THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE
Introduction
Thomas Wylton's major contribution to natural philosophy is repre- sented by his Quaestiones libri Physicorum, a lengthy commentary per modum quaestionis on the eight books of Aristotle's Physics1. The Quae- stiones were probably written in the years 1301-1304, when Wylton was still master of Arts at the University of Oxford2, that is, before he began his studies of theology at Paris3. Although the Quaestiones have not yet
1. A. MAIER was the first to call attention to Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum in her study «Verschollene Aristoteleskommentare des 14. Jahrhunderts», in: Autour d’Aristote. Recueil d’études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à A. Mansion, Louvain 1955, pp. 521-528. Since Maier's study, the research has focused mainly on the problem of the authorship of the Quaestiones libri Physicorum, which are ascribed by some manuscripts to Thomas Anglicus and not to Thomas Wylton. On the authorship, see A. MAIER, «Verschollene Aristoteleskommentare», pp. 522-528; M. SCHMAUS, «Thomas Wylton als Verfasser eines Kommentars zur Aristotelischen Physik», in: Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 9 (1956), pp. 3-11; A. MAIER, «Die Quaestio de velocitate des Johannes von Casale O. F. M.», in: Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 53 (1960), p. 282; Z. KUKSEWICZ, De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l’intellect chez les averroïstes latins des XIIIe et XIVe siècles, Wroclaw-Varsovie-Cracovie 1968, pp. 279-280. 2. On Wylton's biography, see especially, A. B. EMDEN, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500, III, Oxford 1959, pp. 2054-2055. On the dating of Wylton's Quaestiones Physicorum, see Z. KUKSEWICZ, De Siger de Brabant (nt. 1), pp. 176- 177, 181, 279-280. 3. Wylton's activity as master of theology at Paris is relatively better known than his activity as master of arts at Oxford. On Wylton's activity as master of theology, see espe- cially A. MAIER, «Wilhelm von Alwincks Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus (1323)», in: Gregorianum 30 (1949), pp. 265-308; W. SENKO, «Tomasza Wiltona Quaestio disputata de anima intellectiva», in: Studia Mediewistyczne 5 (1964), pp. 5-190; Z. KUK- SEWICZ, De Siger de Brabant (nt. 1), pp. 176-201; ID., «De infinitate vigoris Dei des Pariser Averroisten Johannes de Janduno», in: Manuscripta 9 (1965), pp. 167-170; J. ERMATINGER, «John of Jandun in his Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians», in: Arts libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Age. Actes du quatrième Congrès de Philosophie médiévale, Montréal- Paris 1969, pp. 1181-1183; E. JUNG-PALCZEWSKA, «Jean de Jandun a-t-il affirmé la nature active de l'intellect possible?», in: Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 27 (1986), pp. 15-20; EAD., «Thomas Wilton and his question on the Infinite Power of God», in: Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 32 (1994), pp. 41-56. Wylton's main extant theological work is a Quodlibet, preserved in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica
©RTPM 65,1 (1998) 1-39 2 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES been edited, a recent investigation of Wylton's position on some tradi- tional problems of Aristotle's Physics has started to shed light on his physical theories and their influence. For instance, the analysis of his views on the ontological status of motion and of time has revealed Wyl- ton's strongly realistic approach to natural philosophy4. It has also shown that he openly rejects Averroes' position on these topics, thereby pointing out that Wylton's reputed Averroism is in need of some qualifications. Furthermore, Wylton's treatment of problems like time and the instant of change exerted a great influence on authoritative XIVth-century commentators, such as John of Jandun and Walter Burley5. Accord- ingly, even these fragmentary results are enough to establish the philo- sophical and historical value of Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum. This paper is devoted to Wylton's position on the immobility of place. Indeed, this is one of the traditional problems of Aristotle's theory of place in Physics IV, a problem for which Aristotle presented no satisfactory solution, in his commentators' view, and that con- sequently became matter of debate both in the Greek and in the Medieval tradition. Wylton devotes a specific question to the problem of the immobility of place (Book IV, q. 6: Utrum locus sit immobilis), which is edited in the second part of this paper6. In the first part, instead, we shall present the content of Wylton's discussion, aiming both at providing a guide to the text of q. 6 and at pointing out the originality and historical importance of Wylton's position.
Vaticana, ms. Borgh. lat. 36. A number of new theological questions by Wylton have been most recently discovered by Stephen Dumont. On these new questions and on the other extant theological works by Wylton, see S. DUMONT, «New Questions by Thomas Wylton», in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 9 (1998), pp. 341-381. 4. For Wylton's view on the ontological status of motion, see C. TRIFOGLI, «Thomas Wylton on Motion», in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (1995), pp. 135-154. I have edited Wylton's questions on this topic in EAD., «Due questioni sul movimento nel Commento alla Physica di Thomas Wylton», in: Medioevo 21 (1995), pp. 51-73. For his view on the ontological status of time and for the edition of the question on this topic, see EAD., «Il problema dello statuto ontologico del tempo nelle Quaestiones super Physicam di Thomas Wylton e di Giovanni di Jandun», in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 1,2 (1990), pp. 491-548. For another aspect of Wylton's theory of time, see EAD., «Thomas Wylton on the Instant of Time», in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21/1), Berlin-New York 1991, pp. 308-318. 5. For the debate between Wylton and Jandun on the ontological status of time, see C. TRIFOGLI, «Il problema…» (nt. 4). For the influence of Wylton's treatment of the problem of the instant of change on Burley's treatise De primo et ultimo instanti, see EAD., «Thomas Wylton's Question An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse», in: Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994), pp. 91-141, especially pp. 137-141. 6. All my references to Wylton's question Utrum locus sit immobilis will be to the crit- ical edition contained in Part II below. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 3
PART I
The structure of q. 6 is the following: (i) first Wylton lists some arguments against the immobility of place7, (ii) then he presents three major XIIIth-century «positive» solutions to this problem, i.e., solutions that pretend to show that place is in fact immobile. He rejects them all8, (iii) subsequently he gives a reconstruction of Aver- roes' fragmentary treatment of this problem and he rejects it as well, at least partially9, (iv) he presents his own position and also discusses some objections against it10, (v) finally, he solves the counterargu- ments11. In what follows, (1) we shall first introduce the Aristotelian back- ground of the problem of the immobility of place, thereby clarifying the meaning of the counterarguments found in (i). (2) We shall then explain the main points of the three positive solutions to the problem and of Wylton's refutation of them. (3) Finally, we shall present Wyl- ton's solution, while comparing it with Averroes' position and setting it more generally in the context of the XIIIth- and XIVth-century debate on this problem.
1. The Aristotelian Background In Physics IV.4, Aristotle first defines the place of a body A as the limit of the body B containing A that is in contact with A12. Thus, according to this definition, the place of a ship in a river is the surface of water in contact with the ship. Later in the same chapter, however, Aristotle makes clear that, since this definition is to some extent incomplete, it remains provisional. What needs to be added to it is a requirement that distinguishes place from any container whatsoever. In the follow- ing passage, which leads to the final definition of place, Aristotle argues that the requirement in question is the immobility of place: And, just as a vessel is a mobile place, so place is an immobile vessel. There- fore, when an enclosed thing moves and changes within something that moves, like a ship in a river, it has the surrounding thing serving as a vessel
7. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 2-30. 8. Ibid., lin. 32-139. 9. Ibid., lin. 140-258. 10. Ibid., lin. 259-392. 11. Ibid., lin. 393-440. 12. Aristotle’s Physics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by D. ROSS, Oxford 1979, IV.4, 212a5-6a. 4 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
rather than as a place. But place should be immobile. Therefore, the whole river is rather the place, because the whole is immobile. So the first immobile surface of the surrounding thing, that is place13. This passage, which almost exhausts Aristotle's treatment of the immobility of place, is puzzling in several respects. First, although the difference between an immobile place and a mobile vessel formulated at the beginning of the passage is clear in its abstract formulation, its subsequent illustration with the case of a ship in a river is problem- atic. Since the water surrounding the ship continuously flows, then — Aristotle claims — the place of this ship should rather be identi- fied with the «whole river», which is immobile. The meaning of the expression «the whole river» is not specified by Aristotle, but it can be probably taken to mean either the banks and the bed of the river or the totality of water enclosed by them as opposed to the portion of water immediately in contact with the ship. In both cases, «the whole river» stands for something that is certainly more fixed than the flow- ing surfaces of the water in contact with the ship. Yet, even when the meaning of «the whole river» is thus specified, Aristotle's example cannot be taken as a positive account of the immobility of place. On the contrary, from other aspects of his theory of place, it follows that the whole river cannot be regarded, strictly speaking, as the place of the ship. For, in Physics IV.2, Aristotle distinguishes between common place and proper place. The common place of a body A is that which contains also other bodies besides A, whereas the proper place of A contains only A, being a containing surface that encompasses exclusively A14. Only proper place is regarded as the «true» place by Aristotle. It is clear, however, that the whole river, as opposed to the surface of water in contact with the ship, is not at all the proper place of the ship, since it contains many other bodies besides the ship. One might suggest that in claiming that the place of a body is immobile, Aristotle means that a body must have some immobile
13. ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV.4, 212a14-21. The English translation of this passage is taken from K. ALGRA, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Philosophia Antiqua 65), Leiden- New York-Köln 1995, p. 223. The problem of the immobility of place in Aristotle's theory has been recently discussed by K. Algra, who takes into account also the solutions pro- posed by some Greek commentators. See K. ALGRA, Concepts of Space, pp. 222-230. See also R. SORABJI, Matter, Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel, London 1988, pp. 186-201. 14. ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV.2, 209a31-b1. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 5 place, but that such an immobile place needs not be its proper place. This suggestion, however, cannot be accepted. In fact, Aristotle refers to proper place. In particular, this is proven by the occurrence of the adjective «first» in the final definition stated at the end of the pas- sage quoted above («the first immobile surface of the surrounding thing»). According to the standard interpretation, here «first» serves to specify with which surrounding surface place must be identified, namely, with that in contact with the located body (the first surface, in a spatial order, after that of the located body itself)15. Thus, «first» is used here exactly to distinguish proper place from common place. As a consequence, a first difficulty in the passage quoted above is that Aristotle's account of the immobility of place, as illustrated with the case of the ship in a river, seems to be incompatible with the requirement that place must also be in contact with the located body, i.e., must be its proper place16. A second and even more radical difficulty involved in Aristotle's passage derives from the ontological status itself of place. In Aristotle's view, although place is separated from the body located in it, it does not exist, however, over and above physical bodies. In fact, it is the limit, that is, an accident, of the containing body. But the containing body, being a natural body, can be subject to motion; therefore, also its limit, namely place, can be subject to motion, although in a derivative sense: when the containing body moves, it carries along its limiting surface. Thus, as it seems, the requirement of immobility cannot be reconciled with the ontological status of place as an accident of a mobile body17.
15. For this interpretation, see, for instance, AVERROES CORDUBENSIS, Aristotelis de Physico Auditu IV, t. c. 41 (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis IV, ed. Venetiis apud Junctas 1562 (repr. Frankfurt 1962), f. 140raB); THOMAS AQUINAS, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio IV, lect. 6 (ed. P. M. MAGGIOLO, Torino-Roma 1965, p. 227b, n. 470); AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis IV, lect. 7 (ed. Venetiis 1502 (repr. Frankfurt 1968), f. 80vb). 16. This difficulty is pointed out especially by E. Grant in his survey of the main medieval solutions to the problem of the immobility of place. See E. GRANT, «The Medieval Doctrine of Place: Some Fundamental Problems and Solutions», in: A. MAIERÙ et A. PARAVICINI-BAGLIANI (edd.), Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, Roma 1981, pp. 59-60, see also pp. 61-72. For a traditional study on the medieval theory of place, see also P. DUHEM, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, VII, Paris 1956, pp. 158-302. 17. This basic difficulty has been clearly detected by Algra. See K. ALGRA, Concepts of Space (nt. 13), pp. 229-230. 6 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
This difficulty represents the most common and crucial objection raised by medieval commentators against Aristotle's account of the immobility of place. Wylton in particular puts it forward in the sec- ond argument against the immobility of place in q. 618. In section 3 we shall see that Wylton himself, following Averroes, admits that this objection cannot completely be resolved and consequently is lead to ascribe some kind of motion to place. Before concluding this section, let us mention some points left indeterminate by Aristotle's treatment of the immobility of place and that will be worked out in more details in the following sections. First, Aristotle talks simply about immobility, and this is some- what vague. For in his physical system there are four main distinct kinds of motion: local motion, quantitative motion (increase and decrease), qualitative motion or alteration, and substantial change (generation and corruption)19. But Aristotle does not specify whether place should be deprived of each of these four kinds of motion or just of some of them. Moreover, this point is left substantially unde- termined also by those XIIIth-century authors quoted by Wylton who proposed positive solutions to the problem of the immobility of place. On the other hand, Wylton is much concerned with this question. As we shall see in section 3, he devotes great care to the determination of the kinds of motion that can be ascribed to place; both his criticism of Averroes' view and his position on the immo- bility of place depend essentially on such a determination. Further- more, his concern with this problem also appears albeit indirectly in the list of arguments against the immobility of place at the beginning of q. 6. Apart from the «ontological» argument, discussed above, which is based on the incompatibility between the immobility of place and its ontological status as an accident of a natural body, the other four arguments in the list aim respectively at showing that place can undergo each of the four main kinds of motion20.
18. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 6-15. 19. ARISTOTELES, Physica, V.1-2. Aristotle reserves the term «kínjsiv» (motion) for the changes in the categories of quality, quantity and for local motion, whereas he uses the term «metabol®» (change) for the changes in the category of substance. Since Aristotle's distinction is not relevant in this context, we shall use the terms «motion» and «change» synonymously to indicate any of the four types of change. 20. Argument <1> (lin. 4-5) shows that place can be subject to local motion; argument <3> (lin. 16-20) that it can be subject to increase (quantitative motion); argument <4> THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 7
A second point left undetermined by Aristotle concerns the reasons why place should be immobile. Certainly, in Physics IV.1-5 more than one passage suggests that place must be in some sense more fixed than the body located in it21, however, Aristotle does not formulate any specific argument for the immobility of place. Such arguments were usually supplied by medieval commentators. We shall present some of them in the next section, in order to clarify the meaning of the XIIIth-century positive solutions to the problem of the immobility of place. Furthermore, in section 3 we shall make clear that it is precisely Wylton's treatment of these arguments that make his position at least in part original.
2. Positive Opinions on the Immobility of Place The first opinion quoted by Wylton is based on the distinction between material and formal aspects of place, henceforth referred to for the sake of brevity as «material place» and «formal place». Material place is place as originally defined by Aristotle, namely the limit of the containing body. Formal place is the respect (respectus) or distance (distantia) of the limit of the containing body from the fixed regions of the universe, i.e., the centre and the poles. According to this opinion, then, the immobility of place is granted by formal place22. Wylton refers to an exponent of this opinion as to «unus exposi- tor», who can be with certainty identified with Giles of Rome23. Indeed, Giles' solution is the most quoted and discussed XIIIth cen- tury position on the problem of the immobility of place24. Although solutions very similar to that by Giles had already been presented by Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Roger Bacon and some English
(lin. 21-25) that it can be subject to alteration (qualitative motion) and argument <5> (lin. 26-30) that it can be subject to corruption (substantial motion). 21. See, for instance, the passages in which Aristotle hints at the separability of place from the located body and at the fact that different bodies can occupy successively the same place. ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV.1, 208b1-8; 2, 209b21-31; 4, 211a2-3, 212a7-14. 22. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 32-39. 23. In one of the manuscripts of Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum the expositor in question is explicitly named Aegidius. See the critical apparatus at lin. 33. 24. On Giles' position and its fortune in the XIVth century, see especially C. TRI- FOGLI, «La dottrina del luogo in Egidio Romano», in: Medioevo 14 (1988), pp. 254- 290. 8 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES commentators of the years 1250-127025, it is very likely that Giles' treatment of the immobility of place depends essentially on Thomas Aquinas' treatment of this topic in his commentary on the Physics. In fact, the distinction between material place and formal place is not explicitly formulated by Aquinas, but all the ingredients for it can be found in his commentary26. Aquinas' solution is most probably the second opinion quoted by Wylton27. According to Wylton, the exponents of this position maintain that the place of a body persists, even when that body is contained by continuously changing surfaces, provided that all the succeeding surfaces have some kind of unity, understood as having the same respect to the poles and to the centre of the universe. Wyl- ton's short report summarizes rather faithfully the salient points of Aquinas' solution28. Nevertheless, of two examples for this position that are related by Wylton, while the one of the persistence of fire, after the addition of combustible matter, appears in the Marietti edi- tion of Aquinas' commentary29, the other, which concerns a growing body, does not30. This absence is not enough, however, to question the attribution of the second opinion to Aquinas. For instance, in an anonymous English commentary of the end of the XIIIth century preserved in ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 192, this example appears in an opinion that is explicitly ascribed to Aquinas31. Thus it is likely
25. For the discussion on the immobility of place before Aquinas' commentary on the Physics, see C. TRIFOGLI, «Le questioni sul libro IV della Fisica in alcuni commenti inglesi intorno alla metà del sec. XIII. Parte II», in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 9 (1998), pp. 201-208. 26. For a more detailed analysis of the relation between Aquinas' and Giles' treat- ments of the immobility of place, see C. TRIFOGLI, «La dottrina del luogo…» (nt. 24), pp. 260-268. 27. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 46-58. 28. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, In Physicam, IV, lectio 6, p. 227b, nn. 468-469. 29. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 54-55, and THOMAS AQUINAS, In Physicam, IV, lectio 6, p. 227b, n. 468: «Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quan- tum ad formam, licet secundum materiam varietur, consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis». 30. From Wylton's formulation of this example at lin. 55-58 it is not immediately clear that this concerns a growing body. This point is made explicit, however, in his sub- sequent refutation of the pertinence of this example, at lin. 79-90. 31. I have edited the question on the immobility of place from this Peterhouse commentary (P2) in C. TRIFOGLI, «An Anonymous Question on the Immobility of Place from the End of the XIIIth Century», in: J. A. AERTSEN et A. SPEER (edd.), Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 25), Berlin-New York 1997, THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 9 that Wylton used a copy of Aquinas' commentary in which both the example of the fire and that of the growing body were given. The third opinion is based on a distinction between three ways of considering the limit of the containing body. Take, for instance, the limit of the air in contact with some located body. First, such a limit can be considered simply as the limit of that particular portion of air in contact with the located body; secondly, as the limit of the whole air; thirdly, as the limit of the whole universe, taken as the totality of all physical bodies, of which air is just one part. Strictly speaking, place is the limit of the air considered in the third way. It is then argued that, since the whole universe is immobile, place too, being the limit of an immobile body, will be immobile32. We know that, before Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum but after Aquinas' and Giles of Rome's commentaries on the Physics, two English commentators supported an opinion very similar to the third opinion quoted by Wylton. These are the authors of commentaries per modum quaestionis on Aristotle's Physics that are preserved in ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 19233. The two examples, however, that Wylton reports and ascribes to the exponents of the third opinion cannot be found in the two Peterhouse commentaries; so we cannot conclude that these commentaries were exactly Wylton's sources for the third opinion. Nevertheless, from the similarity between Wyl- ton's third opinion and that of the authors of the two Peterhouse pp. 147-167. P2 reports Aquinas' position as follows: «Thomas, expositor noster, alium modum immobilitatis ponit. Videtur quod dicit quod unitas successionis corporum sufficit ad unitatem et identitatem loci. Quia enim aer circumdans aliquod corpus in eo locatum non simul totus transfertur, sed successive per partes, quarum una recedente, succedit alia, idem faciens in toto, ideo unitas continentiae loci in diversis corporibus sibi succedentibus sufficienter salvatur, sicut unitas ignis sufficienter salvatur in diversis combustibilibus et unitas alimenti in diversis carnibus» (ibid., p. 160, lin. 143-149). Further, that the second example in P2 actually concerns a growing body is made explicit only in a subsequent objection: «Exemplum de alimento non est ad propositum, quia auctum ideo est quod manet unum numero, quia in ipso est aliqua virtus conversiva ali- mentum in speciem alimenti; in ultimum continentis corporis non invenitur aliqua talis species» (ibid., p. 160, lin. 158-161). 32. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 91-119. 33. I have analysed the treatment of the problem of the immobility of place in these two commentaries in my article quoted in note 31. There I have used the sigla P1 and P2 to refer to these two commentaries. While P2 is anonymous, P1 should probably be attibuted to Guillelmus de Bonkes, an Oxford master of arts of the end of the XIIIth century. 10 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES commentaries34, from the fact that these two commentaries seem to be strongly influenced by Aquinas' commentary on the Physics35 and from the remark by Wylton on the substantial identity between the third opinion and Aquinas' opinion36, it can be safely inferred that Wyl- ton's third opinion is a sort of modified version of Aquinas' solution that circulated in the English milieu of the end of the XIIIth century. In order to see more concretely in what sense the exponents of these three opinions intend to provide a «positive» solution to the problem of the immobility of place, the nature of this problem as it was felt in the XIIIth century tradition should be stated. Aristotelian contemporary commentators maintain that the admission of a mobile place would create difficulties for the definition of local motion and of rest. They assume that by definition something moves locally when it changes place and it is at rest when it is in the same place. But if place is taken in Aristotle's sense, i.e., as the limit of the con- taining body, without adding the requirement of its immobility, the definitions of local motion and of rest would be inconsistent. This difficulty comes out very clearly in the case of rest. Take the example of a ship anchored in a river. It is universally assumed that this ship is at rest; but if the place of this ship is the surface of water in con- tact with it, since water flows around the ship, the ship is not in the same place, being surrounded by always different surfaces of water; and this contradicts the definition of being at rest37.
34. For this similarity, compare, for instance, Wylton's report of the third opinion with the passages from P2 and P1 edited in C. TRIFOGLI, «An anonymous question» (nt. 31), at p. 161, lin. 187-201 and p. 164, lin. 243-252. 35. We have detected Aquinas' influence not only in P1's and P2's treatment of the immobility of place, but also in their discussion of the ontological status of motion. On this latter point, see C. TRIFOGLI, «Thomas Wylton on Motion» (nt. 4), pp. 147-149. 36. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 92. Wylton's remark can be prob- ably understood as follows: to say that place is the containing surface qua having a definite respect to the fixed points of the universe and to say that place is the containing surface qua belonging to the whole universe are almost equivalent expressions, because the relevant aspect of the whole universe in this case is its being fixed. Note also that in the passage quoted in the next note Aquinas uses the expression «terminus continentis secundum ordinem vel situm quem habet in toto immobili» as a description of his revised notion of place. 37. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, refers explicitly to this difficulty. After stating his own solution to the problem of the immobility of place, he shows that it actually solves this difficulty: «Et per hoc cessat obiectio quae potest fieri contra hoc quod ponimus locum esse terminum continentis, quia, cum continens sit mobile, et terminus continentis erit mobilis; et sic aliquod quietum existens habebit diversa loca. Sed hoc non sequitur, quia THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 11
In the three opinions quoted by Wylton, the strategy for dealing with this difficulty is very similar. It consists in adding some quali- fication to Aristotle's original notion of place as the limit of the containing body to ensure that, when a body is at rest, its place remains numerically the same and immobile, as the definition of being at rest requires. Thus, place, for Aquinas, is the containing sur- face qua having a definite respect to the fixed points of the universe; similarly, for Giles, place is not only material place, i.e., the contain- ing surface, but also formal place, i.e., the respect of this surface to the fixed points of the universe; finally, for the exponents of the third opinion, place is the containing surface qua limit of the whole universe, which is immobile. So, roughly speaking, in each of these three solutions, a reference to something fixed is added to the con- taining surface in order to confer on place the required numerical identity and immobility. This general strategy, however, is not very successful, as the arguments against each of these three solutions formulated by Wylton show38. And a general reason for its failure can easily be detected. Indeed, the original objection against the immo- bility of Aristotle's place based on the ontological status of place39 is still valid also against the immobility and the numerical identity of the modified notions of place proposed by these XIIIth-century commentators. For, despite the addition of a reference to something fixed, the «modified places» still retain the basic ontological status of limit of a natural and hence mobile body. Oversimplifying the terms of the problem, if place cannot be immobile because it is an accident of a mobile body, it seems hopeless to try to save the immobility of place, positing that place is the accident of a mobile body plus a relation to something immobile. In the next section, we shall see, however, that, in formulating his own position, Wylton does not at all neglect Aquinas' and Giles' treatment of the immobility of place. On the contrary, these two commentators' intuition that place, local motion and rest all require some reference to the fixed points of the universe also plays a fundamental role in Wylton. terminus continentis non erat locus inquantum est haec superficies istius corporis mobilis, sed secundum ordinem vel situm quem habet in toto immobili» (THOMAS AQUINAS, In Physicam, IV, lectio 6, p. 227b, n. 469; my italics). 38. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 40-45, 60-68, 121-128. 39. On this objection, see above, pp. 5-6. 12 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
3. Wylton's position A major difference between the positive XIIIth-century positions on the immobility of place and Wylton's position can be introduced schematically as follows: while the former pretend that the place of a body at rest remains numerically the same, even when the bodies surrounding it change, Wylton acknowledges that in this case the body at rest is in numerically distinct places that correspond to the numerically distinct surfaces in contact with it, so that the place of a body at rest can, in fact, change40. Accordingly, in admitting that place can change, Wylton may be said to hold a negative position on the problem of the immobility of place. Although Wylton's negative position can be regarded as an inno- vation, if compared with the dominant XIIIth-century approach, it is not absolutely new. Indeed, even Averroes seemed to acknowledge that place is to some extent subject to motion. In t.c. 41 of his commentary on book IV of the Physics, he comments as follows on the requirement of the immobility of place added by Aristotle in the final definition of place: In the definition of place, Aristotle posits another difference between place and a vessel. And this is that a vessel is a container and is essentially mobile, whereas place is a container which is immobile if not acciden- tally41. The following of t.c. 41 makes clear that the obscure expression «immobile if not accidentally» (immobile nisi per accidens) is to be expanded as «essentially immobile and only accidentally mobile». Accordingly, in Averroes' interpretation the relevant difference between a vessel and place is that a vessel is essentially mobile, whereas place can be only accidentally subject to motion, but essentially is immo- bile. Clearly, the crucial point of Averroes' exegesis consists in the expressions «essentially» and «accidentally» by which he qualifies the immobility and the mobility of place respectively. The meaning of these qualifications was usually understood as follows: place is essentially immobile, because only bodies are essentially subject to
40. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 268-288. 41. AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 41, f. 139vbL: «In definitione loci aliam differ- entiam ponit inter ipsum et vas, et est quoniam vas est continens et mobile essentialiter, locus vero est continens immobile nisi per accidens». THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 13 motion, whereas place is not a body, but the limit of a body; never- theless, place can be subject accidentally to motion, namely in virtue of the fact that the body of which it is the limit is essentially subject to motion42. On the assumption that only bodies are essentially subject to motion and hence that place cannot be essentially mobile there was a tacit agreement in the Aristotelian tradition. Thus, the debate on the immobility of place concerns exactly the question whether place is subject accidentally to some motion or is deprived even of an acci- dental motion. The passage quoted above clearly shows that Averroes sides with the first alternative, whereas the exponents of what we have called the positive opinions on the immobility of place side with the second alternative. Thus, it is not surprising that Averroes' interpretation was often neglected and sometimes explicitly rejected in the XIIIth century43. But as the negative view on the immobility of place became increasingly widespread in the XIVth century, so Averroes' interpretation increasingly attracted the attention of the commentators44. Thus, while Thomas Wylton reports very briefly the three «positive» opinions presented above, he devotes a detailed and lengthy discussion to Averroes' position45. Having concluded from t.c. 41 that Averroes admits that place is to some extent subject to motion, Wylton tries to determine exactly which kinds of motion Averroes ascribes to place. Lacking explicit indications on this point in t.c. 41, Wylton draws upon other sections devoted to some aspects of Aristotle's treatment of the difference between place, on one hand, and matter and form, on the other.
42. For this interpretation of Averroes' passage, see, for instance, WALTER BURLEY, In Physicam Aristotelis Expositio et Quaestiones, IV (ed. Venice 1501 (repr. Hildesheim-New York 1972), f. 101rb). 43. Averroes' interpretation is not mentioned by Aquinas and is quickly dismissed by Giles. Cf. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, In Physicam, IV, lectio 7, f. 81ra. It was also discussed and rejected by a number of English commentators of the years 1250-1270. Cf. C. TRIFOGLI, «Le questioni…» (nt. 25), pp. 201-203. 44. For instance, Walter Burley and William of Ockham, who both hold a negative view on the problem of the immobility of place, incorporate Averroes' position in their own analysis of this problem. See WALTER BURLEY, In Physicam, IV, ff. 101rb-102ra; GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis IV, cap. 7 (Opera philosophica 5, edd. R. WOOD et al., St. Bonaventure 1985, pp. 85-89). 45. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 140-258. 14 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
In t.c. 18, where he comments on an argument by Aristotle for the difference between the form of the located body and place46, Averroes remarks that place can in some cases be subject to corrup- tion. This happens, for instance, when water, being first surrounded by air, is then displaced. The concave surface of air first in contact with water no longer exists as a containing place, when water is displaced47. Further, in t.c. 20, Averroes implies that place can be subject accidentally to local motion. There Averroes comments on the following argument by Aristotle for the difference between place and matter/form: matter and form are subject to motion, when the composite substance to which they belong moves; but insofar as subject to motion, they require a place; accordingly, if place were matter or form, place would be in a place, though accidentally, and this is absurd48. Averroes remarks that Aristotle's argument is not completely sound. He maintains that it is not absurd that place is accidentally in a place. Indeed, place too is accidentally subject to motion, when the containing body in which it inheres moves, so that, in fact, place is accidentally in a place49. Thus, Averroes infers that place is in a place from the motion he ascribes to place in this case. And, in Wylton's interpretation, this inference shows that the kind of motion to which Averroes refers is local motion, since being in a place is a necessary condition primarily for local motion. In con- clusion, according to Wylton's reconstruction, Averroes admits that place can be subject (accidentally) to two distinct kinds of motion: corruption and local motion. Wylton partially rejects Averroes' position on this point. More precisely, he denies that place can undergo local motion, even in an accidental sense, though agreeing with Averroes that it can undergo corruption50. Wylton's main argument against a local motion of place is based on the assumption that there are opposite species of place, like up and down, so that the same place cannot be simultaneously up and down, as the same color cannot be simultaneously white and black.
46. ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV.2, 209b21-31. 47. AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 18, f. 128rbD-E. 48. ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV.2, 210a5-9. 49. AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 20, f. 129raB-rbE. 50. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 221-258. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 15
Then — Wylton claims — the absurd conclusion that the same place is simultaneously up and down would, in fact, follow, if place were posited to move locally. This is argued for as follows: suppose that some air moves locally from up to down; assume per absurdum that also the place associated to this portion of air moves locally down- wards. Then, since the subject of local motion persists during this motion, and — as Wylton assumes — in our case the subject of the downward motion is upper place, it follows that at the end of the motion upper place would be down, i.e., the same place would be simultaneously up and down51. This is apparently a strong argument against a local motion of place and was often proposed in the Aristotelian tradition52. Yet, its exact meaning cannot easily be established. The main source of difficulty is that two different aspects of Aristotle's theory of place are at work in this argument, namely his general doctrine of place as presented in Physics IV.1-5, according to which place is the limit of the containing body, and the assumption of the existence of fixed regions in the universe, like up and down, right and left, on which, in particular, his theory of natural place is based. The relation between the «general» theory of place of Physics IV.1-5 and the assumption of fixed regions in the universe is never clearly explained by Aristotle53. Nor does Wylton deal specifically with this problem in q. 6. However, the fact that in his main argument against a local motion of place he combines in some way these two aspects of Aristotle's doctrine leads naturally to the following question: when Wylton denies that place moves locally, does he assume that place is simply the limit of the containing body, as defined by Aristotle in Physics IV.4? Other passages in q. 6 show that a negative answer must be given to this question. In fact, it turns out that he introduces a modification to the original notion of place of Physics IV.4, a modification which is substantially the same as that proposed by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome.
51. Ibid., lin. 222-245. 52. This argument is used, for instance, also by the author of the Peterhouse com- mentary P2 against Averroes' position. See C. TRIFOGLI, «An anonymous question» (nt. 31), p. 159, lin. 136-p. 160, lin. 140. 53. For a recent discussion of Aristotle's theory of place and of natural place, see K. ALGRA, Concepts of Space (nt. 13), pp. 195-221. 16 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
This point comes out very neatly from Wylton's interpretation of the difference between a vessel and place posited by Aristotle. Wylton claims that the limit of the containing body taken in itself functions as a vessel for the contained body and not as its place; following Aquinas' and Giles' idea, he maintains that place instead is the limit of the containing body insofar as this limit has a definite order or respect to the fixed points of the universe, i.e., its centre and its poles54. In other words, the limit of the containing body is just one of the constituent elements of place, i.e., material place in Giles' terms; but to get the complete characterization of place another ele- ment must be added, namely the order or respect to the fixed parts of the universe, i.e., formal place in Giles' terms. Furthermore, Wyl- ton acknowledges that it cannot be denied that «material place» is accidentally subject to local motion, when the containing body in which it inheres moves locally. That place is subject to local motion must be denied, however, if also «formal place» is taken into account, since this cannot be subject even accidentally to local motion. For what is subject to local motion persists during this motion, whereas the respect of the limit of the containing body to the fixed points of the universe does not persist when the containing body moves locally55. To put Wylton's point more clearly, the element that changes continuously in the local motion of the containing body is exactly its relative position in respect of the fixed points of the universe, namely the formal aspect of place. Thus, in Wylton's view, Aquinas and Giles are right, when they claim that place conceived of as the limit of the containing body plus a definite respect to the fixed points of the universe cannot undergo local motion. They are wrong, however, when they pretend that place so conceived is absolutely immobile. Although they all use the same «modified» notion of place, Aquinas and Giles, on one hand, and Wylton, on the other, offer a different analysis of the following rele- vant case. Assume that a body at rest is first surrounded by air and then by water. Aquinas and Giles claim that, despite the fact that the surface of water is something else from the surface of air, this body is still in the same place, since the surface of air and that of water have
54. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 309-317. 55. Ibid., lin. 309-311, 401-413. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 17 the same respect to the fixed points of the universe. Wylton remarks, however, that the surface of air and that of water cannot have the same respect to the fixed points of the universe: this respect is, after all, an accident that inheres in air and in water respectively; but the numerical identity of an accident depends on that of its subject; therefore, since air and water are distinct subjects, also the respect to the fixed points of the universe inhering in air and that inhering in water will be numerically different. Accordingly, the body at rest will be in a different place, when air is replaced by water. One can still ask what happens to the place of the body at rest associated to air, when air is displaced. Wylton's answer is that this place no longer exists and in this sense place is subject to corruption. More accu- rately, when air is displaced, air and its surface still exist; however, the definite respect to the fixed points of the universe that air had when it was in contact with the body at rest perishes, since in its displace- ment air acquires a new respect to such fixed points56. In admitting that the place of a body at rest changes, whenever the containing body is displaced, Wylton has to face the difficulty arising from a «changing» place that we have mentioned above in con- nection with the positive opinions on the immobility of place57. This difficulty concerns the description of local motion and of rest in terms of a changing place and is raised by Wylton in some of the objections that he discusses against his own position58. In these objec- tions, he considers once again the case of a body at rest. If its sur- roundings change, then, in Wylton's position, also its place changes; but what changes place, by definition, undergoes local motion; it follows that the same body is simultaneously at rest and in local motion. This is the paradox of local motion and rest often proposed in the medieval debate on the immobility of place. Schematically, there are two main ways out of this paradox: the first way consists in showing that the place of a body at rest does not change, notwith- standing the change occurring in the bodies surrounding it; the sec- ond way consists in modifying the definition of local motion and rest such that a body at rest does not move locally, according to the new definitions, even when its surroundings change. Aquinas, Giles and,
56. Ibid., lin. 268-296, 318-325. 57. See above, p. 10. 58. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 327-336. 18 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES in general, the XIIIth-century exponents of the positive solutions to the problem of the immobility of place took the first approach. Thomas Wylton, like all XIVth-century commentators who acknowl- edged that place is to some extent mobile, took the second approach. In replying to the paradox of local motion and rest presented above, Wylton maintains that a body can be said to move locally not simply when its place continuously changes, as the usual definition states, but only when two further conditions are satisfied: (1) the body must change place in virtue of a change occurring in the body itself; (2) the places that the body occupies at the beginning and at the end of its change, that is, the initial place and the final place, must have some kind of «local» opposition or, at least, «local» dif- ference. None of these two conditions is satisfied in the case of a body at rest, when its surroundings change. This body acquires con- tinuously a new place in virtue of a change occurring not in the body itself but in its surroundings, so that the first condition is not satisfied. But neither is the second and more relevant condition satisfied, and it is interesting to see why it is not. Suppose once more that the body at rest is first surrounded by air and then by water, so that it is first contained by the surface of air and then by that of water. These are formally distinct surfaces and hence, if place were simply the surface of a containing body, as in Aristotle's original definition of place, it would not be clear why these surfaces should not count as formally distinct places. Yet, in Wylton's view, the places associated to the two surfaces are in this case only numerically distinct and not also for- mally or locally distinct. For, as we have seen, like Aquinas and Giles, Wylton assumes that place is the surface of the containing body qua having a definite respect to the fixed points of the universe. Fur- thermore, he tacitly implies that the genuinely local element in his modified notion of place is given by the respect to the fixed points of the universe and not by the containing surface, i.e., in Giles' terms, by the formal element of place and not by its material element. On the other hand, this formal aspect is specifically the same in the surface of air and in that of water that surround successively the body at rest, since these two surfaces have the same kind of respect to the fixed points of the universe, or, in quantitative terms, an equal distance from such points. As a consequence, in Wylton's view, the surface of air and that of water do not count as formally distinct THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 19 places; therefore, according to Wylton's second condition for local motion, they cannot represent the termini of a local motion, so that the body at rest cannot be said to undergo a local motion, even when its surroundings continuously change and despite the fact that it acquires continuously numerically distinct places59. As in other aspects of Wylton's discussion on the immobility of place, the influence of Aquinas' and Giles' positions is very strong in his treatment of the paradox of local motion and rest arising from a changing place. For, as we have seen, the formal element of place introduced by these two commentators, namely the respect to the fixed points of the universe, plays a fundamental role also in the revised definition of local motion that Wylton formulates in order to solve the paradox. On the other hand, Wylton's treatment of this paradox presents a striking similarity with a famous and very influ- ential XIVth-century position on the immobility of place, that of Duns Scotus60. Scotus too holds a negative position on the immobility of place: while he denies that place can even accidentally be subject to local motion, he admits that place is subject to corruption, when the con- taining body in which it inheres is subject to a local motion61. Thus, as to the kinds of motions to be ascribed or denied to place, Scotus' view coincides with that of Wylton. However, Scotus also claims that place is incorruptible «by equivalence with respect to local motion» (per aequivalentiam quantum ad motum localem). The meaning of this expression is explained in the following passage taken from the section of his Ordinatio devoted to the place of the angels. Having declared that place cannot be subject to local motion, he turns to his second main thesis, concerning the incorruptibility «by equivalence» of place: I prove the second point, because (i) although place is corrupted when its subject moves locally, so that, when air moves locally, the ratio of place in air does not remain the same as before … nor can the same ratio of place remain in the water that succeeds the air, because the same accident
59. Ibid., lin. 344-381. 60. On Scotus' position and its fortune in the XIVth century, see especially E. GRANT, «The Medieval Doctrine of Place…» (nt. 16), pp. 65-72. 61. Cf. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, liber 2, dist. 2, pars 2, q. 1 (Opera omnia 7, Vatican City 1973, pp. 255, lin. 10-257, lin. 11). 20 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
in number cannot remain in two subjects, (ii) nevertheless, the posterior ratio of place (which is distinct from the preceding one) is in truth the same as the preceding ratio by equivalence with respect to local motion. For, it is so impossible that a local motion takes place from that preceding place to the posterior place as if these two places were absolutely the same place in number. In fact, no local motion can take place from an ubi to another ubi unless those two ubi correspond to two specifically different places, namely to places which have a different respect, not only numerically, but also specifically, to the whole universe; hence those respects that are only numer- ically different seem to be one in number, because they are so indistinct with respect to local motion as if they were just one respect62. In part (i) of this passage, Scotus argues that a local motion of the containing body implies a corruption of the place associated to this body, so that an absolute immobility of place is incompatible with the ontological status of place as an accident of a mobile body. We have already found this same argument in Wylton63 and we no longer need to comment on it. In part (ii), Scotus introduces his original doctrine of the immobility of place «by equivalence». Although in (ii) Scotus does not mention explicitly the paradox of local motion and rest arising from a changing place, it is clear, however, that he provides implicitly a solution to this paradox. For in (ii) Scotus' main concern is to establish what condition two distinct places must satisfy in order that they can be the termini of a local motion, i.e., in order that a local motion can take place between them. And it turns out
62. Ibid., pp. 257, lin. 12-258, lin. 9: «Secundum probo, quia licet locus cor- rumpatur moto eius subiecto localiter, ita quod, moto aere localiter, non manet in eo eadem ratio loci quae prius (sicut patet ex iam probato), nec eadem ratio loci potest manere in aqua succedente, quia idem accidens numero non potest manere in duobus subiectis, — tamen illa ratio loci succedens (quae est alia a ratione praecedente) secundum veritatem est eadem praecedenti per aequivalentiam quantum ad motum localem, nam ita incompossibile est localem motum esse ab hoc loco in hunc locum sicut si esset omnino idem locus numero. Nullus autem motus localis potest esse ab uno ‘ubi' ad aliud ‘ubi', nisi quae duo ‘ubi' correspondent duobus differentibus specie, quia habentibus alium respectum — non tantum numero sed etiam specie — ad totum universum; ex hoc illi respectus qui sunt tantum alii numero, videntur unus numero, quia ita sunt indistincti respectu motu localis sicut si tantum essent unus respectus». See also at pp. 258, lin. 10- 259, lin. 3. In the passage of his earlier Lectura on Sentences II, parallel to the passage quoted here from the Ordinatio, Scotus holds exactly the same view, but the peculiar expression «per aequivalentiam» does not appear. Cf. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Lectura in librum secundum Sententiarum, dist. 2, pars 2, q. 1 (Opera omnia 18, Vatican City 1982, p. 164, lin. 3-21). 63. Cf. THOMAS WYLTON, In Physicam, IV, q. 6, lin. 268-288, and above p. 17. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 21 that Scotus' condition is substantially the same as the second con- dition posited by Wylton in his revised definition of local motion64. As Scotus formulates this condition, two distinct places can be the termini of a local motion provided that they are not only numerically distinct but also specifically different. Furthermore, just as for Wylton, for Scotus, the specific difference of two places in this context does not derive from the specific difference of the surfaces of the bodies in which they inhere, but from that of the respect of the bodies to the whole universe (or, equivalently, to the fixed points of the universe). The formula «equivalent in respect to local motion» is used by Scotus exactly to describe those places that, though numerically distinct, cannot constitute the termini of a local motion: two places that dif- fer only in number can be considered equivalent from the viewpoint of local motion, as if they were the same place, because, in fact, no local motion can take place between these two places, in the same way as no local motion can take place from one place to the same place. Thus, in Scotus' terms, a body at rest, when its surroundings change, is in the same place by equivalence. Accordingly, although the formula «incorruptible by equivalence» is not used by Wylton, Scotus' explanation for it reflects faithfully Wylton's treatment of the paradox of local motion and rest. Historically, the similarity between Wylton's and Scotus' treatments of the problem of the immobility of place gives rise to the question of whether one of the two authors actually knew and used the work of the other. A final answer to this question needs a more extensive examination and will not be given in this paper.65. Nevertheless,
64. Ibid., lin. 346-348. 65. This question is further complicated by the fact that Scotus deals with the problem of the immobility of place both in the Lectura and in the Ordinatio (see above note 62). But if we leave aside the Lectura, which had only a very limited diffusion, it can be suggested that Scotus' discussion in the Ordinatio depends on Wylton's discussion in his Quaestiones libri Physicorum, since the peculiar expression «incorruptible by equivalence» used by Scotus cannot be found in Wylton. As to the dating, Scotus' Ordinatio is likely to have been written in the years from 1300 to his death in 1308, Wylton's Quaestiones before 1304, so that for the time being there are no sufficient elements for the relative chronology of these two works. However, there is some positive indication that Wylton did not know Scotus' Ordinatio at the time of his Quaestiones libri Physicorum. Concerning the instant of time, Scotus and Wylton held two conflicting positions. Scotus' position in the Ordinatio is quoted and rejected by Wylton in his later Quodlibet (1315), but is not mentioned in the question on the instant of time in the Quaestiones. On this point, 22 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES the similarity that we have detected allows us to conclude that the diffusion of Scotus' doctrine of the incorruptibility of place «by equivalence» shows indirectly the influence of Wylton's ideas on the immobility of place in the XIVth-century.
see C. TRIFOGLI, «Thomas Wylton on the Instant of Time» (nt. 4), pp. 311-314. For the dating of Scotus' Lectura and Ordinatio see especially A. B. WOLTER, «Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus», in: The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1993), pp. 1-36; ID., «Reflections about Scotus's Early Works», in: L. HONNEFELDER et al. (edd.), John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, pp. 37-57. THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 23
PART II
This part contains a critical edition of Thomas Wylton's question «Utrum locus sit immobilis» (Book IV, q. 6). This edition is based on the three manuscripts of Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum that are known at present: C = Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, ms. Plut. VIII sin. 2, ff. 48ra- 50ra (XIVth century) M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, ms. 2015, ff. 61v-64r (XVth cen- tury) V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 4709, ff. 45rb-47va (XIVth-XVth century) Since I am also preparing a complete critical edition of Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum, I shall postpone both the description of the manuscripts and a full discussion of the textual tradition pre- sented by them until the publication of that work. Hence the present edition aims at making available the content of q. 6 rather than at providing a final contribution to the edition of Wylton's Quaestiones libri Physicorum. In this context, however, I shall summarize the main results of the collation of the three mss. relative to Book IV, q. 6, in order to clarify the principles of the present edition. The three mss. seem to derive from a common source, which is distinct from the archetype. This is suggested both by the occurrence of cases where all three mss. offer the same wrong reading (see, for instance, the critical apparatus at lin. 150, 152, 203, 305, 323, 387) and by the occurence of cases where none of the three mss. offers a correct reading (see, for instance, the critical apparatus at lin. 75, 166, 227, 244, 277, 292, 438). No definite grouping can at present be shown to exist among the three mss. Indeed, the cases in which two of the three mss. have a common variant reading are relatively scarse, especially in comparison with the high number of particular variant readings presented by each of the three. The text offered by C, however, is usually of a much better quality than those offered by M and V. Accordingly, the present edition is mainly an attempt at a reconstruction of the text offered by C. This means that we have edited the text of C, correcting it with M and V, when necessary. The critical apparatus is incomplete. The cases in which the text of C has been corrected are systematically recorded; also the variant 24 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES readings common to two of the three mss. are recorded; the peculiar variant readings of M and V, however, have been normally left out with the exceptions of those cases in which they contribute in some way to the intelligibility of the edited text (see, for instance, the variant readings of M in the critical apparatus at lin. 18, 23, 33). The orthography has been normalized according to classical stan- dards. In order to facilitate the reading of the text of q. 6, this has been divided into twelve sections, corresponding to the main struc- tural parts of q. 6. The beginning of each section is indicated by a latin title enclosed in angle brackets. These indications are found at lin. 2, 32, 40, 46, 59, 91, 120, 140, 221, 259, 326, 393. The following critical marks have been used: [album] = «album» delendum censeo.
Cecilia TRIFOGLI Via delle Conce 17 I-56125 Pisa THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 25
THOMAS WYLTON, Quaestiones libri Physicorum, IV, q. 6.
Quaeritur utrum locus sit immobilis.
8 locus] lacus C 12 in] et C 18 locus] eius add. M // vel] planta add. M 19 pri- mus] pars C 21 alterationis] alterius CV 22 correspondet] corporis debet C 23 cor- poris om. M 24 corpus om. C, locus V 26 moveatur] movetur C 29 continuantur] contineantur C, continuentur V
31 ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV, 4, 212 a18-19 26 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
33 quaestionem] conclusionem C // expositor] Aegidius add. M 35 id] illud MV 55 additionem] additem C // animalis] aeris C, alio M 60 illud] id C // accidens] accide C
33 AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis IV, lect. 7 (ed. Venetiis 1502; repr. Frankfurt 1968, ff. 80rb-81rb) 47 THOMAS AQUINAS, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio IV, lect. 6 (ed. P. M. MAGGIOLO, Torino-Roma 1965, p. 227b, nn. 468-469) 54 Ibid., n. 468 THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 27
secundum locum, si prius circumder aqua postea aere, nullum unum corpus numero circumdat me nunc et prius nisi ponatur 65 aliquod tertium corpus cum istis, et tunc duo corpora simul; ergo nullum ultimum nec ullum accidens erit idem numero correspondens huic corpori et illi, et per consequens successio duorum corporum non sufficit ad unitatem numeralem loci. Exempla non sunt ad propositum. 70 <2> Primum non, tum quia ignis, cum sit compositus in se ex materia propria et forma substantiali, non comparatur ad combustibile, puta ad materiam extrinsecam, sicut accidens ad subiectum. Accidens enim capit esse a subiecto et ideo numerum. Ignis enim est quoddam existens in se, sicut apparet de igne in 75 sua sphaera. Unde [quod] ignis iste confixus huic combustibili et illi non oportet quod sit unus numero. Esto enim quod flamma in aere sit una quia materia una; ignis tamen nunc in hoc com- bustibili, nunc in alio non est unus, quamvis appareat unus. <3> Aliud exemplum non est ad propositum. Partes enim 80 materiales quae fluunt et refluunt non dicuntur materiales quia sunt materiae quam perficit forma, quae manet una numero. Impossibile est formam manere unam numero in diversis materiebus, quia una manet, alia corrumpitur; sed substantia materiae est una numero quam perficit forma, sicut ipsa forma 85 una numero; sed dicuntur partes materiales partes individuales quae sunt accidentales respectu speciei. Non obstante igitur quod suppositum quod augetur sit idem numero, quia tam forma quam materia manet substantialis eadem numero, cum ex parte ista subiectum a quo locus unitatem capit, puta corpus, 90 nullum manet idem numero, locus non manebit idem numero.
63 circumder] circumdet MV // aere] aer MV 64 numero] naturale CM 68 unitatem] invicem C // numeralem] numerale C 71 substantiali] subtili C 75 Unde] quod add. CV, licet add. M 77 in aere] materiae C 79 Aliud] ad C // propositum] oppositum C 80 quae] quorum C 82 formam] forma C 83 corrumpitur] corrupta MV 84 sicut] sunt C 85 materiales] substantiales C 86 igitur] subiecto C, ergo M 88-89 cum ex parte ista iter. C 90 nullum] unum C // locus2 … numero om. hom. C 92 in idem] suppl. marg. C
92 Cf. ANONYMUS, Quaestiones super Physicam, lib. IV, q. 6 (ms. Cambridge Peterhouse 192, ed. C. TRIFOGLI (supra, n. 31), p. 161, lin. 187-201, p. 164, lin. 243-252). 28 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
reales. Uno modo in quantum ultimum huius partis aeris; alio 95 modo in quantum ultimum totius aeris; tertio modo in quan- tum ultimum totius universi, et hoc non qualitercumque, sed in quantum universum consideratur per rationem suae totalitatis, non secundum dispositionem suarum partium. Primo modo hoc ultimum est ultimum partis materialis universi, quae fluit et 100 refluit. Hoc ultimum autem secundo modo consideratum est quodammodo pars materialis totius universi, quodammodo pars secundum speciem. Considerando enim totum universum ut dividitur in suas partes, cum habeat quinque partes essentiales, quarum unus est aer, secundum illum respectum potest hoc 105 ultimum dici ultimum partis essentialis universi. Considerando tamen totum universum per rationem totalitatis, cum sic repugnet sibi mobilitas, partibus autem eius convenit mobilitas, vel cir- cularis vel alia, ut sic hoc ultimum est ultimum partis materialis universi. Considerando hoc ultimum tertio modo, sic est ultimum 110 partis essentialis universi. Ultimum autem partis isto tertio modo solum est locus. Et quia pars sub ista consideratione est immobilis, ideo eius ultimum, qui locus est, immobilis est. Exemplum ponunt. Haec caro in quantum haec est pars secundum materiam; illa eadem secundum quod caro non est 115 pars secundum materiam, sed secundum speciem. Caro sub prima consideratione fluit et refluit, caro autem secundo modo con- siderata manet, sic hic. Aliud exemplum: quod quid est secundum se est ingenitum et incorruptibile, quicquid autem in hoc generatur. 120
107 partibus] partes C // circularis] circulariter (?) C 109 tertio] secundo C // sic … modo (lin. 111) om. hom. C 112 qui] quia C 115 pars] caro C 116 consideratione] consignatione C 117 manet] nihil C 118 Aliud] ad C 121 ex] exemplum C 124 me] m.e. C, om. V // vel1] et CV 125 ergo] igitur MV THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 29
<2> Similiter, si ultimum tertio modo acceptum esset locus, 130 numquam reciperet novum locatum; sed secundum illam tertiam considerationem quaelibet pars universi est omnino immobilis et per consequens nulli cedit, et, si hoc, nihil de novo recipere potest. <3> Item, primum exemplum non est ad propositum, ut 135 prius declaratum est, nec etiam secundum, quia per hoc quod quid est salvatur in individuo, corrumpitur per accidens ad cor- ruptionem individui, quia secundum illud esse quod habet in individuo, secundum se tamen non corrumpitur; sed ipsi volunt salvare quod locus sit immobilis et per se et per accidens. 140
135 est om. C, post prius V // etiam] et cum C 136 in om. CV 142 mobilis] immobilis CM 145 non om. CV 149 Aristotelis] aliter vel C 150 aeris] scripsi, aquae CMV (cf. App. fontium, ad lin.146) 151 aquae contentae] scripsi, aeris contenti CMV (cf. App. fontium, ad lin. 146) 152 quando] quoniam C // aliud] scripsi, ad CV, aliquod M 154 modum] motum C
134 Cf. lin. 79-90 144 ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV, 2, 209b21-31 146 AVERROES, In Physi- cam, IV, t.c. 18, f. 128rbD-E: «Et potest aliquis quaerere, cum locus non potest dici separari nisi secundum opinionem dicentium vacuum esse, secundum autem opinionem Aristotelis non separatur a locato, sed corrumpitur per corruptionem eius. Ultimum enim aeris in quo est aqua, quando aqua transfertur ab eo et intrat ipsum aliud corpus, corrumpitur illud ultimum et fit aliud. Et cum ita sit, ista propositio est famosa, non vera». 155 Ibid., f. 128rbE: «Et forte est differentia inter separationem loci et separationem formae, etsi utraque corrumpitur, quoniam corruptio formae est corruptio locati, et non sequitur, si locatum separatur a loco absque eo quod corrumpatur, ut locus separetur a locato absque eo quod corrumpatur». 30 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
differentia inter separationem loci et separationem formae», quod dicit ut faciat rationem Philosophi bonam, [et subdit quod non sequitur] «etsi utraque corrumpitur», si locatum separatur, quod est ad propositum magis, «quoniam corruptio 160 formae est corruptio locati», et sic non est de loco. Et subdit quod non sequitur: «si locatum separatur a loco absque eo quod corrumpatur ut propter hoc locus separetur a locato absque eo quod corrumpatur». Est ergo de intentione Commentatoris quod corrumpitur. 165 Quod locus sit mobilis motu locali aliquo modo probo esse de intentione eius, commento 20, ubi Philosophus probat quod locus neque est materia neque forma, quia utrumque movetur ad motum compositi, locus non. Ibi Commentator dicit quod, cum Philosophus utitur tribus propositionibus in sua ratione, 170 quarum prima est quod materia et forma moventur per motum compositi, secunda quod secundum quod moventur indigent loco, tertia est quod, si altera earum est locus, necesse est ut locus habeat locum. Et dicit quod secunda et tertia propositio sunt verae, prima autem non. Sequitur enim ex ea quod materia 175 et forma sint in loco, quod non dicit Aristoteles. Declarat enim in 6 huius quod omne transmutabile est corpus. Et cum ita sit, materia et forma non moventur nisi per accidens; ergo, si indi- gent loco, est per accidens. Et subdit quod non est impossibile quod locus habeat locum per accidens. 180 Postea dicit: «Ex hoc apparet quod ista contradictio non est vera neque essentialis», et distinguendum de per accidens. Est enim aliquid per accidens semper et aliquid raro. Et dicit quod illud quod est per accidens semper intrat numerum demon- strationum non essentialium, quae dicuntur demonstrationes 185 dialecticae. Et vult quod ista demonstratio solum est in genere
158 etsi utraque corrumpitur om. C 159 quoniam] quam MV 161 quod1] quoniam C // a om. C 162 separetur] separatur C 163 corrumpatur] corrumpitur CV 166 20] scripsi, 24 CV, 18 M 174 verae] vera C 175 Declarat] declarant C 177-178 indigent] indiget C, deest V 181 neque] nec MV // de om. C 183-184 demonstrationum] demons- trantem C // demonstrationes] demonstratione C
166 ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV, 2, 210a5-10 168 AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 20, f. 129raB-C 176 ARISTOTELES, Physica, VI, 4, 234b10-20 180 AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 20, f. 129raC-rbE THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 31
demonstrationis dialecticae. Est ergo sententia sua ultimatim quod materia et forma moventur ad motum compositi, sed hoc est semper. Ex quo sequitur quod in eis semper inveniatur locus, licet per accidens, et per consequens sequeretur quod locus 190 haberet semper locum et necessario, licet per accidens. Et statim declarat quomodo locus habet locum et quomodo movetur, dicens quod manifestum est quod locus non habet locum sem- per neque per se neque per accidens nisi sit de genere accidentis quod accidit raro. Et dicit statim quando hoc accidit, quando 195 scilicet accidit ultimo continenti rem moveri per motum cor- poris cuius est ultimum, tunc potest attribui loco motus per accidens; sed illud accidens est raro. Et quod loquitur de motu locali certum est, quia assignat sibi locum per accidens propter suum motum per accidens — dicit 200 ipse — quod non faceret nisi loqueretur de motu locali. Item, Philosophus hic probat quod locus neque est materia neque forma quia ista moventur ad motum corporis. Certum est quod non loquitur de motu corruptionis, quia materia non cor- rumpitur ad corruptionem compositi. In fine illius commenti, 205 postquam repetit dictum Alexandri, dicit quod locus secundum quod est quantitas non movetur, sed locus secundum quod est locus per se non est immobilis naturaliter et essentialiter. Similiter, commento 41, ubi Philosophus dat differentiam inter vas et locum, dicit Commentator quod vas est continens mobile 210 essentialiter, locus est continens immobile nisi per accidens. Et quod loquitur de motu locali manifestum est per exemplum suum et Philosophi. Loquuntur enim de navi in fluvio. Dicetur: Commentator eodem commento dicit postea quod locus est immobilis essentialiter.
186 demonstrationis dialecticae] demonstrationum dialecticarum MV 187 ad motum] motu C // compositi om. C 189 licet] habet C 194 quando1] quod MV 199-200 dicit ipse om. MV 200 Item] sicut marg. C, similiter cum M 202 certum] quantum C, manifestum M 203 corruptionis] scripsi, corporis CMV 207 est2 om. C 208 commento 41] 11 commento C, Commentator 11 V // Philosophus om. C
201 Cf. supra lin. 166 205 AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 20, f. 129rbF 208 ARI- STOTELES, Physica, IV, 4, 212a14-21 209 AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 41, f. 139vbL 213 Ibid., f. 140raA 32 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
215 Dicendum quod per hoc non intelligit quod essentiae loci repugnat omnis mutabilitas per se et per accidens. Nam tunc con- trariaretur sibi ipsi in isto commento et in fine 20 commenti. In isto commento dicit quod est immobilis nisi per accidens, ita quod motum per accidens non vult negare a loco. In fine 20 220 commenti dicit quod non est immobilis essentialiter.
219 20] 26 C, deest M 224 possunt] possint M 225 commenti] qualis add. sed del. C 226 locati] loci CV // motum2 om. CV 227 cum] scripsi, quin CM, quando V 229 per ipsum om. C 230 motum] motus CV 231 qui] quod C 243 moveatur] concedatur C 244 localiter] scripsi, locatum CV, deest M 245 localiter] locatum CV
218 Ibid., f. 139vbL 220 Ibid., t.c. 20, f. 129rbF 229 Ibid., f. 129raC THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 33
Similiter, Commentator dicit in illo commento 41 quod, si aliquid moveretur ad rem motam, tunc eius motus esset otiosus. Quod dicit apparet in aliis locis, cuius causam credo istam esse, quia quod movetur ad locum movetur ut ibi quiescat; sed 250 si locus moveretur, frustraretur a fine, et per consequens eius motus esset otiosus. Et illud, quamvis sit dictum commenti, videtur esse contra ipsum, quia, si ignis ascendat usque ad concavum orbis lunae ut ibi quiescat, cum, per ipsum, ultimum movetur per accidens 255 ad motum eius cuius est per se, cum ille orbis movetur continue et eius ultimum sit locus, locus movetur continue, et per conse- quens otiosus erit motus ignis ad aliquam partem ipsius concavi tanquam ad locum.
246 41] 11 C 250 moveretur] movetur C // frustraretur] frustra requiritur C 255 cum] tamen C 261 per2 om. C // circulari] circularis C 263 probatum] corr. ex pro- bantur C 265 quia] quae C 270 quod2] ad C 271 aliquid] aliquod CV 273 illud] aliud CV 275 redit] respondit C 276 aeris] aer CM // vel] et CV 277 quoniam] scripsi, qn CV, quod M 278 fit] sic C, similiter M
246 Ibid., t.c. 41, f. 140raA 263 Cf. lin. 222-240 34 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
quens alius locus mihi correspondet nunc et prius. Sed locus qui 280 prius me continebat non manet. Probatio: nam pono quod, me quiescente, prius circumdet me aer, postea aqua. Cum ultimum aquae continet me, si maneret adhuc ultimum aeris et locus, cum locus in actu non est sine locato, locaret aliud locatum; et, si hoc, cum aliud locatum sit in alio situ et respectu ad totum 285 universum, sequetur quod locus prior sit mutatus a loco in locum, ad mutationem scilicet aeris, quod est prius reprobatum. Oportet ergo dicere quod locus qui est ultimum aeris deficiat, adveniente aqua. Item, locus est continens separatum a locato; per hoc di- 290 stinguitur esse locati in loco ab esse in toto. Pono ergo quod ego qui nunc sum in aere recedam a loco in quo sum; partes aeris concurrunt tunc ad invicem et continuantur, et per consequens illud quod erat ultimum separatum, me existente in aere tanquam in loco, iam fit una pars continuans unam partem aeris cum 295 alia et per consequens non magis retinet rationem loci, quod concedo. Imaginor igitur in hac materia sic quod tria sunt de ratione loci proprie dicti, quae ponuntur in eius ratione. Unum est quod sit ultimum corporis, non corpus, ut posuerunt ponentes 300 spatium. Secundum est quod sit ultimum corporis continentis ut continentis, per quod excluditur superficies secundum rationem quidditativam eius, quamvis materialiter sint idem. Tertio ponitur quod sit immobile, per quod distinguitur a vase proprie dicto, quod est transmutabile a loco in locum. Ulterius ponitur primum, 305 per quod excluditur locus communis, qui, etsi contineat locatum, non tamen primo sicut sibi adaequatum. Aliter tamen exponit istas particulas Commentator in fine 41 commenti. De immobilitate loci sic imaginor, quod hoc ultimum aeris 310 in quantum superficies aeris movetur localiter ad motum aeris,
283 aliud] ad C, idem M 284 aliud] ad C, illud M 289 Item] ad idem MV 290 locati] locato C // Pono] quod add. sed exp. C 291 sum2] sunt C 292 continuantur] scripsi, contineantur (?) C, conterminantur V, contir M 294 iam] nam CV // fit] sic C // continuans] continens C 298 proprie] proprii C 300 Secundum… corporis om. CV 302 quamvis] quam add. C 305 qui] scripsi, quia CMV 306 adaequatum] scripsi, adae- quatur CMV 307 41] 11 C, 11 post commenti (lin. 308) V
286 Cf. ibid. 308 AVERROES, In Physicam, IV, t.c. 41, f. 140raA-B THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 35
sed ut sic non est locus; illud etiam ultimum secundum quod est continens me, motum tamen ad motum aeris, vas est, nec ut sic locus. Sed illud ultimum idem subiecto quatenus habet istum ordinem et talem respectum determinatum ad polum vel 315 centrum vel saltem ad intelligentiam moventem caelum, quae secundum philosophiam est in oriente immutabiliter, ut sic est locus. Dico tunc quod impossibile est quod hoc ultimum aeris quod nunc circumdat me recedat ad motum aeris cuius est ultimum 320 per aliquam distantiam quantumcumque modicam nisi mutetur ille respectus. Ideo dico quod, aere recedente, corrumpitur locus, quia corrumpitur illud formale per quod distinguitur a vase. Immo, si aliquod corpus continens continue fluat, dico quod non manet locatum per aliquam partem temporis in eodem 325 loco numero, sed alio et alio numero.
311 etiam] et cum C 312 tamen om. C 315 telligentiam moventem caelum scrips. marg. C 323 continens continue] scripsi, inv. CMV 324 in eodem] siii C, in uno M 327 aliquid] aliquis CV 328 quiescens] quiescenter C // localiter] locatum CV 329 se habere om. C 331 igitur] sibi C, ergo V 332 alio] alia CV // per te] parte CV 333 simul] similiter C, sive V 337 quietem] quiescens CV
341 ARISTOTELES, Physica, IV, 4, 211a2-3 36 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
347 ita om. C, deest V // termini om. C, deest V // habeant] habeat C, deest V 349 Ponitur] puta C, pono V // enim om. C 350 per1] secundum MV // nullum locum] locum unum C 357 ergo] igitur MV 359 quod] quia C 360 haberent] haberet CM // tamen om. C 361 motum] locum C // quamcumque] quantumcumque C 362 postis] postem add. C 364 Philosophi] Philosophus CM 366 relatio] remotio C // alicui] adhuc C 369 nullum] unum C 370 alicui] aut C 371 relatio] remotio C, receptio V
344 Cf. lin. 327-334 364 ARISTOTELES, Physica, V, 1, 224b28-35 365 Ibid., V, 2, 225b11-13 372 Cf. lin. 335-336 THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 37
numero, locus tamen prior et posterior, cum non habeant oppo- 375 sitionem secundum diversos respectus ad universum, non sunt termini motus localis, ut dictum est. Tamen nihil prohibet quod aliquid sit in loco per magnum tempus, loco non deficiente sibi eodem numero, sicut quae sunt in terra iuxta centrum vel aqua in vase, vase quiescente. Unde secundum condicionem corporis 380 cuius est ultimum secundum hoc manet diutius vel citius cor- rumpitur locus.
374 locus] motus CV // habeant] habeat C 375 sunt] sicut C 377 loco2] loquitur C, om. M 380 manet] movet C 386 alium] aliam C 387 manet scripsi, oportet CMV 391 locato2] loco CV 392 aeris] corr. ex aere C
376 Cf. lin. 344-364 382 Cf. lin. 337-340 385 ARISTOTELES, De Caelo, ed. P. MORAUX, Paris, Les Belles Lettres 1965, IV, 3, 310b2-5 390 Cf. lin. 341-343 394 Cf. lin. 4-5 38 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ET PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALES
405 Dico ad maiorem quod ipsa est vera de accidente quod non opponitur motui nec includit aliquid quod motui repugnat, sed instantia est universaliter in his aliis. Exemplum: si sedeam iuxta postem, sedere iuxta postem inhaeret mihi tamquam subiecto. Pono quod movear ad hostium. Nunc non sequitur quod acci- 410 dens quod est me sedere iuxta postem moveatur ad hostium vel per se vel per accidens. Et causa est quia sibi repugnat motus. Ergo cum locus includat quendam respectum ad universum, cui repugnat quod moveatur, manens idem numero, ergo etc.
406 includit] nihil C 408 sedere iuxta postem om. hom. C, iuxta postem V, iuxta suppl. interl. M 410 quod] hoc add. MV 411 sibi] si C 412 quendam] quoddam C 418 non om. CV 421 crescente] quiescente CV 426 defectu locati] defectu loci C, loci defectu V 428 locus] fort. pro corpus 429 advenit] adhuc C 432 tamen] enim C 435 contingit] contra C // ultimum] infrigidatur per ultimum add. C
414 Cf. lin. 6-10 418 Cf. lin. 16-20 423 Cf. lin. 289-296 428 Cf. lin. 21-25 THOMAS WYLTON ON THE IMMOBILITY OF PLACE 39
pelve, quiescente pelvi. Et similiter de terra alterata virtute solis, quiescente continente aliquem lapidem et locante.
437 solis] simul C 438 aliquem] scripsi, aerem C, am MV 439 conclusionem] concessum (?) C
439 Cf. lin. 26-30