Advancing the Veto-Player Framework a Study of the Conditions Under Which Fragmentation Influences the Likelihood of a Peace Agreement

ADVANCING THE VETO-PLAYER FRAMEWORK A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH FRAGMENTATION INFLUENCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PEACE AGREEMENT

ALANNA SMART Master's Thesis Spring 2021

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Isak Svensson

Word Count: 22999

Abstract

Recent research has recognised the complexity of fragmented conflicts; however, debate exists regarding when and how fragmentation hinders peace processes. This study addresses this lacuna, by investigating the conditions under which fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement. Advancing Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework with insights from political parties’ literature, creating a novel causal mechanism, I argue that two conditions affect how fragmentation influences the likelihood of a peace agreement: veto players and outbidding. As veto players can ‘veto’ a peace agreement, a reduction in their number increases the likelihood of a settlement. Where fragmentation increases veto-players, I hypothesise that whether a peace agreement is likely or not, depends on the level of preference divergence, which is dependent on their engagement in outbidding. The hypotheses are tested through a qualitative structured-focused comparison approach, examining the cases of the Philippines (1990-1996), Uganda (1986-1988), Ethiopia (1973-1983), and Afghanistan (1980-1990). Overall, this thesis finds mixed support. Limited support is found for the hypotheses, with half of the cases concurring with expectations. However, the cases also reveal significant support for the mechanisms, although with qualifications, suggesting further refinement is required.

Key words: armed conflict, fragmentation, rebel groups, veto players, outbidding, preferences.

Acknowledgments First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Isak Svensson, for providing me with guidance and support in my endeavors. I am also extremely grateful for the unwavering support of my parents, Chris and Mas, without whom this would not have been possible. Lastly, I would like to extend thanks to my friends, in Uppsala and abroad, whom have shared with me their knowledge, sympathies, and joy.

Contents Abstract ...... 1 Acknowledgments ...... 1 List of Abbreviations ...... 4 I. Introduction ...... 6 II. Theoretical Framework ...... 8 Previous Research ...... 8 Negotiations and Conflict Termination ...... 8 Fragmentation and Conflict Resolution ...... 9 Theory ...... 12 Concepts and Definitions ...... 12 Causal Mechanisms ...... 15 Combining Veto Player and Outbidding Mechanisms ...... 23 Scope Conditions ...... 24 III. Research Design ...... 25 Methodology ...... 25 Case Selection ...... 25 Operationalisation ...... 28 Timeframe ...... 32 Validity, Reliability, and Source Material ...... 33 Structure of Analysis ...... 33 IV. Case Empirics...... 34 Case I: Philippines (1990 - 1996) ...... 34 Fragmentation of the Moro Resistance ...... 35 Veto Players ...... 36 A Case of One-Sided, Non-Escalatory Outbidding ...... 39 The 1996 Jakarta Accord ...... 41 Summary ...... 41

Case II: Uganda (1986 - 1988 ) ...... 42 Fragmentation of the Acholi Resistance ...... 42 Veto Players ...... 43 The Fatal Effects of Outbidding ...... 45 The 1988 Pece Agreement ...... 47 Summary ...... 47 Case III: Ethiopia (1973 - 1983) ...... 48 Fragmentation of the Eritrean Secessionist Movement ...... 48 Veto Players ...... 49 Outbidding and the Formation of the Eritrean Identity ...... 52 The Defeat of the ELF and Continuing War ...... 54 Summary ...... 55 Case IV: Afghanistan (1980 - 1990) ...... 55 Fragmentation of the Afghan Resistance ...... 55 Veto Players ...... 56 A Case of Limited Outbidding ...... 59 The 1988 “Peace Agreement” and Continuing Conflict ...... 61 Summary ...... 61 V. Discussion ...... 62 Cross-Case Analysis ...... 62 Limitations and Bias ...... 65 Alternative Explanations ...... 67 VI. Conclusion...... 69 Bibliography ...... 70

List of Abbreviations

ANLF Afghanistan National Liberation Front CRA Coordination de la Résistance Armée ELF Eritrean Liberation Front EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation Army FLAA Front de libération de l'Aïr et de l'Azawagh FORGE Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset Harakat-i Inqilab Movement of the Islamic Revolution HIG Islamic Party of Afghanistan HIG-Khalis Islamic Party of Afghanistan - Khalis faction HSM Holy Spirit Movement IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation ISA Islamic Society of Afghanistan MHS Mutually Hurting Stalemate MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MILF Moro National Liberation Front NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NIFA National Islamic Front of Afghanistan UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Programme UCDP/PRIO-ACD Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/Peace Research Institute Oslo – Armed Conflict Dataset UPDA Uganda People’s Democratic Army

List of Figures

Figure 1. Veto Player Causal Mechanism………………………………………………………………...... 17

Figure 2. Necessary Constitutive Conditions of a Veto Player……………………………………………....18

Figure 3. Outbidding/Moderating Causal Mechanism……………………………………………………....23

Figure 4. Fragmentation - Peace Agreement: Conditional Causal Mechanism………………………...…….24

Figure 5. Case Selection……………………………………………………………………………...……...28

Figure 6. Rebel Groups……………………………………………………………………………..………34

Figure 7. Case Empirics………………………………………………….…………………………….……62

I. Introduction

Conflicts are seldom fought between only two parties. Approximately 44% of armed opposition movements since 1989 have been fragmented (Walther & Pederson, 2020: 446). These conflicts are inherently unstable, as cross-cutting rivalries and alliances form, shift, and collapse with astounding fluidity. These trends are not new, for example, in Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party fought as bitter rivals until the mid-1980’s when the two began cooperating to the surprise of many (Akcinaroglu, 2012:889). In 1979, the alliance between the Chadian Forces of the North and Popular Armed Forces broke down to lethal consequence (ibid.). Such instability complicates conflicts, introducing uncertainty about actor landscapes in war.

Reflecting these trends, in the last 15 years researchers have moved beyond dyadic analyses of war towards complex multiple-actor studies. These have highlighted the significant effect of fragmentation on conflict dynamics, frequently emphasising its exacerbating effect, such as increasing inter-group violence and civilian targeting, whilst making conflicts longer and harder to resolve. However, some research suggests there is variation in the degree to which fragmentation inhibits conflict resolution, and may even encourage it (Findley & Rudloff, 2012). Given that only a quarter of civil wars end in negotiated settlements (Cunningham, 2011:27), understanding the conditions under which fragmentation influences the likelihood of an agreement is central to improving their prospects.

This thesis addresses this lacuna by asking under what conditions does fragmentation affect the likelihood of a peace agreement? In doing so, this paper aims to reveal mechanisms that affect the impact of fragmentation and assess the relevance of existing frameworks in explaining variation in the prospects of peace agreements.

Combining insights from negotiations, fragmentation, and political parties’ literature, I create a novel causal mechanism and three hypotheses. Drawing on Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework, a reduction in the number of veto players is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of a peace agreement. Where the number of veto-players increases, I argue that the likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the presence of outbidding. Where outbidding takes place, it is hypothesised preferences will diverge to a greater extent, further reducing the bargaining space and the likelihood

6 of a peace agreement. Where the number of veto-players increases, but outbidding does not occur, it is hypothesised that more moderate rebels will likely be co-opted into peace agreements.

To test this, a qualitative structured-focused comparative approach is used to analyse four cases, the Philippines (1990-1996), Uganda (1986-1988), Ethiopia (1873-1983), and Afghanistan (1980-1990). This approach allows deep exploration of the theorised mechanisms. The analysis draws on primary sources, including peace agreements and rebel statements, and secondary sources, such as NGO, think-tank, and academic research.

Overall, this thesis finds mixed support. Whilst the hypotheses find limited support, with half of the cases concurring with expectations, an examination of the causal mechanisms within each case finds substantial support for both the veto-player and outbidding mechanisms, although with some qualifications. Consequently, this thesis finds that the mechanisms are credible and relevant but require further refinement.

The findings contribute to the field by augmenting our understanding of variation in the link between fragmentation and peace agreements. Furthermore, it assesses and confirms the relevance of Cunningham’s (2011) veto player framework, whilst advancing his theory with a credible outbidding mechanism. Regarding policy implications, the findings suggest that developing policies that prevent outbidding may increase the likelihood of successful negotiations.

This paper outlines the theoretical framework, drawing on negotiations, fragmentation, and political parties’ literature to posit a novel causal mechanism and hypotheses. Next, the research design is elucidated, and the empirics are presented. Then, the cases are analysed, and cross-case conclusions are drawn. Limitations, biases, and alternative explanations are then discussed. Finally, this paper concludes with a summary of key findings, implications, and areas for future research.

II. Theoretical Framework

Previous Research

Negotiations and Conflict Termination Rationalist conceptions of war suggest that the choice to enter, continue, or renew conflict arises from bargaining failure. Bargaining can be tacit, pre-emptive behaviour in lieu of direct communication, or explicit, such as negotiations (Schelling, 1960). Crucially, whether bargaining is successful depends on belligerent’s abilities to find a solution that is acceptable to all parties. This solution is found in what is called the ‘bargaining space’. The size of the bargaining space rests between the value of an expected outcome and the perceived utility of hostilities for each group (Fearon, 1995). The larger the value of each, the smaller the bargaining space, and the less likely a settlement. Failing to find an acceptable bargain, the parties shall turn to war.

Accepting the assumption that both the onset and continuation of conflict arises from bargaining failure, existing approaches generally fall within four categories: economic theories, informational theories, commitment theories, and theories on indivisible issues. Economic theories of war suggest that violence is driven by opportunistic greed and ‘loot-seeking rebellions’, wherein rebels extort civilians and local resources for profit (Collier, 2000:841; Grossman, 1999). This occurs because the war economy presents warlords with a more profitable avenue than peace (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Keen, 2000:22). Supporting this, the presence of valuable extractable resources, such as diamonds and oil, has been found to correlate with more intractable conflicts (Fearon, 2004). Following this logic, wars which are costlier are more likely to be resolved, as they are less profitable (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Consequently, increasing the costs of war, by increasing hostilities, or reducing its benefits, for instance through embargoes, can increase chances of a settlement.

A second cause of bargaining failure is imperfect information (Fearon, 1995; Filson & Werner, 2002; Slantchev, 2003; Smith & Stam, 2004). This theory proposes that if belligerents had complete information regarding the utility of war, they would always choose to settle. Imperfect information, resulting in miscalculations regarding relative capabilities and opposition resolve, precede breakdowns in bargaining, as they lead to over-optimism regarding chances of victory (Fearon, 1995). This is compounded by incentives to withhold or misrepresent information in order to manipulate rivals’ 8 calculations, to compel concessions or deter challengers (Fearon, 1995; Lawler & Ford, 1995). Consequently, even the most rational leaders might unwittingly miscalculate the utility of war and avoid settlement in favour of hostilities. The revealing of information, through fighting or negotiations, allows belligerents to reach agreements in future (Filson & Werner, 2002)

Third, commitment problems hinder agreements as belligerents may be unable to credibly commit to carrying out its terms (Walter, 2002). Commitment problems are linked to the security dilemma, as adhering to peace agreements can relegate belligerents to a more vulnerable position than if they had remained hostile (ibid.). Peace agreements usually include addendums for demobilisation, and rebels are often required to relinquish control of territories, thus reducing their strength (Walter, 2009). Once hostilities are paused, it is possible that belligerents might exploit the ceasefire to remobilise troops or build resources for renewed conflict. Essentially, belligerents cannot be certain that their opponents will not renege on a peace agreement (Kirschner, 2010). Without credible guarantees that each party will follow-through on commitments, they will not reach a settlement.

A final bargaining problem is indivisible issues. According to theory, these include religious and territorial incompatibilities, such as secessionist conflicts (Toft, 2002; 2003; Fearon, 2004) or conflicts over ‘sacred spaces’, which have symbolic importance for multiple groups and for which there are no acceptable alternatives or pay-offs (Hassner, 2003; 2006; Goddard, 2006). However, recent analyses of Islamist conflicts have downplayed the significance of issue indivisibility, proposing that the transnational nature of the conflicts (Nilsson & Svensson, 2020; Söderberg Kovacs, 2020) and the influence of spoilers and public backlash (Matesan, 2020) are more important.

Fragmentation and Conflict Resolution Research on fragmentation generally observes an exacerbating effect on conflicts, such as intensifying violence (Bakke, Cunningham & Seymour, 2012; 2015; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012; Staniland, 2012; Bloom, 2005; Wood & Kathman, 2015), encouraging defections (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012; Kalyvas, 2008), increasing intractability (Cunningham, K. 2016), creating spoilers (Stedman, 1997; Nilsson, 2008; Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011), and hastening its renewal (Rudloff & Findley, 2016). Regarding how fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement, the existing literature posits three core mechanisms: creating spoilers, exacerbating commitment and information problems, and reducing bargaining space. 9

It is well-established that spoilers can emerge out of fragmenting parties to derail peace processes (Stedman, 1997; Nilsson, 2008; Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011). Put simply, leaders for whom continued conflict has utility are likely to violently reject peace processes (Stedman, 1997:5). This occurs because peace processes exacerbate pre-existing divisions within rebel movements and groups, causing disagreements over preferred policy, leadership, and strategies, particularly between ‘moderates’ and ‘hardliners’ (Cunningham, 2006; Duursma & Fliervoet, 2020; Lounsbery & Cook, 2011). Alternatively, Pearlman’s (2008:83) internal contestation theory suggests rebel spoilers emerge to improve their power relative to their rebel rivals. Competition and leadership contests within rebel movements may cause a group to reject deals which align with their preferences to undermine a rival group's strength (ibid.).

Second, fragmentation exacerbates information and commitment problems. For instance, Kathleen Cunningham (2013) argues that fragmentation reduces the credibility of rebel groups and increases uncertainty regarding the chances of settlements effectively resolving disputes. According to this approach, this occurs through two mechanisms. First, as the number of rebel factions increases, the ability of a group to credibly commit to agreements on behalf of others and enforce their compliance becomes increasingly difficult to gauge (Cunningham, K. 2013; Blattman & Miguel, 2010:16). Furthermore, factionalism increases the likelihood of leadership contests and change, potentially affecting their ‘internal continuity’ and their ability to make credible commitments for the longer term. Second, fragmentation makes assessing rebel strength and resolve more difficult, increasing the likelihood of miscalculations of the utility of war (ibid.). These information and credible commitment problems increase the likelihood of bargaining failure. However, whilst these arguments make sense when considering internally fragmented rebel groups, it does not account for the fact that independent rebel groups seldom claim to be able to commit on behalf of others. Consequently, whilst it is compelling in explaining why internal fragmentation limits negotiation attempts, it does not adequately explain how movement fragmentation influences the likelihood of a settlement.

A third mechanism elucidated within the literature argues that fragmentation reduces the likelihood of a peace agreement by reducing the bargaining space (Cunningham, 2006; 2011). As rebel fragmentation increases the number of actors, the number of preferences that must be addressed also increases, thus limiting the number of settlements which would be acceptable to all parties. This 10 increases the likelihood of an actor exercising a ‘veto’. Notably, veto players differ from spoilers, as spoilers are only identified ex-post. Veto players, on the other hand, can be identified ex-ante, as whilst they have the potential to spoil peace processes, they do not necessarily do so. This paper builds on this segment of the literature, assessing the relevance of Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework, whilst augmenting it with insights from political parties’ literature and outbidding mechanisms, in adjusting the extent to which preferences diverge.

However, contrary to the expectations of these theories, it has been observed that the duration of war does not always increase with fragmentation and such wars can and have ended in negotiated agreements, at times quicker than non-fragmented conflicts (Findley & Rudloff, 2012). Utilising a game-theoretic model of war and several examples, Findley & Rudloff (2012) find that as the probability of fragmentation increases, the duration of time until a negotiated settlement decreases. They argue that this is because fragmentation weakens rebel groups, creating conditions in which negotiations and settlements are a more favourable option (ibid.). Furthermore, as discussed, fragmentation often arises from disagreements over strategy. In particular, schisms are likely to arise between moderates and extremists over issues such as the use of violence, priority of demands, and participation in peace processes (Duursma & Fliervoet, 2020; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 1995). In other words, splinters can occur precisely because some factions wish to pursue a settlement. According to Findley & Rudloff (2012:20), the Democratic Republic of Congo is just one example where fragmentation resulted “in new configurations of actors more conducive to joint cooperation, following which peace agreements were signed”.

This disagreement regarding how and when fragmentation influences the likelihood of a peace agreement reveals a research gap. Crucially, we do not yet know for certain under what conditions fragmentation does or does not have certain theoretically expected outcomes. Consequently, this study addresses this lacuna. In doing so, it also aims to assess the relevance of Cunningham's (2011) veto- player framework and advance it with an outbidding mechanism. As will be explained, whilst Cunningham’s (2011) framework is compelling, I argue that his condition of ‘preference autonomy’ is insufficient in explaining variation in bargaining space. Noting deficiencies in existing theory, it is important to refine them so that they better capture empirical realities. Furthermore, as only a quarter of civil wars end in negotiated settlements (Cunningham, 2011:27), understanding the conditions under which fragmentation influences the likelihood of an agreement is central to improving their 11 prospects. Consequently, this paper seeks to answer: under what conditions does fragmentation influence the likelihood of a peace agreement?

Theory The theorised causal mechanism relies on two separate but related logics, the logic of veto players and the logic of outbidding. First, key concepts are defined. Second, Cunningham’s (2011) framework is outlined, arguing that how fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement is dependent on changes in the number of veto players. Next, the insufficiency of Cunningham’s condition of ‘preference autonomy’ is elucidated, and ‘preference divergence’ is presented as a compelling alternative. The veto-player framework is subsequently augmented with an outbidding mechanism, arguing that the extent to which preference divergence occurs is conditional on whether we see escalatory outbidding.

Concepts and Definitions This section defines the independent and dependent variables of interest: rebel movement fragmentation and peace agreements. Two broad concepts linked to the outbidding mechanism are also defined: ethnicity/co-ethnics, and preference divergence/convergence (radicalisation/moderation). These definitions inform the operationalisation of these variables, discussed later in the ‘Research Design’.

IV: Rebel Movement Fragmentation Drawing from the literature, ‘fragmentation’ generally falls within two categories. Group, or internal, fragmentation refers to levels of internal cohesion or factionalisation within rebel groups (e.g. Staniland, 2010; Woldemariam, 2016). Movement fragmentation, on the other hand, relates to the level of cohesion and diversity of groups within a particular movement, for instance, a secessionist movement (e.g. Cunningham, K. 2013; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2018; Salverda, 2017). This paper is concerned with the latter.

To understand if a movement is fragmented, one must first define a rebel movement. According to Bakke, Cunningham & Seymour (2012:266) movements “mobilize around a collective identity in pursuit of particular interests related to this identity in a fundamental way”. Consequently, where “rebel groups share a collective identity around which their activities are organised”, they are from the 12 same movement (Mosinger, 2017:15). For instance, groups which purport to represent the aspirations of any given ethnic group, whilst varying in their specific preferences, such as seeking autonomy vs secession, are considered part of the same movement.

To be fragmented, there must exist within this collective identity a number of independent rebel groups. This paper adopts Mosinger’s (2017:15) definition of independence, arguing that groups within a movement are considered independent provided that they do not share a “hierarchical superior”.

One approach to fragmentation suggests that it is driven by the splintering of existing rebel groups into two or more constituent parts (Rudloff & Findley, 2016). This view has credence as many rebel groups emerge out of schisms with an extant parent group. However, this does not acknowledge that many rebel groups arise concurrently and do not share a parent group. Despite differing origins, the proliferation of groups effectively fractures the movement into more constituent parts. Consequently, understanding fragmentation in terms of actor proliferation is useful, and is particularly suitable for capturing the theorised mechanism which concerns the proliferation of veto players.

DV: Peace Agreements Whilst there is no legal definition for a peace agreement, consensus dictates that it is a formalised agreement between two or more belligerent parties aimed at ending an armed conflict. According to Bell (2008: 305), “peace agreements are documents produced after discussion with some or all of the conflict's protagonists, that address militarily violent conflict with a view to ending it”. Adopting this definition, peace settlements are consensual contracts between various actors in war that emerges from prior and/or ongoing negotiations. Notably, peace agreements will not necessarily succeed at ending a conflict. As the Uppsala Data Conflict Programme (UCDP) observes, a peace agreement “addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility” (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020).

This paper adopts a definition based on both Bell (2008) and the UCDP, defining a peace agreement as the formal document produced during/after consensual discussions between two or more belligerent parties that addresses some or all the incompatibilities of a conflict. As such, peace agreements which aim for dyadic peace, as well as full peace, are considered. Conversely, ceasefires which only halt violence, without addressing core incompatibilities, are not considered peace 13 agreements. Similarly, unilateral documents that address some or all the incompatibilities but do not involve the consensual participation of any other belligerent parties are also not considered peace agreements.

Ethnicity and Co-Ethnic Constituencies To understand ethnic outbidding, and why it occurs, the concept of ethnicity and co-ethnicity must be explored. Despite its common reference in social sciences, there is no consensus for the definition of ethnicity. Generally, ethnicity refers to the cultural and social societal cleavages from which individuals identify belonging from shared origins, background, culture, traditions, identity, language, or religion (Aygemang et al.,2005; Cederman et al., 2010). Any combination of these, or all, may delineate an ethnic group's boundaries, depending on the specific context from which it is borne.

Lacking systematic boundaries, Gabbert’s (2006:1) definition of ethnicity as a “specific form of social differentiation whereby actors use cultural or phenotypic markers to distinguish themselves from others” is most useful. Following this logic, we can conceptualise ethnicity as, primarily, the product of self-identification. Consequently, that an individual perceives their belonging to a group is more important than identifying the markers that constitute that group’s boundaries. Put simply, ethnicity can be identified through an individual's self-selection into a specific group or through the perception of others of their belonging to that group.

Once ethnicities are identified, identifying co-ethnic constituents is straightforward. A government’s co-ethnic constituency is identified by assessing which ethnic group occupies the dominant government positions (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014:1238). A rebel group's co-ethnic constituency can be identified by assessing which ethnic group they recruit from most and/or which ethnic group they profess to represent the aspirations of (ibid.).

Preference Divergence and Convergence: Radicalisation and Moderation The outbidding mechanism is concerned with the divergence of preferences. Understanding what preferences are, and what constitutes divergence or convergence, is therefore critical for understanding the theory. Broadly, an actors’ ‘preferences’ refers to their values and their relative order. Whilst preferences and ideology are not synonymous, ideology is a useful proxy for understanding preferences, particularly when discussing institutionalised preferences belonging to a 14 rebel group. Gade et al. (2019:2075) offers the most useful conception, arguing that group ideology can be disaggregated along three axes: conflict framing, conception of the ideal polity, and territorial aspiration. Consequently, this thesis adopts this definition, and considers preference changes along these axes.

The process of moderation and radicalisation connect to the concept of polarisation, defined by Tilly & Tarrow (2006:217) as the “increasing ideological distance between political actors or coalitions''. In other words, moderation and radicalisation refer to diametrically opposed changes in demand, ideology, or stance along the three axes. Assuming political stances to exist on a spectrum, moderation and radicalisation can be conceptualised as centripetal and centrifugal movements from the center, respectively. Therefore, moderation from one group can be understood as preference convergence, as the distance between the groups' ideals reduces. Radicalisation from one group, on the other hand, increases the level of preference divergence as the distance between ideals increases.

Notably, both moderation and radicalisation are referent concepts measured by the changing distance between ideals (Kundnani, 2012). Consequently, discussions regarding moderation and radicalisation with reference to changing stance should not be misinterpreted as a judgement of the ideas themselves (Sprenkels, 2019).

Causal Mechanisms Having established definitions, this section develops the causal mechanism. First, the logic of veto players and its impact on the likelihood of peace agreements is elucidated (Cunningham, 2011). Here, the limitation of Cunningham’s (2011) ‘preference autonomy’ is discussed, with preference divergence posited as a more useful concept. Next, the logic of outbidding is explained, outlining the mechanism through which competition for civilian support can result in preference divergence. Lastly, the veto player and outbidding mechanisms are merged to create a novel causal mechanism, positing three hypotheses regarding the conditions under which fragmentation influences the likelihood of peace agreements.

The logic of ‘Veto Players’ and their Impact on the Outcome of Peace Processes According to Cunningham (2011:15), there are four core mechanisms through which an increase in armed groups in conflict inhibits the likelihood of a peace settlement. First, as the number of groups

15 increases, the bargaining space, within which a mutually acceptable agreement exists, decreases or diminishes entirely (ibid.). Second, the likelihood of bargaining failure because of information asymmetries is higher in multi-actor conflicts, as gauging the likelihood of victory or defeat vis-a-vis the state and each other becomes more complex (ibid.). As a result, armed groups may miscalculate the costs and benefits of the utility of continued conflict, with overly optimistic calculations extending conflict duration. Third, armed groups have incentives to delay the signing of peace agreements to manipulate greater concessions from the state (ibid.). This means parties are more likely to leave, or refuse participation in, peace negotiations (ibid.:134). Fourth, multiple groups will ally and fight with one another across numerous issues in different ways, leading to ever shifting and fragile alliances. This reduces the formation of solid negotiating ‘blocs’, which would effectively reduce the number of ‘actors’ at the table, mitigating the three prior problems (ibid.:15).

But whilst increasing the total number of groups certainly decreases the number of resolutions that are acceptable for all parties, not all parties are equally important for the reaching of a peace agreement. The logic of veto players dictates that only groups who can effectively ‘veto’ a settlement they perceive as unacceptable are able to spoil a peace process (Cunningham, 2011). Conversely, groups without the capacity to exercise a ‘veto’ have little influence on the outcome of negotiations. Consequently, the more veto players that exist, the less likely a peace agreement will be reached.

Applying this logic to fragmentation, fragmentation will decrease the likelihood of peace settlements under the condition that fragmentation increases the number of veto players. If the nascent rebel group is not a veto player, whilst the extant groups are, overall, the number of veto players in conflict has not increased and therefore the projected likelihood of settlement remains the same. If the nascent group is a new veto player, but the group from which it split loses its status, similarly the number of vetoes remains constant. Any changes here in the likelihood of a peace agreement, will depend on whether there was a divergence of preferences. If the number of veto players decreases, for instance if the splintering of a group significantly weakens the viability of both the splinter and parent groups, then the likelihood of settlement increases as the potential bargaining space is increased.

Figure 1. Veto Player Causal Mechanism

Internal Cohesion, Viability, and Preference Autonomy According to Cunningham (2011), whether a group is considered a veto player rests on three conditions, internal cohesion, viability, and preference autonomy. First, the groups must be sufficiently cohesive to overcome collective action problems associated with exercising a veto. Groups which cannot present cohesive demands and foster compliance amongst their members to follow through on any threats made in pursuit of those demands, do not have veto capacity (ibid.:36).

Second, the group must be able to continue the conflict unilaterally, even if all other combatants cease hostilities (ibid.). In other words, they must be strong enough to pose a sufficient threat of sustained hostilities against the state, even in the absence of all external support. Measuring a group's viability encompasses several factors, including their military capabilities, geographical conditions, and access to resources (ibid.). The impact of military capabilities on a group's strength is axiomatic. Larger forces, more training, and better weaponry will naturally increase the ability of a group to sustain hostilities. Conversely, groups which lack such capacity will be too weak to fight the state and thus cannot exercise a veto. Geographical conditions may also impact capabilities, as deeply rural conditions such as forestry or mountainous regions may aid rebel groups in insurgent warfare. Lastly, access to resources is imperative to fund and supply sustained hostilities (ibid.:37). Resources can be acquired through both coercion and consent, such as looting, taxation, donations, and external sponsors.

However, if the group is dependent on an external state sponsor, they are not a veto-player as they cannot continue the conflict unilaterally (ibid).

Lastly, for a group to be a veto player its preferences must diverge from other groups in the conflict. In Cunningham’s latter works, ‘autonomous preferences’ (2011:33) replaces preference divergence (2006). The crux of this condition is that groups which have identical preferences “do not present two different sets of interests that need to be satisfied” (Cunningham, 2011: 33). Consequently, the two groups are only one veto player - provided the two other conditions are fulfilled. In most cases, armed groups will differ in at least some respects, and thus have autonomous preferences. However, this is not universal. First, rebel groups may form coalitions if they realise that their chances of victory are poor and would be improved if they aligned with other groups. In these cases, if they have effectively ceased operating independently then they are a unitary veto player. Second, when actors enter the conflict with the sole aim of supporting an existing player, it can be presumed that any settlement which would appease the original actor would also appease its supporter, and therefore they are a unitary veto player (ibid.).

Internal Cohesion

Viability Veto Player

Preference Autonomy

Figure 2. Necessary Conditions of a Veto Player

Where ‘autonomous preferences’ and ‘preference divergence’ differ, is that the latter accepts the salience of the extent to which centrifugal or centripetal movements in stance affect the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement. Essentially, in Cunningham’s (2011) basic veto-player framework, internal

18 cohesion, viability, and autonomous preferences can be considered dummy variables. Theoretically, any group which is sufficient in all three conditions will be able to exercise a veto. However, the extent to which actors' preferences diverge from one another, by Cunningham’s (2011) own admission, will have a significant effect on the bargaining space, and therefore the likelihood of settlement. In other words, variation in this condition beyond meeting the veto player threshold will, theoretically, have a greater effect on the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The greater this divergence between veto player preferences, the smaller the bargaining space and the less likely a peace agreement.

But that divergence will occur is not axiomatic. Whilst Tokdemir et al. (2020) do suggest that ideology and demands frequently change following fragmentation, they also highlight that such changes can be the moderation of stance. Moderation of preferences, whilst not the complete overlap of preferences and therefore maintaining veto player status, does represent centripetal movement in preferences. That is to say, we can understand moderation as preference convergence. Recalling the models of bargaining, the closer the preferences of the actors in war, the larger the prospective bargaining space within which a settlement might be found. Furthermore, as Pruitt (2007) argues, lowering aspirations are pivotal for fostering readiness for negotiations amongst belligerents.

For this reason, delving deeper into the causes of preference divergence/convergence is central to understanding how fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement. Cunningham (2011) posits that variations in the level of preference divergence is caused by whether the group is a splinter or an ‘original group’. As splinter groups generally arise out of altercations between factions over specific policies, leadership, or strategies (Cunningham, 2006), splinter groups can be expected to have similar preferences as they share members and their original raison d’etre. In contrast, ‘original’ groups which arise separate to extant groups are likely to have more diverging preferences as they do not share origins.

I argue that this is insufficient in explaining preference divergence, as it assumes that group preferences following splits are essentially static. Crucially, it fails to take into account the competitive dynamics through which preference divergence can be exacerbated as a direct result of fragmentation. The following section, outlining the logic of outbidding, explores the conditions under which fragmentation leads to a greater preference divergence, thus having a significant effect on the veto- player framework predictions. 19

The Logic of Outbidding and its Impact on Preference Divergence Applying the logic of outbidding to fragmentation in conflict, this paper suggest that increased intergroup competition between nascent and extant co-ethnic rebel groups, arising from rebel fragmentation, can incentivise radicalisation of ideology and demands (preference divergence) thus decreasing the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement. As will be discussed, however, escalatory outbidding is not inevitable. Therefore, whether outbidding occurs or not will significantly alter the level of preference divergence, and consequently, the likelihood of a peace agreement.

That the proliferation of armed groups results in increased competition is well supported. First, the arrival of nascent challengers reduces the expected share of potential gains extant actors might gain from settlements (Wood & Kathman, 2015:169). In other words, as the number of rebel groups increases, the number of settlements that are acceptable to all parties decreases, thus increasing competition between them to achieve a worthwhile settlement. Furthermore, whilst opposition groups may share their desire to topple the incumbent power, their preferences and values will differ, and thus any potential spoils from victory must be shared.

The entry of new groups also generates significant competition over civilian support and local resources (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Wood & Kathman, 2015). Civilian support is essential for armed groups as they provide material goods, logistical support, and recruitment pools which are vital for the maintenance of hostilities (ibid.). Furthermore, civilian networks provide important information for armed groups regarding defectors and the actions of rivals (Kalyvas, 2006). Constituencies can also confer legitimacy to armed actors, providing leverage in negotiations and access to certain markets. Local populations and resources, however, can only support a finite number of armed groups, with access constituting a zero-sum game whereby gains by one rebel group correspond with losses for another. As civilian support is of longterm strategic importance, groups have significant incentives to procure and maintain access. Therefore, should access be threatened by new groups, armed actors can be expected to adapt their strategies.

In multi-actor settings, civilians have options for whom they support. Consequently, rebel groups must be uniquely appealing to attract and secure civilian support, loyalty, or compliance. The logic that drives this is that groups must differentiate their ‘brand’, to distinguish themselves amongst their rivals and gain a competitive advantage (Tokdemir et al, 2020). Rebel groups can do this by offering 20 unique material or non-material goods, such as shifting their ideology and demands towards the state (ibid.).

Prior research on political parties has paid particular attention to ‘ethnic outbidding’, the process through which competing political parties adopt increasingly extreme views to maintain political relevance and attract the support and votes of extreme constituencies. The logic that belies this, is that in societies that are ethnically stratified, groups which represent the same co-ethnics must compete for the support of their constituents. Under the original models of ethnic outbidding introduced by Rabushka & Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985), ethnic groups present as separately organised groups (Group A and Group B) with diametrically opposed preferences. As the ideal preferences of Group A and Group B lie at opposite ends of a spectrum, if multiple parties that represent Group A arise, a party will attempt to outbid a more centrist party for a broader share of potential supporters by aligning their position closer to Group A’s ideal preferences at one end of the spectrum. In doing so, the group can claim to be the ‘true representative’ of that constituency and its preferences, and denigrate the more moderate group as an ethnic traitor, weak, or rival sympathiser (Chandra, 2005). Threatened by the prospect of a rival's increasing popularity amongst their co-ethnic constituency, and the backlash of accusations, the remaining party/parties will try to outbid the initial bidder, escalating the level of radicalisation amongst all rebel groups that represent that ethnicity.

We can extrapolate this mechanism to rebel groups in conflict as competing rebel groups and political parties share a significant similarity: they both rely on civilian support. Whilst rebel groups do rely to some extent on coercive measures (violence or threats) to ensure compliance and deter defections (Kalyvas, 2006), such measures are often counter-productive (Ross & Gurr, 1989; Cronin 2009). Consequently, like political parties, rebel groups attempt to foster consensual civilian support by engaging in actions that signal their resolve and strength as the legitimate constituency representative, through the provision of material or non-material goods. As a result, mechanisms regarding competition over popular support can be similarly applied.

In conflict settings, outbidding rebel groups can expect several benefits. By radicalising demands, rebel groups can signal the strength of their resolve to the state, their members, and their constituents (Vogt, Gleditsch & Cederman, 2021). According to previous literature, this allows rebel groups to gain

21 greater concessions, increases mobilisation and recruitment, and homogenises membership, increasing internal cohesion and discipline (ibid.).

The strategies by which rebel groups can outbid one another fall into two broad categories: deed- based outbidding and discourse-based outbidding (Lilja, 2012). The former refers to increasing use of violence and threats against one another and the state (Bloom, 2004; Cunningham et al. 2012), whilst the latter refers to the instrumentalisation of myths, cultural symbols, and historical narratives that appeal to the emotions of ethnic constituents (Lilja, 2012).

Outbidding presents significant difficulties for the likelihood of conflict settlement through several co-existing mechanisms. First, radicalisation of demands reduces the bargaining space between the state and rebel groups, reducing the number of acceptable solutions. Second, groups that attempt to outbid rivals have incentives to remain outside of the peace process, to foster an image of resolve, thus creating potential spoilers (Stedman, 1997). These groups may derail peace through violence (deed-based outbidding) or by criticising co-ethnic groups involved in ongoing peace processes (discourse-based outbidding). This increases the costs of participation, increasing the likelihood that other rebel groups may drop out (Maney et al., 2012). Lastly, outbidding can prevent future settlements as rebel group leaders who make radical claims may find their strategy choices limited as adopting radical positions raises the reputation costs for back-tracking in the future (Jenne, 2007).

However, as aptly highlighted by Mitchell et al. (2009:397), “extremist outbidding in ethnic party systems is not inevitable”. This paper does not seek to determine why outbidding does or does not occur, rather, we are interested in how the presence of escalatory outbidding, or not, affects the likelihood of a peace agreement. Where escalatory outbidding is absent, some opposition groups may be more likely to be co-opted by the government. This is because splinters often arise from disagreements between moderates and radicals over strategy or preferences (Duursma & Fliervoet, 2020; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Stedman, 1997; Zartman, 1995). In other words, splinters may occur precisely because some members prefer peace. Consequently, fragmentation may result in preference convergence between the state and that specific fragment. Where one side favours a more conciliatory approach, if undeterred by outbidding, successful negotiations are more likely. Secondly, as fragmentation often weakens rebel groups, their cost-benefit analyses of war may alter in favour of seeking alternative solutions (Findley & Rudloff, 2012). Fragmentation can also reveal information 22 about the relative capabilities of various actors, ameliorating information problems (ibid.). Due to these coexisting mechanisms, if co-ethnic rebel groups are not drawn into peace-hindering escalatory outbidding, then more moderate groups may be more likely to negotiate a deal with the government. The outbidding causal mechanism is summarised below:

Figure 3. Outbidding Causal Mechanism

Combining Veto Player and Outbidding Mechanisms Combining the logic of veto players and outbidding, we can assert several conditional mechanisms. First, where there is a reduction in veto players, the likelihood of a peace agreement will increase. This is irrespective of whether rebels engage in outbidding or not. Regardless, less players will be able to exercise a veto, and thus are unable to affect the outcome of a peace settlement, increasing its likelihood.

Where fragmentation increases the number of veto players, the degree to which it influences the likelihood of reaching a settlement will depend on the extent to which preferences diverge or converge. Consequently, should escalatory outbidding occur, preferences will diverge, reducing the likelihood of a peace agreement. Conversely, should escalatory outbidding not occur, groups with more moderate preferences may be co-opted, thus increasing the likelihood of a peace agreement. The combined causal mechanism is outlined below:

Figure 4. Fragmentation - Peace Agreement: Conditional Causal Mechanism

From the above causal mechanism, we can draw three hypotheses: H1a: Where fragmentation increases the number of veto players, and escalatory outbidding occurs, the likelihood of a peace agreement decreases.

H1b: Where fragmentation increases the number of veto players, but escalatory outbidding does not occur, the likelihood of a peace agreement increases.

H2: Where fragmentation decreases the number of veto players, the likelihood of a peace agreement increases.

Scope Conditions A significant scope condition is that the theory only applies to groups which rely on civilian support for recruits and/or resources. Groups which do not rely on civilian support, do not have incentives to outbid their co-ethnic rivals to increase their share of supporters within their constituency. For example, the Islamic State derives much of its finances from oil and a large proportion of its forces are foreign fighters. As such, the reliance of the Islamic State on its local populations is minimal, and

24 it would likely be able to continue hostilities without the broad support of its constituencies. Consequently, we would not expect to see escalatory outbidding from the Islamic State with its co- ethnic rivals.

III. Research Design

This section outlines the research design including method, case selection, operationalisation, timeframe, and data collection. Finally, the structure of the empirics and analysis is outlined.

Methodology This paper uses a qualitative structured-focused comparison (SFC) approach to examine four cases: the Philippines (1990-1996), Uganda (1986-1988), Ethiopia (1983-1993), and Afghanistan (1980- 1990). Whilst it is argued that qualitative approaches are limited by their lack of clear assessment on the mutual impact between variables and outcomes (Drozdova & Gaubatz, 2014), qualitative research is commended for its ability to contribute to the discovery of causal mechanisms (Glaser & Laudel, 2019). Given that this thesis is concerned with understanding the conditions through which a causal mechanism occurs, rather than whether there is merely a correlation, a qualitative approach is appropriate.

An SFC approach is ‘structured’ as standardised questions are applied to each case, making analytical comparisons systematic and allowing cross-case conclusions to be drawn (George & Bennett, 2005:67) This overcomes concerns that qualitative research can be insufficiently systematic and therefore unable to draw credible conclusions about the population at hand. It is ‘focused’ as it only considers theoretically relevant aspects of the cases within a delimited timeframe (ibid.). Because of this, the questions are determined by the referent research interest.

Case Selection As this study attempts to explain variation in how fragmentation affects peace agreements, this study must adopt a cross-case comparative approach wherein variation is present. A case study approach is beneficial as it allows detailed exploration of the mechanisms, ensuring high internal validity. By testing the causal mechanism across multiple contexts, the study also generates higher external validity (Ruffa, 2020). The process of case selection is the most vital component of research design for qualitative 25 studies or studies in which random sampling is not possible (Marshall, 1996; Seawright & Gerring 2008:295).

This paper uses a most-similar case approach, otherwise known as Mill’s method of difference. This method isolates the causes of variation in the dependent variable, by holding other variables constant. Consequently, to determine the conditions affecting how rebel movement fragmentation (IV) affects peace agreements (DV), all chosen cases have fragmentation present, but vary on the presence of a peace agreement. Other possible factors, barring the theorised conditions, are held constant to exclude them as explanations for variation. Consequently, analysing the differences between cases should identify the conditions that influence variance in how fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement.

As we are only interested in conflict cases in which fragmentation occurred, a list of all potential cases (the population) was established. Recalling its definition, a movement is fragmented when multiple independent rebel groups mobilise around a collective identity. This may occur through splintering of extant groups or via the proliferation of ‘original’ groups. To create the population, this study drew on Duursma & Fliervoet’s (2020) dataset of splinters and augmented it with cases of fragmentation drawing on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.20.1 (‘UCDP/PRIO-ACD’)(Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). Where multiple actors were listed in ‘side_b’ in a Case-Year, these were included as potential cases. This list was then filtered. First, cases of fragmentation which occurred after 2011 were removed as insufficient time has elapsed to study each case for a 10-year period. Second, actors were cross-checked against the UCDP to ensure they were not mergers of former rebel groups, as this would represent a reduction in fragmentation. For instance, Duursma & Fliervoet (2020) list the Coordination de la Résistance Armée (CRA) as a splinter of the Front de libération de l'Aïr et de l'Azawagh (FLAA). Whilst it is true that the CRA was primarily former-FLAA members, the CRA was actually a merger of several armed groups including the FLAA, Front de libération de Tamoust , the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of the Sahara, and the Armée révolutionaire de libération du Nord-Niger (UCDP, 2021b). This case, and other mergers, were removed.

To determine the presence of peace agreements, the PA-X Peace Agreements Database v2 (Bell & Badanjak, 2019; Bell et al., 2019) was consulted. Recalling its definition, a peace agreement must 26 address some or all of the conflicting parties’ incompatibilities. Consequently, agreements which addressed ceasefires, pre-negotiations/processes, and renewals of peace agreements were not included. As PA-X only extends from 1990-2020, academic works were consulted applying the same criteria for earlier cases.

To remove cases where endogeneity (reverse causation) could not be discounted, cases where fragmentation occurred either immediately prior to or after a peace agreement were removed. For example, cases in which fragmentation was known to have occurred in the same year as a peace agreement, but the exact date or cause of fragmentation could not be determined, were removed.

Confounding Variables Mill’s method of difference dictates that possible confounders should be controlled to isolate the causes of variation. To identify confounders, it is pertinent to return to previous research. Two rival theories can be derived from the literature regarding how fragmentation influences the likelihood of peace agreements: power imbalances and internal cohesion. The first suggests that imbalances of power within fragmented rebel movements creates spoilers (Pearlman, 2008), as weaker groups are likely to lose out from negotiations. This is because weaker groups may be left out or have less negotiating power, reducing the potential spoils they might receive. Consequently, smaller groups are likely to undertake spoiling behaviour. The second theory suggests that reduced internal cohesion reduces the credibility of rebel groups, thus reducing the chances of a settlement being reached (Cunningham, 2013). As my own theory concerns internal cohesion, it cannot be controlled for.

To control for power imbalances, co-existing rebel groups were cross-checked with the UCDP for information regarding their estimated troop numbers over the 10 years from fragmentation. In cases where a significant imbalance exists for the majority period, the cases were removed. For instance, the Congolese Rally for Democracy had 20,000-60,000 troops, whereas the coexisting Movement for the Liberation of Congo had ~6,000 troops at its zenith (UNDP, 2021m;2021o). Whilst troop numbers are an unrefined indicator for a rebel group’s overall power, given the timeframe and scope of this thesis it was not possible to determine the relative power-balances of each in more depth. Consequently, troop numbers are a useful proxy for assessing relative strength. Ten cases were identified where the strength of rebel groups were similar.

Beyond controlling for rival theories, other factors may also affect the likelihood of a peace agreement. For instance, conflict intensity affects the likelihood of a perceived mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) (Zartman, 2001). Where conflicts impose higher costs, groups are more likely to grow war-weary and seek alternative methods of settlement. Conversely, in low-intensity conflicts, groups have little incentives to seek resolution elsewhere. Consulting the UCDP/PRIO-ACD (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002), low intensity cases, where the threshold of 1,000 cumulative battle-deaths was not reached during the period of study, were removed. This left cases wherein the cumulative conflict intensity was ‘high’ (>1,000 cumulative battle deaths).

This resulted in the selection of four cases, in the Philippines, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Due to the systematic method of case selection, common selection biases, such as choosing cases on data availability, have been avoided. As several regions (Asia, Africa, and the Middle East) are represented, the generalisability of the study to the broader population, civil conflicts with movement fragmentation, should be high. The cases are summarised below:

Cases IV Confounders Conditions DV

Country Fragmentation Size Conflict Increase in Escalatory Peace Intensity Veto Players Outbidding Agreement Philippines Yes Large* High ? ? Yes (1990-1996) Uganda Yes Medium** High ? ? Yes (1986 - 1988) Ethiopia Yes Large* High ? ? No (1973-1983) Afghanistan Yes Medium** High ? ? No (1980-1990) *Large = >10,000 troops ** Medium = 1,000-10,000 troops Figure 5. Case Selection

Operationalisation This section operationalises the variables, fragmentation, peace agreements, veto players, and outbidding and preference divergence, based on their prior established definitions. To ensure each variable

28 is captured validly, multiple indicators have been chosen based on prior research. The SFC questions asked systematically of each case are elucidated here.

IV: Fragmentation To assess whether a rebel movement is fragmented, measured as a dummy variable, the SFC questions are: do the rebel groups mobilise around a collective identity? And are they independent?

Drawing on existing literature, this thesis uses the following indicators to identify whether the groups mobilise around a collective identity: the composition of members, to assess if they share co-ethnic identity (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014); rebel statements, revealing whom they claim to represent (ibid.); rebel demands, based on primary and secondary sources, revealing whether their activities centre around those identities (Mosinger, 2017); and rebel group names, which research finds change to mirror groups’ identities’ (Ishiyama & Marshall, 2017). To be co-ethnics, the majority of each group’s members must come from the same ethnic group. As ethnicity is based on self-identification, ethnicity does not have to be defined by the lowest possible denominator. For example, whilst multiple ethno-linguistic groups may exist within a region, if the groups subscribe to an overarching narrative regarding a shared regional identiy, then they can be considered co-ethnics. For their activities to revolve around the same identity, some, but not all, of their statements and/or demands must explicitly mention their shared identity. Fulfilling these two conditions, the groups are considered part of the same movement. Exhibiting identity via names is not a necessary condition, but it is useful for evaluating some groups.

To assess group independence, their leadership (Mosinger’s, 2017) and activities (Cunningham, 2011), are evaluated. Provided they do not share leadership nor the majority of their activities, they shall be considered independent, as these indicate both elite level and operational level independence.

DV: Peace Agreement To assess the presence of a peace agreement, measured as a dummy variable, this paper asks: Is it a formal agreement? Does it include two or more warring parties? Was it consensual? And does it address the incompatibilities of conflict?

To evaluate whether it was a formal agreement, that it was both published and signed is assessed, as these signal formality of proceedings. To confirm that at least two parties are included, the number of warring 29 signatories is observed. To assess consent, prior involvement in negotiations and that it was signed by warring parties is considered, as groups which did not participate or were not signatories cannot have given their consent. The conflict incompatibility is assessed by looking at rebel demands, based on primary and secondary data, including the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (‘FORGE’) dataset (Braithwaite et al., 2020), and incompatibility data from the UCDP/PRIO-ACD (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). To evaluate whether the agreement addresses, either partly or fully, the conflict’s incompatibility, the incompatability and peace agreement addendums are compared. For example, if the UCDP states the incompatibility was ‘Government’, with secondary/primary data showing rebels demanded increasing representation, and the peace agreement includes power-sharing provisions, for instance, the incompatibility shall be considered addressed. Fulfilling all these conditions, a peace agreement is considered present.

Condition A: Veto Players To analyse the veto-player mechanism, this paper asks were the nascent and extant rebel groups independent veto players? To assess this, it asks were they internally cohesive? Were they viable? And did they have autonomous preferences? Indicators have been developed for internal cohesion, viability, and preference autonomy, which are all dummy variables.

To assess internal cohesion, borrowing from Cunningham (2011), this study considers continuous leadership for most of the studied period an indicator, as it displays a lack of leadership contests. The type of command structure, as decentralised/factional systems are less cohesive, whether they present a united front, signifying strategic and operational interdependence, and levels of infighting, signifying poor internal discipline and control, are also assessed to determine if there was sufficient cohesion. The command structure signifies cohesion if central command can exercise sufficient control over strategy. Notably, decentralised systems do not prevent overcoming collective action problems, particularly if decentralisation is by design, although it may hinder it. Operative decisions may be independent from the central command, whilst still preserving cohesion, as the reality of war often precludes consistent communication. Infighting is judged to be indicative of insufficient cohesion if it results in the splintering of the group during the studied period. As internal cohesion is a thick variable and difficult to measure, and as rebels have incentives to misrepresent capabilities, this study considers a holistic assessment of the above indicators, based on secondary research, to evaluate sufficiency.

Regarding viability, this paper assesses troop/membership numbers and access to resources, as larger and better resourced groups pose more formidable threats (Cunningham, 2011). Provided each group has more than 1,000 members, this indicator will be assessed as sufficient, as anecdotal evidence suggests groups of this size have been shown to be able to withstand government offences over time (UCDP, 2021), particularly in remote guerilla warfare (Buhaug et al., 2009). To assess access to resources this paper investigates whether the groups were self-reliant, as groups which are dependent on an external state/group cannot continue conflict unilaterally, and consequently are not viable (ibid.). To confirm self-reliance, the group must be engaged in domestic resource extraction as their most important source of financing, based on academic research and Government/NGO/IGO reports. Lastly, this paper assesses whether the groups were able to sustain hostilities for at least a year, based on secondary data including the UCDP/PRIO-ACD, showing that they were strong enough to withstand government forces at the point of fragmentation. One year is appropriate as it displays capacity to withstand sustained hostilities, and because changes to capacity after 1 year would likely be influenced by factors other than fragmentation. As we are only interested in the effect of fragmentation on creating veto players (influencing group viability), delimiting the necessary time frame to immediately after fragmentation avoids observing outcomes which are influenced by other causal factors. Fulfilling all three indicators, the groups are considered viable.

Regarding preference autonomy, differences along their conflict framing of in-group/out-group, their ideal polity, and/or territorial aspiration are identified, as these are the three ideological axes identified in our definition of preferences (Gade et al., 2019:2075). Notably, they must differ in only one aspect to be autonomous (Cunningham, 2011). To identify this, rebel manifestos and secondary research regarding rebel aims and demands are assessed, as these reveal ideological stances. For splinters, the cause of the splinter is also considered, as splinters often arise from disagreements over preferences (Duursma & Fliervoet, 2020).

Condition B: Outbidding To analyse the outbidding mechanism, this study asks: Do they engage in deed-based or discourse-based outbidding behaviours? And if so, did this result in radicalisation (preference divergence)?

Most comparative research conceives deed-based outbidding and radicalisation as observed escalation in violence (e.g. Bloom, 2004; Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour 2012; Lawrence, 2010). Consequently, 31 escalations of violence against the state and escalations in inter-rebel violence are indicators. This is assessed via the UCDP and other secondary data. Regarding discourse-based outbidding, rebel criticisms of rivals and/or peace processes (Maney et al., 2006) and investments in propaganda (Lilja, 2012) are indicators, as these signify attempts to posit oneself as the ‘true representative’ through manipulation of emotional narratives. The establishment of parallel governance is also an indicator, as research finds that groups implement governance to legitimise their claims of authority (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017; Mampilly, 2011). As outbidding behaviours may vary across cases, any combination of these is considered evidence of outbidding. However, for escalatory outbidding to be present, the groups must be perceived to react vis a vis the other. As such, their behaviours must mirror one another (e.g. violence met with violence). Consequently, where there are only low levels of outbidding (i.e. one-sided outbidding) which do not result in escalations vis a vis the other, escalatory outbidding is considered not present.

As with preference autonomy, preference divergence is assessed along conflict framing of in-group v out- group, their conception of the ideal polity, and/or territorial aspirations (Gade et al., 2019:2075), by looking at rebel manifestos and demands, based on primary and secondary sources. If there are significant changes, divergence, meaning movements in stance away from one's opposition, can be assessed by comparing the three axes with that of their opponents. Significant differences in at least one area will signify divergence. Increasingly indiscriminate violence is also considered, although is not necessary nor sufficient, as it represents altering perceptions of acceptable targets of violence, signifying a narrowing perception of in-grouping/out-grouping. Based on relative assessment, preference divergence is measured along an ordinal scale of ‘none’, ‘limited’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high’, relative to each other.

Timeframe To compare cases systematically, this thesis measures the variables of interest for 10 years after rebel fragmentation, or until a settlement is reached. This is an appropriate timeframe as escalatory outbidding is not an instantaneous process, but rather develops over time. Similarly, peace processes typically take years, and so longer timeframes are required to adequately capture its success or failure.

This paper does not consider fragmentation from founding, but rather from when nascent groups become ‘active’ parties in conflict (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). In other words, when there are at least 25 battle-related deaths associated with that actor in a single year (ibid.). This is because this study is interested in fragmentation within conflict, and how it influences the likelihood 32 of any and/or all of them reaching a settlement. Consequently, organisations which have formed but are not yet conflicting parties are not relevant to the analysis. Furthermore, many competitive mechanisms theorised to result in outbidding occur only after conflict entry, for instance competition over recruitment pools and arms. The effect of this decision on the analysis is discussed under ‘Limitations and Biases’.

Validity, Reliability, and Source Material To ensure measurement validity, indicators were operationalised based on prior research. As many concepts are ‘thick’, assessing multiple indicators ensures they are captured accurately. To ensure reliability and replicability, this thesis is transparent regarding its research design and method of analysis. Limitations regarding validity and reliability are discussed in ‘Limitations and Biases’.

This study relies on primary sources, including manifestos and peace agreements, and secondary sources, including reports by non-governmental organisations, government agencies, think-tanks, and academic research. Using a variety of sources is necessary to avoid bias due to under-reporting and ensure valid interpretation of the events. Differences in data availability between cases presents difficulties for the reliability of the study and is discussed in ‘Limitations and Biases’.

To ensure data is trustworthy, source provenance is closely examined to preclude biases from tainting the analysis. For instance, Woldemariam (2011:40) argues that some authors promote a “stylized narrative about [the EPLF’s] virtue”. Consequently, sources were treated with caution and data was triangulated to ensure reliability. Regarding secondary sources, this study relies on research organisations whose methodology is known and well-respected where possible.

Structure of Analysis First, the case empirics are detailed, guided by the SFC questions. Second, the cases are analysed and cross-case comparisons drawn. Limitations and biases within the study, and alternative theories, are then discussed. Finally, this paper concludes with a summary of findings, implications, and areas for future research.

IV. Case Empirics

This section details the empirics for the four cases. Each case experienced rebel movement fragmentation, but only the Philippines and Uganda witnessed a peace agreement between the Government and a rebel group. To begin, the cases and rebel groups are summarised below:

Case Rebel Groups

Philippines Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (1990-1996) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Uganda Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) (1986-1988) Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA)

Ethiopia Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (1973-1983) Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLF)

Afghanistan Movement of the Islamic Revolution (Harakat-i Inqilab) (1980-1990) Islamic Party of Afghanistan (HIG) Islamic Party of Afghanistan - Khalis faction (HIG-Khalis) Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF) Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA) National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) Figure 6. Rebel Groups

Case I: Philippines (1990 - 1996) The Philippines’ Mindanao conflict began in 1972, when the MNLF began fighting the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in the name of Moro self-determination. This was sparked by the 1968 Jabidah Massacre, in which 28 Muslim army recruits were killed by their Christian commanders (Conciliation Resources, 1999). In the late 70’s, the MILF splintered from the MNLF, however they remained inactive for some years. In 1986, they conducted their first attack, they became an ‘active’ in the conflict in 1990 (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). In 1996, the Jakarta Accord was signed between the GRP and MNLF.

Fragmentation of the Moro Resistance The two groups, as indicated by their names, mobilised around the identity of the Moro people, a minority group who make up ~10-14% of the Filipino population (Bell & Utley, 2015; MCPA, 2012). They are the predominantly Muslim inhabitants in the southern Philippines’ Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions (UCDP, 2021l;2021n). The group have long-suffered discrimination and marginalisation, under Spanish colonialism, facing forced conversions to Catholicism, and later, at the hands of the post-independence central government (Asia Foundation, 2017:147). The two groups pursued goals linked to this Moro identity and their struggle. In 1972, the MNLF began hostilities with the aim of establishing the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation), seeking secession from the Philippines and the establishment of an independent Moro state. The MILF similarly contextualised its armed struggle within the plight of the Moro people. In the 70’s and early 80s, the group advertised themselves as a moderate alternative to the MNLF, willing to accept regional autonomy (ibid.). Notably, this goal later changed to secession.

In line with their aims, both recruited from the Moro peoples. It is pertinent to note that the Moro are not a single ethnic group. Rather, ‘Moro’ is an umbrella term that encompasses 13 Muslim ethno- linguistic groups, each with their own histories, culture, and language (MRGI, 2015; Malan & Solomon; 2012). The Maguindanao, Marino, and Tausug, are the largest and constitute the vast majority (MRGI, 2015). Notably, each group draws from different ethnic groups, with the MILF being predominantly Maguindanao and Maranao (Asia Foundation, 2017:148), whilst the MNLF derived most of its support from Tausug (Malan & Solomon, 2012:62). Despite this, the historical narratives surrounding, and political claims for, Moro resistance appear to center around the Moro identity as a collective, rather than focusing on its constituent ethno-linguistic parts (Gisselquist & McDoom, 2015). Consequently, despite drawing on different ethnic groups, they still share a singular identity.

Despite their shared identity, there was little cooperation between them, nor did they share hierarchical superiors. Following their split, the MNLF was led by Nur Misuari, whilst the MILF was led by Hashim Salamat (UCDP, 2021l;2021n). The two groups also engaged in peace talks with the Government separately (Buendia, 2004; Flores, 2019).

Overall, it is clear that the MNLF and MILF represented independent rebel groups within a larger fragmented movement for Moro self-determination.

Veto Players To determine how fragmentation of the Moro resistance affected the number of veto players, internal cohesion, viability, and preferences are assessed.

Internal Cohesion The structures of both groups display an exceedingly high level of organisational capacity. The MNLF was centralised, with the leader Misuari wielding most power (MMO, 2019a). Alongside him were a committee of 13 members who assisted in operational and strategic decisions (ibid.). The group was divided into sections, including a military wing, a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, and a National Congress (ibid.). In contrast, the MILF adopted a consultative “collective leadership” structure wherein strategic decisions were informed by consultation both with its members and civilians (MMO, 2019b). Like the MNLF, the MILF had an executive central committee of religious and political elites who governed key areas such as Islamic and Military Affairs. Other bodies included its judiciary, the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal, and its legislative, the Consultative Council (ibid.).

Both groups also had remarkably consistent leadership over the years. Misuari was the founding leader and chairman of the MNLF from its birth in 1969 to 1996, almost 30 years later, when the MNLF signed the Jakarta Accord with the GRP and demobilised (Stern, 2012). Similarly, the MILF was led by Salamat from its inception until his death in 2005 (Caculitan, 2005: 49).

Neither group engaged in significant levels of lethal infighting. However, the MNLF did suffer a secondary splinter in 1991, forming the Abu Sayyaf Group (MMO, 2018). Whilst certainly indicative of lacking cohesion, the splinter involved a very small number of fighters, and thus does not signify broad organisational problems.

Overall, a holistic assessment determines that both groups had sufficient internal cohesion to overcome collective action problems.

Viability In the 1990’s, both the MNLF and MILF had the capacity to engage in significant hostilities with the GRP. Both had substantial numbers, which this study has quantified as ‘large’ (Large = >10,0000). The MNLF’s numbers were approximately 10,000-15,000 (UCDP, 2021n). On the other hand, whilst the MILF began with comparatively fewer (~3,000), this quickly increased to 10-20,000 as the group embarked on an ambitious 5-year plan to increase forces to 180,000 by 1995 (UCDP, 2021l).

During this time, the MNLF was attacking the government in a “sporadic manner” which led some observers to believe the group had ‘lost steam’ (Grusha & Weis, 2020: 4). In fact, the MNLF did not exceed 25 battle-related deaths in any year after 1993 (UCDP, 2021n). Regardless, the viability of a group is not judged by their ‘active’ hostilities, but rather by their capacity to do so. Given the group's history of low-intensity guerilla tactics, it seems likely that the ability of the group to engage in hostilities had not declined (ibid.). By contrast, the MILF increased their use of violence over the 1990s, continually resulting in over 25-battle related deaths per year, highlighting their ongoing ability to sustain hostilities against the GRP (UCDP, 2021l).

Regarding resources, the MNLF was not self-reliant. According to Testerman’s (2012:142) thorough analysis of MNLF financing, they relied completely on external support to enable their operations. Over the years, the MNLF failed to establish or exhibit any effective control of territory (Grusha & Weis, n.d:5), precluding any effective domestic financing such as taxation or extraction of resources. Indeed, there are almost no accounts of MNLF “efforts to exploit internal sources of finances” (Testerman, 2012:140), and what little donations they received were inconsequential (Yegar, 2002:273). Rather, the group were entirely reliant on external aid for cash, food, medicine, and weapons, primarily from Gadhafi’s Libya (ibid.). Without this support, the group would have been unable to continue hostilities.

On the other hand, whilst the MILF had previously received funding from donors including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan (Caculitan, 2005:4; Abuza, 2005:453), by the early 1990s, the MILF had stopped receiving support, and established self-reliance through domestic sources of funding (MMO, 2019; Abuza, 2005:453). The rapid growth of the MILF in the early 1990s had resulted in the establishment of several permanent camps, at least two of which, Camp Abubakar and Camp Bushra, were de-facto municipalities covering both residential and commercial areas wherein they collected 37 zakat (religious taxes) (May, 2001:269; Franco, 2016; Vitug & Gloria 2000:129; McKenna 1998:229). From these bases, the MILF also developed the local agricultural economy, feeding their troops and trading excess with commercial centers (Franco, 2016). Illicit sources of funding included extortion and racketeering, including ‘protection’ and checkpoint fees in and around its territory (ibid.).

In summary, both the MNLF and MILF had substantial military capabilities which would have allowed them to continue engaging in hostilities against the government. However, the MNLF was dependent on Libya to support its activities, and consequently, cannot be considered an independently viable actor.

Autonomous Preferences Establishing the preferences of the two groups are, at times, confusing as both groups have vacillated between vying for autonomy and full independence at varying points in their histories. However, in 1990, the MNLF demanded autonomy (Paul et al.,2013), hoping to re-negotiate and implement the failed 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which had outlined a system of 13 independent municipalities under Moro self-determination. By contrast, the MILF were rejecting compromise and demanded full independence of the Bangsamoro (Malan & Solomon, 2012: 60).

Notably, their ideal polity differed, reflected by the MNLF’s emphasis on ethnic nationalism versus the MILF’s Islamic revivalism (Project on Violent Conflict. 2015). On one hand, the MNLF was a secular organisation, who emphasised nationalist narratives of a shared homeland and shared experiences of oppression as justification for self-determination (MMO, 2015; Keister, 2011:141). In line with this, they hoped to build a secular, autonomous state - Muslim only in name. On the other hand, influenced by Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi, the MILF adopted a distinctly Islamist stance, indicated by their name (ibid.). As such, Salamat emphasised Islamic values, explicitly detailing his desire to create an independent Islamic state (Niksch, 2002:2; Salamat, 1985:8-9)

The groups also differed in their ambitions for social reform. The MNLF was bound by the need to appeal to its older, more conservative membership, despite being compelled towards social reform by its key supporter, Libya’s Gadhafi (Keister, 2011:148-9). Resultantly, their proposed reforms were moderate, and generally supported the status quo. In comparison, the MILF were decisively radical, desiring to upend established social hierarchies, emboldened by egalitarian values (ibid.:158). 38

In summary, it is clear that the two groups were internally cohesive and had autonomous preferences. Whilst the MILF was also viable, making it a veto player, the MNLF was not, as it was dependent on external funding from Libya. Consequently, the MNLF is not a veto player.

A Case of One-Sided, Non-Escalatory Outbidding An examination of their activities throughout the 1990s reveals a story of one-sided, non-escalatory outbidding. In response to the MILF’s entrance into conflict in 1990, the MNLF did not radicalise, but rather, the group displayed a willingness to negotiate, and in 1992, the MNLF opened bi-lateral negotiations with the GRP, mediated by Libya, the OIC, and Indonesia (May, 2001:269). In response to the peace process, the MILF continuously escalated attacks against the GRP until 1997, targeting the military, politicians, and crucial infrastructure (UCDP, 2021l; Brandt, 2020:77; Cohn, 2007:20).

Whilst pre-negotiation talks between the MILF and GRP took place in 1992, these did not develop into official proceedings (May, 2001:270), and overall, the MILF remained staunchly opposed to engaging in negotiations with the GRP. This obstinate approach won the MILF significant support amongst their constituency, and many MNLF members defected to their ranks between 1992-1996 (MMO, 2019). Despite this, the MILF and MNLF did not engage in fratricidal violence with one another.

Despite the growing support for the MILF amongst the MNLF’s support base, the MNLF did not respond in an escalatory manner or renege on their willingness to negotiate with the GRP. This is not to say that incidences of violence against the government or civilians did not occur - they did - but they occurred at an individual or platoon level and were not part of the MNLF’s overall strategies (Harish, 2005). In fact, after 1993 the group never again exceeded 25-battle related deaths per year.

The MILF also engaged in discourse-based outbidding in an attempt to legitimise their position as leader of the Moro people, at the expense of the MNLF. Since 1984, the OIC has recognised the MNLF as the “sole and legitimate representative” of the Moro (Flores, 2019:51). To combat these claims, during the 1990s, the MILF established parallel governance whilst claiming to “liberate” civilians from the control of the GRP (MMO, 2019). The MILF also engaged in performative governance such as producing marriage/birth certificates, and identification cards, previously 39 unfulfilled by the GRP and MNLF, significantly raising their popularity (McKenna, 1998). The MILF also used its Islamic credentials to justify claims of rightful authority over the Moros - a predominantly Muslim people (MMO, 2019). They established Islamic governance, judicial systems, and invested in propagandist religious and political education (PVC, 2015). Whilst the Moro’s Islamic practices were traditionally moderate, including many folk-traditions, the population still strongly identifies as Muslim (Keister, 2011: 133). Consequently, whilst some resisted abandoning their folk-based traditions, the group achieved broad support, and generally the population respected the group's Islamic stance (ibid.:165).

The MNLF made limited, weak attempts to counter the MILF’s legitimation strategies. Throughout speeches during the peace talks, the MNLF referred to their “moral courage” (MNLF, 1995; Flores, 2019), “commitment to peace and to our people” (MNLF, 1996a; Flores, 2019), and described peace as the “greatest gift” they could give to the Moro’s (MNLF, 1996b; Flores, 2019). Beyond this, however, they did not react to the MILF’s outbidding strategies.

In line with theoretical expectations, as escalatory outbidding did not take place, both groups' ideal polity and territorial aspirations remained static over the period. The MNLF continued to vie for autonomy, whilst the MNLF demanded secession. However, the MILF did increase its attacks against the civilian Christian population, although this was limited (Keister, 2011:166). Whilst indicative of changing conflict framing, notably, attempts by ASG to join the MILF were unsuccessful, as the MILF requested they renounce their indiscriminate violence (Domingo, 1995:84). This suggests that the MILF’s conflict framing, conception of in-grouping/out-grouping, had not radicalised significantly as the central command did not accept indiscriminate violence. Overall, there is no evidence of significant radicalisation in the years 1990-2000, nor was there a significant increase in the number of demands. Consequently, it is assessed that preference divergence did not occur.

Ostensibly, the lack of escalatory outbidding by the MNLF appears at odds with the theoretical expectations of outbidding. However, recalling that the MNLF was not an independent veto player, the MNLF’s impetus for engaging in negotiations, rather than outbidding, becomes clear. The MNLF was deeply dependent on Libya for support, however, in the early 1990s, international pressure had mounted against Ghaddafi to cease his global support of militants (Abuza, 2016:72). In particular, the 1991 Pan Am disaster, in which Libyan-linked agents were responsible for the bombing of a plane, 40 had heightened international pressure. As a result, Libya revoked its support for the conflict, and consequently, “arms to the MNLF dried up” (ibid.). In February 1992, understanding the significance of Libya in swaying the MNLF’s preferences, Ramos conducted a track-two diplomatic visit to Tripoli in an attempt to persuade Ghaddafi to apply pressure to the MNLF. It was successful, and within months, forced by the withdrawal of support and the ensuing MNLF- GRP stalemate, the group were compelled to engage in negotiations (ibid.). This is corroborated by statements from former MNLF members who stated that the primary reason they signed the Jakarta Accord was fear of ‘isolation’ from their external support.

The 1996 Jakarta Accord The Jakarta Accord was signed in September 1996, four years after the peace process began. It was a published document that marked the culmination of consensual talks between the MNLF and the GRP, signed by both (Jakarta Accord, 1996). The conflict's incompatibility was ‘territory’ (UCDP/PRIO-ACD), and as noted the MNLF demanded autonomy. The accord addressed this by defining the development of the new Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Jakarta Accord, 1996). The accord also included socio-economic development programmes, and military and political power sharing provisions (ibid.).

The MILF rejected the peace agreement from the outset, vowing to continue the insurgency (Jarstad et al., 2015:12), and their ranks swelled with MNLF members who were unhappy with the deal (Calculitan, 2005:1-2). Despite this, the peace agreement led to dyadic peace between the MNLF and GRP, proving stable against the backdrop of heightened violence by its co-ethnic peers in the years following.

Summary In summary, the MNLF and MILF represented a fragmented movement linked to the Moro identity and their pursuit of self-determination. However, whilst the MILF quickly established self-reliance, the MNLF were dependent on Libyan support. Resultantly, the MNLF was not an independent veto player. Recognising this explains why the MNLF did not engage in escalatory outbidding to counter the MILF’s legitimation strategies, and preferences did not diverge. Unable to continue hostilities without Libyan support, and facing pressure to end the conflict, the MILF had little choice but to negotiate with the GRP, culminating in the 1996 Jakarta Accord.

Case II: Uganda (1986 - 1988 ) The HSM and UPDA were formed and became ‘active’ in 1986, as rebels fighting against the Ugandan Government and its army, the National Resistance Army (NRA). In 1986, shortly before their formation, the NRA had successfully seized the Ugandan capital, Kampala, from the hands of President Obote and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) (HRW, 2003). The HSM and the UPDA emerged from the defeated remnants of the UNLA and fought against the newly established Government in a short-lived rebellion. By 1988, just two years later, the UPDA had signed the Pece Agreement with the Government of Uganda.

Fragmentation of the Acholi Resistance Both the HSM and UPDA mobilised their identity around the plight of the Acholi people, a predominantly Christian ethno-linguistic group based in Northern Uganda (UCDP, 2021h;2021p). The place of the Acholi people in Uganda’s post-independence history is tumultuous. Following independence from the United Kingdom, the Acholi had enjoyed significant power. Obote, the first post-independence leader, relied heavily on the support of the Acholi and Lango in government and UNLA (MRGI, 2015; Schulz, 2020; Gersony, 1997:9). In 1971, Idi Amin, originating in the West Nile region, successfully seized power from Obote in a coup (ibid.). Following this, Amin began a murderous purge of the armed forces, police, and elites of its Acholi and Langi - believing them to be loyal to Obote (World Peace Foundation, 2019; Otunnu, 2009; MAR, 2004). Following Tanzanian intervention, Obote once again seized power in 1979 (Schulz, 2020). However, in 1986, Museveni and the NRA seized power, once again ending a period of Acholi dominance. Following this, the Acholi feared a repeat of Amin’s genocidal violence (Day, 2011:448). Furthermore, there were widespread fears that Museveni’s ascent to power would result in a backlash against the Acholi population as revenge for the human rights abuses that had been committed by the Acholi-dominated UNLA (HRW, 2003). It is from this context, the loss of Acholi power, that the HSM and the UPDA both emerged. According to the FORGE dataset, both aimed to seize power and ensure Acholi representation (Braithwaite et al., 2020).

In line with this aim, both groups drew the majority of their members from the Acholi (HRW, 2003). Initially, these were former UNLA soldiers, however, this soon grew to include recruits from Acholi civilians who feared reprisals from the NRA . The UPDA also drew support amongst exiled Acholi politicians and Obote supporters (ibid.). 42

The groups did not share leadership. The HSM led by Alice Lakwena, whilst the UPDA was led by Justine Odong Latek, a former-UNLA Brigadier (UCDP, 2021p). Furthermore, the groups did not share operations, although Lakwena did receive some arms from the UPDA when the HSM first formed (Allen, 1991).

In summary, it is clear they represented a fragmented movement which mobilised around the Acholi identity.

Veto Players To determine how fragmentation of the Acholi resistance affected the number of veto players, internal cohesion, viability, and preferences are assessed.

Internal Cohesion The organisational structures of the HSM and UPDA display sufficient levels of cohesion that allowed them to act as unitary groups. The HSM relied on centralised hierarchical delegation, with Lakwena as its Chairman. Within its military structure, the HSM had a dedicated Frontline Coordination Team (FCT) and War Mobilisation Committee (WMC), which were responsible for civilian relations and coordination (Behrend, 2000). The FCT was further divided into a number of divisions, including finances, medicine/health, logistics, moral/political education, and records (ibid.). In contrast, the UPDA was not a centralised nor deeply organised group. It contained a number of distinct factions, each with disparate factional leadership (Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22). Despite this, the group generally acted as a unitary movement under the auspices of Odong Latek, with central command controlling strategic, although not operational, decisions (ibid.)

Further, whilst both groups were certainly short-lived, their leadership remained consistent. Lakwena led the HSM from its inception in 1986 until its defeat in 1988. Accounts of Lakwena suggest she enjoyed extremely strong support on account of her charisma and dogmatic narratives, inspiring zeal that was reminiscent of messianic cults (Kassimeris, 2016:82; Gersony, 1997:25; Allen, 1991:396). On the other hand, the UPDA was led by Latek from its inception in 1986 until the signing of the 1988 Pece Agreement (Lewis, 2020:71). There is comparatively little written about Latek and presumably he did not hold the same demagogue status as his contemporary. Regardless, his continuing hold on 43 the group’s factions, at least until the signing of the Pece Agreement, suggests his leadership was consistent - if brief.

The two groups did not engage in significant infighting during the period, nor did they splinter during the time frame under study.

Overall, the indicators suggest that the UPDA and HSM were sufficiently cohesive to overcome collective action problems.

Viability Both the UPDA and HSM had troops estimated around 2,000 in 1997, leading this study to assess their strength as moderate at the beginning of their rebellion (Medium = 1,000-10,000) (UCDP, 2021h;2021p). This suggests both groups had access to adequate manpower.

According to the UCDP/PRIO-ACD he UPDA and HSM were ‘active’ conflicting parties in both 1986 and 1987, thus sustaining hostilities for more than one year (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The UPDA’s capacity to sustain hostilities, at least initially, is highlighted by what Day (2011:440) described as their “brief yet intense rebellion”. The UPDA succeeded in a number of battles against the NRA, asserting themselves throughout the Northern Uganda, and successfully compelling NRA forces to retreat from small towns and rural areas to larger urban districts (ibid.; Allen, 1991:371; Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:14). Similarly, the HSM enjoyed several victories against the Government in 1986, and the rebellion initially posed a ‘potent’ threat to the NRA (Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22). Buoyed by successes and growing ranks, the group advanced across Uganda southwards towards Kampala.

Regarding access to resources, both groups relied on civilians. HSM had a predatory, although not necessarily coercive, method of resource extraction, as it travelled the length of Uganda. They relied on civilian donations and loans of cash, livestock, and fuel gathered by the WMC (Berhrend, 2000). These activities appear to have been successful, with Berhrend (2000) reporting that it was not unheard of for Acholi and Langi families to relinquish entire livestock to the group. This was reportedly driven by widespread fear of the NRA, who violently stole livestock, and a desire to receive reward after the promise of victory (ibid.) The group also attempted to utilise agriculture, although these attempts 44 ultimately failed. The UPDA adopted similar tactics, often relying on livestock loans or donations, of which excess was sold in Sudan in exchange for arms and ammunition (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:12; Gersony, 1997: 27).

Overall, based on their force numbers, patterns of early victories, and access to resources, both groups appeared to be sufficiently viable at the beginning of their rebellions.

Autonomous Preferences Whilst both groups aimed to overthrow Museveni and seize power, their ideal polity differed. Notably, HSM was fundamentally spiritual in nature. Drawing on traditional spiritual discourses, combined with Christianity, Lakwena claimed to be an ajwaka (spirit medium) and nebi (prophet) who had been instructed to defeat the Government, who were the corporeal embodiment of evil (Allen, 1991). Consequently, HSM’s ideal polity was Lakwena as the spiritual and political leader of Uganda (ibid.), with the 10 commandments as the constitution (Braithwraite et al., 2019).

This contrasts with the suggestively democratic ambitions of the UPDA, who stated their goal was to “‘vindicate the right of the people from all parts of the country to participate in government” (Omara- Otunnu, 1992:456). In 1987, they elaborated on their aims, claiming that they were fighting against the “violation of the [failed] 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord, human rights abuses by the NRA in Acholi, NRM communist dictatorship and foreign elements of Rwandan refugees in the NRA and government” (Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22).

In summary, at the beginning of their rebellions, the HSM and UPDA were sufficiently cohesive, viable, and had autonomous preferences. As such, fragmentation increased the number of veto players.

The Fatal Effects of Outbidding It is clear that the HSM and UPDA competed for support within the Acholi community, as is exhibited through their lethal outbidding. As aptly stated Mamdani (1988:1170), “it is instructive that the first major battles fought by the HSM were not against the NRA but against the UPDA over the question of who was to lead the peasants of Acholiland”. Primarily, inter-group fighting occurred for control of rural areas and access to weapons (Allen, 1991:374). For instance, after convincing several UPDA 45 commanders to provide her with arms, Lakwena soon applied lethal force against UPDA members who refused to accept her leadership (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:15; Van Acker, 2004:347).

The escalatory fratricidal violence between the two groups had a significant negative effect on their viability. The UPDA was soon weakened and demoralised, resulting in a number of defections (Gersony 1997:25; Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22). Reportedly, UPDA forces became extremely fearful of the HSM’s troops, trading stories of their and Lakwena’s mythical powers, even when the UPDA were frequently victorious (Allen, 1991:372). By the end of 1987, the capacity of both groups had diminished to deleterious consequences. Sensing weakness in the opposition, the NRA seized the opportunity to co-opt the UPDA (Gersony, 1997:26). In June 1987, the government offered amnesty to soldiers who abandoned fighting and began peace negotiations with Odong Latek and senior UPDA officers (ibid.). On the other hand, by the time the HSM reached Jinja, 80 miles from the capital, the group was “over-extended” and in “increasingly hostile territory” and were defeated here in November 1987 (Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22).

Other aspects of the conflict also contributed to the groups’ weakening. For instance, the UPDA faced shortages of supplies combined with increased NRA offensives (Nyeko & Lucima, 2002:22). The bizarre tactics of the HSM, including the belief that shea butter oil made them invincible against bullets, resulted in the quick decimation of forces. Despite this, the HSM managed to continue through much of Uganda by continual recruitment of new members - the deaths of former members explained away by insisting they were practicing Lakwena’s commandments improperly (Allen, 1991:377). But whilst both groups' diminishing capacity can, in part, be blamed on the offensives of the NRA or their questionable tactics, numerous accounts suggest that lethal outbidding between the two groups had a significant influence on their capacity.

Despite their competition for support, the two groups did not engage in discourse-based outbidding, including the establishment of Governance or management of civilian relations beyond predatory extraction. Whilst the UPDA did control large swathes of the countryside, they likely did not have the capacity (or perhaps the will) to engage in such activities (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999:15). On the other hand, the HSM preferred to act as roving bandits, exploiting civilians on their marching battle towards Kampala (ibid.).

Neither groups’ preferences diverged significantly following fragmentation. Whilst Lakwena’s message was “radical”, basing her claims of authority in spiritual discourse regarding the purification of the Acholi from evil, her preaching began in 1985 - appearing at least a year before the formation of the UPDA (Allen, 1991:376). Consequently, it is assessed that preference divergence did not occur.

It is likely that the lack of discourse-based outbidding and radicalisation simply signifies how short- lived each rebellion was. Evolution of preferences and establishing narratives are by nature long-term processes. By late 1987, their brief but violent insurgencies had largely run their course, reasonably before any long-term mechanisms could be witnessed.

The UPDA, on the other hand, displayed preference convergence. Originally hostile to Museveni’s Government, they engaged in negotiations with the regime from 1987 and later accepted a peace agreement that fell short of their initial aim, the removal of Museveni’s regime. This change appears to reflect their faltering veto status. Unable to maintain hostilities, having been decimated by lethal outbidding, the group had no choice but to accept peace with the government lest they be exterminated.

The 1988 Pece Agreement In 1988, the Pece Agreement was a published agreement signed between the UPDA and the Government of Uganda, following negotiations. The agreement addressed their incompatibility over ‘Government’ (UCDP/PRIO-ACD) (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002), and their demands for greater representation, by including terms for democratic elections (Pece Agreement, 1988). The agreement also included military power sharing, DDR, and socio-economic programmes for war-torn regions (ibid.). Whilst the document does partially address the conflict incompatibilities, namely power-imbalances and socioeconomic marginalisation, it is important to note that the peace agreement did not arise from general reconciliation between the Acholi and Government. Rather, facing devastation of their forces and falling willpower, accepting peace with the NRA became a more attractive alternative than continuing a ruinous conflict.

Summary In summary, the UPDA and HSM mobilised around the Acholi identity with the aim of re-establishing Acholi power. Whilst both groups constituted veto players at the beginning of the conflict, lethal

47 outbidding between them quickly decimated their forces. Despite this, preference divergence was assessed as ‘none’. Rather, locked in a dual conflict, against the state and each other, Lakwena was soon defeated. The UPDA, by this time, were no longer a viable force and had ceased to be a veto- player. As a result, facing the threat of extermination, the UPDA moderated their preferences, resulting in preference convergence and the signing of the Pece Agreement in 1988.

Case III: Ethiopia (1973 - 1983) The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict was a secessionist conflict that originated in the Eritrean civil resistance movement of the 1950s. The ELF, formed in 1960, soon became the leading organisation of the resistance, and in 1964 began its armed rebellion against the Ethiopian government. The origins of the EPLF are found in 1970, when following internal discord, the EPLF splintered from the ELF and the two fought one another. In 1973, the group became an ‘active’ party against the Government of Ethiopia (UCDP, 2021d). In 1981, after years of inter-Eritrean hostilities, the EPLF successfully drove the ELF from the region and continued fighting unilaterally for Eritrean independence until 1991, when they proved victorious against the Ethiopian Government.

Fragmentation of the Eritrean Secessionist Movement As indicated by their names, both groups mobilised around the Eritrean identity. It is pertinent to note, however, that at this time the Eritrean identity was disputed (Oberst, 1980; Sorenson, 1991). Eritrea is a diverse region, including nine major ethno-linguistic groups, roughly split between Christians and Muslims (Hoyle, 1999). This diversity led some, including Ethiopians, to argue that Eritrea did not have sufficient claim for national identity (Sorenson, 1991; Woldemikeal, 1991:38). However, as Sorenson (1991) notes, such reasoning would similarly disbar any claims of an Ethiopian nationality. Regardless, the rise of Eritrean nationalist sentiment emphasised what they saw as the unique, distinctive regional culture and history (Krylov, 1990; Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011). According to the FORGE dataset, both the ELF and EPLF’s aims revolved around this nationalist identity, sharing the same core ambition - the secession of Eritrea (Braithwaite et al., 2020).

Their members differed somewhat, with the ELF drawing primarily from Muslim nomads (Kylov, 1990), whereas the EPLF was predominantly Christian (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011: 579). However, each group ultimately defined themselves as Eritrean, first and foremost. The EPLF in 48 particular denied any insinuation of religious undertones, emphasising that they were “liberation fighters, not missionaries of Christianity” (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011: 579)

Despite their shared goal, there was little cooperation between them, and their operations remained independent of one another (UCDP, 2021c; 2021d). Further, they did not share leadership. For the majority of the studied period, the ELF was led by Mohammad Nasser, whilst the EPLF was led by Ramadan Mohammed Nur and Isaias Afwerki (ibid.).

Overall, it is clear that the ELF and EPLF were independent groups which belonged to a fragmented movement that revolved around Eritrean identity and the desire for secession.

Veto Players To determine how fragmentation of the Eritrean resistance affected the number of veto players, internal cohesion, viability, and preferences are assessed.

Internal Cohesion The EPLF’s impressive bureaucratic and military capacity is well documented, described as “phenomenal” (Tesfagiorgis , 2015:3), “highly functional” (UCDP, 2021d), and like a “well-oiled machine” (Connell: 2001:345). The group’s chief executive body included 13 members, as part of a broader 37-member central committee (ibid.). The group was influenced by socialist models, and operational and strategic decisions were decided collectively, except in battle where the military commander had unchallenged authority. Its military wing was organised in the US-style of squads, platoons, companies, and battalions (2001:354)

By comparison, the ELF was a less stable and unitary organisation (UCDP, 2021c). Their structure was decentralised, with Zone Commanders controlling various regions, strategically led by the Supreme Council and Revolutionary Command (Tedla, 2014:75). However, a lack of effective communication between the Revolutionary Command and Zone Commanders meant that the latter often acted without the former’s consent in operational matters (ibid.:78). Strategically, however, the group maintained a generally united front.

The ELF was also constrained by infighting. For instance, in 1975, lethal infighting erupted in response to the election loss of Vice-Secretary General Herui (Woldemariam, 2016:149; Tedla, 2014:113). Furthermore, as the ranks of the ELF swelled with an increasing number of young Christian recruits, tensions with the older predominantly Muslim members, and disagreements over distributive weighting of congressional votes further ignited internal tensions (ibid.). But whilst infighting occurred, it did not result in the splintering of the group.

Both groups also had relatively stable leadership during the relevant period. Regarding the ELF, Nasser led the group from 1975-1982, i.e. for the majority of the studied period. Regarding the EPLF, Nur and Afwerki were founding leaders, and both remained central to the leadership committee throughout its history, as is evident by the accession of Afwerki as President of Eritrea following the EPLF’s victory and independence in 1991.

Overall, the ELF and EPLF were sufficiently internally cohesive to overcome collective action problems.

Viability The ELF and EPLF both posed viable threats to the Government of Ethiopia. Whilst, undoubtedly, the splintering of the EPLF had a negative effect on the ELF’s military capabilities, with mass desertions, the ELF did recover ranks and had numbers in the tens of thousands for the majority of the studied period (UCDP, 2021c). In particular, recruitment bloomed after 1975 as Christian recruitment swelled (Woldemariam, 2016: 148). Similarly, the EPLF quickly grew in strength from approximately 2,500 soldiers in 1974 to up to 15,000 in 1975 (ibid.:108). For this reason, this study considers each movement to be ‘large’ (Large = >10,000) and assesses that they each posed a formidable threat to the Government of Ethiopia. As Stewart (2021:102) notes, “their forces were comparable in size”.

Both groups spent extensive periods as ‘active’ conflicting parties, indicating their viability. The ELF remained active in every year until 1980, having first appeared in the UCDP/PRIO-ACD in 1964 (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020; Gleditsch et al., 2002). On the other hand, the EPLF was an active party in conflict in every year between 1973-1991, except 1974, when the group did not reach the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths but were still engaged in active hostilities (ibid.). 50

Regarding access to resources, the EPLF established control over large territories, engaging in quasi- state-like functions, garnering significant popularity and material support (Müller, 2010:794-795). This allowed them to become self-reliant in 1976, relinquishing support from Middle Eastern states (Jüde, 2020:101-102; Pool, 2001:98). They established food, clothing, and medical industries (Jüde, 2020:102), and raised funds through taxes and customs duties on the Sudan border (Pool, 2001:123). The EPLF also received substantial support from Eritrean diasporas, which they broadly encouraged through PR campaigns (Clapham, 2001:9; Hirt, 2013: 11 Jüde, 2020:102). Whilst diaspora support is a form of external funding, it is not linked to the preferences of an external government and therefore is not assessed as impacting their self-reliance.

Information on ELF sources of funding and resources are more difficult to find, although it appears they also had sufficient access to resources. In the late-1960’s, the group relied heavily on civilian extortion, donations, and loans for cash, food, and other resources (Stewart, 2021:118). In the 1970’s, the ELF established extensive governance systems, and relied on taxation to sustain their activities (Steward, 2021:118-120). Purportedly, the ELF also received funds from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, and China, although it is unclear how important these funds were (Tedla, 2014:71).

Overall, both groups constituted a viable threat to the government, based on their troop strength, extended engagements in hostilities, and access to domestic resources.

Autonomous Preferences Whilst both were secessionist (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011:582), leftist (Stewart, 2021:104) , and influenced by Chinese models of governance (Connell, 2001:348-349; Stewart, 2021:97), the scope of their ambitions with regard to their ideal polity varied. Whilst committed to a free and independent Eritrea, the ELF did not desire broad social change or upheaval of the status quo (Tseggai 1988:76). Their ambitions were limited by their conservative, older members who rejected the radical sweeping reforms proposed by their younger, Marxist members (Stewart, 2021:102).

The EPLF leadership, in contrast, was deeply committed to widespread political and social transformation from its birth (Connell, 2001; Stewart: 2021:103). In their Principles of the National Democratic Revolution, published in late 1972 (Pool, 2001:74), their model for the Eritrean state was 51 based on distinctly egalitarian values, and declared goals of upending pre-existing gender, economic, and colonial social hierarchies (Stewart, 2021:101). The group also criticised the ELF for “oppressing and dominating Christians”, the cause of their splinter, and called for religious equality (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011:579). For these reasons, the group is recognised as more radical than its predecessor (Connell, 2001:351; Stewart, 2021:98).

In summary, both the ELF and EPLF constituted veto players. Whilst the ELF was organisationally weaker, both were sufficiently cohesive to overcome collective action problems. Similarly, both were viable, with large forces and extensive resource collection methods, and had preferences which were autonomous from one another.

Outbidding and the Formation of the Eritrean Identity It is well documented that the ELF and EPLF competed for dominance over access to support, resources, for the role of leader of the Eritrean secessionist movement. By 1972, a year before the EPLF appeared as an ‘active’ conflicting party against the Government, fratricidal violence had already engulfed the movement (Saideman et al., 2005:18). As the ELF fragmented into three parts, the core- ELF declared war on the other two factions after failing to reunite them through punitive measures (Pischedda, 2020: UCDP, 2021c;2021d). The two rival ELF factions subsequently abandoned the organisation, joining forces to become an independent group, the EPLF. The First Eritrean Civil War continued from 1972-1974, when Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted in a coup d’état by the military junta known as the Dergue, and the groups held a ceasefire, formalised in May 1975 (Tedla, 2014:108). Whilst lessened, clashes did occur sporadically throughout the 1970s (Stewart, 2016)

Now primarily facing the Dergue, reports suggest that violence between Ethiopia and the Eritrean Secessionists increased significantly. However, without disaggregated data it is unclear whether they acted in an escalatory manner vis a vis the other. In contrast to the brutal and indiscriminate violence administered by Ethiopian forces, both movements reportedly tried to limit civilian casualties and avoided urban warfare (CCR, 2010:7; Erlich, 1983:58; Stewart, 2016:144). This suggests that their perception of acceptable targets did not radicalise significantly during this period.

But the quest for dominance was not limited to lethal methods, with both groups engaging in discourse-based outbidding. In particular, the EPLF strove to create a new Eritrean identity based on 52 egalitarian values and inclusivity. In doing so, they openly critiqued the ELF, particularly regarding their treatment of Christians (Saideman et al., 2005:18). For example, their 1973 manifesto, ‘Our Struggle and Its Goals’, criticised “the divisive ethnic and sectarian antagonisms” of the ELF’s ideals and strategy (ibid.:19). Their open derision of the ELF’s divisive politics, such as their Zonal Command, and their emphasis on inclusivity drew many to their cause and is partially responsible for their popularity. In response, in 1975, the ELF released their own manifesto, which mirrored much of the EPLF’s earlier document, for instance, emphasising that the “national unity of the Eritrean People'' was a “central objective” (ELF, 1975:30), and calling for more egalitarian values, including women’s rights, equal opportunities, and the safeguarding of religious freedoms (ELF, 1975:30-34). Threatened by the popularity of the EPLF, the ELF was forced to abandon its previously sectarian politics in favour of a distinctly ‘Eritrean’ discourse. Notably, they also advanced a clearer and more decisive plan for the proposed Eritrean state than the EPLF, detailing their social, political, and economic plans (Stewart, 2021: 108). In response, the EPLF released their ‘National Democratic Programme’ in 1977 - this time, more detailed, and mirroring the ELF’s plans for democratic elections and regulations for protection from discrimination (EPLF, 1977: 23; Stewart; 2021:110).

Both groups also established parallel governance to legitimise their authority. For instance, the EPLF established public services, including schools and hospitals, often in rural areas previously untouched by Ethiopian governance (Hjalmarsson, 2020; Pool, 2001: 105). Curriculums and medical programmes were politically driven and emphasised the concept of Eritrean rights (ibid). They also engaged civilians through consultative assemblies and encouraged civilian associations (Saideman & Dougherty, 2005:19), legitimising claims that they were fighting a “national and democratic struggle” (Hjalmarsson, 2020:154). Overall, these programmes were highly successful and inspired both loyalty and support amongst their constituents (Saideman et al., 2005:19). As aptly put by Rei (2009:210-11), by engaging in successful governance, the EPLF succeeded in claiming “moral as well as military firepower”. By comparison, ELF governance was less efficient and broad, and was at times merely performative (Stewart, 2021:118-120; Saideman et al., 2005:19; 1997:88). However, evidence suggests the ELF competed to establish governance (Stewart, 2021:133). For instance, despite operating for many years prior, the ELF only began establishing governance systems when the EPLF did. Furthermore, over the years, “the EPLF typically introduced governance initiatives” with the “ELF follow[ing] suit” (Stewart, 2021:133; Sherman, 1980:98).

Crucially, both groups’ engagement in escalatory discourse-based outbidding fomented the creation and deepening of a previously disputed Eritrean national identity, built on egalitarian values and a rejection of the “Dergue’s Colonialist Lies” (EPLF, 1977). In essence, driven by the other, they constructed a national identity that was “impervious to social, ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological divisions” (Pool 2001:55), and consequently was far stronger than what had existed before. In other words, their conflict framing, and sense of in-group/out-group had now become clearly defined. Now whilst this represents preference convergence between the ELF and EPLF, it represents radicalisation and preference divergence in the conflict with Ethiopia. Recalling that radicalisation is not a comment of the values themselves, but rather about whether they represent centrifugal movements in relation to the opposing parties’ preferences, the escalating construction of the Eritrean national identity, and thus the bolstering of independence as a national ambition, were clearly in direct opposition to the preferences of Ethiopia and thus constitute preference divergence. Based on this, preference divergence is assessed as ‘moderate’.

The effect of this preference divergence soon became visible. In 1978, both the EPLF and ELF were struggling under what President Mengistu termed the “total people’s war” (CCR, 2010:6). As a result, both had agreed to enter into negotiations (The Washington Post, 1978). However, despite a number of rounds, all proved unsuccessful (The New York Times, 1989) as both groups were unwavering in that they could only accept “the right of self-determination for the Eritrean People” (The Washington Post, 1978). Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia declined.

The Defeat of the ELF and Continuing War In 1980, lethal outbidding between them ignited once more, and they became embroiled in a conflict known as the Second Eritrean Civil War. By the late 70’s, the EPLF had emerged as the leading player of the Eritrean movement, and they accused the ELF of secretly negotiating with the Dergue - a charge they denied (Girardet, 1982). Regardless, the ELF found itself stuck in a lethal dual contest between the Government of Ethiopia and the EPLF. Ravaged by fighting from both sides, the group was weakened (Greenhill & Krause, 2018:14), and after a decade of sporadic intra-Eritrean fighting, the EPLF succeeded in driving the ELF from Eritrea in 1981 (UCDP, 2021d).

With the ELF defeated, the EPLF maintained control of the Eritrean narrative. Bound by their earlier conviction, the EPLF continued to fight against the Government of Ethiopia, eventually winning de 54 facto independence in 1991. This was shortly followed by de jure independence in 1993, after a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN (Ahmed, 2015:174).

Summary In summary, the ELF and EPLF constituted independent veto players within a fragmented Eritrean secessionist movement. Both groups engaged escalatory outbidding, including both lethal and discourse-based strategies. Notably, this resulted in ‘moderate’ preference divergence, through the development of the nationalist Eritrean identity and the entrenching the movement's ambitions for independence. These goals served as the impetus for decades of Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, and despite several attempts at negotiations, the EPLF never wavered in their goal, leading to the eventual defeat of Ethiopia in 1991.

Case IV: Afghanistan (1980 - 1990) The Movement of the Islamic Revolution (Harakat-i Inqilab), Islamic Party of Afghanistan (HIG), Islamic Party of Afghanistan - Khalis faction (HIG-Khalis), Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA), and National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) all appear as ‘active’ parties in conflict against the Soviet-backed Government of Afghanistan in 1980.

The six, plus one other, soon became known as the Mujahideen, fighting against the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) who had seized power in a 1973 coup d’état. The Soviets eventually withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, however, the conflict continued until 1992, when the opposition succeeded in removing the incumbent government from power. Whilst many refer to the war as the Soviet-Afghan war, suggesting it was an inter-state conflict, the conflict is logged as an ‘internationalised intrastate conflict’ within the UCDP/PRIO-ACD. Here, the PDPA and Soviet Union can be understood as a unitary player up until Soviet retreat in 1989.

Fragmentation of the Afghan Resistance All the groups mobilised around an Islamic Afghan identity, with shared origins in the Islamic intellectual context of Kabul University in the 1950’s (Giustozzi, 2010; Johnson, 2018:6). As such, all the groups posited Sunni Islamist identities and ideologies (FORGE) (Braithwaite et al., 2020), although some were more conservative than others (Giustozzi, 2010; Johnson, 2018:6). Furthermore, 55 they all shared the goal of overthrowing the PDPA, and installing an Islamic Sunni government in its place (FORGE) (Braithwaite et al., 2020; Rahman, 1988:19).

Most shared a predominantly Pashtun tribal base, although with small differences (HRW, 1991a; UCDP, 2021he-k). Harakat-i Inqilab, for instance, also had a substantial number of Uzbek commanders and Tajik supporters (ibid.). The ANLF, on the other hand, drew a comparatively wider support base including the Sufi orders in southern Afghanistan and amongst Dari and Farsi speakers (UCDP, 2021j). The ISA also recruited substantially from non-Pashtuns (Bell, 2013; Nojumi, 2002:86). Despite this, as indicated by their names, the groups emphasised their shared Afghan and Islamist identities, rather than ethno-linguistic groups.

The groups did not act as a single movement with operations remaining separate. Specifically, the groups were based in different territories (Grau, 2004:6): Harakat-i Inqilab in Logar and Helmand; HIG in Nuristan, Nangarhar, and around Kabul; HIG- Khales in Nangarhar, Kabul, Kunar, Logar and Wardak; ANLF in Paktia and Kunar; and NIFA in Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni and Kandahar. Furthermore, the groups did not share leadership (HRW, 1991): Harakat-i Inqilab was led by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; HIG was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; HIG-Khalis was led by Mawlawi Yunus Khalis; ANLF was led by Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujaddidi; ISA was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani; and NIFA was led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani.

In summary, the groups represented independent rebel groups, within a fragmented movement, mobilising around an Islamic Afghan identity.

Veto Players To determine how fragmentation of the Afghan resistance affected the number of veto players, internal cohesion, viability, and preferences are assessed.

Internal Cohesion Evidence suggests cohesion varied across the groups. HIG was the most centralised and disciplined, with Hetkmatyar holding sole decisive power (Johnson, 2018:8; Sinno, 2008:1). ISA and HIG-Khalis also had coherent organisational structures, including internal electoral systems and efficient strategy coordination (Siddiqi, 1989:129). In contrast, many of the other groups were “highly decentralised’ 56 and based on ‘continuously renegotiated arrangements [in which] field commanders gave their loyalty, support and assistance to a party in return for resources necessary to maintain their resistance activities’ (ibid.). Coordination was generally poor, with day-to-day operational decisions made by local commanders (Sinno, 2011:151). Despite this, poor coordination was reportedly “not a major issue”, as local commanders generally fulfilled the groups’ strategic goals - halting soviet advancement (ibid.). In other words, there were few strategic expectations, beyond outlasting their opponents, and thus high levels of efficiency were unnecessary (ibid.) Overall, the command retained strategic control, and the groups each presented, at minimum, a loosely united front.

Notably, the leadership of the Mujahideen parties remained stable between 1980 and 1990, with the leaders of Harakat-i Inqilab, HIG, HIG-Khalis, ANLF, ISA, and NIFA remaining constant for the studied period (HRW, 1991a). This suggests that leadership contests during their tenure remained minimal.

There is also little evidence of infighting within each group, and none suffered splinters during the studied period.

Despite varying levels of internal cohesion, it appears that all groups were sufficiently cohesive to overcome collective action problems, as required by the extent of their strategy, and engage in guerilla warfare.

Viability Whilst estimates of the troops' numbers vary wildly between sources, the groups appear to have had sufficient cadres to pose a formidable threat. According to the UCDP (2021e-k), for all groups, the number of cadres was between 2,000-3,000. Each group also had a larger contingent of supporters of up to 20,000. But whilst the latter figure represents the maximum number of persons who could, theoretically, take up arms at any single moment, a number of sources suggest that the actual number of armed cadres throughout the war was in the thousands for every group. For this reason, this study has assessed the size of each group as ‘medium’ (Medium = 1,000-10,000).

Regarding the capacity of each group to sustain hostilities, each group remained an ‘active’ conflicting party for the duration of the studied period. This was made possible against the much larger and more 57 sophisticated Soviet/Afghan forces, in part, because of their guerrilla tactics, which included ambushes and mine warfare, and their residence in hostile rural environments (Grau, 2010:141; Williams, 2014:929).

It is well recorded that the groups received significant support from both states and private donors. During the 1980’s, cash from the Saudi’s, and weapons from the U.S, U.K, and China, were funneled via Pakistan to individual groups in the Mujahideen (Grau, 2010:139; Steinberg & Woermer, 2013:9; Pentz, 1988). Notably, HIG and ISA received the most external support (Grau, 2010: 137; Steinberg & Woermer, 2013:12; Nojumi, 2002:101 ). However, as aptly noted by Sinno (2011:162), the diversity amongst the Afghan resistance's preferences allowed all willful donors to find at least one group to their liking. Interestingly, such source diversity meant that each single group was not dependent on any single source of funding. Consequently, their preferences were not aligned with any single external state and the groups maintained independence from influence.

Importantly, the insurgencies also engaged in domestic financing. For instance, all groups relied on local agriculture (US Congress, 1986). Furthermore, various groups began to utilise the production and sale of opium in a newly established “drugs for arms trade” (UNODC, 2003:88-90). The groups also taxed constituents within their territories (Sinno, 2011:156).

In summary, the Mujahideen groups under study can be described as viable opponents as they had significant cadres, sustained hostilities, and access to resources. Whilst they received substantial external support for the continuation of hostilities, the diversity of sources precluded any direct dependence on a single actor - shielding them from unwanted influence.

Autonomous Preferences Whilst the overarching objectives of all groups was to remove Soviet forces, overthrow the PDPA, and establish as Islamic state (Williams, 2014:927), there were significant differences between each group’s preferences, with some more conservative or moderate than others. Their differences were primarily related to their ideal polity. HIG was the most radical, positing a markedly fundamentalist Islamic worldview, and aiming to deconstruct the ‘corrupt’ tribal institutions and traditional social norms in favour of a modern Islamist state (HRW, 1991a; Tarzi, 1991:481). Reflecting this, HIG was ‘vehemently opposed’ to reinstating the monarchy (ibid.). On the other hand, Harakat-i Inqilab and 58

HIG-Khalis were traditionalists, who valued local traditions and tribal institutions over a centralised ideal polity (HRW, 1991a; Grau, 2010:137). Harakat-i Inqilab desired a restoration of a secular democratic multi-party system, Islamic primarily by name. They would also accept the return of the former king, Zahir Shah, although it was not a core objective (Siddiqi, 1989:129). The more moderate groups, HIG-Khalis, NIFA, and the ANLF, favoured a returning role of the Shah, although to differing degrees (Grau, 2010:137; Tarzi, 1991:481). Overall, NIFA was considered the most moderate of the groups, as it favoured a return to nationalism over fundamentalist Islam (Grau, 2010:137). Similarly, the ANLF was a secular moderate party, desiring secular politics (ibid.). Overall, it is clear that the groups had preferences regarding ideal polity which differed from one another.

A Case of Limited Outbidding Between 1980-1989 accounts of inter-group competition amongst the Mujahideen for support or resources are seldom. Overall, the Mujahideen were popular amongst their rural support bases and resources such as food, water, shelter, and intelligence were willingly given (Grau, 2010). Notably, whilst almost all the groups shared a predominantly Pashtun support base, the locus of their support was not ethnic. In line with traditional Afghan society, in which social networks are based on tribal or kinship boundaries, the groups were locally based, with leadership coming from village and tribal chiefs or prominent family elders (Dudik, 2009:9). Given that each group operated primarily on a local basis, and within differing territories, it is reasonable that they did not compete for allocation of resources to a significant extent. The only group which differed markedly in their mode of recruitment was HIG, who drew large numbers of recruits from refugee camps through exploiting a “combination of moral, intellectual, and ideological devotion” (Johnson, 2018:7).

In line with this, lethal outbidding was limited. Whilst there is some evidence of inter-rival violence between 1980 and 1989, it was sporadic, rather than part of a systematic strategy. The only group that appears to engage in repeated patterns of rival violence was HIG, which according to Sinno (2008:140), “was party to almost every inter-Mujahideen clash that was reported in accessible sources”. This is corroborated by other accounts, including by Jalali (2011:282), a former Mujahideen member, who noted that HIG fought both Harakat-i-Inqilib. in Helmand, and ISA, in the northern regions. But whilst lethal outbidding did occur, ultimately, the group’s main enemy remained the PDPA and the Soviets. According to Tarzi (1991:482-3), this can be understood through an examination of traditional Afghan societal cleavages. Whilst Afghan society is stratified primarily by 59 tribal lines, there are a number of segmentary kinship structures including extended families, tribes, and sub-tribes, each with “reciprocal social, economic, and political rights and obligations'' (ibid.). Consequently, when all are threatened by an outside enemy, subgroups within these structures are compelled to come together to repel the external threat (ibid.). However, once the Soviets withdrew their support in 1989, the previous tribal patronage-based patterns of social stratification re-emerged, resulting in significant lethal outbidding amongst the Mujahideen (ibid:484; Seerat, 2020). Such disunity between the groups meant that, by 1991, they were perceived by many as mere “bickering warlords” (Tarzi, 1991:479).

There were no records found of discourse-based outbidding by the Mujahideen in the 1980’s, and none of the groups established parallel governance.

Rather, between 1980-1990, there were several attempts to unite the parties, with some efforts more successful than others. As early as January 1980, an alliance named Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan was set up by all 6 parties, with the aim of increasing international support for the ‘government in exile’ and to increase their strength by uniting (UCDP, 2021e-k). However, within weeks, the leader of HIG, Hekmatyar, boycotted the alliance and it soon fell apart (ibid.). By 1985, however, all the groups were fighting in a loose alliance known as the Peshawar Seven, later formalised in 1988 as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen. Despite this, relations between leaders remained tense, and the coalition remained loose, with leadership and operations remaining largely separate (and thus independent veto players).

Accounts of war suggest that the groups did engage in increasing levels of violence against the PDPA and Soviets, and even after Soviets promised withdrawal and were in retreat, the groups did not cease their hostilities (Sinno, 2008:116). The use of indiscriminate violence by all groups also reportedly increased during the period. Teachers, schools, medics, and those suspected of links with the government were attacked (ibid:930). From 1988 onwards, some groups, particularly HIG and HIG- Khales, increased their usage of indiscriminate shelling of urban areas, such as Kabul (HRW, 1990; 1991b). Overall, this suggests that the perception of acceptable strategies and targets of violence widened over the course of the decade, implying some radicalisation of each group's perception of in- grouping/out-grouping.

Despite this, the core goals of each group remained largely static between 1980-1990. Interestingly, all groups publicly rejected engaging in peace talks, despite pressure from their external supporters to do so in the late 1980s (HRW, 1991a;b: Williams, 2014:927), and they also rejected offers of a coalition with the Kabul Government following Soviet withdrawal (Sinno, 2008:139).

Overall, outbidding in Afghanistan appears to be limited. Drawing on disparate tribal networks, there was little overlap between support bases and whilst there is some evidence of inter-group hostilities, primarily instigated by HIG, the groups focused their attention largely on the PDPA and Soviets. The groups also formed a loose alliance, the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, in an attempt to unite the opposition movement. Regarding changing preferences, their aims remained unwavering, although their strategies appear to radicalise with increasing use of indiscriminate violence towards the latter years.

The 1988 “Peace Agreement” and Continuing Conflict In 1988, the Geneva Accord was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US and Soviet Union as guarantors. The three bilateral agreements were intended to end the war, and at the time were “hailed as the key to Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan and a settlement of the conflict” (Klass, 1988:1). However, whilst Pakistan was a key supporter of the Mujahideen, it was not an active conflicting party. Further, the Mujahideen were not involved in negotiations nor in signing of the peace agreement, and resultantly, it was not consensual. Consequently, the agreement does not constitute a peace agreement as defined within this paper.

Unsurprisingly, the accord was rejected by all groups and they vowed to continue fighting. They did so for three more years, when in 1991, the conflict was finally abated - the Mujahideen had proved victorious against the Kabul government and seized power.

Summary In Afghanistan, Harakat-i Inqilab, HIG, HIG-Khalis, ANLF, ISA, and NIFA all constituted veto players as part of a fragmented Islamic Afghan resistance movement, fighting to overthrow the Soviet- backed regime. However, as support followed tribal boundaries, competition for support, and consequently, outbidding was limited. Consequently, escalatory outbidding is assessed as not occurring. As a result, the preferences of each group remained relatively static, displaying limited

61 preference divergence. However, none of the groups were co-opted by the government, rather forming a loose coalition, subverting initial theoretical expectations.

V. Discussion

This section discusses each case, drawing cross-case conclusions and reflecting on the veto-player- outbidding mechanism. Sequentially, limitations of the research design are elucidated, and alternative theories discussed. First, a summary of the empirics is presented:

Case IV Conditions DV Country Fragmentation? Increase in Veto Escalatory Peace Agreement? Players? Outbidding? Philippines Yes Yes No Yes (1990-1996) Uganda Yes Yes Yes Yes (1986 - 1988) Ethiopia Yes Yes Yes No (1973-1983) Afghanistan Yes Yes No No (1980-1990) Figure 7. Case Empirics

Cross-Case Analysis Overall, this paper finds limited support for the hypotheses, with only the Philippines and Ethiopia concurring with theoretical expectations. In the Philippines, the number of veto players increased, but the MILF and MNLF did not engage in escalatory outbidding. As a result, the preferences of each group remained static, and the MNLF were co-opted, as expected. In Ethiopia, the splintering of the EPLF from the ELF increased the number of veto players, and the two groups engaged in escalatory outbidding. As expected, neither group partook in a peace agreement. Conversely, Uganda and Afghanistan ostensibly contradict theoretical expectations. In Uganda, the number of veto players increased, and escalatory outbidding took place, but the UPDA signed an agreement. On the other hand, in Afghanistan, the number of veto players increased, but escalatory outbidding did not take place. Contrary to expectations, none of the rebels signed an agreement. 62

A closer look at each case is illuminating. In the case of the MNLF, the lack of outbidding was directly influenced by their lacking veto player status. Dependent on Libya, who had ceased support for the war, the group were unable to continue hostilities. As a result, the 1996 Jakarta Accord was signed under significant pressure. In other words, whilst the number of veto players did increase in this case, the extant rebel was not a veto player. Consequently, the case highlights the salience of both the veto- player framework and the outbidding mechanism in affecting rebel behaviour.

Uganda similarly highlights the salience of both the veto-player and outbidding frameworks, although not as expected. Whilst escalatory outbidding did occur, it did not result in preference divergence as theorised. Rather, the fratricidal violence had a deleterious effect on rebel strength. The HSM lay defeated, and the UPDA’s had waned resulting in the loss of their veto-player status. Consequently, when offered amnesty by the Government, facing an otherwise inevitable defeat, they too were co- opted by the state. Thus, whilst ostensibly the case appears at odds with theoretical expectations, it simply adds further nuance. Variations in veto-player status over time, influenced by outbidding, have an effect on the likelihood of a peace agreement. Furthermore, whilst the lack of preference divergence ostensibly disagrees with the theorised outbidding mechanism, it is likely that it simply reflects the speed through which both rebellions collapsed. Despite being viable threats against the government, they were unable to survive once locked in a dual contest against the state and one another. It is likely that if they had survived longer, outbidding may have had a measurable effect on the preferences of each group. In light of this, it is likely that larger and stronger rebel groups, which are less susceptible to the negative effects of lethal outbidding, are more likely to see preference divergence, as they will survive long enough to engage in extensive discourse-based outbidding. Thus, whilst outbidding affected the likelihood of a peace agreement being reached in an unforeseen way, speeding the co- option of the UPDA, the case does not disprove either causal mechanism. Rather, it highlights the strength of the veto-player framework, but the need to assess variation of status over time. It also highlights the relevance of the outbidding mechanism, but that variation in the size and strength of a rebel group may affect its outcome.

Ethiopia presents the strongest support for the outbidding mechanism. The ELF and EPLF, both veto-players, engaged in lethal and non-lethal outbidding, resulting in ‘moderate’ preference divergence. Crucially, their efforts in discourse-based outbidding, in particular the establishment of 63 parallel governance and publishing of competing manifestos, helped propel the development of the Eritrean identity. Driven by the other, each fostered an increasingly egalitarian nationalist identity, discarding the previous divisive sectarian policies that had restricted the early Eritrean independence movement. This stronger identity served as the impetus for several decades of war, bolstering their support and undermining any chances of their leadership reneging on their secessionist demands.

Afghanistan depicts the weakest support. All groups were veto players, however, they did not engage in outbidding. Here, the salience of tribal boundaries as the primary mode of social stratification meant competition for ethnic-based support was limited, negating the need for outbidding, and resulting in ‘limited’ preference divergence. Despite this, none of the groups were co-opted into peace agreements, and rather, they formed loose coalitions. Whilst ostensibly at odds with the theoretical expectations of outbidding, coalitions are not inconceivable in outbidding literature. Horowitz (1985) argued that in ethnically heterogeneous societies, where ethnic-based support is limited, parties might form coalitions to pool election votes. As almost all the Mujahideen relied on small tribal bases, they were likely aware of the need to form coalitions to pool support to ensure survival. Whilst Afghanistan is a Pashtun majority state, it is likely that the salience of alternative tribal-based social boundaries created similar conditions to ethnically disparate minority societies, by delimiting the boundaries of support into small groups, consequently necessitating coalitions to maintain sufficient support. As such, this case highlights the importance of recognising salient alternative social boundaries, and their impact on outbidding mechanisms.

Reflecting these discussions, when disaggregating the causal mechanism into its constituent veto- player and outbidding mechanisms, there are disparate levels of support. Overall, the salience of the veto-player framework in affecting the likelihood of a peace agreement is confirmed by all cases. In the Philippines, the lacking independent veto player status of the MNLF meant it was unable to continue hostilities, or engage in escalatory outbidding, and as a result signed a peace agreement with the GRP. In Uganda, variation in veto-player status covaried with the peace agreement. In other words, once the UPDA was unviable, it signed a peace agreement. Additionally, in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, all nascent and extant rebel groups constituted independent veto players, with none signing a peace agreement within 10 years - regardless of the presence, or lack thereof, of escalatory outbidding.

The cases show comparatively less support for the outbidding mechanism. In the Philippines, the groups did not engage in escalatory outbidding and consequently preferences did not diverge, allowing a settlement as expected. In Ethiopia, both groups engaged in outbidding resulting in ‘moderate’ preference divergence, and as expected neither group signed a peace agreement. In Uganda, escalatory outbidding took place, although to unexpected consequence. Preferences did not diverge, and rather, outbidding resulted in the deleterious weakening of both groups and hastening a peace agreement. Here, it is likely that the size and strength of the rebel groups, and their susceptibility to lethal outbidding, influenced the outcome of the outbidding mechanism as each group's rebellion died before long-term discourse-based outbidding and preference divergence occurred. Consequently, this case highlights a need to add further nuance to the theorised conditions. In Afghanistan, escalatory outbidding did not occur, and as expected, preference divergence was ‘limited’. However, all remained immune to co-option. Overall, the cases of Uganda and Afghanistan do not disprove the mechanism. Rather, they showcase the mechanism’s relevance, but they highlight that refinement of the mechanism is necessary to appropriately capture empirical realities.

In summary, whilst the cases show limited support for the three hypotheses, a cross-case analysis reveals significant support for the veto-player mechanism, and moderate support for the outbidding mechanism. Further refinements are required to the latter part of the causal mechanism, to ensure it accounts for variation in survival prospects once lethal outbidding takes place and to account for salient alternative social boundaries.

Limitations and Bias Theoretical Limitations Critically, it is impossible to discount the possibility that the observed relationship is spurious. As discussed, multiple alternative explanations exist for why variation in peace agreements occurs. As all qualitative research designs are limited by their inability to control for all potential confounders, it is possible that the observed relationship is spurious. Unfortunately, this is unavoidable in small-N research. To begin addressing this, likely alternative explanations are discussed in ‘Alternative Explanations’. Furthermore, it is possible that equifinality, the existence of different causal explanations resulting in the same outcome, is responsible for the empirical observations (George & Bennett, 2005). As these cannot be discounted, the explanatory power of the theory is somewhat limited. 65

Research Design Limitations Due to word limits, this thesis was forced to rely on four cases to test its hypotheses. Ideally, six cases would have been used, as this would have allowed me to establish covariation between the condition and outcomes for each of the hypotheses. However, doing so would have necessitated much shallower empirical analyses, limiting this study’s internal validity, and its ability to make credible and detailed explorations of the causal mechanisms. Given that the benefit of qualitative research is its ability to reveal insights into causal mechanisms, limiting the depth of the analyses would be counterproductive to its purpose. Consequently, whilst this thesis is limited in its ability to make conclusive judgements about the impact of theorised variables on the outcome, it has discovered nuances of the causal mechanism which were previously unconsidered by theory, and thus produces important findings. For future research, studying the theorised mechanism against further cases is encouraged.

Second, this study measures fragmentation as occurring when nascent groups become ‘active’ in conflict, rather than their formation, introducing bias. In most cases, this distinction makes little difference as groups often become ‘active’ soon after they are formed. For the MILF, however, the duration between formation, in 1977, and becoming active, in 1990, is much longer (UCDP, 2021l). Consequently, had fragmentation been measured at the point of formation, the results would differ significantly, as only a ceasefire was signed between 1977-1987, with talks to finalise the details of the framework 1987 Jeddah Accord ultimately falling through (MMO, 2019). Despite this, the impetus for measuring from the moment of ‘active’ conflict is sound. First, as this study is interested in fragmentation within conflict, political groups which have formed but are not conflicting parties are irrelevant to this study. Second, many competitive mechanisms influencing outbidding only appear once a group becomes hostile, for instance competition for recruitment or arms. Consequently, whilst it must be acknowledged that such choices affect the analyses, the choices made were ultimately well considered and necessary.

A third design limitation is the lack of more fine-grained indicators and measurements. Some indicators used, such as assessing whether groups were sufficiently internally cohesive and whether outbidding occured in an escalatory manner, is based on a relative assessment of their activities, rather than strictly defined measurements and thresholds. As such, it relies on individual assessment, and there is no clear framework for replicability that could be applied in further studies, limiting this paper's 66 reliability and generalisability. Similarly, by measuring fragmentation and increases in veto players as dummy variables, the influence of variation in the level of fragmentation between cases (note: Afghanistan) was not captured, limiting the study’s internal validity. For future research, developing more fine-grained indicators is recommended to improve validity and reliability.

Empirical Limitations The reliability of the study is also affected by variation in data availability across cases. The Moro and Eritrean Resistance movements benefited from broad data-availability across primary and secondary sources. The long tenure of all four groups, as well as their efforts to establish parallel governance, meant they released numerous statements/publications, from which preferences and outbidding strategies could be assessed. By comparison, due to their short-lived tenure, data on the UPDA and HSM was limited, with mostly secondary sources available. To ensure internal validity, source provenance was examined cautiously. In the case of Afghanistan, many data-sources discuss the Mujahideen as a singular movement without disaggregating its activities by its independent groups. Consequently, at times which group data pertained to could not be verified, and consequently was excluded. As such, it is likely that their activities are underreported, potentially downplaying the level of outbidding. Drawing from disparate sources across cases affects this study’s reliability, as data could not be drawn systematically across comparable sources for each case. Despite these difficulties, extensive data collection methods, using a range of sources, allowed me to acquire sufficient data to make detailed and credible judgments about the causal mechanisms in each case, increasing its internal validity.

Alternative Explanations It is necessary to address whether alternative explanations can explain variation in the dependent variable, particularly in lieu of controlling for all possible confounders. One rival explanation for how fragmentation affects the likelihood of a peace agreement relates to internal cohesion: the more cohesive a group, the more credible a negotiating partner they make, thus increasing the likelihood of an agreement being reached (Cunningham, K.:2013; Blattman & Miguel, 2010). This was not controlled as internal cohesion is a theorised condition necessary for veto-player status and controlling for it would introduce selection bias in the case selection process. Whilst all were sufficiently cohesive to overcome collective action problems, it is clear that visible variation in the level of internal cohesion does not covary with the likelihood of a peace agreement. For instance, the groups which signed peace 67 agreements were the MNLF, a highly organised group with a centrally structured command, and the UPDA, a loosely organised and factional group. Furthermore, the cases with no peace agreements show similar variation in the level of internal cohesion, with the EPLF displaying an extremely cohesive, impressive organisational capacity, the ELF being somewhat less so, and most of the Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, barring HIG, being decentralised. In other words, the cases show no support for the assertion that internal cohesion increases the likelihood of a peace agreement being reached. Consequently, we can conclusively exclude internal cohesion as a viable explanation for the variation seen here.

A compelling alternative explanation is issue indivisibility, which argues that religious or secessionist conflicts are more difficult to solve as they are inherently indivisible (Toft, 2002; 2003; Fearon, 2014). Where groups are competing for ‘sacred spaces’, or fighting over religion, belligerents perceive no acceptable alternatives or pay-offs (Hassner, 2003; 2006; Goddard, 2006). Consequently, the bargaining space is diminished and reaching a settlement is more difficult. Applying this here, the two conflicts without peace agreements, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, were over Islamist and secessionist aspirations. In the two cases with peace agreements, the MNLF was seeking autonomy, and the UPDA’s incompatibility was political. This appears to concur with the theoretical expectations of issue indivisibility, where groups fighting over secessionist or religious incompatibilities are hypothesised to be harder to bargain with. However, when considering the history of the MNLF, and that they too were once a secessionist group, it becomes less clear, as theories of issue indivisibility suggests that groups are unlikely to renege on demands for secession. Despite this, the explanation appears compelling and cannot be discounted, requiring further analysis which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In summary, the uncontrolled rival explanation, internal cohesion, has been discarded as a viable explanation, further bolstering support for the veto-player outbidding mechanism. However, further research is required to examine ‘issue indivisibility’ and whether it constitutes a viable explanation for variation in the dependent variable.

VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper asked under what conditions does fragmentation influence the likelihood of a peace agreement? In doing so, it aimed to evaluate the relevance of Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework and advance it with an outbidding mechanism to correct the insufficient condition of ‘preference autonomy’ with ‘preference divergence’.

Based on an extensive theoretical framework, it was theorised that a reduction in the number of veto players would increase the likelihood of a peace agreement. Where fragmentation increases the number of veto-players, the likelihood of a peace agreement would depend on the presence of outbidding, resulting in preference divergence. Preference divergence reduces the bargaining space, decreasing the likelihood of settlement. Where outbidding does not occur, co-option of moderates into peace agreements would likely occur.

Overall, this thesis has found mixed support. Whilst the complete hypotheses find limited support, with only half of the cases concurring with theoretical expectations, a closer look at the empirics within each case draws strong support for the constituent veto-player and outbidding mechanisms. For instance, the importance of veto-players is confirmed by all cases when taking into account variation over time, and that increases in the total number of veto players arising from fragmentation does not necessitate that all rebel groups are veto-players. Consequently, the relevance of Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework is confirmed. Similarly, the occurrence, or lack thereof, of outbidding is shown to have a marked effect on the changing, or stasis, of group preferences. Resultantly, the salience of outbidding on preferences is also confirmed by most of the cases. Only Uganda displays significantly differing results, where lethal outbidding resulted in the quick decimation of forces thus precluding any long-term changes to preferences as expected. In Afghanistan, whilst preferences remained static as expected, alternative social boundaries incentivised coalitions rather than the expected co-option However, rather than disproving the theory, these cases highlight that further refinements to the mechanism accounting for variation in susceptibility to lethal outbidding are required and alternative salient social boundaries are necessary.

In light of these findings, this thesis has achieved most of its aims. Whilst the conditions under which fragmentation influences the likelihood of a peace agreement cannot conclusively be assessed, this

69 thesis has illuminated credible causal mechanisms. In doing so, it has confirmed the relevance of Cunningham’s (2011) veto-player framework and indicated the credibility and potential of the augmented outbidding mechanism. Notably, it contributes to the field of research by advancing existing frameworks of analysis, combining research on negotiations and political parties’ literature, to posit a new and credible causal mechanism. Regarding implications for research and policy, this paper underscores the importance of understanding and implementing action to mitigate outbidding for the sake of successful negotiations and potential peace.

For future research, it would be pertinent to refine the outbidding mechanism, taking into account variations in susceptibility to lethal outbidding and alternative social boundaries, and test the hypotheses against larger-N cases. Issue indivisibility should also be explored as a possible explanation.

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