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Max Scheler's Critical Theory: the Idea of Critical Phenomenology

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Max Scheler's Critical Theory: the Idea of Critical Phenomenology Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Summer 2014 Max Scheler's Critical Theory: The deI a of Critical Phenomenology Eric J. Mohr Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Mohr, E. (2014). Max Scheler's Critical Theory: The deI a of Critical Phenomenology (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/939 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MAX SCHELER’S CRITICAL THEORY: THE IDEA OF CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY A Dissertation Submitted to McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Eric J. Mohr August 2014 Copyright by Eric J. Mohr 2014 MAX SCHELER’S CRITICAL THEORY: THE IDEA OF CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY By Eric J. Mohr Approved July 11, 2014 _________________________________ Dr. James Swindal Professor of Philosophy Advisor _________________________________ _________________________________ Dr. Eugene Kelly Dr. Tom Rockmore Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy Reader Reader _________________________________ _________________________________ Dr. James Swindal Dr. Ronald Polanksy Dean, McAnulty Graduate School Chair, Department of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT MAX SCHELER’S CRITICAL THEORY: THE IDEA OF CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY By Eric J. Mohr August 2014 Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal This work explores the way core elements of phenomenology map on to the critical theory program in order to demonstrate phenomenology’s relevance for ideology critique. “Critical phenomenology” means putting the findings of phenomenology to work for the sake of social critique. I argue that phenomenology gains a critical edge precisely where many critical theorists suggest phenomenology withdraws from a critical function: on the basis of their theory of intuition. While Adorno takes phenomenological intuition to be another version of identity philosophy, he overlooks the significance of the way in which phenomenological givenness is incommensurable with, and at best only symbolized by, conceptual articulation. An awareness of the tension between logos (concept) and phenomenon iv (intuition) offers an opportunity for the phenomenologist to critique the substitution of lived-experience for conceptual variations of that experience, a tendency central to ideology. This is seen clearly in Scheler’s phenomenology. With the three concurrent components of his theory of intuition—the givenness of the intentional object; the givenness of reality; and the givenness of value—Scheler addresses all the main objections Frankfurt School critical theorists traditionally pose against phenomenology. And he insists on phenomenology’s importance for sociology and the sociology of knowledge. The fact that Scheler’s theories of intentionality and value are, as I argue, taken into an existential and social context, adds social relevance to his value theory. This is significant for the question of ideology and for emphasizing certain shortcomings of critical theory’s approach to this question. I suggest that phenomenology elucidates prior grounds for the possibility of emancipatory critique. The domain of the moral (love and the values the act discloses) is the common root of both theory and practice. The way a society thinks and acts is an outgrowth of attitudinal factors suggestive of certain patterns of valuation. Ideology is, in this case, an intellectual outcome of improper valuing. According to Scheler, rationality is in large part an expression of patterns of valuation, so a critique of rationality in its instrumental form, for example, has to be framed in terms of a moral critique of the trends of social valuation. v DEDICATION To John R. White, for personally introducing me to Max Scheler vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My engagement with, and interest in, Scheler’s philosophy began while I was an undergraduate, under the auspices of John White at Franciscan University of Steubenville. This work is dedicated to John for being so influential for my professional path and my research of Scheler. A word of thanks also to John Crosby and J. J. Sanford for their support and assistance at Franciscan University. At Duquesne, the encouragement and support from my director, James Swindal, to move ahead with a dissertation project on Scheler and critical theory that had such little academic precedent, was invaluable. I am also grateful for the cooperation of the Duquesne University Philosophy Department as well as the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts. The offer of the 2012-13 McAnulty Dissertation Fellowship was an enormous assistance toward the timely completion of this work. I am equally grateful to the Max Scheler Society of North America and the Max- Scheler-Gesellschaft for such rich intellectual fellowship. The MSSNA meetings over the last decade, which have provided a forum to share my ideas to a panel of excellent Scheler scholars, has been richly rewarding. In particular, my professional and personal relationship with Zachary Davis, MSSNA President, was and is invaluable. Thanks also to Michael Gabel and Guido Cusinato of the Max-Scheler- Gesellschaft, and to the late Manfred Frings, for their support. To my readers, Eugene Kelly and Tom Rockmore, I owe great thanks for their diligence and patience in helping me work certain things out. And to my colleagues, C. Dominic Alvarado and J. Edward Hackett for reading and providing feedback on certain parts of the work. vii The idea for the project crystallized around the time of the birth of my daughter, Juliana Magdalen, and came to completion around the time of the birth of my son, Andrew Francis, four years later. Special thanks to Jeanne and Joe Milburn for agreeing to watch Juliana so that I could write. And finally, my deepest heartfelt gratitude to my wife, Holly, who I started to get to know right when I began the doctorate program at Duquesne and has been such a patient, loving, and caring source of support during my eight years in the program. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………………iv Dedication……………………………………….…………………....……………………….……………………vi Acknowledgements………………..…………………………………………………………………………..vii INTRODUCTION Nonconceptuality in Phenomenology and Dialectics………………………………………..……..x CHAPTER ONE The Frankfurt School Critique of Phenomenology……………………………...…………………..1 CHAPTER TWO The Attitude and Object of Phenomenology……………………………………………………..….31 CHAPTER THREE Phenomenology and Reality……………………………………………………………………………….83 CHAPTER FOUR Science, Philosophy, and the Dispute about Values…………………….………………………139 CHAPTER FIVE The Historicity of Spirit and life………….….………….….………………..…………………………200 CHAPTER SIX Toward a Phenomenological Critique of Ideology…………………….…………..……………263 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………….333 ix INTRODUCTION NONCONCEPTUALITY IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND DIALECTICS The idea of critical phenomenology begins by designating phenomenological experience as a critical experience. By “critical experience,” I do not mean something overly problematic nor something very new. It refers to a level of incongruence or incommensurability between our lived-experience throughout the course of our daily, worldly interaction and the ability to think and articulate that experience conceptually. Arguably, this kind of experience is as old as philosophical inquiry, for it is behind Socrates’ admission that he knows that he doesn’t know, as well as his attempts to make the reputedly wise in Athens admit this as well. The idea is likely to have gained momentum in the modern period with Hegel; radicalized with Nietzsche and Lebensphilosophie; equally important, I suggest, to both phenomenology and critical theory; and continues in various forms within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, especially under Wittgenstein-influenced philosophy.1 Within a phenomenological context, this idea pertains to a type of meaning that early phenomenologists, and in particular Max Scheler, called “materiale,” i.e., a nonformal domain of meaning that does not submit to conceptual verifiability, nor is it reducible to sensible content. The concept “art” (or related concepts), for example, cannot exhaust the magnificence of this Botticelli or the brilliance of that Matisse. 1 Although much of this idea has its roots in Hegelian philosophy, it is an idea that is being phased out in certain sectors of analytic philosophy ironically because of the “Neo- Hegeliansim” of Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Following Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on the notion of the Given, they advocate making concepts and rationality pervasive in all perception and natural experience. x The concept “friendship” does not contain the nuances of meaning of individual friendships nor the meaningful differences among friendships with specific people. The concept of “family” is relatively empty in comparison to the meaning of one’s own; the conceptual classification of my home as just another house cannot account for the incongruence between the meaning of my house and those of strangers. The conceptual form “happiness” or “sadness” cannot express the varieties of joy or
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