The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue

Meng Xiaoxu

he North Korean nuclear issue is a major regional issue with implications on Northeast Asian peace and security. Though not a direct party to the issue and unlikely to play a decisive role in its Tresolution, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue, given historical and geopolitical factors as well as the Japan-US security alliance, would still exert complicated influence on the development of the issue and regional interstate relations, thus of special significance and deserving in-depth analysis.

Abe’s Policy of “Increased Pressure” on North Korea

In recent years, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has witnessed a shift from “engagement and dialogue” to “increased pressure.” During the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2002, despite stern warnings from the United States that North Korea was conducting uranium enrichment, then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi insisted on visiting Pyongyang to address the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. During the meeting with then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, Koizumi proposed to resolve security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned, and advocated for engagement with North Korea. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the first Shinzo Abe government, though

Meng Xiaoxu is Professor at the Department of International Politics, University of International Relations.

132 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue denouncing the action as “unacceptable,” still adopted a combined policy of sanctions and limited engagement toward North Korea. After North Korea’s second nuclear test, the Taro Aso government also sought for settlement through United Nations resolutions and advocated return to the Six-Party Talks, without much emphasis on exerting pressure. However, since Abe began his second term as Prime Minister, Japan’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has gradually turned from “pressure” to “increased pressure,” with the nuclear issue prioritized over the abduction issue. After North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, Abe explicitly advocated a tougher policy. In the face of two consecutive nuclear tests and a series of missile tests in 2016, Abe further stressed the necessity of “pressure” and “action.” In the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017, Abe went a step further, announcing that “there is no way forward other than to continue to maximize the pressure on it using every possible means” if North Korea does not abandon its nuclear and missile programs.1 Taking a comprehensive combination of diplomatic, security and economic measures, the Abe government has been increasing pressure on North Korea with strong messages and decisive actions.

A multi-layered “ring of encirclement” The Abe government is endeavoring to build a three-layered “ring of encirclement” surrounding North Korea, with the US-Japan-ROK alliance as the inner layer, “US-Japan-ROK + China-Russia” as the middle layer,” and an outer layer that incorporates other countries of the international community. First, Japan attempts to build the core of the encirclement with the US- Japan-ROK alliance. The Abe government has advocated cooperation with the international community, under the guidance of Japan-US alliance, to induce policy changes in North Korea. Under Japan’s proposal, the joint statement of the 2017 Japan-US “2+2” meeting “condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s recurring provocations and development of nuclear and

1 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” September 25, 2017, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_ abe/statement/201709/_00011.html.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 133 ballistic missile capabilities,” and reiterated both countries’ commitment to pressure on Pyongyang.2 Abe even made three telephone calls with US President Donald Trump in a single week, confirming at the highest level that “stronger pressure must be applied on North Korea” and “the US is with Japan 100% as an ally.” Japan further utilized the opportunity of Trump’s first official visit to the Asia-Pacific to consolidate the two countries’ united front against North Korea. Japan also actively supported the US decision to re-designate North Korea as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” In addition, in case of the US reversal on the North Korean nuclear issue, Japan has been frequently reminding and seeking confirmation from the US. During the US-Japan-ROK trilateral meeting of defense authorities, Japan reiterated that the North Korean nuclear issue is a “major and imminent threat not only to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, but also to that of the US.”3 After then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson indicated the US intention to talk with North Korea without preconditions, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Kenji Kanasugi met with Joseph Yun, the US State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy, the following day, reaffirming the need to put pressure on North Korea to elicit its serious intention and concrete actions toward denuclearization, and stressing again the necessity of Japan-US cooperation in pressuring North Korea.4 Japan also attaches great importance to cooperation with South Korea, and tries to take advantage of their respective alliance with the US to draw the pro-dialogue South Korea to its side and form a US-Japan-ROK core layer of “integrated diplomacy” against North Korea. On several occasions the Japanese Foreign Minister has called on South Korea to adopt maximum pressure on North Korea. The Japanese and South Korean Head of Delegation to the Six Party Talks also confirmed

2 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/ st/page4e_000649.html. 3 “Japan, US and ROK Confirm Trilateral Cooperation as North Korea Poses New Level of Threat,” Sankei News, August 3, 2017, http://www.sankei.com/world/news/170803/wor1708030012-n1.html. 4 “Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Kenji Kanasugi Talks with Joseph Yun, US State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy,” December 13, 2017, http://www.mofa. go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_005423.html.

134 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue that they would work closely at the UN Security Council and on other international occasions to keep pressure on North Korea. Second, Japan tries to incorporate China and Russia into the “ring of encirclement” and build a pressure framework of “US-Japan-ROK + China- Russia” against North Korea. In Japan’s opinion, Russia and especially China have extensive economic interactions with North Korea and thus enjoy greater influence on the country, and a ring of encirclement that includes both China and Russia would be more effective. Abe has, on several occasions, expressed an intent to urge Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin to adopt “more constructive measures,” arguing that “the international community, especially China and Russia, should take the hard facts seriously and increase pressure on North Korea.”5 The joint statement of the 2017 US-Japan “2+2” meeting even “strongly encourage(s) China to take decisive measures to urge North Korea to change its course of action.”6 Abe has also actively engaged in summit diplomacy with China and Russia. When meeting with President Putin, Abe asked Russia to fully implement the UN sanctions to put maximum pressure on North Korea. During the 2017 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam, Abe also expressed his desire to cooperate with President Xi and President Putin. Aside from “hard pressure,” Abe also extended “soft overtures” to China and Russia. Japan’s attempt to enlist China’s support in its North Korea policy is a factor both in its shifting attitudes toward the Belt and Road Initiative, and in its efforts to improve China-Japan relations. Third, Japan undertakes a new form of “global diplomacy” to win international support. The second Abe government has advocated “global diplomacy,” which means developing “strategic diplomacy that looks at the global situation from a broad perspective” instead of simply concentrating on bilateral relations.7 As to the North Korean nuclear issue, Abe has

5 “Prime Minister Meets the Press on North Korean Missile Test,” July 4, 2017, http://www.kantei.go.jp/ jp/97_abe/actions/201707/04kaiken.html. 6 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017. 7 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 183rd Session of the Diet,” January 28, 2013, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201301/28syosin_e.html.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 135 expressed to the international community the necessity of close cooperation, and argued for actively utilizing the “international ring of encirclement” with focus on Australia, ASEAN members, India and European countries.8 To this end, Abe secured agreement with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to apply further pressure on North Korea, and reached consensus with British Prime Minister Theresa May on defining the latest North Korean missile launch as “an outrageous provocation” that “posed an unprecedented, serious and grave threat to Japan’s national security.”9 Through phone calls, Abe confirmed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel their shared commitment to strengthening pressure on Pyongyang. The Prime Minister had also urged Asia-Pacific nations, especially Southeast Asian countries, to jointly build a ring of encirclement against North Korea. In addition, Abe sent Katsuyuki Kawai, Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Liberal Democratic Party, to India in September 2017 to explain the severity of North Korean threat to the South Asian country. Following North Korea’s latest nuclear test, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono also talked with his counterparts of France and Ethiopia, then holding the UN Security Council presidency, to continue pressure. At the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula in January 2018, Kono again urged the international community to “continue to maximize pressure on North Korea and corner North Korea in order to change its policy toward denuclearization.”10

Strengthened deterrence against North Korea Compared with previous Japanese governments, which put more emphasis on strengthening self-defense capabilities, the Abe government attaches greater importance to strengthening deterrence against North Korea,

8 “Prime Minister Abe Urges for Encirclement against North Korea at G20,” July 5, 2017, https://www. jiji.com/jc/article?k=2017070500705&g=prk. 9 “Joint Statement on North Korea by Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister May,” August 31, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000285438.pdf. 10 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula,” January 16, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000325810.pdf.

136 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue The US Defense Secretary James Mattis meets with Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera in Washington DC on April 20. The two sides affirmed the importance in providing credible military backing to the maximum pressure campaign, and agreed to continue enhancing alliance capability to deter and respond to North Korean aggression. in addition to upgrading its current radar system and developing secondary warning radars in an attempt to enhance the ability to collect intelligence on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. To be specific, the Abe government is trying to increase its deterrence capabilities in the following three aspects. First, consolidating the US-Japan alliance and enhancing military integration between the two countries. Abe has emphasized that “With regard to North Korea, it is important that we strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities and also that we enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US alliance.”11 At the summit level, Abe and Trump have, through frequent phone calls, agreed to adopt concrete actions to enhance their defense posture and capabilities, and confirmed “the two countries’ ironclad mutual defense commitments.” Trump also “reaffirmed the

11 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the G7 Taormina Summit,” May 27, 2017, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201705/1223050_11577.html.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 137 commitment of the United States to defending (US) homeland, territories, and allies using the full range of diplomatic, conventional, and nuclear capabilities at (US) disposal.”12 At the cabinet level, the two countries confirmed at the “2+2” meeting their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in air and missile defense, among other areas.13 In terms of military cooperation, Japan is purchasing more American weapons at the request of President Trump. In its 2018 defense budget, Japan’s purchase of US arms under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program reached as high as 410.2 billion yen.14 In addition, the two countries have conducted frequent joint military exercises over the past year, which witnesses strengthened “integration” of the US Armed Forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Second, upgrading the missile defense system and considering interception of North Korean missiles. Japan’s current missile defense network includes the Aegis destroyers, which intercept from the sea ballistic missiles above the atmosphere during the midcourse phase of flight, and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, which strike down from the land missiles as they reenter the atmosphere. In an effort to guard against any interception loopholes left over by Aegis destroyers and increase its offensive capabilities to respond to cruise missiles on a larger scale, Japan is currently considering introducing the US military’s land-based Aegis system and the SM-6 missile to upgrade its own SM-3 missile. Japan also indicated that it would not rule out the possibility of intercepting North Korean missiles flying over its territory. At a meeting of the House of Councilor’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, the Defense Ministry’s Director- General of the Bureau of Defense Policy Satoshi Maeda, when asked about the issue, responded, “Interception would cripple the detonating devices on

12 “Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan,” September 3, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/03/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-call- prime-minister-shinzo-abe-japan. 13 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017. 14 “2018 Budget: Defense Spending Increases for 4 Consecutive Years,” December 23, 2017, https:// mainichi.jp/articles/20171223/ddm/002/010/152000c.

138 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue the missiles, thus avoiding nuclear explosions.”15 Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera also proposed at the House of Representatives’ Committee on Security that any North Korean missiles launched toward areas near the American territory of Guam would be designated as a “situation that provides existential threats for Japan” under the new Legislation for Peace and Security which took effect in March 2016.16 It means that to exert psychological deterrence on North Korea, Japan would be likely to use the right of collective self-defense to authorize a strike on any such missile launched by Pyongyang. Finally, acquiring preemptive capabilities in preparation for striking enemy bases. In its 2018 defense budget, Japan added another 2.2 billion yen to introduce three types of long-range cruise missiles, including installing the Norway-developed joint strike missiles (JSM) on its most advanced F-35 stealth fighter, and equipping its modified F-15 fighter aircraft with the US- developed JASSM-ER missiles and long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM). These efforts would give the Japanese Self-Defense Forces preemptive capabilities, and dramatically expand its striking scale. Despite Japan’s claims that this action is for island defense only, acquiring the ability to strike enemy bases is also an obvious consideration. In addition, Japan has been independently developing high-speed glide bombs for the specific purpose of striking enemy bases.

Tougher unilateral economic sanctions on North Korea Japan’s unilateral sanctions on North Korea, imposed by the Abe government, are actually a follow-up to the US “long-arm jurisdiction” measures, in an attempt to exert greater pressure on an economically battered North Korea. As Abe reiterated, “in response to North Korea’s repeated dangerous provocations, Japan and the United States will cooperate

15 “Nuclear Head Would Not Explode when Intercepted,” August 10, 2017, https://www.jiji.com/jc/ article?k=2017081001165&g=prk. 16 “Japanese Government Strengthens Alert on North Korea in Case of Unforeseen Circumstances,” August 10, 2017, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2017081001193&g=pol.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 139 in increasing pressure such as through further sanctions.”17 As a result of continued development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, Japan has imposed harsher unilateral sanctions. Specifically, since North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in February 2016, Japan has stepped up its punishment against North Korea. Due to Pyongyang’s successive missile launches, with debris falling into Japanese exclusive economic zone, Japan decided on March 28, 2017 to extend its Despite its claimed principles sanctions on North Korea for another two of “dialogue and pressure” years, including an embargo on North and “action for action,” the Korean ships even for humanitarian Abe government’s North purposes and a comprehensive ban on Korean policy is leaning import from and export to the country. more toward “pressure” and After North Korea tested its second “action” with a clear offensive intercontinental Hwasong-14 missile, tendency. Japan’s cabinet passed a resolution to further expand its sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions would not only freeze assets held by those involved in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, but also cover relevant financial services, transportation, and minerals trade, including that of coal. Among the five entities and nine individuals listed as new sanction targets, two Chinese entities already under US sanctions were included in Japan’s list.18 Thus, Japan’s sanction targets expanded to a total of 63 entities and 79 individuals, including those already under UN Security Council sanctions. The targets sanctioned by Japan further grew to 103 entities and 108 individuals after the Japanese cabinet decided to add 19 North Korean entities in December 2017. In order to prevent other countries from transferring commodities to North Korea, the Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force also patrolled on the high seas of the Yellow Sea (west of Korean Peninsula) and the Japanese Sea, and provided relevant intelligence to the US military.

17 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the G7 Taormina Summit,” May 27, 2017. 18 See the additional sanction targets at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000276260.pdf.

140 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue Motives behind Japan’s North Korean Nuclear Policy

Despite Japan’s claims that it would respond to the North Korean nuclear issue under the principles of “dialogue and pressure” and “action for action,”19 the Abe government’s North Korean policy is leaning more toward “pressure” and “action” with a clear offensive tendency, which can be seen as an “increased pressure” policy. The motives behind the policy are complicated.

Playing up security issue in domestic politics The escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis could possibly help the Liberal Democratic Party, which has relatively rich experience in the area of security, to win public support in elections. As the Abe government was embroiled in the Moritomo Gakuen and the Kake Gakuen scandals, there are views within the LDP that focusing on security issues, where the LDP and Abe excel, would help the recovery of approval ratings.20 It is by playing up the North Korean nuclear threat that the LDP won the House of Representatives election in October 2017 and walked out of a dangerous political quagmire. Meanwhile, exaggerating the North Korean nuclear issue would help advance the agenda of constitutional revision and transforming Japan into a major military power, which has long been a goal pursued by the Abe government and domestic conservatives. According to a September 2017 poll by Japan’s Kyodo News, public support for “increased pressure” toward North Korea reached 56.2%.21 Correspondingly, as to the acquisition of strike capabilities against enemy bases, the Japanese public did not register

19 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 193rd Session of the Diet,” January 20, 2017, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201701/1221105_11567.html. 20 “LDP to Prepare for Korean Peninsula Contingency,” September 4, 2017, https://www.nikkei.com/ article/DGXLASFS04H7U_U7A900C1PP8000. 21 “Cabinet Approval Rating Remains at 44.5%: Kyodo Poll,” September 3, 2017, https://www.nikkei. com/article/DGXLASFS03H99_T00C17A9000000.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 141 as strongly a negative response as in the past.22 The Abe government needs to cultivate and maintain the public’s awareness of the North Korean threat in order to accomplish the much-sought-after objective of constitutional revision. In addition, by utilizing the international collective pressure on North Korea, Japan also harbors the intention to bring the issue of North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens back to the spotlight. Since the Japan-DPRK Agreement on Sanctions and Abductees reached in Stockholm in May 2014, the abduction issue has remained at an impasse. When his fourth cabinet was set up on November 1, 2017, Abe labeled both the abduction issue and the nuclear issue as joint priorities, and expressed intention to resolve the former issue at an early date.23 It remains to be seen whether the Abe government can successfully link the nuclear issue, which is of international concern, together with the abduction issue, which is an inherent issue in Japan-DPRK relations.

Fear about materialization of nuclear and missile threats The Abe government, arguing for harsher responses, stressed the stark contrast between the current nuclear threat and previous ones posed by conventional weapons, and pointed out that “the crisis is no longer an idea, but a palpable reality.”24 Considering the relatively premature stage of North Korea’s nuclear strike capability against the United States, and the poor prospect that Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons against South Korea which it regards as belonging to the same nation, it is natural for Japan to think of itself as the most likely target of North Korean nuclear threats and even attacks. In addition, it remains uncertain whether the United States would be able to continue protecting Japan’s security once North Korea exhibited

22 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 3rd edition, 2012, p.182. 23 “Prime Minister Abe Meets the Press,” November 1, 2017, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/ statement/2017/1101kaiken.html. 24 “‘The Crisis Is Palpable Reality,’ LDP Secretary-General Asks for Government Response,” July 29, 2017, http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/170729/plt1707290022-n1.html.

142 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue the capability to strike either the US territories or even the US homeland. Japan worries that an “America First” Trump government would place preventing inter-continental ballistic missiles from threatening the US as its highest priority. The US would be tempted, if the objective was realized, to forgo any attempts to coerce North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons and missiles, instead seeking to maintain the status quo. This potential eventuality, Japan fears, would leave North Korea’s threat to Japan and South Korea neglected. Trump’s predilection for short-term transactions has caused Japan to be concerned about the possibility that the US would make deals directly with North Korea without its awareness. On the other hand, Japan is also obsessed about the uncertainty about the US attitude toward North Korea, which does not rule out using force while simultaneously indicating the intention for dialogue. Obviously, Japan is using the “increased pressure” policy to express its clear position on North Korea and to some degree “kidnap” the United States, to prevent the US escape from the issue and avoid dealing with Pyongyang without international support.

Preventing geopolitical changes in Northeast Asia The Abe government regards the North Korean nuclear issue as a current threat, and believes that with the rise in its capabilities, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles has far exceeded its claimed aims for safeguarding national security, and has led to serve its desire for greater geopolitical influence. A recent report by the Japan Institute for International Affairs pointed out that “the increasing strength of North Korean nuclear strike capabilities would make its objectives go beyond consolidating the current regime and expand to various military goals, including the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.”25 Japan would not like to see the Peninsula reunified by a nuclear-powered North Korea since it

25 Hiroshi Tosaki, “Changes in North Korean Nuclear Issue and Japan’s Deterrence,” Comprehensive Analysis of Situation on the Korean Peninsula and Japan’s Security,” Japan Institute for International Affairs, March 2017, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H28_Korean_Peninsula/13-tosaki.pdf.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 143 would pose potential geopolitical risks to both Japan and the US. Besides, South Korea’s moves under the new situation of the nuclear issue and their implications on Northeast Asian geopolitics push Japan to formulate an active response. Despite the Moon Jae-in government’s opposition to nuclear weapons, domestic views favoring a nuclear-armed South Korea are on the rise. At a meeting with US Defense Secretary James Mattis, South Korea’s Defense Minister Song Young-moo also talked about the issue of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons. According to an August 2017 poll by the South Korean newspaper Munhwa Ilbo, the public approval rating for nuclear deployment rose to 62.8%, much higher than the 34.8% who opposed.26 Undoubtedly, Japan would not like to see South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, since this would dramatically change the strategic environment in Northeast Asia and affect Japan itself. A nuclear- equipped South Korea would destabilize the current ROK-US alliance, and disrupt the established order of the US-Japan-ROK security cooperation. A change in security environment and the modus operandi of current security cooperation would lead to changes in the geopolitical structure of Northeast Asia, which is more of a concern to Japan than the nuclear issue.

Exhibiting leadership in nonproliferation and regional security From the trend to become a “great political power” and make “contributions of an international state” in the 1980s, to the current idea of “active pacifism,” Japan has been pursuing greater international influence and leadership, with a focus on major regional and international hotspot issues. Due to its unique history of being stricken by atomic bombs, Japan is especially active in its pursuit of a leadership role in international nuclear nonproliferation. The Abe government worries that the spiraling escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis could lead to a breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation system. As Abe once indicated, “This could send out the wrong signal to forces around the world that have ambitions of

26 “Tactical Nuclear Redeployment: South Korean Defense Minister’s Remarks Break Taboo,” September 3, 2017, http://www.sankei.com/world/news/170903/wor1709030001-n1.html.

144 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue secretly engaging in nuclear and missile development. If we leave this issue unchecked there is a real danger that security threats could proliferate around the world like an infectious disease.”27 Thus, he emphasized the “common goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”28 In Abe’s opinion, North Korea’s incessant activities that challenge the established international nonproliferation regime have proved that “dialogue for the sake of dialogue would be meaningless,” and North Korea has to choose between “denuclearization” and “collapse.” Furthermore, the Abe government is deliberately distinguishing itself from China on the North Korean nuclear issue, which reflects its desire to pursue a more consequential leadership role in regional security matters. Masashi Nishihara, President of Japan’s Research Institute for Peace and Security, believes that Trump’s reliance on China in preventing North Korean nuclear and missile development is “dangerous diplomacy” that would lower the US status in Asia. “What if President Xi stopped North Korea’s nuclear and missile development? China’s influence on the Korean Peninsula and especially South Korea would increase,” he concluded, and thus favored a US-Japan-ROK dominated approach in resolving this issue. The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang also pointed out that Japan’s efforts to present an image of the most dominant player in regional security issues reflected its “selfish intention of enhancing presence in regional issues.” 29

Implications of Japan’s North Korean Nuclear Policy

Japan’s North Korean nuclear policy is an outcome of the abovementioned self-interests, and is unsustainable because of the following reasons. First and foremost, Japan’s peripheral status in the North Korean

27 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the G7 Taormina Summit,” May 27, 2017. 28 “Comment by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, on the Adoption of a Resolution by the United Nations Security Council Concerning North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Other Activities,” September 12, 2017, https:// japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201709/1224450_11585.html. 29 “Behind Japan’s Reckless Actions Following the United States,” Korean Central News Agency, August 4, 2017.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 145 nuclear issue and its inadequate capabilities would limit its role in solving the issue. Due to constitutional constraints and a lack of wherewithal and formal diplomatic relations with North Korea, Japan would only play a minor role in resolving the nuclear issue. Since Japan is inevitably constrained by the US policy on North Korea, its “increased pressure” strategy will also face the dilemma of “small horse pulling a big cart.” Second, it would be difficult for the US-Japan-ROK core, which is desired by Japan, to materialize. Strengthening security cooperation with South Korea has been a key component of Japan’s “increased pressure” policy. However, due to historical and territorial disputes, as well as Japan’s excessive demonization of North Korea, the Japan-ROK security cooperation has been a missing part in the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relations. Japan’s support for and in contrast South Korea’s opposition to the tripartite military exercise proposed by the US in November 2017 revealed the mistrust. The bilateral relations are even likely to turn sourer due to the territorial dispute and the “comfort women” issue. Third, Japan’s policy is ineffective, and does not provide the right remedy for the crux of the nuclear issue. Although its proposal of a “ring of encirclement” against North Korea could theoretically win support from many countries, it has encountered a major setback in the critically important Northeast Asian region. It would be futile for Japan to bring peripheral non-stakeholders in to enclose the core players, which would also leave vulnerable places for North Korea to break through. If the “increased pressure” policy caused tensions in the established regional security situation, Japan’s long-standing image as a benign power would be greatly tarnished, and its status in future peace negotiations would be substantially weakened. In addition, Japan’s focus on and strengthening of its security could only induce antagonism and distrust from North and South Koreas as well as other neighboring countries, further hurting Japan’s regional leadership role. Moreover, since North Korea’s economy is relatively closed and not heavily reliant on the outside world, continued economic sanctions would have little coercive effect, while running the risk of causing humanitarian crises and a

146 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue security dilemma that pushes North Korea even further away. Lastly, Japan’s North Korean nuclear policy originates more from its own political and security interests, and lacks constructive concerns for regional security. The shortsightedness could make it difficult to bring about effective change. Besides, Japan’s public opinion does not support such tough positions on North Korea, and leans more toward diplomatic engagement. A Genron NPO poll in late 2017 showed that 20.6% of Japanese supported the view that “US military action toward North Korea is necessary,” while 48.3% opposed to this view.30 As to “the most effective solution to the North Korean nuclear issue,” 15.5% of the respondents identified with “multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the Six-Party Talks,” higher than the 8.4% figure supporting “the United States’ military action.”31 Japan’s North Korean nuclear policy would not only be ineffective in making North Korea give up its nuclear and missile programs, but would also run the risk of increasing the country’s perceived insecurity, bringing about a complex series of impacts which would hinder both the resolution of the nuclear issue and the development of regional inter-state relations. First, it would hinder the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and run the risk of wars. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is complex and sensitive, and requires prudent words and actions by relevant parties. Mutual display of force only serves to devolve this issue toward an old path of tension and escalation. The “suspension for suspension” (North Korea suspends its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the suspension of large-scale US-ROK military exercises) and the “dual-track approach” (parallel process of denuclearizing the peninsula and establishing a peace mechanism) advocated by China, together with Russia’s proposal of engaging in political dialogue and solving this issue in steps, both argue for the cooling of tensions as the first priority and place more emphasis on

30 “Military Action toward North Korea Supported by 30% Americans and 20% Japanese,” December 29, 2017, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20171229/ddm/007/030/048000c. 31 “37% in the US Support Recognition of North Korea as Nuclear State,” December 29, 2017, https:// www.asahi.com/articles/ASKDY0GCHKDXUHBI01V.html?iref=comtop_8_05.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 147 dialogue. South Korea stresses the necessity to prevent wars by all means. The United States has also not ruled out dialogue as one of the “options on the table.” As one party to the Six-Party Talks, Japan’s “increased pressure” policy would inevitably upset cooperation among other nations on the North Korean nuclear issue, and run counter to their peaceful efforts. Japan’s policy also risks embroiling itself The situation on the Korean in war. North Korea once warned that Peninsula is complex and “Japan’s imprudent actions had crossed sensitive, and requires prudent over the red line,” which would be words and actions by relevant “doomed to suffer merciless strikes by parties. Mutual display of the nuclear iron fist” with “everything force only serves to devolve in Japan burning down to ashes.”32 this issue toward an old path North Korea would regard any Japanese of tension and escalation. interception of its missiles as the declaration of war, and Tokyo might face North Korean missile attacks as a result. Second, it would aggravate regional security dilemma. The increasingly aggressive role and increased militarization of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will put the region on alert and decrease the region’s sense of security. Japan’s claim that it would “legally” intercept North Korean missiles for the safety of its allies would undoubtedly make the new Legislation for Peace and Security of 2015 a worrying move for those who are concerned about Japan’s future security trajectory. The acquisition of preemptive strike capabilities would make Japan’s “purely defensive defense” policy more vulnerable. Not only does the Japanese government now regard striking enemy bases as constitutional, as to the adoption of preemptive measures, Japan’s Defense Ministry also asserted that “all means would not be ruled out.”33 To effectively strike against enemy bases, the enemy’s radar

32 “Commentary: No Reckless Actions in the Face of Merciless Nuclear Iron Fist,” Rodong Sinmun, November 20, 2017. 33 “Attacks on Enemy Bases Not Ruled Out: Defense Minister Tomomi Inada,” March 9, 2017, http:// www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/politics/list/201703/CK2017030902000258.html.

148 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue system would have to be paralyzed and precision-guide missiles be required, which would greatly change Japan’s current defense network and give rise to regional arms race. Meanwhile, Japan’s introduction of the land-based Aegis system, which is a component of the US Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system, would further aggravate the security dilemma in Northeast Asia. Russia would regard this move as part of the US effort to expand its global missile defense network, which would form a pincer-shaped blockade on Russia from both east and west, and may “undermine strategic stability in the northern part of the Pacific.”34 Moscow also considers the land-based Aegis system, capable of launching the Tomahawk cruise missile, likely to change the balance of power in East Asia and cause negative impacts on Russia-Japan security relations.35 China also believes the issue “bears on global strategic stability and the mutual trust between major countries,” and hopes that Japan can “act cautiously.”36 As concluded by a report from Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, the expansion of military activities will suffer substantial negative impacts. Third, it would destabilize the US-Japan “spear and shield” relationship. The United States has intended to push Japan to strengthen its arms. President Trump, before taking office, denounced the US role as the world police and called on Japan to defend against North Korea by itself. In response, Japan has adopted a policy of “rational realism.” On one hand, Japan sticks to its post-war path and strengthens cooperation with the US, allowing its Self-Defense Forces to support the US military in more meaningful ways and fulfilling its obligations as an US ally. It is hoped by Japan that by changing itself the US would remain to address the North Korean nuclear issue. On the other hand, Japan is endeavoring

34 “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, August 24, 2017,” http://www. mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2844695#8. 35 “Japan’s Land-Based Aegis System Has Adverse Impacts: Russian Spokesperson,” December 28, 2017, http://www.sankei.com/world/news/171228/wor1712280048-n1.html. 36 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on August 21, 2017,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1486314.shtml; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on December 19, 2017,” http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1520766.shtml.

The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue May/June 2018 149 to boost its own security capabilities. However, the actions will reverse the post-war bilateral security relations where the US is the “spear” and Japan the “shield.” Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera once made it clear that Japan, “while strengthening its missile defense as the shield, should have cruise missiles as the spear.” In his opinion, Japan needs to have the “spear” capability against North With an inward-looking Korean missiles, despite that the burden United States, Abe’s pursuit is currently shouldered by the United of militarization, under the States.37 This move would be the decisive banner of “active pacifism,” Japanese factor behind an ultimate would speed up Japan’s pace power shift in the US-Japan security to become an “offensive relationship. Prime Minister Abe once spear.” declined to discuss “strike capabilities against enemy bases” because “in the division of responsibilities between Japan and the US, Japan would rely on the US for enemy base-striking capability.”38 However, not long after that, Japan decided to introduce cruise missiles as a step to actively pursue capability of the “spear.” With an inward-looking United States, Abe’s pursuit of militarization, under the banner of “active pacifism,” would speed up Japan’s pace to become an “offensive spear.” By that time, Japan would replace the US to play a bigger role in regional security, and change the US-Japan security alliance from within. Fourth, it would damage mutual trust between China and Japan. Japan’s exaggeration of China’s responsibility and capability to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis, and its frequent discrediting of China on the issue, would greatly damage the mutual trust and cooperation between the two countries. Japan’s unilateral sanctions on North Korea have not only imposed a reputation cost on China, but also impinged on China’s sovereignty on

37 “Should Japan Acquire Strike Capabilities against Enemy Bases? Former Defense Minister Onodera’s Opinion,” April 12, 2017, http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASK47778GK47UTFK01N.html?iref=pc_rellink. 38 “Strike Capability against Enemy Bases Not Reviewed: Prime Minister,” August 7, 2017, https:// mainichi.jp/articles/20170807/k00/00m/010/061000c.

150 China International Studies The Abe Government’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Issue regulating its enterprises according to domestic laws. As pointed out by spokesperson of Chinese Foreign Ministry, “We will investigate and deal with the Chinese enterprises and individuals in accordance with our own domestic laws and regulations provided that they are suspected of violating the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council,” and “oppose unilateral sanctions imposed by any country outside the framework of the Security Council.”39 Besides, Japan is currently strengthening its missile defense network in the name of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat, while disguising the real intention to target China. Japan’s actions, if unabated, would damage the security trust between the two sides, and affect future cooperation on both the Korean Peninsula and the broader Northeast Asian region.

Conclusion

The North Korean nuclear issue is of relevance to both regional and global security, and it would be in each party’s interests to realize, through peaceful means, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, compared with other stake-holding countries, the Abe government’s North Korean nuclear policy lacks a design for peace process on the Peninsula. It is both irresponsible and unhelpful for resolving the issue, and runs the risk of further escalation of tensions. The best way forward for crisis management would be to bring it under control before it escalates, keeping the cost and negative consequences at the lowest level. An ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue thus still requires that relevant parties return to the path of peaceful dialogue. Japan should, at the earliest date, join the efforts of other regional countries, and bring the nuclear issue back to the track of negotiation and dialogue. In this way, Japan can truly play a more constructive role in maintaining regional peace.

39 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on August 23, 2017,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1486875.shtml; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on July 28, 2017,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1480900.shtml.

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