The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

Occasional Papers Series [Online] Number 9, December 2007

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State: The Future of the Monopoly of Violence

Herbert Wulf

Publication details: The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (ACPACS) Occasional Papers Series [Online] ISSN 1833-9611

Copyright © 2007 Herbert Wulf

The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (ACPACS) The University of Queensland, Brisbane. Qld. 4072. Australia. Internet: www.uq.edu.au/acpacs Telephone: +617 3365 1763 Facsimile: +617 3346 8796 E-mail contact: [email protected]

All papers published in the ACPACS Online Occasional Papers Series are peer reviewed.

The views expressed in this paper, as in any of the Centre’s publications, do not represent the official position of the Centre. The ACPACS Occasional Papers Series and all other ACPACS publications present the views and research findings of the individual authors, with the aim of promoting the development of ideas and discussion about major concerns in peace and conflict resolution studies. Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page ii

Abstract

This paper examines contemporary challenges to the nation-state and critically assesses international interventions in conflict and post-conflict societies. The programmes of the international community aimed at state-building in such situations are considered too narrowly focussed on establishing or re-establishing state-centric institutions. Three factors which challenge the Weberian nation-state are identified: privatization of violence and force, internationalization of the application of force and globalization. Instead of concentrating efforts of post-conflict reconstruction primarily on state institutions and the recreation of a state monopoly of force, a model of a legitimate public monopoly of force is suggested which is based on the local, national, regional and global level. The thesis is that such a model, although it sounds utopian, is more realistic and in line with the international system than the predominant emphasis on the nation-state.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State: The Future of the Monopoly of Violence

Herbert Wulf

In the last analysis the modern state can only conflict societies. Scholars perceive the be defined sociologically in terms of a problems of many developing countries as specific means (Mittel) which is peculiar to generated by “the twin pressures of late state the state … namely physical violence making and their late entry into the system (Gewaltsamkeit). (Max Weber)1 of states” (Ayoob 1995: XIII). Since these societies are neither mature nor have fully War makes states. (Charles Tilly)2 developed as states, authors described them as ‘quasi’ or ‘pseudo’ states, indicating their incomplete formation and possibly emerging process (Jackson 1990). The failure of the Introduction: The Renaissance of state in the non-OECD world has been the State highlighted in an extraordinary outpouring The discussion of the role of ‘the state’ has of studies, many of which use alternative been revitalized in recent years both in terms such as fragile, collapsed, collapsing, weak, fragmented or high-risk states research and in politics. The renaissance of 3 the role of the state took, as its point of (Zartman 1995, Rotberg 2004). The notion departure, the rediscovery by scholars of the of the various concepts usually is that the agency of the state to shape social and fragility, weakness or weakening of the political processes (Evans, Rueschemeyer central state in favour of tribal, ethnic or and Skocpol 1985). This upsurge of interest other local authorities will result in anarchy in the state is manifold and at least four (Kaplan 1994). Implicitly and often different strands of thought can be explicitly, reference to an appropriate role of delineated: the state is based on the Weberian concept of the state. In Max Weber’s political thought Firstly: One issue of eminent concern is the the state lays claim to the monopoly of dissatisfaction with the functioning and legitimate physical violence within a certain effectiveness of the state as an actor or an institution in societies which experience persistent levels of conflict or in post- 3 Milliken and Krause (2002: 771) rightly point out that “state failure and state collapse must be 1 „Man kann vielmehr den modernen Staat distinguished from each other, and must not be soziologisch letztlich nur definieren aus einem subsumed under the vague, broad and ambiguous spezifischen Mittel, das ihm ... eignet: der physischen headings of political conflict or civil war. State Gewaltsamkeit.“ Max Weber (1919: 506). Translation collapse is different.” State maintenance in a according to Lassman and Speirs (1994: 310). weakened or stressed form is seen as the norm while 2 Charles Tilly (1985: 170). state collapse remains a rare phenomenon. Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 4 territory.4 When scholars argue that a state is towards building up state-centric institutions. fragile or has failed, or when major donors’ In these programmes the lack or inadequacy programmes engage in state-building5 this is of effective and efficient state institutions (implicitly) measured against a notion, a has been discovered as the main bottleneck hope or an expectation of a state as it should in the pursuit of security, peace and function. While the various terms signal development. These barriers can be differences in analysis or approaches for overcome, it is presumed, by external fixing the functioning of the state or intervention – in short: by social rebuilding it, they have in common that the engineering. Some scholars even offer state is malfunctioning, not functioning at all toolkits for the restoration of state-centric or has even collapsed. The classic case often institutions (Dobbins et al. 2007). Most of referred to is Somalia but many other the large international peace operations or societies are also listed as such failed, fragile post-conflict reconstruction programmes, or stressed states.6 like those in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Secondly: Based on such an analysis of Congo etc., can be classified in this category. ineffective, inefficient, weak or fragile They are based on a Western-oriented, states, the international community has liberal-value system which promotes developed intervention strategies to respond democratization. to crisis situations. Major donor countries and their associations like the Organisation Promoting democratization and a liberal for Economic Co-operational and market economy has become the lynchpin of Development (OECD 2005), multilateral most peacekeeping and post-conflict institutions like the International Monetary reconstruction programmes. The basic Fund and the World Bank in their post- assumption behind this notion is that conflict and poverty reduction programmes democratization and liberal market (World Bank 2006) and the United Nations orientation foster peace. However, the in their growing number of peace operations academic literature on what should come squarely address the role of the state and first, democratic elections to legitimize the concentrate their intervention and aid efforts central state’s government or to first establish the state institutions that can provide basic services, is highly 4 I use the term violence and force synonymously. The German term ‘Gewalt’, used by Weber, does not controversial and no clear-cut blueprint for differentiate between ‘force’ and ‘violence’. When post-conflict reconstruction is available the term state monopoly of force is used it always (Baker 2001, Paris 2004). Schneckener means its legitimate use. Similarly, when Weber uses (2007) classifies the various approaches of the term ‘Herrschaft’ this can, depending on its international state building programmes into context, mean ‘rule’ or ‘power’. 5 Throughout this paper I use the term state-building. four categories: liberalization first, security In the relevant literature the term nation-building is first, institutionalization first and civil also used. Nation-building usually refers to holistic society first and argues that none of the four development of a society, especially the creation of a approaches should have an exclusive priority national identity while state-building is directed more but that liberalization, security, at the development of functioning state institutions. 6 A list of fragile states is presented in an elaborate institutionalization and emphasis on civil empirical annual study of The Fund for Peace (2006). society should be pursued in parallel. The World Bank has set up a task force in 2002 on The focus on the need for efficient and Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) (World Bank 2006). Eight different types of rankings are effective institutions in the developing world summarized by Schneckener (2007, 40-44). is not new. In fact, the changing perception

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 5 of the state in political institutions resembles countries”, nevertheless clearly underlines a rollercoaster. Modernization theory, that a continuum runs from “bandits and especially in the Anglo-Saxon dominated pirates to kings via tax collectors, regional development theory of the 1960s and 1970s power holders and professional soldiers” predicted optimistically, but incorrectly, that who exercise violence on behalf of the state. once economic development was initiated it He defines war-making and state-making as would naturally lead to a liberal market organized crime (Tilly 1990). Of course, it economy and stable polities resembling makes a difference, if force is applied Western democracies. At a later stage, ‘legitimately’ – as states normally claim they during the 1980s, the state was do – or ‘illegitimate’. But the decisive predominantly perceived as inefficient, question is: How is the ‘legitimate’ bureaucratic and over-sized. Systematic application of force defined? At the liberalization and structural adjustment beginning of the state-building process the programmes – based on the so-called distinction between ‘legitimate’ and Washington Consensus – introduced ‘illegitimate’ use of force was not clear. It conditionality into development policies. was a long process and struggle until the During this period, the state was criticized nation-state became the monopolist of force. both for meddling too much in what should There can be no doubt that states have best be left to market actors as well as for the applied violence on a larger scale, more state’s tendency to make war and trample the efficiently and more effectively since they rights of individuals (Putzel 2005: 7). The have endeavoured to monopolize force. The pendulum has now swung in favor of good question of ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ governance: effective state institutions and a actions of states is not just of historical functional and legitimized state are interest. With the discourse on so-called promoted and assisted with aid by the ‘humanitarian interventions’ and the international community (Debiel 2005). ‘responsibility to protect’, it has been While the Washington Consensus of the elevated to the global sphere. The widely 1980s threatened with more ‘stick’, the accepted cornerstone of non-intervention in present policy offers more ‘carrot’. international law is increasingly questioned Thirdly: Somewhat different from the first in the context of the protection of human two approaches, scholars have concluded rights. The International Commission on that the state is the main perpetrator of Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001: violence against its own people. Colombia is section 6) calls the states’ legitimacy into perceived as such a state in which the agents question: of the state are responsible for the majority “Rather than accept the view that all of cases where violence is exercised states are legitimate…states should illegitimately.7 Possibly present day only qualify as legitimate if they Zimbabwe and certainly the Pol Pot regime meet certain basic standards of and the government in Equatorial Guinea fall common humanity…The implication into this category. Charles Tilly (1985: 169 is plain. If by its actions and, indeed, and 173), while emphasizing that “in no crimes, a state destroys the lives and simple sense can we read the future of Third rights of its citizens, it forfeits World countries from the pasts of European temporarily its moral claim to be treated as legitimate…In brief, the 7 I exclude here studies that argue war brings peace and therefore plead for giving war a chance (Luttwak three traditional characteristics of a 1999; Herbst 2004). state in the Westphalian system

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 6

(territory, authority, and population) model has never fully materialized. Given have been supplemented by a fourth, contemporary challenges, I shall argue that respect for human rights.” cross-cutting and intersecting grids at the local, state, regional, and global levels have Fourthly: There is the neo-liberal project to emerged as has increasing interdependence trim down the state to its core functions. and globalization. Thus, the nation-state has This neo-liberal scheme of ‘deregulation’ lost or transferred part of its sovereignty to aims at more efficiency, claiming that the other entities. Both upwards (to supra- private sector can perform many functions national or multilateral organizations like the better than the state. This trend of trimming EU as well as to private actors like the role of the state to its core competencies companies and NGOs) and downwards to has been dominant in OECD member states lower levels (such as local and district but is not limited to this group of developed associations). So why then the unquestioned or highly-industrialized countries. The emphasis on state-building? Why is the programmes of multilateral organizations victory of the state the best or even the only like the World Trade Organization (and solution to overcome political disorder and globalization in general) spill not only over peacelessness? into the non-OECD countries, they are specifically aimed at including all countries Furthermore, given the poor record of most into this design of a lean state. intervention programmes – measured against these programmes own criteria of short-term What are the effects of these different success – the question needs to be asked if approaches regarding the function of the the whole approach is based on a flawed state in conflict-prone and post-conflict understanding of the role of the nation-state. societies? It is surprising that the debate on This clarification will make it easier to the role of the state does not recognize the understand the disparities between the stark contrast between the pivotal role that theoretical model and the existing the international community places on challenges. In the last part of this paper, I building strong state-centric structures at a will suggest an alternative model to the time of globalization when typical state nation-state based monopoly of force, functions are de-nationalized and the role of namely a ‘public monopoly of legitimate the nation-state diminishes. force’ with a division of labor between the My reflections on the Weberian state, in the local, national, regional and global level. next section of this paper, grow from contemporary concerns. In this paper I will 2. The Weberian Model of the State consider the implications of the Weberian Monopoly of Force in Today’s ideal-type state for the current model of World state-building. Is it justified, particularly in international interventions and The key to the Westphalian modern nation- reconstruction programmes, to place such an state is the monopolization of legitimate exclusive emphasis on nation- and state- force (or organized violence). The state in building along the lines of the Weberian Europe became what Weber (1919) called model? The Westphalian ideal presupposes a the monopolist of the legitimate physical world with sharply drawn borders violence. Weber quotes Trotzky and agrees demarcating distinct, territorial jurisdictions with him that “every state is founded on administered in relative isolation from other force” (Lassman and Speirs 1994: 310). sovereign actors. However, this perfect Already before Weber, political thinkers like

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 7

Machiavelli and Hobbes had observed that ‘legality’, by virtue of belief in the validity states try to monopolize violence and that of legal statute and the appropriate juridical this process of centralization was a driving ‘competence’.9 force in state making. One of the central A normative postulation, based on the theory functions of the modern state – besides the of the democratic state, is narrowing the provision of welfare and the representation perspective to a single type legitimacy of the of its population – is the protection of its monopoly of violence, namely that it should citizens or, in modern terms, the guarantee be based on the rule of law and democratic of their security by establishing the rule of control. This is, of course, by no means a law. universally established practice. Even In the following section, I will consider how established Western states do not always the legitimate use of force can be meet the Weberian criteria of a modern state established, how this relates to governance in which the agents of the state exercise a and the challenges facing the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence over a monopoly of force as it is described by given territory and population. However, Weber. legitimacy is not – and Weber’s classification suggests so – contingent on a Legitimacy and Governance democratic process. Soviet and East European scholars have noted that belief in Weber describes the state as “a relationship the legitimacy of the state socialist system of rule (Herrschaft) by human beings over was rather linked to the state’s provision of human beings, and one that rests on the general welfare or public goods. legitimate use of violence (that is, violence that is held to be legitimate)” (Lassman and Legitimating the state through economic Speirs 1994: 311-312). He describes three development and entitlements to the forms of legitimacy to exercise the population is not a viable option in many monopoly of force: There is, first, the developing societies since the resources to authority of ‘the eternal past’,8 of custom. It exercise the wealth and welfare function of is the traditional power exercised by the the state are lacking. This is one of the root patriarch, by the patrimonial prince or by causes for the weakness of states. Some of elders. Then Weber points to the authority these societies might perhaps even be based on the exceptional, personal gift of electoral democracies in a formal sense, but grace, or charisma. He continues by not substantive. For example states might mentioning specifically the charismatic rule have an elected government, but one which as exercised by religious leaders, the does not practice good governance. The plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue and democratic procedures cast doubt on leader of a political party and, interestingly, whether they can be called democratic. More the warlord. This exceptional personal importantly in the context of the discourse charisma depends on the personal devotion on developing societies in general and to, and personal trust in the qualities of fragile states in particular, is that one or both leadership of the individual. Finally, the of the first two forms of Weber’s categories third Weberian category of legitimacy are rationally devised rules, rule by virtue of 9 One could add to this classification a fourth type of exercising power, the election of a leadership in a 8 In the German original Weber calls it the ‘ewig one-party system as it was (and in some cases still is) Gestrigen’, ringing a more negative connotation than practiced in communist societies in which case the the term ‘eternal past’ (Weber 1919: 507). legality is based on the dominance of the party.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 8 of legitimacy might apply: legitimacy of conditions during war, as in Somaliland and tradition or of a charismatic leader. Puntland, local authorities offered some However, in today’s modern state, according degree of security. Though not perfect, these to the Western norms and the liberal value services were better than what could be system, the first two forms of legitimacy are provided by the central state (Debiel 2002: discredited. The authority to exercise 42). legitimate force in the modern state rests, Secessionist Somaliland, a society not ideally, exclusively on the legality of the recognized internationally as a state, authority belonging to a democratically possesses a government and practices elected political leadership. governance. Bougainville, an island in the This notion is challenged here as too South Pacific belonging politically to the Eurocentric, too myopic. Traditional leaders, state of Papua New Guinea, has managed elders or other local authorities have in many with traditional approaches to solve a long- cases proven to be efficient providers of lasting internal war. Boege (2006) strongly security and able to contain violence. emphasizes both the need for a slow Several scholars have forcefully argued that (unhurried) as well as a co-operative governance is possible without government. approach of conflict solution. In this case, Even in countries like Somalia where the the traditional leaders and the customary central government collapsed in 1991, some means of conflict transformation are provision of security for the people is accepted by the agencies of the state as equal possible (Menkhaus 2007). For example, partners and methods. Menkhaus (2007: during the period when the Islamists where 101) calls such societies ‘mediated’ and the dominant political force in Somalia in Boege (2007: 1-5) speaks of ‘hybrid political 2006, external observers agreed that the orders’ in which not only a modern state but leaders were able to provide some security also traditional non-state actors have a part – for the people and to control the warlords. both in conflict as well as in conflict Of course, this concept of society was resolution and governance. neither appreciated in Addis Ababa nor in When the existence of such structures and Washington. Thus, the Ethiopian military their importance in managing daily life is intervened with US backing to drive the recognized, it becomes clear that the top- Islamist leaders out of the country. Mason down state-building approach according to (2005: 38) illustrates in the case of conflict- the Western model cannot be the only ridden Colombia that functioning authorities answer to provide security, to peace-building “can be found above, alongside, and and state-making. The decisive factor for a below the state; they intersect peaceful, or at least a less violent, future national jurisdictions and overlap one within these ‘hybrid political orders’ is that another.” ‘traditional’ non-state and ‘modern’ state actors are integrated and that they govern co- The potential and actual role of traditional, operatively. Political authority must be religious or other non-state leaders in exercised in an accommodative manner and conflict mediation and in containing not in competitive or confrontational ways. violence highlights the importance of the Examples of hybrid societies in which sub-national and local level. Decision traditional and modern state institutions co- making at the local level might unblock operate are Bougainville and Somaliland, ‘gridlocks’ that exist at the nation-state level while large parts of Afghanistan and Iraq are (Mehler 2002: 134). Under extremely dire hybrid but confrontational. Brown (2007), in

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 9 her study on several Pacific Islands, warns not by definition less arbitrary in their against the view ‘through alarmist lenses’ of political decisions than central state the ‘failing states’ concept and presents an authorities. abundance of sources of resilience in these Menkhaus (2007: 83) concludes: island-states with a mesh of ‘indigenous traditional’ and ‘introduced modern’ “However vulnerable these local governance structures. Characteristically systems of governance are, they have many of such societies are located the added advantage of enjoying a somewhere in between the co-operative and high degree of legitimacy and local confrontational approach. Often the agents ownership, something that cannot be of the state (in whatever rudimentary form said of the inorganic, top-down state- they might exist) and the non-state building projects associated with authorities ignore each other. This is, of national reconciliation conferences course, not an effective format of that have not only failed but have governance. undermined local polities in the process, leaving the country worse In societies where power or the use of force off than before.” is not as centralized as in modern states, ad hoc governance might be practiced by Many attempts at building modern central (traditional) political authorities at the local states’ institutions are castles built on sand. or sub-national level. These might be elders, Local structures in conflict-prone societies religious leaders or even warlords. These are often too weak to find a solution to end a localized politics are often violent, as the conflict. However, the opposite might also presence of warlords in conflict-prone states be the case, namely that solutions can only has demonstrated. However the leadership of be found by grounding them on local 10 traditional or charismatic leaders has often mediation. functioned as a positive mechanism to But as indicated above, today, the liberal- prevent violence or avert disintegration of a value and legally based concept seems to be society. The closeness to the local space is the dominant notion to react to crises likely to promote realistic and bottom-up situations in what is perceived as fragile decisions; local leadership and public states. The widely accepted wisdom in institutions are generally ascribed greater academic and political debate regarding the legitimacy than a distant central state. Their maintenance of stability in such states lies in familiarity with the history and root causes the development of democratic institutions of a conflict in their region facilitates their and a liberal market economy which ensures role in mediating between belligerent groups economic and social development and, furthermore, allows the various (Goldstone and Ulfelder 2005: 10). stakeholders to participate in the solution of problems. Conflict moderations at the local The emphasis on the need for local level have their strengths and weaknesses. ownership in the process of transformation The fact that they are better suited to the of conflict, in development programmes and local situation allows them to offer inclusion in state-building is – conceptually – and participation. Yet the authorities, particularly in traditional societies, often 10 A note of caution on what ‘traditional’ leadership disregard the essentials of democratic rule or ‘customary’ power might mean is appropriate. and might not be in conformity with Western Practically all societies have been influenced by standards of human rights. Local elites are colonization and or by globalization, including custom and tradition.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 10 uncontested. But what happens when theory populations. … To a larger degree, meets practice? How often do international states that have come into being donors, both governments and NGOs, realize recently through decolonization or the goal of local ownership? One of the through reallocations of territory by reasons this may be neglected is the self- dominant states have acquired their interest of many of these organizations. military organization from outside, There is some hubris that international without the same internal forging of organizations or donors are the decisive mutual constraints between rulers factors in most reconstruction projects. and ruled.” Further, it is typical within war-shattered and What is often missing in developing conflict-endemic societies that those groups countries and especially in fragile states is capable of taking local ownership of a the agreement which emerged in the transformation process, are either difficult to European state-building process of find by the international donors, or have a constraining the rulers and making them limited capacity to participate. The subject to courts, parliaments and the international community tends to go ahead withdrawal of funds. It is no coincidence with their programmes in such situations, therefore that the new states posses usually with good intentions, but regardless powerful, often unconstrained military of the potentially detrimental effects on the apparatuses which act like a (strong) state in indigenous structures. Local ownership is the (weak) state and seize power through pushed aside by pressing ahead with the military coups or indirect rule. When wealth internationally sponsored programmes to and the welfare entitlements, which act “as a create state-centric institutions. powerful glue that binds citizens to their What began on a broad front in the period of state” are lacking, fragility is a constituent decolonization continues in the present. The part of that society (Milliken and Krause United Nations promoted the European 2002: 760). state-building process to the world as a whole. It is usually imposed on emerging Undermining the State Monopoly of Force societies in a top-down approach, Weber defines the state as “that human irrespective of the need for widespread, community which successfully lays claim to community legitimation. This also occurs in the monopoly of legitimate physical violence the absence of legitimation-through- within a certain territory”, this territory material-wealth and welfare entitlements, being another of the defining characteristics which were dominant during the European of the state. The specific feature of the state-building process. present is that the right to use physical Tilly (1985: 185-186) points to an important violence is attributed to any and all other difference in the process of state-building in associations of individuals only to the extent Europe and in the developing world, which that the state for its part permits this to appears in military organization. happen. The state is held to be the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence “European states built up their (Lassman and Speirs 1994: 310-311). military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject From this Weberian notion of the state populations and by means of several conditions of a functioning state and selective extension of protection to the intensification of state power can be different classes within those

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 11 delineated (Kaldor: 1997, Tilly 1985: 181, Westphalian concept of the monopoly of Ayoop 1995: 22-23).11 violence.12 First, the expansion and consolidation of the Privatizing Force territorial domain, the actual war-making, in A recent trend in many countries, both in eliminating or neutralizing the external developed as well as developing countries, is rivals. This entails the eradication of private the privatization of violence and security. I armies, the establishment of regular, state- distinguish between two different types of controlled professional armed forces and the privatization: bottom-up through warlords, creation of a centralized state system with militias, rebels, para-military groups, gangs organized war-making activities. and organized crime and top-down through Second, the internal pacification and the outsourcing of traditional military and police maintenance of order in the territory, or the functions to the private sector, intentionally state-making which involves eliminating undertaken by a number of governments rivals inside the territory, and establishing (Mandel 2001).13 The privatization of durable instruments of surveillance and violence and security, whether by default policing for control within the territory. bottom-up or via a deliberately planned top- Third, protection of the people, the security down approach, is a fundamental challenge function. This is achieved by establishing the to the state monopoly of force. The rule of law and the representation of the Weberian concept of the ‘state monopoly of people, including the establishing of courts force’ entails, as shown above, the and assemblies. elimination of private armies and the disarmament of other armed non-state actors. The fourth function on which the first three depend is the acquisition of the necessary The bottom-up violence can be seen as re- means by extracting resources from inside emerging ‘customary local’ orders of or outside the state (taxations, levies, violence. The state-monopoly of force is the customs duties etc.). This entails establishing modern application of force and the top- a state apparatus, a rational state bureaucracy down privatization of force could be with fiscal structures. The impetus to carry classified as post-modern. The ‘customary out this function is the centralization and local’ and post-modern privatization of monopolization of the means to exercise violence and security reverses a centuries- force. old development of establishing a legitimate modern state monopoly of violence by What is the relevance of these factors in disarming citizens in the process of state- today’s state-making and conflict-prevention building. The new trend undermines and efforts? How close do nation-states come to this ideal-type and how distant are 12 developing societies? What trends challenge This section draws on a previous publication of the author (Wulf 2005). the Weberian concept? It is argued in this 13 Privatization of security is not limited to the paper that three trends: the privatization of military alone. It is pursued in many countries in force, the internationalization of military other security areas too, especially in police and functions and globalization, pose such judiciary services. This aspect, though of relevance, is fundamental challenges to the Weberian not specifically addressed in this paper. Top-down privatizing is also called outsourcing. In the United state, that there is a need for a post- States privatizing in legal terms actually means the sale of government assets while outsourcing describes 11 The authors have used different ways of classifying contracting a service. In this paper I use the terms the various criteria. interchangeably.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 12 fundamentally challenges the process of undertaken by the armed forces and the establishing a legitimate state monopoly of police (Cilliers and Mason 1999, Lilly 2000, force. Musah and Kayode 2000, Lock 2001, Singer 2003). While the internationally accepted Many governments in developing countries, norm of a state guarantee for the public good particularly in fragile states, are no longer, or of ‘security’ still exists, its implementation is have never been, capable of guaranteeing not always possible. This does not mean that law and order. Their police and military states no longer play a role in wars and forces are too weak, too corrupt or unwilling conflicts; for private actors are often fighting to exercise the rule of law and the state over the very political control and power of monopoly of violence. Further, the activities the state itself. Zones of asymmetric security of non-state actors can either directly or have emerged, or rather zones of insecurity implicitly threaten sub-state groups with for the poor and zones of relative security violence. The result of the economic and provided for people and their wealth by political activities of the non-state actors is private companies. widespread insecurity. As a consequence of this insecurity other private actors, especially The different processes and forms of private military and security companies, are violence and the application of force in increasingly hired by governments, customary, modern and post-modern international organizations, businesses or societies is schematically illustrated in individuals to carry out tasks previously Figure 1.

Figure 1: Organization and Application of Force

status customary local modern post-modern orders state weak, fragile nation-state globalized process of force bottom-up privatization legitimate state top-down privatization application of violence monopoly of force of force forms of violence and intra-state war, disarmament of non- outsourcing of police application of force warlordism, para- state actors and military functions military violence, to private security and organized crime military companies, continued existence of national forces regulation of conflict customary local rule of law, courts rule of law, courts, conflict mediation largely unregulated private actors of violence

Numerous new companies have emerged interventions have resulted in serious which offer military and security services. personnel bottlenecks in the armed forces. The order books of the companies are full Private contractors are booming as a and still growing now that military budgets consequence of the Iraq War and its are increasing. Many international aftermath. Many of them face serious

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 13 recruiting problems since not enough former activities, including the sensitive Special Forces with experience in combat areas of military and police are available. This affects the quality and functions. training of contract personnel. Private firms are seen by the promoters of To profit from the growing market, the privatization as an alternative in companies regularly hire personnel who are upholding public order if the state has not up to the task or who have a dubious insufficient security forces at its disposal. In service history. addition, private actors are attractive to The causes and motives for the top-down, governments, since they are only paid for the post-modern privatization, the outsourcing services they deliver; a standing regular of military functions to private military army or police force, whether deployed or companies are manifold and sometimes not, always costs resources that might be overlapping. At least eight military, scarce. Military and police skills are now economic, political and ideological reasons offered on a contract basis in the global for this type of privatization can be market. Experts for almost any military or identified:14 police job can be contracted. Hence, economic power can now be more quickly • over-capacities of the armed forces transformed into military power. The after the end of the Cold War which Weberian criterion, the creation of regular led to the decommissioning and professional armed forces, is not principally demobilization of millions of questioned. National armed forces continue soldiers; to exist, although their personnel strength • a shortage of specialized troops in the has been drastically reduced and numerous various international interventions of functions are outsourced to private armed forces; companies. In defending or promoting outsourcing of • changes in war fighting and the use military functions, the most common of modern equipment which cannot argument used is economic in nature. be maintained by the armed forces According to the dominant economic theory, without the back-up services of the market is better qualified to handle these companies; functions and carry them out more • demand for security services by weak efficiently than the armed forces themselves. or besieged governments; But the private sector still needs to produce the empirical evidence that it can contribute • demand for protection by agencies to solving some of the budgetary difficulties engaged in international of the defense sector and, at the same time, interventions and emergency aid; provide the expected security. The actual • intensified demand for armed forces economic results of privatization of military in the ‘war against terror’; functions in the United States and in the United Kingdom – the two countries most • public critique of employing troops advanced in their outsourcing efforts – in wars far from home; illustrate that the enthusiasm for • the neo-liberal concept of the ‘lean privatization is not justified. The evidence of state’ that aims to curtail many state the experience shows that often more gains in efficiency are promised or hoped for than 14 A more detailed elaboration in Wulf (2006: 13-15). are actually delivered (Wulf 2005: 185-192).

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 14

To be quite clear, the delegation of in the sovereignty of states if governments traditional state functions to non-state actors cannot provide the most basic state functions is not per se problematic. The crux of the or if they grossly violate human rights. issue is not who exercises force (public or The international interventions call into private actors) but how the application is question the sovereignty of the nation-state organized (if private actors are regulated and as it is perceived by the Weberian concept. controlled) (Brauer 2007). At present this Intervention signifies an intrusion into the development of privatization occurs largely inner dealings of a nation. This is done with outside the control of parliaments or the the intention to change or retain the political public and is – if at all – under the control of power structures in that nation. There exists the executive. But even governments are a potential tension between the principles of often unaware of what military companies state sovereignty and equality among nations are doing on or close to the battlefield expressed in the UN Charter on the one (Schreier and Caparini 2005, Wulf 2005: 56- hand, and the special protection of individual 59). and collective human rights on the other. Internationalizing Force Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates that The international community has “nothing contained in the present progressively tried to respond to outbreaks Charter shall authorize the United of violence and wars through concerted Nations to intervene in matters which interventionist efforts, and if necessary, by are essentially within the domestic military means. The number of international jurisdiction of any state.” interventions authorized by the UN has Yet, the UN Charter also demands the intensified since the end of the Cold War protection of human rights in accordance with considerations of the moral with the Universal Declaration of Human responsibility and humanitarian concerns Rights. The primacy of political sovereignty taken into account, in order to save lives and and the principle of non-interference were to prevent gross human rights violations. It is given the highest status at the United claimed, and supported by empirical data, Nations until the end of the Cold War. The that the number of genocides and prevailing opinion was based on the international crises has declined sharply in assumption that the consensus gained recent years; internal wars have been in through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 steady decline as has the average number of concerning the absolute sovereignty and people killed in conflict (Human Security equality of states served as the basis for Centre 2005). The United Nations High- international order. Dissolution of this level Panel on Threats, Challenges and consensus, it was believed, would have Change (2004: 33) stated: resulted in anarchic power struggles. “In the last 15 years, more civil wars However, already during the Cold War, and were ended through negotiations than much more so after its end, the tendency to in the previous two centuries in large acknowledge the status of human rights as part because the United Nations an international rather than an inner-societal provided leadership, strategic co- topic gained force. Implicitly this led to ordination, and the resources needed questioning the absoluteness traditionally for implementation.” accepted under the principle of non- This positive trend correlates to the interference. Gradually (and often internationally perceived need to intervene reluctantly) governments accepted certain

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 15 limitations on their conduct out of a growing Annan, called for a reinforcement “of the respect for human rights (MacFarlane 2002: international norm of intervention for the 34). protection of civilians” (Annan 1999: 82). The publication of the Agenda for Peace in The International Commission on 1992 in which preventive diplomacy, peace Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), building and peacekeeping measures in post- established by the Canadian government, conflict situations were underlined, addressed the two mutually exclusive expresses well the enhanced self-confidence principles of non-interference and of the United Nations. Western intervention on behalf of human rights. The governments, having promoted Commission expressed its desire to change democratization and human rights protection the terms of the debate, arguing and as official goals of their foreign policies, concluding that it was not a question of a were hesitant to reject interventions when ‘right to intervene’ but of the ‘responsibility tabled in the name of democracy and human to protect’. The Commission suggested that rights. The high number of deaths inflicted military interventions needed to be based on by wars coupled with an increasing number certain threshold criteria, namely just cause, of refugees as well as changes in the nature right intention, the military as last resort, of warfare and its consequences, led to the proportional means, reasonable means and promotion of humanitarian aspects including the right authorization. requests for ‘humanitarian intervention’. At In his report, In Larger Freedom, the UN the beginning of this new development, Secretary General takes up this issue in Security Council resolutions highlighted the 2005. While arguing that there is a need for exceptional character and the uniqueness of strengthening the sovereignty of states to the situation (humanitarian necessity in the enable them to provide the security of its intervention in Somalia in 1994, and the citizens, he also made it clear that: preservation of democracy in Haiti 1994 “the international community should were emphasized) in order to avoid creating embrace the ‘responsibility to a binding precedent for future protect’, as a basis for collective interventions.15 However, the Security action against genocide, ethnic Council increasingly justifies resorting to cleansing and crimes against military means by stating the necessary humanity.” (United Nations, protection of human rights, preservation of Secretary General 2005). democracy, ending of civil wars, or safeguarding the survival of refugees – thus He emphasizes that the United Nations needs referring to humanitarian concerns. to become more, not less, actively engaged. This principle was accepted when the The reasoning became that the international September 2005 World Summit of the community should not only be allowed to United Nations called intervene in cases of gross violations of human rights, such as genocide and ethnic “for the acceptance of a universal cleansing but should in fact be obliged to do principle of the responsibility to so. The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi protect civilian populations from crimes against humanity when governments are unwilling or unable 15 These were the first UN Security Council to do so.” (United Nations 2005). Resolutions mandating the use of force which argued on the basis for protection of human rights and maintenance of democracy.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 16

This liberalist internationalist claim is an emerging supra-national forces such as in the attempt to codify international legitimacy for EU. Despite the fact that these forces are still new interventionist norms. This can only organized nationally, their missions and their happen at the expense of the nation-state. engagement with other troops go beyond The pendulum has clearly swung from an national borders. There is an inbuilt tension emphasis on non-interference towards between the international tasks and the interventions in defense of human rights. national organization of the military. Given the actual missions of the military and the But the enforcement of liberal and gradual shift of decision making towards the democratically motivated humanitarian international level, national armed forces are interventions within the scope of the United an anachronism. Nations is confronted with a series of problems. The United Nations Security Precisely because the military possesses the Council has mandated interventions instruments of ultimate power, it is highly selectively which can only be understood by important to regulate its legitimacy, civilian recognizing the power politics operating control and accountability. Yet it is exactly within this body. Furthermore, the UN is a owing to military requirements that the hybrid system of an intergovernmental military is the least democratically structured organization which does not function organization in most countries. The conduct according to democratic rules and at the of the military in situations of armed conflict same time acts as the highest authority on and its command chain structure collides questions of war and peace which promotes directly with the concepts of liberty and the establishment of democracy and liberal individuality (Kohn 1997: 141). Expert values through its interventions. This studies offer a plethora of systematic inherent tension makes it an organization in analyses on the institutionalization of need for reform. Moreover, the phenomenon democracy in nation-states. Likewise, the of unilateral interventions conducted without literature on global governance hosts many a UN mandate has by no means come to an future-oriented publications, yet the end, as the NATO intervention in Kosovo democratic control of the armed forces and and the Iraq War sufficiently document. the question of responsibility in international Moreover, the UN member states do not operations are poorly researched (Ku and provide enough financial and human Jacobson 2003, Born and Hänggi 2004). resources to enable the UN to perform all of While many nation-states possess elaborate the peace building and peacekeeping tasks and systematic doctrines for military that they are called upon to fulfill. operations containing clear delimitations of In addition to the emergence of new competencies and responsibilities, similar international norms on intervention and its regimes on the international level are almost fundamental effects on the role of the state, a completely lacking for UN peacekeeping second consequence of the policy to missions concerning the civilian control of intervene is of importance, namely the military operations and responsibilities for effects on the structure of the armed forces. norm compliance. For military operations Decision-making about their deployment conducted under the auspices of the UN the gradually shifts from the national to the requirement prevails that military international level. A certain degree of commanders are responsible to civilian internationalizing armed forces is due to the authorities – mostly the UN Secretary international orientation of UN peace General. The Security Council authorizes operations, of coalitions of the willing and missions, yet the armed forces are

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 17 responsible to their respective national state is being emptied of some of its authority. Moreover, it has become common functions. practice that those units operating under UN Globalization and the ensuing erosion of the command touch base regularly with their nation-state are a fundamental challenge to national superiors. the efficacy of state-orientated monopoly of International democratic control of the force inasmuch as globalization leads to de- armed forces has not developed in parallel to nationalization and promotes the relocation the international military interventions and of authority, from the nation-state to supra- the reorganization of the forces. A culture of national actors. Although wars might be accountability for the decision-makers is manifest at the local level, the political glaringly absent. Democratic control, if economy of armed conflicts has effects on exercised at all, takes place at the national whole regions and conflicts are fuelled from level as in the past but not internationally. beyond national borders. Market Accountability and democratic control of liberalization, deregulation and neo- internationally implemented interventions is conservative economic agendas have – as a rule – more complex and complicated contributed to a freer flow of goods and than national deployments. The question is, services, including the financing of wars. whether the exclusively nationally-oriented The opening up of societies to the globalized democratic control of the armed forces – economy through liberalization programmes, conceptually as well as practically – serves structural adjustment or transition policies, the purpose of multinational missions or if has resulted not only in liberalized markets this control is no longer sufficient and needs and potential for growth but also in severe to be reformed? Truly internationalized social disruption and unrest, including job military institutions and structures are still losses, decreased production and increased not very common. Born and Hänggi (2004) inequality. As a result, many individuals and correctly point out the democratic deficit in groups have turned to operations in the international and regional organizations as informal or shadow economy, ranging from well as in the national context. They speak reliance on support from relatives or clan about a ‘double democratic deficit’ in members in the Diaspora, to moonlighting, decisions about war and peace – nationally to clearly illegal transactions such as and internationally. smuggling, corruption, black market Globalization dealings, warlordism, drug dealing and trafficking in humans and weapons. The The concept of the monopoly of force, which partial integration of some societies into the served as a model beyond Europe is not only world economy has led to cross-border spill- questioned by the privatization and over of violence and economic and military internationalization of force. The state spin-in effects. Outside funding, cross- monopoly of force is also challenged by the border sanctuaries for combatants, external development that an undisputed national reservoirs of violence and military inflows of entity no longer exists. National boundaries finance, personnel and weaponry are now have become increasingly contested and important components in wars (Reno 2000). porous due to the processes of globalization. Duffield (2001) has called wars that are Many actors are able to operate outside the fuelled by and rely on such external factors boundaries dictated by the logic of ‘network wars’. This term points to the fact territoriality. Conceptually and in reality, the that not only NGOs but also warlords act locally and think globally.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 18

The Weberian criterion of a state’s control different format to exercise force aptly and over a given territory has probably never according to agreed norms. It is suggested been fully implemented. The European here that the multiple layers of authority nation-states never had tightly closed which already exist are integrated into a borders; they had interactions with system of shared authority over the neighboring countries and did not posses full monopoly of force. Such a new agenda control over their territory. However, their breaks with conventional accounts of the control over the territory was much tighter monopoly of force concept in which the than that of states in the globalized world. nation-state is conceived as the sole While in the classic period of the nation- appropriate agent.16 state, states were striving for full control of A Conceptual Framework for a Multi- their territory, globalization points into the level Monopoly of Force opposite direction: open, porous borders, liberalized markets and multilateral regimes The reconstruction of the monopoly of rather than state control. violence is not just about re-establishing the central state monopoly of force and the In conclusion, the major impact of respective institutions. A more holistic privatizing and internationalizing military approach is necessary to establish rules and functions and of establishing new norms for regulations. It is important to consider both international interventions is an elementary the internal and external linkages between change in the application of force and the different authorities claiming to have the role of the military in its relation to the right to exercise force. A system of a nation-state. Globalization has changed the segmented, but carefully crafted public basic concept of the nation-state. In most monopoly of force with a clear division of cases national governments alone can no labor should be based, in a kind of a longer take decisions regarding war and the ‘matryoshka’ system, on the following four use of force. Interestingly, concepts of state- levels of authority: building for conflict-prone states have re- emerged now, though the increase of global • the local level, which might consist threats as well as intra-state violent conflicts of federalist structures (in developed and wars make concepts of national security states) or traditional or indigenous appear outdated. forms of shared authority (based on clan, kin or religion) in less Given the challenges within a globalized developed countries. The local level world, the concept of legitimate monopoly offers proven forms of leadership, of of force with its orientation towards the exercising authority and of regulating nation-state needs to be reformed. I propose violence. Even in war-torn and a shift from the state monopoly of force to a conflict-prone societies, zones of multi-level public monopoly of force based governance can be found; on the local, the national, the regional and the global level. • the national level, with credible and accountable institutions of organized 3. The Need for a Multi-level Public force and good governance; Monopoly of Force • the regional or sub-regional level, A logical consequence of the weakening of with regional organizations engaged the nation-state and its inability to institute the monopoly of force is the need for a 16 This section draws on Wulf (2006).

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 19

in providing security, moderating and orders between customary and state safe-guarding peace agreements and authorities. This rivalry or even antagonism facilitating peace beyond the various can create friction or violent conflict. national boundaries; and Oligopolies by definition are faced with the prospect of competition which might evolve • the global level, through the United into dysfunctional structures. A system of Nations, and including accepted multiple authorities is likely to produce international principles and agreed competition between the different authorities norms. and incompatibilities among different levels The intention of proposing such a model is of legitimacy. When one authority to overcome the narrow Westphalian type encroaches on another, this inevitably means territorial fence, the national space. Given a loss of authority for one actor and gain for the globalized world, with hybrid political another. To avoid a ruinous zero-sum game, societies, with porous or non-existent nation- clear and accepted rules for the legitimation state borders, with underdeveloped states must be spelled out. To create the suggested and with asymmetric zones of insecurity, the multi-level public monopoly of violence as future lies not necessarily in trying to re- an efficient and functional instrument, a set establish a nation-state monopoly, but rather of agreed rules is a precondition. Otherwise in a multi-level public monopoly of force. A the system will be bogged down in fights multi-level legitimate public monopoly of over competencies on who exercises the force comes closer to the present reality of various powers. The system must function the international system since it addresses smoothly for there to be a chance to move the different and actually already existing away from the present situation of a levels of political decision-making. destabilized or distorted monopoly of force There are, of course, daunting practical in many parts of the world, towards difficulties of implementing a multi-level establishing a legitimate public monopoly of public monopoly of legitimized violence violence. regulation. Besides problems of What would a set of agreed rules look like? implementation, such a system is faced with The introduction of a multi-level public two conceptual problems: How shall the four monopoly of force requires creating a different levels be legitimized, given the normative and institutional framework of competitive format of legitimation and the order. However, such a system cannot acute deficit in democratic processes at all function if introduced top-down. Mason four levels? Further, how must authority be (2005: 48) in her study on authorities in apportioned at the different levels to avoid Colombia concludes: disputed sovereignties and guarantee a “Authority is not something imposed functional division of labor between these from the top down which consenting segmented authorities? behavior then ratifies. Rather, it is a A multi-level monopoly is an oligopoly social and political relationship based since the powers of a monopoly need to be on interests, norms, identities, and shared between authorities at the different ideas, continually being reproduced levels. This is the topical background to the and modified through the everyday, vociferous arguments about proposals not to shared expectations, and causal touch the sovereignty of the nation-state logics of individuals and versus the ‘responsibility to protect’ as well communities.” as the competition in many hybrid political

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 20

Two crucial functional principles (illustrated their role, as I shall detail below. This would on the following page in figure 2) should leave the UN as the highest authority to provide the basis. First, the monopoly of ensure peace and security only as a last violence should be exercised according to resort. the subsidiarity principle, that is, in a The second principle is based on supremacy, bottom-up approach the lowest level should on a hierarchy of authority. Norm setting be the starting point and only when the local takes place top-down, whereby international level is not capable or cannot be tasked with norms prevail over regional or sub-regional, exercising the monopoly of force should the regional over national and national over next higher level be entrusted with the local levels. The UN has higher authority mission. This concept is, for example, than the regional organizations, the region is exercised in many federal states where a placed higher than the national level and the federal authority (or even local community nation-state has prevalence over the local or counties) executes police functions. Very level. Political thinkers like Hobbes and seldom is this principle applied in societies Rousseau have already pointed to the fact with viable traditional leadership and that agreement on such norms is extremely parallel existing centralized administrative controversial. This has not changed and is and legislative organs, mainly because demonstrated regularly in the UN Security traditional leadership is perceived as pre- Council. modern, out-dated or ineffective. The violent conflicts and wars that are In developed systems the subsidiarity occurring are a striking illustration that not principle prioritizes local and federal levels all four levels will actually be functional and of authority, the function of the police and cannot be expected to exercise their foreseen judiciary, rather than the nationally oriented role in this model effectively and efficiently. armed forces. The central state will only The multi-level approach is designed become involved if the task goes beyond the precisely for such situations where one of local level or if the instruments of the four levels is lacking or incompetent. legitimized organized violence at that level The authorities at the other levels are prove to be incompetent or inadequate. If the intended to practice damage control by nation-state level is ill-equipped or incapable compensating for a dysfunctional level, thus of exercising the monopoly of force, the task preventing the partial or complete is delegated to a regional or sub-regional breakdown of the monopoly of violence. It is organization. Typical examples for such a argued here that the multi-level approach role at the regional level include the capacity will not accumulate problems, but that the to facilitate a peace accord or to prevent the weakness at one level (for example at the trade in humans, drugs or weapons. Regional national level) can be compensated for by organizations already have, according to the the level below (at the local or federal) or UN Charter, such a function. However, in above (the regional or sub-regional level). practice they are often not equipped to fulfill

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 21

Figure 2: Establishing a Multi-level Monopoly of Force subsidiarity principle: monopoly of force supremacy principle: bottom-up top-down global regional ↑ national ↓ local exercising the monopoly of norm setting force

Conceptual considerations and numerous potentially important actors in maintaining practical reasons can be listed to demonstrate peace, conceptually they are somewhat how difficult it is to establish such a system overlooked in-between the UN as the highest as all four levels experience shortcomings. authority and the nation-state with its salient feature of state sovereignty. In Asia, for At the local level there is often a example, an accepted regional organization disconnection between the customary, with full membership of all states of the traditional leadership and the state which has continent does not even exist. In other often been introduced without observing the continents or regions, the organizations already existing institutions. Often, local suffer from a lack of legitimacy as well as leadership has emerged as a consequence of from weak or underdeveloped capacities to failures of the state authorities to deliver the exercise a public monopoly of force. state functions to the population. Many societies face multiple challenges, they At the global level, although the UN is the might be marked by corruption, dominated highest authority on peace and security, its by criminal networks, suffering from weak activities are often heavily biased and public institutions and a functioning civil contested. International norms are society may be non-existent. Indigenous selectively applied because double standards (subsistence and informal) economies are of members prevail. Conflict regions might not sufficient to sustain the livelihood of the be assisted with crisis prevention people and they are threatened by programmes but all too often they are at the international economic developments. mercy of the interests of the dominant powers. The central state level, although usually still considered as the most important agent in Establishing a Multi-level Legitimate exercising the monopoly of force, is Public Monopoly of Force presently incapable in many countries. The debate about the failure of states and the The regional organizations are often too lack of security in almost all post-conflict inept to perform their missions, not just situations signifies the high priority for the because of a lack of capabilities but more so creation of a monopoly of force. It is because of deep-rooted political differences specifically promoted by the proponents of a amongst their members and the ‘security first’ approach. Despite all the unwillingness of most states to devolve anticipated difficulties that the sovereignty functions to the regional body. implementation of a multi-level public Although they are recognized by the UN as

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 22 monopoly of force will encounter, the The Local Level: Multiplicity of Authority proposal suggests an avenue out of the and Hybridity present crisis. The foundation of the suggested multi-level There are a few basic principles that need to public monopoly of violence is an be observed to make such a concept viable: institutionalized division of power between In legal terms this public monopoly of force the different levels. This relationship can must be based on the rule of law. best be described, in the case of developed Interventions in whatever form and at states, as a set of constituent governments whatever level must be based on clear and variously denominated as states, regions or legitimized norms. In political terms it must provinces. Such an established and widely be clear that military intervention is not an accepted system of power sharing does not alternative to diplomacy, negotiations and exist for societies with strong indigenous conflict mediation or moderation. This was leadership based on customs, but it is indisputably spelled out in the 1992 Agenda essential for the survival and a peaceful for Peace, although since then often violated. future of such societies that a political order Despite the claim of governments, it is is found to coexist with the ‘hybridity’ rather questionable that the military has been used than trying to overcome it by suppressing the as a last resort, when political and diplomatic traditional way of life. measures have failed. It seems that the cry The opinions in political theory and practice for military intervention in crises often on the usefulness of federalism and even comes before other means have been more so on ‘hybridity’ are divided. Federal applied. Militarily, if the aim is to control or hybrid structures are seen as causing too violence, force may have to be applied. The much diversity or too much unity, too much criteria for the use or non-use of force needs regionalism or too much centralism and a to be clearly established in order to find an constant competition between centrifugal appropriate and effective compromise and centripetal forces is debated. between the applications of massive firepower and doing nothing (Kaldor 1997). These diverse political powers can be seen Economic reconstruction is a means to make as a seedbed of democracy and participative societies (not necessarily the nation-state) politics, which can broaden legitimacy, limit function again. If these efforts, under the the ‘terror of the majority’, widen citizenship label of state-building, in practice consist by institutionalizing multi-ethnicity and only of economic liberalization in the providing for sub-national competition, thus international community’s protectorates by stimulating local self-governance, innovation reinforcing the old clientele structures and and efficiency. The counter-argument siphoning off scarce resources – then the assumes that sub-national authoritarianism is continuation of fighting or re-emergence of preserved, rule along ethnic instead of conflict and the dissolution of a fragile peace democratic lines are promoted, regional can be expected (Pugh 2004). Culturally, it disparities are fostered, the rule of law is is necessary to rethink norms for undermined, and the rise of demagogues is interventions and the conditions for facilitated (Heinemann-Grüder 2005). The sustainable peace. Cosmopolitan policies empirical experience offers results to support and practice should be the guiding principle, both of the divergent positions. offering participation to citizens in political Devolution of political authority requires decision-making and emphasizing diversity, shifts of responsibility which might also rather than uniformity. include the monopoly of force. For

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 23 advocates, decentralization, similar to by their rivals. It still remains a considerable federalism, is seen as a positive mechanism challenge to consolidate a complex to prevent violence or avert disintegration of administrative network of liberal democratic a society. It is asserted that the proximity to and traditional administrative structures – the local space is likely to promote realistic two levels of administration which have not and bottom-up decisions. As I argued above, coexisted (Albrecht 2005). In contrast, in political solutions at the local level have Afghanistan for example, the problem is the their strengths and weaknesses. Central lack of a monopoly of force at the central governments frequently react with state level. State structures scarcely exist and centralization measures to control or for centuries the rulers of Afghanistan did overcome politicized heterogeneity or not manage to extend their rule beyond a few regionalist movements. This can easily result urban centers. The development still suffers in a disconnection between the state from a clientele network of regional and institutions and the every-day life of the local warlords in parallel alliances of people (Brown 2007). Opponents to convenience and competition. Violent decentralization and federal systems point conflicts and wars arising from erosion or out that local leadership frequently proves as disintegration of the state are but one side of violent and authoritarian as their the coin. The other side is that the very counterparts at the national level. The emergence of the nation-state has misuse of power which can occur at the contributed in many cases to violence or has central state level, can happen locally as disrupted traditional local pre-state/or hybrid well. Delegation of power to the lower level mechanisms for conflict management. Wars can help to ameliorate conflicts but can also and large-scale violence have arisen as a lead to their exacerbation if the local result of state formation, as for example in authorities are not impartial in conflicts over today’s Sudan where century old conflict group rights (Mehler 2002). The subsidiarity management mechanisms had previously principle mentioned in this section above been used (Deng 2000). calls for decentralization. The National Level: Institution-building To complicate matters further, often the The nation-state still has an important role to central state is manipulated by strongmen in ensure security, especially at the end of the capital with excessive top-down control conflict, but, at the same time, many states from the centre and abuse of public offices are incapable of fulfilling that function but only limited authority at the local level. effectively. Despite the predicted demise of It would seem that strengthening the local the state and the dire experiences with weak level, if properly legitimized, could or fragile states, it is still national counterbalance the focus on the central governments which remain critical in government. In Sierra Leone, for example, at international relations, whether it is a the end of the civil war, the chiefdoms were decision to fight war, intervene in conflicts, reinstalled and entrusted with additional to arm or disarm. International policy authority to devolve power. The difficulties remains decidedly state-centric – even in the division of labor between the though its importance is gradually reduced. jurisdiction of local councils and chiefdoms became quite evident and turf wars were Provision of security has been described as imminent. Critics of this policy complain the priority function of the nation-state in that these chieftains were created by the post-conflict societies. However, looking at colonial powers and are now deeply resented the record of central governments’ decisions

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 24 in post-conflict situations, the results are at A central thrust of this paper is the argument best mixed. To properly establish and that too much attention in recent peace control the agents of the state monopoly of building reconstruction programmes is force, a legitimized government with focused on the national level, precisely functioning state institutions is required. It is because the national space no longer is the an extremely difficult task to build effective exclusive state authority. Hence, state institutions where such institutions reconstruction programmes and particularly have no tradition and where competing the creation or re-establishment of the authorities exist. There seems to be monopoly of force needs to be addressed not consensus that, when the international just at the state level but beyond and below. community intervenes, the military This is particularly the case for peacekeeping operations are usually the easiest part, while operations. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham the rebuilding of state institutions and (2005: 142) argue that peacekeepers should successfully fostering governance are as be released from an overly state-centric difficult as ensuring a sustainable peace. control system. They address this chiefly with regard to the policy of sending states The supporters of a policy of ‘democracy and highlight that for each peacekeeping first’ argue that no efficient state institutions mission the UN depends on the decisions of can be established if a culture of the governments of the UN member states. accountability within decision-maker Instead, the peacekeepers should be spheres is absent and if the government is answerable to a more transparent, not appropriately legitimized. Civil conflict democratic and accountable institutional and governance issues such as corruption, arrangement based on a permanent military abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of volunteer force recruited directly among accountability, corrodes states from within. individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan State failure undermines governance and rather than patriotic values. This is what the adds to communal, national and regional authors call a post-Westphalian or instability. The proponents of the concept of democratic peacekeeping – peacekeeping ‘institution-building first’ argue that war- that is not solely focused on the nation-state shattered societies will not be able to as the main actor. establish democracy instantly and that an externally imposed democracy will not be The Regional Level: Increasing accepted at once. Usually, both of these Responsibility and Capacity concepts overlook and do not appropriately Regional organizations should have an take into account, that external interventions immediate interest in promoting peace since do not take place in a vacuum but that local civil wars normally affect neighboring structures exist and that some of them are countries through spill-over and viable structures of authority. In addition, the destabilization. In cases of conflict, regional shock therapy which usually accompanies bodies have the strongest vested interest in the reconstruction and democratization formulating an immediate response to programmes includes market oriented contain the problem. Regional organizations economic reform which can exacerbate can play an important role in addressing rather than ameliorate conflicts by stressing security threats and are well placed to free market competition and thus driving the monitor peace agreements and produce early trends towards societal inequality – at least warnings of a crisis. Reform proposals to in the short and medium term. that regard have been made (United Nations General Assembly 2000). The experiences in

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 25

Europe have facilitated the prospects for a to launch a largely successful peacekeeping more active and expanded responsibility of operation. This was, however, a coalition of regional organizations. Since the 1990s the the willing under the auspices of the United United Nations has continued to emphasize Nations since no regional organization was the importance of regional organizations in capable of taking over the responsibility. promoting and facilitating peace and Regional organizations suffer from four stability within their respective regions. weaknesses which need to be overcome to Because of the proximity of regional establish a functional multi-level monopoly organizations they can function as a of force: continental or sub-continental forum to de- escalate tensions, mediate conflicts and Contested sovereignty: The concept of the promote a comprehensive regional approach function of regional organizations with for cross-border issues (UN General respect to the sovereignty of nation-states Assembly 2001: 31). remains in many cases contested. Usually states refuse to transfer functions to the In reality, however, most regional regional body. Delegating traditional nation- organizations have no convincing record to state authority to a regional body is jealously justify such expectations. Given their present guarded and opposed by most governments. structure, institutions such as the African Most regional bodies stress their character as Union (AU), the Organization of American intergovernmental organizations that might States (OAS), the European Union (EU), the cooperate and pool resources, but Association of South East Asian Nations nevertheless their members refrain from (ASEAN), the Organisation for Security and relocating governmental authority to the Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the regional body. This presents a barrier for an Organization of the Islamic Conference enhanced role for ASEAN. Similarly, the (OIC), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and AU policy of international peace missions is, others are not in a position to apply the despite some change, still strongly monopoly of violence effectively. In recent influenced by the predecessor’s years several regional organizations have (Organization of African Unity, OAU) started to take over responsibilities for the heritage of non-intervention into the internal promotion of peace. The EU, the OSCE and matters of its members. the AU have all carried out security interventions in recent years.17 Early Overlapping responsibilities: The division of warning mechanisms have developed and labor among regional organizations is enabled regional organizations to monitor unclear and competitive. This is especially critical developments. Regional institutions the case when geographically overlapping can also mediate among parties to a conflict. organizations exist, such as the EU, OSCE Yet, among the ASEAN member states, the and NATO in Europe; the AU and discussion on regional security is only in its ECOWAS, the Southern African emergence. The experience in East Timor Development Community (SADC), the has illustrated that peacekeepers, which were Intergovernmental Authority on mainly recruited from the region were able Development (IGAD) in East Africa and the OIC in Africa; similarly ASEAN and the

17 In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization OIC in the Middle East. Even in cases of (NATO), not being a regional organization but a largely overlapping memberships as within military alliance with global reach, has also the EU and NATO the role of these two intervened, at present most prominently in organizations in cases of crises has been far Afghanistan.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 26 from clear and their division of labor highly to build up its own military capacity, it is controversial as the Kosovo war in 1999 accepted wisdom that not many more troops demonstrated, or as can be gathered from the than the number at present could be continuing debate and competitive behavior deployed in the various peacekeeping regarding ISAF and Enduring Freedom missions. ASEAN, with virtually no troops in Afghanistan. peacekeeping facilities of its own, is a case in point too. A recent example is Africa: in Fundamental political differences: Many Darfur, by August 2004, when the killings of regional organizations lack common and civilians were still at a very high level, there fundamental values that are fully accepted were fewer than 300 AU soldiers in place to by all members. Often a compromise, guard an estimated 1.5 million Darfuris addressing emergencies, wars and other driven from their homes by government- regional concerns, is based on the lowest backed militias. Only by mid-2005 the AU common denominator, resulting in inaction peacekeeping forces had increased to 3,000 or mere lip service of the regional body. In troops. Requesting coalitions of the willing contrast to the EU, for example, no other to do the job instead of a regional important regional organization includes organization is a typical reaction in a only democratic member countries. The situation of incapacity of the responsible work of the Organization of American States regional bodies. Ad hoc coalitions can bridge (OAS) has time and again suffered from or circumvent the gap when a lack of fundamental political differences within the agreement within regional organizations organization, which often found its appears. The disadvantage is that such expression in the distrust of the dominant coalitions can only be formed on an ad hoc economic and military power of the United basis. This makes long-term commitments States. The AU is occasionally still forced difficult or impossible and adds to the into inactivity in violent conflicts because of problem of legitimizing a peace force when the lingering political differences among the members of the regional organization object members. The conflict within the SADC to an engagement. during the 1990s concerning procedures of the military intervention of its members in The balance sheet of the regional the DRC was not resolved for many years. organizations’ experience in peace keeping While some governments wanted to is no reason for optimism. In practice, intervene militarily and did so, others regional organizations have proven that they insisted on using diplomatic means only are almost as awkward and inflexible as the (Berman and Sams 2000: 175). UN themselves; practical measures often fail or are forgone because of a lack of political Lack of capacity: The final weakness is the agreement. Old traditional and historical absence of adequate institutions to antagonisms and differing attitudes continue implement decisions, for example to execute to exist. sanctions, and the lack of military muscle to project force if required in a crisis situation. To prevent the misuse of interventions by The lack of military power might even be an regional organizations it would be necessary asset since it forces regional organizations to to strictly follow the logic of the norm get more active and efficient in preventive supremacy principle described above. Norm diplomacy. Lack of strong military forces setting needs to take place from top to can prevent policy makers from hastily bottom, with the UN as the decisive resorting to military interventionist means. authority. This is already practiced in part, Even in the EU which has undertaken efforts for example, by the South African

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 27 government who has made its participation The UN Security Council already has a in peace missions contingent upon a mandate monopoly to authorize the use of force at the from the UN or the AU. This rule should be global level. This, however, is not the same applied as a universal standard. as a monopoly of force. A lack of capability is but one part of the problem. In addition, The Global Level: Norm Setting and the UN suffers from a fundamental Democratization conceptual flaw. The executor of the global United Nations activities and programmes authority to apply force is not controlled by a are not neutral. As long as they are legitimized body and operates instead subjugated by the dominant economic and according to the veto of the powerful military powers they serve primarily as a permanent members. This de-legitimizes its tool for problem-fixing or band-aid solutions actions. This deficiency in global for the existing world system, even though governance is the specific bottleneck and such peace operations and humanitarian barrier to creating the globally required and interventions might be morally justified. The democratically legitimized monopoly of functioning of the international system, and violence. with it the multi-level monopoly of violence, Reform of the UN has been suggested at depends on the enhancement of international various levels, most of them aimed at an norms - a world order in which nation-state improving the organization’s efficiency, as sovereignty is limited in accordance with the well as its peacekeeping and peace building existence of a higher-level executive capability. Other suggestions aim at authority in addition to regionally and changing the membership of the UN globally accepted legal norms. The above Security Council to represent the present mentioned deficiencies of the UN – namely global power relations rather than those of its hybrid system of being an 1945. Suggestions for true democratic intergovernmental organization which does reform however are mainly discussed among not operate according to democratic rules academics and NGOs, but not seriously and at the same time acts as the conscience among the member state governments. of the international community, as well as It is obvious that the UN capacity to being the highest authority on questions of guarantee peace, if necessary via military war and peace – require fundamental means, could be greatly improved through reforms. Despite these organizational and technical, organizational and financial conceptual insufficiencies and despite the reforms, which is less ambitious than the gap between the theory and practice of level of reform called for by an elementary international norms, there is no realistic democratization of the UN. For example, the alternative to the UN. suggestion of standby contingents for Decisions to assist a member state or to peacekeeping would enhance the flexibility intervene on humanitarian grounds are of the UN and allow for quicker reactions in presently taken selectively – à la carte. It is times of crisis. not the provisions and obligations of international law but political opportunity Conclusion and power politics which constitute the decisive criterion in the world of state One might dismiss the proposal of a multi- power. Thus, the concept of a responsible level monopoly of violence as unrealistic ‘international community’ is still far from and utopian. The idea of such a model is to being a reality. find an alternative to the eroding state

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 28 monopoly of force. As argued in this paper There is a need to continue to develop the future lies not necessarily in re- international norms so that interventions are establishing a nation–state monopoly, but no longer based on arbitrary decision making rather in a multi-level public monopoly of at the UN Security Council. Even when UN violence. A multi-level legitimate public mandated peacekeepers intervene on monopoly of force is more in line with the humanitarian grounds, this mandate suffers present day international system which is no from a democratic deficit. The decisions to longer primarily a nation-state system. The intervene, although according to present fundamental assault on the international law and accepted norms, are Westphalian nation-state system is so far- taken by a highly politicized UN Security reaching that alternatives need to be Council in which democratic rule is not considered. This has been recognized de represented. Stricter criteria for when to facto at the local level by the emergence of intervene are required to avoid the selectivity leadership in severe situations of fragile and arbitrariness of these decisions and to states and at the global level by the creation hold the decision-makers accountable. of transitional administrations or UN There is a need to reform the state monopoly protectorates, but conceptually, peace of force. Reconstructing the monopoly of building is still considered as a hopefully force should not be geared primarily to short-term transition to establishing a creating or re-establishing efficient functioning nation–state. This perspective is institutions at the level of the nation–state. too narrow. Instead a carefully crafted division of labor What is required is a paradigm change – in exercising the monopoly of force at the which is reflected in the various reports on global (UN), regional (regional the ‘responsibility to protect’ – that neither a organizations), nation-state and local level is strong and sovereign nation-state nor the UN needed. At the same time there is a need for with its intervention capacities are the only strengthening the enforcing capacities of the primary institutions to solve problems of ‘legitimate monopoly of force’ at some of insecurity and violent conflict. Both the local the suggested levels. At present, most of the level and the regional level need to be capacities are concentrated at the nation- seriously involved in conflict prevention, state level; the UN has to beg national conflict mediation and post-conflict governments for the deployment of forces reconstruction. International (and in many when a crisis arises even after the Security cases national) law must accommodate the Council mandates a peacekeeping operation. suggested division of labor between the The problem is even more prevalent at the local, national, regional and global level. regional level. The governance tasks are too complex for The movement towards creating new single nation-states to handle, especially international norms for intervention in the those states that are in crisis or have emerged name of ‘protection of human rights’ and the from conflict.18 occasional establishment of UN protectorates, as for example in Kosovo, illustrate that the traditional nation-state 18 One aspect not further considered here is the need monopoly of violence is not universally for an effective regulation of private military viable. However, this basic challenge to the companies to overcome the legal grey zone in which they presently operate. This includes the prevention of certain security tasks, particularly the actual public sector and a taboo for private military fighting, which should remain the prerogative of the companies.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 29

Westphalia nation-state system has not yet led to the conceptual formulation or practical establishment of an alternative system. The suggestion for a legitimate multi-level public monopoly of force, with a division of labor between the different levels and acceptable and agreed norms for the application of force, is intended to be a contribution to conceptualizing such an alternative.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 30

Brown, Anne M. (ed) (2007) Security and References Development in the Pacific Islands. Boulder Albrecht, Peter (2005) The Sierra Leonean and London: Lynne Rienner. State in 2005: Revisiting the Root Causes of Brauer, Jurgen (2007 forthcoming) ‘Private the Conflict. KAIPTC Paper 9. Accra: Kofi Military Companies: Markets, Ethics, Annan International Peacekeeping Training Economics’, in Andrew Alexandra, Marina Centre (KAIPTC). Caparini and Deane-Peter Baker (eds) http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/no_9. Private Military Companies: Ethics, Theory, pdf. and Practice. Annan, Kofi (1999) ‘Two Concepts of http://www.aug.edu/~sbajmb/paper- Sovereignty’. The Economist, 18 September. PMCs.pdf. Ayoob, Mohammed (1995) The Third World Cilliers, Jackie and Peggy Mason (eds) Security Predicament. Boulder: Lynne (1999) Peace, Profit and Plunder? The Rienner. Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies. Pretoria: Institute for Security Baker, Pauline H. (2001) ‘Conflict Studies. Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace’, in Chester A. Debiel, Tobias (2002) ‘Haben Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Krisenregionen eine Chance auf tragfähigen Aall (eds) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges Frieden?’, in Tobias Debiel (ed) Der of Managing International Conflict, pp. 765- zerbrechliche Frieden, pp. 20-63. Bonn: 784. Washington: United States Institute of Dietz Verlag. Peace Press. Debiel, Tobias (2005) Dealing with Fragile Berman, Eric G. (2002) ‘African Regional States. ZEF-Discussion Papers on Organisations’ Peace Operations: Development Policy No. 101. Bonn: Developments and Challenges’. African Zentrum für Entwicklungsforchung (ZEF). Security Review 11 (4): 33-44. Deng, Francis M. (2000) ‘Reaching Out: A Berman, Eric and Katie Sams (2000) Dinka Principle of Conflict Management’, in Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and William I. Zartman (ed) Traditional Cures Culpabilities. Geneva: United Nations for Modern Conflicts, African Conflict Institute for Disarmament Research ‘Medicine’, pp. 95-126. Boulder and (UNIDIR). London: Lynne Rienner. Boege, Volker (2006) Bougainville and the Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Discovery of Slowness: An Unhurried Beth Cole DeGrasse (2007) The Beginner’s Approach to State-Building in the Pacific. Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica: ACPACS Occasional Paper No 3. Brisbane: Rand Corporation. Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557/. Studies (ACPACS). Duffield, Mark (2001) Global Governance Born, Hans and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2004) and New Wars. The Merging of The ‘Double Democratic Deficit’, pp. 203- Development and Security. London: Zed 215. Ashgate: Aldershot. Books. Duffield, Mark (2005) Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror. Paper prepared for the Conference

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 31 of the European Association of Development Kaplan, Robert D. (1994) ‘The Coming Institutes. Bonn: Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, http://www.eldis.org/cf/search/disp/DocDisp Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are lay.cfm?Doc=DOC19533&Resource=f1. Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet’. Atlantic Monthly 273(2): 44-63. Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Scocpol (eds) (1985) Bringing the Kohn, Richard H. (1997) ‘How Democracies State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge Control the Military’. Journal Democracy University Press. 8(4): 140-153. Goldstone, Jack A. and Jay Ulfelder (2004- Ku, Charlotte and Harold K. Jacobson (eds) 05) How to Construct Stable Democracies. (2003). Democratic Accountability and the The Washington Quarterly: 28 (1): 9-20. Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas (2005) Press. ‘Russia’s Ethnofederalism: Under- institutionalize, not Self-sustaining’. Lassman, Peter and Ronald Speirs (eds) Unpublished paper presented at the (1994) ‘The Profession and Vocation of conference “The Russian Federation and the Politics’, in Weber: Political Writings, pp. EU: New Dimension of Regionalism and 309-369. Cambridge: University of Federalism”. University of Leuven, 8 Cambridge. November 2005. Lilly, Damian (2000) The Privatization of Herbst, Jeffrey (2004) ‘Let Them Fail: State Security and Peacebuilding. London: Failure in Theory and Practice’, in Robert I. International Alert. Rotberg (ed) When States Fail. Causes and Lock, Peter (2001) ‘Sicherheit á la Carte? Consequences. Princeton: Princeton Entstaatlichung, Gewaltmärkte und die University Press. Privatisierung des staatlichen Human Security Centre (2005) The Human Gewaltmonopols’, in Tanja Brühl, Tobias Security Report 2005. Vancouver: Debiel, Brigitte Hamm, Hartwig Hummel (http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index. and Jens Martens (eds) Die Privatisierung php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Ite der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und mid=63). Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess, pp. 200-229. Bonn: International Commission on Intervention Dietz Verlag. and State Sovereignty. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect. Luttwak, Edward N. (1999) ‘Give War a http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28508-201-1- Chance’. Foreign Affairs 78 (4): 36-44. DO_TOPIC.html. MacFarlane, S. Neil (2002) Intervention in Jackson, Robert H. (1990) Quasi-states: Contemporary World Politics. IISS Adelphi Sovereignty, International Relations and the Paper No. 350. London: The International Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). University Press. Mandel, Robert (2001) ‘The Privatization of Kaldor, Mary (1997) ‘Introduction’, in Mary Security’. Armed Forces & Society 28 (1): Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds) 129-151. Restructuring the Global Military Sector, pp. Mason, Ann C. (2005) ‘Constructing 3-33. London and Washington: Pinter. Authority Alternatives on the Periphery:

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 32

Vignettes from Colombia’. International Rotberg, Robert I. (ed) (2004) When States Political Science Review: 26 (1): 37-54. Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mehler, Andreas (2002) ‘Dezentralisierung, Machtteilung und Krisenprävention’, in Schneckener, Ulrich (2007) Internationales Tobias Debiel (ed) Der zerbrechliche Statebuilding. SWP-Studie 10. Berlin: Frieden, pp. 121-140. Bonn: Dietz Verlag. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Menkhaus, Ken (2007) ‘Governance without Schreier, Fred and Marina Caparini (2005). Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Law, Practice and Governance of Private Building, and the Politics of Coping’. Military and Security Companies. DCAF International Security 31 (3): 74-106. Occasional Paper No. 6. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Milliken, Jennifer and Keith Krause (2002) Armed Forces (DCAF). ‘State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details. Strategies’. Development and Change 33 (5): cfm?lng=en&id=18346&nav1=4. 753-774. Singer, Peter W. (2003) Corporate Musah, Abdel-Fatau and J. `Kayode Fayemi Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military (eds) (2000) Mercenaries: An African Industry. Ithaka: Cornell University Press. Security Dilemma. London and Sterling, Tilly, Charles (1985) ‘War Making and State Virginia: Pluto Press. Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter B. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Development (OECD) (2005) Making Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State Back In, Poverty Reduction Work. pp. 169-191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/5/3483987 8.pdf. Tilly, Charles (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990 - 1992. Paris, Roland (2004) At War’s End. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Blackwell. Press. The Fund for Peace (2006) Failed States Pugh, Michael (2004) ‘Peacekeeping and Index 2006. Critical Theory’. International Peacekeeping 11 (1): 39-58. http://www.fundforpeace.org/programmes/fs i/fsindex2006.php. Putzel, James (2005) ‘Globalization, Liberalization, and Prospects for the State’. Trotha, Trutz von (2000) ‘Die Zukunft liegt International Political Science Review 26 in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der (1): 5-16. Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit’. Reno, William (2000) ‘Shadow States and Leviathan 28: 253-279. the Political Economy of Civil War’, in Mats Berdal, and David M. Malone (eds) Greed United Nations (2005) The 2005 World and Grievances. Economic Agendas in Civil Summit: An Overview. Wars, pp. 43-68. Boulder and London: http://www.un.org/ga/documents/overview2 Lynne Rienner. 005summit.pdf United Nations General Assembly (2000) Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 33 their Aspects. Report of the Special Woodhouse, Tom and Oliver Ramsbotham Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (2005) ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the New York: (A/55/305). [Brahimi Report]. Globalization of Security’. International Peacekeeping 12 (2): 139-156. United Nations General Assembly (2001) Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the World Bank (2006) Engaging with Fragile Secretary-General. New York: (A/55/985 States. An IEG Review of World Bank and S/2001/574). Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress. United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/ Challenges and Change (2004). A More Wulf, Herbert (2005) Internationalizing and Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Privatizing War and Peace. Basingstoke: New York: Report of the High-level Panel Palgrave Macmillan. on Threats, Challenges and Change. Wulf, Herbert (2006) Good Governance United Nations, Secretary General (2005) In Beyond Borders: Creating a Multi-level Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Public Monopoly of Legitimate Force. Security and Human Rights for All. DCAF Occasional Paper 10. Geneva: http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.h Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control tml. of the Armed Forces (DCAF). http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details. Weber, Max (1919) ‘Politik als Beruf’, in cfm?lng=en&id=18340&nav1=4. Gesammelte Politische Schriften, pp. 505- 560. Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958. Zartman, William I. (ed) (1995) Collapsed Quoted and referred to in the text according States: The Disintegration and Restoration to Lassman, Peter and Ronald Speirs (eds) of Legitimate Authority. Boulder and (1994) ‘The Profession and Vocation of London: Lynne Rienner. Politics’, in Weber: Political Writings, pp. 309-369. Cambridge: University of Cambridge.

Challenging the Weberian Concept of the State ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 9, December 2007 Page 34

The Author Prof. Dr. Herbert Wulf was Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) from its foundation in 1994 until 2001. He is presently a research associate at BICC. This paper was mainly written in spring 2007 while working as a visiting scholar at the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (ACPACS). Herbert Wulf has served as a consultant to various international organizations, among them the Parliament and the Commission of the European Union as well as to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Human Development Report of UNDP. He served as consultant to the United Nations Development Programme in Pyongyang, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea on capacity building in disarmament between 2002 and 2007.

In his previous research positions he was Deputy Director of the Institute for Development and Peace at the University of Duisburg, Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. He studied at the Universities of Cologne (economics), Mannheim and Hamburg (sociology) and wrote his dissertation at the Free University of Berlin in international relations. He taught at several Universities in Germany, Scandinavia and the United States. Prior to his work in research, he was Director of the German Volunteer Service in India. In February 2007 the Center for Conflict Studies of the Philipps-University in Marburg in Germany awarded the Peter-Becker price for peace and conflict research to Dr. Herbert Wulf. His research fields include governance, with UN peacekeeping and the future of the monopoly of violence, internationalization and privatization of conflict and the privatization of the armed forces, arms production, arms trade, arms industry conversion and arms control and disarmament, especially within the UN system. A particular regional interest relates to India (in development cooperation theory) and North Korea (the nuclear ambitions). He has written extensively on these issues. His latest book is Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace (2005) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Acknowledgement I would like to thank ACPACS, especially its Director Kevin Clements, for the opportunity to work for several weeks at ACPACS. This paper has greatly profited from the discussions at ACPACS. In particular, I would like to thank Volker Böge for his comments on an earlier draft of the paper, for extremely helpful comments by two anonymous reviewers and to Patricia Manley and Anna Nolan for editing the manuscript.