Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran
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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. COPING WITH A NUCLEARIZING IRAN JAMES DOBBINS, ALIREZA NADER, DALIA DASSA KAYE, FREDERIC WEHREY NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation. Library of Congress Control Number: 2011942595 ISBN: 978-0-8330-5865-2 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise from top left): Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (AP/ Hasan Sarbakhshian); President Barack Obama (AP/Carolyn Kaster); Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (AP/Hasan Sarbakhshian); Revolutionary Guard's Tondar missile is launched in a drill (AP/Fars News Agency, Ali Shaigan). © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Rich- ardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and founda- tions and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/isdp.html or con- tact the director (contact information is provided on web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO U.S. Interests, Objectives, and Strategies .................................... 3 Long History of Mutual Grievances ............................................. 4 Ups and Downs in the Relationship ............................................. 6 CHAPTER THREE Iran’s Interests, Objectives, and Strategies ................................... 9 Iranian Views of the United States ..............................................11 Iranian Factional Interests .......................................................12 Ideological Opposition to the United States ...................................16 The Revolutionary Guards ...................................................... 20 Iran’s Future Nuclear Posture ................................................... 24 Conclusion ........................................................................ 27 CHAPTER FOUR The Other Actors .................................................................29 The Gulf Cooperation Council States ......................................... 30 Key Areas of U.S. Leverage ......................................................39 v vi Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran Israel ............................................................................... 42 Halting Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities .......................................... 42 Constraining Iran’s Regional Influence ..................................... 44 Influencing Iran’s Internal Political Evolution .............................. 44 Turkey ............................................................................. 50 Syria ................................................................................ 56 Iraq 59 China ...............................................................................61 Russia ...............................................................................63 Europe ............................................................................. 66 Conclusion ........................................................................ 68 CHAPTER FIVE U.S. Instruments and Iranian Vulnerabilities ..............................71 Diplomacy .........................................................................71 Third-Party Intermediaries ....................................................72 Multilateral Diplomacy ........................................................74 Direct U.S.-Iranian Dialogue .................................................75 Iran’s Political System and U.S. Diplomacy .................................78 Sanctions ...........................................................................79 Covert Action ..................................................................... 84 Soft Power ......................................................................... 86 The Military Option ..............................................................89 Halting Iran’s Nuclear Program .............................................. 90 Moderating Iranian External Behavior ...................................... 90 Influencing Iran’s Internal Evolution ...........................................91 Conclusion .........................................................................91 CHAPTER SIX Policy Alternatives ...............................................................93 Engagement ....................................................................... 94 Containment .......................................................................95 Preemption ........................................................................ 96 Deterrence ........................................................................ 97 Normalization .................................................................... 98 Contents vii Regime Change .................................................................. 99 Conclusion ........................................................................ 99 CHAPTER SEVEN Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran ........................................... 101 Containment Plus ............................................................... 103 Deterrence ..................................................................... 104 Sanctions ....................................................................... 106 Engagement .................................................................... 107 Soft Power ..................................................................... 108 Bibliography .................................................................... 111 Summary It is not inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons or that it will gain the capacity to quickly produce them. American and even Israeli analysts continually push their estimates for such an event fur- ther into the future. Nevertheless, absent a change in Iranian policy, it is reasonable to assume that, some time in the coming decade, Iran will acquire such a capability. Western policymakers shy away from addressing this prospect, lest they seem to be acquiescing to something they deem unacceptable