KUWAIT COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Harrison M. Symmes 1953-1955 Principal Officer, Kuwait City illiam A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1954-1956 Vice Consul, Kuwait City illiam D. (rewer 1955-1957 Principal Officer, Kuwait City Talcott . Seelye 1956-1960 Consular-,conomic Officer, Kuwait City Joan Seelye 1956-1960 Spouse of Consular-,conomic Officer, Kuwait City James A. Plac-e 1959-1961 ,conomic Officer, (a.hdad, 1ra2 Dayton S. Ma- 1961-1963 Char.e d3 Affaires, Kuwait City Nicholas Shapiro 5a-as 1962-1964 ,conomic Officer, Kuwait City illiam A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1963 Char.e d3 Affaires, Kuwait City Charles O. Cecil 1966-1968 8otation Officer, Kuwait City James A. Plac-e 1966-1969 ,conomic Officer, Kuwait City illiam D. olle 1968-1970 Deputy Chief of Mission, Kuwait City 9eor.e :uincey 5umsden 1969-1972 ,conomic Officer, Kuwait City 1972-1974 Des- Officer, Kuwait, (ahrain, :atar, UA,, ashin.ton, DC alter M. McClelland 1970-1974 Deputy Chief Of Mission, Kuwait City Fran=ois M. Dic-man 1972-1976 State Department, Arabian Peninsula Des-, ashin.ton, DC 8ichard . (o.osian 1972-1976 ,conomic Officer, Kuwait City illiam A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1972-1976 Ambassador, Kuwait 8ichard ,. Undeland 1974-1975 Public Affairs Officer, US1S, Kuwait City Fran- ,. Maestrone 1976-1979 Ambassador, Kuwait Fran=ois M. Dic-man 1979-1983 Ambassador, Kuwait (roo-s rampelmeier 1980-1982 Deputy Chief Of Mission, Kuwait City Anthony :uainton 1984-1987 Ambassador, Kuwait Kenneth A. Stammerman 1987-1989 ,conomic Counselor, Kuwait City 1989-1992 Consul 9eneral, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Dou.las 8. Keene 1989-1990 Director, Arab Peninsula Affairs, ashin.ton, DC Morton 1. Abramowitz 1989-1991 Ambassador, Tur-ey Paul H. Tyson 1989-1993 ,conomic Officer, 5ondon, ,n.land Howard (. Schaffer 1990 Kuwait Tas- Force, ashin.ton, DC 5awrence Hydle 1990-1991 Kuwait Tas- Force, ashin.ton, DC Mary A. 8yan 1990-1991 Kuwait Tas- Force, ashin.ton, DC John T. McCarthy 1990-1994 Ambassador, Tunisia David ,. 8euther 1991-1992 Political Officer (TDA), Kuwait City 8ichard McKee 1991-1993 Office Director, Arabian Peninsula, ashin.ton, DC Paul H. Tyson 1993-1996 ,conomic Counselor, Kuwait City HARRISON M. SYMMES Principal Officer K wait City (1953-1955) Harrison M. Symmes was born in North Carolina in 1921. He graduated from the University of North Carolina with an A.B. in 1942, and completed an M.A. at George Washington University in 1948. He served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1946. Mr. Symmes joined the Foreign Service in 1947. In addition to Egypt, he was posted to Damascus, Kuwait, Libya, and Jordan. Mr. Symmes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989. :C 2here3s the reverse side of the coin there. I3d li4e to move on now to your first post after Arabic training. 5ou had what seems li4e a dream post, going to Kuwait--this is 1978 to 1977-- as principal officer. How did this assignment come about and what were your responsibilities9 SAMM,SC ell, thatDs very stran.e because 1 remember when we were bein. briefed in the Forei.n Service 1nstitute by people from the Near ,ast. One of these persons 1 referred to earlier who impressed me very much said, EThose of you who are not specializin. in ,uropean affairs may find the easiest way to .et to 5ondon or Paris or Madrid or 8ome is to become a Near ,astern specialist, because there are three positions in 5ondon, two in Paris, and so on down the line for which you can 2ualify in your mid to more senior .rades as a specialist.E And 1 can recall that when 1 too- Arabic that was one of the thou.hts that entered my mind. EThis is how 1Dm .oin. to .et to 5ondon.E F5au.hterG On the other hand, we reco.nized, those of us who were interested in the Arab world, that it had some pretty despicable posts. 1 can recall a collea.ue of mine who served in both Port Said and in Aden who said he had served at both orifices of the 8ed Sea. F5au.hterG And he didnDt mean the oral orifice when he was tal-in. about this. F5au.hterG So we -new there were a certain number of unhealthful and hardship posts at which we would be as-ed to serve. 1 had studied Arabic on my own in ,.ypt and made some pro.ress. The Department found out about this, and then 1 was .iven money to spend an hour or two a day studyin. collo2uial Arabic in Syria. 1 had made considerable pro.ress in Arabic, and so when 1 applied to ta-e lan.ua.e and area trainin. in ashin.ton--it was for a yearDs assi.nment-- 1Dd made a decision that, EO-ay. eDre .oin. to do this because, 1Dm terribly interested in it. 1t has any number of challen.in. problems. 1tDs a -ey area of the world. 1tDs poorly understood. 1 thin- 1 can ma-e a contribution of some -ind. 1t has some stin-in. posts and so what weDll have to do is ta-e those stin-in. posts when weDre youn. and can face up to them and then hopefully .et some .ood posts later on.E So after 1Dd finished my trainin., and weDd had delays in promotion because of McCarthyism and John Foster Dulles comin. in and so on, 1 saw the opportunity to have my own post in Kuwait as a tremendous one. So we went into it with our eyes open but perhaps not open enou.h, and it was a terribly difficult post physically. 1 can .o into some of the reasons if you want. First of all, my predecessor had done almost nothin. to fix up the post and ma-e it habitable. For example, when 1 arrived, the ConsulateDs accounts had not been sent in for six months. The office was just incredibly disor.anized, even chaotic. 1 went there with my wife and two small children, one only five months old and one just over two years. e had a hell of a time with the livin. conditions. (ut we fi.ured weDd .et this behind us and then weDd be 2ualified for somethin. better. Another factor was that we would be in char.e. eDd be runnin. the post. :C What was our interest and what was the situation in Kuwait9 We3re tal4ing about 378 to 377. SAMM,SC The really productive, what you mi.ht call .usher oil wells, had just been discovered in Kuwait prior to my arrivin. there. The Kuwait oil concession was jointly owned by (ritish and American interests, the American interest bein. 9ulf Oil. And down in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Jone, a .roup of other American oil companies had .otten a concession. The oil reserves in the Middle ,ast had been a matter of deep contention between the (ritish and the American .overnments for decades, even before the First orld ar. 1t was with .reat difficulty that 9ulf and other American companies had mana.ed to obtain concessions, and this was a continuin. concern to us. 1n other words, we watched how the (ritish dealt with their concessions, because if they messed them up as they had done to a certain extent in 1ran just before 1953, to that de.ree concessions all over the place would be messed up. So our concern was for the American ownership of those concessions in Kuwait, for how the (ritish dealt with their concession, and then the lar.er strate.ic interests that 1Dve referred to, that is the so-called Soviet march to the Persian 9ulf, or the desire to come down and ta-e over the oil fields because the Soviets -new about these oil fields, as well. That was the main strate.ic interest there and why we had a consulate. Our consulate when 1 went there in D53 was only two years old. 1t had been opened in D51 with .reat difficulty because the (ritish did not want us to have a presence there. e were the only other country represented in Kuwait. The (ritish had what was called a special political relationship with Kuwait. That special political relationship meant that the (ritish .overnment was responsible for the defense and forei.n affairs of Kuwait. The political formula went on to say that Kuwait was an independent shei-hdom in special treaty relationship with the (ritish .overnment. The (ritish had let us in, but they were very unhappy about our bein. there. So 1 found, as my predecessor and subse2uent people found, also, that one of the thin.s we had to do was to secure our relationship with the (ritish and to ma-e sure that we didnDt disturb them too much. The (ritish personnel who staffed what was called a political a.ency in Kuwait and the political residency in (ahrain were mostly people who had come out of the (ritish political service in 1ndia, the 1ndian civil service and political service. :C ,ndia having achieved its independence a few years before. SAMM,SC ThatDs ri.ht. They were colored with the 8aI mentality 1 must tell you. Some of them had also come out of the Sudan political service, but it was a colonialistsD mentality. There were exceptions. There were some very fine (ritish people that 1 met in the 9ulf. (ut there was that mentality, and they tended to see us as usurpers. And also they thou.ht we had some very bad ideas about how to treat the local people and so on.