ISS PAPER 265 | SEPTEMBER 2014 Radicalisation in Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Republican Council

Anneli Botha

Summary Despite a history of extremism and unconventional political developments in Kenya, relatively little empirical research has been done to determine why and how individuals join al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). This paper is based on interviews with Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan individuals associated with al-Shabaab and the MRC. These organisations have very different profiles. Al-Shabaab pursues an Islamist terrorist agenda while the MRC pursues a secessionist agenda; the latter has not carried out terrorist attacks. Muslim youth have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they see as government-imposed ‘collective punishment’ driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals are potential terrorists. As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/ religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase.

Islamist extremism did not appear used as a battleground to target the Qaeda and al-Shabaab’s philosophy in Kenya for the first time after the United States and its interests, individuals in traditional African communities has country’s military intervention in involved in the attacks included both allowed al-Shabaab in particular to in 2011 or with al-Shabaab’s subsequent foreigners and locals. Since then spread throughout the broader region, attacks on Kenyan restaurants, public violent extremism has gradually lost its including in Kenya. The most dramatic places and churches. The first significant exclusively foreign character and national manifestation of the group’s abilities manifestation of the growing threat and regional extremism has expanded, to strike beyond Somalia came when of extremism in post-independence which suggests that there must be a it successfully executed attacks in East Africa can be traced back to the local/national and regional element to this Kampala, , on 11 July 2010 and again on 21 September 2013 in 7 August 1998 attacks on the US growing threat. , Kenya. In the first instance, the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Although the objective of this paper is group used two suicide attacks as its Salaam, , which were attributed not to provide a historical analysis of modus operandi, while in the Kenya to al-Qaeda. al-Qaeda’s and al-Shabaab’s presence strike attackers resorted to a Mumbai- Although a number of political officials in in Kenya, it is important to recall that style assault on the Westgate shopping Kenya and Tanzania claimed that their al-Shabaab’s roots are in Somalia, mall using automatic rifles and hand respective countries had merely been but the increasing acceptance of al- grenades. Together with these dramatic PAPER

attacks, al-Shabaab was also implicated Despite this long history of extremism in smaller attacks in which Kenyan and unconventional political nationals were the primary targets developments in Kenya, relatively of improvised explosive devices and little empirical research and analysis hand grenade attacks, with the same are available regarding why and how devastating consequences. individuals are radicalised and recruited into al-Shabaab and the MRC. In addition to being the victims of al- Shabaab attacks, nationals from Kenya The analysis in this paper is based on and Uganda were also directly involved in interviews with 95 individuals associated recruiting their fellow nationals to join the with al-Shabaab, 45 individuals organisation’s ranks. Initially, after being associated with the MRC, along with 46 radicalised, these individuals left their relatives of individuals associated with countries to fight in Somalia. This trend al-Shabaab and five associated with also gradually changed in that locally the MRC.2 Relatives were interviewed marginalised, radicalised and recruited in cases where primary members had individuals started being used to execute disappeared or were incarcerated or attacks in their own countries. Turning killed. All the respondents were Kenyan against their fellow citizens in this way and Somali-Kenyan nationals who grew means that these radicalised individuals up in Kenya and who were radicalised are identifying with something other than while in that country. being Kenyan. The aim of this paper is to Although the MRC is often mistakenly determine what it is that such radicalised associated with al-Shabaab, it became individuals identify with, and how they apparent that there are very clear become radicalised. differences in the type of individuals For this paper, interviews Although the Mombasa Republican who join al-Shabaab and the MRC and were conducted with Council (MRC) has to date not been their reasons for doing so. Although implicated in acts of terrorism, it is often both organisations mainly recruit from perceived to be associated with al- the same geographical , they are 95 Shabaab in the coastal region of Kenya. very distinct in nature. Even though individuals associated Demonstrations calling for the secession al-Shabaab has a foothold in Nairobi with al-Shabaab, of the region from Nairobi led to the brief and has even attracted members from banning of the organisation in October western Kenya, north-eastern Kenya 45 2010 and the arrest of its members.1 particularly needs attention. individuals associated There are very clear differences between the types with the MRC, of individuals who join al-Shabaab and those who 46 join the MRC, as well as their reasons for doing so relatives of individuals Because the MRC partly functions in Ethnicity and divide Kenyans associated with the same geographical area as al- politically and socially and have caused al-Shabaab, and Shabaab (i.e. Kenya’s coastal region), it several violent clashes (the post-election has attracted additional attention from violence in 2007 is the most recent the Kenyan security agencies. This co- manifestation of this). The reality is that 5 existence also makes it a natural choice ethnic coalitions and the rural-urban when an organisation is sought against divide polarise politics in Kenya. This was relatives of individuals associated with MRC which to test the al-Shabaab profile especially felt in the north-eastern and presented in this study. coastal regions, which are characterised

2 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council by marginalisation, frustration and manifest in demonstrations following of key themes emerge, most notably, resentment towards Nairobi, the centre allegations that prominent radical Muslim denial that domestic circumstances in of political power. This divide is, however, clerics are being assassinated by Kenya contributed to the radicalisation of not based on ethnicity alone: the religious Kenyan security agencies. Most notable Kenyan nationals. Politically, confronted divide between the coastal region, which examples include the killings of Sheikh with the bombing of the US embassy is predominantly Muslim, and Nairobi, Aboud Rogo in August 2012, Sheikh in Nairobi and the subsequent acts of which is seen as predominantly Christian, Ibrahim Omar in October 20136 and terrorism in Mombasa in 2002, some further complicates politics in Kenya. Sheikh Abubakar Shariff – also known as Kenyan governmental officials considered Furthermore, with specific reference to Makaburi – in April 2014.7 Kenya to be an innocent victim of the the MRC, Mombasa was not ruled as part of the British Empire, but was part Only a few officials accepted that Kenya was of the Sultanate of Zanzibar.3 These factors contributed to the fact that both experiencing internal problems that needed religious identity (reflected in al-Shabaab) to be addressed and ethnic identity (reflected in the MRC) threaten the sense of national identity of A number of publications provide an conflict between the United States and individuals living in this region. excellent historical overview of the spread Islamic extremists. At that time, only Introduction to al-Shabaab of Islamist extremism in the Horn of a few officials accepted that Kenya and the mrc Africa, including Kenya. What is important was experiencing internal problems for this paper is, firstly, to recognise that that needed to be addressed, such as A renewed drive to fight for the self- extremism in Kenya is not a new Chris Murungaru, the then-minister for determination of people in the coastal phenomenon and, secondly, that although national security, who on 29 June 2003 region appeared in 2008 when the MRC the threat originally came from outside the acknowledged that ‘Kenya’s war against regained momentum, calling for secession region, it increasingly gained momentum terrorism will only be won by accepting from Kenya. The MRC was among 32 9 in Kenya itself by attracting local Kenyans that the problem exists’. groups that were banned by the Internal to its philosophy and objectives since the Nevertheless, despite growing evidence Security Ministry in Gazette Notice 12585 US embassy bombings in August 1998. of the gradual radicalisation of a number published on 18 October 2010 in terms of local Muslim community members of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, The success of al-Qaeda’s East African and evidence that Saleh Ali Saleh before the organisation was unbanned cell was further emphasised on 28 Nabhan (who was closely linked to both on 25 July 2012 after the Mombasa High November 2002 when two suicide al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda) was directly Court ruled the banning unconstitutional.4 bombers targeted the Israeli-owned involved in the attacks in Mombasa in Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. Unlike in the The MRC focuses on land grievances 2002, the dominant opinion, including case of the bombing of the US embassy and the fact that ‘outsiders’ or people that of Kenyan investigators, remained in Nairobi in 1998, all of the suspects from the rest of Kenya dominate the that the attacks in 1998 and 2002 involved in both of these attacks were local economy, which is centred were orchestrated from abroad. This is Kenyan nationals, with the exception predominantly on tourism.5 Although the clearly illustrated by a comment made of Abu Talha al-Sudani, a Sudanese majority of its members are Muslim, the by John Sawe, Kenya’s ambassador to national. Even the two suicide bombers, respondents interviewed clearly showed Israel at the time, who in the aftermath Fumo Mohamed Fumo and Haruni that the MRC has a very different agenda of the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in from al-Shabaab. Bamusa, were Kenyan nationals. During Mombasa stated, ‘There is no doubt in the subsequent investigation another Despite the fact that the two my mind that al-Qa’eda is behind this Kenyan national and suspect, Faizel organisations, influenced by different attack, because we have no domestic Ali Nassor, killed himself and a Kenyan histories, contest different areas (the problems, no terrorism in our country, police officer when he detonated a hand MRC focuses on land issues and is a and we have no problem with our grenade on 1 August 2003 rather than neighbours, no problem whatsoever’.10 secessionist movement while al-Shabaab being arrested.8 stresses Islamist extremism), the question Furthermore, security in Kenya is is whether they tap into the same When the reaction of Kenyan officials to increasingly being politicised, which in frustrations and grievances that often the above attacks is analysed, a number turn affects the way in which the Kenyan

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government responds to terrorism. For while recognising these external example, following the killing of at least circumstances, will also refer to the 15 people in the village of Poromoko process of political socialisation that near Mpeketoni on the Kenyan coast introduces individuals to the radicalisation on 15 June 2014, President Kenyatta process. Political socialisation refers to: blamed official political opponents, even though al-Shabaab accepted The way society transmits its responsibility.11 Instead of attempting political culture from generation to bring people together, politicians are to generation. This process may harnessing political divisions for their serve to preserve traditional political own ends, which further threatens norms and institutions; on the other national unity. hand, when secondary socialisation As a result the Kenyan leadership has agencies inculcate political values not stepped in to address growing differently from those of the past radicalisation when firm action could still or when children are raised with

Instead of attempting to bring people together, politicians are harnessing political divisions for their own ends

have prevented the current radicalisation political and social expectations process and increase in attacks in Kenya. different from those of their forebears, Instead, local conditions have enabled the socialisation process can be a growing frustrations to become worse, vehicle of political and social change. enabling al-Shabaab to strengthen its Political socialisation [is therefore] the foothold in Kenya. The consequences process, mediated through various of the country’s inability to address agencies of society, by which an growing radicalisation has not only individual learns politically relevant enable al-Shabaab to recruit foreign attitudinal dispositions and behaviour fighters in Kenya, but has also facilitated patterns. These agencies include the spread of al-Shabaab in the country such environmental categories as and the broader region. Confronted the family, peer group, school, adult 12 with this growing threat, both security organizations, and the mass media. policymakers and practitioners are In other words, political socialisation at urged to carefully reassess the strategy the individual level can be described as a and tactics they employ to respond to lifelong process through which a person 15 al-Shabaab and the MRC, as well as develops a unique frame of reference that people were other organisations on the fringes of guides his/her individual political choices. conventional political participation. An individual’s frame of reference can be killed on defined as the ‘glasses’ through which Radicalisation facilitators he/she sees the world around him/her. 15 June 2014 and process This frame of reference also includes a President Kenyatta Instead of understanding radicalisation person’s views on politics and religion, blamed official political from a perspective of the conditions which are developed through a similar opponents, even though al-Shabaab accepted conducive to it or root causes process to his/her views on a specific responsibility that almost exclusively focus on political party or ideology. Ultimately, external circumstances, this analysis, the political self is made, not born,

4 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council and includes ‘feelings of nationalism, vulnerable to a loss of this magnitude. present did the mother play a role. In one patriotism, or tribal loyalty; identification However, the majority of respondents of these examples both parents punished with particular partisan factions or interviewed had a father (82% in the the particular respondent and, in the other, groups; attitudes and evaluations of case of al-Shabaab and 69% in the the respondent was female (punished by specific political issues and personalities; MRC) and mother (84% in the case of al- the mother). Among MRC respondents, knowledge regarding political structures Shabaab and 80% in the MRC) present mothers played a slightly more prominent and procedures; and a self-image of in their lives. role when both parents were present: rights, responsibilities, and position in the To assess the relationship a person fathers took the lead (47%), followed by political world’.13 had with his/her parents while growing mothers (34%), both parents (8%) and older siblings (11%). The prominent role It is this nexus between socialisation and up, respondents were asked which that a father figure played had a direct radicalisation that Hogan and Taylor see parent had taken the lead in making the impact on the level of respondents’ as essential to the ‘making of a rules in the family, who had punished interest in politics and was therefore a key terrorist’14 and that a conscious decision the respondent and what type of factor in the political socialisation process. is rarely made to become a terrorist. punishment the person had received. This paper will essentially argue that Respondents were also asked to indicate Regarding the type of punishment, involvement in terrorism results from how severe this punishment was and 73% of al-Shabaab and 71% of MRC gradual exposure to and socialisation how involved his/her parent was while respondents indicated that they were towards extreme behaviour and they were growing up in an attempt to physically punished, 14% of al-Shabaab increasing legitimisation of the use of assess parental type. In the families of and 11% of MRC respondents were violence to achieve political ends. al-Shabaab respondents where both emotionally punished, and 13% of al- parents were present, the father made Shabaab and 18% of MRC respondents The role of the family in the rules in 100% of the cases. were not punished at all (permissive radicalisation It is particularly interesting that where a parents). When asked how severe this Within the sample group, 18% of al- father was absent the mother made the punishment was and how involved the Shabaab and 31% of MRC respondents rules in the house in only three cases, person responsible for punishing the child grew up without a father, while 16% of al- while a male relative made the rules most was in his/her life, the majority al-Shabaab Shabaab and 20% of MRC respondents of the time. The three cases where the (59%) and MRC (80%) respondents grew up without a mother. In the case mother made the rules in the family were indicated that severity was between 1 and of al-Shabaab, 11 respondents grew the only occasions when a female was 5 (on a scale of 1 to 10), and 41% of al- up without both parents present. What ‘permitted’ to make the rules overall. This Shabaab and 34% of MRC respondents is particularly telling is the age at which indicates a very conservative society. In referred to harsher punishment. In respondents lost their fathers and the case of the MRC, the mother made contrast, 54% of al-Shabaab respondents mothers, respectively: in the case of al-Shabaab, 19% lost their fathers and 13% lost their mothers when they were Most al-Shabaab and MRC respondents lost younger than five; 81% lost their fathers one or both parents between early adolescence and 40% lost their mothers between the and early adulthood ages of 16 and 18; while 47% lost their mothers between 19 and 20. In the case of the MRC, 17% lost their fathers when the rules in the household in all cases referred to a lesser involvement of their they were younger than five, 75% lost where the father was absent, with the authority figure. In four of the most severe their fathers and 75% lost their mothers exception of two cases where an older cases respondents rated very severe between 16 and 18, while 8% lost their sibling stepped in. punishment (between 9 and 10), but very fathers and 25% lost their mothers little involvement from a parent (between A similar trend was also noted in terms between 19 and 20. 1 and 2). In comparison, 31% of MRC of the person who was responsible for referred to a lesser involvement of their Most al-Shabaab and MRC respondents punishing respondents. Among al- authority figure. lost a parent or their parents between Shabaab respondents fathers took the early adolescence and early adulthood, primary – almost exclusive – lead; in Regarding the respondents’ position at a time when individuals are particularly only two cases where both parents were in the family, 62% of al-Shabaab and

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60% of MRC respondents were middle Figure 1: Whom respondents children, 26% of al-Shabaab and 11% informed of their joining of MRC respondents were the oldest, al-Shabaab/MRC 90 while 12% of al-Shabaab and 29% of 80 MRC respondents were the youngest. 59 According to Eckstein, middle children 70 33 are generally sociable, relate well to 60 older and younger people, and excel at 50 working in a team.15 In addition to these 40 13 24 positive characteristics, middle children 30 0

are known to experience the greatest 20 18

sense of not belonging. It is particularly 10 0 0 this quality that contributes to their 0 21 11 26 34 4 7 5 25 vulnerability in searching for a sense of Parent Friend Sibling belonging (to be discussed later). Parental Religious Relative Nobody support leader Community leader In terms of family size, the majority of MRC al-Shabaab respondents came from relatively small families. Some 68% of al-Shabaab and 56% of MRC respondents came from respondents informed another sibling. families of between one and four siblings, To put this analysis in context: 73% of while 28% of al-Shabaab and 39% of al-Shabaab and 87% of MRC MRC respondents came from families respondents informed another person; of between five and nine siblings. A in other words, 27% of al-Shabaab and very small minority (4%) of al-Shabaab only 13% of MRC respondents kept quiet and MRC (5%) respondents came from about their decision. families of between 10 and 14 siblings. These discrepancies can possibly be Coming from smaller families had an attributed to the differences between apparent impact on the involvement of the two organisations. Due to the MRC’s parents, especially fathers, in discussing history, children were most probably politics with their children while they were politically socialised to take up the growing up: 68% of al-Shabaab and 78% cause of the from their of MRC respondents discussed politics The majority of respondents parents. In contrast, al-Shabaab does came from relatively small with their fathers as children. It was not not have a history in the area, despite the families. Coming from surprising to note that 59% of MRC smaller families had an respondents interviewed and 21% of al- strong religious connections with most apparent impact on the Shabaab respondents indicated that their residents. But al-Shabaab’s nature causes involvement of parents in parents supported their decision to join it to function in greater secrecy than a discussing politics with the organisations. Figure 1 shows whom community organisation such as the their children respondents informed of their decision to MRC. In other words, the MRC is possibly join al-Shabaab/the MRC. more accepted than al-Shabaab, but, more importantly, the ideology behind al- Despite parental support, of those Shabaab is relatively new in the area. 62% who did not keep their decision to of al-Shabaab and themselves, only 24% of MRC and 11% In addition to relatively limited parental of al-Shabaab respondents informed involvement in respondents’ recruitment a parent of their decision to join the to the MRC and especially al-Shabaab, organisation. In addition to informing their siblings played the smallest role 60% parents, MRC respondents also informed in introducing respondents to the of MRC respondents other siblings (18%) or other relatives organisations (affecting 7% of MRC were middle children (5%). In contrast, only 4% of al-Shabaab and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents).

6 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Secondly, only 7% of MRC and 6% of al- when joining and while being members both defining both ‘us’ and ‘them’ – this Shabaab respondents indicated that they of their respective organisations. In this will be discussed below. As a result, had family members in the organisation category, 91% of MRC and 55% of al- clearly defined in- and out-groups exist they joined. In contrast, 36% of MRC Shabaab respondents rated their sense for both al-Shabaab and the MRC. and 13% of al-Shabaab respondents of belonging in joining their respective Role of religious identity recruited family members to their organisations at between 5 and 10 (1 respective organisations. represented the least and 10 the highest Based on 2009 census figures as level of being accepted and experiencing presented in Table 1, Kenya is a Role of peers in radicalisation a sense of belonging in the respective multireligious country. is the and recruitment organisation). When asked to rate their most practised religion (84%), followed The role of friends in respondents’ sense of belonging while being members, by (11%). decision to join the organisations was 100% of MRC and 87% of al-Shabaab unmistakable: friends were identified as respondents rated their sense of Table 1: Kenya’s religious makeup the most active role players in introducing belonging between 5 and 10. Although Religion Total % MRC (66%) and, to a lesser extent, both indicated an increase in this feeling al-Shabaab (38%) respondents to the over time, al-Shabaab respondents Catholic 9 010 684 23 organisation (see Figure 13). Secondly, recorded a substantial increase of Protestant 18 307 466 49 60% of MRC and 54% of al-Shabaab 32%. In other words, over time the Other Christian 4 559 584 12 respondents indicated that they had sense of belonging increased for most Muslim 4 304 798 11 recruited other friends (see Figure 2). respondents, effectively providing recruits Hindu 53 393 Below 1 Friends were also the largest group that with a new identity. Traditionalist 635 352 2 was informed of respondents’ decisions Other religion 557 450 1 This specifically speaks to the group to join these organisations (34% of al- No religion 922 128 2 dynamics in the organisation as drawing Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents; Unsure 61 233 Below 1 people to join it with and through see Figure 1). friends. Being part of something bigger Source: WA Oparanya, minister of state for planning, national development and Vision 2030, 2009 than the individual possibly explains Population & Housing Census results, Nairobi: Figure 2: Involvement of family why respondents rated their sense of Government Printer, 2010, 33 and friends in recruitment belonging higher. This sense of 90 belonging was also emphasised when 80 Until the end of one-party rule in Kenya 82 respondents were asked to define ‘us’ 70 the role religion played in politics was 71 (i.e. those they identified with). For 60 kept in the background, with the 60 84% of MRC and 68% of al-Shabaab 50 54 exception of the Shifta war, which respondents, ‘us’ referred to members of merged religion and ethnicity. It was 40 the organisation. In addition to the above only after the opening of the political 30 36 84%, 16% of MRC respondents referred landscape in 1982 that religion became 20 23 to people from Coast Province as ‘us’ at a visible factor, when President Moi 10 11 13 the same time as referring to members of 7 refused to recognise the Islamic Party of 0 6 the organisation. Kenya and the Democratic Movement Join alone Recruit Recruit None of the respondents referred to (DEMO) due to their religious affiliation. Join with family friends friends Join with other Kenyan nationals as being part of family DEMO had its origins in traditional beliefs, al-Shabaab MRC ‘us’. Naturally, if there is an ‘us’ there especially those of the Kikuyu, that must be a ‘them’ (i.e. opponents): ‘foster the spirit of communalism in the The fact that the majority of respondents 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab agrarian sphere, fidelity to indigenous joined with friends (see Figure 2) respondents referred to the Kenyan cultural expressions, and reverence for testifies to peer pressure, but also government as ‘them’, while 5% of the ancestors’.16 affects how interpersonal relationships additional MRC respondents referred to a should be interpreted. Associated combination of the government and other Refusing to register these two parties with this category is also the sense of ethnic groups. In the case of al-Shabaab, was interpreted as an attempt on the belonging respondents experienced religion also played an important role in part of the Kenya African National

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Union (KANU) government to deal Consequently, it is not always easy for with the potential challenge these two such organisations to reach and integrate parties might pose to the predominantly those on the fringes who need to be Christian political status quo. Despite incorporated into mainstream society. The the fact that Kenya is a secular country, unfortunate reality is that in post- Muslims feel discriminated against. In independence Kenya have been kept on the first instance, Muslims are not well the borders of the national agenda, which represented in key government positions caused many to feel that they were not and institutions. It is, however, when fully part of Kenya. Equally, it causes the applying for national identity cards and government and non-Muslims to question passports that Muslims especially feel the patriotism of Muslims, a perception discriminated against. For example, that was strengthened by the fact that when applying for a passport, Muslims after independence the started

Despite the fact that Kenya is a secular country, Muslims feel discriminated against

are required to produce additional agitating for a separate homeland with the documentary evidence of citizenship, option of joining their brethren in Somalia, whereas ‘Christian applicants only resulting in the so-called Shifta war.19 needed two birth certificates, their own Starting with the importance of religion and of one of their parents, applicants in respondents’ lives, al-Shabaab with Islamic names were required to respondents placed their religion in the produce, in addition, the birth certificate three top positions: ‘most important’ of one of the grandparents’.17 (59%), ‘very important’ (37%) and ‘important’ (4%). MRC respondents Despite the challenges in obtaining equally regarded their religious affiliation recognition as an Islamic political party, as important: 32% regarded it as ‘most Kenyan Muslims achieved collective important’, 59% as ‘very important’ and representation through the National Union 9% as ‘important’. of Kenya Muslims (NUKEM), which was established in 1968 by junior members At this point important it is important to of KANU. NUKEM also established note that, in contrast to al-Shabaab, MRC and maintained close links with Arab respondents came from different religious backgrounds, i.e. 59% were Muslim, countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and 25% were Christian and 16% practised Libya. This led to the establishment of the traditional beliefs. Therefore, although Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims in religious identity is important to MRC 1973. Recognised as the sole legitimate respondents, the organisation does not representation of Muslims by the Kenyan have an identifiable religious character. government since 1979, its legitimacy With regard to al-Shabaab, the Muslim is not always acknowledged among the community is predominantly concentrated 18 Muslim community. Similar to other in Coast and North Eastern provinces and 73% established religious organisations in in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, where other countries, more radical individuals this community is in the majority. Muslim THE PERCENTAGE OF view these structures as being too close AL-SHABAAB RESPONDENTS minorities also live in Christian-dominated to the formal political dispensation and WHO ‘HATED’ areas scattered across Kenya. The OTHER consider participating in them as a form Somali and Kenyan Somali community of legitimising these institutions. represents the largest part of Kenya’s

8 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Muslim community; however, Muslims to respondents’ willingness to accept When asked to define the intensity of can increasingly be found among all others, in terms of which only 27% of the ‘conflict’ between Islam and those ethnic groups. al-Shabaab respondents answered in the perceived to be its enemies, 74% of respondents classified it as ‘ongoing’ Figure 3 summarises respondents’ affirmative. In stark contrast, 76% of MRC and 26% as an ‘all-out war’ (Figure 5). perceptions of religious diversity (the third respondents indicated that they accepted This relates to the perception among bar indicates whether they thought they other religions. Most revealing is that 73% Muslims that they are treated as second- were able to live out their own religion). of al-Shabaab respondents indicated class citizens: many feel they are on the that they ‘hated’ other religions. This receiving end of religious (Muslims) and Figure 3: Respondents’ perceptions confirmed al-Shabaab’s strong religious/ of religious diversity ethnic (especially Somali) profiling. 90 Islamic bias, but to indicate to what extent

80 respondents perceived their religion (Islam) Figure 5: Categorising ‘the enemy’ 79 and intensity of 70 73 as being under threat, both al-Shabaab the conflict and MRC respondents were asked a 60 80 50 53 series of questions to establish their threat 49 70 74 40 perception, presented in Figure 4. 60 63 30 37 Figure 4: respondents’ religious 50 20 49 threat perceptions and 10 40 4 type of threat 0 30 32 100 97 20 24 26 80 18 Religions Religious Marry into 10 16 13 equal (yes) diversity other religion (negative) 9 al-Shabaab MRC 7 5 60 67 0 60

Other When evaluating respondents’ percep- 40 42 religion All-out Ongoing Government tions of religious diversity, 79% of 34 External Government enemy 20 al-Shabaab and otherMRC al-Shabaab respondents indicated that 21 5 6 religious diversity was not a ‘good thing’, 0 for the following primary reasons: there is The role of religion was again confirmed no trust (67%) between religious groups, Physical Ideological when respondents were asked why they it contributes to a lack of understanding Under threat Combination al-Shabaab MRC joined al-Shabaab: 87% of respondents between different religious groups (12%) cited religion (see Figure 6). and the domination of one religious group by another (11%), and leads to In categorising the origin of this In addition to motivation, the role of violence between religious groups (10%). perception of threat, the majority of al- a religious figure in the recruitment In contrast, 49% of MRC respondents Shabaab respondents (49%) identified process should also be noted: 34% of indicated that religious diversity was not the government as the source of the al-Shabaab respondents indicated that a ‘good thing’ for the following primary threat to their religion, followed by other they were approached by a religious reasons: there is no trust (28%) between religions (24%), an external enemy (18%) figure. This was the second-largest group religious groups, it contributes to a lack and a combination of the government after friends that introduced respondents of understanding (18%) and it leads to and others (9%). Kenya’s military to the organisation. In contrast, none of violence (5%). In an attempt to determine intervention in Somalia in October 2011 the MRC respondents were introduced the extent of exclusivity, respondents might possibly explain the increase in by a religious figure or joined for religious were asked if they would marry a person perceptions of threat, while the way reasons. Radical preachers, however, from another religion. The majority (96%) in which the government continued do not have to be directly or physically of al-Shabaab answered in the negative. to respond to radical scholars such present to radicalise individuals: a In contrast, 53% of MRC indicated as Aboud Rogo Mohammed, Sheikh number of especially al-Shabaab and that they would marry a person from Ibrahim Omar and Sheikh Abubakar to a lesser extent MRC respondents another religion. This directly speaks Shariff further complicated matters.20 interviewed referred to the effect that

Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council ISS PAPER 265 • SEPTEMBER 2014 9 PAPER

Figure 6: Reason why respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC 100

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10 12 12 14 14 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0

Ethnic Political Personal Religious Ethnic and Adventure Ethnic and Economic Religious and economic political al-Shabaab MR economicC

videos, CDs and audiotapes of radical were vulnerable and unable to defend preachers had had on them. themselves against extremists who are better versed in the Qur’an, and Recently converted Kenyan who know how to manipulate religion Muslim youth (Islam) to serve their particular ideology. Another trend was that, in addition to The UN Monitoring Group for Somalia being local – i.e. not foreigners or part of confirmed this concern and noted that the Somalia expatriate or Kenyan Somali since 2009 al-Shabaab had rapidly community – some of those implicated expanded its influence and membership in attacks in Kenya were young people to include non-Somali Kenyan nationals. who had recently converted to Islam. Some of the non-Somali Kenyans said For example, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha (aged to be fighting inside Somalia include 28), also known as Mohammed Seif, Juma Ayub Otit Were, Suleiman Irungu a Kenyan national, was arrested after Mwangi ‘Karongo’ (also known as the two grenade attacks on 17 and 24 Habib), Mohamed Murithi and Ramadan 21 October 2011. Oliacha was found with Osao. In October 2011 a non-Somali six guns, 13 grenades and hundreds Kenyan, Elgiva Bwire, was jailed for of rounds of ammunition in his house. life after confessing to carrying out He pleaded guilty to nine charges, two grenade attacks in Nairobi.24 In including causing grievous bodily harm another example Kenyan police officers to two people, and was sentenced to arrested Titus Nyabiswa, aged 26, in life imprisonment.22 What was interesting a village on the Kenyan coast close was that, according to his mother, he to Mombasa and confiscated several was brought up in a strict Catholic family firearms and hand grenades. According and came from Busia in western Kenya to information, Nyabiswa converted 87% and attended schools in Nairobi.23 to Islam in the western part of Kenya THE PERCENTAGE OF AL-SHABAAB RESPONDENTS This raised concern among the Muslim before becoming involved with Omar WHO CITED RELIGION community as to the way in which Faraj, who was allegedly involved in a AS THEIR REASON FOR young people were converted to Islam. bombing incident on 24 October 2012 JOINING THE ORGANISATION Extremists not representing Islam in that killed a police officer and two other effect manipulated new converts who suspected members of al-Shabaab after

10 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council police officers raided the suspect’s home group (including the Kikuyu, the Kamba mobility and urbanisation among the in Mombasa.25 and other subgroups); and the coastal country’s inhabitants, the majority of Bantu (Mijikenda). Among Kenya’s Nilotic Among Kenyan security officials, newly Kikuyu live in south-central Kenya (in the speakers, the major groups are the converted Muslims are at the top of their , Muranga and districts); River-Lake or western group (Luo); the list of possible suspects: based on the the majority of Luhya in western Kenya highlands or southern group (Kalenjin); above examples this is a real concern. (in the Bugoma, Busia and and the plains or eastern group (Maasai). But among al-Shabaab respondents districts); the majority of Luo in south- The Cushitic-speaking groups include interviewed, only 9% had converted to western Kenya (this grouping consists of the Oromo and Somali. The Kikuyu, who Islam before joining the organisation. around 40 subgroups, each associated make up 22% of the population, are This is, however, not to say that converts Kenya’s largest ethnic group. The Luhya with an area); the majority of Kamba in are not vulnerable to be radicalised and are the second largest (14%), followed east central Kenya; and the majority of recruited into al-Shabaab’s ranks, but by the Luo (13%), the Kalenjin (12%) and Kalenjin (who include the Nandi, Kipsigis, rather that Muslims who grew up in the Kamba (11%). Although economic Eleyo, Marakwet, Pokot and Tugen) in Islam and can be expected to be better and political development have increased west-central Kenya.27 informed are equally vulnerable and should not be overlooked. Equally, treating new recruits to Islam as suspects Table 2: Kenya’s ethnic composition will make them more susceptible to Ethnic group Population Predominant location radical scholars and even possible Kikuyu 6 622 576 and Nairobi (estimated at 47%) and Rift Valley recruitment to al-Shabaab. (15%) The role of ethnic identity Luhya 5 338 666 Western region (80%) and Nairobi (16%) Kalenjin 4 967 328 Rift Valley Province (95%) Since independence the reality experi- Luo 4 044 440 (estimated at 87%) and Nairobi (15%) enced at the grassroots level in Kenya Kenyan Somali 2 385 572 area, North Eastern Province was that ethnic allegiances are a real Kisii factor in access to and the distribution 2 205 669 Nyanza (95%) of resources. Leys referred to the ‘ideol- Mijikenda 1 960 574 Coast Province ogy of tribalism’ to describe what he saw Meru 1 658 108 Meru district, Eastern Province as a conspiracy by the Kenyan political Turkana 988 592 Turkana, Samburu, Trans-Nzoia, Laikipia and districts, leadership to manipulate ethnic identity to Rift Valley Province achieve its own goals.26 Maasai 841 622 and districts, Rift Valley Province Teso 338 833 Busia district, Western Province Al-Shabaab respondents interviewed Embu 324 092 Embu district, Eastern Province in Nairobi came from a vast number of Taita ethnic groups; however, ethnicity was 273 519 Taita district, Coast Province a more prevalent factor among MRC Kuria 260 401 Kuria district, Nyanza Province respondents (discussed below). Before Samburu 237 179 Baringo district, Rift Valley discussing the ethnic identity of MRC Tharaka 175 905 East Meru, Embu and districts, Eastern Province members, a brief overview of the ethnic Mbeere 168 155 Embu district, Eastern Province composition of Kenya is relevant. Borana 161 399 Northern Province Kenya’s population is divided into Basuba 139 271 Western Province, originally from the Lake Victoria islands of more than 40 ethnic groups (the most Rusinga and Mfangano Swahili prominent are presented in Table 2) 110 614 Coast Province belonging to three linguistic families: Gabra 89 515 Northern Province the Bantu, the Cushitic and the Nilotic. Orma 66 275 and Tana River districts, North Eastern and Coast provinces Language traditionally has been the Rendile 60 437 district, Eastern Province, between and primary characteristic of ethnic identity. Mount Marsabit Bantu-speaking Kenyans are divided Source: Oparanya, 2009 Population & Housing Census results, 34–35; S Elischer, Ethnic coalitions of into three different groups: the western convenience and commitment: political parties and party systems in Kenya, German Institute of Global and group (Luhya); the central, or highlands, Area Studies 68 (February 2008), 11

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Coast and North Eastern provinces are ethnic – profiling and being rounded up home to the Mijikenda (who include the and arrested. Giriama, Digo, Kauma, Duruma, Jibaba, The difference between al-Shabaab and Kambe, Rabai and Ribe), Pokomo, the MRC is that only MRC respondents Taita, Taveta Malakote and Swahili (the (25%) referred to ethnicity as a reason group, not the language). Kenya’s small for joining the organisation. This was ethnic minority groups, including the confirmed when respondents were asked Borana, Burji, Garba, Orma, Sakuye and to indicate why they joined: in addition Waata, also live in these two provinces. to ethnic alliances (33%), 45% referred However, over the years other ethnic to their ‘community’. When asked to groups, including the Kamba, Kikuyu and explain what community they referred to, Luo, migrated to the coast from other respondents indicated coastal people. 28 regions. The economic consequences Secondly, 43% of MRC respondents of this migration have contributed to classified ‘them’ (opponents) as other the ethnic marginalisation of the original ethnic groups. Some respondents even inhabitants. Although MRC respondents specifically identified the Kikuyu and interviewed included Bajun, Digo, other ethnic groups in government as Duruma, Gariama, Kamba, Luhya, Meru, the ‘enemy’. To confirm respondents’ Rabai, Shirazi, Somali and Taita, the ethnic identity they were asked to rate the majority of respondents came from four importance of their ethnic group: for 18% ethnic backgrounds: the Gariama (39%), their ethnic group was ‘most important’, for Digo (13%), Bajun (9%) and Luhya (9%). 68% it was ‘very important’, and for 13% it Al-Shabaab respondents, on the other was ‘important’. hand, included Arab-Kenyan, Bajun, When evaluating respondents’ positions on Barawa, Boran, Gabra, Garre, Giriama, ethnic diversity, 92% of MRC respondents Jomvu, Kamba, Kauma, Kikuyu, Kenyan indicated that ethnic diversity was not a Somali, Luhya, Luo, Mgunya, Mijikenda, ‘good thing’ (see Figure 7), for the follow- Mohonyi, Nubi, Orma, Pokomo and ing primary reasons: there is no trust (48%) Swahimis. The majority of respondents among ethnic groups, it leads to violence interviewed came from the following (24%) between ethnic groups, it leads to ethnic backgrounds: Bajun (20%), domination (16%) by one ethnic group over Kikuyu (10%), Luhya (7%), Luo (7%) and others, and contributes to a lack of under- Mijikenda (7%). Although from a larger standing between ethnic groups (12%). pool of ethnic groups than members of the MRC, there are remarkable similarities. Figure 7: Ethnic contact and perceptions of One of the ethnic communities that are ethnic diversity categorised as marginalised on both 100

fronts is the Kenyan Somali community. 90 95 92 Perceptions on the part of other Kenyan 80 90 nationals that the Kenyan Somali 70 60 community is responsible for the growing 50 security risks in the country further 49 40 47 contribute to this marginalisation. Being 92% 30 38 visibly part of the Muslim community, 20 THE PERCENTAGE OF despite not being in any way part of 10 MRC RESPONDENTS al-Shabaab, contributes to their being 0 WHO INDICATED THAT treated differently. Most notably, members Ethnic Ethnic ETHNIC DIVERSITY WAS groups diversity equal (no) (negative) of the Somali-Kenyan and Somali Discrimina- ‘NOT A GOOD THING’ tion (yes) communities reported racial – or, rather, al-Shabaab MRC

12 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council From the above analysis one can important role of parents in the political participation will also explain declining conclude that ethnic identity for MRC socialisation process, politically active political participation. respondents was more important than parents of MRC respondents contributed When assessing whether respondents national identity (or being Kenyan). to their children’s later involvement in trusted politicians and the political the cause of the coastal people. This Although ethnic identity was not system, none of the MRC and 1% of al- confirms Greenberg’s view that in many identified as a reason for joining Shabaab respondents indicated that they instances adult opinions can be traced the organisation, some al-Shabaab trusted politicians. Despite not trusting to political socialisation as a child in that respondents still rated ethnic identity politicians, 22% of MRC respondents still ‘the child is father to the man’.29 This fairly highly: 5% indicated that their believed that elections could bring about is particularly relevant to basic political ethnic group was ‘most important’, 40% change, while only 4% of al-Shabaab orientations such as identifications, classified it as ‘very important’, 31% as respondents had the same trust in the loyalties and values. ‘important’ and 24% as ‘not important’. political process (see Figure 8). It was especially Bajun and Mijikenda Remembering the Shifta war and respondents from al-Shabaab who rated subsequent developments surrounding Figure 8: respondents’ political their ethnic group as most important, the coastal people, the MRC advocates experience 90 serving as a link between al-Shabaab the same succession agenda as 80 78 70 When asked why respondents did not think that 68 60 66 elections would bring change, 86% of MRC and 50 72% of al-Shabaab respondents did not consider 40 39 elections to be ‘free and fair’ 30 20 22 10 and the MRC in terms of ethnic identity. previously. Discussing politics possibly 4 1 0 It is important to emphasise that al- influenced later political participation 0

Shabaab respondents referred to their in that 66% of MRC respondents rust Discuss politics religious rather than their ethnic identity voted before joining the organisation. oted before V T Elections as being under threat. In contrast, this might also explain joining politicians bring al- S organisationhabaab MRC change why al-Shabaab respondents saw Political circumstances political participation as less important, When asked why respondents did not Prior political experiences are an considering that the ideology al- think that elections would bring change, important indicator of the extent to Shabaab represents is not historically 86% of MRC and 72% of al-Shabaab which people trusted politicians and embedded in Kenyan society. This is respondents did not consider elections the political system. To put it differently, seen in the fact that 39% of al-Shabaab to be ‘free and fair’, while 28% of al- one would expect people who trust the respondents voted before joining the Shabaab and 14% of MRC respondents political system to present their issues organisation, versus 66% of MRC did not recognise the political process. and frustrations through the legal and respondents (93% of MRC and 78% of Among al-Shabaab respondents, those non-violent option in order to achieve al-Shabaab respondents interviewed who did not recognise the political change. Resorting to violence or the were eligible to vote). process indicated that their religion did illegal option is therefore regarded as the Greenberg’s theory therefore implies that not allow them (haram) to participate last option. the parents of al-Shabaab respondents in this process. Additionally, when the As mentioned earlier in this paper, the (referred to as the first generation) researcher presented the statement family serves as the first place where a played a lesser role in transferring their ‘Government only looks after and protects child gets to know the political culture of political orientations through socialisation the interests of a few’, all MRC and 99% his/her country. In both the MRC (78%) to their children. Instead of parental of al-Shabaab respondents agreed with and al-Shabaab (68%) respondents influence, peers played a more active it. When asked if ‘standing up against indicated that parents discussed politics role as an agent of political socialisation government is legal and just’, only 4% of in their presence while they were (which will be discussed later). However, both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents growing up (Figure 8). Considering the lack of trust in politicians and political answered in the negative (Figure 9).

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Figure 9: Trust in the political Development Report, could not have system stated the situation in Kenya better:

High inequality can lead to latent

100 100 social conflict, which manifests itself 99 96 96 through political struggles for public 86 80 resources. Inequality may mean that 72 different social groups have different 60 interests, and the outcome of the 40 political process through which those interests are reconciled may lead to 28 20 reduce aggregate outcomes. This may 14 0 happen because political processes (electoral or otherwise) seek to effect Revolt Not free legal redistributions, but may do so in and fair Not recog- Government nise political protects ways that have high economic costs. process a few al-Shabaab MRC Influencing latent social conflict are factors such as inequality, ethnic and It is clear based on the answers provided linguistic fragmentation, and social that politicians and government face a distrust in government institutions 30 serious legitimacy crisis among individuals (emphasis added). who ended up joining al-Shabaab These factors, in turn, directly impact and the MRC. In other words, if the on the state’s ability to deal with government wants to present an option social conflict.

to unconventional political participation, As mentioned, both religion and ethnicity it needs to create the necessary political divide Kenya. As explained in the space to permit the expression of political section on ethnic composition, the most frustrations and interests other than economically marginalised communities through the use of violence. in the country include the Turkana in North Eastern Province, the MijiKenda Socio-economic factors and Sanye in Coast Province, the Burji in When socio-economic factors are Eastern Province, the Maasai and Ogiek mentioned, many who consider poverty in Rift Valley province, and Muslims in or poor socio-economic conditions to the North Eastern and Coast provinces, be a motivating factor in radicalisation although Muslims are considered to be 31 will read through the following section generally better off than other minorities. looking for proof that al-Shabaab and In Kenya, the coastal community feels economically marginalised despite the MRC respondents were driven to these growth its members see around them, organisations as a result of economic leading to unmet expectations. It is when frustration. However, there was no direct access is based on ethnic, cultural or link between poverty and the reason why even religious differences between the respondents joined these organisations. ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ that economic However, uneven development and conditions can possibly contribute to 96% subsequent relative deprivation played a radicalisation and instability. The coastal THE PERCENTAGE OF ALL prominent role among MRC, but not al- region and North Eastern Province are RESPONDENTS Shabaab, respondents. To an extent, the not only less developed than the rest WHO THOUGHT THAT description of the relationship between of the country, but are the two regions OPPOSING THE GOVERNMENT inequality and conflict, as published WAS LEGAL AND JUST that have been traditionally Muslim (65% in the July 2006 World Bank World of MRC respondents interviewed are

14 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Muslim). In other words, what makes Table 3: Regional inequality given to coastal representatives. Not this uneven development more volatile in Kenya surprisingly, the Coast has also taken is the perception that the religious divide Income Un- Access a relative marginal position in respect in the country ultimately contributes to Region (top employ- to elec- to the distribution of investments and 10%) ment tricity this situation. It is therefore not only a services … the Coast appears the Nairobi 45% 24% 71% debate about development; it becomes most deprived region.33 a religious or ethnic and, eventually, a Nyanza 43% 12% 5% Respondents were asked to identify the political debate. Subsequent calls for Rift Valley 43% 12% 11% Eastern most important reasons for joining the self-determination and independence 42% 7% 7% Province two organisations. While the majority from Nairobi become intertwined Western 41% 28% 2% of al-Shabaab respondents referred in religious, political and economic Province to religion (as discussed above), 6% Central circumstances that are increasingly 39% 6% 19% Province combined religion with economic difficult to separate. Coast 34% 23% 19% reasons, while a further 4% referred to Province Underdevelopment is measured in economic reasons. In contrast, MRC North terms of per capita income, the level of Eastern 27% 35% 3% respondents gave a very different picture: education and the availability of health Province purely ethnic reasons were the most and other services. Based on this model, Unsure 61 233 Below 1 prevailing (25%); then came political the North Eastern Province, which is Source: Society for International Development, reasons (21%); followed by combinations almost exclusively Somali and Muslim, Pulling apart, 10 – 13 of ethnic and economic reasons (14%), is still one of the most underdeveloped religious and economic reasons (14%), areas in Kenya. Although Mombasa and ethnic and political reasons (2%). Claims by ordinary people that the might on paper give the impression of A further 12% of MRC respondents Kenyan authorities disregard the needs of being better off than expected, after (in contrast to 4% among al-Shabaab people at the coast are not unfounded, spending time in the district evidence of respondents) referred to economic nor is it a new debate. According to relative deprivation is clearly visible. reasons. This confirms that economic Foeken, Hoorweg and Obudho in their frustration linked to ethnic and political According to the Society for International regional study of the Kenyan coast, the marginalisation is the driving force behind Development, in Nairobi the top 10% of coastal region was traditionally far more the MRC. households command about 45% of total developed as a trade route from the income, while the bottom 10% command Middle East and India into the mainland. Although the link between economic less than 2%.32 Nairobi, Nyanza and This situation changed dramatically from circumstances and recruitment to Rift Valley provinces seem to have the the 1900s: al-Shabaab is less defined (only 10% of respondents referred to economic reasons in any way), extremist When access is based on ethnic, cultural or religious movements have used poverty and differences between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots,’ unemployment, the growing gulf between economic conditions can contribute to radicalisation rich and poor, inadequate government services, political corruption, and and instability perceived government subservience to American demands to their advantage.

widest income inequalities. In the present Apart from Mombasa, no intermediate By sometimes providing humanitarian report the following regional inequalities, urban centres have been designated. assistance, Islamists offer a solution: presented in Table 3, were identified as There has not been any concerted a return to core religious values facilitating marginalisation that although effort or planning for the development would bring social justice, good not always based on facts, contributed of this part of the country by government and a higher level of moral to negative perceptions between ethnic successive governments. Since life. In summary, although the study groups. The divisions between Nairobi Independence the centre has been recognises the role broad economic and communities in North Eastern and dominated by up-country groups circumstances play in contributing to Coast provinces serve as a particularly and there has been an under a person’s susceptibility to extremism, good example. representation of ministerial positions MRC respondents were shown to be

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more susceptible than al-Shabaab 72% of al-Shabaab and 75% of MRC respondents in this study. respondents attended public school, followed by 25% of al-Shabaab In addition to the economic and social respondents who attended an Islamic development issues raised in this school. The remaining MRC respondents section, education or a lack thereof was attended a combination of public and identified as a crucial contributing factor Islamic schools (13%) and Christian to relative deprivation. Education is not schools (2%). Schools should have only key in securing a future, but, as served as an integrating tool for the mentioned before, the type of education majority of respondents who attended a person receives is equally important. It is, however, in the area of education that public school. As a result, the majority of Muslim areas, most notably the Coast both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents and North Eastern provinces, had contact with and friends from other feel discriminated against, especially religious and ethnic groups. when comparing the education figures In addition to the type of school of Kenya’s provinces, as presented in respondents attended, the level at Table 4. which and length of time a person attended should also be taken into Table 4: Number of students at different education levels based on account, remembering the theory that the 2009 census, by province each extra year of schooling per capita reduces the risk of conflict by around Province Pre-primary Primary Secondary Tertiary Population 1%.36 Among MRC respondents, 67% Nairobi 155 936 490 314 176 837 69 345 3 138 369 only attended primary school, 24%

Central 220 612 987 348 265 881 25 321 4 383 743 secondary school and 9% studied further. Al-Shabaab respondents had a Coast 250 380 758 062 108 401 8 941 3 325 307 better record, with 47% only attending Eastern 257 690 1 509 526 268 751 13 645 5 668 123 primary school, 45% secondary school

North Eastern 24 383 414 541 60 133 2 431 2 310 757 and 8% studying further (see Figure 10). When analysing school-leaving Nyanza 426 046 1 513 952 309 130 18 359 5 442 711 age, the majority of MRC (44%) and Rift Valley 640 044 2 475 352 411 416 49 061 10 006 805 al-Shabaab (56%) respondents left school between 15 and 19 years of age, Western 271 971 1 276 295 195 918 11 016 4 334 282 followed by 36% of MRC and 33% of Total 2 247 071 9 425 390 1 796 467 198 119 38 610 097 al-Shabaab respondents who left school Source: Oparanya, 2009 Population & Housing Census results, 26 between 20 and 24. Considering that the school-going age is six years, the According to Mazrui, in the educational majority of respondents had 9–13 years sphere Muslims encounter inequality of schooling, followed by 14–18 years in the provision of essential services, for the second group. Only 8% of al- facilities and opportunities.34 For example, Shabaab and 6% of MRC respondents in Mombasa the majority of government- interviewed attended school between sponsored elementary schools that have four and eight years, leaving school performed the poorest in the national between ten and 14 years of age. examination are predominantly Muslim. Of those al-Shabaab respondents who In contrast, Muslim schools that have studied further, 12 respondents opted performed relatively well have been for Islamic studies, four studied electrical predominantly privately owned.35 engineering, three studied information In addition to the lone al-Shabaab technology, while two studied commerce respondent who did not attend school, and business administration. One of

16 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Figure 10: Respondents’ level willingness to take up unskilled manual the organisation. In contrast, 47% of of education jobs. The Kikuyu came to dominate the MRC respondents were employed, 80 lower grades in Mombasa Municipal 51% unemployed and 2% were 70 Council’s staff by the 1970s and are studying at the time of their recruitment. 67 60 also successful traders. Regarding type of employment, 56%

50 The Luo moved from labour-intensive of MRC and 20% of al-Shabaab 47 45 professions in the port and railway respondents were employed in the 40 sectors to management and trade union unspecified low-income group (e.g. 30 posts, and the Kamba have developed petrol attendants, labourer, driver, etc.), 20 24 woodcarving businesses. These groups while 26% of al-Shabaab and 19% 10 are reputed to be more successful in of MRC respondents were fishermen 8 9 petty trade and manufacturing than 0 (although this group can also be coastal people. Tending to see the classified as low-income, the number ertiary Primary T city as their own, the latter resent Secondary of respondents in this career justified it the success of migrant groups and al-Shabaab MRC being a separate category). characterise up-country people as more aggressive, unscrupulous and grasping Considered to be in a better position, the most impressive respondents (from than themselves. In contrast, up-country 33% of al-Shabaab and 25% of MRC an education perspective) studied people (referring to Kenyans from the respondents classified themselves medicine at Nairobi University, while central and western regions) formed as businessmen. A further 21% of another studied psychology at the the perception that coastal people are al-Shabaab respondents were religious same university, but did not finish his unsophisticated, unprogressive and scholars. In addition to the employment studies. Those MRC respondents who neither entrepreneurial nor hardworking. status, respondents were given an studied further focused on information Rakodi, Gatabaki-Kamau and Devas opportunity to indicate whether their technology, accounting and social work. also found that coastal respondents economic situation was a factor in their Overall, al-Shabaab respondents were considered themselves to be more joining the organisation (discussed better educated. susceptible to poverty because up- below). It is important to note that, with The number of years a person spent country people are single migrants or the exception of a few, the majority at school is therefore not the most have only small families to support, of respondents did not have the important factor in preventing later while up-country people felt that necessary education to secure better radicalisation; it is also the quality of education that determines its value in preparing a person for a career. To put The number of years a person spent at school is this differently, not being able to finish therefore not the most important factor in preventing school will have an impact on the kind of opportunities or career options the later radicalisation; it is also the quality of education person will have in later life. Employment opportunities are determined by they were more vulnerable because they employment. One of the reasons for education, and a lack of education is lacked the support of local this situation might be access to quality the biggest cause of relative deprivation, kinship networks.39 education institutions, as alluded to in the which in turn can facilitate radicalisation. section dealing with education. Returning to the potential role unemploy- According to Rakodi, Gatabaki-Kamau ment has in radicalisation, employment Why and how respondents and Devas,37 traditionally coastal people and unemployment figures among joined al-Shabaab and the MRC are found in all occupations, but are disproportionately concentrated in al-Shabaab and MRC respondents The analysis above identified a number unskilled and casual jobs because of can be summarised as follows: among of differences and similarities between al- their low educational levels.38 Up-country al-Shabaab respondents, 33% were Shabaab and the MRC with reference to groups gained an early foothold in the employed, 50% unemployed and 17% the personal background of respondents, large-scale formal sector due to their were students at the time they joined lack of trust in the political system, and

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religious and ethnic background. The – targets adolescents and young adults, only remaining yet essential questions are 43% of respondents only joined after their why and how respondents joined the two 25th birthdays. In contrast the organisations and if there is a difference MRC predominantly targets people in between the organisations in this regard. their 20s and older. This is also in line Regarding the age at which respondents with its primary focus: that secession joined: 57% of al-Shabaab and 52% will resonate more with people who

The majority of respondents did not have the necessary education to secure better employment

of MRC respondents joined between have experienced relative depravation the ages of 10 and 24. Although very first hand. close, when ages are broken down, a In terms of whether marital status and few interesting trends emerge: 5% of having children of their own at the time al-Shabaab respondents joined between of joining al-Shabaab and MRC had the ages of 10 and 14, 17% between any impact: 54% of al-Shabaab and 15 and 19, and 35% between 20 and 52% of MRC respondents were single, 24. Some 25% of MRC and 21% of 42% of MRC and 41% of al-Shabaab al-Shabaab respondents joined these respondents were married, 4% of groups between the ages of 25 and 29, each were divorced, and 2% of MRC followed by 20% of al-Shabaab and 14% of MRC respondents who joined and 1% of al-Shabaab respondents between the ages of 30 and 35. After had lost their spouses at the time of 35, only 2% of al-Shabaab respondents their recruitment. Although a majority joined, whereas 9% of MRC respondents of single respondents did not have joined, with 7% of the latter even joining children, 14% of al-Shabaab and 12% after the age of 40 (see Figure 11). of MRC respondents had children when they joined their respective This implies that although al-Shabaab organisations. In other words, although – in keeping with its name ‘The Youth’ the majority were not married at the time of their recruitment, marital status Figure 11: Age at which respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC did not have a specific impact in preventing individuals who were married 50 and having children from joining. The 45 45 small difference in marital status should 40 also be interpreted along with the age 35 35 of respondents at the time of joining, 30 remembering that al-Shabaab attracted 25 25 younger respondents. 20 21 20 The families of especially al-Shabaab 15 17 14 respondents were asked to shed light 10 on the process and changes they had 5 7 7 2 noticed in the behaviour of respondents 5 0 1 1 0 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40+ who disappeared, were incarcerated or were killed (i.e. changes prior to their al-Shabaab MRC deaths in the latter case). Among the

18 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council most noticeable changes, 85% became Figure 13: Who introduced Respondents were also asked to rate very religious, 65% isolated themselves, respondents to their level of frustration at the time of while 52% withdrew from former friends. the organisation? joining: 96% of al-Shabaab and 87% 70 Only 28% became very prescriptive of MRC respondents rated their level 66 to other family members as to their 60 of frustration at between 5 and 10. behaviour in what was acceptable and Breaking this figure down among al- 50 forbidden. Of those interviewed, 91% Shabaab respondents, 48% rated their indicated that the person who was 40 frustration levels between 5 and 7, with 38 recruited disappeared at some stage. 30 34 a further 48% indicating frustration levels of between 8 and 10. With reference These changes were noticed over the 20 21 20 to MRC respondents: 54% rated their following periods: 3% over days to a 10 frustration levels between 5 and 7 and 4 month, 37% over two to six months, 3 7 0 0 7 0 33% indicated levels between 8 and 23% over seven to 12 months, 23% 0 10, while only 13% of MRC and 4% over one to five years, and 14% over Self Friend Relative Religious of al-Shabaab respondents reported more than five years. In other words, figure Approached Forced lower frustration levels of between 1 the majority (63%) of family members al-Shabaab MRC and 4. These figures directly support the noted changes in the behaviour of their role emotions play in the radicalisation sons/daughters, brothers/sisters and process, as presented in Figure 14. husbands within a year. Breaking this As mentioned in the section on figure further down, the overall majority religion, the majority of al-Shabaab (37%) noted these changes at between respondents (87%) referred to religion Figure 14: Emotions respondents two and six months. These changes or the need to respond to a threat to experienced when joining al-Shabaab in behaviour reflect a relative short their religious identity as their motive for and the MRC recruitment process (a few months to a joining the organisation, while a further 45 year), as indicated in Figure 12. 6% combined religion with economic 40 reasons. Only 4% of al-Shabaab 40 35 respondents exclusively referred to Figure 12: Period between 30 32 introduction and joining economic reasons. In sharp contrast, 25 60 MRC respondents were motivated by 25 20 22 a combination of ethnic, political and 18 19 18 50 15 50 economic reasons, as discussed in the 15 10 section on economic circumstances. 40 42 5 3 Some respondents who referred to 6 2 0 30 0 30 economic reasons – 12% of MRC and Guilt Fear 4% of al-Shabaab respondents – thought Anger Hatred 20 22 Contempt 19 that by joining these groups, membership 17 Anger and hatred 10 14 would become a career. This places a al-Shabaab MRC 3 3 0 question mark over these individuals’ 0 1-30 2-6 7-12 1-5 5+ ideological commitment. In other words, days months months years years Considering the relatively high levels of if these individuals had access to other guilt in the results given in Figure 14, employment opportunities they would not al-Shabaab MRC respondents were asked to clarify what have joined these organisations. At the made them choose guilt as a factor. same time, it also places a question mark Respondents recalled personal stories of What is particularly interesting is the over the success of strategies – based letting close family and friends down and role a friend and a religious figure played on a small percentage of respondents that as a result guilt made them leave in introducing the person to al-Shabaab, who raised employment as an issue for Somalia or stay in the organisation. while 21% of al-Shabaab and 20% of – that if these individuals are offered The initial reasons for joining were, MRC respondents joined alone employment opportunities, they will not however, similar to other respondents (Figure 13). join these groups. already mentioned.

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When asked to clarify or to provide faction. According to Najib Balala, additional information that finally ‘pushed’ the former mayor of Mombasa: the person to join, the majority of both al- ‘Harassment and intimidation [by the Shabaab and MRC respondents referred government] have always been there to injustices at the hands of Kenyan for us. Now we are already branded as security forces, specifically referring to second-class citizens because we are ‘collective punishment’. When asked Muslims and .’ to identify the single most important factor that drove respondents to join al- Similarly, according to the then director Shabaab, 65% specifically referred to the of Muslims for Human Rights, Khelef government’s counterterrorism strategy. Khalifa, the police harassed Muslim Comments included: ‘Government and residents in Mombasa in response to security forces hate Islam’, and ‘All the attacks. Instead of pursuing the

The majority of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents referred to injustices at the hands of Kenyan security forces, specifically ‘collective punishment’

Muslims are treated as terrorists’, but key suspects, the police arrested their also pointed to more specific examples: relatives when they failed to arrest those ‘the assassination of Muslim leaders’ or directly involved in the attacks.40 When the ‘extra-judicial killing of Muslims’. One talking to Kenyan Muslims, especially respondent even referred to a specific in the coastal region, one notices a incident (although the date was not growing perception of people being provided): ‘Muslims were beaten badly by treated as second-class citizens. People GSU [General Service Unit, a paramilitary complained and gave examples that, wing of the Kenya Police Service] at despite being born and regarded as the Makadara grounds’, while others Kenyan nationals, their fellow Kenyans, referred to Muslims being arrested for no and especially police officers, treated apparent reason. All of these enforced them as ‘foreigners’. Especially the perception that the government, with following growing insecurity in Kenya specific reference to its security forces since the intervention of the country’s (the government’s representatives in forces in Somalia, people are told to terms of respondents’ day-to-day lives), ‘go home’, are often disregarded at hated them, leading to injustices (referred government buildings and are arbitrarily to by name) and marginalisation. arrested without cause. This further contributed to a sense of not being seen This led to discriminatory responses, as being Kenyan. further fuelling sentiments of marginalisation, since many of the arrests The worst example of a campaign appear to have been discriminatory of mass arrests came during the and arbitrary in nature. Even after the period 4–10 April 2014, when Kenyan 4 005 Paradise Hotel blast in 2002 – at a time authorities arrested 4 005 Somali- when extremism was not well known looking individuals as part of Operation THE NUMBER OF SOMALI- and before the formation of al-Shabaab Usalama Watch in an attempt to root out LOOKING INDIVIDUALS – local Muslim leaders feared for their ARRESTED IN THE PERIOD al-Shabaab or al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, 4–10 APRIL 2014 community. This would provide further or ‘The Youth’, which can be traced justification for the increasing radical back to al-Ittiãd al-islãmiyya and Ittihãd

20 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council al-mahãkim al-islãmiyya, commonly left civilians dead, including a local chief, Consequently, it was not a surprise that known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). women and children.45 the ‘us’ for al-Shabaab respondents The ICU had its origins in a coalition in referred to members of the organisation Even though the incident sparked 2006 between local courts and (68%) and Muslims (32%), as shown in retaliatory attacks and protests, it also Islamists in Mogadishu.41 The operation Figure 15. When asked to identify ‘them’ opened debate on how the state should was launched following two attacks in (opponents), al-Shabaab respondents respond to a very challenging security which gunmen shot dead six worshipers referred to other religions (67%) and threat. While security forces (the police at the Joy in Jesus church in Likoni, the government (30%), as shown in and military) have experienced constant Mombasa on 23 March 2014,42 while a Figure 16. To al-Shabaab respondents, threats of attacks since the armed week later, on 31 March 2014, six people ‘them’ extends well beyond other forces’ intervention in Somalia, the were killed and ten others wounded in religious groups in Kenya: 3% even consequences of blind retaliation are the California area in Eastleigh, Nairobi specifically referred to Ethiopia (following severe. Fighting an often-unidentifiable when attackers hurled explosives into its intervention in Somalia), the United enemy who uses the anonymity of the a food kiosk and at people waiting at States and other countries that fall in a bus stop.43 This was probably one masses to hide among and to strike and the category of being anti-Islam. One of the most visible examples of mass then disappear is extremely frustrating. respondent categorically stated that arrests following a campaign of racial However, lashing out against the imposed Western values finally drove him profiling. Confronted with a problem of collective is not only ineffective, but is to join the organisation. insufficient holding areas, suspects were also counterproductive, because a real even held at a sports stadium in Nairobi danger exists that those not involved in Figure 15: Respondents’ to give authorities an opportunity to affected communities might see the need perceptions of ‘us’ verify individuals’ status in the country. to defend themselves against the ‘other’, 90 However, the authorities released 3 010 thus ‘driving’ individuals to extremism. 80 84 70 people after they were interrogated and It is, however, not only the government 68 ascertained to be Kenyans without any and its security forces that treat people 60 criminal record. Those considered to on the fringes of society as the ‘enemy’, 50 be in the country illegally were almost but also the broader Kenyan community, 40 immediately deported to Somalia.44 which is driven by an established 30 32 It is clear that strategies based on mass perception that al-Shabaab only consists 20 arrests, racial profiling, etc. have proved of Somali nationals or those who are 10 14 0 0 2 0 0 0 more than once to be counterproductive. visibly Muslim. To illustrate this, Kenyan 0 Additionally, police-led criminal justice nationals turned against and attacked Family Country responses to terrorism are more effective Somali and Kenyan Somali nationals Organisation Religion/Organisation members ethnic group members and than an arbitrary and heavy-handed following the detonation of an explosive ethnic group al-Shabaab MRC

In the coastal region, one notices a growing perception For MRC respondents ‘us’ referred to of people being treated as second-class citizens members of the organisation (84%) and a combination of organisational members and ethnic or coastal people (14%), response. One of the most prominent device on 18 November 2012 in versus ‘them’, who are the Kenyan and recent examples occurred following Eastleigh, Nairobi. This was not the first government (52%), other ethnic groups the killing of three soldiers in Garissa occasion on which people retaliated in (43%) and a combination of government in November 2012. After the incident, this way. Earlier, on 30 September 2012, attackers reportedly fled to the Bumuila ordinary people attacked Somalis living and other ethnic groups (5%). Similar to Mzuri area, resulting in an operation to in Eastleigh after a grenade attack on St al-Shabaab, MRC respondents referred pursue them. Although the incident is Polycarp Church that killed one child and to arrests and mistreatment on the part under investigation, according to reports injured nine others. During this retaliation of security forces, but the vast majority Kenyan troops retaliated by burning incident at least 13 Somalis were injured specifically referred to: ‘Fighting for our markets and opening fire on a school that and property was destroyed.46 tribal rights and the rights of coastal

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people’, ‘land grabbing on the part of belonging (32% of MRC and 16% of government and other ethnic/tribal of al-Shabaab respondents). A further groups’ and ‘resource distribution’. 13% of al-Shabaab and 7% of MRC respondents indicated that they stayed Figure 16: Respondents’ for the adventure, while 8% of al-Shabaab perceptions of ‘them’ respondents referred to a combination of 80 adventure and the sense of belonging they had experienced. The remaining 2% of 70 both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents 60 67 referred to a combination of responsibility 50 52 and a sense of belonging (see Figure 17). 40 43 Respondents were also asked if they 30 30 experienced a sense of regret. Forty-six 20 per cent of MRC and 40% of al-Shabaab

10 respondents indicated that their biggest 3 5 0 0 regret was that they had not recruited 0 more members to the organisation; Other Other religions country 42% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC

Government Government and other regretted some of the tactics the ethnic group al-Shabaab MRC organisation used; 13% of al-Shabaab and 9% of MRC respondents regretted being caught; while 12% of MRC and The reasons for joining al-Shabaab and 5% of al-Shabaab respondents regretted the MRC are only a part of understanding joining their organisations. These results why people become involved in these further emphasise the role identity plays organisations; the second part deals in both groups in joining and staying, with why a person would want to stay associated with a sense of belonging in them. In answering this question, the and responsibility. In assessing a sense majority of both al-Shabaab (61%) and of belonging, respondents were asked to MRC (59%) respondents considered it rate their sense of belonging when they their responsibility, followed by a sense joined the organisation and while they were part of the organisation (see Figures Figure 17: reasons why respondents decided to stay in al-Shabaab 18 and 19). and the MRC 70 Figure 18: Sense of belonging of al-Shabaab 60 61 59 respondents 50 100 90 13 40 80 70 48 39 30 32 60

% 50 20 40 45 16 10 13 30 20 33 7 2 2 8 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 10

Fear 0 1-4 5-7 8-10 Adventure Belonging Economic Belonging Responsibility Responsibility and Rating on a scale of 1-10 and adventure belonging al-Shabaab MRC Being a member Joining

22 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Figure 19: Sense of belonging of represents, but based purely on the central role religious figures played in the mrc respondents answers provided by respondents, it radicalisation process. 0 would be a mistake to place extremists 100 As mentioned earlier in the paper, al- 90 from both groups under one banner. Shabaab and MRC respondents leaned 80 53 Finding a solution to the problem posed either towards a religious (al-Shabaab) 70 by both groups – as well as other similar 60 47 or an ethnic (i.e. a geographical) identity groups – requires a better understanding

% 50 9 (MRC). This differentiation was also of their respective members and what 40 reflected in the reasons for joining the 79 drives individual members. 30 organisations, as well as the distinction 20 In both organisations middle children made between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that 10 12 0 were particularly vulnerable to presented clearly defined in- and 1-4 5-7 8-10 radicalisation. Although respondents out-groups. With reference to ‘them’ Rating on a scale of 1-10 from both organisations came from very (opponents), both organisations identified similar family structures – most came the government. Although al-Shabaab Being a member Joining from relatively small families – a number respondents firstly referred to other of important differences could be noted. religions and secondly to the government Although the values differ, it is important Firstly, more MRC (31%) than al-Shabaab as ‘them’, the majority of respondents to note that in both organisations (18%) respondents grew up with a father identified the government as being the sense of belonging respondents figure. This is particularly interesting behind the threat to their religion when experienced increased substantially the since a number of practitioners the asked if they considered it to be under longer the person stayed in the group. author interacted with were under the threat and to identify the type of threat. Some al-Shabaab respondents explained impression that growing up without a that they rated belonging between 1 The government and the way it has father is one of the single most important and 4 as a result of obstacles they had responded in the past to both al- factors facilitating later radicalisation. encountered and the dangers associated Shabaab and the MRC is the most with being a member. Secondly, more MRC than al-Shabaab important unifying factor. Political factors respondents informed their families have pushed Muslim youth to join This confirms that the identity of the organisation becomes the identity of the individual, in that belonging to a terrorist The sense of belonging respondents experienced organisation can result in a collective increased substantially the longer the person stayed in identity in terms of which individual identities are replaced by a sense of the group being part of something greater.

Conclusion that they were joining their respective extremist groups as a counter-reaction organisations. Similarly, the parents of to or way of retaliating against what they Based on the answers provided by MRC respondents were more active in see as ‘collective punishment’ that is al-Shabaab and MRC respondents, it discussing politics with their children driven by a misguided perception that can be empirically stated that the two and were aware of their child’s decision all Muslims are terrorists or potential organisations have two very different to join the MRC. This indicates the terrorists. In addition to their religious profiles. Despite the geographical identity, Kenyan Somalis as an ethnic overlap, the two organisations are active role parents played in the political group are also marginalised. As a result, clearly driven by two different socialisation process in establishing an a convergence of religious and ethnic motivations: the MRC is driven by a active ethnic identity as coastal people identity provided a bridge between al- combination of ethnic and economic who had a history of being marginalised Shabaab and the MRC, especially in the factors, while al-Shabaab’s core is radical by other Kenyans. In addition to peers coastal and north-eastern regions. Islam. The two can meet in fighting who took over from parents as another against a ‘common enemy’ in the form of socialisation agent by introducing This convergence did not start when the Kenyan government and the respondents to the organisations, al- Kenyan troops entered Somalia in 2011. politically influential ethnic groups it Shabaab respondents also exposed the Instead, ethnic marginalisation among

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Kenyan Somalis can be traced back to meaningfully and non-violently attend to the Shifta war that gained momentum the problems thrown up by this context. following the growing economic and It is apparent that Kenyans are extremely political marginalisation of coastal people. divided. While diversity can be celebrated The role perceptions played in classifying when mutual respect exists, it can also people further fuelled marginalisation and destroy a country from within when there the entrenching of in- and out-groups. At the same time it is important to is no trust with reference to both religious remember that the MRC is multi- and ethnic differences, as described by religious, although the majority of al-Shabaab and MRC respondents. The members are Muslim. Religious identity, greatest threat to stability in Kenya will however, became increasingly prominent be if extremists succeed in dividing the following the anti-terrorist campaign after country between Muslims and non- the US embassy bombings in 1998. As a Muslims or between the coastal people

It would be a mistake to group extremists from both organisations under one banner

result of the security forces’ counter- and those in Nairobi. Addressing and terrorism activities, many Muslim youths breaking these perceptions extend (especially Kenyan Somalis) have been well beyond the responsibility of the arbitrarily arrested and incarcerated on police – the process requires the entire suspicion that they are engaged in Kenyan government to initiate dedicated terrorist activities. This has contributed to strategies to build national identity in a a form of xenophobia directed at country that is religiously and ethnically Muslims by non-Muslims, or at least this divided. As long as Kenyan citizens, was the perception that was created. especially those on the fringes of society, Furthermore, al-Shabaab was able to exclusively identify with an ethnic or religious identity that is perceived to be break through ethnic separation by under threat, radicalisation will continue attracting followers from different to increase. ethnic backgrounds. In addition to the political circumstances Of even more concern are claims of described above, economic circum- extrajudicial killings of ‘problematic’ stances – with reference to relative individuals, most notably radical Muslim depravation – played a prominent role in scholars. The reality is, however, that the radicalisation of MRC respondents. It the ‘elimination’ or assassination of such is, however, important to emphasise that leaders or scholars has radicalised and it was not poverty that drove respond- recruited dozens, if not hundreds, to the ents to the MRC, but rather evidence of ranks of extremist organisations, ensuring inequality based on ethnicity and a new wave of radicalism and collective geographical location. Access to basic resolve among their members, ultimately services, especially education, together 67% indicating that threats of violence with the quality of this education, directly or imprisonment are rarely effective contributed to marginalisation, which The percentage of MRC deterrents. An effective counterterrorism later facilitated radicalisation. Al-Shabaab respondents who only policy and strategy should appreciate respondents were, however, better off in attended primary the broader context in which violent school comparison to their MRC counterparts in actions or attacks occur and seek to that more individuals attended secondary

24 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council The ‘elimination’ or assassination of leaders or scholars 21 t Odula, Kenya attacks: Elgive Bwire Oliacha, al Shabaab member, pleads guilty, has radicalised and recruited dozens, if not hundreds, Huffington Post, 26 October 2011, http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/26/kenya- to the ranks of extremist organisations attacks-al-shabaab_n_1032508.html. 22 The Guardian, Al-Shabaab attacker given life sentence for Kenya grenade blasts, 28 school – 45% versus 24%, respectively, 5 I Gatsiounis, After al-Shabaab, Current Trends October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ considering that a further 67% of MRC in Islamist Ideology 14 (2012), 80. world/2011/oct/28/kenya-jails-alshabaab- 6 al-Jazeera, Kenyan Muslim cleric killed attacker?intcmp=239. respondents only attended primary in aftermath of mall attack, 4 October 23 Kenyan Whispers, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, alias school. This difference might also serve 2013, http://america.aljazeera.com/ Mohamed Saif, jailed for life, 28 October as a reflection of the agenda and driving articles/2013/10/4/popular-muslim-clerickilledi 2011, http://www.kenyanwhispers.co.uk/ nkenyainaftermathofmallattack.html. force behind both organisations: whereas angelaspress/?tag=elgiva-bwire-oliacha. 7 The Star, Radical preacher Makaburi shot 24 p Leftie, Al-Shabaab executes ‘Kenyan spy’, the MRC has a domestic agenda, dead, 2 April 2014, http://www.the-star. Daily Nation, 11 January 2012, http://www. al-Shabaab is driven by a radical interpre- co.ke/news/article-161436/radical-preacher- nation.co.ke/News/Al+Shabaab+executes+ makaburi-shot-dead. tation of Islam that has an external origin Kenyan+spy+/-/1056/1303950/-/vx9k9u/-/ 8 Ibid. index.html. where developments beyond Kenya 9 All Africa, Kenya: suspected terrorist, 24, is 25 J Kouri, Suspected Al Shabaab terrorists in influence its overall agenda. arrested, 30 June 2003. Kenya linked to Obama family, The Examiner, Domestic circumstances directly 10 W Maclean, Israelis attacked in Kenya – 11 29 October 2012, http://www.examiner. die, al-Qaeda blamed, Reuters, 28 November com/article/suspected-al-shabaab-terrorists- influenced the individual’s susceptibility 2002. kenya-linked-to-obama-family. to radicalisation and recruitment. If we 11 Washington Post, Kenya’s president denies 26 C Leys, cited in P Mawhood and M Wallis, return to education, attention should al-Shabab is behind attacks, blames politics, Ethnic minorities in Eastern Africa: Kenya and 17 June 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. Tanzania, Regional Politics and Policy 3(1) be directed at the type and quality of com/world/kenyas-president-denies- (1993), 172. education people receive. Similarly, even al-shabab-is-behind-attacks-blames- 27 J Prinz, Determination of national identity though the majority of both al-Shabaab politics/2014/06/17/0b6e63d6-f64d-11e3- in ambivalence of traditional means of 8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html. and MRC respondents attended public communication and the medium radio in the 12 KP Langton, Political socialization, London: case study of Kenya, master’s thesis, Wien school, the level of integration and Oxford University Press, 1969, 4–5. University, Vienna, 2008, 28–32. contact with individuals from different 13 re Dawson and K Prewitt, Political 28 mO Makoloo, Kenya: minorities, indigenous ethnic and religious backgrounds needs socialization, Boston: Little Brown, 1969, 18. peoples and ethnic diversity, Minority Rights attention. 14 J Hogan and M Taylor, The making of a Group International, 2005, 26. terrorist, Jane’s Intelligence Review 13(12) 29 es Greenberg, Consensus and dissent: (2001), 16–18. Notes trends in political socialization research, in ES 15 d Eckstein, Empirical studies indicating Greenberg (ed.), Political socialization, New 1 National Council for Law Reporting, Randu significant birth-order-related personality Brunswick: AldineTransaction, 2009, 5–6. Nzai Ruwa & 2 others v Internal Security differences, Journal of Individual Psychology 30 World Bank, World Development Report, Minister & another [2012], Miscellaneous 56(4) (Winter 2000), 484–486. 2006, 13, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ Application 468 of 2010, Kenya Law Reports, 16 a Mazrui, Ethnicity and pluralism: the external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB 2012, http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/ politicization of religion in Kenya, Institute of /2003/10/07/000090341_20031007150121 view_preview1.php?link=7580873638800550 Muslim Minority Affairs Journal 14(1–2) (1994), /Rendered/PDF/268950PAPER0WDR02004. 9511415. 193–194. pdf. the majority of interviews were conducted by 2 17 Ibid, 198. 31 makoloo, Kenya, 30. representatives of the Kenya Muslim Youth 18 b Møller, Political , in H Alliance in Nairobi, , Mombasa, 32 society for International Development, Pulling Solomon, A Fadare and F Butler (eds), Political apart: facts and figures on inequality in and . The author wishes to extend Islam and the state in Africa, Pretoria: Centre Kenya, 2004, 9, http://www.sidint.net/docs/ special thanks to Hassan Ole Naado, Khamis for International Political Studies, University of pullingapart-mini.pdf. Mwaguzo, Shahid Mubari, and others for their Pretoria, 2008, 133. assistance and support. 33 d Foeken, J Hoorweg and RA Obudho, 19 the Shifta war (1963–1967) was a secessionist The Kenya coast: a regional study, Leiden 3 I Akintola, , in H Solomon, A conflict in which ethnic Somalis in the Northern University, 2000, 7, https://openaccess. Fadare and F Butler (eds), Political Islam Frontier district attempted to join with their leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/4675/ and the state in Africa, Pretoria: Centre for fellow Somalis in a Greater Somalia after ASC-1241504-044.pdf?sequence=1. International Political Studies, University of Kenya gained independence. See A Botha, 34 mazrui, Ethnicity and pluralism, 198–199. Pretoria, 2008, 37. Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to 4 b Otieno, AG to appeal lifting of MRC ban, radicalisation and extremism, ISS Paper 245, 35 møller, Political Islam in Kenya, 116. The Star, 26 July 2012, http://www.the-star. Pretoria: ISS, 2013. 36 p Collier, The challenge of Ugandan co.ke/news/article-8724/ag-appeal-lifting- 20 The Star, Radical preacher Makaburi shot reconstruction, 1986-98, Washington, DC: mrc-ban. dead. World Bank, 2 November 1999.

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37 C Rakodi, R Gatabaki-Kamau and N Devas, Poverty and political conflict in Mombasa, Environment and Urbanization 12 (2000), 158. 38 Ibid. 39 BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Kenyan police say ‘key’ suspect in Mombassa terror attacks has Yemeni links, 27 December 2002. 40 s McGregor, Kenya criticized for arrests of Somalis to curb ‘terrorism’, Bloomberg, 11 April 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2014-04-11/kenya-criticized-for-mass- arrests-of-somalis-to-curb-terrorism-.html. 41 Gulf News, Gunmen kill four in attack on Kenyan church, 23 March 2014, http:// gulfnews.com/news/world/other-world/ gunmen-kill-four-in-attack-on-kenyan-church- 1.1307715?utm_content=1.1307715&utm_ medium=RSS&utm_source=Feeds&utm_ campaign=Gunmen_kill_four_in_attack_on_ Kenyan_church&localLinksEnabled=false&u tm_term=News_RSS_feed. 42 C Ombati, Death toll in Eastleigh blast rises to six, The Standard, 1 April 2014, http:// www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/ article/2000108304/death-toll-in-eastleigh- blast-rises-to-six. 43 J Kithuure, Mass arrests in Eastleigh lead to public outcry, Sabahi Online, 9 April 2014, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/ articles/features/2014/04/09/feature-01. 44 O Mathenge and Z Angira, Garissa erupts in violence after soldiers’ killing, Daily Nation, 21 November 2012, http://www.nation. co.ke/News/Garissa-erupts-in-violence-after- soldiers-killing/-/1056/1625452/-/ex3xjcz/-/ index.html. 45 b Boniface, Somali Kenyans urge police, citizens to stop ethnic profiling, Sabahi Online, 5 December 2012, http:// sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/ features/2012/12/05/feature-01?change_ locale=true. 46 Ibid.

26 Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council PAPER

About the author ISS Pretoria Anneli Botha has been a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Block C, Brooklyn Court 361 Veale Street Security Studies in Pretoria since 2003. After completing an honours degree New Muckleneuk in international politics she joined the South African Police Service’s Crime Pretoria, South Africa Intelligence Unit in 1993, focusing, among other things, on terrorism and Tel: +27 12 346 9500 religious extremism. She has a master’s degree in political studies from the Fax: +27 12 460 0998 University of Johannesburg and a PhD from the University of the Free State. [email protected] Her specific areas of interest are counter-terrorism strategies and the underlying causes of terrorism and radicalisation. ISS Addis Ababa 5th Floor, Get House Building, Africa Avenue Addis Ababa, Ethiopia About the ISS Tel: +251 11 515 6320 Fax: +251 11 515 6449 The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims to enhance [email protected] human security on the continent. It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and delivers practical training and ISS Dakar technical assistance. 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam Dakar, Senegal Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 Acknowledgements Fax: +221 33 860 3343 This paper is based on the author’s research for a doctoral thesis at the [email protected] University of the Free State entitled ‘Radicalisation to commit terrorism from a political socialisation perspective in Kenya and Uganda’. The ISS is grateful for ISS Nairobi Braeside Gardens support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of off Muthangari Road Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya the USA. Tel: +254 20 266 7208 Fax: +254 20 266 7198 [email protected]

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© 2014, Institute for Security Studies ISS Paper No 265 Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. The opinions expressed do not reflect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.