level planning for higher education got into full swing in the 1970s. The Board of
Regents started developing their quadrennial statewide plan for higher education in fall 1975.
They set five goals for postsecondary education: quality education, responsiveness to societal needs, efficient use of resources, freedom of access, and freedom of choice (Education
Commission of the States 1977). Efficiency made the list, but the more societal imperatives still held sway. Specific recommendations included self-assessment procedures and alternatives to faculty tenure (85). In November 1978, a progress report was submitted to the governor reaffirming these goals, and in 1978–79 the process began of reviewing institutional missions for the 1980 Statewide Plan (ECS 1979). The 1980 Statewide Plan aimed to “redefine the mission of the whole postsecondary system, establish overall goals to guide the efforts of the entire system, set measurable objectives to be achieved by 1990, and describe activities to further those objectives to be undertaken…” (ECS 1980, 406).
Acting for the Board of Regents, beginning in 1973, the State Education Department conducted academic quality assessments of the state’s doctoral programs. A total of twenty-nine programs were closed between 1973 and 1978. This sharp move for quality and downsizing
33 would prove contentious. In 1976, SUNY sued the Board of Regents, claiming it did not have the power to “dis-credit” academic programs that did not meet their standards (ECS 1978, 92). The
State Supreme Court ruled in the Regents’ favor, and in June 1978, the lower court ruling was sustained by the state’s highest court, the Court of Appeals. Public hearings were also held on the program review standards, which had not been revised since 1971 (ECS 1979). They were ultimately revised in April 1980 (ECS 1980). These standards addressed quality issues in off- campus extension centers, which were growing extremely rapidly.
In 1977 the Regents began a project designed to locate employment in businesses for people with humanities PhDs. They received a seven-week orientation “in cooperating business schools to prepare them for jobs in cooperating corporations” (ECS 1978, 92). During 1978, 50 students participated, supported by grants from the NEH, Rockefeller Foundation, and several corporations (ECS 1979). For example, a two-year grant from the Fund for the Improvement of
Postsecondary Education facilitated self-assessment of higher education, encompassing an evaluation of programs, outcomes, and graduates, and a review of industry needs (ECS 1978).
The Governor’s response to the 1980 Statewide Plan for higher education “proposed significant changes in the planning process to focus it more on the needs of society, as well as on those of institutions” (ECS 1982, 121). Four issues in particular were identified in that plan: economic development; maintaining the balance among the three major sectors of higher education (SUNY, CUNY, and private); remediation; and health sciences training.
Economic development rapidly became one of the most important issues in New York, due to interest from the governor, the legislature, and the business community. The Center for
Worker Education at City College enrolled more than 200 students specifically associated with labor unions in the city (ECS 1982). SUNY reported an increase in education, research, and
34 technical assistance programs to local communities and businesses. Assistance programs were developed at SUNY as well, and in 1982, SUNY had more than twenty Development Centers for
Business across the state. In 1981, the State Education Department initiated a series of manpower studies to help higher education meet future state economic needs. Studies focused on the supply and demand for physicians, dentists, engineers, and public school teachers and staff (ECS 1982).
Engineering was a particularly pressing need, due to the high demand both for working engineers and for the faculty to teach them. In June 1982, the regents issued a report recommending more opportunities for working engineers to receive part-time graduate education, encouraging industry-university cooperation, and calling for state fellowships for doctoral training. In these ways the higher education decision-makers intended to meet economic needs external to the organization, as values came more to embrace economic purposes.
New York’s public universities had not achieved national recognition for their academic stature before 1989, when SUNY Buffalo was invited to become a member of the Association of
American Universities, known for their excellence in research and graduate education. Aspiring to this same honor, SUNY system leaders wanted to upgrade graduate programs and research capability at other campuses: Albany, Binghamton, and Stony Brook (Almanac 1990, 181).
As the 1990s drew stronger demands for accountability by system leaders, intersections of access—democratic and demographic—with economic imperatives erupted into open confrontations within the educational system. The dual structure of New York’s higher education system reveals how accountability pressures from the state were perceived by system leaders and translated for SUNY and CUNY, respectively.
For SUNY a report, Meeting the Productivity Challenge: System and Campus Reports, led to the development of performance indicators for the system (Richardson 1994). These
35 indicators included measures of trends in the dollar volume of sponsored research for all campuses and for full-time faculty at SUNY university centers; numbers of graduates by academic field; and amounts of sponsored research related to economic development, environmental studies, health care, public education, and social services (71). SUNY was to be accountable by performance indicators for research primarily, especially in specific fields related to vocational and social arenas. This is identical to the direction taken by IBHE at the same time.
Meanwhile, CUNY in the 1990s became an arena for a host of democratic imperatives: providing affordable access, serving the needs of increasingly diverse populations, extending opportunity for mobility, cultivating civic values, and rewarding merit. This way had been paved in 1990 when budgets for CUNY were especially tight. Student activists and faculty members charged that this was a sign “that the state is uninterested in a university system that has come to be dominated by needy Caribbean, Hispanic, and black students” (Almanac 1991, 195). In
March 1992, about fifty students, faculty, and staff members filed a class-action lawsuit against
Governor Cuomo and the state, accusing New York of “giving SUNY financial preferences because it is ‘predominantly white’” (Almanac 1993). A state court found in favor of the state, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to point to any specific discriminatory acts (Almanac 1996).
In 1993, a committee appointed by CUNY Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds issued a report calling for CUNY to act more like a unified system of higher education: It included recommendations that the colleges reorganize or consolidate some academic programs (Almanac
1994). Reynolds had been hired in 1990 from California State University, where she was well known for improving academic preparation for college. She brought with her a program called the College Preparatory Initiative (CPI). Beginning in 1993, students would need to have eleven academic credits on their high school transcript to be admitted to a senior college (nine for a
36 community college). By 2001, students would need sixteen academic credits, the same as before open admissions began in 1970. This included three years of sequential math, two years of lab science, four years of English and social science, two years of foreign language, and one year of fine arts. The CPI was not mandatory, however. Students who failed to have the required academic courses could be admitted, but they had to demonstrate competence in the missing areas or take courses in those areas once they arrived. The Board of Trustees was entirely aware of its voluntary nature: it prefaced its motion on CPI with the reminder that CUNY remained committed to providing a place for every high school graduate (Traub 1994). The purpose of the program was to work collaboratively with high schools to increase academic preparation, and it seemed to work as a signal despite having no actual consequences. At California State
University, the program had increased math and science enrollment at secondary schools by 20% over five years. But as Traub points out, CUNY students are far more diverse in economic circumstances and academic preparation than students at Cal State—CSU only accepts the top third of all high school students, and many of its campuses are located in wealthier suburban areas.
The CUNY administration used CPI to signal its commitment to higher academic standards to various actors in the policy environment. Since it was not feasible for political and educational reasons to increase standards in actuality, as that would reduce student access and opportunity, CUNY needed a means to signal its commitment to standards without actually increasing them. As a signal, CPI was moderately successful in the short term, despite having no real consequences for students. The New York Times called the plan “a broad plan to tighten educational requirements over the next decade” (McFadden 1992, A1). The CPI, according to
37
McFadden, demanded “tough new curriculum standards that would place a heavy onus on the city’s public high schools and their students, who make up a bulk of the student body.”
CUNY Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds had yet another program in mind when she was appointed, a plan to restructure CUNY's academic programs to improve efficiency and reduce duplication. Once she arrived, this became a high priority, in order to respond to CUNY's latest fiscal crisis. Reynolds established a committee chaired by Leon Goldstein, the president of
Kingsborough Community College, with the charge to investigate possible academic restructuring efforts. The committee returned with a 160-page report urging the elimination of programs throughout the system, euphemistically called Academic Program Planning. The faculty immediately saw the report as a bureaucratic infringement upon their traditional rights to evaluate and maintain academic programs, and reacted angrily. The president of the faculty union said, "If the purpose is to give more authority to the Chancellor, then it won't work. That would amount to an academic dictator, an academic Fuhrer. I don't believe the Chancellor would want such a designation" (Newman 1992a, A1). The argument was also put forth that a college without basic liberal arts programs is not a college at all. One history professor at Brooklyn
College responded, "If French is removed from Brooklyn College, it is no longer a viable and full-fledged four-year college" (Newman 1992b, B1).
The faculty was unified in its opposition to this APP initiative. "It's been an amazing sort of thing, because it's a proposal that has unified faculties in a way that I haven't seen in a long time. The traditional left-right divisions or whatever just don't exist on this. There is a very intense sense of outrage about this," said Hunter College's faculty senate chair (Newman 1993).
Faculty opposition turned out to be very effective, and Reynolds dropped the plan within six months (Weiss 1993a). The attempt was not entirely a failure, however. Forty-five programs
38 were voluntarily eliminated by the campuses, and the CUNY Board voted to institute academic program reviews throughout the system and to give the chancellor more authority in evaluating their results (McFadden 1993). Despite the apparent retreat, the Reynolds proposal continued to be attacked by faculty and even local writers and actors, including Tony Kushner, Ruby Dee,
Toni Morrison, and Susan Sontag, all of whom wrote editorials blasting the APP (McFadden
1993). Reynolds, however, later used her power of the purse to distribute an extra $15 million to colleges that backed the new proposal and scaled back their academic programs (Weiss 1993b).
Here we see a clear example of how, when this approach is instigated—cutting out or back programs to improve efficiency or avoid duplication—resistance is generally widespread.
Such a move is not just an affront to faculty governance. In their concern for protecting and extending access, faculty at CUNY saw that eliminating programs for the purpose of eliminating duplication within a statewide system would result in differential consequences for different segments of student populations.
Access was most directly challenged in the New York system when New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani called for an end to open admissions at CUNY—apparently in the name of academic standards. Throughout 1997, Giuliani had repeatedly called CUNY’s educational record “pathetic,” backed up by Governor George Pataki, who called its record “dismal.”
Although Giuliani and Pataki lacked authority to move on the issue themselves, they used their powers of appointment to bend the CUNY board to their will, as the governor appoints ten of its members and the mayor appoints five. Mayor Giuliani pushed hard to end remediation entirely throughout CUNY, including at the community colleges. After much discussion and compromise, the CUNY board eventually approved a plan in June 1998 to eliminate remedial education at the four-year colleges and to establish transition programs for students to meet the
39 new standard (Healy 1998a). The New York State Regents demanded to review the policy, which they approved in November 1999 with a number of compromises negotiated by members of Friends of CUNY, who had previously opposed any change in remedial policy (Arenson
1999) and after a favorable review by an outside panel (Zemsky et al. 1999).
The question of English proficiency was central. In May 1997, the CUNY Board of
Trustees adopted a policy requiring community college students to pass an English-proficiency test to graduate (Almanac 1997). In July, a state court judge ruled that the board had moved too hastily, and ordered CUNY to award degrees to 125 students who had failed the test. In January
1998, the president of Hostos Community College resigned amid charges that Hostos students lacked adequate proficiency in English.
Mayor Giuliani subsequently established a Task Force to investigate CUNY from top to bottom. The centerpiece of the Task Force’s work was the Schmidt report, produced by the
Mayor’s Advisory Task Force on the City University of New York and chaired by Benno C.
Schmidt, the former president of Yale University and president of the Edison Group, a corporation that provides private solutions to public school problems. Other members of the committee included Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute who previously had called for an end to open admissions and the termination of all remedial programs in the CUNY system. It also included then-Board chairman Herman Badillo, an architect of the new policy on remedial education. The report was primarily written by Roger Benjamin of RAND, the executive director of the Mayor’s Task Force and former primary author of a report calling for more accountability in higher education. This was a committee with an express mandate from the
Mayor, and the report reflects his political agenda more than other RAND reports for the
Mayor’s Task Force, which are often a vital source of data (e.g., Renfro and Armour-Garb 1999).
40
The Schmidt report claims to be “shocked by both the scale and depth of CUNY students’ remediation needs” (21), and by CUNY’s being “inundated by NYCPS graduates who lack basic academic skills” (5). The proposed solution was a more differentiated system in the name of “standards.” They advocated stratification by institution, by creating three tiers of senior colleges stratified by average SAT score; and stratification within institutions, by mandating that remedial students not be admitted to associate’s degree programs in community colleges. Thus the report recommended a five-tiered system of public higher education in New York, far more stratified than any other state system in the US. The basic mandate in the Schmidt report read:
"CUNY must strive to become a unified, coherent, integrated public university system, for the first time in its history. CUNY must rethink its architecture as a university, to focus the academic mission of its various campuses, to offer a range of higher education appropriate to the needs of
New York, to encourage excellence and efficiency, to reduce redundancy, and to make the whole greater than the sum of its parts" (Schmidt et al. 1999, 102).
Addressing remediation specifically, the Schmidt report advocated allowing “at least some” (35) of the CUNY community colleges to offer remedial education, but only under certain conditions. The primary condition was that “CUNY must recognize remediation for what it is: an unfortunate necessity, thrust upon CUNY by the failure of the schools, and a distraction from the main business of the University” (35). Further, the report argued that CUNY must recognize that
“some students’ basic skill deficits are so deep that it is highly unlikely they will be successful in reaching levels of preparation necessary for college study” (40). “It is far better that such students get the skills need [sic] for vocational training, for general literary [sic], or for English fluency, without wasting their time and money in remediation programs that aim to teach quadratic equations or how to write at college levels of sophistication, when such outcomes are
41 extremely unlikely” (40). Glaring errors aside, it is impossible not to scrutinize these remarks for their implicit class and race biases. The stance articulated in the report reveals how conservative political interests wrote off as unaffordable—or worse, wasteful—investment in at-risk (or non– native English speaking) students as potentially vital contributors to society.
Some effects of CUNY’s new policy were immediately evident. Increasing standards for transfer students forced CUNY to reject 2,000 applications for intra-CUNY transfers from community to senior colleges (Renfro and Armour-Garb 1999). Spring 2000 was the first semester when students were barred from admission to senior colleges for failing the FSAT remedial skills assessments in reading, writing, and mathematics. Approximately 600 students in
Spring 2000, or about 10% of the incoming class, failed the FSAT on their first try (Arenson
2000). An additional 350 students cleared the hurdle after participating in Prelude to Success,
CUNY’s intensive workshop to prepare students to pass the FSATs. A remaining 300 students did not pass, however, and remained barred from enrolling in the senior college that had admitted them. These data may indicate that the remedial policy has impacted more students than was estimated by the special panel hired by the Board of Regents to evaluate the policy (Zemsky et al. 1999), but far fewer than was estimated by Lavin and Weininger (1999a and 1999b).
In the CUNY Master Plan for 2000–2004, the Goldstein administration made evident that it embraced the (tiered) flagship idea. The plan articulated a vision that entails “creating a flagship environment within highly selective colleges and a university-wide honors college.” In other words, the intention was to create nationally prominent flagship programs and eventually
“a small number of highly selective colleges” rather than a single flagship campus. One strategy would be cluster hiring, where new full-time faculty would be hired in selected programmatic areas throughout the system. The flagship strategy was ostensibly part of “a comprehensive
42 strategy of institutional renewal” for CUNY, tied with the goals of “high standards” and
“accountability.” Whether this set of initiatives could bring about these goals as well as the elusive goal of a more integrated system was unclear. It is important to note, though, that the flagship idea was central to the new CUNY administration’s strategy to improve its relationship with the city and the state by responding to the Schmidt report recommendations.
This confluence of powerful economic and political pressures undeniably reconfigured the local expectations for CUNY, via demands for improved quality, efficiency, and productivity. As in other states, vocational programs were also aligned to meet the changing needs of local industry. Of course, some may view this to be a great improvement, tying college offerings more closely to the world of work. After all, they say, isn’t a college degree the ticket to social and economic mobility? Shouldn’t employability be a primary outcome of a college education, particularly since the cost is so high? Without the ability to secure steady and lucrative employment after graduation, how can students repay what they must borrow to attain their degrees? Yet others defend the innate value of a liberal arts education and its ability to produce well-rounded, well-educated individuals, citing those attributes as the “skills” necessary for success in work and in life. Limiting schooling at any level to job training, or tracking students into vocational or academic paths, risks undermining the educational process itself. The distinctive legacy of service by CUNY was to provide education that had both economic and social value to its students. Changes in the 1990s threatened to further stratify the system, designating community colleges to be the sites for remedial courses, tracking those students on a clear vocational path, and selecting others to have access to campuses with abundant resources.
The ideology of excellence held by New York neo-conservatives fueled a process of externally imposing priorities and policy changes on CUNY, significantly altering its admissions
43 practices and academic program offerings. One result of this process was to further alienate faculty, who already suffered from low morale due to the barrage of unwelcome external demands, the scrutiny, and the charges by legislators that faculty did not teach enough. Unlike in other states, where faculty workload was the subject of scrutiny—and performance metrics were imposed—in New York the faculty (especially at CCNY) became scapegoats, taking the heat for the system’s inefficiencies, and their liberal or radical politics were seen as a major obstacle to this agenda of excellence. The faculty for the most part saw this agenda as displacing the populist legacy of welcoming and socializing immigrants.
The case study interviews back this up consistently, portraying the external agenda as
“intrusive,” as administrators and faculty alike talked in extreme terms of being “under siege,”
“assaulted by a hit squad that reflected the Mayor’s choices” especially as perceived by those at
CCNY. They saw an alignment between the mayor, the CUNY Chancellor, and the Board as
“gunning for the university.” At BMCC senior academic leaders saw it similarly but expressed that they attempted to work together, doing what was asked but not to the point of
“compromising our integrity.” The faculty at all three sites—BMCC, CCNY, and SUNY Stony
Brook—at varying times perceived faculty control as having been displaced. As one put it: “The trustees own the curriculum and are not taking into consideration the types of students we are trying to educate,” including many who come with major needs for basic skills, a clear failure of the K-12 system. Administrators and faculty were in a difficult position, having to “accurately reflect what our students are doing. People are going to have to accept what is realistic.”
Across the country, members of the academy have feared that academic restructuring creates greater stratification across campuses within a system—which are as widespread as the boundaries of whichever state—that it ultimately deprives place-bound students of broad access
44 to fields of knowledge, while other students have access to more and better academic programs.
In fact it is highly likely that differential access to academic programs is not distributed equally throughout populations; quite the opposite. Academic stratification is most likely tightly linked to student characteristics such as race, class, and gender; as for example in the restructuring that moved students requiring remediation in the form of further English skills from their four-year universities to community colleges—both in California and New York (see above).
Technological advances may be one partial antidote for these stratifications. However, such restructuring severely limits the space for creative thinking in policy. For example, anyone educated is not likely to imagine that a university with no courses in French or Italian is offering its students broad and varied possibilities for exploring the history, culture, and art of western civilization. Although systemwide “academic planning” warrants greater deliberation, related initiatives may well remain stalled in a distributive struggle where entrenched interests and entitlements are played out.
45
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Endnotes Appendix F
1 Unlike the other two systems, the California Community Colleges have statutory protection (along with K–12 education) that provides workload and inflation funding increases.
2 The UC system has a unified budget, coordinated by the president’s office (UCOP). The practice has been that no campus-specific information is reported to the legislature, and this is credited with reducing campus tensions over the budget. The priorities in the UC budget are the result of meetings between the chancellors and their planning and budgeting vice chancellors. The budget is then negotiated between the president’s office and the executive-branch Department of Finance, and then with the legislature. Capital improvements are submitted separately on a five-year time line (Richardson et al. 1997). Perhaps the most difficult part occurs after the budget is passed, when the legislature provides a lump-sum appropriation to the university system. The subsequent allocations to the campuses are accomplished through yelling and screaming (Richardson et al. 1997), although a formula was devised and agreed to that distributes each year’s budget increment. The formula is driven by campus enrollments, with graduate students weighted more than undergraduate students. The California State University system budget also has been unified, and an enrollment-driven formula distributes the increment to individual campuses. From 1976 to 2000, UC campuses received far more state appropriations per FTE student than the other two systems. For the three case study sites in this study, the figures at the end of the century show UC Berkeley receiving $14,357 per FTE student, San Jose State $6,842, and San Jose City College $2,571 (Table 6).
3 In the 1990s at UC Santa Cruz, “disbarment” (expulsion) rates among upper-division students were much higher among transfers than students who had entered as freshmen, other factors notwithstanding, linked to their having fulfilled their lower-division requirements at other institutions, usually community colleges (Martin 2004).
4 The percentage of children living in poverty in California had been higher than the national average; and the average income of the poorest 20% of the population lower than the national average (NCPPHE, MU 2000, 71).
5 A website detailing the program and its features is available at www.itransfer.org.
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