3 Small arms proliferation in Nagorno Karabakh

BEFORE 1988 the situation in Karabakh did not differ much from the developments in . All arms belonged to the state law-enforcement agencies. The population possessed a negligible quantity of hunting rifles and a handful of unregistered weapons. This is largely because of the traditional indifference of the (including those living in Nagorno Karabakh) towards weapons. It was also because the Azerbaijani authorities were always concerned with preventing any accumulation of arms in the potentially rebellious province. During the transition period, when the local population began to confront the central and Azerbaijani authorities, militants in Karabakh began to procure arms through different channels to those used by Armenia. Unlike in Armenia, there was no opportunity to receive arms from officials within the MOI, the prosecutor’s office or the KGB, and then cover their tracks by staging robberies or arson. Ethnic Azerbaijanis traditionally held all key positions in these agencies and all Armenian officers were dismissed after the beginning of hostilities and had no access to the arsenals. It was similarly impossible to acquire arms from military storage facilities. From February 1988 on, Karabakh was flooded with elite units and the MOI’s Internal Forces. They were under the strict supervision of special departments who answered directly to the central staff of the Soviet KGB. Hence, the option of making financial deals with the commanders was ruled out from the very beginning. Armenia was therefore the only channel of arms supplies open to Karabakh until 1991. There is no common border between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, so the weapons had to be shipped in by air or along the mountain paths through Azerbaijani- populated areas. The controls at /Khankendi airport and the border in Karabakh were strengthened, with special checkpoints manned by the Azerbaijani OMON and Internal Forces of the Soviet MOI. Their task was to prevent arms supplies reaching Karabakh and to arrest those bringing them in. There are no official Soviet documents stating the amount and description of the weapons seized. According to former combatants and those who transported these weapons, such operations were considered a success if one third of the arms could be delivered to Karabakh. As a result of the large-scale hostilities which started in mid-1991 in Karabakh, captured arms became a major source of arms supplies. This source provided a steady supply of weapons right up to the ceasefire in May 1994. Armenians suffered from a 2 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN NAGORNO KARABAKH

constant shortage of arms and ammunition, and some of their combat operations were planned with the sole aim of seizing weapons from the enemy. All captured arms were left in Karabakh – on leaving Karabakh, units that came from Armenia could only take weapons they had registered on entry. Despite such procedures, a certain amount of arms must have been shipped to Armenia from the conflict zone and involved in subsequent trafficking. However, most of the captured weapons remained in Karabakh and were commissioned by the Karabakh Army. They were registered and appropriate accounting procedures were set up. The actual number of captured arms has never been revealed and there are conflicting estimates. It is impossible to compare them with official Azerbaijani figures, since neither party has ever published information on weapons losses.

Security The entire system of law-enforcement agencies in Nagorno Karabakh replicates the structures in system in Armenia. As in Armenia, the key role belongs to the MOD. As was Nagorno mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the conflict, supplies of all sorts of SALW and other weapons for the Karabakh army came through Armenia. Karabakh Before the collapse of the USSR, all elite units of the Soviet MOD and MOI (deployed ad interim in Karabakh to secure the state of emergency) were withdrawn and took all their weapons with them. The only military equipment left from the Soviet Army belonged to the 366th motor rifle regiment, which was based permanently in Stepanakert/Khankendi. Apart from a tank battalion, the regiment was mostly armed with SALW,in accordance with Soviet standards. Another source of arms in the early phase of the war was captured weapons. The quantities captured, however, were insufficient to sustain the large-scale war that had broken out in Karabakh. It was for this reason that the military leadership in Karabakh sought from 1992 to establish direct contacts with the Russian military-industrial complex and the Russian MOD. The Karabakh Army received direct supplies of weapons from these sources (independently from Armenia). Most of the shipments involved SALW for a number of reasons: it was easier to transport SALW secretly; SALW were cheaper and more economical weapons in comparison with heavy armaments; combat experience showed that a large number of armoured vehicles and heavy weapons in the mountains is a disadvantage rather than an advantage. SALW are more useful in mountainous areas than other weapons. Russian supplies to Karabakh continued after the 1994 ceasefire agreement. Data on the quantity and types of arms available now to the Karabakh defence army are secret. Moreover, some officers of the Armenian MOD argue that their Ministry has no reliable information on this issue either. The chaos of the early days of the war and the existence of numerous channels of supply precluded any opportunity to calculate the number of weapons shipped to Karabakh at this stage. One can hardly verify the figures of captured arms and weapons lost on the battlefield. The situation is particularly difficult with the assessment of SALW,since heavy weapons and armoured vehicles can be counted more easily and are much harder to conceal. The same sources believe that the Karabakh military commanders are well aware of the actual quantity of SALW at their disposal and maintain strict accounting and control of arms. However, they deliberately give lower figures to their counterparts in Yerevan so that they have secret weapons kept in reserve. Hence there is likely to be more SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 3 weapons available than those for the 20,000-strong Karabakh army and for the 30,000 reservists who can be mobilised if hostilities begin again. The MOD in Karabakh plays an extremely important role in political and economic life. Samvel Babayan, who headed the Karabakh MOD from 1993 until March 2000, controlled the economy of the state and subordinated it to the needs of his agency. No significant development in domestic or foreign policy could occur without his consent and participation. The situation changed after the dismissal of Babayan, who was arrested and accused of plotting to assassinate Arkadi Gukassian, President of Nagorno Karabakh. It is worthy of note that the arms used by the assassins – Kalashnikovs and grenade launchers – were not duly registered. The investigation showed that they were obtained from the secret reserves of the MOD. After a failed assassination attempt, the Karabakh MOD came under greater control by the political authorities and lost its monopoly over the economy. Moreover, it is likely that only Babayan and his close associates possessed full informa- tion about the secret SALW stockpiles and where they were stored. The present fate of these storage facilities and whether they are known to the current leaders of the MOD is unclear. There is a potential threat that such SALW may be involved in illicit trafficking. The MOI in Karabakh has never played a crucial role in domestic politics or in the economy. It has always been subordinate to the MOD. The same holds for the National Security Directorate and the Border Guard Service, which patrols Karabakh’s border with Iran. All these structures comprise about 3,000 people. They are equipped to be able to take part in large-scale hostilities as regular units assigned to the MOD. Their regular arms include sub-machine-guns, sniper rifles, heavy machine-guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank systems and anti-aircraft missile systems in conformity with the standards of the motor-rifle units of the regular army. Bearing in mind the permanent risk of war in Karabakh, the authorities considered distributing arms among reservists, as in Israel and some other countries. The idea was eventually rejected. However, each reservist knows the number of his registered weapon. To make mobilisation easier and quicker, these weapons are stored in small quantities very close to the homes of reservists. Thus, civilians do not possess officially registered arms. Given that strict measures were quickly implemented to prevent illicit arms possession among civilians, one may assume that there is no problem of uncontrolled SALW proliferation in Karabakh. The pro-government parties in Karabakh have no opportunity (even secretly) to procure arms and to establish armed groups. The major political players – an analogue of the Armenian Yerkrapah and the local branch of the Dashnaks – have no para- military units. Meanwhile, experts believe that the very structure of the Dashnak party and its financial and communication capabilities enable it to quickly set up a military branch quickly if required.

Saferworld's research project on arms and security in the Caucasus This chapter is part of a wider Saferworld report, entitled The Caucasus: Armed and Divided – Small arms and light weapons proliferation and humanitarian consequences in the Caucasus, which collects together case studies from local experts on the situation in their particular geographical region. The report focuses on the conflicts in the region, the relationship between conflict and levels of arms possession, and the effects of small arms proliferation since the break-up of the Soviet Union. It also includes a chapter on ’s policy towards the small arms issues in the Caucasus. To obtain a copy of the complete report, please contact Saferworld at: [email protected] or visit www.saferworld.org.uk