Caietele Echinox, vol. 26, 2014: Possible Worlds: Fantasy, Science-Fiction 292 Ion Manolescu

Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation

ABSTRACT One of the most consistent debates in This study deals with the cognitive science recent cognitive science, particularly in cog- issue of mind vs. brain functioning. In terms nitive neurology, psychology and philoso- of cognitive neurology, psychology and philo- phy, relates to a fundamental question: can sophy, it seeks to depict an image of the mind- the mind be split from the brain and, as a brain-body relation which contradicts the result, “deposited” and studied away from “Unitarian” position. In order to show that the its recipient? Or else to phrase this in medi- brain can operate without the mind’s know- cal terms, can the non-physical entity of the ledge, and even make decisions against the mind be separated from the physical entity mind’s resolutions, I chose to provide theore- of the brain, in order to get a clearer view of tical examples from two main cognitive areas its processes? of research (the computational theory of mind Although, traditionally, mental activity and the information pattern theory) and fic- and brain activity are considered to be one tional examples from cyberpunk literature and the same thing, while subjective experi- (Bruce Sterling and Rudy Rucker). Both cog- ence remains forever connected to and de- nitive theories allow us to understand the brain pendent on the physiological organ that pro- as a computing organ (the hardware), whereas duces or shelters it, during the last four dec- the mind is regarded as its unfolding of ades, numerous theoretical studies and fic- programs (the software). As for cyberpunk tional contributions (based on substantial neu- fiction, it illustrates several post-human robot- rological data provided by brain imaging tech- ic and cyborgic dissociations of the mind- niques) convincingly brought forward re- brain-body traditional unity: either the brain sults contradicting or even reversing the o- operating outside the body, or the mind opera- pinion that there is no such thing as a “mind ting outside the brain. functioning outside the brain” or a “brain

functioning outside the body”. As this study KEYWORDS Cognitive Science; Neurology; Computational will try to demonstrate by means of neuro- Theory of the Mind; Information Pattern psychological information and fictional il- Theory; Cyberpunk Fiction; Bruce Sterling; lustration (extracted from cyberpunk litera- Rudy Rucker; Post-Human Condition; Mind- ture), the living brain could be separated Brain Dissociation. from the mind, and even from the human body. Moreover, well shielded from the out- ION MANOLESCU side world by its strong, encapsulating skull, Bucharest University, Bucharest, Romania it will often do things that the mind is nei- [email protected] ther in control of, nor aware of. Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation In terms of the dissociation model, the functions (FIND, SCAN, 293 mind vs. brain issue can be tracked back to ZOOM, ROTATE and so on) two main scientific theories: the computa- showing the same kind of tional theory of the mind and the theory of properties as a computer (indication, config- information patterns of the mind. Both are uration, integration, repositioning, reorienta- elaborated after 1980 and need to be seen as tion, alteration etc.). The better the neural mutually beneficial. Since these theories re- computer works, the more efficient the im- ly on a computer-based model of the mind- age-processing quality is (1980: 171). Three brain activity, they can be perceived as part years later, pursuing his cognitive research of a larger cyborgic psychological and phil- in Ghosts in the Mind’s Machine. Creating osophical view on the post-human con- and Using Images in the Brain, Kosslyn dition. suggests that a deconstruction of the mind- The computational theory of the mind brain relation would prove useful to better was developed by cognitive neuropsycholo- understanding how mental images succeed gists, such as Stephen Michael Kosslyn in representing absent objects or beings. (1980; 1983), as well as by philosophers Consequently, he describes the human brain such as Daniel C. Dennett (1978; 1981, with as a cybernetic device, constantly processing Hofstadter) or Douglas R. Hofstadter (1985; mind programs during one’s lifetime span.1 1981, with Dennett), who added their per- Kosslyn’s idea, almost chronologically sonal expertise to the field. Hofstadter, for coincidental with that of mathematician and instance, was specifically interested in find- fiction writer Rudy Rucker, author of sever- ing answers to the endless paradoxes of the al cyberpunk novels on the mind-brain com- mind, embodied in self-referential sen- putational relation, is illustrated in the cy- tences, drawings or musical parts – a most berpunk fiction of the eighties and nineties challenging issue, but with less consequence of the 20th century by the human comput- to the arguments of this study. erized upgrading theory, described by writ- In Stephen Michael Kosslyn’s view in er Bruce Sterling in his novel Holy Fire as Image and Mind, mind imagery results from “posthuman self-actualization” and “the a brain activity that is similar, in many software functioning of the soul” (1997: 70; ways, to that of a computer (1980: 5-6). At 330). Deconstructing and displacing the lo- the top of this process of imagery produc- cation of mental activity, while conceiving tion, maintenance and representation, the it as a computerized derivation of the human mind is conceived as a complex system of brain, is also a key point of the cyberpunk computational operations generated by the theories of mind-brain-body dissociation in neural computer of the brain. To put it in Sterling’s novel Schismatrix Plus (1985). another way, for Kosslyn, the brain is the Here, one of the characters, the cyborg-wom- computer of the human body, while the an Kitsune, casually tells her lover, Lindsay, mind is its succession of programs. Both that, through cyber-surgery, her sexual or- enable us to solve each and every problem gans have been replaced by a sample of her that comes to our attention, in order to find brain tissue, thus placing the computerized the best solution for our individual survival. center of pleasure (initially situated in the In order to provide arguments for his neuro- brain) directly in her vagina (1996: 34). computational assumption, Kosslyn builds Later on, in his book with Olivier up a theoretical model of image-formation Koening, Wet Mind. The New Cognitive processes, in which mental operations are Neuroscience (1992), Kosslyn describes the compared to and described by computer two main computational cognitive ap- Ion Manolescu 294 proaches to the mind-brain the brain provide a satisfactory answer to issue (the Dry Mind approach the problem of mind-brain splitting? Can and the Wet Mind approach), the human brain be successfully separated seemingly shifting his research interest to from its cranial shelter, without altering the the latter. In the Dry Mind approach, spe- mind processing events taking place in or cific to cognitive psychology, the central outside their physiological recipient? And, metaphor is regarded to be the computer: even more daring, could we even think of (regardless of the fact that we still disagree Just as the information processing op- on whether we “think” with our brains or eration in a computer can be analyzed with our minds) reshaping the brain, after without regard for the physical ma- detaching it from the body, such as the hard chine itself, mental events can be ex- of a computer can be detached from its base amined without regard to the brain. unit, and, in the process, preserve and copy This approach is like understanding the its most valuable item: the information properties and uses of a building inde- processes of the mind? pendently of the materials used to con- Since the eighties, this both philosoph- struct it; the shapes and functions of ical and neurological question has been ad- rooms, windows, arches and so forth dressed by numerous theorists, logicians, can be discussed without reference to medics, AI researchers and robotic scien- whether the building is made of wood, tists. For instance, the famous physicist Ste- brick or stone. (1992: 4) ven Hawking can be regarded as the living proof of Daniel C. Dennett’s mind experi- In contrast, in the Wet Mind approach, ment Where am I?, developed in Brain- specific to cognitive neuroscience and backed storms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and up by magnetic resonance imagery and Psychology (1978). In Where am I?, Den- computerized scanning of the brain, “[…] nett suggests that a schizophrenic decon- the mind is what the brain does: a descrip- struction of the unified body-brain-mind tion of mental events is a description of concept, based on a cyborgic model that brain function, and facts about the brain are would hypothetically work by separating the needed to characterize these events.” (ibid.) brain from the degradable body and the As a result, the computational theory of mind from the degradable brain, might just the mind takes two separate courses of ac- solve the problem of conscience preserva- tion: one separating the hardware of the tion: as long as body/ brain disposal does brain (the living computer) from the software not influence the process of information pat- of the mind (the processes derived from the tern transmission and maintenance, our hu- living computer), in order to psychologically man individuality can be safeguarded (1986: and philosophically understand their differ- 310-23). ences in decision-making, and the other su- Dennett’s philosophical experiment perposing hard and soft, so as to neurol- and the questions that arise from its trou- ogically explain the nature of information bling conclusions may just be mirrored in processing that allows the brain to produce the location and identity issues of real post- and externalize human behavior (1992: 50). modern medical human cyborgs, such as Summing up Steven Michael Koss- Steven Hawking. Struck by a motor neuron lyn’s early cognitive research during the last disease, the famous quantum physicist is decades of the 20th century, one might ask: unable to speak or move more than his fin- can the computerized theoretical model of gertips, but the cyborgic, prosthetic engre- Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation nage that completes his deteriorated body the brain. 295 enables him both to express his thoughts The issue of splitting and to verbally materialize them. Via a brain and mind (generally, voice generator, a speech synthesizer called through a “brain in the machine” transplant) SGD (a sophisticated device connected to is frequently dealt with by cyberpunk the physicist’s body and to its computerized writers in the eighties. In their fictional terminal), Hawking’s brilliant imprisoned perspective, the mental state can easily be mind in a formidable imprisoned brain in a separated from the activity or even the paralyzed, degraded body is able to com- location of the brain, thus giving birth to municate (and communicate itself/ its self) new forms of conscience and meta-con- with the outside world, as if nothing were science. Such is the case of Lindsay, Bruce wrong with the ensemble. Sterling’s exiled inter-galactic character in As surprising as this may seem, Haw- the novel Schismatrix, who feels his mind king’s living cyborg condition testifies to a slowly falling into its “second mode of con- functional dislocation of the unified identity sciousness” (1996: 14). that a human being is supposed to have, be Finding the neural location of con- accustomed to and rely on. However, this science and defining one’s self when the dislocation works for the better, enabling brain and mind supposedly unified activity Hawking to perform his usual tasks: the malfunctions, in a futuristic society where activity of the brain is computer-monitored, robots and humans become conflicting enti- the “voice” of the mind is generated/ proc- ties, seems also to be Rudy Rucker’s main essed by a machine (the Speech Generating fictional concern. In his Ware Tetralogy, Device), while the movements of the body gathering the novels Software (1982), Wet- are enabled by another machine (a complex ware (1988), Freeware (1997) and Real- wheelchair, perfectly suited for the scien- ware (2000), Rucker depicts a 21st century tist’s needs).2 hyper-technological society in which robots In terms of the computational and created by humans gradually became auton- cyborgic theory of the mind, Hawking pos- omous and, therefore, try to explain their sesses and does not possess his own self. purpose in terms of neural and mechanical His half-machine, half-human condition consciousness. Not being able to achieve makes him the owner of an out-of-body sub- this goal on their own, they proceed to dis- jectivity, prolonged in a prosthetic way, sect their human creators, in order to find from its captive inside to the living outside out the location of their individual and col- world, by means of computerized cables, lective essence (the soul, aka conscious- joysticks and keyboards. The visible, bodily ness) and then extract it from its living car- Hawking, made out of flesh and bones, is cass, so as to “rebuild” it in a freshly engi- defined by the digital, out-of-bodily engi- neered robotic body. The essential part of neered Hawking, and vice-versa. Humanly the process is being able to separate mind deconstructed and cyborgically reconstruct- (the information-pattern bearer) from brain ed, Hawking’s fractured existence (which I (the physiological, disposable computing u- may call, using a psycho-technological nit that contains the mind). Hence, the mind term, schizo-prosthetic) enables us to catch is treated as software, while the brain is re- a glimpse of what might just happen when garded as hardware, the robots always fa- we try to fulfill a seemingly impossible task: voring the first: to successfully separate the brain from the The soul is software, you know. The body and to successfully split the mind from software is what counts, the habits and Ion Manolescu 296 the memories. The brain and producing nanite ants freely circulate the body are just meat, seeds through each human body: for the organ tanks. (Rucker, 1997a: 66) Luty believed the future lay with nants: a line of bio-mimetic self-reproducing Rucker’s main character in Software, nanomachines that he’d patented. brilliant scientist Cobb Anderson – the man (Rucker, 2009: 20) who invented thinking robots and now pro- vides them with the soft of his mind, in As a result, information is instantly order to be implanted in other humans or shared by billions of people and each indi- robots – also holds a theory of mind-brain vidual thought or action (from eating, to dissociation, which relies on strongly con- sex) is universally broadcasted on each and flicting the benefits of bio-software and everyone’s mental screen in real time hardware use: frames. The process of universal neuro-cyber- A robot, or a person, has two parts: netic mind connection is described in Hylo- hardware and software. The hardware zoic as “teeping”, a form of neuro-digital is the actual physical material in- tapping in and telepathic peeping which volved, and the software is the pattern enables one person to instantly seek the in which this material is arranged. mind images of another. “I want to explore Your brain is hardware, but the infor- the ebb and flow of shared identities.” says mation in the brain is software. The one character, metanovel writer Thuy, “Con- mind…memories, habits, opinions, scious minds used to be like isolated fire- skills… is all software. (ibid.: 112) flies in the night. And now the light is eve- rywhere.” (Rucker, 2010: 94) In Rudy Rucker’s view, the human Along with the computational theory of body merely acts as a disposable recipient the mind, the second main scientific theory for the brain organ, which can be extracted that could shed some light on the mind- from its biological carcass and re-implanted brain dissociation problem is the theory of into another. In the second stage of this re- information patterns of the mind. It can be verse-engineering process, which relies on tracked down to the middle of the 20th cen- robotically dissecting and rebuilding the hu- tury and to experiments such as Allan Tu- man creator, the brain itself becomes a dis- ring’s – only to quote his famous “Turing posable part, as long as the mind can be Test”, meant to separate human beings from isolated and separated from its superfluous machines, in terms of conscious vs. me- computing biological container. chanical information processing and re- Later on, in two of his science-fiction sponse –, or to those conducted by infor- novels from the years 2000, Postsingular matics pioneers Claude Shannon and Nor- (2007) and Hylozoic (2009), Rucker provides bert Wiener. the mind-brain dissociation theory with an e- However, its fundamental guidelines ven more futuristic conclusion. In Postsingu- are to be found later on, in the eighties and lar, there is no stringent necessity to extract the nineties, in two of Hans Moravec’s the mind from the brain, since all of humani- books on robotics and AI: Mind Children: ty’s minds are now inter-connected, by The Future of Robot and Human means of viral, invisible neural nano-com- Intelligence (1988) and Robot: Mere Ma- puters, called nants. These prolific, self-re- chine To Transcendent Mind (1998). Mora- Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation vec’s main assumption is that human beings quite disturbing from a moral/ 297 exist in the form of information patterns, ethical perspective. If trans- rather than of bodily presence. Whatever de- ferring conscience (encrypted fines me as a human being – seems to be the in the information patterns of the mind) into author’s strong statement – no longer relates a computer is feasible, then why not see the to my flesh-and-bones carcass, which is human body as “disposable”? And, if the subject to deterioration and, therefore, in human body is accepted as “disposable”, time, will inevitably become unusable. On why not “dispose” of it in “due” time, in the contrary, what is specific to my epheme- order to provide the mind (and its neural ral, but intense existence in this universe information patterns) with a “better host” (thoughts, memories, feelings, emotions, the and some optimal, “reliable” functioning ability to rationalize or to experience the conditions? The ethical implications of such sophisticated processes of consciousness a chain of logic are, to say the least, and self-examination) exclusively depends troubling. on the information encrypted in my mind. In Mind Children, Moravec’s dissocia- Moravec’s way of illustrating his theo- tion theory is argued with both passion, and ry is quite similar to Daniel C. Dennett’s ration. The author seems undisturbed by any and raises the same questions regarding the moral criticism, since his both philosophical location of conscience and the repositioning and bio-technological goal is to achieve of subjectivity outside the body. Via a human immortality by means of mental mental experiment that resembles Dennett’s pattern preservation: 1978 one, the robotic scientist imagines a situation in which the conscience of a living The pattern-identity position has clear human being can be extracted from the dualistic implications – it allows the brain (through a complex downloading pro- mind to be separated from the body. cess) and then uploaded into a computer; (1988: 119) however, during the operation, the brain is irreversibly destroyed by the robotic doctor And, a couple of pages later: which (or should we say: who), much alike as in Rudy Rucker’s cyberpunk novels, per- More radically, we could “download” forms the surgery.3 our minds directly into a body in the Basically, Moravec’s dissociation ar- simulation and “upload” back into the gument relies on three what if’s: 1. what if real world […] (ibid.: 121) the human mind would be a set of infor- mation patterns?; 2. what if this set of infor- In an envisioned post-biological world, mation patterns could be extracted from the gaining immortality through robotic and cy- living brain?; 3. what if, once extracted, the borgic surgery applied to the body has to information patterns could be preserved and prevail over moral considerations, since its then recharged (much as we recharge an e- purpose is to improve human life. lectrical battery) into a new, improved re- The main issue in Moravec’s experi- cipient? Should any of these what if condi- ment (the achievement of immortality by tions fail, his theory would not be validated. transferring human thoughts from their nat- When closely examined, however chal- ural “container” – the brain – to an artificial lenging from a philosophical or bio-tech- recipient – the silicon chip – where they nological point of view, the consequences of could be safely, more efficiently and less Hans Moravec’s mental experiment seem cost-productive stored) remains debatable in Ion Manolescu 298 bio-ethical terms, although such as Dreyfus (1979; 1992), who argue technologically and psycho- that human intelligence can not exist outside logically attractive (for in- its biological body, both the thesis of split- stance, in the prospect of post-human clon- ting the traditional mind-brain-body relation ing). His assumption, based on the intuitions (through a succession of downloads), and of Shannon, Wiener and, in general, of the the one of the disposable body (no longer pioneers of cybernetics who participated in regarded as a mandatory condition for hu- the fifties in several annual scientific meet- man existence) receive a great deal of praise ings called The Macy Conferences – name- and support. ly, that the human being is nothing else but Perhaps the most spectacular support a message deposited in a biological ensem- comes from one of the world’s leading au- ble, but not intrinsic to it – was therefore thorities on AI and the main developer of severely criticized from an ethical perspec- the first print-to-speech reading machine for tive, as well as in terms of the democratic the blind, Ray Kurzweil. In Kurzweil’s techno-cultural policies of postmodernity.4 view, expressed in his book The Age of Spir- Nevertheless, the moral issue is ad- itual Machines (1998), the road to immor- dressed by the author ten years later, in Ro- tality on which humanity cautiously em- bot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind. barked a couple of decades ago is filled with Although mainly associated to mental ex- extractable biological software: periments and computer simulations, and not to the real biological world, the mind- Actually, there won’t be mortality by brain-body dissociation problem is now the end of the twenty-first century. Not dealt with in a more prudent way, as if Mo- in the sense that we have known it. Not ravec had sensed that, in the future, its con- if you take advantage of the twenty- sequences could become far from com- first century’s brain-porting technolo- pletely harmless: gy. Up until now, our mortality was tied to the longevity of our hardware. […] mistreating people, intelligent When the hardware crashed, that was robots or individuals in high-resolution it. […] As we cross the divide to in- simulations has greater moral signifi- stantiate ourselves into our computa- cance than doing the same at low reso- tional technology, our identity will be lution or in works of fiction, not be- based on our evolving mind file. We cause the suffering individuals are will be software, not hardware. (1999: more real – they are not –, but because 162-163) the probability of undesirable conse- quences in our own future is greater. However, Kurzweil’s argument in fa- (2000: 199) vor of artificial intelligence is not 100 % identical with Hans Moravec’s theory or Even so, lately, the information pattern Rudy Rucker’s fictional illustration depict- theory in the field of human and artificial ing conscious, autonomous robots, equipped mind research gains more and more ground. with bio-artificial brains and experiencing Cognitive psychologists and philosophers sudden changes of temper (therefore, per- use it to discuss the nature of conscience, sonality). On the one hand, as well as in cognitive neurologists to pinpoint the Moravec and Rucker’s works, in Kurzweil’s location of conscience. Despite the criticism Age of Spiritual Machines, human identity constantly brought forward by “Unitarians” relies on the permanence of software (the Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation mind) within a hardware (the brain, and the human beings (or “meaties”) 299 body) that goes on existing, be it in a vul- in their state-of-the-art labs nerable, disposable form. On the other hand, (Rucker, 1997b: 63). in a slight differentiation from Moravec and In Freeware (1997), the third novel of Rucker’s perspective, Kurzweil does not Rucker’s tetralogy, the “meatbops” turn into associate the mind with a single soft con- “moldies” (bio-artificial entities made of tained in the brain, but rather with a set of plastic and algae genes), paradoxical forms files pre-installed in the brain and, therefore, of life displaying bodies with variable ge- as easily un-installable. ometry and minds with alternative states of But, for all three authors who theoreti- consciousness (Rucker, 1998: 4-5). cally embrace the mind-brain-body dissoci- Realware (2000), the novel that con- ation, the process of “downloading” one’s cludes Rucker’s robotic cycle, deals with an identity can not elude a three-way bio-tech- alternative reality of mind, matter and flesh, nological process: extracting the brain from in which strange four-dimensional beings the body; extracting the mind from the and shape-shifting alien creatures called brain; extracting the soft/ mental files from “Metamartians” interact with the people on the mind. Only by following these compul- Earth. The “Matamartian”’s most spectacu- sory steps can one abandon the fragility of lar asset is a device called “allas” which the flesh and, consequently, achieve his or enables the mind of a human or a robot to her post-human condition. At the end of the take control over physical matter. Conse- road, in a blaze of perpetually undeterio- quently, brain, mind and matter are no long- rated information, lies humanity’s most er connected in a stable, coherent operation- wanted terminal state: immortality. al relation. Immortality is also what robots seek – From a cognitive science neurological apart from understanding conscience – in perspective, both the computational theory Rudy Rucker’s cyberpunk novels. In Soft- of the mind and the theory of information ware, the so-called “boppers”, complex ro- patterns of the mind testify to a non-unified bots with real, living brains, designed by model of mind and brain, of mental states Cobb Anderson, rebel against the human and brain activity. Through non-invasive world because it is made of decaying, there- brain imaging and magnetic scanning medi- fore unsustainable organic material. Dissat- cal techniques, such as functional magnetic isfied with the conclusion, they start build- resonance imaging (fMRI), diffusion imag- ing their own society on the Moon, while ing (dMRI), magnetic encephalography offering their Creator immortality. Still, (MEG) or electric encephalography (EEG), their offer comes at a price: Cobb Anderson researchers are now able to “see” what is gets to be bio-mechanically duplicated into happening inside the brain (often in situa- Cobb Anderson 2, in exchange for his origi- tions or during activities when the subject is nal soul. “Preserving your software” is all not mentally aware of what his or her brain that the robots are interested in (1997a: 24). is doing) and in which precise location. By In Wetware (1988), the “boppers” have measuring the parameters of the blood flux even greater bio-technological ambitions. and the electro-chemical responses to spe- They discover how to inject bio-human cific stimuli in different parts of the brain, DNA (called wetware) in their own soft- scientists are getting closer to pinpoint the ware codes. As a result, they become a new location of yet undetermined areas of form of biological and artificial life, human decision and awareness, such as “meatbops”, ready to build symbiotic conscience. Ion Manolescu 300 Perhaps the most spec- which the mind is not aware: brain damage, tacular recent research in this electrical stimulation of the healthy brain area is that conducted by the and drug stimulation of the healthy brain Human Connectome Project (or HCP), a (2009: 36). In these three situations, the huge scientific project launched in July brain either malfunctions (the first case) or 2009 with the participation of 33 scientists is fed with false information (the last two and doctors from several main universities cases), which results in a “false knowledge” and hospitals in the United States (including and a distorted/ mistaken picture of reality Harvard, UCLA and Massachusetts General (ibid.). The process of splitting mind from Hospital) and the financial support of the brain (or, better said, mind experience from National Institutes of Health, the main U.S. brain activity) and of “falsifying” informa- agency for bio-medicine. The project is tion is quite simple: the senses feed the meant to last around 5 years and consists of brain information extracted from the outside scanning the brains of 1200 healthy human world (physical reality), but the damaged subject, in order to achieve the human organ interferes with this transmission and brain’s complete map of neural “circuitry”. provides the subject with a false/alternative Mainly by means of diffusion spectrum model of the outside world. imaging (DSI) and diffusion tensor imaging For instance, patients experiencing se- (DTI), the researchers of the Human vere memory loss may identify and repeat Connectome Project attempt to find the the physical activity they started to learn the “roads” followed by water molecules inside previous day with the help of an examining the neural networks of the brain, specifically doctor, but may not be able to remember the inside the axon’s “tubules”. As a result of doctor’s face or name (2009: 27). In this examining the patterns of tiny molecules of specific case, illustrative for a medical con- water in trillions of synapses and billions of dition of the damaged brain called proso- neurons, scientists of HCP even hope to pagnosy (the subject’s ability to identify a discover the precise location of conscience, face as being human, but the impossibility somewhere between the two cerebral to determine who it belongs to), our mental hemispheres, in the parietal medial cortex.5 perception of the outside world is complete- In terms of the mind-brain dissociation ly different from the patient’s one. To sum theoretical perspective, more and more re- up Chris Frith’s theory, first the brain gets cent cognitive neurology and cognitive psy- deteriorated, then the mind is “convinced” chology contributions show that, much of its truth (in fact, a false representation of more frequently that we might think (with the outside world). As a result, we actually the mind? or with the brain? with both at the do not have a straightforward, accurate ac- same time? or with each one, separately?), cess to the external world: “direct” repre- the brain performs specific activities that the sentation in the mind is merely an illusion mind is not even aware of. This tiny, hard- created by the brain (2009: 40). working physiological organ6 often sepa- Frith’s neurological mind-brain disso- rates itself from the mind and makes deci- ciating examples (including the analysis of sions of its own. optical illusions and their effects on true vs. In his book, Making Up the Mind. How false human knowledge of reality) can be the Brain Creates our Mental World (2007), extended to the realm of dreaming activity – British cognitive neurologist Chris Frith during profound sleep, the mind is not describes three situations in which the brain aware of what the brain is doing – and to “knows” things about the outside world of that of unconscious rewards – which the Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation mind rejects, but the brain dictates, in order flirting, and so on), or through 301 to obtain pleasure, via the activation of acquisition. Consequently, “happy hormones” flows, such as serotonin although we “know” that we or dopamine. In the first case, despite a must not spend our money on anything else strong cerebral activity during sleep (testi- but the rent, we leave the sporting goods fied to by the monitoring of the brain with a shop with the latest hardshell mountain helmet with electrodes), we remember only jacket in our bag. Flat broke, but happy, we 5 % of our dreams. Therefore, one might experience the euphoria of having “chosen” say that, while dreaming, the brain performs (that is, of leaving the brain the decision to a set of operations (including decision-mak- choose) the “proper” course of action which ing inside the dream) which the mind is not instantly rewarded our body with pleasurable conscious of. In the second case, while the chemicals. The mind will have its own way mind strongly opposes an action, the brain later on, demanding a rational explanation, orders it, through what I may call the hor- together with the vocal, infuriated landlord; monal blackmailing of the mind. “You take but the brain will pretend to have no part in this course of action, and I will reward you this disagreeable reglement de comptes. with an irresistible flow of dopamine!” seems The final question in all these exam- to be the brain’s slogan addressed to the ples of mind-brain dissociation may be: how mind. many things does the brain do without us For example, after a hard week’s work, (or our mind) knowing them? The answer we enter our favorite sporting goods shop, is: quite a lot. Our senses provide our brain having in our pocket just the amount of with reliable or unreliable information, but, money needed to pay the rent. The rent is in both cases, the brain selects only what due to be paid this precise afternoon, no seems relevant to it in terms of optimum delays accepted. The mind tells us not to survival insuring. As a result, the mind often spend the money on any item exhibited in gets convinced of the “reality” of faulty in- the shop, as it is urgently needed by the ten- formation provided by the selective brain ant. However, this course of action is hardly and performs accordingly, as if it were able motivating for the brain, since it makes it to somehow detect the “mistake”, but not provide the body with stress hormones: cor- strong enough to correct it. tisone, epinephrine etc. Or, as all of the cog- Optical illusions, change blindness re- nitive neurologists, psychologists and phi- actions (for instance: getting used to a spe- losophers tell us from the eighties until to- cific road sign in a specific place and not day, the human brain seems to have been noticing it has been changed overnight) or genetically and evolutionary “programmed” unintentional blindness reactions (for in- to ensure us with optimum survival condi- stance: looking at your mobile phone for the tions, as well as with a state of well-being/ time, seeing a new text message icon, read- pleasure/ comfort. Neurologically, this state ing the message, putting the phone back into translates itself into one relentless operation: the pocket, and completely ignoring the the flow of chemical rewards and prizes. time on the display) are some of the most The brain therefore does what the convincing examples that mind and brain do “brain wants” or what the “brain likes”, sep- not always concur in decision-making. In arating itself from the mind and demanding/ optical illusions, such as the “flipping ambi- generating bodily rewards, either through guity” type (the “Duck-Rabbit” illusion, or recognition (for instance: looking at the “Old Lady-Young Mistress” illusion), the someone and being looked at; smiling; mind is fooled both by the optical system Ion Manolescu 302 and by the brain: its simply cerebral areas will get alternatively activat- can not hold both repre- ed and shut down: the cortical area responsi- sentations at the same time. ble with emotion generation (the true smile) Actually, the dissociating brain acts here and the cortical area responsible with move- more like an automatic Word “spelling and ment control (the fake smile). Not only does grammar” checking program, correcting the the brain often do what the mind does not mind’s received information, in order to “know” about, but it sometimes does things make it more useful to the human subject that it, itself, is not “aware of”. and, therefore, better suited for his or her Ultimately, as is the case with cyber- survival. punk fiction characters, the mind-brain dis- Such internal “errors”, and their cor- sociation issue may be resolved by partly or rections, are being thoroughly analyzed by completely abandoning the human biologi- optical illusion expert Richard Gregory, in cal condition. In Bruce Sterling’s short story two of his famous books on the psychology Cicada Queen, from Crystal Express (1989), of seeing: Eye and Brain. The Psychology of “cognitive metasystems” and alternative Seeing (1966) and Seeing through Illusions ways of embodiment take over the tradition- (2009). In Gregory’s view, the “false”/ al- al human mind-brain-body system: ternative information fed by the eyes and the brain to the mind is related to two main And, conversely, Mechanists are slow- internal upsets, the hardware (neurological) ly abandoning human flesh in favor of upset and the software (cognitive) upset: cybernetic modes of existence. (1990: 49) It turns out that there are several kinds of illusions. Some are due to upsets of In another story included in the same the physiology of the nervous system; volume and called Spider Rose, the protago- others, very differently, are like incor- nist has the ability to chemically alter her rect hypotheses in science – due to in- normal body and mind condition, tuning appropriate assumptions, or misplaced them to the most suitable parameters: knowledge. The first kind of illusions may be compared with computer hard- Nothing was what Spider Rose felt, or ware errors; the second kind with bugs almost nothing. There had been some of software […]. (Gregory, 1998: viii) feelings there, a nexus of clotted two- hundred-year-old emotions, and she Moreover, during these semi-uncon- had mashed it with a cranial injection. scious processes of dissociation involved in […] Rose was clever. She might have optical illusions, change blindness reactions been insane, but her monitoring tech- and unintentional blindness reactions, some niques established the chemical basis cortical areas of the brain tend to get more of sanity and maintained it artificially. electrical impulses, while others are being Spider Rose accepted this as normal. slowed down or even shut down. This also (1990: 29) requires a great amount of energy consump- tion from the brain.7 Should we want to And, in a third story from Crystal Ex- smile at someone nice we meet for the first press, Sunken Gardens, the protagonist, Mi- time and begin with a real, true smile and rasol, is able to alter her perceptions by means then fake it, because we suddenly seem not of cerebral tuning. This chaotic-ordered, to like that person anymore, two different Prigogine-like operation generates virtual mind Mind vs. Brain: The Cyberpunk Dissociation patterns and body reactions/ behaviors which York: Tor. 303 no longer resemble the “human”-like ones: Sterling, Bruce (1990) – Crystal Express, New York: Mirasol watched the winds through the Ace books. fretted glass of the control bay. Her al- Sterling, Bruce (1996) – Schismatrix tered brain suggested one pattern after Plus, New York: Ace books. another: nests of snakes, nets of dark Sterling, Bruce (1997) – Holy Fire, New eels, maps of black arteries. (1990: 85) York: Bantam Spectra.

All these fictional examples implying a dissociating body-mind-brain condition may Bibliography. Theory be analyzed not only from a human neurolo- gical perspective, but also from a cybernetic Dennett, Daniel C. (1986) – Brain- post-human point of view.8 storms. Philosophical Essays on Mind and As a conclusion, neither the computa- Psychology, Brighton: Harverster Press. tional theory of the mind, nor the informa- Dreyfus, Hubert (1979) – What Com- tion pattern theory can satisfactorily explain puters Can’t Do: The Limits of Artificial what happens in the brain, when it operates Intelligence, New York: Harper and Row. beyond the borders of the mind. However, Dreyfus, Hubert (1979) – What Com- neurological research in the last four dec- puters Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Arti- ades, as well as cyberpunk fiction anticipa- ficial Reason, Cambridge, Massachusetts: tions, provided us with useful tools in get- MIT Press. ting a step closer to mapping the human Frith, Chris (2009) – Making Up the brain and understanding its functioning in or Mind. How the Brain Creates our Mental outside the mind’s frame. When the hypo- World, Oxford: Blackwell. thetical map of the brain’s “circuitry” will Gregory, Richard (1998) – Eye and Brain. eventually be completed, some of the most The Psychology of Seeing, Fifth Edition, troubling questions of cognitive psychology Oxford: Oxford UP and philosophy may get their answer: what Gregory, Richard (2009) – Seeing through is conscience? where is it situated? what is Illusions, Oxford: Oxford UP. its purpose? will we be able to preserve it? Hayles, N. Katherine (1997) – The Con- dition of Virtuality. In Masten & Stallybrass & Vickers (eds.), 1997. Bibliography. Fiction Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985) – Meta- magical Themas: Questing for the Essence Rucker, Rudy (1997 a) – Software, New of Mind and Pattern, New York: Basic York: Avon Books. Books. Rucker, Rudy (1997 b) – Wetware, New Hofstadter, Douglas R. & Dennett, Dan- York: Avon Books. iel C. (eds.), 1988 – The Mind’s I. Reflec- Rucker, Rudy (1998) – Freeware, New tions on Self and Soul, Toronto, New York, York: Avon Books. London, Sydney, Auckland: Bantam. Rucker, Rudy (2000) – Realware, New Kosslyn, Stephen Michael (1980) – Im- York: Eos, HarperCollins. age and Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts Rucker, Rudy (2009) – Postsingular, and London, England: Harvard UP. New York: Tor. Kosslyn, Stephen Michael (1980) – Rucker, Rudy (2010) – Hylozoic, New Ghosts in the Mind’s Machine. Creating Ion Manolescu 304 and Using Images in the Brain, New York, London: Notes W.W. Norton & Company. Kosslyn, Stephen Michael & Koening, 1 In Kosslyn’s own words: “We can speak Olivier (1992) – Wet Mind. The New of the mind as being embodied in the brain, Cognitive Neuroscience, New York: The just as we speak of a program as being em- Free Press. bodied electronically in the computer; men- Kurzweil, Ray (1999) – The Age of Spi- tal events – thinking, remembering, and the ritual Machines. How We Will Live, Work rest – can be understood in terms of a sym- and Think in the New Age of Intelligent Ma- bolic description of the stored information.” chines, London: Phoenix. (1983: 19) Manolescu, Ion (2003) – Videologia. O 2 For more information regarding the com- teorie tehno-culturală a imaginii globale, puting devices and software used by Steven Iaşi: Polirom. Hawking, see: www.hawking.org.uk/the- Masten, Jeffrey & Stallybrass, Peter & computer.html. Vickers, Nancy (eds.), 1997 – Language Ma- 3 See, among other explanations: Moravec chines. Technologies of Literary and Cultur- (1988: 84). al Production, New York, London: Rout- 4 See, for instance: Hayles (1997: 186-87). ledge. 5 For further medical details and a spectac- Moravec, Hans (1988) – Mind Children: ular brain mapping digital illustration, see: The Future of Robot and Human Intelli- www.humanconnectomeproject.org. gence, Cambridge: Harvard UP. 6 According to neurologists, the brain repre- Moravec, Hans (2000) – Robot: Mere sents only 2% of the human body, but con- Machine To Transcendent Mind, Oxford, sumes almost 20% of its energy. See, a- New York: Oxford UP. mong others, Frith (2009: 9). 7 Just for powering up the process of seeing, Web Bibliography the brain uses “about 4 per cent of the ener- gy of the food we eat” – Gregory (2009: 3). www.hawking.org.uk/the-computer.- 8 See Manolescu and his post-human condi- html. tion techno-cultural analysis (2003: 165-184). www.humanconnectomeproject.org.