chapter 13 The Tragedy of and the Philosophy of Tragedy (Sergey N. Bulgakov and Lev I. Shestov)

Vladimir N. Porus

Abstract

The tragedy of Bulgakov is the tragedy of philosophy. The tragedy of Shestov is the phi- losophy of tragedy. Tragedy is a key word; it is therein that the thoughts of both philoso- phers overlap. From the standpoint of Bulgakov, the tragedy of being is not to be solved in the “philosophy of tragedy,” for this philosophy itself is not tragic; it does not live in tragedy, but only on it. Bulgakov’s idea of uniting and philosophy should have seemed intolerably false to Shestov as, in his opinion, it could only lead to deviation from , to its blending into philosophy and not to the latter’s rising to the knowledge of . “The tragedy of philosophy,” according to Bulgakov, is, first of all, recognition of the insolvability of the main tasks philosophical is setting for itself: looking into the causes of evil in the world, the possibility of freedom, the sense of history, and the unity of things in the great Whole. The form taken by this tragedy is antinomianism.

Keywords tragedy of philosophy – philosophy of tragedy – reason – faith – antinomianism – being – philosophy of history

Humanity has entered the third millennium without that it somehow will manage to escape global disasters. The cruel experience of the past years does not strengthen this belief but rather calls it into question. However, the irony of our time is that the global threats (environmental, economic, military, etc.) have become so usual that being reminded of them engenders boredom. We have become accustomed to their existence and drive a thought of their inevitability away from us. Otherwise, we would find living to be too difficult, if at all possible. People realize the tragic nature of being at the crucial moments of their lives. The existentialists of the 20th century used to call such moments “limit situa- tions.” At such moment Being reveals its true nature to individuals and throws

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The Tragedy of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Tragedy 193 off “the veil of Maya.” The same might be happening to peoples, nations, and cultures. Philosophy (along with art) has always been the self-consciousness of humanity. In the “limit situations” it is imbued with tragedy. This feature appears to be of two kinds: philosophy is awareness of tragedy and, at the same time, participation in it. A rationalist just pretends to be able “not to weep, not to laugh, not to turn one’s back but to understand.” Take a good look at the eyes of Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza. Nevertheless, Spinoza and “The Unhappiest One” of Søren Kierkegaard often have a “right-of-way” lying between them as well as mutual distrust growing into hostility. The Russian philosophy of the first half of the recently expired century was not only a “sensorium commune” of world tragedy but realized the greatest ordeal therein. What is a way to keep dignity in a situation with no favorable outcome? Is it to remain human in the inhuman world captured by the mad- ding whirlwind of history? Is it to keep deep inside an ability to see the light in the pitch darkness? These questions sound today as relevant as at the time when Sergey N. Bulgakov and Lev I. Shestov were putting them to each other. Their dispute in absentio still remains an important spiritual lesson for us. … “For various reasons I find it difficult to write about the world view of Shestov,” Bulgakov used to confess. At the time when the main works of Shestov were already widely known, Bulgakov, who knew the author well and treated him with respect and sympathy, did not pay interest to these “writings.” However, the theological quest of Bulgakov, as well as of other Russian religious thinkers of that time, was to all appearance of the same low interest to Shestov. (Shestov doubted their trueness; he did not trust the religious exercises of “intelligen- tsia,” in particular when they were claiming transformation of faith and “refor- mation.” As he thought, coming to believe is torturous and hard work which is really impossible for those who, like Nicolas Berdyaev, , or Bulgakov, do not do it by simple and joyful opening of their but through sophistication and rational construction to the results of which the inward spiritual workings and experiences “are adjusted” in one way or another.1 Nevertheless, to nearly a greater extent this characterization pertains to Shestov himself in whose religious quest anguish and intellectualization are far too evident. Mutual distrust in matters of faith is a communication feature

1 Lev Shestov, Works, v. 5 (Saint-Petersburg: Schipovnik, 1911, 97–98). [Шестов, Лев. Сочинения в 6 томах. Т. 5. Санкт-Петербург: Шиповник, 1911, c. 97–98.] (in Russian).