Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark: the SIOP Option That Wasn’T Bruce G

THE DEFENSE MONITOR

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Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark: The SIOP Option that Wasn’t Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., President

ONE OF THE MOST RAREFIED experiences From the time of this highly planet – 30 minutes from Russia to of a newly installed president is his classified orientation briefing given the American heartland – or from receiving of the “nuclear football” immediately upon his assumption submarines lurking off the U.S. conferring the right to order the of the presidency through the end coasts – 10 to 15 minutes to Wash- use of nuclear weapons in defense of his tenure, a president is made ington, D.C. – puts the president in of the American national interest. to believe that he is the nuclear the hot seat. He must evaluate early Few, if any, presidents have had quarterback in control of the nuclear warning information, weigh his a firm grip on the “football” how- football and would call the shots in response options, and render a deci- ever, as all U.S. presidents receive a the event of a nuclear showdown or sion within minutes and seconds. misleading briefing on their nuclear enemy missile attack. In the latter Given the awesome responsibility weapons rights and responsibilities, case, the short flight time of missiles and authority of the commander and options. launched from half way around the CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

Beware the Phony Defense Budget Prognosticators Winslow Wheeler, Visiting Senior Fellow. This article is based on a commentary that ﬁrst appeared in Defense Week, Feb. 2, 2004. Copyrighted material reproduced here with permission.

IN FEBRUARY 2004 the Bush adminis- said it was set at $380 billion, others tion neutral) growth in the defense tration rolled out its fiscal year 2005 that it was $400 billion, and still others budget from 2004 to 2005. Few of those defense budget. Many of the things $462 billion. They are all correct: the calculations across papers will agree. journalists will write about it will Department of Defense (DoD) spent Last year, The Washington Post had it be – and already have been – con- $380 billion for peacetime operations; at 4.4 percent, The Wall Street Journal fusing, if not misleading, and many adding Department of Energy and had it at 4.2 percent, Bloomberg news of the prognostications from Capitol other non-Pentagon defense spending service had it at 3.8 percent, and a Hill, the Pentagon and the presiden- brought it to $400 billion; and with Iraq well-distributed trade journal, Defense tial candidates will be quite phony. and Afghanistan operations – that is, News, had it at 6.5 percent. This year, The press started out with a literal to actually use our forces – it cost a The Washington Post has already had confusion of numbers. A comparison grand total of $462 billion. However, it at both 5.7 percent and 7.9 percent. across different newspaper articles almost none of the articles explained Don’t bother paying much attention. showed that they cannot agree on these differences. First, we may not even know the the levels for the new budget, or even The press sows more chaos with size of the old 2004 defense budget, the old one. For fiscal year 2004, some what articles say is “real” (i.e. infla- CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

Volume XXXIII • No. 2 The Defense Monitor • 1 NUCLEAR DARK tually geared to withhold retaliation onslaught and then take stock of the in the event of enemy missile attack, proper course of action exists only CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1 real or apparent. It is so greased for on paper. That is what presidents in chief in a situation of apparent the rapid release of U.S. missiles by never learn during their tenures. incoming nuclear missiles, one can the thousands upon the receipt of Their real control is illusory. What’s only hope for a deliberate, rational attack indications from early warn- more, the truth has been kept from act of leadership and prudence that ing satellites and ground radar that the presidents intentionally. impels a president to refrain from the president’s options are not all Military nuclear commanders ordering retaliation in the event of created equal. The bias in favor of designed the hardware and pro- a false alarm triggered by faulty launch on electronic warning is so cedures of emergency decision- sensors or human error. powerful that it would take enor- making to ensure that no president What is misleading about the mously more presidential will to would actually deliberately opt to brieﬁng is that the president’s sup- withhold an attack than to autho- ride out a Soviet nuclear attack, even porting command system is not ac- rize it. The option to “ride out” the though U.S. nuclear policy endorsed

Another Episode: The Case of the Missing “Permissive Action Links”

Last January, I asked Robert McNamara, the secre- order to circumvent this safeguard. During the tary of defense during the Kennedy and Johnson early to mid-1970s, during my stint as a Minuteman administrations, what he believed back in the 1960s launch officer, they still had not been changed. was the status of technical locks on the Minuteman Our launch checklist in fact instructed us, the firing intercontinental missiles. These long-range nuclear- crew, to double-check the locking panel in our un- tipped missiles first came on line during the Cuban derground launch bunker to ensure that no digits missile crisis and grew to a force of 1,000 during other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the McNamara years – the backbone of the U.S. the panel. SAC remained far less concerned about strategic deterrent through the late 1960s. McNa- unauthorized launches than about the potential mara replied, in his trademark, assertively confident of these safeguards to interfere with the imple- manner that he personally saw to it that these mentation of wartime launch orders. And so the special locks (known as “Permissive Action Links”) “secret unlock code” during the height of the were installed on the Minuteman force, and that he nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant regarded them as essential to strict central control at 00000000. and preventing unauthorized launch. After leaving the Air Force in 1974, I pressed the When the history of the nuclear Cold War is service, initially by letters addressed to it and then finally comprehensively written, this McNamara through congressional intermediaries, to consider vignette will be one of a long litany of items point- a range of terrorist scenarios in which these locks ing to the ignorance of presidents and defense sec- could serve as crucial barriers against the unau- retaries and other nuclear security officials about thorized seizure of launch control over Minute- the true state of nuclear affairs during their time man missiles. In 1977, I co-authored (with Garry in the saddle. What I then told McNamara about Brewer) an article entitled “The Terrorist Threat to his vitally important locks elicited this response: World Nuclear Programs” in the Journal of Conflict “I am shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Resolution in which I laid out the case for taking Who the hell authorized that?” What he had just this threat more seriously and suggesting remedial learned from me was that the locks had been in- measures including, first and foremost, activat- stalled, but everyone knew the combination. ing those McNamara locks that apparently he and The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha presidents presumed had already been activated. quietly decided to set the “locks” to all zeros in The locks were activated in 1977.

2 • The Defense Monitor Volume XXXIII • No. 2 second-strike retaliation – assured very principle. Almost no senior on LOW. For Nunn, however, it was destruction – as the essential ele- civilian official, let alone president, clear that the apparatus of nuclear ment of U.S. deterrent strategy. ever caught on to the egregious de- control and release was geared to While the rhetoric of top civilian ception that kept them in the dark do just that. If it looked, sounded, officials, the theories of academics, about their true options in wartime. and walked like a LOW duck, then the media accounts, and the debates One exception was former Sen. Sam call it a LOW duck. Nunn declared on Capitol Hill revolved around Nunn, D-Ga. His close scrutiny of it a duck, understood that this duck the necessity and sufficiency of be- nuclear affairs, combined with a carried serious risks of starting a ing able to retaliate massively after keen intellect, led him to realize that nuclear war by accident, and pro- absorbing a full-scale Soviet strike, the United States long ago adopted ceeded to call for a relaxation of the the nuclear commanders had long a strategy of launch on warning nuclear hair-trigger on both U.S. and since jettisoned this principle. They Russian missiles in order to alleviate knew full well that the U.S. nuclear this danger. command system would collapse Nunn almost certainly did not under the weight of such a Soviet Almost no senior civilian fully grasp the commitment to LOW first strike, and that their ability to embodied in the nuclear operational carry out their war plan (the Single official, let alone president, world, however. Only the most se- Integrated Operational Plan, or nior nuclear generals understood the SIOP) and achieve the high level of ever caught on to the imperative, and they simply refused destruction of Soviet military and to admit it, owing to their justifiable industrial facilities required by the egregious deception apprehension that such an admis- war plan (which they themselves sion would stir enormous public con- set at such high levels) depended that kept them in the troversy and almost certainly force completely on not waiting more them to revise operational practices than a few minutes before initiating dark about their true in ways that would put the viability a large-scale counterattack. Riding of the U.S. SIOP in jeopardy. out was not a practical choice in the options in wartime. My efforts to expose the hair- real world, and so the operational trigger status of U.S. and Russian system was geared so that presiden- nuclear forces and their reliance on tial approval to unleash U.S. strate- LOW have been met with vigorous gic forces before the first incoming (LOW) – that is ordering and car- denials from the nuclear brass. The Soviet missile reached America rying out U.S. missile launches after efforts have been well-grounded in would be obtained. And if for some early warning sensors indicate an personal experience, confidences reason timely presidential authori- incoming nuclear missile strike with senior U.S. nuclear generals, zation could not be secured, launch but before enemy missiles hit their facts and analysis assembled in ar- authority quickly cascaded down targets on American soil. He came ticles and books – notably, Strategic the military chain of command to to this realization quite indepen- Command and Control (Brookings, ensure that U.S. missiles did not dently, without helpful testimony 1985), The Logic of Accidental Nuclear remain sitting ducks for very long. from strategic nuclear commanders War (Brookings, 1993), and Global Presidents were innocent victims who doggedly denied their reliance Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Brook- of the prevailing overarching prin- on LOW in public, and virtually all ings, 1995). But neither this body of ciple of deterrence based on second- private, fora. The official dogma work nor any other clarion call from strike retaliation, never the wiser they expressed was that the United any quarter succeeded in engender- to the thorough-going engineering States had the capability to launch ing a national debate and reckoning. of the complex early warning and on warning and a potential adver- And the nuclear brass never stepped command system operations so sary should not assume that a U.S. forward to testify candidly about as to deny them any semblance of attack would be ridden out, but the true state of affairs – about the wartime options aligned with that that the United States did not rely CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

Volume XXXIII • No. 2 The Defense Monitor • 3 (nicknamed Rods from God) de- world – with the exception of the assets – resulting in itchy trigger signed to burst from space into the United States – have expressed a fingers during a crisis. Indeed, past atmosphere at high speeds and desire to ban space weapons under Pentagon war games have found that slam into deeply buried bunkers. an international treaty. The U.S. use of space weapons often led to rapid Far from being aimed solely at the military’s obvious interest in space escalation of hostilities – in some cases protection of U.S. space capabilities, weapons, however, has led some straight to all-out nuclear war. such weapons are instead intended countries, such as China and India, Finally, destroying satellites will for offensive, first-strike missions. to consider countering with their create debris, already recognized by Tauscher is right to be concerned own anti-space programs. the international space community as about the wisdom of the Air Force A space arms race would have a threat to future safe operations in plans. U.S. unilateral weaponization no true winners. Launching and space. Tauscher has taken a first step of space is likely to set off a space maintaining satellites and spacecraft toward forcing the “space hawks” in arms race that in the long run will is exorbitantly expensive. Satellites the Bush administration to explain undercut, rather than enhance, U.S. also are inherently vulnerable; there- their misguided goal of space domin- national security and global stabil- fore space-based weapons would be ion. Here’s hoping others in Congress ity. Up to now, most nations of the high-value, “use them or lose them” will follow her lead. ■

NUCLEAR DARK you believe you have incontrovertible president’s decision process toward proof that warheads actually are on launch before the arrival of the first CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3 the way. . . . Our policy was premised enemy warhead.” (Jonathan Schell, illusory nuclear flexibility of the on being able to accept the first wave The Gift of Time, Metropolitan Books, president. of attacks. We never said publicly 1998, pp. 191-194). To his great credit, one senior that we were committed to launch This admission should go down in general spoke candidly of the matter on warning or launch under attack. the annals of nuclear truth-in-pack- soon after retiring from his exalted Yet at the operational level it was aging, but I am afraid that no presi- position as commander in chief of never accepted that if the presidential dent is reading the fine print on the the Strategic Command in 1994. decisions went to a certain tick of the label of his “nuclear football.” Maybe Former Air Force Gen. George Lee clock, we would lose a major portion hardly anybody cares any more about Butler gave an interview in which of our forces. . . . Notwithstanding this state of affairs. But they should the truth was finally laid bare for all the intention of deterrence as it is care, because the nuclear hair-trig- to read. Here are some excerpts: expressed at the policy level – as it is ger constitutes a continuing danger “Part of the insidiousness of the declared and written down – at the of apocalyptic proportions, and the evolution of this system . . . is the un- level of operations those intentions folks behind the scenes who qui- fortunate fact that, whatever might got turned on their head, as the etly turn high-level policy intention have been intended by the policymak- people who are responsible for actu- on its head, still cannot immunize ers (who, incidentally, had very little ally devising the war plan faced the their launch on warning configured insight into the mechanisms that dilemmas and blind alleys of concrete system from the confusion and false underpinned the simple words that practice. Those mattered absolutely to alarms that could trigger an inad- floated onto a blank page at the level the people who had to sit down and vertent nuclear exchange. The early of the White House), in reality, at the try to frame the detailed guidance to warning and command systems on operational level, the requirements exact destruction of 80 percent of the both sides are inherently susceptible of deterrence proved impracticable. adversary’s nuclear forces. When they to mistakes and technical malfunc- . . . The consequence was a move in realized that they could not in fact tions, and serious false alarms of in- practice to a system structured to assure those levels of damage if the coming nuclear strikes have occurred drive the president invariably toward president chose to ride out an attack, on both sides since the official end of a decision to launch under attack. what then did they do? They built a the Cold War. Let the holders of the . . . Launch under attack means that construct that powerfully biased the nuclear footballs beware. ■

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