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The Abe Government's Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue

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The Abe Government's Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue Meng Xiaoxu he North Korean nuclear issue is a major regional issue with implications on Northeast Asian peace and security. Though not a direct party to the issue and unlikely to play a decisive role in its Tresolution, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue, given historical and geopolitical factors as well as the Japan-US security alliance, would still exert complicated influence on the development of the issue and regional interstate relations, thus of special significance and deserving in-depth analysis. Abe’s Policy of “Increased Pressure” on North Korea In recent years, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has witnessed a shift from “engagement and dialogue” to “increased pressure.” During the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2002, despite stern warnings from the United States that North Korea was conducting uranium enrichment, then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi insisted on visiting Pyongyang to address the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. During the meeting with then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, Koizumi proposed to resolve security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned, and advocated for engagement with North Korea. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the first Shinzo Abe government, though Meng Xiaoxu is Professor at the Department of International Politics, University of International Relations. 132 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue denouncing the action as “unacceptable,” still adopted a combined policy of sanctions and limited engagement toward North Korea. After North Korea’s second nuclear test, the Taro Aso government also sought for settlement through United Nations resolutions and advocated return to the Six-Party Talks, without much emphasis on exerting pressure. However, since Abe began his second term as Prime Minister, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has gradually turned from “pressure” to “increased pressure,” with the nuclear issue prioritized over the abduction issue. After North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, Abe explicitly advocated a tougher policy. In the face of two consecutive nuclear tests and a series of missile tests in 2016, Abe further stressed the necessity of “pressure” and “action.” In the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017, Abe went a step further, announcing that “there is no way forward other than to continue to maximize the pressure on it using every possible means” if North Korea does not abandon its nuclear and missile programs.1 Taking a comprehensive combination of diplomatic, security and economic measures, the Abe government has been increasing pressure on North Korea with strong messages and decisive actions. A multi-layered “ring of encirclement” The Abe government is endeavoring to build a three-layered “ring of encirclement” surrounding North Korea, with the US-Japan-ROK alliance as the inner layer, “US-Japan-ROK + China-Russia” as the middle layer,” and an outer layer that incorporates other countries of the international community. First, Japan attempts to build the core of the encirclement with the US- Japan-ROK alliance. The Abe government has advocated cooperation with the international community, under the guidance of Japan-US alliance, to induce policy changes in North Korea. Under Japan’s proposal, the joint statement of the 2017 Japan-US “2+2” meeting “condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s recurring provocations and development of nuclear and 1 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” September 25, 2017, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_ abe/statement/201709/_00011.html. The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 133 ballistic missile capabilities,” and reiterated both countries’ commitment to pressure on Pyongyang.2 Abe even made three telephone calls with US President Donald Trump in a single week, confirming at the highest level that “stronger pressure must be applied on North Korea” and “the US is with Japan 100% as an ally.” Japan further utilized the opportunity of Trump’s first official visit to the Asia-Pacific to consolidate the two countries’ united front against North Korea. Japan also actively supported the US decision to re-designate North Korea as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” In addition, in case of the US reversal on the North Korean nuclear issue, Japan has been frequently reminding and seeking confirmation from the US. During the US-Japan-ROK trilateral meeting of defense authorities, Japan reiterated that the North Korean nuclear issue is a “major and imminent threat not only to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, but also to that of the US.”3 After then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson indicated the US intention to talk with North Korea without preconditions, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Kenji Kanasugi met with Joseph Yun, the US State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy, the following day, reaffirming the need to put pressure on North Korea to elicit its serious intention and concrete actions toward denuclearization, and stressing again the necessity of Japan-US cooperation in pressuring North Korea.4 Japan also attaches great importance to cooperation with South Korea, and tries to take advantage of their respective alliance with the US to draw the pro-dialogue South Korea to its side and form a US-Japan-ROK core layer of “integrated diplomacy” against North Korea. On several occasions the Japanese Foreign Minister has called on South Korea to adopt maximum pressure on North Korea. The Japanese and South Korean Head of Delegation to the Six Party Talks also confirmed 2 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/ st/page4e_000649.html. 3 “Japan, US and ROK Confirm Trilateral Cooperation as North Korea Poses New Level of Threat,” Sankei News, August 3, 2017, http://www.sankei.com/world/news/170803/wor1708030012-n1.html. 4 “Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Kenji Kanasugi Talks with Joseph Yun, US State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy,” December 13, 2017, http://www.mofa. go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_005423.html. 134 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue that they would work closely at the UN Security Council and on other international occasions to keep pressure on North Korea. Second, Japan tries to incorporate China and Russia into the “ring of encirclement” and build a pressure framework of “US-Japan-ROK + China- Russia” against North Korea. In Japan’s opinion, Russia and especially China have extensive economic interactions with North Korea and thus enjoy greater influence on the country, and a ring of encirclement that includes both China and Russia would be more effective. Abe has, on several occasions, expressed an intent to urge Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin to adopt “more constructive measures,” arguing that “the international community, especially China and Russia, should take the hard facts seriously and increase pressure on North Korea.”5 The joint statement of the 2017 US-Japan “2+2” meeting even “strongly encourage(s) China to take decisive measures to urge North Korea to change its course of action.”6 Abe has also actively engaged in summit diplomacy with China and Russia. When meeting with President Putin, Abe asked Russia to fully implement the UN sanctions to put maximum pressure on North Korea. During the 2017 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam, Abe also expressed his desire to cooperate with President Xi and President Putin. Aside from “hard pressure,” Abe also extended “soft overtures” to China and Russia. Japan’s attempt to enlist China’s support in its North Korea policy is a factor both in its shifting attitudes toward the Belt and Road Initiative, and in its efforts to improve China-Japan relations. Third, Japan undertakes a new form of “global diplomacy” to win international support. The second Abe government has advocated “global diplomacy,” which means developing “strategic diplomacy that looks at the global situation from a broad perspective” instead of simply concentrating on bilateral relations.7 As to the North Korean nuclear issue, Abe has 5 “Prime Minister Meets the Press on North Korean Missile Test,” July 4, 2017, http://www.kantei.go.jp/ jp/97_abe/actions/201707/04kaiken.html. 6 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017. 7 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 183rd Session of the Diet,” January 28, 2013, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201301/28syosin_e.html. The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 135 expressed to the international community the necessity of close cooperation, and argued for actively utilizing the “international ring of encirclement” with focus on Australia, ASEAN members, India and European countries.8 To this end, Abe secured agreement with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to apply further pressure on North Korea, and reached consensus with British Prime Minister Theresa May on defining the latest North Korean missile launch as “an outrageous provocation” that “posed an unprecedented, serious and grave threat to Japan’s national security.”9 Through phone calls, Abe confirmed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel their shared commitment to strengthening pressure on Pyongyang. The Prime Minister had also urged Asia-Pacific nations, especially Southeast Asian countries, to jointly build a ring of encirclement against North Korea. In addition, Abe sent Katsuyuki Kawai, Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Liberal Democratic Party, to India in September 2017 to explain the severity of North Korean threat to the South Asian country.
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