Annual Assessment 2011-2012

Executive Report Annual Assessment No. 8 2011-12 Annual Assessment - Jewish People Policy Institute

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

JPPI's New Dashboard Geopolitical Turmoil in the Middle East Creating Jewish Meaning in the U.S. and Europe Israeli Democracy: Politics and Society

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE (Established by the Jewish Agency for Israel) Ltd. www.jppi.org.il (JWBU3BN$BNQVTr10#+FSVTBMFN [email protected] 5FMr'BY Partners and Members Board of Directors and Professional About JPPI of the General Meeting: Guiding Council:

!e Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) is an independent professional policy planning think tank Lester Crown and Charles Goodman Co-Chairs incorporated as a private non-proﬁt company in Israel. !e mission of the Institute is to ensure the thriving on behalf of Crown Family Philanthropies Stuart Eizenstat of the Jewish People and the Jewish civilization by engaging in professional strategic thinking and planning Dennis Ross on issues of primary concern to world Jewry. Located in Jerusalem, the concept of JPPI regarding the Jewish Jack Kay People is global, and includes aspects of major Jewish communities with Israel as one of them, at the core. Associate Chair Irina Nevzlin Kogan Leonid Nevzlin JPPI’s activities are action-oriented, placing special emphasis on identifying critical options and analyzing POCFIBMGPG/BEBW'PVOEBUJPO their potential impact on the future. To this end, the Institute works towards developing professional Jerry W. Levin Members of the Board strategic and long-term policy perspectives exploring key factors that may endanger or enhance the future BT1SFTJEFOUPG6+"'FEFSBUJPOPG/FX:PSL Irwin Cotler of the Jewish People. JPPI provides professionals, decision makers and global leaders with: Sami Friedrich t 4VSWFZTBOEBOBMZTFTPGLFZTJUVBUJPOTBOEEZOBNJDT Ratner Family Dan Halperin t i"MFSUTwUPFNFSHJOHPQQPSUVOJUJFTBOEUISFBUT Charles Ratner David Hatchwell t "TTFTTNFOUPGJNQPSUBOUDVSSFOUFWFOUTBOEBOUJDJQBUFEEFWFMPQNFOUT BT$IBJSNBOPGUIF+"'*#VEHFU Steve Ho"man Alan Ho"mann and Finance Committee t 4USBUFHJDBDUJPOPQUJPOTBOEJOOPWBUJWFBMUFSOBUJWFT Vernon Kurtz t 1PMJDZPQUJPOBOBMZTJT Natan Sharansky Morlie Levin t "HFOEBTFUUJOH QPMJDZSFDPNNFOEBUJPOTBOEXPSLQMBOEFTJHO BT$IBJSNBOPGUIF+"'*&YFDVUJWF Glen Lewy Judit Bokser Liwerant JPPI is unique in dealing with the future of the Jewish People as a whole within a methodological Paul E. Singer Isaac Molho framework of study and policy development. Its independence is assured by its company articles, with POCFIBMGPGUIF1BVM&4JOHFS'PVOEBUJPO Steven Nasatir BCPBSEPGEJSFDUPSTDPDIBJSFECZ"NCBTTBEPST4UVBSU&J[FOTUBUBOE%FOOJT3PTTΗCPUIIBWFTFSWFEJO Avi Pazner !e Judy & Michael Steinhardt Foundation Jehuda Reinharz UIFIJHIFTUFTDIFMPOTPGUIF64HPWFSONFOUBOE-FPOJE/FW[MJOJO*TSBFMΗBOEDPNQPTFEPGJOEJWJEVBMT with significant policy experience. The board of directors also serves as the Institute’s Professional James Tisch John Ruskay Guiding Council. as ChairNBOPGUIF+"'*#PBSEPG(PWFSOPST Doron Shorer Jerry Silverman Ted Sokolsky Our thanks to UJA Federation of New York, the Jewish Federation of St. Louis, the Jewish Federation Alan Solow of Metropolitan Chicago, and Alex Grass z"l for their Michael Steinhardt support of this project. Aharon Yadlin

President and Founding Director Avinoam Bar-Yosef

Projects Coordinator Ita Alcalay ANNUAL ASSESSMENT 2011!2012 Executive Report No. 8 JPPI's New Dashboard Geopolitical Turmoil in the Middle East Creating Jewish Meaning in the U.S. and Europe Israeli Democracy: Politics and Society

PROJECT HEADS Dr. Shlomo Fischer, Jewish People Developments Amb. Avi Gil, Geopolitical Turmoil in the Middle East Prof. Steven Popper, 2011-12 Integrated 'Net' Assessment

CONTRIBUTORS Gedaliah Afterman, Avinoam Bar-Yosef, Nadia Ellis, Sylvia Barak Fishman, Inbal Hakman, Michael Herzog, Arielle Kandel, Yogev Karasenty, Antony Korenstein, Dov Maimon, Asaf Nissenbaum, Sever Plocker, Shmuel Rosner, Suzanne Last Stone, Shalom Salomon Wald, Noah Weinberg, Alexander Yakobson

JPPI, Givat Ram Campus, P.O.B 39156, Jerusalem 91391, Israel Telephone: 972-2-5633356 | Fax: 972-2-5635040 | www.jppi.org.il

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without express written permission from the publisher. Printed and Distributed by the Jewish People Policy Institute

Graphic Design: Lotte Design Cover Design: Shlomit Wolf, Lotte Design

ISBN 978-965-7549-06-3 Table of Contents

Foreword By Ambassadors Dennis Ross and Stuart Eizenstat 5 2011-12 Integrated "Net" Assessment 9 Selected Indicators of World Jewry – 2011-12 26 !e Jewish People’s Agenda: Dilemmas and Suggested Policy Directions 29

2. Geopolitical Developments Developments in the Geopolitical Arena and their Possible Implications for Israel and the Jewish People (2011-12) 39

3. Creating Jewish Meaning in the United States and Europe Creating Jewish Meaning: Emerging Adults, Cultural Creativity, and the Jewish Future in the U.S. and Europe 111

4. Developments in Israel Analysis: A New Political Landscape 139 New Proposed Knesset Bills and Israeli Democracy 145 Summer 2011 in Israel: !e Revolt of the "Undeprived"— What it Was, How it Was, What’s Left 157 !e People's Army? Orthodox Soldiers and Religious Dilemmas in the IDF 177 Science and Technology Policy in a Jewish People Context 191

5. Developments to Watch 205

1 F o r e w o r d

One of the signal achievements of the JPPI has analysis and set of conclusions about the state been the production of the Annual Assessment of world Jewry. In an interesting innovation, it of the Situation and Dynamics of the Jewish compares the state of the Jewish People over time, People. If all it provided were a snapshot of using these key dimensions and evaluating how the state of the Jewish People in Israel and the each looked in 1945, 1970, 1999, and 2011. Diaspora worldwide, it would represent a major Obviously, in 1945, after the Shoah and before the contribution. Indeed, even on this limited basis, emergence of the State of Israel, world Jewry was at it would provide a foundation for making annual a nadir. But the 1970, 1999, and 2011 comparisons comparisons about directions, trends, problem are noteworthy. In both 1970 and 1999, Israel’s areas and potential opportunities, and these standing internationally was clearly higher, Israel annual comparisons would provide insight for faced fewer and less direct threats than today, and developing priorities and programs. From its the bonds within the Diaspora and with Israel were inauguration, the Annual Assessment has met very strong. Jewish identity and demographic this standard and o"ered recommendations for trends did not seem to be under stress in 1970. But addressing critical needs. by 1999 the issue was clearer and responses to it !e 2011-12 Annual Assessment once again meets were not yet being developed. this standard. In truth, however, it goes above At the dawn of the 21st century, the Jewish and beyond only o"ering a snapshot for annual People enjoyed—for the first time in its history comparison. !e 2011-12 Assessment o"ers a clear —significant "hard power," mainly due to Israel's framework for judging whether world Jewry and strong army, strong emerging economy, and Israel are thriving, maintaining, or declining. Using rapidly developing, creative high-technology five key dimensions—geopolitical developments, sector. !e Jewish People's "soft power" too, was demography, identity formation and expression, impressive, a result largely of the recognition intra and inter-community bonds, and material widely accorded to Diaspora Jewry's multiple resources—the Assessment provides a penetrating contributions to humanity, and the cultural,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 5 economic, and intellectual prominence Jews gas fields in Israel's territorial waters provided a had achieved in countries around the world, major boost. In the Diaspora, Jewish financial particularly in North America. resources are also recovering. Although the decreasing proportion of Jewish philanthropy By 2011, however, it became clear that the going to Jewish causes is a matter of concern, the geopolitical threats may be as great as at any time "soft-power" value of Jewish contributions to the since Israel's founding in 1948—with upheaval general community is extraordinary. in the Arab Middle East and the rising tide of the Muslim Brotherhood, which ideologically !is Annual Assessment also dramatizes that we remains fundamentally hostile to Israel; with the are at a critical inflection point in Jewish history. stockpiling of hundreds of thousands of rockets We can manage the external threats with a strong near Israel’s northern and southern borders, and sovereign Jewish state, an enduring alliance with the uncertainty of what will emerge in Syria; the most powerful nation on earth, the United and with the question of whether force will be States, and a well-integrated Diaspora, at least needed to resolve the potentially existential half of which is strongly identified with Jewish threat from Iran. religious or cultural activities. While the Annual Assessment identifies the But internal challenges are troubling, such as di#cult geopolitical dilemmas and challenges democraphic decline and assimilation in the our people faces, other measures may look more Diaspora; a lack of consensus in Israel on basic hopeful this year. Statistics show an increase of issues including where the country wants its 600,000 in the global Jewish population over the eventual borders to be; its relationship with past several years, from 12.9 million to 13.6 million. its Arab citizens and the Palestinians under But the underlying picture is more complex. its control; the impact of a growing Haredi While Israel's Jewish birthrates are healthy and population on democratic norms, the economy, promising, they are still exceeded by Palestinian and women's rights; and the small radical population growth. And in the Diaspora, JPPI's elements in its society. gauge shows consistent demographic decline. Once again the recommendations that are made In the areas of Jewish identity and inter- in the Assessment are thoughtful and o"er a community bonds, the Annual Assessment finds guide to action. On the geopolitical level, the some slight improvement this year: more trips call for improving global and community crisis to Israel; greater participation in internal Jewish management becomes especially important if debates; more Jewish social networks and self- sanctions and diplomacy fail in dealing with the initiated activities by young people. Iranian nuclear program. !e suggestions on enhancing identity are innovative and useful, !e Jewish People's resources are growing too. particularly the ideas on promoting and funding !e recent discovery of major proven natural

6 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Jewish cultural start-ups as a way of giving young may also be crucial, not only for Israel but for the Jews an entirely new means of identifying with demographic trends within the Diaspora itself. Jewish life. !e 2011-12 Assessment is a remarkable Similarly, given the demographic trends statement on the direction of world Jewry and arising from the scale of inter-marriage in the what needs to be done to foster its well-being. Diaspora, the recommendations on outreach !e question, of course, is whether those in a to non-Jewish spouses and the children in inter- position to act on its recommendations will do marriage families are increasingly necessary. so. In addition, the suggestion that global Jewish organizations promote a friendlier approach to Ambassadors Dennis Ross and Stuart Eizenstat conversion to promote greater pluralism in Israel Co-Chairs, !e Jewish People Policy Institute

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 7

2011-12 Integrated 2 "Net" Assessment

How did the Jewish People fare in 2011? Table 1. assessment of the short-term balance of trends provides one way of answering by providing an seen as drivers of Jewish People outcomes.

Table 1. Assessment of Trends A!ecting the Jewish People at Year End 2011

STRONGLY STRONGLY PROBLEMATIC STATUS QUO IMPROVED PROBLEMATIC IMPROVED

GEOPOLITICS

DEMOGRAPHY DEMOGRAPHY

IDENTITY IDENTITY FORMATION FORMATION & & EXPRESSION EXPRESSION

INTER- & INTRA- INTER- & INTRA- COMMUNITY COMMUNITY BONDS BONDS

MATERIAL MATERIAL RESOURCES RESOURCES

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 9 Five Key Dimensions: t Identity Formation and Expression. !ere are various ways in which identification with It seems natural to root both an annual assessment the Jewish collectivity may be a#rmed and and a longer-term perspective in the observed expressed. !is dimension focuses on the trends in external conditions and key internal extent to which individuals do so. dimensions a"ecting Jewish People interests and t Bonds Within and Between Communities. 1 a"airs. JPPI has focused on five key dimensions, Strong Diaspora communities are now also Geopolitics, Demography, Identity Formation regarded even by Israel as important aspects and Expression, Bonds within and between of Jewish People welfare. !is dimension Communities, and Material Resources. examines the nature of the fundamental bonds t Geopolitics. What is the “net” power of the between Israel and other Jewish communities Jewish People in comparison to the threats it as well as the state of bonds within those faces? Outside of Israel the communities themselves. Five Key Dimensions: Jewish People faces little t Material Resources. !is dimension examines t Geopolitics collective physical threat, wealth accumulation and its availability for t Demography but what are the trends? Jewish causes2, Jewish involvement in science t Identity Israel is still subject to and technology as key sources of future Formation & existential threats by economic power, and economic growth in Expression avowed enemies as well as Israel. !is latter is important not only for t Bonds intense anti-Israel e"orts within and Israel but for the prospect of government between by a variety of groups. An investment in the Jewish future abroad. Communities important factor is the !ese dimensions represent complex aggregates t Material political and economic Resources power and influence that subsume such important values as influence, of the American Jewish quality of life, and others. Each could be parsed community and, to a lesser degree, other further but their broadness can also serve a Jewish communities. purpose. !ey provide a framework that allows for a comprehensive integration of many factors. In t Demography. In parallel with the major factors application, this can direct attention to important of quality and influence, numbers matter for details that may then be developed further within sustaining communities and culture, generating an integrated context. political power, fostering in-marriage, and maintaining excellence in education. !e Table 1. shows net assessments because they are intended to reflect changes in the balance between location of Jewish communities and the challenges or opportunities and responses in each attitudes and nature of the surrounding culture year. As annual assessments they measures changes also a"ect demographic trends and e"ects.

10 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE on the margin rather than a longer average.3 Brief which Israel is forced to defend itself against a evaluations are presented below.4 combined o"ensive on multiple fronts, including its home front (for instance, following an Israeli Net Assessment of the Five Key or American operation against Iran; following Dimensions 2011-2012 a violent deterioration in Gaza, or in Lebanon, etc.). GEOPOLITICS Damage to Israel’s international stature, if !e year ahead could bring the maturation of Israel were viewed as the party responsible for critical developments, necessitating unequivocal the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, the decisions with potentially critical impacts on the erosion of the international standing of Israel’s fate of Israel and the Jewish People. !e dramatic American ally, the collapse upheavals in the Arab world, which have, so far, of the strategic axes !e year ahead led to the overthrow of the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, of Jerusalem-Cairo and could bring the Libya and Yemen, also threaten the stability of Jerusalem-Ankara, or the maturation other regimes. rise of political Islam in the of critical Iran's continued progress toward achieving a Middle East. developments, nuclear weapon sharpens the dilemma facing Israel: Economic downturn, as necessitating either to risk having a country ruled by religious a result of deterioration unequivocal zealots, who declare that Israel has no right to exist, in the security situation, decisions possess a doomsday weapon; or, alternatively, to and/or as part of the “de- attack Iran's nuclear facilities risking a severe and legitimization” campaign ongoing security deterioration and boosting Iran's waged against Israel (the motivation to obtain a nuclear weapon and to take global economic crisis is revenge against Israel (and perhaps against Jewish obviously exacerbating targets in the Diaspora). An Israeli attack could such scenarios). create a crisis with the United States if it led to a loss of American lives and if it were interpreted as Damage to Israel-U.S. relations, in light of a Israeli interference with the policy of negotiations perception in some US circles that the price of and sanctions against Iran, and/or as an attempt by the US friendship with Israel is increasing steadily Israel to drag Washington into another Middle East (this potential damage will probably be suppressed war. until after the November 2012 elections). Israel is facing numerous threatening scenarios: While the upheavals in the Arab world could go on for years, certain developments are already discernible Security deterioration, which in the extreme and should be taken into account in shaping any case could develop into an all-out war, in policy vis-à-vis the roiling Middle East arena:

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 11 !e flourishing of political Islam: Political Islam Arab uprisings, has worsened in their wake. !e is emerging as the major victor of the Arab revolt. economic crisis may force Arab governments It remains to be seen whether the entry of the to focus their e"orts on economic recovery Muslim Brotherhood into the political game in and domestic a"airs, but it could also create a Arab countries will mitigate their positions, lead temptation to redirect internal frustrations against them into coexistence with secular parties in ruling “the Zionist arch-enemy.” Does the economic crisis coalitions, or engender dark theocracies. Would in the Arab world also o"er an opportunity and they work toward the abrogation of the peace a context for a proactive policy by Israel and the accords with Israel or respect them (as some of Jewish People? their leaders vaguely declare), thereby paradoxically Breakout of ethnic conflicts: !e compromised conferring popular and power of the central governments in Arab religious legitimacy to Israel’s actual countries, the economic crisis, and the sense the accords, and perhaps and perceived that the US is weakening and providing less and even resulting in the power is less order in the region, could combine to trigger moderation of Hamas correlated with serious breakouts of ethnic and religious conflict. hostility? Since Israel is the prevalent incapable of a"ecting !e Perception of US decline and disengagement: view of the growth of political Based on the US decision to withdraw from Iraq U.S. power Islam, can we enhance and Afghanistan; its unsuccessful e"orts (yet) to the likelihood that, once curb Iran; the failure to advance an Israeli-Palestinian in power, it would be as agreement; the regional perception that US minimally hostile to Israel response to the Arab revolts has been inconsistent; as possible? and obviously, the American economic crisis and its implications. Since Israel’s actual and perceived !e increased power of power is correlated with the prevalent view of the “Arab Street”: It seems safe to assume that US power and the intensity of its friendship with future rulers of Arab states will have to be much Israel, can Israel, for its own good, help the United more attuned to popular sentiment. To what extent States to restore its standing in the Middle East? will public opinion, which is saturated with hatred of Israel and gives priority to the Palestinian issue, !e decline of traditional regional strategic be reflected in the respective Arab governments’ alignments: !e pro-American “Moderate Axis” foreign policies and in their stances on Israel in was shaken: Mubarak’s ouster and the deterioration particular? Are Israel and the Jewish People capable in Israel’s relations with Turkey exacerbate its of mitigating the animosity of the Arab Street? strategic isolation. Will Israeli decision-makers face this strategic reality promptly and creatively, !e worsening economic crisis: !e deteriorated especially vis-à-vis Egypt and Turkey? economic situation, which helped fuel the

12 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !ese dilemmas necessitate choosing between second largest concentration in the US accounting two polarized approaches: one prefers to watch for a further 40% (see Figure 1. below). and wait, while the other opts for spotting and In October 2011, Israel’s population was 7.8 pursuing opportunities proactively. !e clash million, of which 5.9 million were Jews and between these two approaches will continue to 1.6 million Arab Muslims and Christians.5 !e play out in the strategic and political discourse in Jewish population is relatively young: 26% are Israel and the Diaspora in the year ahead. 14 and under, with the proportion in the ultra- DEMOGRAPHY Orthodox population larger still. Recent years have seen an increase in Jewish Israeli births with !e demography of Israel di"ers from that of the a decline in the rate of Israeli Arabs.6Arabs are still Diaspora. !e overall direction is toward continued likely to comprise about 25% of Israel’s expected concentration in Israel and the US, especially in population of nearly 9 million by 2025 with the a few urban centers, with an increasing share of ultra-Orthodox, becoming more than 10% of the especially young Jews residing in Israel. In 2011, out population. of a global Jewish population of approximately 13.6 million, Israel accounted for about 42% with the

Figure 1. Demographic Di!erences between Israel and Diaspora Communities: 2011-12 2011-12 Demography Global

JPPI

Diaspora Israel

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 13 A negative balance of births and deaths now may a"ect numbers is change in the definitions prevails in most Jewish communities across of Jewish belonging. New definitions may expand the Diaspora. More frequent out-marriage the ranks, but without changes in how they may is associated with growing percentages of become engaged this may not actually change the children not raised Jewish. !is contributes to reality of Jewish life. the steady process of Jewish population aging At the end of 2011, we detect a slight improvement and population decrease. It took 13 years to largely due to Israeli trends. increase the number of Jews from 11 million in 1945 to 12 million in 1958, but it took 50 more IDENTITY FORMATION AND EXPRESSION years to add another million. Since 1970, world Identity reflects how individuals think and feel Jewish population has about particular aspects of themselves. !e overall increased little compared !e spectrum trend in Jewish identity construction, especially to an increase of global of Jewish among the young, is toward more diverse and population of over 73%. identity is pluralistic forms. !ere is a shift from the ethnic becoming !e rate of Jews marrying to the cultural, and from community-oriented broader with non-Jews is above 50% in to individualistic and universal. Jewish identity is increasing the United States, above increasingly less something imposed but rather distance 40% in the main Western something that one chooses and shapes. !is less between the European countries, and frequently involves membership in classical Jewish polar extremes above 75% in the former organizations. Jewish identity, excluding Orthodox Soviet Union. Diaspora and Haredi Jews, is decreasingly about an agreed fertility is below the level set of concepts and symbols. necessary for generational !e spectrum of Jewish identity is becoming replacement. Yet, Jewish broader with increasing distance between the numbers are related to their geographical polar extremes. !us, there is intensification of composition. In the Diaspora, ongoing family and Jewish identity among the strongly identifying cultural changes blur identification boundaries group that sends its children to Jewish day schools and raise complexities in defining the Jewish and whose college students enroll in courses with collective. !e world’s 13.6 million Jews are Jewish content. !e polarity is accentuated by the intimately connected to several more millions. high correlation between these various patterns: Some have Jewish origins or family connections those high (or low) on one factor are most but are not currently Jewish, because they changed often high (or low) on most or all other factors. their own identification, or are non-Jewish children !us, Jewish communities have individuals with of intermarried parents, or are non-Jewish partners "high Jewish social capital," i.e., Jewish social in intermarried households. !e key issue that connections, friends and networks, educational

14 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE and communal activities. !is group experiences “ownership” of Jewish culture and tradition. For a mutual reinforcing of Jewish identity. A second Israeli Jews, 92% feel being part of the Jewish People group has low Jewish social capital. Weak is an important guiding principle, and as many feel Jewish identiﬁcation often gets worse with each themselves to be part of world Jewry. At the same generation. A strong Jewish social network in the time, Israeli Jews also feel that they are "di"erent teen years is a predictor of college friendships and from Jews in the Diaspora.”7 choice of Jewish marriage partner. Orthodox groups have, however, increased In this area, despite countervailing trends, there public demands for stricter adherence to their appear signs of an increase in the number of interpretation of Jewish tradition. !e contrast potential entry points during the Jewish life cycle. between the Diaspora and what appears to be a !ere is also some evidence of greater support counter-trend among for and awareness of the importance of social Orthodox and ultra- Ties between networks in the accumulation of Jewish social Orthodox circles in Israel Israel and capital. !is leads to a more hopeful assessment has potential for greater the largest of the balance of forces than past history might distancing. Diaspora suggest. communities BONDS BETWEEN remain strong, It’s never a trivial matter to say one is a Jew in Europe. AND WITHIN but are !ere is poor public support for faith-based social COMMUNITIES and educational initiatives, and the pursuit of changing religious and ethnic ties is perceived as out of step Israel-Diaspora bonds with contemporary society. With the exception show opposing trends. of some urban areas, we observe a distancing of Ties between Israel and a majority of Jews from Jewish organizational life. the largest Diaspora Arresting this trend will require more substantial communities remain communal resources to be invested in supporting strong but are changing. Uneasiness about and grassroots initiatives, leadership programs, youth criticisms of Israel have grown in North America. cultural empowerment programs, outreach on !e young have greater exposure to negative views campuses and the establishment of diverse and while being more removed from formative events attractive activities for young adults. (the Holocaust, Israel`s birth, Six Day War, etc.), which once served as touchstones for unity. !is Within Israel, the polarity takes a di"erent form. makes inherent gaps between Israel and North !e conﬂict between secular and religious does America (wealth, education, culture, political not allow for the pluralism typical in the Diaspora. beliefs, religious attitudes, perceptions of burden However, in response to this polarity there has sharing) potentially more prejudicial to mutual been recent interest in retrieving the feeling of understanding.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 15 Yet, the younger generation travels more to Israel, focus is to strain the bonds between those two accesses Israeli web sites, and is more prone to great communities and the European Diaspora. integrate components of Israeli culture into its own. !e easing of travel and communication MATERIAL RESOURCES seem to be compensating for other di#culties. Before the current global economic crisis, world !e major institutions mediating Israel-Diaspora Jewry was at a zenith of wealth creation. Most relations have yet to translate the opportunity Jews live in countries that are among the richest, represented by emergent personal networks into and the majority belongs to the middle and a vehicle for collective belonging and action. Yet, upper socioeconomic strata. Jews contribute to participation in pro-Israel activities in the US—e.g., technological and economic know-how and take the growth of AIPAC Policy senior positions in the global business system. Conference attendance— Urban skilled occupations remain the hallmark of !e U.S. is still intensive. this workforce. and Israel, with eighty A considerable majority Israel’s occupational structure is like that of OECD, percent of of French, British, and the “club” of developed economies. Only 14% world Jewry Russian Jews have visited of Jews have jobs requiring advanced degrees. and most soft Israel, have ﬁrst-degree !erefore, while the Israeli GDP per capita is about and hard family there, and claim 55-60% of the US, the ratio of per capita Jewish power, are Israel plays a central role in income is lower. their Jewish identities. But perceived as the !e global spread of education might reduce they ﬁnd the relationship key poles of the the comparative advantage the Jews have had in to be asymmetric. While Jewish future literacy, social attitudes and basic knowledge, as Europe’s Jews face direct well as in the new knowledge-based economies. consequences of Israeli Yet, despite increased competition, there seems state actions, Israel engages European Jewry almost little evidence of this yet. Israeli high technology solely on anti-Semitism and anti-Israel activity, prowess remains among the world’s most making statements (e.g., calls for mass aliyah) advanced. without consultation or considering their e"ects. !e cost of Jewish living in the Diaspora—synagogue !e US and Israel, with eighty percent of world membership, Jewish community centers, day- Jewry and most soft and hard power, are perceived school tuition, and even Jewish burial costs—can as the key poles of the Jewish future and set the pose a barrier to many Jews who wish to belong agenda for European Jewry. Many expect that the but cannot a"ord to do so. In the US, a family with most vital of the 1.3 million European Jews will several children in Jewish day school requires an resettle in Israel or North America while the rest amount equal to the national median income just assimilate. A concrete consequence of this US-Israel

16 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE for sustaining its Jewish participation. !is has been static.14 !e price of housing relative to earnings exacerbated by the financial crisis to which the Jews is greater than in London or New York.15 !ese are sensitive because of professional status and capital trends contrast with Israel’s egalitarian past accumulation. Donations to Jewish Federations of and early Zionist culture. It is this that brought North America were down from $938 million in demonstrators into the streets in 2011. 2009 to $925 million in 2010.8 !is continues the trend seen since the onset of the financial crisis. Yet, LEADERSHIP donations to Israel started to rebound in 2010 and Table 1. shows a slightly improving situation on continued to do so through 2011.9 balance in most dimensions. It should be noted, Israel fared well in the “Great Recession,” however, that while leadership is not included exhibited 5% growth and 5.5% unemployment because of quantitative measurement di#culties in 2011, experienced low inflation, and recently Trans- over the short term, discovered massive natural gas fields in territorial generational 10 the trans-generational waters. While Israel escaped the travails of renewal of renewal of high quality most OECD countries, low unemployment goes high quality leadership is a Jewish together with by far the lowest rate of labor leadership is a 11 People concern. Some of participation (57%). !e uneven ability to Jewish People the trends noted above participate in Israel’s wealth-creating sectors has concern created a polarizing income inequality surpassed may mean a mismatch by only four countries in the OECD (US, Turkey, between the need for Mexico, Chile).12 !e protests of the summer individuals who have the of 2011 called attention to fundamental issues capacity, creativity and regarding distribution of wealth and burden deep understanding to sharing among Israelis, suggesting fault lines meet the challenges facing not visible in the aggregate performance of the the Jewish People and the numbers available. national economy. In recent years there has been Despite some beginnings, a systematic and a significant rise in the cost of living. In the past coordinated e"ort to attract and prepare the best four years, the prices of food and other essentials and the brightest for top-level leadership positions such as electricity and housing rose,13 some by in the Jewish community, politics, civil service, as much as 25-33%, while real incomes remained business, and academia is lacking.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 17 ! riving -Sustained -Sustained peace;regional -Preponderant power;hard -De- proliferation; for regard -High Israel; anti- -Fringe Semitism; oil -Plummeting dependence. -Diaspora communities increasing; at grows -Israel equal to rate global average. Progressing - Strong US; - Strong power; hard - Growing proliferation; - Arrested wanes - Delegitimation in force; anti-Semitism; - Waning - Oil dependence declines. -Diaspora communities increasing; above rate at grows -Israel OECD average. Maintaining -Engaged US; -Engaged US; power; hard -Static powers by -Concern proliferation; over its retains -Israel friends; -Manageable anti- Semitism; -Oil secondary is political factor. -Diaspora static; communities at grows -Israel than no more rate OECD average. Troubled -Rising new powers in instability;result hard -Waning power; -Growing proliferation; of -Delegitimation Israel; anti- -Growing Semitism; -Oil works against Israel. -Diaspora communities see signiﬁcant & out-marriage assimilation; in growth net -Low Israel. Declining -Rising radical Islam; power; hard -Little to -Proliferation groups; terror as pariah; -Israel anti-Semitism; -Wide -Oil supports petro- terrorism; power. -Diaspora in communities demographic decline; in growth -Negative Israel.

Table 2. IndicatorsTable Characterizing the State of External and Internal Drivers A ! ecting Jewish People

Geopolitics Demography Jewish

18 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE -Jewish cultural -Jewish cultural widely literacy is shared; involved -Youth in dense Jewish social network experience. -Meaningful Israel-Diaspora cooperation; -Diaspora communities dense and have socialgrowing networks. economic-High in Israel; growth in -Wealth Diaspora increases & absolutely relatively; in -Leadership technical fields. -Jewish cultural literacy -Jewish cultural a growing to relevant is majority; entry points-Multiple social Jewish into network widely-used. -Close Israel-Diaspora and Diaspora-Diaspora bonds; -Diaspora communities denseexhibit social networks. -Moderate economic in Israel; growth -Diaspora wealth increases relatively; in technical -Leadership fields. -Jewish cultural -Jewish cultural relevant literacy is a majority;to have -Youth multiple entry points Jewish into social network. -Close Israel- Diaspora bonds; Diaspora -Static community social networks. -Moderate economic in growth Israel; -Diaspora wealth static; -Important in presence technical fields. -Jewish cultural -Jewish cultural in decline;literacy is limited have -Youth entry points into socialJewish network experience. -Drifting Israel- Diaspora bonds; -Diaspora communities social patchy exhibit networks. economic-Low in Israel; growth -Diaspora wealth declines relatively; in -Nominal presence technical fields.

-Jewish cultural -Jewish cultural to relevant literacy is a declining minority; largely -Youth of Jewish unaware social network. Israel- -Strained Diaspora bonds; -Diaspora exhibit communities declining and patchy social networks. -No economic in Israel; growth in Diaspora -Wealth declines & absolutely relatively; in presence -Little technical ﬁelds.

Expression Bonds

Material Base Material

Identity Formation and and Formation Identity Inter-/Intra-Community

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 19 BRIDGING THE SHORT AND Prior work of JPPI provides a reference point LONG TERMS for understanding trends.16 Table 2 (pp 18-19). provides a qualitative scale for determining what An assessment of the state of the Jewish People are positive or negative trends in light of five at any one point in time requires both a long and distinct Jewish People futures based upon specific short view. Some changes during one year may indicators. deeply a"ect the lives of generations to come. Yet, We can apply these dimensions to several historical in other dimensions the processes of change may reference points. In 1945, the year that determined require a generation to have an e"ect. Taking solely many aspects of our modern world, the Jewish a short view may mean that several years of slight People also had come as close to destruction as changes could be missed until their cumulative they had since Roman times. !is is indicated in e"ect takes hold. Only a longer view can apply Figure 2. where the central gauge provides a key to the necessary corrective as well as to allow for the scale derived from Table 1. and the other five reassessment if, as is natural, a current perspective evaluate the key dimensions accordingly. on real-time events misses their deeper meaning.

Figure 2. Characterization of Key Drivers A!ecting the Jewish People in the Year 1945 1945

Geopolitics

Demography Bonds

JPPI Identity Resources

20 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE In 1970, there was a di"erent portrait. Israel apparent. !ere was little distance between these had smashed the armies of its main antagonists, communities and Israel, the major institutions enjoyed high world regard, and had not yet been of Jewish life were functioning well, and concern subjected to the crises of 1973. Jewish communities largely focused on the communities in the Soviet- in the West were widely accepted by the larger dominated world with which the communities in society, had growing resources, and pressures from the West manifested solidarity. out-marriage and assimilation were not yet fully

Figure 3. Characterization of Key Drivers A!ecting the Jewish People in the Year 1970 1970

Geopolitics

Demography Bonds

JPPI Identity Resources

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 21 Before the Second Intifada, 1999 represented a adaptations to these changes were not yet widely high water mark in several respects. One of the in place to support the formation and expression drivers was thriving. Yet, the demographic trends of identity. of recent decades were becoming clearer while

Figure 4. Characterization of Key Drivers A!ecting the Jewish People in the Year 1999 1999

Geopolitics

Demography Bonds

JPPI Identity Resources

22 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE How would the same assessment look at the remarkable if this did not a"ect the key drivers end of 2011? !e time since 1945 has seen an of Jewish People interests. None has passed upward trend in Jewish fortune unparalleled both into true crisis. It is true that the geopolitical in magnitude and rapidity of change. Yet Figure dimension appears to be moving in unwelcome 5. suggests that more recent times show reason directions. !e material base has su"ered reverses for cautious concern when compared to earlier and questions remain over the capacity of Jewish benchmarks. Do these constitute a transitory dip institutions and leadership. Yet, despite recent in an otherwise ascending trend or might they be events, resources are available and a strong core signaling the beginning of yet another larger turn sense of identity remains. of the wheel? In the end, Figure 5. should be viewed neither as Recent decades have seen tumultuous change prophecy nor fate. Rather, it is a spur to action. in the very fabric of the world. It would be

Figure 5. Characterization of Key Drivers A!ecting the Jewish People in the Year 2011 2011

Geopolitics

Demography Bonds

JPPI Identity Resources

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 23 Notes

1. For greater detail on Jewish People interests, see pages 11. http://laborsta.ilo.org/sti/DATA_FILES/TABLE_PDF/ 26-30 in “A System of Indicators for Measuring the ISR_EN.pdf. Well-Being of the Jewish People,” Annual Assessment 12. http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-unequal- 2010, Jewish People Policy Institute, 2011. countries-in-the-developed-world-2011-4?op=1. 2. It is quite possible for Jews to accumulate greater 13. The Marker, 14/03/12. P. 2. wealth individually while distributing a smaller share, relatively and absolutely, to Jewish causes. 14. See Summer 2011 in Israel: !e Revolt of the 'Undeprived' — What it was, How it was, and What's 3. !is is similar to viewing a sports team’s performance Left, this Annual Assessment (2011-2012). during one game. !is represents only a marginal change on its overall season performance. !e 15. http://taubcenter.org.il/index.php/publications/ signiﬁcance of that short-term change will depend discussion-papers/economic/the-land-of-milk-and- on what has gone before and will come after. honey/lang/en. 4. In subsequent years this assessment will focus more 16. For a detailed discussion see Gil, Avi and EinatWilf on the recent “deltas” or changes. However, in this (2010). ϮϬϯϬ͗ ůƚĞƌŶĂƟǀĞ &ƵƚƵƌĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ :ĞǁŝƐŚ initial assessment we look at somewhat broader WĞŽƉůĞ. Jewish People Policy Institute, January. trends. 5. !e balance of 0.3 million represent non-Arab Christians or people whose religion is not classiﬁed by the national registry. Many are associated with Jewish families. 6. In 2011, 130,000 births were recorded for Jews and non-Arab others. 7. Guttman Survey, “A Portrait of Israeli Jews, Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews” (2009), published in January 2012. 8. http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/ Article.aspx?id=218451. 9. Eric Fleisch and Ted Sasson, "!e New Philanthropy: American Jewish Giving to Israeli Organisations," !e Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis university, 2012. 10. According to a report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published on February 13, 2012.

24 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE

Selected Indicators oF World Jewry – 2011-2012 g 3 f - - - - - 97 41 33 220 464 157 212 894 128 2,910 2,339 1,619 2,551 2011 16,845 Aliyah b ------100 >50 >50 >75 >35 >50 >50 >70 >70 >50 >65 Most recent Ever Visited Visited Ever Israel, Pop. % of Jew. b ------5 45 54 45 10 35 60 >60 Most 15-95 40-45 33-75 40-45 50-80 recent Recent Recent Out- marriage Rate (%) b k ------75 60 71 85 40 97 55 25 >20 >15 5-20 Most 50-55 10-25 recent Jewish Jewish Day-school Attendance Rate (%) e ------4 9 6 45 28 84 57 20 17 50 55 38 2011 Index Of Human Development Rank – World a - - - - - 2011 16,289 35,982 48,387 11,805 14,856 34,945 30,255 37,208 40,107 12,127 12,516 19,477 80,000 20,000 50,000 6,000- GDP per capita, $ US PPP d - - 2020 34,000 42,000 34,000 90,000 70,000 i i 134,000 482,000 108,000 381,000 364,000 162,000 278,000 i i 6,543,000 1,070,000 5,581,000 5,200,000 i Projected j 13,917,000 c 9,700 2,000 2010 95,600 40,800 39,400 72,300 48,600 163,200 483,500 119,000 375,000 292,000 389,600 182,300 5,912,600 1,158,800 5,650,000 5,275,000 h 13,647,500

b - - 1970 30,000 70,000 171,000 140,000 390,000 90,000 35,000 530,000 107,000 282,000 1,331,000 286,000 514,000 2,582,000 5,686,000 5,400,000 12,633,000 Jewish Population Core Deﬁnition Core Population Jewish l m Europe non- Europe FSU France World Country Israel Brazil Germany Canada Other non- Other EU Mexico Other UK North America United States Romania Latin America Argentina Bulgaria Hungary EU Other

26 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE

- - - 97 94 233 625 871 173 2,051 7,225 3,678 2,933 2,666 ------>65 >75 ------80 80 22 20 65-75 50-75 ------65 85 >15 >15 >15 >15 ------2 76 66 174 123 130 - - - - - 7,076 1,088 5,001 2,000- 2,000- 2,000- 2,000- 16,750 28,344 20,000 41,089 11,000 10,880 - - - 3,000 8,000 i 21,000 60,000 57,000 25,000 15,000 97,000 i i i 173,000 130,000 105,000 i i 100 7,600 2,700 2,600 34,900 19,200 71,500 76,200 18,600 70,800 330,000 205,000 107,500 115,100 - - - 5,000 65,000 70,000 312,000 104,000 808,000 777,000 195,000 254,000 118,000 2,151,000 o n Rest FSU FSU Rest Europe FSU Russia Ukraine Australia Africa FSU Asia FSU Zealand New other and Ethiopia Asia (rest) South Africa Morocco Other Oceania a. Source: Website for the IMF, projection for 2011- Gross domestic product (Current international dollar) based | b. on Source: Division Purchasing-power-parity of (PPP) Jewish Demography per and capitaStatistics, ! e A. Harman GDP Institute of Contemporary Jewry, ! e Hebrew University of Jerusalem. | Reports, c. Jewish Source: Data Bank DellaPergola, | d. Sergio, Source: adapted (2010), from DellaPergola, "World Rebhun, Tolts (2000), development Jewish medium Population," variant. based | Current e. on A Jewish measure of Population health, a countries mentioned of sums not are country’s continents on data ! e 2012/1. Israel Of educational Abstract Statistical Statistics, of Bureau Central Israel Source: f. attainment, and real income. Source: but of United general Aliyah Nations figures from permanent and the citizens Development continent. Israeli - | residents permanent of g. consists and Program population, Including jure) (de permanent country the of basisnot (2011). the on definedspecified. is population | | h. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. ! e residents without Israeli citizenship (including those who had been out of the country less than one year at the population Revised time i. | of residents the Jewish of estimate). number! e the to only refer and religion by population the of segmentation to according are here data States. Baltic Without l. | NJPSfollowing2001. reduction downward Basedk. | j. responseNJPSAfter 2001. | adjusted on 2020. for projections | Turkey. and FSU Israel, Without States. | o. Baltic With | n. Including Turkey. m.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 27

!e Jewish People’s Agenda: Dilemmas and Suggested 4 Policy Directions

Basic Principle: Policy initiatives should be should be taken into account in shaping any policy redirected to future-oriented projects and vis-à-vis the roiling region: priority given to investing in the next generation. t Political Islam is Flourishing: Political Islam is emerging as the major beneﬁciary of the Arab revolt. It remains to be seen whether Geopolitical Policy Dilemmas: the entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into the political arena in Arab states will t Iran: Iran’s continued progress in achieving a moderate their positions, lead to coexistence nuclear weapon sharpens the dilemma facing with secular parties in ruling coalitions, or Israel: either to risk the reality of a state ruled engender dark theocracies. Will they work by religious zealots who possess a doomsday toward the abrogation of peace accords with weapon and regularly declare that Israel has Israel or respect them as some of their leaders no right to exist, or, alternately, to attack vaguely declare? If existing accords with Israel Iran’s nuclear facilities and risk a severe and are upheld, it might paradoxically confer ongoing security deterioration, including acts popular and religious legitimacy to them, and of revenge against Jewish targets in Israel and perhaps even result in a toning down of Hamas the Diaspora, and a likely redoubling of Iranian hostility. Since Israel holds no sway in the nuclear e"orts. !is possible scenario demands growth of political Islam, can we enhance the strengthening the preparedness of potential likelihood that, once it is in power, it would targets, not only in Israel, but also throughout be as minimally hostile to Israel as possible? the Diaspora. t !e Increased Power of the "Arab Street": It While the Arab upheavals could go on for years, is reasonable to assume that Arab rulers will certain geopolitical developments and the policy have to be much better attuned to popular dilemmas they present are already discernible and sentiment. To what extent will Arab public opinion—often saturated with Israel hatred

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 29 and outrage over the Palestinian issue—be deterioration in Israel’s relations with Turkey reflected in the new Arab governments’ exacerbate its strategic isolation. Will this foreign policies and in their positions on Israel new strategic reality be faced promptly in particular? Are Israel and the Jewish People and creatively by Israeli decision-makers, capable of mitigating the Arab Street’s especially vis-à-vis Egypt and Turkey? animosity? !e dilemmas outlined above necessitate choosing t Worsening Economic Crisis: !e severe between two polarized approaches; one that economic situation, which partly fueled the prefers to watch and wait, while the other opts for Arab uprisings, has worsened in their wake. !e proactively spotting and pursuing opportunities. economic crisis may force Arab governments !e clash between these two approaches will to focus their attention on economic recovery continue to play out in the strategic and political and domestic a"airs, but it could also create discourse in Israel and the Diaspora in the year a temptation to redirect internal frustrations ahead. against the "Zionist arch-enemy." Does the economic crisis in the Arab world also o"er an opportunity and a context for proactive Action-Oriented Policy policy-making by Israel and the Jewish Recommendations People? t Perceived US Decline and Disengagement: Leadership Based on the US decision to withdraw from Over the next ten years, a significant number of Iraq and Afghanistan; its unsuccessful e"orts top-level Jewish professionals will retire. Highest (yet) to curb Iran; the failure to advance an quality leadership is of critical importance. JPPI Israeli-Palestinian agreement; the regional views the trans-generational renewal of top perception that the US response to the Arab professionals, political leaders, civil servants, etc. revolts has been inconsistent (and obviously, as a major challenge that demands action. the American economic crisis and its 1. Initiate a Trans-Generational Leadership Project implications). As Israel’s actual and perceived to: power is correlated to prevalent views of US power and the intensity of its friendship with a) Map the senior positions in the global Jewish Israel, can Israel, for its own good, help the community and major Jewish organizations to US to restore its standing in the Middle East? be filled in the next three to five years. t Unstable Traditional Regional Strategic b) Create a set of practices designed to locate the Alignments: !e pro-American "Moderate most suitable candidates to move into these Axis" was shaken: Mubarak’s ouster and the senior positions and develop an orientation program for them.

30 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE c) Provide training and support for career targets in the Jewish communities all over the progression. !is support program should world and attack upon the Israeli home front. contain special components for women in 1. Global Crisis Management System: order to assist them in entering leadership positions. Part of this program should have an a) Improve global and community-based crisis Israeli focus to strengthen the bond between management systems to direct, coordinate the communities. and oversee preparedness for potential crises, supervise crisis management activities, and 2. Encourage entry of the young generation into work toward restoring normal daily life as politics and public service in their countries while soon as possible (see JPPI’s training manual).1 involving the best and most inspiring facilitators from di"erent ﬁelds from the academic and b) Design an action plan to best prepare against a practical worlds. public opinion backlash in case of general war in the Middle East. 3. A Jewish People Leadership Academy, with a course of study of six weeks to three months 2. Support citizens in Israel under attack duration, should be established, preferably in (such a deployment is likely to contribute to Jerusalem, to provide discourse, learning, and strengthening the ties between Israel and the networking opportunities for leaders. Candidates Diaspora): for the leadership academy should have the following general characteristics: a) Jewish communities should be mobilized together with local elements and Israeli t Commitment to the long-term thriving of the experts to prepare concrete plans to support Jewish People broadly; Israeli citizens in case of a protracted military t Deeply rooted knowledge of Jewish history confrontation, including "life as usual" and its dynamic interaction with a changing initiatives and traditional and e-learning environment; programs for Israeli children during war. t Orientation toward pluralistic Jewish b) While physical security is the GOI's continuity. responsibility, Jewish communities can contribute by upgrading equipment and Geopolitics digital connectivity in shelters. While meeting the geopolitical challenges of the State of Israel is the responsibility of the 3. Jerusalem-Washington-US Jewry Triangle: !e Government of Israel (GOI), global Jewish community should engage in an e"ort to avoid organizations should engage in the following making Israel a partisan issue in domestic US e"orts while at the same time understanding the politics. implications of confrontation with Iran for soft

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 31 4. Israel and the Jewish People should reach out 2. Making Jewish Service a Rite of Passage: to Asia, particularly China and India, focusing on a) Provide Taglit-Birthright and Masa graduates cultural and information exchanges, science and with a follow-up program of 2-5 months' technology policies, Judaism and Israel studies in international and Israel experience consisting Asia, Asian studies in Israel and more. Israel and of service, study and personal growth. world Jewry can and should find ways to help Asia's rising powers to address their most urgent b) Jewish service program graduates should be challenges, including, in particular, energy security, granted a "Jewish Benefits Package" engaging fighting poverty, and rural development. them further in community life (such as free JCC memberships, one-year scholarships to Identity Jewish kindergarten, etc.). 1. Lifecycle Vouchers – Expanding the Scope of c) Consider expanding successful North Taglit-Birthright: Based on points of intervention American identity programs to include Jewish along the Jewish life cycle, JPPI recommends European counterparts. gradually extending Taglit-Birthright’s ("birth- d) !e GOI should provide clear policy guidance right") scope and brand by granting each Jewish to the IDF regarding religious observance for newborn and his/her parents a portfolio of orthodox soldiers and their integration.3 vouchers redeemable for education/identity building experiences at key lifecycle junctures. 3. Promote Cultural, Religious, and Social !ese vouchers would enable: Creativity and Entrepreneurship in the United States and Europe: a) Enhancing post-Bar/Bat Mitzvah learning, including Israel-related education and a) Encourage and fund Jewish cultural startups, subsidized Israel experiences for teenagers which represent an alternative, nontraditional such as summer camps; yet increasingly e"ective means for young Jews to a#liate with Jewish life. b) Expanding and improving access to preschool and elementary-school programs; b) Global private philanthropists and Jewish organizations should establish a venture fund c) Coaching new parents. to provide financial and mentoring support for !e Voucher System should be a flagship and be non-establishment Jewish startups in Jewish funded through a supplementary budget based on communities worldwide.4 contributions from Israel and Jewish philanthropy. Participation in this program should not preclude Bonds within and between later eligibility for Taglit-Birthright’s program. Jewish Communities 1. Encourage "people-to-people" programs and strengthen partnerships between

32 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE communities, professionals, academics, and 5. Replenish the pool of soon-to-retire Jewish politicians around the world. technicians and technical engineers 2. Create a professional advocacy mechanism: who came to Israel in the post-Soviet Establish a comprehensive global strategy immigration of the 1990s. !e Government in partnership with Israel to support of Israel should fund and expand training Jewish organizational e"orts to fight de- and recruitment programs for these new legitimization. !is mechanism should foster personnel. !ese programs should also transparency and coordination, and encourage include re-training of older technicians and non-institutional and non-traditional e"orts. encourage the entrance into the technical labor force of populations who are under- Aliyah from the West represented (e.g., peripheral populations, minorities, and women). !e GOI should facilitate the recognition of foreign academic and professional degrees of Demography new immigrants; enhance the job placement system; and better assist the social integration Even though quality counts for much in terms of schoolchildren. !is activity assumes critical of Jewish influence, numbers are still important importance in light of developments in Europe. and any decline in them could have negative consequences, both internally and on Jewish soft Resources power. !is suggests a need to maintain current levels while crafting demographic policies to 1. Philanthropic e"orts should be redirected facilitate increased birth rates. to future-oriented projects and give greater priority to investing in the next generation. 1. Reduce obstacles that interfere with Jewish marriage and family formation. Lesser family 2. !e GOI should allocate more funds to formation has a reducing impact on Jewish ensure the Jewish future globally. 5 fertility. Additionally, marriage remains the 3. Jewish organizations should engage together normative framework for procreation among in a best-practices e"ort to enhance the most Jews. proportion of philanthropic dollars directed 2. Reduce obstacles that interfere with growth to Jewish causes. in family size. !e State of Israel should 4. Israeli science and technology policymakers enhance social services and increase financial should include an international "Jewish support that would lead to the decision to People component" in Israel's national have a third and fourth child. Science and technology policy. !e policy 3. Networking society: Encourage and invest should be "network-based" and thus remain in frameworks for virtual encounters among open to appropriate foreign contributions.6

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 33 young Jewish singles to facilitate chances of communities. New approaches may foster new interaction and marriage. ways of attracting the younger generation; the 4. Outreach: Multiply e"orts to encourage more the younger generation identifies with non-Jewish spouses and the children of inter- Israel, the more it will likely increase its Jewish marriage to enter and identify with the Jewish identity, and also look for ways of building fold. bonds between communities. !e more bonds between communities, the greater the ability to 5. Conversion: Global Jewish organizations fight de-legitimization. If Israel and the Jewish should promote a friendlier Israeli approach to world are so interdependent, Israel should make 7 conversion and encourage pluralism in Israel. every e"ort to become more attractive as a focal point; and if reciprocity is important, we need As Israel becomes the largest and most powerful to find ways for the Diaspora to have more of an Jewish community, it should support the impact on Israel’s policies that may a"ect world initiatives in this assessment, emphasizing North Jewry. !is is not a new problem, but it bears a American, Latin American, and European Jewish fresh look.

34 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Notes

1. See "Crisis Management in the Community: Preparedness, Coping, Reconstruction. A Training Manual," JPPI, 2008. 2. See "!e People's Army: Orthodox Soldiers and Religious Dilemmas in the IDF," (this Assessment). 3. See "Creating Jewish Meaning: Emerging Adults, Cultural Creativity, and the Jewish Future in the US and Europe," (this Assessment). 4. !is recommendation takes note of Israel’s growing economic prosperity as well as anticipated new sources of revenue from recently discovered natural gas reserves, etc. 5. See "Science and Technology Policy in a Jewish People Context," (this Assessment). 6. See also "Jewish Demographic Policies," Sergio DellaPergola, JPPI 2011.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 35

PART 2

Geopolitical Developments

Developments in the Geopolitical Arena and their Possible Implications for Israel 5 and the Jewish People (2011-2012)

!e shockwaves reverberating throughout the Arab 1. !e Global Complex, in which the "World world over the last year pose signiﬁcant challenges Order," that prevailed during the Cold War era to Israel and the Jewish People. !e uncertainty and the “American Moment” that followed the that traditionally characterizes the Middle East collapse of the USSR have been supplanted by is exacerbated by the current anxiety and air of a "World Dis-Order" that has yet to consolidate crisis permeating the entire geopolitical arena. !e into a stable and functioning system. !e number of “moving parts” within the international United States—whose friendship is so critical system and the diversity of its components make to Israel, and which is home to an exceptionally orchestrating a sound foreign policy di#cult. thriving half of the Jewish People—continues !e dramatic upheavals in the Arab world, which to witness a steady diminution of its power have, so far, led to the overthrow of the rulers of and international stature. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, also threaten the 2. !e Middle East Complex, in which the anchors stability of other regimes. !e dust has not yet that long provided relative strategic stability in settled, and any attempt to draw fast conclusions the region are tottering, and chances are slim about the "new face" of the Middle East would be that stabilization and a resulting semblance of presumptuous. Even the term "Arab Spring" that calm will take hold in the near future. To this, has labeled the tumultuous and still unfolding one should add the ouster of Egypt’s President events, is more wishful thinking than a true Mubarak, the uncertainty regarding Assad’s portrayal of their possible consequences. reign in Syria, the ongoing crisis in Israel- In such a dynamic reality, indecision is as much Turkey relations and, above all, the dramatic a decision as any other and, therefore, decision- achievements of political Islam. All of this is makers in Israel and the Diaspora are not exempted happening as Iran continues to make progress from making di#cult choices. Such resolutions are toward obtaining nuclear weapons, challenging imperative in light of geopolitical developments in Israel (and the US) with the dilemma of whether the following four major complexes: to launch a preemptive military attack, or not.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 39 3. !e Israeli-Arab Conflict Complex, in which !e Global Complex the stalemate continues to threaten both the security and the Jewish-democratic character !e passing year has thrown the transformation of the State of Israel, which in turn helps to fuel of the international system into sharper focus. the phenomena of de-legitimization against it. Conventional power configurations—a bi-polar !e ongoing failure of the model of "direct talks or uni-polar world order—are being replaced by with US mediation" drives the Palestinian side one in which power is distributed among relatively to prefer an alternative course—an enforced numerous actors. !e "World Order" is being solution under an international diktat. subsumed by what currently seems to be a "World Dis-Order." !e central actors in the international 4. The Jerusalem-Washington-U.S. Jewry arena are plagued by their own urgent domestic Triangle complex, which constitutes a critical problems. !e US is enduring a severe and strategic resource for the power of Israel and protracted economic crisis; the European Union the Jewish People, and in which the past year is fraying as a result of the financial crisis; China has revealed both the strength of Israel and is struggling to provide su#cient economic of the Jewish People (mainly in preventing growth to quash social unrest within a gigantic, steps by the American administration in rapidly aging population (about a quarter of a contradiction with the Israeli government’s billion Chinese are expected to be 65 or older stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue), and in 2030); despite impressive growth rates, India the danger involved in exercising this power, is poverty-stricken and plagued by entrenched as in turning Israel into a wedge issue between corruption; Russia’s population is declining, it is Republicans and Democrats. heavily dependent on oil and gas prices, and is !ese complexes are of course intertwined and experiencing a surge of protest against government interdependent. Many of the trends within them incompetence, mounting corruption, human are not amenable to intervention by Israel or the rights violations, and Putin’s controversial decision Jewish People, but in a limited number of cases to retake the presidency. (Following claims that the policy chosen could have a significant e"ect. the parliamentary elections of early December !e year ahead could witness the maturation of 2011 were falsified in favor of Putin’s party—which critical developments, necessitating unequivocal still lost 77 seats—a protest rally near the Kremlin decisions with potentially critical impacts on the drew some 40,000 people, the largest since the fate of Israel and the Jewish People. early 1990s). !reats to world peace abound: in the nuclear arena, the threat posed by Iran and North Korea (where the young and untested Kim Jong Un succeeded his late father, a development that intensifies the

40 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE unpredictability of his country’s future course. testing crisis, the US boasts huge advantages: more Other countries are struggling to maintain domestic than half of the world’s top-rated universities are control (Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, in the US; out of a total $1.2 trillion invested in Yemen, and more). Bin Laden’s annihilation was a R&D globally, $400 billion was invested in the US severe blow to Al Qaeda, but not enough to crush alone (although its population comprises just 5% Islamic terror altogether. !e global economic of the world’s total population). !e US continues crisis continues, and there are fears for the fate of to lead in the nano-technology and biotechnology the international monetary system. Globalization based industries of the future; waves of immigrants creates interdependence and reciprocal influences continue to flock to its gates, providing productive not just in prosperous times, but also in times and entrepreneurial human resources. According of crisis when the failures and deficiencies of the to the World Economic Forum’s Global international bodies charged with guiding the Competitiveness Report world order become all too apparent. Professor 2011-2012, which rates Despite the Kishore Mahbubani from Singapore nailed it when the competitiveness of relative erosion he said: “Today the world’s seven billion citizens the world’s economies, of U.S. power, no longer live in separate boats. !ey live in more the US is rated fifth it is still the than 190 cabins on the same boat. Each cabin has a (following Switzerland, world's largest government to manage its a"airs. And the boat as a Sweden, Finland and economy and whole moves along without a captain or a crew. !e Singapore—none of the international world is adrift.”1 which could be a strategic arena's most !e critical global reality is the backdrop for the competitor of the US), significant ongoing debate whether the US—like other whereas BRIC countries military and world civilizations throughout history, which lag far behind (China—26; diplomatic have declined and fallen after thriving to record Brazil—53; India—56; power heights—has entered its period of decline, or is Russia—66). In addition, US power just at a temporary ebb from which it the US defense budget will rebound? Alongside those quick to lament its equals the combined total of the defense budgets demise there are others who regard the current of all the next 15 rated nations. Without taking crisis as temporary, even if only because the other a position on the yes or no “decline debate,” the contenders for global supremacy are troubled with erosion of Washington’s power, at least in the short internal problems and are ill-equipped to succeed term, is currently demonstrated in the context the US as the world’s leader. After all, the United of the economic crisis—both in its reluctance to States is still the world’s largest economy and the encumber itself with further commitments in the international arena’s most significant military and international arena, and in the growing perception diplomatic power. Even today, in the throes of a of other states regarding an erosion of US power.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 41 !e gradual shifting of the global economic center resources to defense is dwindling. !is reality of gravity from the West to the East is also a factor turns NATO into an organization whose raison in the financial crisis a$icting Europe, which has d’être is increasingly in question. US Secretary of worsened in the last year. !e crisis has intensified Defense Robert Gates warned, on June 10, 2011, the impact of long-term trends: aging populations that NATO could become irrelevant given its and improvident welfare systems. It is also fueling members’ reluctance to invest in its development. resentment toward the entire EU enterprise. During the Cold War, the US covered roughly Surveys show that 63% of the German public does 50% of NATO’s military expenditures, whereas it not trust the European Union, and 53% does not now covers about 75%. Even when NATO forces see a future for Germany within the Union. At the take part in military operations (in Afghanistan December 9, 2011 emergency summit of European this year there were 40,000 soldiers from non-US leaders in Brussels it was decided that a new treaty NATO members, along with 90,000 American expanding budgetary regulation of EU members soldiers), their capabilities are constrained by rigid would be formulated to mitigate the debt crisis, regulations and a lack of basic combat equipment. causing a severe dispute with Britain, which NATO’s operation in Libya exposed this reality: refused to accept revisions to existing treaties. !e although Libya is Europe’s own “backyard,” less economic crisis exposed an unbalanced reality than half of NATO member nations took part in in which a single currency is expected to unify a the operation, which was carried out mainly by continent that is otherwise extremely fragmented France and Britain. !e fighting laid bare NATO’s both fiscally and politically. Individual countries are state of military unpreparedness (in ammunition, subject to a single monetary policy that limits their intelligence, training and maintenance) and hence ability to act independently and with flexibility in the necessity of relying on American aid, even crisis situations. against an inferior adversary such as Libya. (All this Last year’s events have increased doubts about raises disheartening questions about a situation the future of the Euro and the very concept of the where these forces would have to face a real European Union. !e Lisbon Treaty, which was enemy.). meant to yield an e"ective pan-European foreign !e United States and the Middle East policy, is unable to face that task vis-à-vis the dramatic upheavals in the Arab world. Europe’s !e US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, its ability to intervene militarily is limited not only failures to curb Iran’s nuclearization and to advance by its di#culty in consolidating a cohesive foreign an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, its reaction to the policy but also by the ongoing erosion of the Arab uprising, which was perceived in the region military power of continental states. As the Cold as hesitant and inconsistent, along with its severe War and the Soviet threat are increasingly perceived domestic economic situation combine to portray as a thing of the past, the political will to allocate the US in the eyes of Middle Eastern actors as a

42 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE declining superpower that fails to achieve its goals, in Libya, where we do not have a single soldier on is increasingly preoccupied with its own woes and, the ground ... Over the last decade, we have spent thus, less willing to assume responsibilities in the a trillion dollars on war, at a time of rising debt region. !e observation that “the US is leading from and hard economic times. Now, we must invest behind” with respect to American foreign policy in America’s greatest resource—our people ... doctrine, made by a source within the Obama America, it is time to focus on nation building here administration in an April 2011 interview in "e at home.” New Yorker, created a storm of controversy (and It seems that the economic constraints and while administration o#cials strongly criticized accumulated fatigue of remote, multi-casualty this observation, it did capture the view held by wars that do not end in an unequivocal victory many experts on Obama’s foreign policy). Libya combine to make Washington prioritize a strategy was a test case for this thesis as the US let France of focused warfare against terror elements using and Britain lead the operation. Proponents of this unmanned aircraft, commando troops and policy maintain that it is a wise approach that targeted killings of terrorist leaders (last year, the takes into account shrinking US resources and its US excelled in this: Bin Laden was eliminated on preference for operating in the international arena May 1, 2011, in a commando operation in the heart within multi-lateral frameworks (after all, the US of Pakistan, and other senior terrorists su"ered a achieved its goal to overthrow Gaddafi without similar fate). !e strategy of counterinsurgency a single American soldier setting foot on Libyan revived during George W. Bush’s presidency and soil); opponents see this as an abandonment of the designed to provide sustained security to local international arena jeopardizing vital American inhabitants in order to win their trust, while at the interests, as well as conveying a dangerous message same time cultivating a local government capable of American passivity, an unwillingness to fight of providing services and security, necessitates too for its own interests (for instance, against Iran many resources and too long-term a commitment and Syria). !e US attitude was clearly expressed for the US to make at this time. in President Obama’s June 22, 2011 speech on Afghanistan: “My fellow Americans, this has been !e exigencies of an election year—the need to a di#cult decade for our country. We have learned respond to American voters’ priorities—reinforce the anew the profound cost of war—a cost that has inclination to focus on domestic a"airs. Encouraging been paid by the nearly 4,500 Americans who have American economy figures of late 2010 were soon given their lives in Iraq, and the over 1,500 who have replaced by harsh data during 2011. Although in done so in Afghanistan ... we must be as pragmatic December 2011-January 2012 a slight improvement as we are passionate ... When innocents are being was registered, it is still unclear whether this trend slaughtered and global security endangered ... we can continue. Talk of a “double dip” pervades in the must rally international action, which we are doing punditry of economic experts. !ese trends were bluntly manifested in a process that led to a last-

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 43 minute deal in Congress, which prevented the US for the Middle East” have been floated in light of from reaching a state of insolvency (August 1, 2011). the instability of the Arab world, but were rejected !e deal between the Democrats and Republicans by Washington. American foreign aid will shrink, raised the authorized debt ceiling from $14.3 trillion and many aid programs around the world will be to $16.4 trillion, and stipulated that $2.5 trillion curtailed at the same time that reality poses new must be cut in government spending over the challenges. coming decade. In the wake of the deal, which also Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her exposed the di#culties of the American political frustration by saying: “!ere is a democratic system in addressing the economic crisis, the credit- awakening in places that have never dreamed of rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the democracy and it is unfortunate that it’s happening credit rating of the US at a historic time when our own government government from AAA to !e dramatic is facing so many serious economic challenges, AA, for the first time in its upheavals in because there’s no way to have a Marshall Plan for history (August 5, 2011). the Arab world the Middle East and North Africa” (September 30, !e budgetary cuts tied to pose complex 2011). Clinton went on to clarify that the Middle the legislation authorizing dilemmas for East is not going to be the focus of US foreign the debt-ceiling increase the U.S. and the activity, but the Asian-Pacific region, which, she are expected to impede West; strategic said, has become a major engine in world politics: the administration’s and economic “In a time of scarce resources, there’s no question ability to intervene in the interests that we need to invest them wisely where they international arena. A joint are in stark will yield the biggest returns, which is why the bipartisan congressional contradiction Asia-Pacific represents such a real 21st-century committee was unable with fundamental opportunity for us.”3 to reach agreement on a democratic values spending cuts plan (for ten !e Arab Spring poses di#cult policy dilemmas to years, beginning in January Washington, and the price is double: in the eyes of 2013). !e committee’s the Arab masses out in the town squares, the US failure forces an automatic $600 billion cut in the has done too little, too late, while in the eyes of the defense budget, with far-reaching implications for rulers still in power, the US has forsaken loyal allies, US military. (It is expected that e"orts will be made proving that it cannot be trusted. King Abdullah of to revise the decision later in 2012.) In this context, Jordan diagnosed this sentiment in a Washington it is highly likely that the foreign aid budget would Post interview, when asked whether he and other be significantly diminished, and there have been leaders in the region thought the US can be relied (relatively isolated) calls to cut assistance to Israel upon. !e King replied: “I think everybody is wary as well.2 Ideas regarding a possible “Marshall Plan of dealing with the West ... Looking at how quickly people turned their backs on Mubarak, I would say

44 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE that most people are going to try and go their own US and the West, when strategic and economic way. I think there is going to be less coordination interests are in stark contradiction with the with the West and therefore a chance of more fundamental values of Western liberal democracy. misunderstandings.”4 !e administration was criticized for not doing Criticizing the US administration for an enough to encourage the Arab uprising and for inconsistent policy vis-à-vis the Arab uprising is acting in an immoral and discriminatory manner. easy enough. But according to this logic, should According to critics, the administration was late the US encourage a coup in Saudi Arabia? Is to intervene in Egypt, avoided intervening in Syria it right to ignore the harsh consequences of a to stop the killing of protestors, and used relatively military intervention in the name of democracy feeble rhetoric to respond to the suppression of and human rights? (such as a dramatic rise in oil the revolt in Bahrain. !us, on January 25, 2010, prices, which would lead to a global economic at the height of the mass rallies in Cairo (with catastrophe should the Saudi monarchy is the Tunisian ruler already ousted), US Secretary toppled). Obama’s dramatic call (in his Cairo of State Hillary Clinton stated: “Our assessment Speech, June 4, 2009) to open a new page in the is that the Egyptian government is stable and relationship between the US and the Islamic is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate 7 world gave rise to high hopes, only to end in needs and interests of the Egyptian people.” Two great disappointment. !e American image in days later, Vice-President Joe Biden declared that the Middle East is at a low. A regional opinion he “does not consider [Mubarak] to be a dictator,” poll carried out in October 20115 surveyed 3,000 and that dialogue was needed between Mubarak 8 respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and the protestors. !e US changed its position and the United Arab Emirates. !e results showed just four days later. Having spoken with Mubarak a slight improvement in the level of sympathy by telephone, President Obama publicly declared toward the US and its president compared to in a February 1, 2011 press conference that he 2010, but still, a 59% majority expressed negative had made it clear to him: “It is my belief that an attitudes toward the US. In another poll taken orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be in Egypt in March-April 2012, 79% expressed a peaceful, and it must begin now.” Of course, such a negative attitude toward the United States and tough message was never conveyed to Hamad bin 69% expressed a lack of conﬁdence that President Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Sunni king. Obama will "do the right thing" in the world's !e US consented to the entry of Saudi forces into eyes.6 Bahrain to defend the Sunni minority rule and to Criticism is especially harsh regarding Washington’s curb the surge of protest in a country where Shiites conduct vis-à-vis the Arab Spring and the Israeli- comprise 70% of the population. After all, Bahrain Palestinian conﬂict. Indeed, the dramatic upheavals is a major naval base for the Fifth American Fleet in the Arab world pose complex dilemmas for the and enjoys the status of a non-NATO ally. Saudi

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 45 Arabia shares US fears of an Iranian takeover of the explaining (on August 18, 2011) that “!e Zionists island, which is depicted on Iranian maps as Iran’s and Israel are the first to benefit” from the Arab 14th district. !ese arguments are enough to usurp riots. Palestinian National Authority President democracy and human rights considerations. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), whose UN !e US president was not in any hurry to dictate application for Palestinian statehood, submitted on that Bashar Assad step down, even in light of the September 23, 2011 was made in direct defiance of mass slaughter the Syrian tyrant has inflicted on President Obama, who had reiterated just one day protestors to protect his Alawite minority rule. earlier what he had declared in his May 22, 2011 Obama, in a May 19, 20ll speech on the Middle AIPAC speech, that “No vote at the United Nations East, gave Assad the option of remaining in power will ever create an independent Palestinian state.” on the condition that he consent to reforms: Both al-Maliki and Abu Mazen, in these instances, “President Assad now has a choice: He can lead have gone against the superpower that has helped that transition, or get out of the way.” Later, when them so greatly: !e US endeavored to liberate and the US did demand Assad’s removal, no military stabilize Iraq, a mission that carried a heavy price threat was made. !e starkly di"erent treatment in human life and huge financial resources; the of Gaddafi gives rise to a sense that US policy is massive American aid to the Palestinian authority selfish and inconsistent. In the Libyan case as well, since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 Obama’s course was cautious and conditioned amounts to $4 billion, about $600 million annually. on a multi-national intervention, one that would stand the test of international law and would not !e American Withdrawal from Iraq entail the physical presence of American troops on On December 14, 2011, President Obama Libyan soil. On October 20, 2011, the day Gaddafi congratulated US troops on their way back from was killed, Obama boasted that Washington Iraq by saying: “We are leaving behind a sovereign, succeeded in upholding these principles (and stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative indeed, the Arab League, the UN, and major government that was elected by its people.” !e European allies all urged international intervention coming months will reveal whether—and to what to thwart the slaughter that Gaddafi promised his extent—Obama was exaggerating in painting so rosy opponents in Benghazi). a picture of the outcome of nine years of war in Iraq !e erosion of the US image prompts Middle (a war he had labeled “dumb” prior to his election). Eastern leaders to act based on the premise that Indeed, a few days after this declaration and following Washington can be opposed without a price tag. the withdrawal of the last American troops, Baghdad Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki followed was hit by a lethal wave of terror attacks that left Tehran’s lead by publicly supporting Assad, about 70 dead (December 22, 2011). !e coming justifying Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology, months will tell whether the huge investment of supporting the Shiite uprising in Bahrain, and the US and its partners in Iraq was made in vain, or

46 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE worse, caused more strategic damage than good (US which would draw neighboring countries eager losses in Iraq total 4,479 dead, 32,200 wounded, and to both lay their hands on Iraq’s energy resources over a $1 trillion spent). !e main beneficiary of this and defend themselves against fears that Iraqi is of course Iran. Although the interests of Shiite Iran instability might leak into their own territories. A do not completely match those of the Shiite majority flare-up in Iraq would compound current surges of currently dominant in Iraq, this new situation will instability in the Gulf caused by the Arab uprising. make it easier for Iran to broaden its influence and !e US had planned to maintain a huge embassy in to meddle in Iraq’s internal politics, so that Iraq Iraq with 16,000 employees, with several thousand continues to serve Iranian interests by continuing to trainers and security personnel contracted be too weak and divided to pose a threat to Iran and by private American security companies. !is its regional aspirations. American presence (which was later decided to !e withdrawal itself was highly controversial reduce by half), is supposed to help in the recovery inside the US. Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert of Iraq, leaving the US with considerable leverage. Gates spoke publicly, on May 25, 2011, in favor of !e implementation of the massive arms deals keeping some American forces in Iraq and called signed with Iraq would necessitate the long-term upon Iraq to accept this position. He explained presence of American instructors and trainers, and that retaining these forces would be “a powerful the US would probably keep an eye on the situation signal to the region that we’re not leaving, that we from the air, and from its base in neighboring will continue to play a part ... it would be reassuring Kuwait. !e United States is augmenting its forces to the Gulf States ... it would not be reassuring in the region and upgrading the armies of its Gulf to Iran, and that’s a good thing.” American region allies in order to fortify the anti-Iran line and commanders on the ground recommended to compensate for the strategic vacuum created leaving 18,000 soldiers, but Washington’s attempt by its withdrawal from Iraq. It is not surprising to leave just 4,000 soldiers failed because the Iraqi that Muqtada al-Sadr, the extremist Shiite leader government refused to grant the troops legal and a close ally of the Iranians, declared that an impunity. !e optimistic scenario regarding Iraq’s extended US diplomatic presence in Iraq amounts future portrays it as a stable state; led by a political to a continuation of the occupation: “!ey are all system that manages to reconcile the ethnic blocs occupiers, and resisting them ... is an obligation.”9 (Shiite, Sunni and Kurd); whose governmental and Nevertheless, the capability of this non-military economic recovery is accelerating; remains a US presence to curb Iran’s increasing influence in Iraq ally; fights against Al Qaeda and Iranian subversion; must not be overestimated (one manifestation of and generally provides a positive model for this influence is Iraq’s objection to Arab League Middle Eastern stability. But the possibility of an steps against Assad, who is Tehran’s ally). !e US alternate, pessimistic scenario is highly disturbing. could also face a di#cult dilemma if its sta" in Iraq !e withdrawal could ignite a civil war in Iraq is targeted for lethal terror attacks.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 47 !e potential for a ﬂare-up in Iraq is very high. of the Taliban’s gradual recovery and the failure of !e country remains ethnically fragmented. the Kabul government to e"ectively govern the Internal disputes around the division of power country, Obama decided (in December 2009) to are still raging, the government’s performance is step up the troops by 30,000 soldiers, for a limited inadequate, and corruption is deep-rooted (Iraq period of time (until July 2011). !e objective is rated 175 among 182 countries in Transparency was to crush Al Qaeda, curb Taliban momentum, International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and train Afghan security forces to defend their 2011). Displaced from power following the ousting own country. In his June 2011 speech, Obama of Saddam Hussein, the Sunnis may become even committed to bring the additional forces back more marginalized in the wake of US withdrawal. home by September 2012 (i.e., the eve of the !ey claim that Prime Minister al-Maliki is a November 2012 elections), and to a complete tyrant who breaches the agreements designed withdrawal by the end of 2014. !e actors in the to facilitate co-existence among the di"erent arena are not oblivious to the transience of the factions. !e Kurds in the north, who are resolved American presence, which makes the attainment to defend oil resources in their territory, are wary of of American goals that much harder. !e number the consolidation of a strong central government of troops in Afghanistan grew during Obama’s in Baghdad, and will probably continue to try to term to reach 100,000. In a decade of war, the US thwart it. Iraq’s position as a battleground between has lost 1,800 soldiers and $400 billion in direct Saudi Arabia and Iran may become aggravated, costs. A majority of the American public is of the and the upheavals in neighboring Syria, which are opinion that the US should end its involvement in approaching civil war, will make e"orts to keep Afghanistan. In November 2001, a Gallup survey Iraq stabilized even harder. revealed that a massive majority [91%] was in favor of intervention. Ten years later, according to a CBS !e Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) Complex survey, the supporting camp had shrunk to 34%.10 !e American invasion of Afghanistan and the Hamid Karzai’s failing government is plagued overthrow of Taliban rule were intended to prevent by political instability, so there is no guarantee it from becoming a base for Al Qaeda and the whatsoever that US investment of blood and Islamic Jihad organizations that have found refuge treasure will ever bear fruit. !e US is therefore there. During his election campaign, President faced with di#cult dilemmas: Should some forces Obama argued that unlike the war in Iraq, the remain in Afghanistan after 2014? Should the US war in Afghanistan was vital for US security. What try to reach a compromise with the Taliban to began as a limited mission has developed into a gain stability and minimize damages? !e Taliban full-blown and ongoing war against the Taliban, certainly has an incentive to wait for the US to whose combatants were moving freely back and withdraw. Should the United States prepare for forth from bases in neighboring Pakistan. In view years of economic support and other assistance to

48 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Afghanistan? With an unemployment rate of 40%, Mike Mullen confirmed that Pakistan was actively the country is rated near the bottom of the world supporting and harboring Afghan opposition GNP per capita index. fighters the US was trying to stop. !e ISI, which !e di#culties in stabilizing Afghanistan and is controlled by the military (and which is not fighting e"ectively against terrorist elements are e"ectively monitored by the civilian government), mounting in light of the long-standing training is not interested in the Taliban being defeated, and and support extended by the ISI (Inter-Services acts to thwart US e"orts to stabilize a democratic Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence service) to central government in Kabul capable of governing Islamic terror groups operating in Afghanistan. the entire country. !is is the background for the !is activity, which Pakistan continues to deny, is declaration made by US Defense Secretary Leon intended to allow Islamabad to exert influence in !e American Afghanistan, against what is perceived as a strategic Panetta on October 11, 2011, that the US failure to crush threat from India. Delhi is indeed cultivating ties the Taliban in with Kabul. In the last decade India has invested “cannot resolve the issues of Afghanistan without Afghanistan about $2 billion in infrastructure projects and and to stabilize signed a strategic partnership agreement with resolving the issues of Pakistan.” !e American the situation Kabul (October 4, 2011), in which it committed in Pakistan is to train and equip the Afghan army. !e supreme failure to crush the Taliban in Afghanistan emblematic commanders of the Pakistani military envision of an overall a nightmare scenario in which their country— and stabilize the situation in Pakistan becomes picture of wedged between India and Afghanistan—is American attacked simultaneously by both. !e anticipated emblematic of an overall picture of American weakness and US withdrawal from Afghanistan is certainly no abandonment incentive for Pakistan to abandon its leverage, weakness and desertion. which is based on its support of the Afghan Taliban. !e Arab Uprising And indeed, in global terms, the real strategic "headache" is Pakistan, which possesses a nuclear On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian named arsenal that is rapidly expanding, and a reputation Mohamed Bouazizi stood in front of the local for having no qualms about proliferating nuclear governor’s house in the town of Sidi-Bouzid technology. In Pakistan Islamic terrorist groups and set himself on fire. !at desperate act was operate freely (Bin Laden found a haven in triggered by a forceful confiscation of his vegetable Pakistan for years before being killed by American cart, his livelihood, by local police. Broadcast on commandos). satellite TV and disseminated on the Internet through social networks, the event sparked a In a Senate hearing (September 22, 2011), then series of demonstrations across the Arab world. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta" Admiral

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 49 In a month’s time, the Tunisian Zine el-Abidine young people without any hope for a decent future Ben Ali abdicated his throne and sought refuge in (90% of the unemployed in Egypt are under 24), Saudi Arabia (January 14, 2011). !e wave of revolt rampant corruption, revocation of basic freedoms spread throughout the region from Libya to Syria, and human rights violations. However, the best and to date has led to the ouster of rulers in Tunisia, experts, including intelligence agencies, failed to Egypt, Libya and Yemen. It threatens to topple foresee what was coming and could not imagine others as well. !e elections that have taken place Arab crowds flooding the town squares risking in various Arab countries since the uprising began their lives in the line of fire. gave dramatic expression to the massive support Western governments, also taken by surprise, were enjoyed by political Islam in the Arab world. faced with di#cult dilemmas: Should they help Parties representing the Muslim Brotherhood have to oust tyrants—with whom the West has closely won every election campaign held in the Arab cooperated for years even though their regimes world since then (in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt), were rife with violations of democratic principles with the exception of Algeria—which did not see and basic human rights? Or should they favor a significant citizen revolt—where the ruling FLN protecting economic interests, the uninterrupted party won the elections held on May 12, 2012 flow of oil, stability and the curbing of Islamic (although the Islamic bloc claimed the election movements? !e di#culty in formulating a results had been tampered with). consistent and cohesive policy led to what has Obviously, it is much too early to pretend to been perceived as a vacillation—an incoherent "recap" the outcomes of the Arab uprising. line. !e Libyan case was exceptional largely due Events are still unfolding, but it seems that what to Gaddafi’s personality, the relatively broad had initially been termed the "Arab Spring" has international support behind the intervention, turned into an "Islamic Spring." How this trend will and the Arab League’s support of the insurgency. develop, which is immensely significant from an !e Libyan intervention demonstrated some of Israeli perspective, is shrouded in uncertainty. Will the potential of an aggressive and well-coordinated their newfound governmental responsibility cause international e"ort. It began with UN Security these movements to moderate their positions, or Council Resolution No. 1970 (February 26, 2011), are their leaders’ appeasing messages merely lip which imposed sanctions on Gaddafi and referred service masking their true intentions to impose the issue to the International Criminal Court. the rigid laws of Islam and their original doctrine, Resolution No. 1973 followed approving a "no- which negates Israel’s very existence? fly zone" over Libya (March 19, 2011). Gaddafi’s !e Middle Eastern picture on the eve of the assets were frozen, a naval siege and arms embargo upheavals was clear for all to see: ine"ective imposed, and a host of countries quickly recognized governments, poverty, economic hardship, high the authority of the Libyan National Transitional unemployment rates (about 25%), myriads of Council. Injecting NATO forces into the military

50 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE campaign in Libya swayed the pendulum in favor gluing together a society burdened by poverty, of the rebels and a"orded them time to organize illiteracy, tribalism, social division, radical Islam, and arm. Bombardment throughout March oppression of women, corruption in government, 2011 prevented Gaddafi’s forces from storming discrimination against minorities, unemployment, Benghazi and slaughtering his opponents as he had poor educational systems, backward economies, promised. Although various observers predicted and weakened, frustrated middle classes. !e that the fighting would be long and frustrating, masses that risked their lives taking part in rebel forces soon overtook Gaddafi’s palace forcing the uprisings demonstrated remarkable unity, him to flee with his family (August 23, 2011). He dedication and spontaneous mobilization to was finally captured and executed on October 20, remove the regimes that had made their lives 2011. Gaddafi had been isolated in the Arab world, so miserable for so long. !e satellite networks, to the point that even the Arab League overcame headed by Al Jazeera, along with Internet social its usual indecision and reached a resolution in networks, helped galvanize spirits by broadcasting support of the "no-fly zone." Qatar even dispatched the exhilarating events live to every corner of the 6 Mirage fighter aircraft to join the Western forces Arab world. Facebook and Twitter facilitated the operating in Libya. mass mobilization, coordination and the logistics !e Syrian case is totally di"erent. !e West of getting protesters to the demonstrations. !e is reluctant to intervene militarily and, due to uprising was not led by any formal organization Chinese and Russian objections, is struggling to and had no popular, charismatic leader, nor impose further sanctions on Assad. was it based on a clear ideological platform. New communication technologies have played What will the Middle East look like when the dust an invaluable supporting role in overthrowing of the Arab upheavals settles? !e emerging reality incumbent rulers because they enable anonymous does not promise a swift or peaceful breakout bloggers to organize demonstrations in the town of regional democracies that uphold human squares from the safety of their own quarters rights and liberal principles. Western analysts (which could be anywhere on earth). !is new, were quick to christen the tumultuous events digital reality partly explains the conspicuous lack the "Arab Spring"—an enlightened and sweeping of a top-down leadership, a unifying organizational awakening to democracy, human rights, liberty, structure, and ideological platform—all hallmarks liberal values, religious freedom, equality for of revolution in pre-Internet times. women, and modern economies. But the unfolding reality has been disappointing, and much of the Questions also abound regarding the ability of the optimism that attended the beginning of the uprisings’ leaders to successfully integrate into the uprising has been replaced by alarm. It is increasingly new political landscape it engendered. !e "powers doubtful whether the revolt that succeeded of the past" have not vanished: the army, the old in overthrowing rulers could also succeed in political parties, and, of course, the newly legal,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 51 popular and well-organized Muslim Brotherhood. praised Hamas suicide bombers and who signed !ese forces are eager to preserve their power a fatwa calling for “Jihad to liberate the Holy Land and exploit the new conditions to advance their from the Zionist regime,”11 along with Nassrallah, own interests. From the perspective of frustrated Ahmad Yassin, Kardawi and others, is now promising protestors, the revolution is being "hijacked," and a liberal, enlightened Islamic government that threatens to reach places they hadn’t foreseen: upholds democracy and the separation of powers, an Islamic bloc takeover, military rule, the respects human rights, allows freedom of the press consolidation of coalitions that reserve political and defends the rights of women and minorities. power for the military, traditional parties and In an article published on the eve of the elections Muslim factions. Moreover, the prospect of civil (October 17, 2011) in the Guardian, Ghannushi war and the disintegration explained: “God says in the Qur’an that "!ere is no of the state into rivaling compulsion in religion"; therefore we believe that !e Arab tribes and ethnic groups neither the state nor any social actor has the right monarchs must not be overlooked. to interfere in society in order to impose a certain have remained lifestyle, belief or idea. !ese should be matters relatively stable Tunisia, where the Arab of free personal choice.” Will the actual reality be because, among revolt first erupted, was also di"erent, or will Tunisia prove to be the Arab pioneer other things, the first country to hold of an Islam that peacefully coexists with democracy, their claim to elections to its National human rights, pluralism and liberal values? be scions of Assembly (October 23, the Prophet 2011), which was charged In neighboring Libya—torn by religious, tribal, and Muhammad reins with formulating a new territorial disputes and lacking any real government in the clerics and constitution and setting institutions—the vision of Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the trumps their the rules for parliamentary rebel leader, does not bode well. On October 23, authority and presidential elections. 2011, he promised that Islamic Law would be the Monitored by foreign legal basis for Libyan legislation, and that all laws observers, the elections contradicting Sharia would be annulled, including went smoothly and ended with a resounding the one that prohibited polygamy and revoked the victory (43%) for the Islamic party Ennahda. Until Qur’anic right of men to take four wives. the revolution, the Tunisian constitution had been Commentators are uncertain whether the Muslim considered the most liberal of the Arab world. Brotherhood’s entry into the political arena in Will the new constitution, under the auspices Arab states will moderate its positions, lead it to of Ennahda, be regressive? Party leader Rachid coalesce with secular political parties, perhaps Ghannushi promised while campaigning that his even position it at the frontline of a confrontation party’s victory would secure an economic flowering with radial Salafist groups, or if, alternatively, dark “similar to Turkey’s.” Ghannushi, who had previously theocracies will emerge.

52 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e Arab uprising takes place in a region riddled of the Prophet Muhammad, to rein in the clerics with ethnic divisions. Sudan split into two states and trump their authority. Indeed, the commonly last year, Northern and Southern, and there have heard slogans in protests within Arab monarchies already been clashes between the respective do not call for dethroning kings, but for replacing armies, which threaten to deteriorate into all-out the government, and enacting reforms. !e war. !e impoverished Southern Sudan declared monarchs have responded with massive splurges independence on July 9, 2011. It controls territory of public spending, promises of reform and 31 times larger than Israel’s, yet its paved roads dismissals of standing premiers. !e Saudi king total less than 60 kilometers. Yemen is torn even promised that, starting in 2015, women between the Houthi tribes’ uprising in the north would be allowed to take part in municipal and riots in the south, and the absence of any real elections and could be appointed members of government control allows Al Qaeda a safe haven the King’s Advisory Council. !e King of Morocco, there. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was who so far seems to have managed to navigate the wounded in an assassination attempt in June 2011, stormy seas of revolt, promised (in March 2011) finally aquiesced to public pressure and abdicated, changes to the constitution that would curtail his in return for a promise of impunity, on November own powers. When asked by Lally Weymouth in an 23, 2011. !e Kurds in Iraq aspire to independence, October 2011 Washington Post interview: “If you and the pent up tension between the Shiite look five years down the line, do you see yourself majority and the Sunni minority could erupt in relinquishing some power to the parliament?” King the wake of US withdrawal. !e riots in Syria may Abdullah of Jordan promptly replied, “Probably spiral into an all-out struggle between the Sunni, sooner.” Alawite, Kurd and Druze factions. Lebanon could We will have to wait and see whether a result of slide back into the trauma of a harrowing ethnic the regional uprisings will be the transformation civil war (between Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and of the absolute monarchies of the Arab world into Druze). !e Palestinian majority in Jordan is being constitutional monarchies, with real parliaments. systematically denied access to positions of power and its national security agencies. And in Bahrain, Powers that are threatened by the Arab uprising a Sunni minority rules the Shiite majority (70%). are forced to react in order to preserve their might. Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to dispatch troops In this context, it is striking that, at least until now, to neighboring Bahrain (March 2011) to suppress the Arab monarchies have remained relatively the local protest, led by the Shiite majority and stable, and their rulers appear to enjoy more directed against the Sunni King Al Khalifa. Other popular legitimacy compared to the secular oil-based Emirates are quick to forcefully suppress rulers who took power through coups or were disobedience while simultaneously announcing endorsed by an incumbent military regime. !e the allocation of hefty sums for social causes, Arab monarchs claim to be scions of the dynasty housing, and job creation. !is financial largesse

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 53 is not possible in all Arab countries. Paradoxically, Axis" states have been reconfigured and this is the deteriorated economic situation that helped of key importance to Israel: Mubarak’s ouster ignite the riots has worsened in their wake. In the weakened a critical link in the Israeli strategic immediate term, a significant decrease in economic alignment. While the relationship with Egypt had growth has been recorded, with growth in Egypt, never been warm, Mubarak kept the peace, was Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia expected to a constructive partner on security issues, and saw decline to about zero, compared to 4% or more the danger posed by Iran and radical Islam eye in 2010. Tourism and foreign investment have to eye with Israel. !e deteriorated relationship been hit hard, and local capitalists are transferring with Turkey has potentiated this new reality, and their money out of the region due to a sense of Israel’s strategic isolation. At the same time the basic insecurity in the present, and uncertainty "Axis of Resistance," which is hostile to Israel— about the future. A report based on IMF data, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas—is also coming published on October 15, 2011, suggested that apart. !e threat to Assad’s regime may eliminate the cost of the Arab uprising to the regional the strong Iranian link in this axis and restrict its economy amounted to $56 billion, with the main maneuverability in the region, weaken Hezbollah, victims being Syria ($23.3 billion), Libya ($14.2 and increase Hamas dependence on Egypt. Syrian billion), and Egypt ($9.79 billion). A solution to the opposition leaders promise that the post-Assad economic breakdown cannot be reached in the Syria will have a chillier relationship with Iran and near future; it is therefore expected that the dire Hezbollah. To reiterate, the processes of change economic situation will continue to fuel the unrest are still evolving, and they contain a great number throughout the Arab world. of "moving parts." Because each element of the Without drawing any conclusions regarding the regional strategic alignment may take on various final outcome of the Arab revolt, it seems safe to possible shapes, a matrix encompassing all the assume Arab rulers will have to be much more potential combinations, and their outcomes, is attuned to popular sentiment from here on out. extremely complex and stymies decision-makers. Fear of the government is no longer as paralyzing !e awakening of the Arab populace impacts as it used to be, and taking to the streets has all states in the region and they are responding become a realistic option for redress. !e fact that accordingly, even if the uprising has skipped some parliamentary election victories have granted real of them altogether and is relatively weak in others. power to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is bound !e key players in the Middle Eastern arena with to translate into increasing influence over future the greatest potential to a"ect Israel’s national governance and foreign policy. !e upheavals are security are Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi expected to undermine strategic alignments that Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Each is discussed in detail had provided a semblance of stability in the region. below. !e components of the pro-American "Moderate

54 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Egypt with his two sons beside him (August 3, 2011) signified more than anything else the earthquake “Egypt is not Tunisia.” !is was the reaction of many that continues to confound and shake the Arab expert commentators and analysts when asked world. if the riots in Tunisia could eventually lead to the collapse of the Mubarak regime. Abdel Moneim !e parliamentary election process in Egypt, which Said, former chairman of the board of directors began on November 28, 2011 and which required of the Al-Ahram newspaper and director of the three rounds of voting for the People’s Assembly Center for Strategic Studies, calmed his readers by and the Shura Council, ended on January 11, saying that “the critical mass of Egyptians is, indeed, 2012. !e results turned the Islamic parties into di"erent from the critical mass of Tunisians. It has the dominant force in the Egyptian parliament. not yet abandoned the wisdom that tells them not !e Freedom and to leave a place until they know where they are Justice Party (the Islamic Close scrutiny heading.”12 Much to the surprise of this Egyptian Brotherhood) won 38% of the scholar, as well as many others, the riots that broke of the parliamentary seats utterances out in Cairo immediately after the Tunisian ruler, and the Al-Nour Party of Islamic Bin Ali, fled his country and sought refuge in Saudi took 29%. bloc leaders Arabia on January 14, 2011, led to Mubarak’s fall As a result of its sweeping raises doubts of on February 11, 2011. Even Major General Aviv victory, the Muslim regarding their Kohavi, head of the Israeli Military Intelligence, Brotherhood now faces commitment failed to read the future, and a few days before new dilemmas, ones to the peace Mubarak’s ouster, in a discussion before the reserved for those in agreement Knesset’s Foreign A"airs and Defense Committee, power: How to address with Israel announced that “government stability in Egypt is the ailing Egyptian 13 not in any danger.” But Mubarak did not survive economy? How to the massive riots. !e police capitulated and proceed vis-à-vis the Egyptian military, which retreated from the streets, and the army, which does not seem willing to give up its authority and had taken positions in cities across Egypt, opted economic privileges easily? Should the government not to confront the protestors. On February 1 risk a severe clash with the military in order to keep Mubarak announced that he intended to retire, it at bay during the formulation of the constitution and only remain in o#ce for a few months to and the appointment of government o#cials? ensure a smooth transfer of power, but the masses How to address the surprising clout of the Salafists in Cairo’s Tahrir Square were enraged by this plan (cooperation or confrontation)? How to convince and called for Mubarak’s immediate removal. !e the world that Egypt is a stable state, lucrative for humiliating sight of the ailing Mubarak wheeled to investors and attractive to tourists? And, of course, trial in a hospital gurney and put in an iron cage how to regard the peace agreement with Israel? In

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 55 this context it bears mentioning that any discussion regime, or continue to control the country in of the chances of a functioning democracy in one guise or another. Many of the Tahrir Square Egypt must take into account its acute poverty, protestors do not sense a real change in the way high illiteracy rates, and the extremist religious their country is being run. !e transitory military doctrines prevalent among large swathes of the rule is no substitute for the democracy they Egyptian public. An April 2011 Pew survey found envision, and they are increasingly suspicious that that 62% of respondents maintained that laws instead of handing control over to civilian bodies, should be strictly consistent with the Qur’an, the army intends to continue holding power for while an additional 27% maintained that the law a while longer. (Since the fall of Mubarak, 12,000 must accord with the values and tenets of Islam. civilians have been tried by military court). !e In a previous poll in December 2010, 82% of army’s attempt to ensure that the new constitution respondents supported the punishment of stoning would grant it immunity to civilian control for adultery, 77% were in favor of chopping o" (especially its budget) provoked much anger. On the hands of thieves, and 84% agreed that Islamic November 19, 2011, the protestors were back in apostates should be put to death. Tahrir Square demanding that the military regime !e ﬁrm religiosity of Egyptian society is not the make way for an elected civilian government. sole explanation for the Islamic bloc’s victory. !e protest deteriorated into severe violence; During the long years of oppression, the mosques the government resigned, and an agreement was remained a relatively safe haven for disseminating reached, according to which SCAF committed to Islamic doctrine (an advantage not enjoyed by transfer power to a civilian government and hold other opposition movements, whose activities presidential elections by July 2012. were forcefully suppressed). !e intensive charity !e economic situation in Egypt is grave and work and support networks for the needy the getting worse. Foreign currency reserves are down Islamists weaved across Egypt have won them to $20 billion mark and eroding at the rate of $1 many loyal supporters. Fed up with government billion a month. About 40% of the population corruption, many in the Egyptian public regard subsists on less than $2 per day, and 34% of the the Islamists’ religious commitment as a guarantee adult population is illiterate (one of the highest for a government that is averse to corruption and rates in the Arab world). Mubarak had put Egypt adheres to the values of justice. on the tracks of a free economy, which yielded !e rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed a 5% annual growth rate, but the instability Forces (SCAF) is expected to last at least until and possible Muslim Brotherhood pressure to July 2012, when it was promised that Egypt would introduce a populist economic policy may drag have a new president. Until then it remains unclear the Egyptian economy even further down. A whether the military will return to its barracks and rigid religious climate and instability would deter leave the political arena to a civilian and democratic tourists from returning to Egypt (tourism is 10% of

56 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the Egyptian GNP and provides 6 million jobs). In conservative Salafist Muslim preacher. Following order to prevent an increase in the unemployment the disqualification, the leading candidates were rate (currently 12%), and given the population’s Amr Mussa (formerly the Arab League's secretary current growth rate, Egypt must create 650,000 general and previously foreign minister under new jobs each year necessitating an annual growth Mubarak), Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, (who rate of at least 6.5% (this year the growth rate is had been ousted from the Muslim Brotherhood as expected to be zero). a result of his desire to seek the presidency), and Violent eruptions over religious di"erences add Mohamed Morsi, the representative of the Muslim to the instability. In severe riots that broke out Brotherhood who was nominated following the in Cairo on October 9, 2011, the army was pitted disqualification of Khairat El-Shater. against the Coptic minority, which was protesting !e presidential elections were held on May 23-24, the demolition of a Coptic church in the city. 25 2012. As Egyptian law requires an absolute majority, protestors were killed and dozens more injured. the two leading contenders in the first round— !e bloody event is just one in a host of hostilities Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafik—will face o" against Egypt’s Christian minority (the eight in a second of voting on June 16-17. Mohamed million Egyptian Copts comprise one of the Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, was oldest Christian communities anywhere), and nominated only after El-Shater was disqualified presents the Military Council a double challenge: from running. Morsi holds conservative Muslim maintaining stability while also avoiding the positions, and is remembered in Israel for having creating a perception in the West that the Egyptian called Israelis “murderers and vampires.” Shafik, regime fails to protect minority rights. a former head of the Egyptian Air Force who is !e reformist forces that spurred on the revolution identified with the Mubarak regime, has pledged are struggling to organize politically, and the to restore security and stability to Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood is now Egypt’s best-organized !e presidential contest reflects a primary rift political party. Its leaders, who in the spring of 2011 in Egyptian society: political Islam on one hand, made a commitment not to run a presidential and the old regime on the other. !e liberal candidate, have not kept their promise. !e Shura forces that sparked the revolution have been left Council decided by a small majority (56 to 52) that frustrated and alienated from both candidates. Khairat el-Shater, deputy head of the movement, !e coming months will show whether Egypt would run for the presidency. !e Presidential can embark on the road to recovery under a Election Commission, however, disqualified his stable government or whether internal divisions candidacy along with those of nine others (out will bring further turbulence. It is important to of 23), including some who had been considered note that the presidential elections are taking leading contenders: Omar Suleiman, Mubarak's place even though the work of drafting the new intelligence chief, and Hazem Sala Abu Ismail, the Egyptian constitution has yet to be completed, not

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 57 to mention the referendum that must be called to is for peace, but it depends also on the other side. ratify it. !is means that the presidential powers ... If you asked me what kind of relations between of o#ce will likely be determined and codified the Arab world and Israel I would like to see, I only after the new president has been elected. It would say that the Arab position—to which Egypt is unclear whether the drafting of its constitution is a party—is based on the Arab Peace Initiative of will be completed before the general election, 2002.”14 much less the referendum that is supposed to SCAF chairman General Hussein Tantawi promised ratify it. Egyptian judicial authorities dissolved on July 23, 2011 that Egypt would honor all the the constitutional commission in which the agreements it had signed, and continue to pursue Islamic bloc held a decisive majority, and a new a stable and sustainable peace in the Middle East. constitutional framing commission has not yet In contrast, Nabil Alarabi, secretary general of been appointed. !e creation of a constitution is the Arab League, said in an Al Arabyia interview complicated by the tensions resulting from the on August 26, 2011, that the peace agreement di"ering political aspirations and agendas of the between Israel and Egypt is not sacred, unlike the various players involved: the Islamic bloc, the Qur’an or the New Testament. He said that “if one military, and the liberal elements. side breaches the agreement, the other side should Analysts foresee a number of possible scenarios warn it and keeps the right to revise or annul the regarding the future Egyptian regime: in one, agreement.” When asked about the possibility that the generals currently in the temporary Military Egypt would annul the agreement with Israel, King Council (all of whom served under Mubarak) Abdullah of Jordan alarmingly observed: “!at is a continue to rule the country in one guise or very, very strong possibility.”15 another; in another, the Muslim Brotherhood !e positions of the Islamic bloc are especially becomes the dominant political power; in a third pertinent. In the wake of the sweeping electoral scenario, power is shared between the army and victory, the international press was clearly relieved the Muslim Brotherhood; and a fourth envisions to report the Muslim Brothers’ a#rmation of the elected Egyptian president ruling under its commitment to honor existing Egyptian parliamentary supervision. agreements, including the Camp David Accords. From Israel’s perspective, the immediate question !is stance was also attributed to the Salafist is the danger involved in a possible Egypt breach of party, whose spokesman, Nussri Hamad, said in an the peace agreement with Israel leading to a renewal interview to the Kuwaiti newspaper A-rai al-Am of conflict. Egypt’s rulers have been inconsistent on December 20, 2011, that there was no reason on this issue. Leading presidential contender Amr not to talk with Israel as long as it was endorsed by Moussa was asked if, as president, he would honor the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and not conducted the peace agreement, and responded: “[T]he treaty in secret. But closer scrutiny of the utterances of is a treaty. For us, the treaty has been signed and it Islamic bloc leaders raises doubts regarding their

58 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE commitment to existing peace agreements. Shortly people will express their opinion on the matter ... after Mubarak was ousted, Rashad al-Bayoumi, !e accords will be honored by law, but each side is deputy head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, entitled to re-examine the treaty.”16 !is double talk said in Asharq Al-Awsat on February 27, 2011 that does nothing to allay the fears of those concerned “We respect international agreements and major about the fate of the Camp David Accords. political issues, whatever they may be, however Surprisingly, the statements of Emad Abdel with regards to an objective and academic look Ghafour, head of the Salafist Al Nour party, sound [at this issue], it is the right of either side, or any less disturbing. In an Al Jazeera interview on one side, to review and discuss according to the December 21, 2011, Ghafour was asked, “Do you circumstances and requirements. !e Camp support the two-state solution?” He replied, “We David Accords were never put to the people or accept what Palestinians accepted and we will even to the parliament in the proper manner, accept what they will accept.” When asked, “Will but rather these were enforced from above. One Al Nour seek to annul or amend the Egypt-Israel of the most important articles of this agreement Peace Treaty?” he responded, “When it comes to was the establishment of a Palestinian state, very all the agreements that Egypt has signed, we have well, but let us ask: where is this [Palestinian] state? to respect them and demand that they be carried Secondly, where is this comprehensive peace in out. !ere are many articles in the peace treaty light of the daily massacres and brutal attacks that that have not been carried out, such as solving the the Palestinians are subject to? Who has destroyed Palestinian issue, giving Palestinians the right to this agreement, in light of the genocidal plans self-determination, self-rule, and the establishment against the Palestinian people, and the systematic of a Palestinian state on the Palestinian land. !ese move to Judaize Jerusalem and destroy the al-Aqsa are many articles which, if implemented, will make Mosque? !ere is also the issue of the secret articles the Palestinian people feel they benefitted from included in this accord, from selling Egyptian the peace process.” natural gas to Israel at a fifteenth of its real price. All of this must be put to the people, and it is the !e future of the peace agreement with Israel has people’s right to reconsider these conventions. Of not disappeared as an issue in the presidential course, we do not accept the Camp David Accords election campaign. In the first televised debate of at all, but re-evaluating and dealing with this must its kind in Egypt (May 11, 2012) between two of be done according to the law.” Even after the the candidates—Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Muslim Brotherhood’s victory, al-Bayoumi adopts Aboul Fotouh—the latter labeled Israel "an enemy" a hard line: “Under no circumstances would the and promised to reexamine the treaty between the Muslim Brotherhood recognize the State of Israel two countries. Moussa responded that, indeed, ... the accords were signed a long time ago, and the "Most of our people see it as an enemy but the Egyptian people were not party to them, so the responsibility of the president is to deal with such things responsibly and not run after hot-headed

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 59 slogans".17 !e Muslim Brotherhood candidate, “[...] not only to universal human rights, but to the Mohamed Morsi, made clear in an article he international obligations that the Government of published on January 8, 2012, that "!e party also Egypt has undertaken.”19 !e actual test of these stresses that the Palestinian people have the right promises will come when the elected Egyptian to liberate their land…"18 government takes charge. In operational terms, for According to one interpretation, conditioning Israel and the Jewish People this means one thing— Egyptian commitment to the peace accords on keeping up the pressure on Western governments the activation of heretofore unimplemented to insist in their dealings with the Islamic bloc that articles, and the demand to re-examine the it keeps—in both its rhetoric and actions—the Camp David Accords, are both pieces of double Egyptian commitment to the peace with Israel. At talk designed to conceal the same time, one cannot ignore a reality in which the US and the West regard it as a vital interest to Russia and the Islamic bloc’s real cultivate connections with political Islam, which is China used their objective: to abrogate the poised to assume a dominant position in Middle veto to block a peace accords with Israel. Eastern a"airs in the coming years. Security Council Another interpretation resolution conversely maintains Israel is thus faced with di#cult conundrums against Assad's that the Islamic bloc is regarding the future of its relationship with Egypt. regime to gradually adapting to Peace in Mubarak’s time may have been cold, but prevent a West- regional and international the Egyptian president was a strategic partner. led military realities, and absorbing Will this continue to be the case when the Muslim operation the fact that Egypt’s Brotherhood plays a significant, indeed majority, against Syria economy cannot recover role in Egyptian politics? Egyptian opinion polls without Western aid. give only a vague picture. !e findings of an opinion !e West insists on poll taken on October 24, 2011 by Al-Ahram Centre Egypt’s continued commitment to its peace for Political and Strategic Studies are relatively agreement with Israel. Indeed, the United States, encouraging: 62% want the peace agreement which in current negotiations with the Muslim with Israel to be honored, with certain security Brotherhood, has reiterated what it demands of revisions; 23% support the agreement without the organization, including that it honor the peace change. However, in the 2011 Arab Public Opinion treaty with Israel. American diplomats say that their Poll, conducted by Shibley Telhami in conjunction Egyptian counterparts have repeatedly expressed with Zogby International, on November 21, 2011, their commitment to honor the agreement, and only 37% supported the agreement, with 35% State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, demanding its annulment. An April 2011 Pew poll in a briefing, said that the administration has found that 54% wanted the agreement annulled, secured the commitment of the Muslim Brothers, compared to 36% in favor of keeping it in place.

60 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Another Pew poll (March-April 2012) found that attempt was repeated on September 9, and nearly 61% of Egyptians are interested in revoking the cost the lives of Israeli security agents who were peace treaty with Israel while 32% want to keep it. trapped inside the Embassy and only rescued In light of their conflicting results, the polls do little after President Obama’s intervention. According to allay concern. Many questions remain open: To to reports, General Tantawi did not respond to what extent will Egyptian public opinion, which is telephone calls for help from Israeli leaders. !e deeply hostile to Israel and prioritizes the Palestinian Eilat attack also cast light on the deteriorating issue, a"ect Egypt’s foreign policy? How will revised security situation in Sinai. !e Bedouin tribes, attitudes toward Hamas become manifest? (On who have been complaining for years about May 29, 2011, Egypt announced the opening of the discrimination by the central government in Cairo, Rafah Crossing to Gazans, but the Egyptians are are increasingly enboldened and do not hesitate enforcing relatively stringent restrictions on actual to attack police posts with firearms, often joined passage). How limited is Israel’s ability to respond by Islamic Jihad and terrorist groups from Gaza in case of aggressive Hamas provocations (by the that have found shelter in the Sinai Peninsula. In fear, for instance, of Egypt being dragged back into view of the threat (the gas pipeline to Israel has the conflict)? Is a change expected in Iran-Egypt been sabotaged 14 times since early 2011), Israel relations? (In February 2011, the new government agreed to Egypt’s deploying more troops in Sinai allowed Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal than stipulated in the peace agreement. However, into the Mediterranean for the first time since defending the pipeline became irrelevant following 1979. !e Egyptian Foreign Minister said on March the April 22 announcement by Egyptian national 2011 that his country wished to open a new page gas corporation that it was canceling its natural in its relationship with Iran.) Will an Ankara-Cairo gas contract with the supplier of gas to Israel, EMG, axis emerge to threaten Israel? which has joint Egyptian-Israeli ownership. O#cials in Israel and in Egypt chose to explain the motive !e answers to these di#cult questions bear on for the contract's cancellation as commercial and a central and fundamental issue: Could Israel be not political (Egypt supplied 37% of the Israel forced to revise its security doctrine significantly in Electric Company's gas consumption in 2010, but light of the changes in Egypt? An early indication only 18% in 2011 because of the attacks on the of the new situation’s gravity was revealed in pipeline in northern Sinai). !e interruption of the the terror attack north of Eilat on August 18, supply of Egyptian gas marked the end of one of 2011, in which eight Israelis were killed. During the only significant expressions of economic ties IDF attempts to pursue the perpetrators, who between Egypt and Israel, reflecting the continued had retreated into Sinai territory, five Egyptian erosion of relations between the two countries. soldiers were accidentally killed. !e masses in (!e bleak outlook is somewhat brightened by Cairo reacted with incensed demonstrations and Cairo’s help in maintaining the ceasefire between attempted to break into the Israeli Embassy. !e

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 61 Hamas and Israel, as well as its fruitful mediation, Why? Because you have to be very closely linked which facilitated the agreement for the release of to the beliefs of the people. !is is the core issue. Gilad Shalit (on October 18, 2011)). When there is divergence between your policy and Another "pacifying" structural factor is Egypt’s the people's beliefs and interests, you will have this reliance on foreign aid. !e grave economic vacuum that creates disturbance.” situation necessitates external assistance, and, Assad was convinced that his adherence to the apparently, leaves no resources for military radical anti-Israeli axis (Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas) adventurism. Top Egyptian military brass, some and the fact that—unlike other Arab rulers—he of who were trained in the US, are reluctant to had not become Washington’s ally ensured his disturb Washington’s friendship and support. !e popular support. But the riots that erupted in Syria US gives Egypt $1.3 billion annually in military aid in March 2011 proved him very wrong. Assad, who (constituting about a third of the Egyptian army’s succeeded his father in 2000, failed to satisfy hopes budget) and another $250 million for civilian that he would bring reform and modernization purposes. To help out the new government, the to Syria. Like his father before him, he has reacted US has agreed to forgive $1 billion in Egyptian brutally to his opponents, and has even sent debt and grant an additional $2 billion in loan tanks to attack protestors; around 10,000 have guarantees. !us, the US has substantial leverage been killed to date. !e extreme brutality Assad over Cairo and has already proven (e.g. in the inflicted on Syrian citizens prompted the Saudi Israeli Embassy incident), that it will use that king to recall his ambassador from Damascus (on leverage to preserve the peace between Egypt and August 7, 2011) and to urge Assad to “stop the Israel. However, the arrests of the representatives killing machine and end the bloodshed.” of American organizations (who were active in Assad continues to fight to retain power despite Egypt promoting democracy and human rights) sanctions and explicit calls from US and Western and the fact that 61% of Egyptian citizens consider leaders to step down. Unlike the Libyan case, no American aid to their country "harmful" suggests one—neither the West nor the Arab League—is that some surprises may lie ahead. prepared use military force against the Syrian ruler Syria at this point. According to the New York Times on October 27, 2011, Turkey, where thousands of In interview in the Wall Street Journal on January Syrians have flocked for refuge, allows the armed 31, 2011, Syrian President Bashar Assad was asked Syrian opposition—the Free Syrian Army—to about the Arab uprising. With extreme confidence, operate from inside its territory. !e Syrian he explained why the riots in Tunisia and Egypt opposition, after having established a body that is would skip his country. According to him, unlike supposed to represent all the insurgent groups— other Arab countries, Syria’s loyalty to the tenets of the National Syrian Council—su"ered a painful resistance secures popular support. “Syria is stable. blow when a UN Security Council resolution

62 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE aimed at intensifying pressure on Assad further and elections. Damascus relented on December isolated him was rejected (on October 4, 2011). 5, 2011 and allowed Arab League observers into Russia and China do not often exercise their its territory following an Arab League ultimatum veto power, but they did so to undermine the threatening further sanctions and calling for UN resolution. !e two sought to preclude a West- intervention. !e observers are charged with led military operation against Syria (as happened monitoring Syrian compliance with the League’s in Libya), signaling their principled objection demands: withdrawal of tanks and troops from to foreign intervention in the domestic a"airs city streets, dialogue with opposition leaders, of sovereign states, a practice they fear would release of political prisoners, and opening the legitimize similar intrusion in their own a"airs. country to human rights activists and journalists. Russia and China are also seeking to protect the !e observers’ presence, however, has not made a Syrian arms market (and in Moscow’s case, a naval di"erence. base in Tartus, which was visited in January 2012 Russian and China continue to protect Assad in by the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov" and in the Security Council, casting a veto (February 4, which some 600 Russian technicians are currently 2012) against a resolution supporting the Arab building a modern dock for warships). !e UN peace initiative for Syria that passed by thirteen Security Council vote laid bare the di#culty of votes to two. reaching the consensus needed for managing the international system and for e"ective coping with In light of the deadlock, UN Secretary General Ban crisis (none of the BRIC countries voted in favor). Ki-moon, appointed his predecessor, Kofi Annan, as his special representative on the crisis. Annan Having earlier (October 16, 2011) rejected an published a six-point plan (March 16, 2012) based initiative by the Gulf States to suspend Syria’s on a cessation of the fighting, the army's withdrawal membership, the Arab League changed its mind in from cities, stationing of observers, release of an emergency session held on November 12, 2011 prisoners, freedom of movement for journalists, when it decided to suspend Syria, impose economic and sanctioning gatherings and demonstrations sanctions on Assad, and open negotiations with (which should allow for a process of transition Syrian opposition parties in order to agree on a to free elections and the democratization of the unified vision for the transitional period. Assad had government in Syria). !is time, the plan won the been unimpressed by the Arab Foreign Ministers’ support of China and Russia. !ere were, therefore, initiative, publicized ten days earlier, which analysts who considered it the only possible way had stipulated that the regime must withdraw out of the crisis. !e opposition took exception tanks and armed forces from the streets, release to the plan as it did not call directly for Assad's detainees, desist from violent repression, allow departure, while Assad—despite having agreed to Arab League observers to enter Syria, and begin the plan on March 27, 2012—has so far refrained a national dialogue leading to a new constitution from implementing certain elements of it.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 63 From the perspective of Assad, his family and “If a crazy measure is taken against Damascus, I will cronies, the regime’s collapse would mean losing need not more than six hours to transfer hundreds their power, or worse, their lives in revenge of rockets and missiles to the Golan Heights to fire executions. !e Alawite minority (about 12% of them at Tel Aviv.”20 the population) has ruled Syria since Assad’s father Syria’s future is unclear. Opposition factions grabbed the reins of power in 1970, although the promise to establish a democratic regime that will vast majority of Syrian citizens are Sunni (about uphold the rule of law and minority rights. But that 75%). Alawites occupy the top military and is obviously not the only possible scenario. Assad security service positions. !is is a significantly could defeat the rebels and survive. Syria could fall di"erent situation from the one that led the into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egyptian military to abandon Mubarak and avoid descent into a protracted ethnic and religious civil confrontation with the demonstrating masses. !e war is an equally realistic scenario. Assad himself Syrian regime’s resolve to continue head on in their articulated the dilemma posed by his regime’s struggle for survival found expression in statements potential collapse. In a Sunday Telegraph interview by Rami Makhlouf, President Assad’s first cousin (a on October 30, 2011, Assad warned that “Syria is the tycoon who controls 60% of the Syrian economy). hub now in this region. It is the fault-line, and if you In a New York Times interview on May 9, 2011, play with the ground you will cause an earthquake Makhlouf warned: “If there is no stability here, ... Do you want to see another Afghanistan, or tens there’s no way there will be stability in Israel ... When of Afghanistans?” we go down, we will not go down alone.” Indeed, the Syrian regime organized marches of Palestinian As of this writing, Assad has not been crushed, refugees to the border with Israel in the Golan and the military remains mostly loyal to the Heights, and also behind the Lebanese border regime. !e opposition’s use of firearms against (May 15, 2011). Over a dozen demonstrators who Assad’s army may escalate into a civil war, which crossed the border fence in the Golan Heights many argue is already underway. A Lebanon-like were killed, which signified both Damascus’s scenario in Syria could attract foreign involvement determination and the dangerous potential of (from Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq); the country civilian marches confronting IDF forces. In fear of might disintegrate into rival ethnic segments, losing its Syrian ally, Iran is fanning the flames by turning Syria into a roiling cauldron of regional threatening that Israel will pay the price for any instability. (Syria has stockpiles of lethal chemical external intervention aimed at toppling Assad. weapons, including the neurotoxic gas Sarin, !e Iranian News Agency reported that Assad along with launch capabilities for SCUD missiles has warned the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmad and shells). !e Israeli government has exercised Davutoglu that if he is attacked by NATO, he will caution and has refrained from taking a front- set the whole Middle East on fire, especially Israel: line role in the struggle to topple Assad (Foreign Minister Lieberman demurred from this approach

64 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE and called for a policy publicly favoring Assad's authorities, which included four confidential resignation).21 Israel is not interested in giving arrest warrants, two of them naming members Assad an excuse to claim that "outside forces" are of Hezbollah. !is development undermines behind the violence. While Israel must refrain from Hezbollah’s carefully cultivated image as the providing any pretext for Assad to act against it, it forefront of resistance to Israel and the US. Never cannot ignore the fact that the Syrian president's convinced by Sheikh Nasrallah’s allegations that calculations may be made independently of Israel’s Israel was responsible for Rafik Hariri’s murder, the actions, and could lead him to take desperate Sunni Lebanese public now has corroboration for measures. suspicions that the Shiite Hezbollah was behind the assassination of the beloved Sunni leader. !e Lebanon unfolding legal process, !e danger to Assad’s regime also threatens along with the Syrian !e danger Lebanon’s stability. !e fall of Assad may change and Hezbollah sabotage to Assad’s the precarious balance of power and the political e"orts, could reopen regime also calculus underpinning the inter-factional alliances old wounds in Lebanese threatens that characterize local politics in the Land of society, which has yet Lebanon’s Cedars. !e Lebanese are divided in their attitudes to recover from its long stability toward events in Syria. !e Western-aligned years of civil war. Israel March 14 Coalition supports the rebels, whereas should be alert to the the Hezbollah-led March 8 camp supports Assad’s possibility that Hezbollah regime. could try to divert public scrutiny through violent On July 7, 2011, a change of power occurred in provocations against Israel. Nasrallah recently Lebanon when Nagib Mukati’s government won boasted that “[A]ny war that Israel decides to a parliamentary majority. !e March 14 Coalition, initiate in the future will start in Tel Aviv, not in led by Saad al-Hariri, son of the slain Rafik al-Hariri, the occupied northern areas.”22 He also threatened was forced from o#ce following an orchestrated an all-out war if Israel attacks Iran (November 11, move by Syria and Hezbollah, which began when 2011), and proudly claimed (May 11, 2012) that, the Shiite organization withdrew its support for "Today we are not only able to hit Tel Aviv as a city the coalition government on January 12, 2011, but, God willing, we can hit specific targets in Tel following Saad Hariri’s rejection of the demand Aviv and anywhere in occupied Palestine."23 that Lebanon denounce the United Nations tribunal that investigated his father’s February Nasrallah’s organization, which demonstrated its 2005 assassination. power by ousting the young Hariri, faces significant threats. Assad’s overthrow, if it comes to pass, On June 30, 2011, the tribunal submitted may block the arms supply line and fracture the indictments to Lebanese law enforcement

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 65 Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas axis. In that case, raises, housing projects, and generous grants to Hezbollah stands to lose an ally that has been clerical institutions, the monarchy’s mainstay. !e especially sympathetic to the organization and its Saudi mufti, the kingdom’s top cleric, published leader. Hezbollah spokespersons’ constant support a fatwa that was echoed by the clerics in their of the brutal suppression of the Syria uprising sermons at the mosques, according to which places the organization in a tough position vis-à- Islam forbids street rallies. !e enormous financial vis the Arab world, and also clashes with positions resources, the alliance between the monarchy Hezbollah has taken in support of popular revolts and the clerics, the absence of substantial in other Arab countries. American and Western pressure for change, and !e risk of losing its Syrian ally may also drive Iran the relative popularity of King Abdullah (who to increase e"orts to strengthen its presence in has a reputation for promoting economic and Lebanon. Indeed, in a meeting with the Lebanese social reform) combine to preserve Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, the Iranian ambassador to stability. Political freedom, human rights, women’s Beirut said that “ ... [D]eveloping stronger defense equality and democracy are, however, still a pipe cooperation was necessary given the daily violations dream, so the power of subterranean insurgent of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli fighter jets.”24 forces, especially within the younger generation, is !is was reported a few days after the Iranian News di#cult to estimate. Agency (IRNA) reported that Lebanese President !e Saudi monarchy stands in direct contradiction Suleiman approached Tehran with a request to with anything the protestors across the Arab train and arm the Lebanese army.25 Hezbollah has world aspire to achieve. Despite its oil treasures, plenty of excuses to attack Israel; the newest is the economic gaps are extremely wide, and the youth Lebanese claim to a territory of 430 nautical square unemployment rate is around 25%. (In Saudi miles of underwater gas fields. Lebanon has refused Arabia, whose leaders are over 70, half of the to recognize the maritime border with Israel (which population is under 18). External threats make was also the basis of the Israel-Cyprus Maritime the Royal House of Saud increasingly nervous, Border Agreement). !us, drilling facilities in Israel’s particularly Iran’s incessant subversive interference. recently discovered underwater gas fields could !e fear that Iran is agitating the Shiite minority become a possible target should Iran and Hezbollah that is concentrated in the eastern, oil-rich but (and possibly Syria) decide that the benefits of a deprived regions of Saudi Arabia. !e functionality flare-up with Israel are worth the price tag. of the ailing 87-year-old monarch is limited. !e death of Crown Prince Sultan, his heir apparent, Saudi Arabia on October 22, 2011, left Crown Prince Nayef bin !e Arab uprising raises anxiety in Riyadh. !e Abdul-Aziz Al Saud (age 78) first in line to the Saudi king took precautionary measures by Saudi throne. O#ciating as minister of the interior announcing the allocation of $130 billion for wage since 1975 and in charge of, among other things,

66 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the notorious Mutaween, the religious police, !e Saudi regime watched anxiously as the US Nayef is reputed to be a tenacious conservative abandoned Mubarak, who had been its strategic adamantly opposed to reform. After September ally for three decades. Cracks in the strategic 11 he expressed skepticism about the involvement partnership between Washington and Riyadh could of Saudi terrorists in the attacks, claiming that the widen if it turns out that the US does not prevent Zionists were actually behind these attacks. Iran’s nuclearization. One way the Saudis have !e Arab uprising intensified tensions between expressed their anger is by criticizing US conduct Riyadh and Washington. !e US is torn between with respect to the Palestinian issue. Prince Turki al- strategic interests, i.e., wishing to secure the flow Faisal, brother of the Saudi foreign a"airs minister, of oil and to block Iran on the one hand, and its and the kingdom’s former intelligence chief and ideological commitment to the values of freedom ambassador to both London and Washington, and human rights on the other. Indeed, it is di#cult has used acerbic language in expressing Saudi to ignore the fact that Saudi Arabia is the world’s anger in articles he has published in the US. In the leading oil-producer, with $540 billion in foreign Washington Post on June 10, 2011, he was adamant: currency reserves, most of which is invested in US “!ere will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi government bonds. !e Saudis are championing relations if the United States vetoes UN recognition the camp that seeks to quash the Arab uprising, of a Palestinian state. It would mark a nadir in the fearing that Iran would exploit the upheavals to decades-long relationship... !e ideological distance increase its regional clout. !e Iranian threat is between the Muslim world and the West in general the main driver of Riyadh’s foreign policy. It has would widen—and opportunities for friendship and motivated their vigorous opposition to Assad cooperation between the two could vanish.” In the (who is pro-Iran and a member of the Alawite New York Times on September 11, 2011 (ironically, minority, a branch of Shiite Islam); recalling their exactly ten years after fifteen Saudis took part in the ambassador in Damascus; and their support of horrendous 9/11 attacks), the prince threatened: the Sunni-majority Syrian opposition. It was the “!e United States must support the Palestinian reason behind their decision to dispatch, in March bid for statehood at the United Nations this month 2011, more than 1,000 military troops through the or risk losing the little credibility it has in the Arab 26-kilometer causeway to neighboring Bahrain to world.” He said that Saudi Arabia would pursue help suppress the (Shiite and allegedly pro-Iran) policies that are at odds with those of the United majority there. Saudi Arabia is convinced that Iran States, including opposing the government of Prime is inciting the Shiite revolt against the Sunni rule in Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq—whom the Saudis Bahrain; that Iran is operating against Saudi Arabia regard as an Iranian puppet—and refusing to open from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen; and that Iran an embassy there; as well as ignoring US interests in is attempting to undermine Riyadh’s position in Afghanistan and Yemen. Turki forewarned that “[W] the Muslim world. ith most of the Arab world in upheaval, the "special

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 67 relationship" between Saudi Arabia and the United strategic alliances by cultivating ties with Pakistan, States would increasingly be seen as toxic by the China, India and Turkey, they certainly do not vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, who demand regard these powers as strategic equals of the US. justice for the Palestinian people.” After all, it was the US who in 1990 came to the From the Saudi perspective, the long-standing rescue to stop Saddam Hussein’s forces, which had relationship equation between Washington and invaded Kuwait and were threatening Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, which is contingent on the monarchy’s And the US is still the only military actor that can security, on the one hand, and the uninterrupted curb Iran’s aspirations and secure oil routes. !e flow of reasonably priced oil on the other, is Iranian assassination attempt against the Saudi tottering not just because of the US response to ambassador in Washington on October 10, 2011 the Arab uprising and indicates that, despite tensions, the common Saudi Arabia is its reluctance to coerce enemy in Tehran will continue to provide common convinced that Israel into accepting an ground for the Washington-Riyadh partnership. Iran is inciting arrangement based on Jordan the Shiite revolt 1967 lines. !e Saudis see against Sunni the American invasion In the wake of several demonstrations in Amman rule in Bahrain, of Iraq as a severe expressing solidarity with the popular protests in and that Iran strategic mistake that has Cairo and calling for the ousting of the Jordanian is trying to strengthened the Shia government, King Abdullah II of Jordan took undermine and opened the door several steps to forestall the Arab uprising’s spread Riyadh’s position for an Iranian takeover to his country. On January 1, 2012, he dismissed as leader of the of Iraq. With mounting Prime Minister Samir Rifai’s government and Muslim world concern, the Saudis instructed his successor, Marouf Al Bakhit, “to take are watching Iranian speedy practical and tangible steps to unleash a influence spreading real political reform process that reflects [Jordan’s] from neighboring Yemen to the far-o" Morocco, vision of comprehensive reform, modernization and they will fight resolutely to retain their and development.” At the same time, Abdullah position. !us, for instance, the Egyptian SCAF announced the allocation of $650 million for was promised $4 billion in Saudi aid, and Riyadh emergency social expenditures. Continuing invited the sister-monarchies—Jordan and demonstrations in Jordan and Al Bakhit’s failure Morocco—to join the Gulf Cooperation Council to implement substantial reform, and to fight the (GCC). !e massive $60 billion arms deal signed rampant corruption that enrages many Jordanians, on October 20, 2010 between Washington and led the king to dismiss him after ten months in o#ce Riyadh illustrates Saudi fear of things to come. and appoint, in his stead, Justice Awn Khasawneh. While the Saudis are working to diversify their Replacing the prime minister and incumbent

68 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE ministers is a routine tactic in which these o#cials the unemployment rate in Jordan was around 30%. are used as scapegoats to deflect public criticism Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Jordan (and Morocco) away from the king. In a move designed to mollify to join the GCC, of May 10, 2011, reflected a Saudi the Muslim Brotherhood’s oppositional spirit, e"ort to curb the damage triggered by the Arab Khasawneh invited them to join his government, uprising by stabilizing its sister-monarchies in the which they declined. He went on to declare that Middle East. Amman was also promised a $2 billion the 1999 deportation of Hamas leadership from aid grant, payable over five years, in addition to the Jordan had been a legal and political mistake. $400 million Riyadh has already transferred. !is declaration sparked rumors that the Hamas Like many of his predecessors, Khasawneh did leadership would soon visit Jordan. not survive in his position for long and Fayez al- King Abdullah boasts that no life was lost during Tarawneh was appointed to take his place on April the demonstrations in Jordan, but he is frustrated 26, 2012. !e change apparently signals the king's by the lack of progress in implementing reforms, preference to once again rely on his traditional base and worried about the acute economic situation, (the Bedouin tribes) and to abandon attempts which he regards as the main driver behind the to appease the Muslim Brotherhood (and the protests. He maintained that the new prime Palestinians who find political expression through minister was specifically appointed for his record it). !e task of formulating the election law (along of promoting reforms and upholding the rule of with pressing economic problems) will pose a law. Jordanian public opinion polls indicate that significant challenge: how to elect a parliament Jordanians are primarily concerned with economic democratically that reflects the diversity of development and the eradication of corruption, political power while at the same time stemming and not necessarily after radical change in the dominance of the Muslim bloc, retaining the the political structure. As already mentioned, power and support of the king's traditional bases the Jordanian king enjoys a legitimacy that of support, and ensuring that the Parliament will distinguishes him from the despots in neighboring not extricate itself from palace control. Arab states: He is a scion of the Prophet !e demonstrations in Jordan had a distinct Muhammad. Nonetheless, this is not the first time overtone of hostility toward Israel. On September he has instructed his prime ministers to pursue 13, 2011, against the backdrop of the violent reform; they usually fail to achieve his goals having storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo, the Israeli run up against the obstructionist Jordanian elite, Embassy in Amman was closed o" and its sta" which benefits from the status quo. !e Jordanian evacuated as a preemptive measure in anticipation economic situation is grave: during the first half of of a demonstration scheduled the following day. 2011 alone, the kingdom su"ered a 60% decline in In media interviews the Jordanian king expresses investments, along with a significant decrease in frustration with Israeli policy. In a Wall Street Western tourism. Even before the Arab uprising, Journal Interview on September 20, 2011, he

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 69 explained that although he had been reassured Israel’s security interests ... Discussion about Jordan by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s past as a Palestinian state is against Israeli interest and public statements regarding the peace process, the against reality. Saying Jordan is Palestine opposes Israeli leader has repeatedly failed to implement international borders as well as the peace accord his rhetoric. "Everything we see on the ground we signed with them.” He said that such talk has been completely the opposite ... [!ere is] severely harms Israel’s security interests because a increasing frustration because they're sticking their Palestinian state on both banks of the Jordan River head in the sand and pretending that there's not a would be “militant and extreme,” undermine the problem." In another interview Abdullah said, “[A] region’s stability, and create perpetual conflict with lot of us have come to the conclusion that this Israel. particular [Israeli] government is not interested in a two-state solution.”26 Iran Against the backdrop of the upheavals in Egypt and !e Arab uprising carries risks and opportunities its concerns over its own internal a"airs, Jordan for Iran. Iranian spokespersons were quick to was able to exhibit greater activism in encouraging describe the Middle East riots as a “religious renewed contacts between Israel and the Islamic awakening” against governmental tyranny Palestinians, and thus, at the beginning of January and as an expression of the masses’ identification 2012, Jordan hosted meetings between negotiators with the ayatollahs’ message. Elegantly omitted Isaac Molho and Saeb Erekat. !e talks, which the was the fact that it was the Iranian leadership that Jordanian King called "baby steps,"27 did not lead to brutally suppressed the surge of civil disobedience a breakthrough. in their own country in 2009. One positive result, from Tehran’s perspective, is the fall of Mubarak, !e King is frustrated by the absence of any progress who was a pivotal actor in the US-led anti-Iranian in solving the Palestinian problem. More than half alignment. of the kingdom’s population is Palestinian, and any deterioration in the West Bank’s security situation !e imminent US withdrawal from Iraq and could easily spill over to the “East Bank” and shake Afghanistan opens the door for Tehran to exert the kingdom. !e US withdrawal from Iraq, Jordan’s and deepen its influence. However, Assad’s neighbor to the east, creates a temptation for Iran possible overthrow could rob Iran of a vital base to fill the vacuum. Such a scenario, if realized, would for connecting with the Arab world and its allies, increase Amman’s anxiety, and would, of course, Hezbollah, Hamas and their ilk. While Ahmadinejad concern Israel, which regards Jordan’s stability as did urge Assad to put an end to the brutal a fundamental principle in steering Israeli policy. crackdown on protestors (September 8, 2011), his In light of these concerns, Foreign A"airs Minister call was primarily a propaganda ploy meant for the Lieberman clarified, on November 14, 2011, that ears of the Arab public—without actually shifting claims that Jordan is the Palestinian state “harm Iran’s active engagement in Assad’s survival, and

70 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE perhaps also was intended to pave the way for report, published on November 8, 2011, stated continued Iranian influence in Syria should Assad that Iran has been working toward producing eventually be deposed. !e Arab uprising, along nuclear weapons. !e report stressed that Iran with the recent attraction to the Turkish model by is suspected of carrying out secret experiments the region’s inhabitants, is significantly eroding the whose only purpose could be the development of a appeal of the Iranian alternative. nuclear weapons. !e prevailing assessment is that As mentioned earlier, developments in the Middle the Iranians possess enough uranium to produce East have also rekindled the strategic rivalry three or four atomic bombs (after the uranium is between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries processed to become highly-enriched). aspire to lead the Muslim world; they represent the !e IAEA's report of February 24, 2012 determined two major streams of the Muslim world, Sunni and that "there remain serious Shiite, locked in a centuries-old struggle. Iran was concerns over the military IAEA: recently forced to watch as its rival Saudi Arabia dimension of the Iranian Iran has used military force to quell the Shiite-majority nuclear program" and significantly revolt in Bahrain. that Iran has significantly intensified the !e US evacuation from Iraq is expected to intensified the pace of pace of uranium exacerbate the struggle for influence between uranium enrichment at enrichment Riyadh and Tehran in the oil-rich country. the nuclear installations at nuclear Confrontation between these two major oil in Natanz and Fordow installations producers could cause spiraling petrol prices. near the city of Qom. !e in Natanz Riyadh may attempt to reduce oil prices by ramping report even cautioned and Fordow up production levels to economically harm Iran, as that Iran is preventing near Qom well as persuade the US that a military attack on IAEA inspectors from Iran would not necessarily result in oil shortages visiting the sites where, or dramatic price increases. Conversely, Iran it is suspected, Iran is conducting experiments could cause world oil prices to rise by blockading consistent with the development of nuclear the Strait of Hormuz, or through other violent weapons. provocations such as attacking Saudi oil fields. Israel's message on this issue is not uniform. Israeli Intelligence agencies and think tanks continue to spokespersons have expressed varying opinions debate about the exact point in time at which over the last year concerning the pace of the Iran will finally possess a nuclear capability. Voices progress the Iranians are making. Defense Minister continuing to claim that the Iranian nuclear Ehud Barak recently stated that Iran was probably program is peaceful are increasingly marginalized. less than a year away from achieving nuclear An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) capability. Barak told CNN, on November 20, 2011, that it won’t be long “before no one can do

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 71 anything practically about it because the Iranians Information regarding Iranian nuclearization are gradually, deliberately entering into what I call is obviously riddled with half-truths and a "zone of immunity," by widening the redundancy psychological warfare by all concerned. !ere of their plan, making it spread over many more is no telling what the Iranians have been able to sites, and adding hidden elements.” conceal from IAEA observers, surveillance satellites Major-General Aviv Kochavi, chief of military and other intelligence gathering devices. On intelligence, said in a briefing to the Knesset’s September 2, 2011, IAEA confirmed that Iran had Defense Committee that “[B]ased on their began to transfer some of its uranium-enrichment infrastructure and the technical know-how and centrifuges from its nuclear facility near the city of uranium they have, within a year or two after Natanz to its Fordo plant, an underground facility [Khameini] makes that decision, they will have near the holy city of Qom more able to withstand nuclear weapons.” He went on to say that this airstrikes. It reported that Iran has begun to timetable excludes a missile-launched atomic experiment with more advanced centrifuges, and bomb, because Iran would need more time to clarified that Iran possesses the basic knowhow to develop an e"ective missile delivery system. produce nuclear weapons. However, he stressed that missiles were not a As mentioned, assessment bodies have produced prerequisite for activating nuclear weapons. In very di"erent estimates regarding the time a speech at the Herzliya Conference (February required for Iran to produce a su#cient amount 2, 2012) Kochavi explained Iran's production of of highly-enriched uranium, from its stores of low a nuclear weapon is now no longer dependent and medium enriched uranium, to build its first on acquiring capabilities but on a decision by nuclear bomb. Some say the timeframe is eight the spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini. "If weeks. (And next year, this timeframe is expected Khameini gives an instruction to obtain a first to shrink to a fortnight due to accelerated nuclear explosive installation, we believe that it production of enriched uranium). Estimates would take a year. If he gives an instruction to regarding the time needed to produce the nuclear translate this capability into a nuclear warhead, weapon itself range from one year to a few years. this will, by our estimation, take a further year or !is suggests that the program of sanctions and two."28 political isolation imposed on Iran has not yielded In contrast, former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan, the hoped-for outcome, although it has inflicted who retired in early January 2011, estimated that great damage on the Iranian economy (Russia and Iran was a long way away from nuclear capability, China have continued to prevent the adoption among other reasons, as a result of a series of of sweeping sanctions, even after the latest IAEA failures over the course of the project. He said that report). !e United States, which is leading the even in the worst-case scenario, Iran will probably battle to intensify the sanctions against Iran, has not have nuclear arms before 2015. succeeded in bringing the European Union into

72 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the e"ort. !e imposition of sanctions against !e US is clearly disturbed by Iran’s pursuit of the activity of the Iranian Central Bank, preventing nuclear arms. !e American president has made Iranian banks from engaging in international it clear that his country will not allow this danger transactions through the SWIFT network (March to materialize. In his AIPAC speech on May 22, 15, 2012), and steps that limit the Iranian oil 2011, Obama reiterated his position: “We remain industry (Europe will implement the oil embargo committed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear beginning July 1, 2012) are having painful economic weapons.” He did not, however, answer the main consequences: the local currency has lost 40% of question: When all the non-military measures its value since October 2011, and the prices of are exhausted, would he order the US military to basic foodstu"s has risen 40% in just a few months. finish the job? US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s !e unemployment rate stands at 15%, the annual speech at the Saban Conference on December 2, inflation rate is 24%, and growth is non-existent. 2011, left many with a sense that the US does not It is likely that the fate of Libyan ruler Gaddafi spurs consider a military o"ensive against Iran a feasible the ayatollahs’ regime in Iran to continue their option. !e text of Panetta’s speech did state that pursuit of an atomic bomb. After all, would the it was his “department’s responsibility to plan for West have come to the rescue of the Libyan rebels all contingencies and to provide the president against Gaddafi had he insisted on continuing with a wide range of military options should they Libya’s nuclear program, and been in possession become necessary. ... !at is a responsibility I take of nuclear weapons? It must be assumed that very seriously because when it comes to the threat from Tehran’s point of view, nuclear weapons are posed by Iran, the president has made it very clear the regime’s insurance policy. !e example set by that we have not taken any options o" the table.” North Korea is a case in point. But his responses to questions from the audience As usual, Iran continues to try to tear holes in the raised doubts regarding American determination. international isolation it faces by suggesting various Panetta described the negative consequences of arrangements. In this vein, Ahmadinejad, in his a military operation against Iran in great detail: latest speech before the UN Assembly, proposed it could strengthen the regime, fail to hit all that Iran would stop enriching uranium beyond the the targets and cripple Iran’s ability to quickly level needed for civilian nuclear power stations, if it reinstate its nuclear program after the strike, were allowed to purchase 20%-enriched uranium cause severe damage to Western economies, for medical research and treatment. Most experts inspire Iranian retaliation against US forces, and believe that Tehran’s intentions are, as before, start a flare-up that would “consume the Middle to deceive and play for time. Nevertheless, some East in a confrontation and a conflict that we maintain that the proposal should be accepted, would regret.” !e confusion created by Panetta’s and its validity put to the test in the belief that this statements must have prompted his clarification would expose Iran’s deception. a few weeks later. On December 21, 2011 he said,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 73 “If they proceed and we get intelligence that they lead to a terrible war. !e US also assumes that if Israel are proceeding in developing a nuclear weapon reaches the conclusion that the US intends to let then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop Iran attain nuclear weapons, it would preemptively them. !ere are no options that are o" the table.” attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. !e Americans fear On the same occasion, General Martin Dempsey, this scenario, because Israel’s ability to achieve the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Sta", said: “I’m desired outcome is much lower than their own, satisfied that the options that we are developing are and there is the heightened risk that the US could evolving to a point that they would be executable be dragged into war under conditions and timing if necessary.”29 not of its choosing. Although there is no major President Obama’s ultimate decision, of course, disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem remains a mystery. Indeed, Obama even went a regarding Iran’s progress toward nuclearization, step further in his speech at the AIPAC Conference di"erences in their military capabilities greatly (March 4, 2012) when he refuted the charge that diminishes the potential time horizon for an Israeli the United States had chosen to "contain" the operation. !is could, in turn, lead to a "moment Iranian nuclear threat rather than to arrest it: of truth" in relations between the two countries, in "Iran's leaders should understand that I do not which they are forced to reveal their intentions in a have a policy of containment. I have a policy to more overt and specific manner. (When Chairman prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. … I of the US Joint Chiefs of Sta" Dempsey was asked will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to whether Israel would warn the United States ahead defend the United States and its interests." of time if it decided to attack Iran, he said he had no idea.30) !e Americans are wary not only of the potential increase of Iranian influence in Middle Eastern While the Israeli side is deeply skeptical about a"airs should it go nuclear, but also of the real the sanctions’ ability to stop the Iranian nuclear danger of a downward spiral into a nuclear war program, the Americans believe that Tehran is between Israel and Iran. In this view, there is responding to the pressure, which is why it should relatively little likelihood that a mutual and stable be increased and also extended to curtail Iran’s balance of deterrence can exist between the two oil exports and the freedom of its central bank. countries: Israel, a tiny state, which according to Moreover, there is growing evidence of increasing many assessments has a large nuclear arsenal, versus internal tensions in Iran (between the ayatollahs' the much-larger Iran with a small number of bombs. camp, Ahmedinejad's, and within the Revolutionary !is situation exacerbates each side’s fear that it Guard), a process that opponents of a military will be attacked first, which in turn incentivizes strike believe will enhance the e"ectiveness of the a preemptive strike. Washington assumes that sanctions policy. Tehran's willingness to return, "containing" the Iranian nuclear threat is no simple after a year of deadlock, to talks on its nuclear task, and that a trigger-happy nuclear finger could program is an expression of the painful e"ects of

74 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the increasingly stringent sanctions, as well as of the Israeli navy stopped the ship Victoria about the growing threat of a strike against Iran by Israel 300 kilometers o" the Israeli coast, with military and the US. !e first round of talks between Iran equipment on board that originated in Iran and and the P5+1 group (the permanent members of was intended to supply Hamas in the Gaza Strip. the UN Security Council plus Germany) took place On April 16, 2011, the head of Iran’s Civil Defense in Istanbul on April 14, 2012 and yielded di"erent Administration, Reza Jalali, blamed Israel and the interpretations about the emergence of a possible US for the Stuxnet computer worm attack on Iran’s agreement ahead of the next meeting (on May 23 in nuclear centrifuges. Recent explosions at missile Baghdad). Iran is being required to cease uranium and nuclear facilities in Iran, attributed by the press enrichment at the 20% level and to remove its to secret Israeli and US operations, contributed stockpile of this uranium from its territory; to to the mounting tension, which increased close the underground installation in Fordow, even further in early December 2011, when an and to cooperate fully with IEAE inspectors. !e American intelligence drone was intercepted United States and its allies are being required to by Iran. In recent years there has been a series of lift sanctions immediately. Various commentators assassinations of Iranian scientists, engineers and believe that there is a reasonable chance that the army o#cers involved in its nuclear program. !e sides will reach a gradual "road map" formula killings are invariably attributed, by both Iran and based on reciprocal steps, such that each side the international media, to Israel. incrementally relinquishes some of the "cards" it is !e Iranians are not sitting on their hands. On holding. October 10, 2011, an assassination attempt Israel is likely to find itself isolated—and even against the Saudi ambassador to Washington on the brink of a crisis with the United States if was uncovered, which, according to the US an agreement is reached—which, in the Israeli Department of Justice, was initiated by elements view, is inadequate (and if it includes a clause within the Iranian regime. While those behind with requirements of Israel in the nuclear area). the attack had made the Saudi ambassador their Prime Minister Netanyahu strongly criticized the preferred target, the Israeli and Saudi embassies talks in Istanbul and stressed that setting a date in Washington were also mentioned as possible for a second round would give Iran additional bombing targets. !e plotters were members time to enrich uranium without constraint: "My of the Kuds Brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary first impression is that Iran received a gift… Iran Guards, which was also responsible for the attack must immediately cease all uranium enrichment, on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, and remove all enriched material from the country, and the Jewish Cultural Center in that city in 1994, in dismantle the nuclear facility in Qom."31 which more than a hundred people perished. !e Tensions between Israel and Iran took form in Israeli embassies in Georgia and India (February 13, various ways in the last year: On March 15, 2011, 2012) were also targets of Iranian reprisals, and an

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 75 attempt in Azerbaijan was foiled (January 24, 2012). all its objectives. When asked what might happen Not without reason, commentators dubbed the after such an attack, Dagan replied, “!ere will be fighting that took place in Gaza in March 2012—at war with Iran. !is is one of the things we know the provocation of the Islamic Jihad as the "general how to start, but not how to end.” He noted that front" in the war with Iran. !e Iron Dome system's Iran could be expected to fire missiles into Israel success in intercepting over 80% of the rockets fired for many months afterwards. It could be expected on Israel, which threatened to hit populated areas, to engage Hezbollah with its tens of thousands strengthens, according to many analysts, those in of Grad rockets and hundreds of long distance Israel who favor a military attack on Iran. SCUDs, some of which could reach Tel-Aviv and Iran’s continuing progress toward nuclearization farther south. Concurrently, Tehran could also exacerbates Israel’s engage Hamas to attack Israeli cities on its behalf, and Syria might join the war as well. Various U.S. dilemma: Should Israel administration risk a starkly re-aligned !e bitterest attack against Netanyahu and Barak's o#cials fear Middle Eastern reality, leadership on Iran came from the former head of that Israel in which a country ruled the Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin (April 27, 2012): "I have will try by fanatic clerics, that no confidence in the current leadership that is to drag declares Israel must be going to bring us to an incident on the scale of war the United wiped o" the map, gets with Iran or a regional war. !ey are not people on States into hold of a doomsday a personal level whom I would depend to lead Israel a war weapon? Conversely, into an incident of this scale, and also out of it.… against Iran should Israel attack Iran’s !ey are presenting a false picture to the public on nuclear facilities and risk the subject of Iran. !ey tell the public that if Israel a long-term and wide- acts, then Iran won't have a nuclear bomb. !at is ranging deterioration in a false picture. Many experts actually say that and its security situation, which could also place Jews Israeli attack will accelerate Iran's nuclear dash."32 in the Diaspora in jeopardy as targets of Iranian Speculation about disagreements within the top revenge? In reference to a possible Israeli attack, defense echelon regarding the e#cacy of attacking former Mossad chief Meir Dagan said, “!at’s the Iran’s nuclear facilities abounds in the Israeli stupidest thing I’ve ever heard” (May 6, 2011). Dagan press. Netanyahu and Barak are usually depicted explained that Iran possesses proven capabilities as proponents of an attack, while the IDF chief of to move its nuclear infrastructures around in order sta" and the heads of Mossad and Shabak are to conceal them from international monitors or portrayed as opposing such a move. President intelligence agencies. He stressed that it was not at Shimon Peres has also been quoted as opposing all clear that the Israeli Air Force was even capable an Israeli attack on Iran (February 23, 2012).33 of performing the job to its completion, meeting Publication of his comments drew a harsh

76 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE response from Defense Minister Barak: "!is is the international community. !us, the Israeli the same Shimon Peres who in 1981 opposed decision carries fateful security and economic the attack on the reactor in Iraq."34 Barak even implications not only for Israel, but for its best took the trouble to correct Chief of Sta" Ganz, friends as well. As it has been before, the Jewish who described Iran's leadership as "moving one community could become a target of both step at a time toward the point at which they will Iranian retaliation and charges that it “pushed” be able to decide whether to produce a nuclear the US, “as in the Iraqi case,” into a military weapon. !ey haven't yet decided whether to go operation "contrary to American interests." the extra mile.… In my opinion, he (Khameini) !e blunt manner in which Israel’s leaders are will be making a huge mistake if he does so and warning of the Iranian threat has drawn various I don't think that he will want to go the extra kinds of criticism, but there is no denying that this mile. I think the Iranian leadership is made up of Israeli policy has captured the world's attention 35 extremely rational people…" Barak responded and has contributed to the adoption of substantial that Iran "is not rational in the Western meaning measures against Iran in a way that had not 36 of the word." previously occurred. An Israeli decision to attack Iran could seriously damage American interests, including possible Turkey Iranian retaliation against American soldiers and !e Arab Spring took Turkey as much by surprise targets in the region. Since Iran has progressed as it did the West. Otherwise, it is likely that Prime significantly in all areas involved in acquiring a Minister Erdogan would have passed up the honor military nuclear capacity, there is a high probability (and the $250,000) of accepting the al-Gaddafi that it will be necessary to attack Iran again and International Prize for Human Rights (November again, until it stops trying to rebuild its nuclear 29, 2010). Turkey was quick on its feet and took program. Against this background, various o#cials vigorous diplomatic steps to fulfill its role as a major in the US administration fear that since, in their force in shaping the Middle East, according to the view, Israel does not have the capacity to wage tireless Turkish Foreign A"airs Minister Davutoglu, an ongoing conflict of this kind against Iran, it is who often boasts that his country is “right at the Israel's intention to "drag" the United States into a center of everything.”37 war against its will. Turkey o"ers Arab countries in the midst of Indeed, when US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta turmoil a model: a democracy that respects Islam was in Israel for a brief visit (October 3, 2011) and is developing a prosperous modern economy. he held a joint press conference with his host, Erdogan expressed Ankara’s aspirations and vision Defense Minister Ehud Barak, in which he warned of its regional position in his victory speech (June that any operation to stop Iran’s nuclearization 13, 2011), his third in a row: “Sarajevo won today must be agreed upon and coordinated with as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir;

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 77 Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, him with Hitler: “If you want to see someone who Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won has fought until death against his own people, as much as Diyarbakir.” In a similar vein, which just look at Nazi Germany, just look at Hitler, at reflects Ankara’s awareness of its regional might Mussolini, at Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania.”39 and strategic importance, Davutoglu, during a visit Turkey has an 885-kilometer-long border with to Cairo, described Ankara’s vision of establishing Syria, and its concerns about the instability there a Turkish-Egyptian axis: “!is will not be an axis are obvious. !ousands of Syrian refugees have against any other country—not Israel, not Iran, already found shelter in Turkey, and Ankara is not any other country, but this will be an axis of allowing Syrian opposition groups—including democracy, real democracy ... !at will be an axis armed militants of the Free Syrian Army—a safe of democracy of the two biggest nations in our haven and an operational base in its territory. region, from the north to the south, from the Black Ankara’s stance against Assad heightens tensions 38 Sea down to the Nile Valley in Sudan.” over Tehran, which is afraid to lose its Syrian Ankara endeavors to position itself on the winning ally to a real contender for regional hegemony. side of the Arab uprising. As a regional superpower, Combining democracy, modernity and Islam, the Turkey o"ers Middle Eastern countries not thriving Turkey provides a much more attractive only a governmental model, but also economic model than Ahmadinejad, and is highly popular advantages. In September 2011, on a tour of three in the Arab world. Nevertheless, Erdogan’s Arab countries that have undergone revolutions condescending manner and his recommendation this year—Tunisia, Egypt and Libya—Erdogan was that Cairo favor the secular model, did little to win received by rapturous crowds. To underscore the the hearts of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. !at benefits of economic cooperation for Ankara’s incident—and Cairo’s refusal to allow Erdogan to allies, Erdogan’s entourage was accompanied by visit Gaza—reflected the limitations of the non- a delegation of 280 businessmen. During the visit, Arab Turkey in its quest for influence in the Arab Davutoglu promised that Turkey’s $1.5 billion world. investment in Egypt would balloon to $5 billion Since his appointment in 2003, Erdogan has led his within two years. Turkey has realigned itself with country to impressive economic growth: Turkey the zeitgeist of the Arab world, and Erdogan spoke is currently the world’s 16th largest economy. resolutely against Bashar Assad and Muammar (Nevertheless, the IMF anticipates a decline in Gaddafi’s brutal repression. !e same Erdogan, Turkish economic growth rates due to its swelling who, in November 2009, justified the invitation of external debt.) Erdogan has taken vigorous action the Sudanese ruler to Ankara by saying, “It’s not to decrease the military’s influence in the political possible for a Muslim to commit genocide,” now sphere. According to the Turkish constitution turned directly against Assad’s genocide of his own and Ataturk’s doctrine, the army is charged with people, urging him to step down and even equating defending democracy, and has used this power

78 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE to oust four elected governments since 1960. friendship with Bashar Assad is in a state of Erdogan did not hesitate to file charges against collapse, tensions with Cyprus are mounting, and some 200 army o#cers for conspiring to topple also with Greece and the European Union. Turkey the government. He went on to prove that his is in conflict with Tehran over Syria’s fate, as part of government’s stability was robust enough to an emerging rivalry over regional hegemony, and survive even when the top echelons of the military the US withdrawal from Iraq has made Baghdad tendered their collective resignation on July 29, the spoils in yet another contest between Tehran 2011. Curbing the military’s power in Turkey signals and Ankara. Tehran’s resentment has grown as a Erdogan’s deviation from Ataturk’s doctrine, result of Ankara’s agreement, in September 2011, which stipulated Turkey’s Western orientation. to deploy a NATO anti-missile defense system in Commentators are debating the impact France its territory—e"ectively an early warning system in and Germany’s objection to Turkey’s acceptance case of an Iranian missile launch. !e war against into the European Union had on Erdogan’s decision the Kurdish underground (PKK) has intensified, to consolidate a Middle-Eastern-oriented strategic and following the killing of 20 Turkish soldiers alternative, labeled by some as “neo-Ottoman.” on October 12, 2011, Erdogan vowed to fight According to the German Marshall Fund, in 2004 terrorists to the bitter end, and ramped up Turkish some 75% of Turkey’s citizens wished to become army operations in Iraqi territory. With respect members of the European Union, compared to to France, on December 22, 2011 Turkey decided only a third of them today. to recall its ambassador from Paris following Since its establishment, Erdogan’s government ratification of a bill that makes Armenian genocide has declared that it has a “zero problems” policy denial a criminal o"ense in France. Turkey has toward its neighbors. After long years of tensions dealt with Cyprus with a belligerence that belies and conflicts, Ankara has extended its hand its “zero-problems” policy. For example, Ankara in peace to Armenia, showed its willingness to dispatched a research vessel, escorted by warships, reach an arrangement with Cyprus, entreated to the island’s coastal waters to signal its objection Syria to solve the border issues between the two to undersea gas drilling operations planned by countries and abolished the need for visas, tried Nicosia. to mediate between Iran and the West, and, of Israel is a favorite target of Erdogan’s belligerent course, also between Jerusalem and Damascus. On rhetoric. Turkey has discovered a direct correlation the domestic front, Turkey has tried to implement between its increasingly acerbic attitude toward reforms to appease its Kurdish minority. !is Israel and the sympathy it garners on the Arab reconciliatory mood, however, has not yielded Street. !e tension between the two countries, any substantial results, and Erdogan is currently which erupted at the 2009 World Economic Forum guided by a more hard-line doctrine. Concurrent conference in Davos, in a verbal confrontation with its deteriorated relations with Israel, Turkey’s between Erdogan and President Peres

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 79 andculminated in the flotilla a"air (May 31, 2010), “the West’s spoiled child,” and urged sanctions in which nine Turkish citizens were killed. Ankara against it. In his tongue lashings Erdogan often demanded an apology, compensation, and the refers to the sensitive nuclear issue; during a visit to lifting o" the naval blockade of Gaza. !e Palmer South Africa on October 5, 2011, he defined Israel Committee, appointed by the UN in an attempt as a “threat for its region because it has the atomic to reach a formula to reconcile the relationship bomb.” between the two countries, published its findings Israeli o#cials are usually reserved in their on September 2, 2011. !e Palmer Report asserted responses to Erdogan’s barbs. But his accusation that the Israeli blockade of Gaza was legal, and that Israel exploits the memory of the Holocaust in that the Israeli soldiers did encounter organized order to justify its actions against the Palestinians violent resistance, but it also found that Israel crossed the line and triggered a harsh Israeli used excessive and unreasonable force and should, response. In a CNN interview on September 25, therefore, express regret and make restitution. 2011, Erdogan claimed that “[T]he Israeli people !e Palmer Report stated that Turkey could have are only resorting back to the issue of genocide in done more to persuade the Flotilla’s organizers to history. And using that genocide, they are always avoid a confrontation with the Israeli navy. Turkey acting as if they are the victims all the time. We rejected the report’s conclusions, and President said, for that, go ask Germany to pay its dues Abdullah Gul declared it “null and void.” !e Israeli and they have. So Germany has paid and is still ambassador was expelled, and Ankara announced paying its dues to Israel. But neither Turkey nor a moratorium on all military and economic ties the Muslims in the region have such a problem. with Israel until Jerusalem meets Turkey’s original !ey have never exerted such cruelty on Israel. conditions (apology, compensation, end Gaza But Israel is very cruel in that regard. It shows no blockade). !e Turkish foreign minister warned mercy.” On September 26, 2011, Netanyahu called that his county would take all the necessary steps to Erdogan’s charges “mendacious and scandalous,” ensure the safety of its ships in the Mediterranean. while Foreign Minister Lieberman said, “We don’t Israel, which accepted the report’s conclusions, have any problems with Turkey. We respect the announced that it would not apologize (the Turkish people and Turkey as a state. Our problem Palmer Report recommended that Israel “express is with the current leadership, which is radically regret”). !is failure was the culmination of a Muslim, supports terror and nourishes terror.” long period of attempts to strike a compromise between the two countries. Torn between two It is di#cult to separate the deterioration of Israel- major allies, the US tried to advance a formula for Turkey relations, which took an especially sharp compromise and encouraged Israel to apologize, turn for the worse in the wake of the Flotilla but in vain. Erdogan exploits any opportunity to incident, from the new, broader strategy guiding verbally attack Israel, whom he accused of being Erdogan’s foreign policy, despite his assertion in a UN Assembly speech on September 22, 2011, that

80 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Turkey has no problem with the Israeli people. Cyprus (April 26, 2012). !e Turks are resentful “We have a problem with the Israeli government,” of the fact that the (Greek) Cypriot government he said, adding that Turkey had good relationships has signed maritime border agreements with Israel with previous Israeli governments. Erdogan insisted and Lebanon (thereby breaching, in their view, the on Ankara’s terms for restoring ties: “!e Israeli rights of the Turkish Republic under their wing). government is not being honest at all. Right now, as !e Cypriots, who are members of the European long as they refuse to apologize for the nine people Union, are not about to budge, and tensions are of Turkish descent who lost their lives on the flotilla, expected to mount in July 2012 when Cyprus will as long as they refuse to pay compensation to the assume the European Union presidency for a six- families, and of course as long as the embargo on month term (Ankara has already announced that Gaza has not been lifted, the relations between the it will freeze its ties with two countries will never become normalized.”40 In the EU during this period). !e Jerusalem- an Al Jazeera interview, Erdogan promised that at Turkey is expected to Ankara axis, the next opportunity he would send warships to toughen its stance. !e which had escort convoys on humanitarian missions to Gaza. higher the potential of been a In light of these threats, the possibility of a flare- the underwater gas fields strategic pillar up with Turkey cannot be dismissed, especially turns out to be, the more for Israel, against the backdrop of hasty management of muscle Turkey is expected has collapsed— tactical provocations. !e discovery of natural to flex. At the same Israel-Egypt gas reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean has time, Cyprian interest in relations are also provoked a sharp admonition from Turkey cooperating with Israel also uncertain that it would block Israeli unilateral attempts to to extract and market the exploit these resources. In an Al Jazeera interview gas, and defend the area, on September 8, 2011, Erdogan warned, “Israel is expected to grow. has begun to declare that it has the right to act in !e Israeli government faces a complex dilemma exclusive economic areas in the Mediterranean… because Turkey plays an increasingly central role in Israel will not be the owner of this right.” Erdogan the eastern Mediterranean. !e Jerusalem-Ankara described o"shore drilling by Cyprus and Israel as axis, which had been a significant strategic pillar “madness,” and went on to declare that Turkey is for Israel, has collapsed. !e level of Israel-Egypt the guarantor of “the Turkish Republic of Northern relations is also uncertain. !is reality forces Israel Cyprus [TRNC]” and will defend its rights. (Turkey to examine ways to stem the deterioration of its is the only country to recognize the Turkish Cypriot relationship with Turkey. In addition, Turkey is state, and 30,000 Turkish soldiers are stationed increasingly perceived as pivotal in US Middle there.) And indeed, Turkey has begun to search Eastern strategy, and despite major past disputes for oil and natural gas by drilling in Northern (examples include not allowing American forces

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 81 to cross Turkey on their way to Iraq, and Turkey’s light of the strategic issues faced by Turkey. Both uncoordinated attempt to reach a "compromise" countries are concerned about unfolding events with Tehran on the nuclear issue), relations in Syria, and both are interested in having stable between Ankara and Washington—as well as neighbors in firm territorial control. In addition, Obama’s relationship with Erdogan—are warming. both nations are obviously alarmed by Iran’s As a result, Washington has openly expressed its interference, pretensions for regional hegemony, displeasure with Israel’s inflexible stance, which and e"orts to obtain a nuclear military capability. makes ending the crisis with Turkey even more As Turkey increasingly regards itself as a regional di#cult. E"orts to reach a compromise continue, leader, tension increases between the model it but both sides remain entrenched in their provides for the region (democracy, separation positions. It is doubtful whether even complete of religion and state—while favoring expressions Israeli compliance with Ankara’s conditions would of Sunni Islam) and the ayatollahs’ model (Shiite change the strategic rationale animating Turkey’s theocracy, hostility to the West and its values, and hostility to Jerusalem, which has proven to be an rule by clerics). endless source of sympathy and credibility for Even if no significant change in the relationship Turkey in the Arab world. with Ankara is expected in the short term, e"orts As Turkey’s aspirations for regional hegemony grow, to find a compromise that would remove the a radical shift in its attitude toward Israel is less flotilla a"air from the agenda must continue in likely. It could take a turn for the better if Israel were earnest. It serves no Israeli interest to deepen the to engage in a process of achieving a permanent estrangement with Turkey, so it must avoid any settlement with the Palestinians, thereby reducing provocation. At times the dilemma is particularly regional hostility and neutralizing a key component poignant, as in the decision not to renew Elbit of Turkish rhetoric against it. Israel’s ability to Corporation’s export licenses, required for a $90 compensate for the strategic damage caused by million aerial photography system project, for the collapse of its cooperation with Turkey is fear that the system’s secrets would be passed to quite limited. One step in that direction, which hostile elements. Where possible, Israel’s interest was surely noticed by Ankara, is the tightening in improving the relationship should be declared of Israel’s security ties with Greece. !e Israeli air (as in dispatching aid to the earthquake victims force held joint training exercises with its Greek on October 23, 2011, following telephone calls counterpart in early October 2010, again in late from Peres and Netanyahu to their counterparts June 2011, and most recently, in March and April in Ankara). !e economic arena could also help 2012. !e Greeks also helped to prevent another restore ties. Despite the political decline in the flotilla from sailing out of Greek ports to Gaza. relationship, based on Export Institute data, An opening for improving cooperation between Israel’s trade with Turkey (commodities import Ankara and Jerusalem may turn up eventually in and export, excluding diamonds) is on the rise

82 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE and in 2010 amounted to $3.1 billion—a 26% !e Israeli-Palestinian Conflict increase compared to 2009. (In the first half of 2011, trade volume between the two countries !e direct Israeli-Palestinian talks that began in a grew by 27%.) !is trend should be encouraged celebratory summit in Washington on September in order to strengthen non-political ties that are 1, 2010 survived three rounds of meetings between key to strengthening mutual interests, and which Netanyahu and Abu Mazen. !e Palestinians insisted could help in preventing further deterioration and that Israel continue to freeze settlement construction cultivating a basis for an eventual rehabilitation of (after the end of a ten-month moratorium in late the relationship. September 2010), but the Israeli side refused, and even rejected a generous incentive package o"ered Of course, Israel must also take into account the by Washington, which included 20 F-35 Stealth safety of some 25,000 Turkish Jews, and avoid fighter planes in return for extending the freeze for supplying any unnecessary pretext that could three months. Netanyahu o"ered a deal of his own kindle local hostility toward this community. In at the Knesset: “If the Palestinian leadership will say this context, there is some encouragement in unequivocally to its people that it recognizes Israel as Erdogan’s gesture of extending New Year greetings the nation-state of the Jewish People, I will be ready to his country’s Jews in September 2011, on the eve to convene my government and request a further of Rosh Hashanah, stressing Turkey’s commitment suspension of settlement construction.”41 to religious and cultural pluralism. Erdogan is careful to point out his positive attitude toward !e Palestinians rejected Netanyahu’s o"er. Abu Jews and inter-faith co-existence, and has solemnly Mazen claimed that in their three meetings promised to return properties confiscated from Netanyahu had insisted on focusing exclusively on Jews and Christians last century. While it is easy to security issues and demanded an Israeli military be carried away in times of conflict into a pattern of presence in the Jordan Valley for the next 40 years. Jewish escalation vis-à-vis Ankara (through activity !e Palestinians, who submitted their positions in the US Congress, etc.), this would be a mistake. in writing and enclosed a map representing land At this time, in particular, it is advisable to augment swaps amounting to 1.9%, complained that the ties between Diaspora Jewry and Turkey (and the Israelis ignored their positions and declined to relevant Turkish Diaspora) in order to create an present any of their own that might facilitate "inoculating layer" that could prevent further negotiations to bridge the gaps between the two collapse, and perhaps even help in attempting to sides. !e Palestinians made it clear that they normalize relations between the two countries. expected Israel to present a set of initial positions similar to those presented by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on the eve of his resignation. !ese positions, which according to Olmert, “have never been o#cially rejected by Abu Mazen and should

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 83 be brought back to the table today,” were detailed Earlier, in a June 22, 2009 Newsweek interview, in a September 31, 2011 article he published in Olmert revealed that he had o"ered the Palestinians the New York Times: “According to my o"er, the a state on 93.7% of the Palestinian territories, along territorial dispute would be solved by establishing with a land swap of 5.8% of Israeli territory, and a Palestinian state on territory equivalent in a safe-passage corridor from Gaza to the West size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza Strip Bank. Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza with mutually agreed-upon land swaps that take Rice, who was stunned by the boldness of into account the new realities on the ground. Olmert’s proposals, described her feelings in her !e city of Jerusalem would be shared. Its Jewish recently published book: “Am I really hearing this? areas would be the capital of Israel and its Arab I wondered. Is the Israeli prime minister saying that neighborhoods would he’ll divide Jerusalem and put an international body become the Palestinian in charge of the Holy sites?”42 As mentioned, the !e Palestinians capital. Neither side would Palestinian demand that negotiations resume from demand that declare sovereignty over where they had stopped in talks between Abbas negotiations the city’s holy places; they and Olmert, but Netanyahu’s government made resume from would be administered it clear that it did not regard itself as obligated or where they were jointly with the assistance committed to those proposals. left by Abbas of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Olmert; !us, the attempts to re-launch negotiations by and the United States. Netanyahu’s first securing an extended settlement construction !e Palestinian refugee government is freeze failed. On December 7, 2010, Israel and the problem would be not committed US announced that they were unable to reach addressed within the to those an agreed-upon formula that called for a three- framework of the 2002 proposals months settlement freeze extension and a stepped- Arab Peace Initiative. !e up discussion of borders and security issues. new Palestinian state !e Americans believed that a relatively quick would become the home of all the Palestinian agreement on borders, along with new security refugees just as the state of Israel is the homeland arrangements, would put an end to the settlement of the Jewish People. Israel would, however, be construction controversy, as the precise amount prepared to absorb a small number of refugees of West Bank territory to be annexed to Israel or on humanitarian grounds. Because ensuring handed over to Palestinian sovereignty would Israel’s security is vital to the implementation be finally determined. Following the failure of of any agreement, the Palestinian state would these e"orts, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton be demilitarized and it would not form military announced, on December 10, 2010, that it was now alliances with other nations. Both states would time to address the permanent settlement issues, cooperate to fight terrorism and violence.” and that the US would vigorously pursue that

84 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE course: “It is time to grapple with the core issues of exercise its veto to thwart what it considered a threat the conflict on borders and security; settlements, to the principle of direct talks. But US Ambassador water and refugees; and on Jerusalem itself ... !e to the UN Susan Rice emphasized Washington’s United States will not be a passive participant. We position: “We reject in the strongest terms the will push the parties to lay out their positions on the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity... core issues without delay and with real specificity. [which] violates Israel’s international commitments, We will work to narrow the gaps asking the tough devastates trust between the parties, and threatens questions and expecting substantive answers. the prospects for peace.” !e isolation of the US And in the context of our private conversations in the Security Council as a result of its support of with the parties, we will o"er our own ideas and Israel revealed a new Middle East reality, in which bridging proposals when appropriate.” the US and Israel wield less diplomatic leverage in In practice, however, this policy, so assertively obtaining their goals in the international arena. In outlined by Clinton, found no implementation, this case, Mubarak’s absence and the transitional and the US failed to extract detailed positions government’s susceptibility to Egyptian pubic from Israel. E"orts to find a formula for resuming opinion jeopardized the political wherewithal the talks failed, including President Peres’ attempts to mobilize Egyptian support in dissuading the and secret meetings with Abu Mazen. Abu Mazen Palestinians from bringing their case to the Security revealed that he had met the Israeli president three Council. times during that year, in Amman, London and Abu Mazen reiterated that negotiations were his Rome, and that he was on his way to yet another preferred course of action, but his experience with meeting in Amman, on July 28, 2011, when he got the Israelis had taught him that there was no chance a last-minute call from Peres asking to postpone for serious negotiations unless Israel committed their scheduled meeting because he did not have a to freeze construction in the settlements and mandate from the prime minister to proceed. East Jerusalem, and agreed in principle that final In light of the political stalemate, and in spite of borders would be based on the pre-June 1967 President Obama’s requests and warnings to avoid lines with agreed-upon land swaps. !e Palestinian it, the Palestinians decided to take their e"orts to president vented his frustration with Obama, who the UN to gain recognition as a state according to had been adamant that Israel halt construction in the 1967 borders. Early last year, on February 18, the the settlements, but then retreated. In an interview Palestinians demonstrated their ability to mobilize on April 24, 2011, Abbas explained his insistence the UN and embarrass Israel and the US, when the on the freeze as a precondition for resuming talks: UN Security Council was convened at their request “We both went up the tree. After that, he came in order to vote on a resolution condemning the down with a ladder and he removed the ladder settlements. Fourteen (out the fifteen) member and said to me, jump.” !e Palestinians claimed states supported the resolution obliging the US to that although Israel had accepted the Roadmap in

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 85 April 2003, it failed to meet the terms of its ﬁrst 2004, which were overwhelmingly supported by phase, i.e., that “[Israel] immediately dismantles both houses of Congress. Among other things, settlement outposts erected since March 2001 ... those commitments relate to Israel not having freezes all settlement activity (including natural to withdraw to the 1967 lines, which are both growth of settlements).”43 In response, Israeli indefensible and which would leave major Israeli spokespersons argued that the Palestinians, too, population centers in Judea and Samaria beyond had not met all the conditions stipulated in the those lines. !ose commitments also ensure Israel’s Roadmap. well being as a Jewish state by making it clear that !e American failure to bring the sides back to the Palestinian refugees will settle in a future Palestinian negotiating table lurked in the phrasing of President state rather than in Israel. Without a solution to the Obama’s May 19, 2011 speech in which he promised Palestinian refugee problem outside the borders of to clarify US Middle East policy in light of the Arab Israel, no territorial concession will bring peace. uprising and the criticism of Washington for having Equally, the Palestinians, and not just the United lagged in its support for the masses in their revolt States, must recognize Israel as the nation state of against their autocratic rulers. the Jewish People, and any peace agreement with them must end all claims against Israel.” !e resignation of special Middle East Envoy George Mitchell, just a week before the planned !e two met on the day after Obama’s speech, speech, added a resounding chord to the US failure and at the end of that meeting they held a joint to move forward with a solution to the Palestinian press conference where the tension between them problem. Obama, who defended his country’s was obvious. Some American reporters described overall Middle East policy, referred to the Israeli- Netanyahu’s remarks as “a public lecture to his Palestinian conﬂict and asserted that “permanent host President Obama.” For instance, "e Atlantic Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, journalist Je"rey Goldberg began his account of and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine the event by writing, “Like many of you, I watched should be based on the ‘67 lines with mutually the Prime Minister of Israel publicly lecture agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized the President of the United States on Jewish borders are established for both states.” !is history with a mixture of shock, amusement speech was made a few days before Netanyahu’s and bewilderment. (From the expression on the scheduled address to a joint session of Congress. President’s face, I would assume he was mostly 44 Netanyahu’s o#ce, which learned about the feeling annoyance.)” speech’s expected content only shortly before the !e criticism hurled at Obama from the Israeli side actual speech, was taken by surprise and reacted was echoed by key American Jewish organizations with blunt disapproval: "Prime Minister Netanyahu and Republican Party spokespersons, who expects to hear a rea#rmation from President attacked the president at the onset of the election Obama of US commitments made to Israel in year. !e sharp criticism forced Obama to clarify

86 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE his statements in another speech, which he gave at has betrayed Israel.” !ese comments amplified the AIPAC Policy Conference three days later: “’67 fears that the coming election campaign will drag lines with mutually agreed swaps means that the the Middle East into the heart of the contest parties themselves... will negotiate a border that is between the parties. di"erent than the one that existed on June 4, 1967 !e American position that negotiations must ... It allows the parties themselves to account for refer to some kind of baseline (by implication, the the changes that have taken place over the last 1967 borders) reflects a principled rejection of the 44 years, including the new demographic realities Israeli position that the space beyond the Green on the ground and the needs of both sides.” In Line is “disputed territory.” Accepting the notion both speeches Obama expressed fundamental that the ‘67 lines are the basis for discussions American stances reflecting profound support strengthens the Palestinian bargaining position of Israel. !us, for instance, with respect to the because it means that Israel is the one who should security issue, the president asserted that, “Israel “ask” the Palestinians to accept land swaps, i.e., to must be able to defend itself—by itself—against exchange territory that is ostensibly theirs to swap any threat.” (and not territory to which both parties lay claim). In fact, Obama’s first speech did not signal any shift !e failure to revive the talks was the impetus for in traditional US positions regarding the conflict’s the Palestinians’ formal resolution, announced on resolution: strong support of Israel’s security, two June 26, 2011, to apply to the UN for recognition states for two peoples, and secure borders based as a state based on the 1967 lines. Abu Mazen and on the 1967 lines with land swaps. But the wording his sta" ran a global diplomatic campaign to enlist of the first speech triggered acute tensions because maximum support for their application. In Israel, it was presented without prior coordination; fears of the consequences of the Palestinian move because of Netanyahu’s reaction, which created mounted. Acceptance by the UN requires nine the impression that Obama was demanding that votes at the Security Council. !e US committed Israel return to the1967 borders exactly as they to use its veto power in that case, which meant were, which Netanyahu rejected on the grounds that in order to protect Israel, the US would have that they were indefensible; and because of the to be backed into a minority corner, potentially reactions of senior Republicans who have turned compounding the Islamic world’s hostility to the Israeli imbroglio into a wedge issue in time Washington—which could, in turn, befoul the for the 2012 elections, and a vehicle for taking mood between Washington and Jerusalem. !e swipes at Obama. !e presumptive Republican Palestinian alternative—bringing their case to presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, proclaimed, the General Assembly (where there is no veto “Obama threw Israel under the bus.” Former possibility) in order to upgrade the Palestinian Republican presidential hopeful and current Fox Authority to non-member observer state was commentator Mike Huckabee asserted, “Obama perceived as being equally dangerous for Israel.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 87 Such a status would allow the Palestinians to file East Jerusaelm. !irty-six countries supported the suit against Israel at the International Court of resolution, ten abstained and only two—Israel and Justice and to exert pressure on Israel through their the United States—rejected the resolution. activities in various UN agencies. For example, !e Israeli leadership’s reaction to the Palestinian as a result of their admission to UNESCO (the UN initiatives has not been consistent. Defense vote passed with 107 votes in favor and 14 votes Minister Barak warned that the Palestinian bid for against, on October 31, 2011), the Palestinians statehood at the UN would cause a “diplomatic could then petition UNESCO designation of tsunami,”46 and enhance de-legitimization trends, historical, archaeological and religious sites beyond whereas Foreign Minister Lieberman dismissed the the 1967 lines (such as the Cave of the Patriarchs, tsunami talk by saying that in reality, “[T]here isn’t Rachel’s Tomb, the Temple Mount mosques, etc.) a diplomatic tsunami, not even rain on a cloudy as Palestinian heritage sites meriting UNESCO day.”47 protection. !e UNESCO move also illustrated the "price" that the US is forced to pay in the Cornered into unpopular positions in the international arena for its friendship with Israel. international arena because of Israel, and reluctant !e US fFunding Prohibition statute mandates to be isolated on the UN Security Council, immediate cessation of Washington’s financial Washington was spurred into making further support of any UN agency that accepts Palestinian e"orts. And indeed, in the weeks preceding the membership (the US covers 22% of UNESCO's General Assembly, a diplomatic endeavor to create total budget). Indeed, US State Department a compromise formula—based on principles Spokesperson Victoria Nuland expressed concern outlined in President Obama’s speeches—for that the funding cut could have damaging renewing the negotiations, and thereby thwarting ramifications for the US. By not paying its dues, the Palestinian UN quest. !is attempt failed as the US could severely inhibit its ability to influence well, and the Quartet session on July 11, 2011, in UNESCO and act within it: “We are very concerned which the formula was to be announced, could about it, which is why we didn’t want it to happen not find agreement. Concurrently, Israel and the in the first place and why we’re concerned about US tried to dissuade European countries from this move being replicated in other UN agencies.”45 supporting the Palestinians at the UN, arguing that !e isolation in the institutions of the UN in which Israel was not to blame for the failure to re-start Israel and the United States find themselves was direct talks, since it had, in principle, accepted the also evident in the UN Commission on Human Quartet’s plan. Rights in Geneva when it voted (March 22, 2012) !e Palestinian UN initiative was criticized within to establish an international committee of inquiry the Palestinian camp as well. It was argued that the into construction in the settlements and its e"ect move was nothing more than propaganda that made on the rights of Palestinians in the West Bank and no di"erence on the ground; that it could jeopardize

88 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the rights of the Palestinian diaspora; and that there construction, including natural growth.) was no advantage in clashing with the US. Abu On October 2, 2011 Israel accepted the Quartet’s Mazen was not deterred by the criticism from within initiative. Its statement said that “[W]hile Israel (Hamas ridiculed the entire venture), Israeli threats, has some concerns, it will raise them at the or President Obama’s explicit September 22, 2011 appropriate time.” !ese concerns focused on warning that the US would veto the Security Council the timeframe—Israel argued that three months resolution. !e very next day, Abu Mazen presented was too short a time for negotiating territorial the formal application for Palestinian membership and security issues; and that core matters such as to the UN Secretary General. !e Palestinian refugees and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state petition to the Security Council was transferred were postponed to a later stage. !e Palestinians to a professional sub-committee, to buy time for accepted the Quartet’s attempts to reach agreement over resuming talks. call as well, but in their American (At the same time, American diplomacy managed response they argued diplomacy to thwart the Palestinian attempt to secure nine for the inclusion of the managed to votes at the Security Council, which would obviate Roadmap’s stipulation thwart the the need for the US to exercise its veto power.) On that Israel freeze Palestinian September 23, 2011, the Quartet issued a statement construction in territories attempt to that adhered to the tenets stipulated in Obama’s beyond the 1967 line. secure nine speech. At the center was a preparatory meeting, On October 26, 2011, UN Security scheduled to take place within a month, where the Quartet representatives Council votes parties would be expected to agree on an agenda met separately with both and methodology for proceeding, with the goal parties, and released a of achieving a ﬁnal agreement by the end of 2012. statement that said, “[T] Within three months, both parties were expected he parties agreed with the Quartet to come forward to present their detailed positions on territorial with comprehensive proposals on territory and and security issues; within six months, they were security within three months (in e"ect, accepting expected to make substantial progress (to which the Quartet’s outline). !e Palestinians, however, end the Quartet would convene an international stated that the talks would not be resumed as conference in Moscow, in consultation with the long as the Israeli government failed to freeze all parties, at the appropriate time). !e outline called settlement construction. And the Israelis replied upon the parties to refrain from provocative actions that they would not present any proposals if the and reiterated their obligations under the Roadmap. Palestinians did not agree to direct and secret (Although the Quartet’s announcement did not bilateral talks without preconditions. refer speciﬁcally to the settlements, according to the Roadmap Israel is committed to freeze settlement !e Palestinians set January 26, 2012 as the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 89 deadline concluding the three months allotted Authority and transfer responsibility for the West by the Quartet. If there were no progress Bank to the "occupying power." According to them, until then, they warned, they would take new the PA was established as a temporary, transitional measures against Israel—from renewing their UN body until the establishment of an independent application for statehood, to “returning the keys of state. Since Israel is not interested in this, they said, the Palestinian Authority” to Israel, the occupying there is no point in the PA's continued existence. power. !e time pressure helped reach an !e possibility that Abu Mazen's letter would agreement to hold a meeting between the parties’ mark a negative turning point in Israeli- delegates to the talks—Isaac Molho and Saeb Palestinian relations and perhaps even lead to Erekat, who met in Amman on January 3, 2012, a violent deterioration provided the backdrop under Jordanian auspices, in an attempt to revive for a telephone conversation between President the Quartet’s outline and avoid a deterioration Obama and Abu Mazen (March 20, 2012), in of the process, and an escalation of conflict. As which Obama attempted to persuade Abu Mazen expected, the rounds of talks in Amman did not to give ultimatums in his letter to Netanyahu. not yield substantial results, and in a speech to After some delays, Saeb Erekat handed the the Arab League foreign ministers (February 12, letter to Netanyahu on April 17, 2012 (PA Prime 2012) Abu Mazen responded by threatening Minister Fayyad, who opposed the move, did not that if Israel did not agree to negotiations on participate as planned in the meeting). As agreed, the basis of the 1967 borders and did not freeze Netanyahu sent his letter of reply to Abu Mazan settlement construction, the Palestinians would through his representative, Isaac Molho, on May renew their attempt to be admitted to the United 12, 2012. At the end of that meeting, the two Nations. Abu Mazen claimed that Prime Minister sides agreed on a joint statement: "Israel and the Netanyahu did not present substantive positions Palestinian Authority are committed to achieving on the core issues of a permanent settlement. He peace and the two sides hope that the exchange promised to send Netanyahu a letter in which he of letters between President Abbas and Prime would detail all the Palestinian claims and, in the Minister Netanyahu will contribute to this."48 absence of a positive Israeli response, he would During the exchange of letters, it was clear that consider himself free to seek assistance from the the two sides were trying to avoid ultimatums, and international community and the UN. In briefings even attempting to express a willingness to return the Palestinians held with foreign diplomats, they to the negotiating table. made it clear that they have taken into account that the United States will cut o" financial aid to Following the establishment of Israel's broad the Palestinians, and that Israel will stop its tax national unity government (May 7, 2012), Secretary payments. In such an eventuality, the Palestinians of State Clinton told Netanyahu that the American have promised to dismantle the Palestinian administration hopes that it would remove the coalition di#culties that had interfered in the past

90 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE and that Israel would take steps to advance the Palestinian leader of historic stature.” Less than peace process with the Palestinians.49 !e coming a month later, in the wake of the deal to release months will show whether the establishment Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian of the new Israeli coalition will in fact help prisoners struck with Hamas, other commentators bring a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian predicted his imminent demise. According to negotiations. this view, Hamas will now capture the hearts and !e Palestinian attempt to move the conﬂict to minds of the entire Palestinian people as it can now the UN compels Israel to take stock. !e longer claim that while Abu Mazen was wasting words the stalemate in negotiations, the more likely that in New York, Hamas was liberating Palestinian the pattern of “direct talks” will lose its strategic prisoners from Israeli conﬁnement. As Abu Mazen position as the only acceptable format for reaching loses international support, Hamas is fortifying an arrangement between Israel and its neighbors— its ties with pivotal regional actors: Post-Mubarak and, accordingly, international legitimacy for using Egypt has become a friend of Hamas, Jordan has multi-lateral measures to resolve the issue would announced its intention to improve its ties with increase accordingly. (One milestone along this Hamas, Qatar has endorsed Hamas, and Turkey problematic route was the format of indirect now openly supports Hamas. “proximity talks,” which the Americans tried to Indeed, the Arab upheavals have created a new conduct in 2010 as a substitute for direct talks.) and complex geopolitical picture for Hamas. !e !e trend toward internationalizing the process organization is about to lose its support base in is gaining truck partly because of a growing Damascus as a result of its reluctance to declare international perception that the US is not a fair its loyalty to Assad as he struggles to preserve broker. Obama’s UN General Assembly speech his rule. !e slaughter Assad ordered against on September 21, 2011 was heard, by Palestinians the protestors—mostly Sunni, including many in particular and the Arab world in general, as a members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is sweeping, one-sided declaration of support for close to Hamas—has made it impossible for Hamas Israel. Attempts to usurp US exclusivity in leading leaders to support Assad. It has been reported that the peace process may also illustrate the notion, Iran has stopped funding Hamas as a result. prevalent in the international arena, that the Conversely, there is new hope for Hamas in Cairo. United States is in decline and now tends to lead Mubarak, the PLO’s long-standing ally, has been better “from behind” as part of multi-national ousted, and the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, frameworks. In an extreme imagining, this trend who are fast becoming top players in Egyptian could encourage support for a forced settlement politics, are the natural allies of Hamas. Its growing by international diktat. relationship with Egypt is fed by its fear of losing Commentators were quick to celebrate Abu its Syrian patron and the expectation that post- Mazen’s 2011 UN speech as “the birth of a Mubarak Egypt will be more hospitable to Hamas.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 91 (!ese changes probably helped Hamas decide technocrats, would deal with rebuilding, and make to accept Egypt’s mediation and move forward preparations for parliamentary and presidential with the Shalit deal). Against this backdrop, in a elections. According to Abu Mazen's allies, Hamas surprising move, on April 27, 2011 in Cairo, Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, agreed to the establishment also agreed to sign a reconciliatory agreement with of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and the PLO—the same document it had rejected to limiting actions against the Israeli occupation to when advanced by Mubarak. !e agreement non-violent resistance (Israel rejected the initiative calls for holding presidential, parliamentary, and outright and Netanyahu made clear: “[T]he National Palestinian Council elections. Until Palestinian Authority must choose either an alliance then, a unified caretaker government would be with Hamas or peace with Israel. !e two cannot appointed, composed of go together.”50 !e steps taken by Mashal exposed a independent figures. Its deepening rift within Hamas and placed a question Palestinians primary mandate includes mark over his leadership. !e heads of Hamas in advocating rebuilding the Gaza Strip, Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh chief among them, rejected a one-state preparing for elections, the "concessions" Mashal made in his interactions solution hold and establishing state with Abu Mazen. Mahmoud al-Zahar stated that it would institutions. It contains publicly that Mashal had made the agreement on focus the an agreement to release his own, while Haniyeh himself wasted no time struggle against political prisoners held by in leaving for Iran to meet with Khameini (April the “Israeli both sides, and provides 23, 2012) and, while there, to commit himself to Apartheid for the appointment of a continue the armed struggle against Israel until State” joint political committee all the Palestinian lands are liberated. Mousa Abu to pave the way for the Marzook, deputy head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, historic integration of also came out against Mashal's actions and made Hamas into the PLO. Abu Mazen and Khaled clear in an interview with the American-Jewish Mashal met in Cairo on December 21, 2011, and newspaper, "e Forward (April 19, 2012) that even engaged in a further series of PLO-Hamas talks. It if the Israeli-Palestinian agreement were endorsed was announced that the parties had formulated in a referendum, Hamas would nonetheless regard an outline that would lead to reconciliation, with it as a temporary cease-fire only (hudna) and elections by May 2012. not a permanent peace agreement: "We will not 51 !e Doha Agreement (February 6, 2012) was recognize Israel as a state." Hamas has not yet another step in the reconciliation e"orts. Under completed the complicated set of institutional the terms agreed, the sides committed to establish elections currently in progress. When they are a unity government headed by Abu Mazen complete, Mashal's standing—which, as stated, himself. !e government would be composed of was weakened by his leaving Damascus and the

92 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE loss of support he had enjoyed from Syria, Iran, and a time when Egypt’s limited resources should be Hezbullah—will become clearer. directed to addressing urgent domestic problems. Alongside the tough rhetoric, Hamas has generally All this informs the prediction that mounting taken care to observe the cease-fire with the IDF. Egyptian pressure will drive Hamas to moderate !e latest flare-up, during the first half of March its stance. Indeed, some Hamas spokespersons 2012, was initiated and managed by the Islamic have recently intimated that they are ready to lay Jihad. Ismail Haniyeh even stated in an interview down their arms, opting instead for a strategy of with Reuters that Hamas would not be dragged non-violent resistance to Israel. !is would ease into a war should one break out between Iran the way for Abu Mazen to continue to pursue and Israel. "Iran did not ask us for anything and reconciliation with them. As one might expect, we think that Iran is not in need of us… Hamas other Hamas spokespersons continue to declare is a Palestinian movement that acts within the their endorsement of armed resistance to the Palestinian arena and it carries out its political and Israeli occupation. If we do get to witness a more field actions in a way that suits the interests of the moderate Hamas, it would be a striking example Palestinian people."52 of the irony of history. !e greatest achievement of the movement that begat Hamas would, Although the Palestinian public wishes to see its paradoxically, lead its moderation, possibly even leadership overcome internal divisions, it must be its incorporation into the political process vis- noted that, in the past, both sides have invested à-vis Israel. Once again, it should be noted that most of their energies in maneuvers to hold each there are alternative credible scenarios that do other responsible for the failure of reconciliation not necessarily lead to a more moderate Hamas. e"orts. !e coming months will tell whether To a certain extent, Israeli policy could a"ect the the Arab Spring’s shockwaves will change the direction and trajectory of such developments. calculations of the rivaling Palestinian factions, and bring about a true unification. One optimistic !e process taking place in Egypt is likely to be scenario foresees a chain of events that would relevant to a dilemma that should concern Israel in lead Hamas to moderate its positions: !e Muslim relation to the Hamas issue. If Egypt continues to Brotherhood, whose leaders are expected to honor its peace treaty with Israel and if the leaders assume roles in Egypt’s highest political echelons, of the Islamic bloc continue to profess that they would be forced to address Egypt’s severe economic will not violate an existing agreement (even though distress. For that they will need the West’s support, it is contrary to their ideology), then we will see a foreign investors, and a thriving tourism industry. familiar historical pattern in which the necessity It won’t be easy for them to endorse the violent of accepting an existing reality (even one that is terror organization, Hamas, which would not play considered negative) helps bridge the dissonance at all well in the West. Hamas could also drag that develops between ideological principles on Egypt into a violent confrontation with Israel at the one hand, and real-world constraints on the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 93 other. !e policy lesson may be: It is better to could easily spin out into extreme violence. confront Hamas with a new political reality than Palestinians are also toying with the possibility of to demand that it agree to accept it in advance. closing down the Palestinian Authority altogether, !e possibility that no political settlement is on “handing in the keys” and the responsibility for the horizon raises the question of potential violent running the territories back to the “occupying eruptions in the West Bank. Some argue that the power.” probability of violance is slim because Palestinian Another Palestinian political alternative has been inhabitants would have much to lose. Fatigue gaining currency: relinquishing the two-state formula lingers in the wake of the of the bloody Second in favor of a “one-state solution.” In this scenario, the Intifada, and West Bank Palestinians currently Palestinian struggle would radically transform, shifting enjoy relative security and economic development the focus to equal rights within Israeli-controlled (although it is heavily dependent on foreign territory, including the right to elect and be elected resources). But less optimistic possibilities cannot to public o#ce. Palestinians in favor of this approach be ignored, nor the inspiration the Arab uprising believe that the world would be even more attuned to may provide. !e Palestinian public and its leaders their struggle—no longer one of self-determination feel frustration at the fact that their situation is and the quest for independence, but rather a struggle again not the world's top concern. !e events for justice “against the Israeli apartheid regime.” that are galvanizing the Arab world, the global !is road ends with the establishment of one state economic crisis, the issue of Iran, and despair over between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are distracting world with an Arab majority and a Jewish minority. attention away from the Palestinian issue. !is An Israeli-Palestinian collision course, in legal, political frustration can lead to acts of violence that would and, possibly, security terms, would be detrimental to bring the Palestinian matter back to center stage. Israel in every respect. A possible, and oft-threatened, Such an outbreak might have occurred against the resignation by Abu Mazen, who frequently referrs backdrop of the hunger strike by 1,600 Palestinian to his imminent retirement and promises to refrain security prisoners (April 17 - May 15, 2012) held from contending in the coming elections, must by Israel. !e death of one of these prisoners be factored into the equation. At 76, and rapidly could have been the spark that ignited a new losing hope of becoming the first president of an conflagration. In the end, though, an agreement independent Palestine, Abu Mazen may be driven was reached that restored most of the prisoners' to secure a final biography of intransigence and rights and a flare-up was avoided. defiance vis-à-vis Israel and the United States, and to With the political process deadlocked, the IDF is vigorously pursue unification with Hamas in order to preparing for di"erent protest scenarios, including leave a patriot’s legacy as one who did not concede possible mass marches on road blockades, his people’s demands and achieved the yearned-for settlements, and even Jerusalem—events that reconciliation of its factions.

94 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE In the international arena, the absence of any constant conflict with its best friends, which is progress toward the resolution of the Israeli- corrosive to Israel’s image and credibility. !us, a Palestinian conflict is increasingly attributed to sharp condemnation of Israeli settlement policy Israel. !is harms Israel’s international standing, and the disturbing escalation of violence by settlers, increases its isolation, and fuels de-legitimization issued by the EU members of the UN Security trends. In this context, the issue of settlement Council (UK, France, Germany, and Portugal), construction continues to be the primary factor drove the Israeli Foreign Ministry to issue a stern, working against accepting the Israeli government’s defiant response in which it declared that the four position. !us, the approval of 1,100 new housing European countries would “lose their credibility units to be built in the Giloh neighborhood of and make themselves irrelevant,” and that instead Jerusalem (on September 27, 2011), which is of condemning Israel, the EU should concentrate based on the distinction, prevalent in Israel but on the situation in Syria and Iran. rejected by the rest of the world, between new !e position of foreign elements who blame Israel neighborhoods on Jerusalem’s periphery, beyond for the deadlock in the diplomatic process is backed the Green Line, and settlements in the occupied up by the debate within Israel on this issue. !e former territories, triggered severe international criticism Shin Bet chief, Yuval Diskin, spoke particularly bluntly including a harsh telephone call to Netanyahu in this vein: "We are not talking to the Palestinians from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel’s because this government is not interested in talking to o#ce confirmed that she had told Netanyahu that the Palestinians… !is prime minister knows that if he his decision to green-light new Jewish housing takes even the smallest step forward in this direction, units in East Jerusalem has “raised doubts that the then his solid government and his coalition will come Israeli government is interested in starting serious unraveled—it's very simple.55 President Shimon Peres 53 negotiations” with the Palestinians. was less blunt, though contrary to the government's In another instance, an Israeli announcement of position that Abu Mazen is not interested in peace a plan to build 2,600 new housing units in the talks, Peres claims that Abu Mazen is a serious and settlement of Givat Hamatos garnered particularly fitting partner and that it is most certainly possible vehement reaction (as it is perceived as part of to reach a peace agreement with him: "I am aware of an Israeli scheme to encircle the city of Jerusalem the other views. I don't accept them… I have had not with Jewish neighborhoods), and European Union a few conversations with Abu Mazen over the past Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton stated that three years. All of them were with the knowledge of “[A]ccording to international law, settlements the prime minister. He knows all the details. On the are illegal, therefore, the Israeli decisions must be basis of these conversations, I have been convinced revoked.”54 that it would be possible to achieve peace with Abu !e harsh criticism drives Israel to responses that Mazen. He is a fitting partner, and he can deliver the 56 often contribute to the impression that it is in goods."

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 95 !e Jerusalem-Washington- public opinion of US is the Palestinian issue. !e American Jewish Community more the US position in the Israeli-Palestinian Triangle conflict is perceived as one-sided in Israel’s favor, the harder it will be for the US to have the Addressing the relationship between Washington sympathy of the Arab world. Arab governments and Jerusalem necessitates including an additional attuned to their publics, which are largely hostile key ingredient: the American Jewish community. to the US, may pursue policies that conflict with American Jewry is a highly significant factor of the US interests. To the extent that Israel is identified triangular relationship, which a"ects its agenda and as the primary cause of this, tensions between strongly influences its dynamics. !e last year has Israel and the US will grow stronger. General shown the might of Israel and the Jewish People in David H. Petraeus’ (recently appointed CIA chief) the American arena as well as the dangers involved in testimony before the Senate Armed Services exercising this power. Pundits are debating the extent Committee, on March 16, 2010, reflects the mood to which current American policy toward Israel is a prevailing among certain o#cials in the Obama "voluntary" product of the long-standing friendship administration as well as in the community of with Israel and the Jewish People (an attitude that foreign a"airs experts in academia and think tanks: is deeply rooted in American public opinion and “!e enduring hostilities between Israel and some prevalent in Congress), and to what extent it is the of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our product of cold political campaign calculations in an ability to advance our interests ... Arab anger over election year (November 2012), Jewish influence and the Palestinian question limits the strength and capital, and the competition with Republican rivals. depth of US partnerships with governments and It must be assumed that if American policy toward peoples in the [region] and weakens the legitimacy Israel becomes more the product of cold, calculated of moderate regimes in the Arab world.” political interests and pressures, and less the product !is argument was already voiced in a December of friendship—a sense of shared destiny and mutual 2006 paper submitted by the bipartisan Baker- fraternity—the danger of the relationship taking a Hamilton Committee, appointed by Congress negative turn will become much more substantial. to suggest policy regarding the war in Iraq: “!e In 2011, the United States was forced to face United States cannot achieve its goals in the the challenge of mass protests and upheavals in Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab- the Arab world. While the dust has yet to settle, Israeli conflict.”57 and there is no telling where the dramatic public !e five days between May 19 and May 24, awakening in Arab countries will ultimately lead, 2011 were a culmination of the dynamics of the it is safe to assume that Arab rulers will have to be Washington-Jerusalem-American Jewry triangle. much better attuned to popular sentiment than in As already mentioned in a di"erent context, on the past. One of the key issues a"ecting the Arab May 19, as part of his speech regarding the Arab

96 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE uprising, President Obama reiterated his view, Although election year rules dictate that anger that “[T]he borders of Israel and Palestine should toward Israel must be curbed so as not to lose be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed the Jewish vote, White House criticism did find swaps.” In response, the Prime Minister’s O#ce expression in the media. In White House press declared—in unequivocal terms—that such briefings it was argued that Israel’s failure to borders were indefensible and that Israel would advance the peace process makes it di#cult for never return to them. !e administration was the administration to address the Arab uprising, enraged by Israel’s response and argued that the manipulates domestic American politics, and Prime Minister’s O#ce deliberately ignored the aligns the American Jewish community against the fact that President Obama presented the 1967 president. In this context, former Defense Secretary lines and land swaps as a starting point for new Robert Gates was quoted negotiations, and certainly did not demand that as saying, not long before American Israel retreat to those lines. Moreover, he reiterated his retirement, that the US editorials the need to safeguard Israel’s security a number has received nothing from portray Israel of times in the speech. !e discord between the Israel in return for all the as unacceptably two leaders was publicly evident in the joint steps the administration interfering in Obama-Netanyahu press conference held after has taken to guarantee U.S. domestic their meeting on May 20, 2011. In his speech at the its security—access to politics, AIPAC Policy Conference on May 22, 2011, Obama top-quality weapons, buoyed by took pains to clarify that Israel’s future borders assistance in developing the organized would be di"erent than the one in place on June missile-defense systems, Jewish 4, 1967, and that the parties would be allowed to high-level intelligence community take account of new demographic realities on the sharing, diplomatic ground in delineating final borders. Netanyahu assistance, and more. gave a sweeping speech in front of both houses of Israel’s image as an arrogant, ungrateful country is Congress on May 24, 2011, which received sustained reflected in the political, media driven discourse applause and repeated standing ovations. In fact, in the US, often accompanied by claims that it has been pointed out that Netanyahu got 28 Israel does not know what’s in its own good; that standing ovations in Congress, compared to the Israeli diplomacy is paralyzed by internal political 26 standing ovations Obama received during his constraints; and that it is acting passively against 2011 State of the Union address. !e event helped increasingly threatening adverse trends: mounting fuel White House allegations that Netanyahu is isolation, de-legitimization, and demographic manipulating the US domestic political scene, processes that challenge its capability of remaining harnessing the Republican Party’s attack Obama both democratic and Jewish. American editorials strategy in the 2012 presidential race. often air the argument that the price of friendship

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 97 with Israel is becoming too dear for Washington. weapons: “If there’s nothing else we can do It is in US interests to be perceived as a fair broker besides take military action, then of course you in the peace process, to maintain its position vis- take military action.” Romney repeated this in an à-vis a tumultuous, changing Arab world, and to article in the Washington Post (March 5, 2012), and cultivate strong ties with main regional actors: even undertook: "I will make clear that America’s Egypt and Turkey, both currently in conflict commitment to Israel’s security and survival is with Israel. Israel is portrayed as unacceptably absolute. I will demonstrate our commitment to interfering in US domestic politics—buoyed the world by making Jerusalem the destination of by the organized Jewish community—to make my first foreign trip."59 candidates’ support of Israel, or lack thereof, a Republican candidate Newt Gingrich, who has major electoral consideration. since dropped out of the race, caused an uproar Various commentators were quick to attribute when he called the Palestinians “an invented the 2010 defeat of David Weprin, the Democratic people” (December 9, 2011). candidate for New York’s ninth congressional !e Democratic administration is outraged that district to the Jewish community’s disappointment the Israeli side does little to inform American Jews with President Obama’s policy toward Israel. (!e about how much the president has done for Israel. district has a large Jewish population and has been Obama won the 2008 campaign with 77% of the a Democrat stronghold for more than 90 straight Jewish American vote, and significant Jewish funding years). Even though there were di"erent reasons (according to the Washington Post, about 52% of for the defeat, the line taken by Jewish former the significant contributions made by individuals New York Mayor Ed Koch guided the media’s to the Democratic party are made by Jews). !e interpretation of the Republican victory. “I like 2012 results may show a decline in Jewish support. President Obama ... I helped get him elected,” Koch According to Gallup polls, Obama’s approval rating said at the Republican winner’s election night among Jews is plummeting: 68% in May, 60% in July, 58 party, “but he threw Israel under the bus.” and 54% in September. 2011 In the Annual Survey In the 2012 election cycle we have already seen of American Jewish Opinion (AJC, September maneuvers to position Israel as a wedge issue. 2011), respondents were asked: “Barack Obama is Republican presidential hopefuls (with the the Democratic candidate and Mitt Romney is the notable exception of Ron Paul), early in the Republican candidate. Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, primary process, pledged their commitment to or neither?” Obama won 50% of the votes and order military force in preventing Iran from going Romney won 32%. (16% would vote for neither and nuclear. Mitt Romney, the presumptive nominee, 2% didn’t know). Nevertheless, some commentators labeled Obama’s Iran policy a failure. In a speech reject these assertions and argue that the decline of on November 12, 2011, Romney promised that Jewish support for Obama simply reflects the rate of if elected president, Iran would not have nuclear decline in the general American population.

98 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Obama and his sta" are frustrated by Jerusalem’s section entitled President Obama’s Unwavering lack of appreciation, along with parts of the Jewish Commitment to the State of Israel and the US- community, of steps the administration has taken Israel Relationship, 2012 emphasizes that Obama for Israel’s sake. !e Obama re-election campaign demands that any peace agreement stipulate that is deploying a kind of response team of well known Israel is a Jewish state, the homeland of the Jewish and respected Jewish figures armed with position People, and describes in detail the administration’s papers detailing how good Obama’s administration e"orts to thwart de-legitimization steps against has been for Israel and the Jews. President Obama’s Israel; its assistance in fighting terrorism; its speech before the UN General Assembly on commitment to prevent Iran from attaining September 21, 2011 was an overt courting of nuclear capability; the additional aid for the Jewish support. He said, “America’s commitment development and deployment of Iron Dome ($205 to Israel’s security is unshakeable. Our friendship million); its insistence on the conditions Hamas with Israel is deep and enduring. And so we must meet in order to be a legitimate partner believe that any lasting peace must acknowledge in the Palestinian government (recognize Israel, the very real security concerns that Israel faces accept previous agreements, and reject violence); every single day. Let us be honest with ourselves: the assistance in rescuing besieged security agents Israel is surrounded by neighbors that have waged in the Israeli Embassy in Cairo; and even the fact repeated wars against it ... Israel, a small country of that Obama has met with Netanyahu eight times less than eight million people, looks out at a world since his election. !e document also details the where leaders of much larger nations threaten financial aid to Israel: “President Obama sent Israel to wipe it o" of the map ... !ose are facts. !ey the largest-ever security assistance funding in cannot be denied. !e Jewish People have forged 2010 ($2.775 billion) and raised that to $3 billion a successful state in their historic homeland. Israel for 2011.”61 It also quotes outgoing Secretary of deserves recognition. It deserves normal relations Defense Robert Gates, in his testimony before with its neighbors. And friends of the Palestinians Congress on March 2, 2011: “In terms of concrete do them no favors by ignoring this truth.” steps to improve the security relationship between Obama’s re-election website details the president’s [the US and Israel], more has been done in the last actions on Israel’s behalf. He is portrayed as one two years than in any comparable period in my 62 who “has worked tirelessly to ensure Israel’s [45-year] career.” security, and in light of recent turmoil in the region, With this statement in mind, Gates’ retirement has dramatically increased America’s support for eve complaint is even more resounding. As Israel’s security and qualitative military edge. !e reported by Je"rey Goldberg, Gates told the President has a deep understanding of the grave president that “Netanyahu is not only ungrateful, threats Israel faces and he has been steadfast in but also endangering his country by refusing to supporting Israel's right to defend itself”.60 !e grapple with Israel’s growing isolation and with the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 99 demographic challenges it faces if it keeps control Israel’s standing in the United States is also eroding. of the West Bank.”63 Gates’ successor, Defense An air of distrust surrounds Israeli sincerity Secretary Leon Panetta, also warns against the in moving forward with a peace process that isolation into which Israel is backing: “It’s pretty culminates in the establishment of a Palestinian clear, at this dramatic time in the Middle East when state. An especially scathing September 14, there have been so many changes, that it is not a 2011 New York Times editorial—criticized Prime good situation for Israel to become increasingly Minister Netanyahu: “Mr. Netanyahu has been isolated. And that is what has happened.”64 the most intractable, building settlements and Israel’s increasing isolation creates discomfort in the blaming his inability to be more forthcoming on his US because it underscores America’s own isolation conservative coalition. Egged on by Congressional in supporting Israel. It Republicans, he has sought to embarrass Mr. Obama—astonishing behavior for so close an ally !e political was quite apparent in that does not serve his own country’s interest.” !is reality of the the US diplomatic e"ort sharp tone may not reﬂect the entire American 2012 U.S. against the Palestinian media, but it does suggest a worrying trend. !e election cycle UN bid for statehood. Wall Street Journal’s editorial line, in contrast to may help While President Obama the Times’ frequent criticism of Israel, has directed postpone did commit to veto the most of its criticism at the Palestinians, and usually Israel’s “Hour resolution, Washington supports Israeli government’s positions. About the of Truth” maneuvered to avoid having to exercise its veto Palestinian UN initiative, the Journal had this to power by dissuading other say: “What Palestinians seek out of a UN vote isn't Security Council members an a#rmation of their right to a state, but rather from supporting it. (As mentioned, the US did another tool in their perpetual campaign to harass, 65 manage to thwart the Palestinian attempt to delegitimize and ultimately destroy Israel.” secure nine votes, so, for now, there is no need for !e political reality of the 2012 US election cycle its veto.) Ongoing construction in the settlements may help postpone Israel’s "hour of truth," the is an especially blunt rebu" to the administration, point at which its positions on the vexing issues as are other steps, such as Netanyahu’s decision to of a permanent agreement must be presented. appoint a team of legal experts to legalize houses But such a postponement does not release Israel built on privately-owned Palestinian land, which from the horns of its dilemma. Even if postponed triggered a particularly curt American response: until after the elections, it is bound to raise its head “We oppose any e"ort to legalize settlement again insisting that Israel take painful decisions. outposts, which is unhelpful to our peace e"orts A post-election United States may return to the and would contradict Israeli commitments and Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process in earnest, obligations.” (October 12, 2011). guided by fundamental American interests and

100 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE free of internal political pressure, and could place episode that is ultimately incompatible with heavy pressure on Israel to reach an agreement, and justice. !ey regard recognition of Israel as a Jewish may even give rise to calls for a forced settlement. state as acceding to the argument that places moral Under such circumstances, US Jewry might find responsibility for the conflict on the Palestinians, itself between a rock and a hard place. !e need which would exempt Israel from any responsibility for decisions regarding permanent core issues for Palestinian su"ering and subvert the refugees’ also raises tough questions for the Jewish People demands for reparations to compensate for lost with respect to the future of Jerusalem and the property and su"ering. In e"ect, the demand is Holy Sites (Cave of the Patriarchs, Rachel’s Tomb, perceived as expecting a Palestinian embrace of etc.). Such historic decisions are bound to raise the core Zionist doctrine. Abu Mazen only fanned the question, to what extent is Diaspora Jewry entitled controversy when, in his UN speech, he referred to a say in matters close to the heart of every Jew, to Palestine as the Holy Land for Muslims and everywhere. Christians and omitted any mention of the Jews: !e Jewish dimension of a permanent settlement “!e Holy Land, the land of Palestine, [is] the land also explains Netanyahu’s demand that the of divine messages, the ascension of the Prophet Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state and Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the as the homeland of the Jewish People, a position birthplace of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him).” upheld by the vast majority of American Jews. Is recognition of Israel as a Jewish state a "Red Line" Netanyahu reiterated this demand in his UN no Palestinian leader can cross? Ironically, the General Assembly speech on September 24, 2011: term “Jewish state” is mentioned in the Palestinian “!e core of the conflict is not the settlements. Declaration of Independence (Algiers, 1988), in ... !e core of the conflict has always been and relation to the UN partition resolution. It appears unfortunately remains the refusal of the Palestinians that a formulation taking into consideration to recognize a Jewish state in any border.” Palestinian sensitivities around this issue could Abu Mazen, on his part, has vowed to never accept be accepted by them in the later stages of Netanyahu’s demand. His o#cials have come up negotiations, but not at the start. For instance: !e with various arguments to justify this rejection: parties recognize the right of the two peoples, the accepting the demand would alienate the rights Jewish People and the Palestinian People, to self- of the Arab minority in Israel; it would constitute determination in the framework of an independent an implied renunciation of the Palestinian state. demand for the right of return of refugees, and an Over the course of the last year, the power of acknowledgement of the claim’s futility; it would Israel and the Jewish community in the US has constitute an admission that the Jews have a manifested itself. With the help of organized Jewry legitimate right to the Land of Israel, and that the and relying on support from the Republican Right Palestinian claim to the land was a brief historical and Christian-Evangelicals, Israel stood its ground

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 101 on the issues impeding negotiations with the Conclusion Palestinians, including continued construction in the settlements, even though it was greatly !e last year has been fraught with significant resented by the White House. Israel’s conduct geopolitical developments brought on by the was possible in the context of Obama’s weakened dramatic upheavals in the Arab world. Any attempt position, the result of the continuing deep to draw hard and fast conclusions about the "new economic crisis, the exigencies of an election year, face" of the Middle East would be presumptuous. and the 2010 Republican takeover of the House Nevertheless, Israel and the Jewish People clearly of Representatives. Making support for Israel a have to navigate a new reality, which is riddled wedge issue in the 2012 elections is dangerous with dangers and weighty challenges. !e great for the future of the US-Israel relationship . In the uncertainty that characterizes the Middle Eastern past, Israel has been careful to keep the issue of its region is potentiated by the current anxiety American support above partisan squabbles; this and crisis atmosphere marking the entire global was, of course, a more comfortable position for arena. !e number of "moving parts" within the American Jewry. international system, and the diversity of these components, makes conducting a sound foreign It is feared that short-term achievements based on policy more di#cult. transitory political conjunctures may carry a painful price tag, especially if the Obama administration Because every building block in the regional remains in o#ce after the 2012 elections, and strategic alignment may take on various if Israel continues to be perceived as an ally that alternative shapes, a matrix encompassing all the encumbers US foreign policy, manipulates US potential combinations is extremely complicated domestic politics, and pushes for moves that are in and encumbers decision-makers. Moreover, direct opposition to US core interests—including although the Middle Eastern picture on the eve a situation where Israel and the Jewish community of the upheavals was clear for all to see: ine"ective would be blamed for “pushing” the US into war governments, poverty, economic hardships, high with Iran. Such conceptions in the United States unemployment rates, myriads of young people should be understood as warning signs that must who have lost any hope for a decent future, be heeded by the leaders of both Israel and the rampant corruption, revocation of basic freedoms Jewish American community. and human rights violations. !e best experts failed to foresee what was coming, and could not envision Arab crowds flooding town squares and risking their life in front of live fire from the armed forces. Political expertise lies in tracing the movement and development of the trends and patterns that

102 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE define the reality we face. But when that reality An economic downturn in Israel, as a result becomes erratic and turns current theories on of deterioration in the security situation, and/ their head, it is no surprise that these experts’ very or as part of the "de-legitimization" campaign commitment to the patterns they have cultivated waged against it—sanctions, not necessarily by is likely to betray them. One should be wary of governments, enacted against Israeli products, unequivocal predictions; in fact, it would be rather tourism, investments, etc., which the global surprising if there were no further surprises in the economic crisis complicates—is also a possibility. Middle East. Israel-US relations, have been strained in light of When reality is this fitful, the instinctive human the growing American perception that Israel is response is to entrench, react tactically and refrain ungrateful, and that the price of US friendship with from initiating any fresh strategic moves until after Israel is increasing steadily. !e US image in the "the dust settles." But against the backdrop of the Muslim world has also su"ered. Washington faces past year's developments, Israel faces numerous isolation in international forums, and is harshly categories of threatening scenarios, which a criticized for its support of Israel (It is reasonable proactive Israeli initiative—despite the uncertain to assume that this damaging potential in Israel- conditions—could possibly help contain, or at US relations, will be marginalized at least after the least mitigate their potential damage. November 2011 elections.) Security deterioration, which in the extreme case While the Arab upheavals could go on for years, might devolve into all-out war, with Israel forced certain observations and dilemmas are already to defend itself against a combined o"ensive discernible, which should be taken into account along multiple fronts, including its home front— in policy planning vis-à-vis the seething Middle for instance, as a result of an Israeli or American Eastern arena: operation against Iran; a retaliatory operation in !e flourishing of political Islam: Political Islam Gaza or in Lebanon; following a deterioration in has emerged as the major winner of the Arab the relationship with the Palestinians—should be uprising. It remains to be seen whether the entry factored into the regional calculus. of the Muslim Brotherhood onto the political field Further damage to Israel’s international position in Arab countries will moderate their stances, lead is likely as a result of Israel’s enduring image as them into peaceful coexistence with secular parties the intransigent party in the deadlocked Israeli- in governmental coalitions, or engender dark Palestinian peace process, the erosion of the theocracies. Will they work toward the abrogation international standing of Israel’s American ally, of peace accords, or will they (as some of their the collapse of the strategic Jerusalem-Cairo and leaders vaguely declare) respect them, thereby, Jerusalem-Ankara axes, and the rise of political somewhat paradoxically, conferring popular and Islam in the Middle East. clerical legitimacy to these accords; even forcing

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 103 Hamas to tone down its rhetoric and positions? opportunity and a context for proactive policy- Since Israel is incapable of a"ecting the burgeoning making by Israel and the Jewish People? of political Islam, do we have the wherewithal to Breakout of ethnic conflicts: !e compromised ensure that (when in power) it would adopt a power of the central governments in Arab stance more consistent with Israeli interests? countries, the economic crisis, and the sense !e increased power of the "Arab Street": that a weakening US is providing less and less Without drawing any premature conclusions order in the region, could combine to trigger a about the final picture of the Arab uprising, it serious outbreak of ethnic and religious conflicts. seems safe to assume that future rulers of Arab In Iraq, the pent up tension between the Shiite countries will have to be much more attuned majority and the Sunni minority could burst in the to popular sentiment. To what extent will Arab aftermath of the US withdrawal—while the Kurds public opinion, which is saturated with hatred pursue their own dreams of independence. !e of Israel and prioritizes the Palestinian issue, find riots in Syria could spiral into an all-out struggle expression in the respective Arab governments’ between Sunni, Alawite, Kurd and Druze. Lebanon foreign policy, and in their stance on Israel in may slide back into the trauma of a harrowing particular? For instance, is Israel’s ability to respond ethnic civil war (between Shiite, Sunni, Christian to violent provocations by Hamas limited by fears and Druze). Jordan’s Palestinian majority is being that it could drag Egypt back into the conflict, systematically deprived of access to positions and if so, to what extent? Are Israel and the Jewish of power and national security agencies. And in People capable of defusing the animosity of the Bahrain, the Sunni minority rules over the Shiite Arab Street? majority. !e worsening economic crisis: !e deteriorated !e perception of US decline and abandonment: economic situation in the Arab world, which helped !e process of US withdrawal from Iraq and fuel the demonstrations, has worsened in their Afghanistan is perceived in some quarters as wake. In the immediate term, there is a considerable abandonment; its failure to date to curb Iran’s downturn in economic growth. Local tourism and nuclearization e"orts; its failure to advance an foreign investment have su"ered and local investors Israeli-Palestinian agreement; and its response are transferring their money out of the region due to the Arab uprising, which was perceived as to uncertainty about the future and the lack of hesitant and inconsistent in the Middle East; a basic sense of security. !e economic crisis may along with a severe, protracted internal economic force Arab governments to focus their e"orts on slump, all combine to paint a picture of a steadily economic recovery and domestic a"airs, but it weakening American superpower, unable to could also create a temptation to divert internal attain its goals, increasingly preoccupied with its frustrations against "the Zionist arch-enemy." Does own predicaments, and progressively less willing the economic crisis in the Arab world also o"er an to assume intervening roles in the region. Israel’s

104 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE power—both its actual strength and the way power tomorrow. Prime Minister Netanyahu it is perceived—is directly correlated with the articulated the spirit of this argument in his Knesset perception of US power, and the intensity of its speech of Nov. 23, 2011: friendship with Israel. Can Israel, for its own good, “!e Middle East is no place for the naïve ... Chances help the Unites States restore its standing in the are that an Islamist wave will wash over the Arab Middle East? countries, an anti-West, anti-liberal, anti-Israel and !e decline of traditional regional anchoring ultimately an anti-democratic wave ... [!e Arabs] strategic arrangements: !e shockwaves are moving, but they are not moving forward throughout the Arab world are toppling strategic toward progress, they are going backwards ... I will alignments that have traditionally characterized not ignore reality, I will not ignore the dangers, I the Middle East. !e component countries of will not ignore history ... or give up on any of our the pro-American "Moderate Axis" have changed. security requirements that have increased because Mubarak’s ousting and the deterioration in of the recent crises and not diminished. !is is not relations with Turkey intensify Israel’s strategic the time to yield them.” isolation. At the same time, however, the "Axis of !is approach is closer to the “watch and wait” Resistance" hostile to Israel—Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, pole. Prime Minister Netanyahu explained its Hamas—is also being torn apart by the threat theory vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue: “I decided to Assad’s regime. !is strategic reality must be to determine our policy according to reality and thoroughly comprehended by Israeli decision- not to wishful thinking... I remember that many makers, especially vis-à-vis Egypt and Turkey. of you called upon me to seize the opportunity !e dilemmas outlined above necessitate choosing and make hasty concessions, to rush into an between two diametrically opposed approaches: agreement, that the time was right. It is the one prefers to watch and wait, while the other opts opportunity, the right time, you said. Don't miss for proactively spotting opportunities and taking the opportunity. But I do not base Israel's policy initiative. on illusion. !e earth is shaking. We do not !e ﬁrst approach argues that the threats facing know who will take over any land that we give Israel have grown considerably following the up, not tomorrow, this very afternoon. We see Arab upheavals, and that this is not the time to this reality everywhere. Whoever does not see take risks based on wishful thinking and strategic it is burying their head in the sand. But that did naiveté. Political Islam, extremely hostile to Israel, not stand in the way of people suggesting that I will probably dictate the path of most Arab states give in. I said that we want to reach an agreement in the foreseeable future, and this uncertainty calls with the Palestinians because we do not want a for maximum caution because any territory given bi-national state, but we must insist on having by Israel today may fall into the hands of a hostile stable and secure foundations, we have always wanted that but now we need it more than ever

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 105 ... [I]t is not the time to rush into things, it is the Additionally, such an initiative has the potential time to be cautious in our connections with the of: boosting the Israel-US relationship by crediting Palestinians.”66 Washington with an "historic achievement," as the sponsor of the agreement, which would, in !e alternative approach argues for taking a turn, restore the US position in the Middle East proactive initiative toward obtaining progress and upgrade its ability to obtain its goals in the in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab world; substantially curbing the trend of de- particular, and the broader Israeli-Arab conflict legitimizing Israel; strengthening Israel’s economic in general (as part of a comprehensive regional growth potential and its ability to find new markets; agreement) as the way to bring about a potential improving Israel’s diplomatic position and image major realignment of Israel’s strategic situation, around the world, and break Israel’s isolation in and an answer, albeit only partial, to the new international forums; alleviating the challenges challenges born as a consequence of the Arab of co-existence with the Arab minority in Israel; upheavals. !ey include: removing the Israeli issue securing Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic from the agenda of the Arab Street, which is fast state, and turning it into a more attractive country becoming a more significant factor in shaping its in foreign eyes, and a more attractive state for the governments’ policies toward Israel; reducing the majority of its citizens, and for Diaspora Jewry. temptation for Arab countries to resolve internal insurgencies by initiating a violent confrontation !e clash between these two approaches will with Israel; a chance to dissolve some of the glue continue to resonate in the strategic and political holding together the region’s extreme opposition discourse in Israel and the Diaspora in the year camp (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other ahead. Is this a time for strategic passivity? Or do Islamic terrorist groups); paving the way for we still have the prerogative (or at least a part of it) normalization of Israel’s relationship with the in this matter? !e dramatic turbulence of last year entire Arab and Islamic world; improving the is expected to intensify, throwing these di#cult ability to restore strategic partnerships that have dilemmas into sharper focus. !e changes are been damaged (Egypt), threatened (Jordan), or still stirring beneath our feet, shaping the future destroyed (Turkey); and improving the ability to of the Middle East and of Israel. Israel faces tough build a regional strategic coalition against Iran’s dilemmas that must not be ignored. ambition for hegemony in the Middle East.

106 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Notes

1 Kishore Mahbubani, “A Rudderless World,” New York 19 Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2012. Times, August 18, 2011. 20 Jerusalem Post, April 10, 2011. 2 Walter Pincus, “United States needs to reevaluate its 21 Haaretz, February 20, 2012. assistance to Israel,” Washington Post, October 18, 2011. 22 "e Daily Star (Lebanon), October 21, 2011. 3 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Paciﬁc Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011. 23 Reuters, May 11, 2012. 4 Interview by Lally Weymouth, Washington Post, 24 Press-TV, October 10, 2011. October 24, 2011. 25 Tehran Times, October 4, 2011. 5 !e Arab Public Opinion Poll, released on November 26 Interview by Lally Weymouth, Washington Post, 21, 2011 by Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for October 24, 2011. Peace and Development at the University of Maryland. 27 CNN, January 17, 2012. 6 !e Pew Research Center, conducted between March 28 , Feb. 2, 2012. 19 and April 10, 2012. Haaretz 29 , Dec 21, 2011. 7 David E. Sanger, “As Mubarak Digs In, US Policy in Egypt Daily Telegraph is Complicated,” New York Times, February 5, 2011. 30 Reuters, November 30, 2011. 8 PBS News Hour, January 27, 2011. 31 Haaretz, April 15 2012. 9 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, “Withdrawal 32 Haaretz, April 27, 2012. means a victory for Iran,” Los Angeles Times, Oct 28, 2011. 33 Haaretz, February 23 2012. 10 “After 10 Years, Public Is Weary of Afghan War,” 34 Haaretz, April 27, 2012. Bloomberg, October 7, 2011. 35 Haaretz, April 25, 2012. 11 A Call to all Muslims, http://www.muslimnews.co.uk, April 12, 2002. 36 Haaretz, April 26, 2012. 12 Al Ahram Weekly, January 20-26, 2011. 37 New York Times, September 18, 2011. 13 Haaretz, January 25, 2011. 38 New York Times, September 18, 2011. 14 Interview by Lally Weymouth, Washington Post, May 39 Daily Telegraph, November 22, 2011. 10, 2011. 40 Time, September 26, 2011. 15 Interview by Lally Weymouth, Washington Post, 24 41 Haaretz, October 11, 2011. October, 2011. 42 "e Daily Beast, October 23, 2011. 16 Al-Hayat, January 1, 2012. 43 A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two- 17 Washington Post, May 11, 2012. State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict, April 30, 18 Asharq Al-Awsat, January 8, 2012. 2003

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 107 44 "e Atlantic, May 22, 2011. 45 Haaretz, October 31, 2011. 46 Haaretz, March 13, 2011. 47 Haaretz, September 26, 2011. 48 Galei Zahal, May 13, 2012. 49 Haaretz, May 11 2012. 50 Haaretz, Februar 6, 2012. 51 Forward, April 19, 2012. 52 Jerusalem Post, May 10, 2012. 53 Haaretz, September 30, 2011. 54 Haaretz, October 18, 2011. 55 Haaretz, April 28, 2012. 56 Haaretz, March 12, 2012. 57 !e Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report, p. 7. 58 CNN, September 27, 2011. 59 Washington Post, March 5 2012. 60 President Obama’s Unwavering Commitment to the State of Israel and the US-Israel Relationship, 2012 barackobama.com. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Bloomberg, September 6, 2011. 64 Politico, October 3, 2011. 65 Editorial, “!e Palestinian Statehood Gambit,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2011. 66 Netanyahu’s speech at the Knesset, November 23, 2011.

108 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE PART 3

Creating Jewish Meaning in the United States and Europe

Creating Jewish Meaning: Emerging Adults, Cultural Creativity, and the 6 Jewish Future in the U.S. and Europe

Introduction Today's creative innovations by young American Jews range from the frankly religious—such Cultural Flowerings and Institutional as liturgically rigorous post-denominational Startups egalitarian “independent” congregations, to the cosmopolitan and secular—such as rock !e past few decades have witnessed a veritable concerts that attract Jews and non-Jews in equal explosion of Jewishly oriented cultural works numbers. !ey include groups that reinvent ritual produced by US Jewish writers, musicians, serious and new ways of looking at ritual, consortiums and popular artists and performers, as well as of innovative young Jewish philanthropists, religious thinkers and social entrepreneurs. A organizational startups that foster social justice century ago artists like Irving Berlin, Aaron e"orts around the world, and new—and often Copland, the Gershwin brothers, and the great critical—ways for American Jews to interact with Jewish innovators of American musical theater Israel; phenomena such as the reclamation of articulated the voice of America—and arguably classical Jewish texts through “Storah-telling1” helped to shape tolerant American values—but and non-stereotypical Jewish fusion cuisine kept connections to their Jewish musical roots that is Kosher By Design2; and Jewish ﬁction private and out of the public eye. In contrast, today's with protagonists who are Jews of mixed racial young artists consciously and proudly incorporate or cultural background, merging religious and Jewish materials into works that non-Jews as well as cultural traditions. Disproportionately, they are Jews ﬁnd meaningful. Cynthia Ozick once remarked expressed through contemporary Jewish music sardonically, "Whenever people mention humanity, that features the fusion of diverse ethnic musical they do not hesitate to omit the Jews." But today's traditions—for example, Aharit HaYamim, a young American Jewish artists believe Jews are part band that has performed in New York at the of humanity, and present Jews and Jewishness with Jewlicious Festival is billed as “Israeli reggae, dub pride and passion in their novels and performances, and ska.”3 secure in their own Jewish identity.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 111 Not least, the majority of Jewish start-ups that draw for artists and Heeb Magazine, among other younger American Jews have a strong component initiatives, closed its doors due to lack of adequate of global social justice, often regarded as the raison funding. Reactions from the Jewish community d’etre of Jewishness. !is is most pronounced in were swift and conflicting. Commentary magazine innovative Jewish social justice organizations, blogger Matthew Ackerman advised concerned but also permeates much artistic and religious Jews to "Shed No Tears for the Death of JDub" expressiveness as well. and be grateful that funders were "directing their priorities elsewhere."4 Responding to Jacob For many, these global, Berkman's detailed report in "e Forward (July 20, Younger multicultural artistic, spiritual, 2011), an "Israeli Jew" commented: American Jews and social activist expressions frequently aren’t “background music” !ere's been a tendency in recent Jewish embrace the to their Jewishness—they philanthropy to fund the "next big thing" particulars of are a primary focus of their or the inspirational "bright spark" of young Jewish culture, Jewishness. Moreover, the Jews' life. Money has been literally thrown but reject “Us elements that comprised the at people and ideas purely based on the and !em” core of Jewishness for earlier appearance of hip. Many of these are constructions generations leave many of bound to fail as their founders have never of ethnicity them cold. Younger American had to deal with the self discipline inherent Jews frequently embrace the in bootstrapping an organization....5 particulars of Jewish culture, But David A.M. Wilensky, a blogger for New Voices: but reject “us and them” constructions of ethnicity. National Jewish Student Magazine disagreed: !ey say they seek meaning—but they want the "Perhaps the saddest thing about it is that the freedom to find their own, idiosyncratic formation o#cial Jews try so hard—and fail so spectacularly— of what is meaningful. !ey seek community—but to market Jewishness to us as the epitome of they vigorously reject pre-fabricated social groups cool. But JDub doesn't try to be cool. JDub is just and “don’t want people and ideas forced down our cool and we'll all be just less cool without it."6 !e throats.” subtext of the passionate argument that ensued What do these creative flowerings and institutional in Jewish periodicals and the bloggosphere could be developments mean for American Jewish life, now unsubtly paraphrased: Is the new Jewish creativity and in the future? Observers disagree dramatically. a viable source of revitalization for American Jews Recently, for example, JDub Records—which had in their twenties and thirties, or a pretentious, promoted Jewish musical artists through album unimportant, anemically-Jewish drain on scarce sales and concerts, had famously "discovered" the philanthropic resources? Many observers, especially Hasidic rock-star Mattisyahu, and had served as a those who devote considerable amounts of time and catalyst for the creation of the Six-Points fellowships energy to conventional Jewish institutions, including

112 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE federations and defense organizations, synagogues Generational Continuity and Discontinuity7 and Jewish schools, wonder if cultural connections Today's American Jews in their twenties and thirties can really take the place of visceral tribalism: Can are not the first to be artistically creative and to be reading a witty novel or attending a JDub concert committed to practical social justice projects with featuring North African Jewish musical motifs— the goal of transforming along with many hundreds of Jewish and non- society's ills. However, Jewish musical a#cionados—really be considered !eir their Jewish identity is to comprise ethnic identification, and is this kind of grandparents’ di"erently related to identification transmittable to the next generation? strategy was their novels, plays, films, typically to !is essay explores the social ramifications and policy music, and visual arts compartmentalize implications of the fact that for many American Jews than their grandparents’ their Jewishness in their twenties and thirties these creative spiritual and parents’. In the and express start-ups, new ways of approaching religious texts and grandparental generation, it only with ceremonies, a broad spectrum of artistic expressions, even those who had very other Jews and global social justice enterprises are the most little in the way of Jewish compelling and accurate reflection of their Jewish ethnic capital, who knew religious, spiritual, and/or ethnic connections. After little or nothing of Jewish discussing the interests and concerns of American languages, written texts, Jews in their twenties and thirties, the discussion and cultural expressions, had a sense of being focuses on questions such as: What is the prognosis linked—positively or negatively—to the Jewish for the innovative, globalized Jewish multiculturalism People and Jewish destiny. Partially because of this that attracts younger American Jews—can this sensitivity, assimilation was an important coping culture really sustain Jewish communities and strategy for them. Ambitious American Jews be transmitted to the next generation? How can were still dealing with anti-Semitic quotas in their Jewish communal institutions respond to a younger schooling and professional careers. !is generation's generation that often regards their e"orts with a strategy was typically to compartmentalize their profound hermeneutics of suspicion? How do Jewish Jewishness and express it only when they were philanthropic start-ups relate to more established with other Jews. In "mixed company" they knew Jewish charitable organizations? What interventions how to blend in. !ey engaged with other Jews may plausibly revitalize a passion for Jewish in Jewish organizational life, they followed Jewish Peoplehood among the diverse segments of the next events in news publications (always scrutinizing generation of Jews? How can we understand and articles anxiously to see if Jews were involved in nurture the relationship to Israel among Jews in their developing scandals or tragedies—a potential twenties and thirties? catalyst for anti-Semitism—as well as swelling or kvelling (expressing delight) with pride at Jews who

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 113 achieved). !ose who had religious leanings made as well as Jewish readers not only because of their Conservative Judaism the largest movement in literary excellence but also because their dual American Judaism, preserving traditions within the vision as Jews and Americans provided insights into synagogue and the rabbi's home—but not making American history, culture and life. too many demands on ordinary congregants. For !e "baby boomer generation" were the children these Jews, Israel, as "the Jewish State," made a of these strongly ethnic Jews and the parents profound di"erence. !eir connections to Israel had of today's Gen-X, Y, Z. !e baby boomers were their own ups and downs, of course, depending on a demographically large group that gained a many factors. Only a large minority actually spent reputation for participating in social movements in time in Israel. But for many of these American Jews, the 1960s, such as student protest movements, anti- concern about Israel was Vietnam War protests, Civil Rights demonstrations, experienced on a visceral Young and Second Wave Feminist consciousness raising. level—in their kishkes—a American Jews Some of them dabbled in drugs and experimented personal identification. have with alternative lifestyles. An important minority not experienced Artistic expressions among Jewish baby boomers attained extensive their Jewishness produced by American Jewish educations through the now growing Jewish as an Jews in the middle of the day school movement—often enhanced by Jewish impediment to 20th century by writers summer camps, especially Hebrew-speaking educational, such as Saul Bellow, camps like Massad and Camp Ramah—and occupational, Bernard Malamud, and extended in the college Jewish studies programs or social especially the young Philip and departments that had begun to be established. mobility Roth eloquently illustrate Some who received intensive Jewish education the simultaneous hunger became founders of the Havurah movement,9 for acceptance—and independent worship, study, and Jewish experiential awareness of Jewish di"erence, as Jews engaged groups that met at convenient times on Sabbaths in an alternately painful and hilarious process of and Jewish holidays and were more likely to be assimilation. In Roth's early writing, the characteristics led by a psychologist or a professor than by an of “us,” the Jews, and “them,” the Christians who ordained rabbi. !ose women with strong Jewish owned America, were clearly conflicting, but seemed educations launched feminist movements within fixed and easily contrasted. Portrayals of upwardly Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative, and mobile Jews caught in a love-hate relationship with then Orthodox wings of American Judaism, and white-bread America in Roth's novels and Woody changed the face of Jewish leadership by bringing Allen's films launched both artists, and others like women into positions of prominence such as the them, into celebrated careers.8 American Jewish rabbinate and Jewish scholarship, and bringing authors were read and celebrated by non-Jewish Judaism to the center of women's lives.

114 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Many baby boomers were attracted to aspects and deliver genuine Jewish meaning—to of Judaism that lent themselves to do-it-yourself themselves or others—through enriching projects, such as those described in "e First Jewish experience, be it in prayer, learning, Catalog10 and its subsequent editions. Sociologist culture, or social justice....!eir more Marshall Sklare charged that the Catalog and universalist social justice interests, the generation that produced it sacrificed "the bound with their sense of Judaism's normative to the aesthetic," and blatantly exposed particular mission in the world, lead their "subordination to the youth culture"— them to value Jewish engagement in significantly—because of its "downplaying" of "the addressing society's greater ills.13 entire social and ethical dimension of Judaism in !e leadership and cultural creators of this 11 particular." younger generation of Today's "emerging Jewish adults" are the American Jews depart !e social children of these baby-boomers.12 Unlike earlier from the ethos of the and ethical generations, today's young American Jews Havurah generation dimension of typically have not experienced their Jewishness precisely in regard to Judaism is to be an impediment to their educational, Marshall Sklare's critiques: the focus occupational, or social mobility, having grown it is to a great extent of young up in a world where Jewish words and humor "the social and ethical American are part of the cultural toolkit of television dimension of Judaism” Jewish newspersons and urbane public figures. !e that they explore in their engagement arts they create, view, read, listen and dance to, novels, emphasize in their and the organizations they create reflect those worship, and promote in changed circumstances. Steven M. Cohen divides their organizations. their innovative enterprises into three categories: "expressive, progressive, and protective." Unlike the "establishment camp—as embodied in Cosmopolitan Cultural Creativity of federations, congregations, human service Younger American Jews agencies, Jewish Community Centers (JCCs), and !e great Jewish creators of American musical defense organizations," who "see great need to theater articulated the voice of America—and defend Jewish interests at home, in Israel, and arguably helped to shape American values—but around the world," many young innovators "see kept connections to their Jewish musical roots the establishment camp as overly concerned with private and out of the public eye. In the 1960s threats to continuity...and excessively defensive": and 1970s, as in literature, film, theater and other Instead, leaders of the non-establishment art forms, ethnicity became newly attractive, sector consider it their mission to express and overtly Jewish music became popular on

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 115 every brow level. !eodore Bikel and Harry story of assimilation behind many novels ago. Belefonte gave way to Yitzhak Perlman playing Indeed, Roth’s 1986 masterpiece, "e Counterlife, Klezmer music in the streets of Warsaw and Israeli may be considered the exemplar of the motifs and rock stars giving concerts at Masada on Public concerns of much contemporary Jewish writing, Television fundraisers. Adam Sandler sang endless which often portrays the kaleidoscopic glinting of variations on “!e Hanukkah Song.” Fiddler on the counterlives available to Jews today.) Roof’s “Sunrise, Sunset” became a staple of lounges Like many mainstream, well-educated middle and and elevator muzak sequences. Jewish music has upper middle class Americans in their age cohort, become mainstream (at least in some geographical younger American Jews are attracted to cultural locations) and young Jews feel that they are expressions with a multicultural, multi-flavored mainstream as well. range. Graphic novels, becoming increasingly Tribalism and Today, that excruciating popular, are by their very nature episodic, with assimilationism awareness of “us and visible cellular boundaries, but even in prose are replaced by them,” and the hunger fiction today pastiche prevails, quilting together individualistic for assimilation that goes dissonant experiences, revealing the seams and and spiritual with it, are all but gone— fault lines, and sometimes shining a spotlight on yearnings except for first and second them.14 for personal generation Jews from the A fascination with Jews and Jewish societies in rather than Former Soviet Union, like remote, far-flung corners of the world—the “planet national Gary Shteyngart, who of the Jews”—leaves the well-established comfort redemption bemoans that he must of self-reflexive American Judaism and crosses “rehash the old immigrant imaginative boundaries to explore new ways of narrative,” and admits, thinking about Jews and Jewishness. Both tribalism “We may very well be the and assimilationism are replaced in these novels last immigrant Jews in this country who have a foot by very individualistic and frequently spiritual in both worlds.” Today’s Jewish immigrants want yearnings toward personal, rather than national desperately to succeed, but do not measure success redemption, portraying Jews in settings less familiar by their ability to disappear into the smooth, sweet to American readers: Argentina, Alaska, Asia, world that Philip Roth would later subversively call North Africa. !e striking relocation of American the “American Pastoral.” Instead, their visions of Jewish fiction to international destinations has success are themselves jaggedly dissonant. Today’s emerged partially because assimilation is now a writing is not Portnoy with a Russian accent. stale story, and partially because there is little to Instead, it conveys a di"erent idea of what it is to be struggle against in the familiar American urban an American, and thus what it is to be an American setting, and thus a paucity of ready-made dramatic Jew. (Philip Roth himself, impressively, left the tension. In planet of the Jews novels,15 Jews travel

116 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the world—and it is in many ways an unfamiliar Musician Dan Wolf eloquently described this new world. By placing the performance of Jewishness arena as “sacred space,” elaborating that young in a setting unfamiliar to the writer and many of people are “able to define sacred space as anything his/ her readers, the novelist de-centers the reader that we hold important in our lives and give weight and creates fresh insights and analysis. Novels and value to.” Examples of such redefinitions of about Jews in unfamiliar places and times stretch sacred, Jewish space, according to Wolf are “Purim the imaginative capacities of the reader as they parties in clubs,” “[reading] the same novel, Jewish illuminate contemporary Jewish existence. or not, and using it as sacred text,” and “five hundred people or a thousand people dancing, sweaty, to a DJ from Tel Aviv in San Francisco, or Music Provides a "Neutral" Jewish Home for Balkan Beat Box on tour.” Many Young Jews Music, literature, and rock Many young clubs become the new Neutral space—something di"erent from what Jewish loci for this generation to Jews in their twenties and thirties often charge musicians explore their Jewishness in is the contrived feel of the conventional Jewish incorporate ways that transform these singles scene—is intensely sought after by both Biblical and spaces and entities into Jewish musical performers and audiences, in liturgical the sacred. Wolf and other cultural venues from rock clubs to book clubs. materials culture-shapers advocate Both Jewishly knowledgeable but alienated and into for the legitimacy of Jewishly ignorant young professionals may shy their music cultural connections to away from synagogues and other institutions in the Judaism that o"er relevant Jewish community, but are drawn to venues that access points for young speak their language and don't feel threatening. adults. For example, the "is Week section in the June 9, 2011 issue of the widely read magazine TimeOut Jewish musicians often express their Jewishness New York provides a plethora of “Rock, Pop, and through art that fuses Jewish and international Hip Hop” events and happenings going on in cultures. Many young Jewish musicians release Williamsburg for that typical week including the CDs with non-Jewish bands, working with folk following: music, rap, a cappella, and alternative rock, before forming their own Jewish bands or creating "e Big Jewcy Party at the Brooklyn Jewish-themed records. !ose musical styles Winery on North 8th Street near Roebling are then incorporated into their Jewish music (Jewcy describes itself as “a smart and fun as well. Young Jewish musical cultural leaders curated platform for ideas that matter bring together musical motifs from Judeo-Arabic to young Jews today, including Culture, songs of North Africa, from the Latin rhythms Social Justice, and Jewish Food”)

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 117 of South American Jews, and from the musical Communal and Religious Expressions of trends of their generation. At the same time, they Jewish Multiculturalism are confident and unselfconscious about using Just as young Jewish artists use novels, films, Jewish subjects and musical motifs within their and musical media to explore Judaism and push multicultural mix. Many incorporate Hebrew against conventional boundaries, young Jewish biblical and liturgical materials into their eclectic communal entrepreneurs and religious leaders music. express their social and spiritual goals and challenge !ese young artists aim to produce universal conventional American Jewish models. According music that reaches a population—both Jewish to the 2010 Survey of New Jewish Initiatives in and non-Jewish—that has not experienced North America,16 the most prevalent organizational anything Jewish before. areas of focus are: "Jewish education (53%), community Cultural Much as writers do, building (31%), spirituality (28%), ritual (26%), and connections these musicians believe 20s/30s engagement/development (25%)." their work comments on create an Rabbi and author Danya Ruttenberg observes that humanity and translates entryway for "part of the move away from denominationalism to all audiences. Many this generation is a move toward pluralism." !is "realigning of younger Jews enjoy the to connect the boundaries" is a primary characteristic of option of listening to not only to young Jewish leaders, says Rabbi Elie Kaunfer, klezmer punk or indie Jewish culture, co-founder and executive director of the rock music that is not but also Mechon Hadar Institute, especially when trying to force a message to Judaism compared to earlier generations of American on the audience—it Jewish leaders who tended to locate themselves is "about the music," within denominational a#liations. !ose expressing one’s self, and a#liational categories—Orthodox, Conservative, exploring one’s identity. Cultural connections Reconstructionist, Reform—convey networks of create an entryway for this generation to connect meaning, particular religious attitudes, and styles. not only to Jewish culture, but also to Judaism, !ey explicitly signify not only (or even primarily) artists insist, asking the Jewish community to theological convictions, but of lived styles of Jewish recognize the legitimacy of the sacred space practice and beliefs. In today's American Jewish they are creating. !ese creative spaces provide communities, however, as rabbis and lay leaders an outlet for the artists who use them to express within the di"erent established American wings themselves and their Jewishness, and also supply of Judaism battle to assert their boundaries and a unique arena for other young Jews to explore strengthen their denominational identities, young their Judaism without pressure, no-strings- American religious leaders often reject these labels attached. with their pre-packaged meanings and redefine

118 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE religious a#liations in their own terms, creatively like the Independent Minyanim, emphasized an shaping their Jewish practices to make them egalitarianism that expanded to include women, relevant to and resonant with their own visions and urged innovative approaches to passionate and values. prayer in a non-institutional structure with lay-led !e movement of young American Jews across services. wings of Judaism has been conditioned by Yet today, most Independent Minyan leaders are the transdenominational environments and eager to draw a ﬁrm line between their creations institutions many of them experienced in their and those of their predecessors. !ey emphasize teen and young adult years. Many report being critical di"erences between Havurot and active in BBYO in high school. Some had traveled Independent Minyanim, arguing that Havurot did to Israel with the Nesiyah high school program, not emphasize rigorous or had studied at the Genesis or Bima Brandeis mastery of liturgical Leaders of the summer teen programs, which have a similar and textual materials, Independent approach, then becoming active in their college and "did not produce Minyanim Hillels, where friendships crossed denominational the next generation of movement boundaries. minyan founders, even say they are An important segment of young Jewish religious if some of the goals of catalyzed leaders is breaking with the mold and providing these minyanim and by non- alternatives to denominationalism. !ey have the Havurot were the denominational transformed the American Jewish landscape same,” according to Elie Jewish through the creation of Independent Minyanim, Kaunfer in his new book experiences worship and study communities that exist depicting the creation of independently of denominational movements. !e and rationale for Mechon 17 leaders of the Independent Minyanim movement Hadar. come from a variety of di"erent backgrounds, but !e ambiences of Independent Minyanim can commonly say they are catalyzed by myriad non- be divided between those that are similar to denominational Jewish experiences, including Orthodox environments and those that have more Israel trips, day schools, and Hillels. !e concept in common with Reconstructionist or Reform of independent worship communities has a values and mores. Although di"erent experiences strong recent precedent in the 1960s and 1970s, motivate the leaders of the Independent Minyanim when groups of rebellious young Jewish leaders movement, many perform traditional—some of founded experimental worship communities them virtually Orthodox—services conducted called Havurot in reaction to what they then saw with egalitarian principles. Indeed, Kaunfer as an unspiritual and overly materialistic and pro- explicitly says that their davening (prayer chanting) forma institutional Jewish world. Havurot, much sounds “just like Orthodox if your eyes are closed,”

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 119 with the firm proviso that egalitarianism is a all wings of Judaism—spoke about social justice sacred principle in the Independent Minyanim in language virtually identical to classical Reform movement. Rabbi Ethan Tucker, co-founder of Jewish conceptions of the universalistic mission Mechon Hadar, explains, “I think it boils down to of Judaism to be an ohr lagoyim (a light unto the gender, nothing more, nothing less.” Gender issues nations). are handled di"erently in Partnership Minyanim, Fluidity is a condition of their lives, including specialized, Modern Orthodox subsets of the Jewish mobility. Shmuly Yanklowitz, on the cusp Independent Minyanim movement. In about 15 of thirty, is the founder of the Orthodox social Partnership Minyanim in justice enterprise Uri L'Tzedek and graduate of !e pursuit the United States, Israel the open Orthodox rabbinical seminary Yeshivat of social justice and Australia, men and Chovevei Torah. He believes that the proliferation as the women are separated, of social justice organizations for young American raison d’etre usually by a halakhic Jews has taken place partially because the of Jewish mekhitzah divider, but girls attention of the community is so “fragmented.” identification and women are allowed to Rather than being united around one great resonates lead all parts of the service international or national social justice mission, he for young and Torah reading except says, groups of young Jews are attracted to very American Jews for the Amidah and other di"erent causes, and even a single individual may prayers for which women’s be attracted to many di"erent causes. Rather leadership is explicitly than having a “holistic” sense of mission, they proscribed by rabbinic have multiple missions, “because they belong to law. Like fully egalitarian many di"erent communities. !ey don’t expect Independent Minyanim, Partnership Minyanim are one community to fulfill all their needs—or to reported to provide intense worship experiences. absorb all their social justice energy.” !ey do not expect to have “a life of faith or a life Global Focus for Social Justice of meaning.” Rather, they respond to “moments of faith or moments of meaning.” One of the jobs of !e international cultural scope that so appeals a spiritual leader, according to Yanklowitz’s vision, to American Jews in their twenties and thirties is to “bring all these things into a conversation is a reflection of the moral compass that typifies in a complex way: social community, text, lived their generation as well. !e pursuit of social experience, activism, and spirituality.” justice as the raison d'etre of Jewish identification is echoed by young leaders and educators, writers For many young American Jewish leaders, social and artists, across the wings of American Judaism. justice concerns become especially poignant in Many of our informants—with backgrounds in critical examinations of Israel’s policies. !is is

120 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE especially true for a constellation of individuals attachments but also to knowledge of and critical and institutions that one leader called “the New attitudes toward a broad range of Israeli policies. Israel Fund, J-Street, Pro-Peace, Pro-Israel, Pro- For example, a young Jewish professional described Palestinian, Progressive, Post-Zionist elite.” It should at length problems in Israeli life, such as "tra#cking be emphasized that these are not the only voices sex workers, foreign workers who are oppressed, among young leaders. Young, innovative leaders Bedouins that don't have water." A young rabbi also include many who are strongly "pro-Israel" in explains that generally the world to her "doesn't the conventional sense; however, these leaders are seem that threatening," so she doesn't understand far more likely to locate themselves in conventional why Jews are "so closed- leadership positions in the major wings of o"." Many young Jews, !eir critical American Judaism or within the Jewish communal echoes Rabbi Sharon attitudes network. However, the proliferation of alternative Brous, "are very resentful toward Israel organizations with non-conventional Jewish views of a Jewish life and a are often is symptomatic of the new, multicultural Jewish Jewish experience that is matched globalism. insular, that's only worried by critical attitudes Many young American Jews have very high about Israel or that's only toward the standards for moral national behavior, expecting worried about the Jewish United States the countries they feel attached to—like the community or Jews in United States and Israel—to live up to those moral need." Young adults are standards. !eir critical attitudes toward Israel are looking for "some more often matched by critical attitudes toward the broad articulation of United States, reflecting a redefinition of their what it means to be a Jew relationship and involvement with Israel. Young and a human being in the world," explains Brous, American Jewish leaders and cultural figures so that young Jews understand what it means to ubiquitously declare themselves to be dedicated engage "not only the Jewish community, and not to global and local social justice in vigorous only the Jews in Israel, but far beyond the Jewish e"orts that transcend ethnic, geographic, and community as well." socioeconomic boundaries.

Alternative Voices—the Young Familiarity—with Israel—Breeds Critiques Traditionalists as well as Connections Innovative young American creators include a As a result, unlike past generations, among signiﬁcant group who can be classiﬁed as "young American Jews in their twenties and thirties traditionalists," musicians, social, political, and repeated trips to Israel are related not only to religious activists, and authors who are "protective"

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 121 (to use Cohen's terms) of the Jewish People and incorrect to be pro-Israel on the Harvard campus the State of Israel. In American Jewish writing at the height of the Second Intifada, and that her by younger authors, for example, protagonists overt pro-Israel stance brought students into her are sometimes the symbolic exemplars either class "almost as a refuge from campus culture, of Diasporism or, in contrast, of Zionism and who were very afraid of their peers." Even today, protective traditionalist loyalties. Some writers Horn says "the terrorist attack was tremendously portray intrepid wandering Jews who pursue formative in my adult life." personal existential salvation in remote diasporic Dara Horn's novel "e World to Come (2009) locations despite daunting odds. Others— legitimates tribalism by capturing the vulnerability equally feisty—are traditionalists. According of contemporary Jewish communities to terrorist to a personal interview, threats, while at the same time emphasizing the the depth of novelist Writer immanence of spirituality in a variety of unlikely Dara Horn's attachment Dara Horn persons and places. Horn grew up in a Conservative to survivalist ethnic discovered it home and today maintains Conservative Jewish Jewishness was forged in was politically connections and activities. Her connections her own experience of incorrect to to Jews and Judaism are intellectual, literary, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. be pro-Israel emotional, and strongly traditionalist in many Horn explained that on the ways. She earned a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature "9/11 was tremendously Harvard at Harvard, having learned Yiddish so she could devastating" to her campus understand 19th century Hebrew writing better— emotionally and "very "I realized they were thinking in Yiddish," she says much alienated me from of the master Hebrew stylists of the time. university life, university culture." When she returned to Harvard, she Other writers also have strong connections to discovered an overtly anti-Israel environment, traditional Jewish communities—and equally strong which "felt like a di"erent planet" to her after arguments with them—and utilize both their insider New York. She was consoled that her thesis knowledge and their outsider critiques in their ﬁction. advisor was Yiddish scholar Ruth Wisse, "herself Allegra Goodman’s Kaaterskill Falls (1999) masterfully of course alienated from university culture." It captures the gradations of accommodation and was through Wisse's profound combination of rebellion within stringently Orthodox summer deep commitment to Jewish ethnic survival and colonies in the Catskill Mountains; and the love of literature that Horn felt encouraged to sociological jockeying of religious in-groups and out- continue believing in "the value and importance groups animates Tova Mirvis’ Ladies’ Auxiliary (2000) of literature, at a time in my life when I did not see and "e Outside World (2004), which depicts inbred it." Horn soon discovered that it was politically Southern Jewish communities interacting with outsiders from the North.

122 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Young Jewish Creative Initiatives and reinforced by the voluntary enjoyable and Structural Changes in aspects of being ethnic." 19 American Jewish Identity and in !e pattern exhibited by young creative American American Patterns of Belonging Jews fits this identity pattern very well. As we have seen, young (non-Orthodox) Jews do not It would seem that the new young Jewish creativity conceive of their Jewish identity in terms of "us represents structural changes in both American and them" and many of them have significant Jewish identity and in general American patterns social and personal relations with non-Jews. Like of belonging. all social phenomena, this too is over-determined. !e change in Jewish identity started to occur In addition to the general shift in values in the past after 1945 but we are starting to see its e"ects in 30 years from "survival" the most recent generation—those who are now to "self-expression"20 (in !e creative 20-40 years old. !is change can be described which intergroup trust is expression of (in Karen Brodkin's words) as "Jews became increased), the entrance Judaism exactly white folks."18 !at is that Jews became (or were of American Jews, along fits the allowed to become) part of the dominant white with other Euro-ethnics pattern of American ethnicity just as other Euro-ethnics into the general white “Optional (e.g. children of Italian or Polish immigrants) ethnicity means that Ethnicity” became part of this population. As part of the di"erences between Jews overall white American ethnicity, inter-European and others are just not white ethnicities of origin (Italian, Polish, WASP that important anymore. etc.) began to seem less important, As Brodkin Furthermore, the creative, (1998) describes it, this change had several cultural expression of causes: the discrediting of racist and eugenic Judaism exactly fits the discourse regarding European ethnic groups in pattern of "optional ethnicity." It's optional, it's the wake of WWII and the Holocaust; the 1945 fun, and it adds interest and status to those who GI Bill of rights and the post-war Federal Housing engage in it. Administration (FHA) policy of suburbanization. !e second structural aspect is that mass- !ese last two factors enabled the Jews to membership organizations have been in decline become middle class. Joining the white American in the United States for over a generation. Since middle class ethnicity enabled the Jews like other the 1970s not only have labor unions been in Euro-ethnics to engage in "optional ethnicity" decline (they have been under sustained political or "costless ethnicity." !is form of ethnicity is attack) but also fraternal organizations such as basically symbolic and it is essentially a "leisure the Elks, mass ethnic organizations such as the time activity, rooted in nuclear family traditions Knights of Columbus, Veterans Associations

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 123 and the like.21 !us, the non-denominationalism Conclusion: Creative Entryways or "post-denominationalism" of younger Jews for a Jewishly At-Risk Cohort and their resistance to joining establishment organizations fits the contemporary American Protectionist, conventionally-Zionist young Jews pattern. It would seem that these changes are due are in a minority among their age cohort. Many to the fact that America has become a network of the innovative activities they promote are not society in which mass modes of production and controversial because their goals are transparently political organization (the nation state) are being in the service of traditional Jewish values such as replaced by more individualized and customized Zionism and Jewish knowledge and practice, even modes of production, consumption and identity when their methods are innovative and unfamiliar. formation (even within However, more "edgy" young leaders, artists, and a transnational space) social entrepreneurs sometimes engender hostility. !ey are not (Castells 1996).22 Thus just recalcitrant In the religious world, the young leaders who young Jews like other young people, created Independent Minyanim are often accused Americans are not joining they reflect of being "selfish" in their search for spiritual Jewish mass, one-size-fits- structural intensity and meaning, since many have removed all organizations (such as changes in themselves from the wings of Judaism that lavished Federations) but rather Jewish and their resources on their day schools, summer participating in projects American camps, and other educational ventures. Some more based upon shared society mature rabbis, within the Conservative movement interest and meaning. especially, have complained about a "brain drain" !ese structural aspects or a "commitment drain" that seems to have drawn are stressed here because it many of their most gifted young protégés into the is important to realize that Independent Minyanim movement. With these the new patterns evinced by the young leadership young leaders absent from congregational schools, are not simply whims of recalcitrant young people, worship services, and other activities—taking with rather they reflect structural changes in Jewish them their inspirational singing, studying, lecturing, and American society and hence will have staying and general thoughtfulness—the congregations power of one sort or another. !us, it is imperative that remain miss their talents. Had they remained, that Jewish communal organizations formulate a they would have provided what sociologist long-range response to them. Charles Liebman called the "conservative elite" of their generation. Where is the sense of wider community, some critics wonder. In the search for personal perfection, is the sense of peoplehood and obligation lost?

124 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e fact of the matter is that the huge population Kelner notes when looking at his history as a of Jewish singles in their twenties and thirties young Jewish leader/researcher and describes scarcely, if ever, sets foot into Conservative and why "the distinction between funders, recipients, Reform (and some Orthodox) congregations researchers, and practitioners is misleading": except on high holidays or special family occasions. I am an alumnus of the Wexner Graduate Singles are, however, attracted to Independent Fellowship and the Jewish federation Minyanim and Partnership Minyanim. In that system's Project Otzma, as well as a sense, these innovative new congregations are former participant in !e Conversation, not really "stealing sheep" from the established a collaborative project of the Center denominational congregations. One may look for Leadership Initiatives and "e at them as performing just the opposite task— Jewish Week. I have keeping single young Jews involved with prayer taught in all three “!e distinction and other congregational activities until and if Wexner Foundation between they marry, have children, and then seek out more leadership programs funders, conventional environments that o"er religious (Graduate Fellowship, recipients, schools and other services expanded families Israel Fellowship, researchers, require. Indeed, making room in establishment and Heritage and spaces for the creative leadership and innovations Program), in the practitioners of younger leaders can bring benefits to both. Mandel Foundation's is misleading” Tact and care are necessary, of course: many an Jerusalem Fellows "Independent Minyan" has fled the pro"ered program, in the STAR chapel or social hall of a neighboring synagogue Schusterman Rabbinic (often to a local church social hall) when they felt Fellowship, and in the (correctly or incorrectly) that they were being co- alumni program of opted by a larger entity that did not share their the Bronfman Youth Fellowships in Israel.... values. [Young Jewish leadership and change are grounded] in the world of private philanthropic foundations.23 Recognizing and Promoting Interactions As Brandeis Professor Sylvia Barack Fishman !ere is much potential benefit to recognizing and conducted her own interviews for the Avi Chai supporting fluid symbiotic relationships between Young Leadership project, she was struck by how "conventional" institutions and philanthropies and often she found "innovative," "non-conformist" "innovative" Jewish leadership. !ese are not two Jewish cultural leaders housed within conventional hermetically sealed worlds—just the opposite, Jewish institutional workplaces—federations, they are deeply interwoven, as sociologist Shaul synagogues, etc. Rather than denying or ignoring

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 125 the symbiosis between the "old, conventional" and the important creative e"orts of immensely "new, innovational" expressions of Jewishness, we talented and dedicated young Jewish artists, should try to build on their beneﬁts: proximity can entrepreneurs and leaders. JDub participants promote dialogue, where there is a will to do so. have been "disproportionately young, single, and earn[ing] relatively low incomes"25—precisely the Opening—not Closing—Doors demographic that is most likely to feel alienated Many observers, especially those who devote in conventional American Jewish organizations. considerable amounts of time and energy to For many decades, American Jews have not conventional Jewish institutions, including formally a#liated with Jewish institutions until federations and defense organizations, synagogues they marry, have children, and face family needs and Jewish schools, such as educating their school-age children. Today, wonder about the value of Paradoxically, large numbers of American Jews postpone such a Jewishness based solely Jewish culture adult responsibilities well into their thirties and upon cultural connections. occupies a even their forties. As a result, those with weak more "Why should we," the Jewish ties often have little impetus to participate in prominent dialogue goes, "devote conventional Jewish activities, and few alternative place in scarce communal funds opportunities to explore their connections to maps of to supporting a large and Jewishness. meaning of loosely organized group of Cultural venues comprise a particularly large the Jewishly people who care little and segment of the Jewish identity of those with the impoverished give less to conventional least Jewish education, the fewest Jewish friends, Jewish organizations, who and/or the most alienation from the organized seemingly mention Israel Jewish community. It is a paradoxical fact that only to criticize it, who while the most Jewishly engaged actually consume do not see intermarriage as a challenge—indeed, far more Jewish culture than the least Jewishly whose rolls include a fair number of non-Jews. engaged, Jewish culture occupies a much more Why should we reward novelists who celebrate prominent place in the Jewish maps of meaning the Diaspora and have been accused of excoriating of the Jewishly impoverished. By supporting 24 Israel?" Jewish cultural venues—particularly those that Punishing young adult creators and consumers appeal to a broad spectrum of younger Jews— of these Jewish arts for what appears to some we are maintaining the vital Jewish connections observers as shallow Jewishness is quite literally of the most Jewishly at-risk population. We are tantamount to slamming closed the doors also supporting the work of some of our most through which the least Jewish enfranchised committed young leaders. are most likely to walk, as well as rejecting

126 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE We can learn from "protective" young leaders Creating Jewish Meaning in like Dara Horn. One of the most striking Europe: Emerging Adults, Cultural characteristics of these young creative Creativity, and the Jewish Future traditionalists, whether they are musicians, artists, or authors, or they work within artistic !e past decade has seen remarkable growth venues, or religious, communal or social and a revitalization of Jewish life across Europe. justice organizations that reach their peers, is New initiatives are emerging in countries across that they know that conventional, knee-jerk the continent, and people are connecting and condemnations—no matter how brilliantly reconnecting to Jewish life—culturally and polemical—will simply alienate their diverse spiritually. Social entrepreneurs are creating audiences, not change minds. !ese young leaders new realities, focusing are not afraid to speak up for what they believe on education, arts and New initiatives in—quite the contrary—they are eloquent culture and community are emerging in advocates for their values, including their ways building, and introducing countries across of understanding Jewishness. But at the same new ways of expressing the continent, time, they have learned the art of listening with Judaism, ways that are and people are an open heart and responding to the complexity inclusive, open and connecting and of the contemporary multicultural ethos. !ese accessible, reaching reconnecting to are skills worth emulating. people who were Jewish life previously una#liated with the established communities. Rather than leaving societal needs for the Jewish central institutions, social entrepreneurs are creating innovative solutions, delivering extraordinary results and improving the lives of thousands of disa"ected Jews. Young activists, even in very isolated environments and with very little, if any, institutional support, have been responsible for starting up a number of new initiatives such as a Jewish Web-Radio in Milan, a Jewish- Israeli ﬁlm festival in Amsterdam, a career advice center in Moscow, a European Jewish- Muslim dialogue conference, and a Holocaust Memorial Day in Romania.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 127 Anja Yablonskaya, 25, from Ukraine, a community model that frequently manifests the European development director for the Jewish community skill of managing contested space rather than in Kiev, has been responsible for developing the demanding instant clarity. “Breathing One Air” program. “!ere are a lot of "Israel and America, for so long the dominant Jews in Ukraine but the number of those a#liated voices of world Jewry, carved up between them with a community is small. !e old community the ideological how-to-be-a-Jew discussion in the model is not working, and it is important to me 20th century. While Israel ‘nationalized’ Jewish life, to help bring a change and a new vision of Jewish America "privatized" it. In Israel, the state managed life not only in Kiev, but all over Ukraine. I want to it for everyone. In America everyone was free to change the attitude of ‘what can I get from the make it up as they chose. For a long while these community’ to ‘what can two thriving centres conducted a dialogue of I give to the community,’” Europe as the the deaf as to who was the most likely to survive she s aid. “Young most promising into the 21st century. !e one thing they mostly people are interested place for a Jewish agreed on, though, was that Europe was a basket in something modern, revival, o"ering case, either dead or dying, a vast cemetery (or for progressive and fresh an alternative the positive amongst them – a museum) with a and so I’m trying to build model that few survivors left over from the Shoah. Both felt creative projects based frequently justiﬁed in the prescience of their forebears for on things like modern engages the leaving. Jewish life in Europe was always doomed. art, tolerance and human European skill th rights to draw intelligent "But near the end of the 20 century, three startling of managing and dynamic people to things happened. America discovered that its contested space the community.” system (or lack of it) for securing the future of the Jews wasn’t quite working as had been hoped. !e huge upheavals of Jewish continuity developments Back to the Future: Will a Jewish emerged from that. Meanwhile, the Israeli Renaissance Come from Europe? government commissioned the Shenhar Report, which found that most Israelis wouldn’t know a Clive Lawton, the founder of the UK-born Jewish teaching if it bit them on the nose. (Still not Limmud festivals initiative, perceives Europe quite sure what they’re doing about that!) But the as the most promising place for a Jewish third thing was that suddenly, in the midst of this revival. For him, Europe, rooted in its 2,000- momentary loss of self-conﬁdence on the future- year heritage, is certainly not a duplication of-the-Jews front, people noticed that Jewish life of the US and the Israeli models, for which he was not only continuing in Europe, it was actually questions the sustainability, but an alternative starting to stir."

128 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Hence, according to the Jumpstart Report writers,26 than their American counterparts, but they lack Europe is witnessing an unprecedented revival of mentoring and support systems. European Jewish contemporary Jewish life. As of spring 2010, they institutional leadership shares with the European estimated that there were 220-260 European Jewish political elites conservatism and a respect for startups currently in operation. Relative to their tradition, which in our case also means an aversion respective populations, there were, according to to risk and a resistance to emerging elites. these observers, nearly twice as many Jewish startups !e generation gap is not equally wide throughout in Europe (1 project: 6,400 people) compared with the entire continent. Coming from di"erent North America (1 project:11,000 people). historical and sociological backgrounds, European While the Connecticut-based Westbury Group27 Jewish communities di"er in terms of their shares a similar optimism regarding European acceptance in the general society, communal Jewish revival, some younger practitioners, who capabilities, and in the have community-building experience in America intensity of their Jewish European Jewish and in Israel, observe a gap between US-funded life. British Jewry, which institutional startups and the local Jewish establishment, shares many cultural leadership which doesn't back the new entrepreneurs. "My and institutional links shares a fear," says Ariel Beeri of PresentTense, "is that with other Anglo-Saxon conservatism, Jewish investment in building communal capacity Jewries, has enough self- which also in Europe has been either a reaction to the conﬁdence and cultural means an Holocaust, or a desire to "scale" the innovation anchoring to establish aversion to happening in the United States of America or Israel and support innovation risk to the Old World. What has resulted is a bifurcated incubators. community in Europe where the Old Guard holds Of the communities both the keys to the Jewish communal pot, and that deeply su"ered in the incentive to keep control. In the other corner, the Shoah, French Jewry is the only one that has the New Guard is learning from their generation succeeded to set up an extensive network of throughout the world and trying to start new communal services. Yet, this rebuilding has been ventures, but with external funding and therefore done in a centralized manner that leaves very little without the buy-in of their institutions or their key space for individual initiatives. Ezra Venture, whose community members." name refers to Joshua Venture, the US project that Yet Europe is certainly a di"erent place and one of inspired the organization, is the ﬁrst continental the major di"erences between the old continent Jewish social incubator. In order to overcome the and the new one lays in the lack of institutional lack of support for "innovative projects that meet support for grassroots initiatives. Young European new cultural educational or social needs within Jewish entrepreneurs are not less innovative the community," six young French businesspersons

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 129 decided to invest their own savings to provide seed enjoying music together. All across Europe, money and mentoring for 2-3 projects a year. Until small groups of activists have launched Jewish now, three of their ventures have succeeded in cuisine courses, Jewish art expos, and Jewish securing long-term financial backing from central film festivals. !e leading project that, thanks Jewish institutions. to its professionalism and exceptional spirit, has As a rule, startups are born to respond to needs succeeded to expand out from London to more not met by the institutions, and given the lack of than one hundred other places is the Limmud responsiveness of the institutions, young European enterprise. Jews have no other choice than to create startups !e question that challenges young Jews is how and provide themselves with their own solutions. to be part of the "cultural mélange" they see as Institutional withholding an extremely positive global trend and, at the Institutional of engagement seems to same time, keep their ethnic distinctiveness? withholding of be one of the key reasons !eir response, which is pretty smart, is to engagement for the large number launch, what we may call, Brand J. In order to is a key reason of innovative startup position themselves in the roiling activity of the for the large projects in Europe. self-identified Jewish cultural, social and political number of initiatives, they have adopted as part of their Launching Brand J innovative brand name the letter “J” or alternative easy- startups in !e challenges that to-Google common designators that echo their Europe face European Jews ethno-religious linkage – let's mention among are partly similar and others: JDub, Jewcy, JewTube, RadioJ, Jewsalsa partly di"erent from and JuMu (music and art), Jhub and JVN (social those of their American innovation) and J-Street and J-Call (politics). counterparts. !erefore, Yet, when we compare American and European the startups they create also di"er in some Jewish innovation scenes, some di"erences are respects from their American counterparts. blindingly obvious: the proliferation in North But let's start with some commonalities such America of creative spirituality and Tikkun Olam as music, dance, and fun. All over the world, grassroots projects is not echoed by a similar emerging adults listen to and make music, drive in Europe. !is gap illustrates one of the and young, international contemporary music fundamental di"erences between being an celebrates diversity and does not get along emerging Jewish adult in Europe and in America. well with ethnical and religious borders. From Rio de Janeiro to Paris, London and Berlin, Beyond the lack of institutional backing of Jazz'n'Klezmer festivals attract mixed bands startup projects, as mentioned earlier, Europe is of Jews and non-Jews playing together and di"erent from America in at least the following

130 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE interconnected dimensions: reluctance from the precisely this pathological need, shared by Jews general population to accept Jewish exceptionalism, and non-Jews alike, to question the Jewishness of the centralism of the Jewish establishment, the any known person. Artists, politicians, writers, and Shoah-centered discourse about Jews, language movie producers of Jewish ancestry are routinely diversity and lack of connectivity. Local startup questioned by the media about their relationship initiatives aim to cope with these specific needs. to Judaism, and to Israel. !is obsession positions Jewish identity as a delicate matter for European Between Assimilation and Distinctiveness Jews in general and emerging adults particularly. Whereas in America, young Jews have Concretely, Jews are faced with an impossible choice: softly integrated their Jewishness into their they are subliminally asked to assimilate while the multifaceted identity, European Jews still live social milieu doesn't allow them to do it. To cope according to a binary identity, like that of with this tragic choice, one American Jews in previous generations. Similarly of fastest-growing Jewish to the grandparental generation of today's French sarcastic blogs, Anti-Semitism American Jews, even the European Jews who named Jewpop, has chosen has justified & have very little in the way of Jewish ethnic capital, as its slogan the grotesque continues to who know little or nothing of Jewish languages, motto "!e Site that fulfill a critical written texts, and cultural expressions, have a Sees Jews Everywhere," function in the sense of being linked—positively or negatively— and as its battle cry "Join construction to their Jewish ancestry. Even if young European the Conspiracy," therefore of European Jews do not experience any impediment to their taking the anti-Semite collective educational, economic, or social mobility, their obsession ad absurdum. identities Jewishness is a key component of their identity. Refusing the isolationism As a result of the global post-modern cultural that is tempting a part of identity collage, they can, as do their American the community and the counterparts, study Talmud and eat lobster on pitiful attitude of Jews who Friday night. try (in vain) to hide their Jewishness, they decided to assume, with humor, their ethnic identity in a way Anti-Semitism has fulfilled, and continues to fulfill, that recalls Philip Roth's attitude in the sixties. !e a critical function in the construction of European initiative is so successful that some non-Jewish artists collective identities. On the old continent, Jewish ask to contribute to the blog. As Jewish humor and belonging is never a trivial issue. !e most popular the blogosphere are both known to press against word that appears beside any famous person in frontiers, the Belgian version of this blog calls itself France on Google is "Jew" and, it was only following "!e Site that Sees Goys Everywhere," and ridicules an anti-racism campaign, that Apple decided to further the anti-Semite obsession. withdraw the "Jew/non-Jew" app that answered

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 131 !e Shoah is a key reference of the post-war Europe is certainly a need for a spiritual renaissance in and this centrality casts the Jews in a troublesome Europe, but because grassroots initiatives are role in this tragedy. Young Jews don't want be jeopardized by the Jewish establishment, the reduced to this negative symbolic role. Moreover, traditionalism of the Jewish centralistic leadership, the Shoah reference is a double-edged sword and religion's bad name in Europe, we don't yet because any reference to the Holocaust reminds see alternative Independent Minyans and Havurot the Europeans of their miserable attitude, not to in Europe. !is lag between “new-age” initiatives mention murderous deeds, during this period. emerging in the US and their slow acceptance Young Jews try in di"erent ways to reject this in the more conformist world is not specifically problematic trap. One way is through literature and Jewish—we observe a similar delay with other art. In this regard, the graphic novel We Will Not religions too—and, not surprisingly, London is the Go to Auschwitz tells the story of third generation first place in Europe where alternative Minyans survivors that decided to “tour” the thousand and new communities initiatives, such as the years of Jewish life in Poland, but deliberately avoid Assif's melodic traditional egalitarian community visiting Second World War sites. and the "Shabbat Resouled" funk band, have begun emerging. Centralism and conservatism of the Jewish establishment Language diversity and the need to We mentioned earlier interconnect isolated communities !e Internet has that very little funding is !e Internet has helped isolated English- helped isolated available for innovation speaking or Hebrew-speaking Jews to connect English- in the Jewish community themselves to the "global shtetl." However, in speaking and that young adults Europe, isolation comes along with the diversity or Hebrew- are rarely integrated in of languages and an inability to produce speaking Jews the leadership. !is is high-quality Jewish educational materials. An to connect particularly true in the interesting way to confront these constraints themselves to religious domain where, is Jewish European Learning Experience Dot. the “Global even if very few Jews are net. (JELED) Developed through a joint e"ort Shtetl” religiously observant, of several small communities, this e-learning the central rabbinates project aims to create curricular materials, representing entire ideas, and opportunities for interaction, and communities are under is made available in ‘uncommon’ languages, the exclusive control of Orthodox authorities. such as Dutch, German and Finnish. If children Despite this, Reform communities are growing, can play games, solve puzzles and find coloring particularly in the Protestant countries. !ere books and other activities on Jewish topics, the

132 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE forum enables their parents and teachers to be connectivity is a matter of survival, and young in contact with peers from other communities, adults who want to keep their Jewishness are the both national and international. Many startups ones who invent creative festivals and hospitality aim at gathering and connecting young adults traveling experiences to meet fellow Europeans from tiny communities who do not have the with Jewish backgrounds. If strategic thinkers and opportunity to experience Jewishness in their young adults alike believe that we should better use immediate environment. the existing real estate and Shoah reparations to fund For small isolated communities lacking critical new initiatives, the central institutions are reluctant to demographic mass, physical and virtual make such decisions.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 133 Notes

1 Story + Torah = Storah. 9 Riv-Ellen Prell, "!e Havurah Movement: Prayer and Community in American Judaism" (1989). 2 Susie Fishbein, "Kosher By Design" (New York: Artscroll/ Shaar Press, 2003). 10 Richard Siegel, Michael Strassfeld, and Sharon Strassfeld, "!e First Jewish Catalog: A Do-It-Yourself Kit" 3 An e-ﬂyer advertisement, “Jewishlicious Music Spotlight: (1965). Aharit Hayamim,” on Tuesday, February 17, advertised the concert in the following way: “Aharit Hayamim is Israel’s #1 11 Marshall Sklare, "!e Greening of Judaism," Festival Band. Aharit’s Israeli reggae, dub and ska groove and Commentary 58 (No. 6), December 1974: 51-57 (rpt. sensibility is rooted in a longing for peace and love of Zion Marshall Sklare, Observing America's Jews, Waltham, they share with their Rastafarian Brethren….!ey embody MA.: Brandeis University Press/ University Press of New the Grateful Dead and Bob Marley rolled into one.” (Adam England, 1993, pp. 74-86). S., Music Director: [email protected]). 12 Robert Wuthnow, After the Baby Boomers: How 4 Matthew Ackerman, "Shed No Tears for the Death of Twenty- and "irty-Somethings Are Shaping the Future JDUB," posted July 14, 2011, www.commentarymagazine. of American Religion (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton com. University Press, 2007). 5 Jacob Berkman, "Music Dies for JDub Records: Legacy 13 Steven M. Cohen, "Expressive, Progressive, and of Groundbreaking Jewish Label Lives On," July 20, 2011, Protective: !ree Impulses for Nonestablishment comments posted following article, "Israeli Jew," http:// Organizing among Young Jews Today," Wertheimer, ed., forward.com/articles. "e New Leaders, op. cit., pp. 84-111. 6 David A.M. Wilensky, "JDub Records, a music video 14 See: Jay L. Halio and Ben Siegel, eds., Turning Up the Flame: eulogy," posted July 13, 2011, http://blog.newvoices.org. Philip Roth’s Later Novels, (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); Janet Handler Burstein, Telling the Little Secrets: 7 Data are drawn primarily from extensive interview American Jewish Writing Since the 1980s, (Madison, Wisconsin: and focus group data from the diverse studies in the !e University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Lois E. Rubin, ed., forthcoming volume, "!e New Jewish Leaders: Reshaping Connections and Collisions: Identities in Contemporary Jewish- the American Jewish Landscape," edited by Jack American Women’s Writing, (Newark: University of Delaware Wertheimer (based on research funded by the Avi Chai Press, 2005); Paul Zakrewski, ed., Lost Tribe: Jewish Fiction Foundation), and also incorporate recent social scientiﬁc from the Edge, (New York: HarperCollins/ Perennial, 2003). studies of younger American Jews, including a 2010 Survey of New Jewish Initiatives in North America (Jumpstart, 15 Planet of the Jews novels include such very di"erent !e Natan Fund, and !e Samuel Bronfman Foundation), works as Nathan Englander’s "e Ministry of Special Cases and a study published by the Jewish Community Center (2007), Judith Katz’s "e Escape Artist (1997), and Rivka Association (JCCA) and Berman Jewish Policy Archive at Galchen’s Atmospheric Disturbances (2008), each of which NYU Wagner, among other sources. brings its Jews to Argentina. Jews shiver in Siberia in Anya Ulinich’s Petropolis (2007) and end up in Alaska in Michael 8 Sylvia Barack Fishman, "!e Way Into the Varieties of Chabon’s "e Yiddish Policeman’s Union (2008) and Amy Jewishness" (Woodstock: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2007), Bloom’s Away (2008). Sephardic Jewish culture and the 213-215. dislocation of Jews in Muslim, Arab or North African lands

134 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE are depicted in novels such as Dalia Sofer’s "e Septembers and Culture (!ree Volumes) Blackwell, Oxford, 1996). of Shiraz (2007) and Gina Nahai’s Cry of the Peacock (1991), 23 Shaul Kelner, "In Its Own Image: Independent echoing a cornucopia of celebrated pieces of memoir Philanthropy and the Cultivation of Young Jewish literature portraying similar subject and societies. Other Leadership," in Wertheimer, New Jewish Leaders, op. cit., novels, such as Gary Shteyngart’s Absurdistan (2006) and pp. 261-321, p. 256. Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated (2002), and Allen Ho"man’s strange Small Worlds (1996) and 24 Ruth Wisse, “Slap Shtick. !e Yiddish Policeman’s Big League Dreams (1997), tell unfamiliar stories about Union" Commentary Magazine, 124, no. 1 (July/August, European Jews, recounting eerie travels that, whether they 2007): 73–77. proceed through familiar or unfamiliar countries of origin, 25 Cohen, "Expressive, Progressive, and Protective," op.cit, are painted with grotesque details distant in every way p. 105. from the warm hominess of “Fiddler on the Roof.” 26 www.jewishecosystem.org/euro2010/, p.7. 16 2010 Survey of New Jewish Initiatives in North 27 www.compasseurope.org/about-compass.php. America, op.cit. !is classiﬁcation system was developed by Steven M. Cohen and Dasee Berkowitz (2009). 17 Elie Kaunfer. Empowered Judaism: What Independent Minyanim Can Teach Us (Woodstock: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2010), 95. 18 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What that Says About Race in America. (New Brunswick, N.J. and London: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 19 Mary C. Waters, "Optional Ethnicities – For Whites Only?" In Silvia Pedraza and Ruben G. Rumbaut eds. Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in America. (Belmont Ca.:Wadsworth 1996) p. 444-54. Mary C. Water, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1990. 20 Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Post- Modernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1997) See Annual Assessment 2010. 21 !eda Skocpol, "Recent Transformation of Civic Life", in !eda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina eds., Civic Engagement in American Life, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998). !eda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, (Norman, Oklahoma, U. of Oklahoma Press, 2003). 22 Manuel Castells, "e Information Age: Economy, Society

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 135

PART 4

Developments in Israel

Analysis: A New 7 Political Landscape

On May 8, 2012 Israelis awoke to a new political Israeli politics: Shaul Mofaz, whose party, Kadima, landscape: a national unity government based on was at risk of being trounced under his leadership; one of the widest coalitions in the country's history, Ehud Barak, whose Independence Party (that had with 94 of the 120 Knesset members (78 percent of split from Labor) was hovering too close to the the total). !ey had gone to sleep the night before electoral threshold, the minimum percentage of with the bill to dissolve the Knesset having passed votes needed to gain Knesset representation; and its first reading, and with agreement among the Binyamin Netanyahu, who despite his popularity parties to hold elections on September 4, 2012. in the polls, faced a number of di#cult tests before !e Knesset's decision to dissolve itself and hold the elections and who, only a day earlier, had early general elections was not triggered by political been surprised at a meeting of his party's central constraints. Netanyahu's government enjoyed a committee by the strength of the ideological stable majority and could have remained in power right and of settler activists in Likud. even without broadening the coalition. However, An analysis of the dramatic changes first requires the decision to bring the elections forward should an understanding of the factors that brought not have come as a surprise to anybody in Israel's Netanyahu to opt for early elections: political arena. Even though the prime minister a) !ere was concern within the prime minister's had promised to hold the elections at the end political circle that the re-election of Barak of the Knesset's legal term in late fall 2013, he Obama in November would result in an nevertheless made all of the preparations needed attempt by his administration to interfere in to enable him to join any initiative to hold early Israel's internal politics. Political insiders in elections at a time convenient to him. !ese steps Israel believe that something similar occurred also forced the rest of the political establishment under the elder George Bush, against Yitzchak to make similar preparations. Shamir during the 1992 election campaign, !e 180 degree turn that occurred between May 7 and under Bill Clinton against Binyamin and 8 was made possible mainly by a convergence Netanyahu himself in 1999. of interests among three of the central figures of

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 139 b) !e overt attacks by the former heads of the In fact, despite the prime minister's concerns about Mossad and the Shin Bet on the diplomatic- the reaction of the right within his own party, and security leadership over the handling of Iran, of Avigdor Lieberman who is competing for the and the emergence of the Iranian threat as a same base of support, Netanyahu remained strong subject for public debate, demanded for the enough to advance almost any policy or initiative. prime minister a renewed mandate before !is strength was, to a large degree, based on the engaging in any military initiative. weakness of his opponents in the Knesset, who c) Elections had to be held early enough to had not managed to produce a candidate with leave a window for a strike against Iran a chance of succeeding him or of imposing a before the US elections in November, in di"erent agenda. the event that diplomatic Tzipi Livni, until last month leader of the All the Zionist and economic e"orts to opposition, paid a personal political price for the parties except achieve a settlement with situation that had developed. !is once-promising Meretz Tehran failed. leader, whose 2009 campaign — "Tzipi or Bibi" — declared they d) T h e s h o r t achieved impressive electoral results (28 seats for would p o l i t i c a l a n d l e g a l her Kadima Party to 27 for Likud), was unable to not rule timetable for legislation assemble a coalition. Her success at the ballot box out joining a dealing with "sharing the proved to be worthless since the votes she received Netanyahu-led burden" and army service came mainly from the left bloc. !is in contrast to government in by ultra-Orthodox Jews the previous elections held in March 2006, when the future following the Supreme Kadima leader Ehud Olmert drew his power from Court's decision to strike the ailing Ariel Sharon's popularity, which enabled down the Tal Law. the party to win signiﬁcant support from the right bloc. Livni also proved unable to rally the e) Introducing the two-year budget for 2013- troops in opposition, neither within her own party 14 that may require painful cuts as a result (indeed, Shaul Mofaz defeated her by a substantial of the deﬁcit's growth, a possible decline in margin in the Kadima leadership elections) nor in economic growth, urgent security needs, leading an active opposition that o"ered a credible the pressure of the social protest movement, alternative to the government. and the economic crisis in Europe. !e victory of former journalist Shelly Yachimovich, f) While the rival parties were prepared for who was elected Labor leader and who has earned elections on a technical level, they did not respect for her work as a member of the Knesset present a serious threat to a Netanyahu/ and her success in rehabilitating the party's Likud victory, and early elections did not standing, is not yet considered a viable candidate pose an electoral risk. for prime minister.

140 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE A convergence of interests against early elections Under Sharon and Peres, Kadima was considered also developed within the current coalition: a party capable of capturing support from both the split in the Labor Party that left Barak with Likud and Labor. !eir e"ective departure from a shrinking political horizon; the cloud of the the political scene cast doubt over the party's police investigations and threat of indictment survival in its original form. Even though Livni lost that have accompanied Foreign Minister Avigdor her support within the party itself, she, at least Lieberman's tenure; the threat to Shas leader Eli spoke to Kadima's public. Livni is "one of them" Yishai from his predecessor Arieh Deri, who spent in a way that Mofaz is not, hence the erosion of years in jail for corruption and who has announced his leadership and of Kadima's strength, especially his intention to return to the political arena; and following Livni's departure. the lack of interest among the other coalition Into the liberal center, too, partners in early elections. came Yair Lapid, who has Yair Lapid, In all the latest opinion polls, Netanyahu has led natural intelligence and who lacks the other contenders by a substantial margin. the charm of a television diplomatic !is situation led most of the Zionist parties, personality, but lacks and political with the exception of Meretz, to declare that they diplomatic and political experiance, would not rule out joining a Likud-led coalition. experience. On the is competing Moreover, Netanyahu's increased strength and the declarative level, he claims for the lead he built over his rivals eroded the potential for to be fighting corruption same voters a shift in the "blocking alliance"—of the kind that and nepotism, and to as Kadima has in the past forced a change in government— support liberal values. But could emerge within the Knesset. the by-laws he set out for Despite his experience as a former vice-prime his own party state that minister, minister of defense and army chief of sta", he cannot be removed which would seem to qualify him to run for prime as its head until 2020, while the council he set up minister, Shaul Mofaz was not seen by the public to govern the party includes his wife, his son, his as a serious alternative to Netanyahu. !is can be personal trainer and others who were appointed explained, among other reasons, by his decision to secure his own position. At this stage, he is not a when Kadima was founded to leave the Likud at contender and does not pretend to be a candidate the last minute for the padded bandwagon of Ariel for prime minister. Sharon. !is came after he publically committed But if Mofaz and Barak's political reasons for to stay in Likud, and his decision cut his ties with delaying elections are clear, why did Netanyahu his natural base in the center-right of the political join the e"ort to establish a broad coalition? In map, at a time when Kadima captured the liberal the first briefing Netanyahu held with Mofaz in center-left position. his role as leader of the opposition, Mofaz raised

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 141 the idea of joining the coalition. Netanyahu, who the prime minister: the striking down of the Tal Law, had rejected a similar o"er from Barak in 1998 which had ensured that relations with the ultra- only to be trounced in elections, tasked one of Orthodox remained calm; and the relocation of the his advisers with checking whether there was settlement of Migron from its present site. any substance to Mofaz's overture which, to say A broad coalition—of the kind that Netanyahu the least, did not inspire great confidence in the succeeded in establishing—is likely to make it prime minister. significantly easier for him to overcome these Concurrent with the ongoing election hurdles, to contain the right wing of the Likud preparations, then, a quiet exploration began and to turn Netanyahu into a leader on a national among the political advisers, who were also scale, with a wide base of support. He is also likely joined by Barak's. !ese to complete his entire term and become—other !e broad conversations, which than David Ben-Gurion—the prime minister with coalition lasted almost two weeks, the most years of service. strengthens did not rule out a widening And yet, the central factor in his decision is likely Netanyahu's of the coalition. However, to have been Iran: ability to two significant events a) Netanyahu as head of a national unity initiate new occurred on the eve of coalition is not the same Netanyahu heading policies in Netanyahu's decision in a coalition of the right. Assessments are that various areas this regard: this change would not only strengthen him a) At the Likud domestically but make it much more di#cult Central Committee for the Obama administration, assuming the meeting it became president is re-elected, to interfere openly in apparent to the prime internal Israeli politics. minister that the strengthening of the right wing within his b) !e absence of elections in September widens party, and of the settler representatives, the range of options available with regard risked forcing him to stand at the head of a to Iran should diplomatic negotiations and Likud list that would make it very di#cult economic sanctions fail to halt Iran's nuclear for him to function e"ectively after the program. elections, even if he were to win as expected. c) Bringing one more former minister of defense b) !e Supreme Court decision to demolish a and army chief of sta" into the decision- neighborhood in the settlement of Beit El, making circle significantly strengthens the which increased pressure on Netanyahu. Netanyahu government against criticism of his government's judgment in the In addition to these, two other tests already faced diplomatic-security arena.

142 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e agreement between Netanyahu and Mofaz !e Labor leader, Yachimovich, was on the ascent focuses on cooperation on three levels: a) and, at first glance, it appears that she is among advancing the peace initiative with the Palestinians; those harmed by the cancellation of early elections. b) enacting new legislation dealing with the issue But it is likely that, in the long term, she will benefit of army service and employment among the from the move. As leader of the opposition, she Haredim; and c) changing the electoral system. may well be able to rally behind her the majority of !ese are three "landmines" that Israeli society and those voters who oppose the new broad coalition its leaders have not succeeded in disarming in the and emerge as the main alternative. past. Yair Lapid is in a far less comfortable position: a Solving these three issues cannot be taken for year-and-a-half outside the political arena could granted even with the new coalition, and e"orts completely erode his to deal with them are likely to bring additional chances. If Tzipi Livni Even if the changes in the political landscape, and the returns to the arena with new broad dismantling of old political partnerships. a few disa"ected Kadima coalition narrows MKs, she will compete for somewhat, the same political turf as Netanyahu's ttt Lapid and further erode ability to initiate his position. It is true that new policy Lapid has said that he is It is too early to tell where Netanyahu is heading. directions has not interested in bringing Even if the new broad coalition narrows somewhat, been strengthened known politicians into his ability to initiate new policy directions in his party. But given the various areas has been strengthened considerably. shifting nature of Israeli politics, the possibility that !e move that he led has placed him in an almost he could change his mind cannot be ruled out, and unassailable position. Ehud Barak also stabilized a Livni-Lapid union would likely yield respectable his position for at least another year, enabling him electoral dividends. to better prepare for elections when they do come. As of now, Kadima's accession to the coalition !e significance of the move for Mofaz is less significantly reduces the bargaining power of clear. He gained time, but his credibility has been the religious parties, of Yisrael Beiteinu, and of dented: from having been Netanyahu's bitterest the entire right wing, that is likely to oppose critic, he has now become his partner. Only e"orts to advance a diplomatic initiative with substantial accomplishments during his time in the Palestinians and the Arab states. Such an government—or, alternatively, his rejoining Likud initiative is likely to improve Israel's standing with Netanyahu's support—are likely to improve with the West, and thereby, provide Israel with his political standing. greater freedom of action vis-$-vis Iran.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 143

New Proposed Knesset Bills 8 and Israeli Democracy

Major bills submitted in the Knesset in the past year that have stirred controversy:

t Nakba Bill t Media Defamation or In its original form, the bill proposed to Anti-Libel Bill criminalize the practice of marking Israel’s !e bill proposes to increase six-fold the Independence Day as a day of mourning. It present limit on compensation for libelous was passed into law by the Knesset in March reports. It passed ﬁrst reading in the Knesset 2011 in a much amended form, which in November 2011. dropped the criminal sanction. t Bill regarding foreign government t Anti-Boycott Bill funding of NGOs In its original version, the bill proposed to Originally submitted in the form of two bills, make calls for boycott against Israel and it seeks to limit and tax foreign government Jewish settlements in the occupied territories funding of Israeli NGOs. To date, discussions a criminal o"ense. It was passed into law by on the NGO bill have been frozen by Prime the Knesset in July 2011, but the criminal Minister Netanyahu. sanction was dropped, though the law still t Bill regarding the vetting of allows punitive damages. A petition against Supreme Court justices by a Knesset the law has been submitted to the Supreme committee Court. !e bill was dropped in November 2011, after being slammed by Prime Minister Netanyahu.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 145 t Bill aiming at restricting the right of t Basic Law 15: Legislation petition before the Supreme Court !e new proposed legislation allows that !e bill was unanimously voted down by only the High Court of Justice (HCJ), the Ministerial Committee on Legislation in composed in this instance of a panel of November 2011. nine justices1, has the power of judicial t Bar Association bill review. !e proposed legislation would also enable a Knesset majority of 65 !e bill proposes to change the composition MKs (out of 120) to temporarily (for of the committee that nominates judges for a ﬁve-year period subject to extension) the Supreme Court, giving the ruling coalition override such decisions. A legal increasing representation. It was frozen in memorandum describing the proposed January 2012 by decision of Prime Minister law was distributed by the Ministry of Netanyahu, after sharp criticisms by some Justice in April 2012. Likud ministers and the attorney general.

!e past year has been marked by strong system emerged and developed under extremely preoccupation, both in Israel and abroad, adverse conditions, which is remarkable in itself, with a string of bills sponsored in the Israeli and is a strong counter-indication to the demise parliament by the nationalist right-wing party, of democracy today. !e claims of the imminent Yisrael Beiteinu, of Foreign Minister Avigdor collapse of Israeli democracy are not new, and Lieberman and by members of Prime Minister assaults on democratic and liberal values have Netanyahu’s center-right Likud party as well been successfully repelled in the past. !e as some lawmakers from Tzipi Livni’s centrist common assessment and sense is that the Israeli Kadima party. !e bills have stirred intense Supreme Court will quash any legislation that controversy, and claims abound that they are is contrary to democratic and liberal norms. illiberal and infringe the fundamental right of Indeed, even before being challenged in front freedom of expression and the independence of of the Supreme Court, the new proposed bills the judiciary. Both in Israel and in the Western initiated in the past year highlighted above were in media, one increasingly hears that Israeli fact frozen, dropped, or severely amended. !ese democracy is deteriorating. outcomes occured due to the legislative process in It is extremely unlikely, however, that the current Israel, and to the political opposition. assault on liberal rights and freedoms will Some of the legislative proposals were dubious succeed, and that Israeli democracy will su"er from the viewpoint of liberal democratic norms, substantial erosion. Israel’s liberal democratic and several of them clearly violated them. !ey

146 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE seemed to be attacking the legitimacy of certain ministers and the attorney general. !e second views and to be targeting left-wing organizations series of controversial bills seeks to limit and tax and individuals, the fundamental right to foreign government funding of Israeli NGOs. To freedom of expression and the general principle date, discussions on the NGO legislative proposals of equality and non-discrimination. have been frozen by Prime Minister Netanyahu. One of the ﬁrst contentious legislative proposals !e introduction of these bills now follows several was the so-called "Nakba" bill, which proposed socio-demographic shifts that have a"ected Israeli to criminalize the practice of marking Israel’s democratic culture in the past two decades. First, Independence Day as a day of mourning. It was the ultra-Orthodox population has grown more passed into law by the Knesset in March 2011 in a than threefold since 1990, from three percent of much amended form, which dropped the provision the total population to for criminal sanctions. Similarly, the ‘Anti-Boycott’ over ten percent today. !e likelihood bill, which initially sought to make calls for boycott It is among the Haredim of substantial against Israel and Jewish settlements in the that commitment to civil erosion occupied territories a criminal o"ense, was passed equality and support of of Israel’s into law by the Knesset in July 2011 in a modiﬁed freedom of expression democracy is version, which abandoned criminal sanctions, is the lowest.2 Second, extremely low though it still allows a legal avenue to pursue immigrants from the punitive damages. In the past several months, two former Soviet Union, who series of Knesset bills have generated particularly arrived in the past two tumultuous discussions, both within Israel and decades, today represent overseas. One bill proposed that prospective almost 20 percent of Israeli candidates for Israel’s Supreme Court be vetted citizens. Although Russian by a Knesset committee, but it was dropped in immigrants are gradually November 2011, after being slammed by Prime becoming more similar in their views to the general Minister Netanyahu. Another bill, aimed at Jewish public in Israel, they are still relatively new to restricting the right of petition before the Supreme democratic norms and politics.3 !ird, these socio- Court, was unanimously voted down by the demographic shifts a"ect not only the populace, Ministerial Committee on Legislation in November but political elites as well. !e controversial bills 2011. A third bill, the so-called "Bar Association" initiated in the past year have been proposed by bill, would have changed the composition of the lawmakers who are not only responding to their committee that appoints judges, giving the ruling constituencies’ expectations but who also believe coalition increased representation. It was frozen that the delicate balance between nationalist and in January 2012 by decision of Prime Minister liberal values has tilted too far to one side. For Netanyahu, after sharp criticism of some Likud example, in the view of some segments of Israeli

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 147 society, certain domestic NGOs have exploited the held that the two Basic Laws passed in 1992 had openness of Israeli society to further an anti-Israel “supra-legislative constitutional status” and that, agenda, both within Israel and abroad in such accordingly, the Court may strike down Knesset forums as the United Nations and the international legislation violating the rights enshrined in the two media. !e bill against foreign government Basic Laws4. !e Court broadened judicial review funding of Israeli NGOs is regarded by some as a to all twelve Basic Laws in the 2003 Herut case5. legitimate law that merely seeks to prevent foreign But most significantly, the Israeli Supreme Court countries from supporting such organizations has developed a particularly active approach to and interfering in Israel’s internal a"airs. It is not judicial review, intervening quickly and on a myriad dissimilar to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of issues at a constitutional level, in contrast to the (FARA) in the US, which tradition of prudentialism that has historically requires any organization characterized the US Supreme Court.6 In the past whose activities are decades, In the past decades, the activist policies of the supported by foreign the activist Court have generated opposition from across funding and which act in a policies of the political spectrum, and not only from right- political or quasi-political the Court wing circles as is often assumed—in fact Likud capacity to register as a have generated Prime Minister Menachem Begin was one of the foreign agent and make opposition strongest supporters of the Court and of Judge periodic public disclosure from across Aharon Barak, while the opposite was true for Labor of its relationship with the political Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. But opposition to foreign donors. spectrum the Court’s judicial activism has increased in the !e perceived need by last several years, including within mainstream some lawmakers to alter legal academic circles. !us, the controversial bills the balance between initiated in the past year in the Knesset are part of national needs and liberal values through this dynamic of opposition to the Court. Although, legislation, including legislation aimed at the in the 1990s, the most vocal opponents of the Court composition and powers of the Court, also were the ultra-Orthodox and nationalist factions, reflects a sense among some circles of the Israeli who rejected its interventionism in matters either public and leadership that the Supreme Court has pertaining to religious issues or to the rights of non- overstepped its role and has allowed, under the Jews, opposition to the Court’s judicial activism has rubric of protecting individual rights, a minority to spread among wide sections of the Israeli public in rule over the majority. A ‘constitutional revolution’ the last decade, as a result of controversial rulings has occurred in Israel over the past two decades. on social and defense matters. Although the In the landmark 1995 Mizrahi case the Supreme Supreme Court still outpolls other courts in public’s Court, presided over by Justice Aharon Barak, confidence, in 2010 only 56 percent of the general

148 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Jewish public—Jewish citizens excluding Haredim involved observers argue that the proposed 65- and settlers—retained great faith in the Supreme vote threshold is too low for them to support Court, compared to 80 percent in 2000.7 Growing the bill. !ose seeking an amended version argue opposition to the judicial activism of the Court is that legislation to override the Court might be one of the main factors contributing to this steep necessary, but only in cases when there is a more decline.8 considerable Knesset majority. !ere are also many In April 2012 the most serious attempt at changing MKs who oppose any such remedy, and would the balance of powers between the Israeli High vote to defeat Neeman's proposal. Court of Justice and the Knesset was introduced Socio-demographic shifts and the controversy by Justice Minister Yaacov Neeman. !e proposed over the Supreme Court’s judicial activism new Basic Law, a 15th, would o#cially acknowledge (paralleling, to a large HCJ’s role in judging the constitutionality of extent, controversies in Whether this laws, but would give the Knesset the power to the United States over new Basic temporarily override court decisions (with a 65 judicial activism) do not Law can MK majority vote). Like all proposed legislation portend the demise of pass the related to the Israeli courts, this instantly became Israeli democracy itself. Knesset at a matter of heated debate. Supporters claim that !e presence of strong this time such an acknowledgment of the Court's power is a forces committed to is far de-facto acknowledgment that Israel's Basic Laws liberal democratic values from certain function very similarly to an o#cial constitution, from the founding years others argue that giving the Knesset the power to of the State of Israel, circumvent Court decisions is hazardous to Israel's despite conditions liberal democracy. !e most serious criticism of extremely inhospitable the proposed legislation, so far, has come from to embedding liberal incoming Chief Justice Asher Grunis. Grunis democracy, is a strong counter-indication to publicly complained that it was inappropriate to the demise of democracy today. !e emergence propose such a momentous law without consulting and development of democracy in Israel was a the Court’s justices. remarkable achievement. It requires no e"ort for Whether this new Basic Law bill can pass the peaceful and prosperous West European countries, Knesset at this time is far from certain. !ere are such as Denmark or Norway, to maintain liberal members of the coalition who oppose some of democracy within societies imbued for generations the proposed bill’s language and/or some of its with a democratic political culture and which details—the most contentious debate relates remain free of violent conﬂict or its prospect. to the number of Knesset members required to Israel came into being and developed under override a Court ruling. More than a handful of conditions and in an environment decidedly

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 149 adverse to liberal democracy. And yet, it became 1977, it has been claimed repeatedly that Israel’s over the years more of a liberal democracy— democracy is eroding and that some sort of clerical rather than less, as often alleged. !e first and fascism is taking shape. Many warnings were voiced foremost impediment to liberal democracy in in the late 1970s and 1980s with the ascension to Israel has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even in power of the Likud under the leadership of Prime longstanding democracies, violent conflicts or Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. severe threats to the state’s stability and security !e rhetoric of ‘democracy in danger’ was heard are likely to lower democratic standards during well into the 90s. And yet, while many opponents the time these pressures prevail. But in Israel the to the policies of the Israeli right were predicting state of emergency is chronic and open-ended. the imminent collapse of Israeli democracy, the Moreover, the conflict country was in fact undergoing an extensive has important spill-out process of liberalization. Israeli democracy is not !e first e"ects on Israeli society a formal democracy, but rather, a substantive and foremost itself. It shapes, and one. Today, unlike before 1977, the ruling party or impediment certainly makes even coalition in Israel is well aware that it can be voted to liberal more of a challenge the out of power in the next election. !e power of the democracy in relationship between Knesset as well as the judiciary—first and foremost Israel has the Jewish majority the Supreme Court, but also the attorney general — been the and the Arab minority, has grown much stronger vis-à-vis the executive Arab-Israeli which overwhelmingly branch. Civil society and the media are far more conflict regards itself as part of developed, vibrant, and influential. Freedom of the Palestinian people. expression is outstanding, including on issues as Furthermore, the sensitive as security. !ere is every freedom to composition of Israeli vilify not only the Israeli government and its policy society militates against the development of a but also the state and its ideology. In fact, every liberal democracy no less than the unremitting Zionist sacred cow is today drawn and quartered — Arab-Israeli conflict. !e large majority of Israel’s particularly so in the academy, media and in Jewish population originally emigrated from the arts. !is is not to say that the past decades countries deprived of any democratic political have been free from any assault on freedom of culture, and in many cases, characterized by expression and democracy. During this period, a rather autocratic one. As for the large Arab too, nationalistic rhetoric abounded; at its worst minority in Israel, it has no other experience of it was racist and fascist. Illiberal bills were often democracy than Israeli democracy itself. submitted to the Israeli parliament and on some History also reveals that claims of the imminent occasions, undemocratic administrative decisions demise of Israeli democracy are not new. Since and draconian laws were adopted.

150 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE But past assaults on democracy by the executive that has ordered the government to dismantle and legislative powers have been repelled, chiefly the Ulpana settlement in Beit El, and has recently owing to the intervention of the Israeli Supreme announced one of the most significant decisions in Court. Even long before the "constitutional the Court's history protecting the rights of women revolution," the Supreme Court was vigilant in from discrimination in pay in the workplace. Chief protecting liberal democratic norms through Justice Grunis also has been zealous in defending narrowing interpretations of laws limiting those the prerogatives of the Court in the face of the rights and freedoms. For example, according to proposed Ne'eman Basic Law. !e appointment, the terms of a 1985 amendment to the Basic Laws, in early January, of four new Supreme Court candidates that reject Israel’s right to exist as the judges to replace retiring justices represents, state of the Jewish People, or negate its democratic taken as a whole, a fair nature, or incite to racism, can be prevented from cross-section of Israeli !e appointment participating in Knesset elections. !e legislation society and ideologies, of four new allowed for the disqualification in 1988 by the which may a"ect the justices, taken Central Elections Committee of the extreme-right perception of the Court as a whole, wing Kach party, led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, a as more balanced in the represents a fair decision that was upheld by the Supreme Court. eyes of the public.10 Still, cross-section of But at the same time, the Supreme Court opposed any such changes in the Israeli society all attempts to disqualify Arab parties on the composition of the Court grounds that they oppose Israel’s Jewish character. are not likely to drastically It has overturned in 1988, and then again in 2003 alter the historical role of and most recently in 2009, all decisions to ban the Court as guardian of Arab parties9. democratic values.11 If the past is any indication, the Supreme Court Even prior to Supreme Court intervention, the will strike down today, as well, any legislation that controversial bills can be fully expected to be violates democratic values. It will either interpret it adopted in a considerably changed form—if they narrowly in a way that does not violate democratic are adopted at all. !e multiple stages of the principles, or quash it altogether. Today the Court’s legislative process in Israel, as in other parliamentary ability to strike down such legislation through the democracies, ensure that there is often a great power of judicial review is far stronger. di"erence between what is originally submitted In February 2012, Chief Justice Beinish retired and and what is eventually passed. A bill that violates was replaced by Chief Justice Asher Grunis who freedom of expression as originally submitted may was known for his opposition to the Court's judicial well end up not violating it as adopted. And indeed, activism. Yet, since ascending to the High Court, while no intervention of the Supreme Court has Chief Justice Grunis has overseen a Court which yet taken place, many of the controversial bills have

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 151 already been modified in the course of the various very doubtful. In any case, a petition against the stages of the legislative process, if not abandoned law has been submitted to the Supreme Court for altogether. Attorney General Weinstein sent a review. letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding the Second, in the current political climate it is unclear bill seeking to limit and tax foreign government whether elected representatives who initiated the funding of NGOs, in which he warned him that controversial bills in fact intend for them to pass in the proposed legislation was unconstitutional and their original form. In the past months and years, that he would not be able to defend it should it be anger has grown among the Israeli public against passed into law and challenged before the Supreme the fringes of the left that have, for example, Court. To date, discussions on the NGO bill have cooperated with the UN Goldstone report, or been frozen by the Israeli against the extreme leftist organizations calling prime minister. As for the Netanyahu came for a boycott against Israel or collecting evidence two most controversial out strongly against Israeli o#cers. Some on the Israeli right Supreme Court bills, it against the bill on have, therefore, decided that they should at least seems that neither of them vetting Supreme appear to be doing something to fend o" these will be passed into law, Court justices radical leftist trends. Proposers (and supporters) at least in their original in the Knesset: of the bills claim that there is an urgent need to form. Prime Minister “!ere will not establish a better balance between liberal and Netanyahu has come out be such a law in nationalist values. But submitting draconian bills is strongly against the bill a government of also often merely a political tactic intended to score on vetting Supreme Court which I am public opinion points, rather than to bring about justices in the Knesset, the head" the changes these bills propose. Lawmakers initiate and declared that “!ere the bills with an obvious desire to be noticed by will not be such a law the public. Such bills also participate in the ‘game’ 12 in a government of which I am the head.” !e of mutual vilification played by both the Israeli second bill, seeking to limit the right of petition right and the Israeli left. While such legislative before the Supreme Court, has been unanimously demonstrations are a negative contribution to voted down by the Ministerial Committee on Israeli public life, this does not necessarily mean Legislation. !e anti-boycott bill has been adopted that that there is a serious intention to carry the after the criminal sanctions, originally proposed, bill all the way to the statute book as proposed. were dropped, though the law still allows legal petition for punitive damages. It is, indeed, highly Even if the controversial bills do not pose a risk problematic from the viewpoint of freedom of of destroying Israeli democracy, the political expression. Whether an Israeli court would be machinations cause considerable damage to Israel. likely to award punitive damages in such cases is !ey cause internal damage to Israeli politics and democratic culture. Specifically, the legislative

152 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE process is discredited. Legislation is a serious Israel is, on average, considerably more moderate, process and one should never propose a bill that in its attitude toward the state, than its political is merely a political demonstration – especially if leadership and its vocal intellectual elite. it is a demonstration of intolerance and contempt Furthermore, the controversial bills and the for liberal values. !e ‘game’ of mutual vilification illiberal rhetoric surrounding them play into and demonization between the Israeli left and the the hands of Israel's political adversaries. Many Israeli right poisons the public atmosphere. At persons and organizations overseas welcome present, parts of the right (unfortunately, not just any chance to claim that Israel is only a ‘pseudo- the extreme right) are clearly leading the way, but democracy’; the recent legislative fury provides left-wing contributions to this game should not be them with ammunition. Apart from the ‘usual discounted. suspects’ who are Moreover, the recent controversial bills cause habitually hostile to Israel, !e recent considerable damage to Israel's reputation some of Israel's strong controversial abroad —not just to its reputation as a democracy, supporters and defenders bills cause but also to its image as a strong and successful have also spoken out and considerable country. It conveys the impression that Israel is expressed concern. US damage a torn state and society, perhaps on the verge of Secretary of State Hillary to Israel’s disintegration, and that Israeli patriotism needs Clinton said in a closed reputation to be protected by punitive legislation. A recently forum at the Saban Center abroad – not published survey of the Israel Democracy Institute in Washington that she is just to its shows that as far as the Israeli public is concerned, worried and astonished by reputation as a including the great majority of the left, there is no the legislative initiatives democracy problem of patriotism.13 Among Israeli Jews, nearly in the Israeli parliament 88 percent declare that they are proud to be Israelis. to put restrictions 82% of those who define themselves as belonging on left-wing organizations.14 !at a high-level to the left and, interestingly, 66% of the ultra- US government o#cial, whose long-standing orthodox say that they are proud to be Israelis. commitment to Israel cannot be questioned, !e number of Israeli Arabs who say that they are comes to express such comments, even though it proud to be Israelis is much lower than among seems they were not intended to be on the record, Jews, but it is nonetheless, much higher than most is not a good sign. If these concerns persist, they people would have expected—nearly 53%. !at an may cause real damage to US-Israel relations, absolute majority of Israeli Arab citizens are willing especially since the sense that Israel and America to say so is a remarkable achievement under the share common democratic values is clearly one of circumstances, and confirms what many polls, over the main pillars of the wide support Israel enjoys the years, have indicated—that the Arab public in among the American public.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 153 Last, but not least, the current attempted assault values and norms should never be taken for on democracy is likely to cause damage to granted. !ey are always in danger, liable to be the relationship between Israel and the Jewish challenged and eroded in various ways. !is does Diaspora—particularly the American Jewish not mean that democracy itself, or the overall community, most of which is politically liberal. level of freedom, is in danger. If one wishes to American liberal Jews, although they may be very summarize the progress of American democracy critical of Israel’s present government and policies, in the 1960s, it is clear that, all in all, this was a are fundamentally supportive of the Jewish state, not time of great improvement, particularly as regards the least because they take pride in Israeli democracy. the rights of African Americans, but also in other Many of them have voiced strong concerns about ﬁelds. And yet there were constant attacks and the recent legislative trends. !ey stressed that, like violations of democratic norms during this period for the rest of the American public, commitment to (not to speak of shrill illiberal rhetoric), many of shared moral values and democracy is one of the them hailing from US President Nixon himself in key elements binding together American Jews and the late 1960s and early 1970s. Israel. !e perception that Israeli democracy is in To some extent, even obvious rhetorical danger could lead to a decline in the attachment of exaggerations may sometimes be useful in liberal Jews to Israel. Some fear that eventually this confronting real dangers—but only to a limited may contribute to a weakening of the bipartisan extent. Certainly, there were in the past and we support enjoyed by Israel until now, with American witness today some illiberal and undemocratic conservatives—Jews and non-Jews alike—who will trends in Israel. Such trends and forces need to remain staunch supporters of Israel while liberals be vigorously confronted. !e Israeli political and increasingly distance themselves from the Jewish judicial system and the Israeli public provide the state. !at would be a very undesirable development necessary resources for this. In the meantime, it for Israel, the interest of which is without doubt to is also worth pointing out, once in a while, and be supported by the Jewish community and the particularly as voices claiming the very opposite wider American public across the political board— are so often and so loudly heard, that the existence by both Democrats and Republicans. and development of Israeli democracy has up to !e price of freedom is eternal vigilance - though now been a remarkable achievement. not exaggerated fear mongering. Democratic

154 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Notes 1983 Rubinstein case with regard to an amendment to the Elections Financing Law (HCJ 141/82 Amnon Rubinstein 1 !e Israeli Supreme Court currently has fifteen justices, M.K. et al. v. Chairman of the Knesset et al., June 16, 1983). but generally sits in panels of three. !e new proposed !e Supreme Court also pronounced a landmark ruling in legislation requires an expanded panel of nine justices the 1989 Schnitzer case (HCJ 680/88 Meir Schnitzer et al. for the Court to exercise the power of judicial review. v. "e Chief Military Censor et al., January 10, 1989), when it imposed substantial legal constraints on the exercise 2 "e Israeli Democracy Index 2011 (Jerusalem: !e Israel of military censorship according to the 1945 Defence Democracy Institute, 2011). (Emergency) Regulations, judging that “[f]ree expression 3 "e 2009 Israeli Democracy Index – Auditing Israeli may not be curtailed unless there is a near certainty that Democracy Twenty Years of Immigration from the Soviet the publication will cause substantial and grave harm to Union (Jerusalem: !e Israel Democracy Institute, 2009). security.” Two more recent examples of the exercise of judicial review by the Court are the 2006 Adalah case 4 CA 6821/93 Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Cooperative Village, (HCJ 8276/05 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights 09 November 1995. !e two Basic Laws passed by the in Israel et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., December 12, Knesset in 1992 – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 2006) and the 2009 Academic Center case (HCJ 2605/05 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – provided for the Academic Center of Law and Business et al. v. Minister of first time for the protection of fundamental human rights Finance et al., November 19, 2009), in which the Court and civil liberties. held than a legislative amendment was unconstitutional, 5 HCJ 212/03 Herut v. Chairman of the Central Elections because it violated several rights enshrined in the 1992 Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset, 08 January 2003. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty disproportionately. 6 Alexander M. Bickel, "e Least Dangerous Branch: 10 !e four newly appointed judges of the Supreme "e Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven, Court are Jerusalem District Court Judge Noam Sohlberg; Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1986). Jerusalem District Court Deputy President Zvi Zylbertal; 7 Tomer Zarchin, “Study: Faith in court system tumbles Tel Aviv District Court Judge Uri Shoham; and the Dean of among Haredim, settlers,” Haaretz, 22 June 2010. the Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law Daphne Barak-Erez. 8 !ere are other factors however, including discontent 11 !e example of the US Supreme Court is a good with the length and complexity of legal proceedings and case in point. !e US Supreme Court has indeed changed disappointment in specific court rulings. recently in a stark direction to the right, following the appointment of several conservative judges, and yet 9 !ere are several other examples of the Israeli Supreme the Court has not overturned past liberal decisions on Court’s exercising judicial review, both before and after abortion and a#rmative action. the enactment of the two 1992 Basic Laws. In the 1981 “Agudat Derekh Eretz” case (HCJ 246/81 “Agudat Derekh 12 It is significant that Dorit Beinish, the outgoing Eretz” et al. v. Broadcasting Authority et al., July 28, 1981), president of the Supreme Court, declared, during the rare the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the visit paid by the prime minister to the Court ahead of her Elections Law, on the basis that it had not been passed retirement, that she had always believed that Netanyahu by an absolute majority of the Knesset as required in the would not agree to any legislation weakening the Court: “I case of legislation that infringes the principle of equality knew that (...) your background, world view, and everything in elections. A similar ruling was held by the Court in the you represent would not allow any harm to come to the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 155 court,” she said to Netanyahu. 13 “Israeli Democracy Survey 2011” in "e Israeli Democracy Index 2011 (Jerusalem: !e Israel Democracy Institute, 2011). 14 Barak Ravid, “Clinton warns of Israel's eroding democratic values,” Haaretz, 05 December 2011.

156 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Summer 2011 in Israel: !e Revolt of the "Undeprived" — 9 What it Was, How it Was, What’s Left

1. Introduction and Conclusion: and television networks erected live broadcasting From Tents to Committees posts amidst the tents, and provided nonstop reporting around the clock. !e coverage was unprecedented: in fact, the media urged citizens !e tents that sprouted in July 2011 on Rothschild to take to the streets in protest and counted every Boulevard in Tel Aviv were emblematic of the passer-by as a bona fide protester. "Social Protest Summer." !ey were the highlight of the protest. !e wave was triggered by Daphni Who were these multitudes of protesters? Leef, a young woman from Tel Aviv who was evicted Although no survey has been carried out to from her rented flat and could not find alternative examine the socio-economic characteristics of the accommodations. Leef decided to express her protests' leaders and participants, the broad media protest by putting up a tent in a location that is coverage did yield a typical portrait of a protester, the epitome of Tel Aviv’s image as the epicenter of who was not necessarily found among those Israel’s culture and fashion: the Mann Auditorium, physically occupying the tents. !ese were young Habima National !eater, the intersection of men and women, aged 25-35, married with young Rothschild and Ben-Zion Boulevards. Soon, many children or planning a family, educated, university youngsters joined Leef, and at the height of graduates or studying toward an academic degree, the protests some 2,500 enthusiastic, eloquent, working and earning above the average wage creative, and angry young Israelis occupied the (around NIS 9,000 per month), renting or living Rothschild Tent City, as it came to be called. !eir in flats that they considered too small, and still anger was contagious; tent cities rapidly sprang up in need of financial assistance from their well-o", in parks and boulevards in other cities (the largest middle-class parents. In other words, the salt of the was in Jerusalem). Hundreds of thousands attended earth, the invisible backbone of Israeli society. the rallies organized by the young protesters. !e What were they protesting against? !e center of vast majority of the media mobilized to support, the protest was the plight of the young middle boost, and glorify the protest movement. !e radio class, i.e., the economic di#culties of the protest

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 157 leaders. !ey were hit hard by the rapid increase for a fundamental change in economic policy. It in the price of food and housing, two of the major was only toward mid-summer, when the monster expenditures in any young family’s budget. It was of protests threatened to turn on its creators in quite surprising: there is a vast body of empirical the form of aimless anarchy, that its leaders began and statistical data showing that Israeli society is to consolidate a platform. !ey asked a host of plagued by deep economic inequality and extreme socio-economically left-wing oriented experts for poverty, but there are no figures indicating the advice. Concurrently, the government established economic pauperization of the middle class. the Trajtenberg Committee, a broad public- During the last decade, the poor got poorer, the governmental commission headed by Prof. Manuel rich got richer, and the middle remained in the Trajtenberg, a prominent economist who declined middle. And yet it was to remain in his role as economic adviser to the this middle—the middle prime minister when Netanyahu was elected. !e !e resonance class—that came out to committee was authorized to suggest significant and magnitude protest en masse, whereas changes in the state’s budget and taxation policy. of the call: "!e the poor remained unseen At the time, near Rosh Hashanah and amidst People Demand and unheard. discussions by various committees and public Social Justice" groups, the universal call for “Social Justice,” first forced the !e voices of the middle heard during the early stages of the protest wave, government class, however, burst grew louder. !at slogan fueled the protest and to make forth at full volume. !e quickly entered the Israeli vocabulary despite the changes in its early manifestations of eventual decline of the protest movement. taxation policy the protest were already discernible in the spring Many corporations pointed to the “Social Protest” and summer of 2010, as an explanation, or pretext, for the decline in when at the end of their profits in the third quarter of the fiscal year. another drought year, it was decided to levy a !e politicians were quick to use this buzzword special “Household Drought Tax.” Opposition in their public speeches, regardless of the to the drought tax took the form of civil context. !e involvement of academic circles was disobedience, forcing the government to partially detectable from the start, when already in early retreat. !e “Water Protest” was soon followed by August some of the protest leaders decided to the “Petrol Protest,” the “Cottage Cheese Protest," consult a team of experts, led by Professors Aviah and the “Housing Price Protest.” In each of these Spivak and Yossi Yona. When faculty members specific cases, the protest amounted to merely returned to their teaching routine as the summer demanding government or corporate action to vacation and overseas sabbaticals were drawing decrease the price of certain commodities or to their end, academia’s involvement intensified services. It did not incorporate a political demand and scientific conferences were organized to

158 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE explore and discuss “Social Justice.” Having out, so that the anticipated negative changes in tax played a critical role in augmenting the protest, collection forecasts for the coming years are not the media now uses the phrase incessantly and attributed to these steps, but to the crisis in Europe unhesitatingly. !e Trajtenberg Committee for and its repercussions on Israeli economy. Socio-Economic Change opened its report to Many of the taxation changes attributed to the the prime minister and finance minister with a protest are far from being radical inventions; philosophical discussion of the issue of social Finance Ministry’s Managing Director Haim justice, and an attempt to define it. Shani and other senior Finance Ministry o#cials !e slogan “!e People Demand Social Justice” presented to Prime Minister Netanyahu a similar (ha-am doresh tzedek hevrati), chanted by the layout during 2011, which was promptly rejected. hundreds of thousands attendees of the massive !e Finance Ministry’s protest rally in Tel Aviv in August 2011, has thus top professional echelon Many of the remained etched in the public’s consciousness. objected to Netanyahu’s taxation But has it also had an e"ect? It did, partially. Its vision of the desired tax changes resonance and magnitude have so far forced the system; he insisted on attributed to government of Israel to introduce a number of low corporate taxation, the protest changes to its direct and indirect taxation policy. regarding it as an incentive movement !ese changes are scheduled to go into e"ect to investment. “It took are far from in 2012 and upgrade, to a certain extent, the mass demonstrations,” being progressivity of the Israeli taxation system. Most Shani said recently, “for radical of these changes will benefit a highly defined and Netanyahu to adopt the inventions specific segment: young working middle-class line suggested by Treasury families with children aged 1-4 years. In bottom- o#cials.” From a macro- line terms, such families would get an addition economic perspective, the of several hundred shekels to their net monthly Social Justice protest achieved a shift of about 0.5% income (depending on the children’s age and the of the national income from the top percentile parents’ salaries). !e source of financing such to the sixth to eighth decile of the wage earning additions, paid in the form of special tax credit population. National Security Institute experts points to wage earning parents and increased have determined that the change derived from the child benefits, was found in increasing the burden redistribution of income across the entire economy of taxation for those whose gross monthly income is not going to cause any reduction in inequality exceeds NIS 40,000, increasing tax brackets on indicators or deliver families from poverty. capital gains from investment and financial savings, But the social protest did not set out to reduce and increased taxation on corporate profits. On poverty and inequality. It centered on the middle paper, these measures should balance each other class, and the middle class gained from it. !us,

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 159 from a sectorial point of view, the “Revolt of the evidence of the concentration of poverty in two Undeprived” has been quite successful. From distinct population groups—the ultra-Orthodox the point of view of Israeli society as a whole, (Haredi) community and the Muslim-Arab sector. however, the outcome is disappointing. Dr. !ese reports found consistently, year after year Daniel Gottlieb, deputy including in 2011, that every second Haredi and managing director of Arab citizen is living below the relative poverty Research at the National line, a calculation based on half the median family’s Security Institute, hit the income, adjusted to the number of persons. About Every second nail on its head when he two thirds of Israeli poor and about 75% of the Arab and wrote in the latest report children plagued by poverty belong to these two Haredi citizen on poverty (November groups. Shortage of food is felt only in these two is living below 2011): “A policy designed groups, even after receiving the transfer payments the relative to increase social justice to which they are entitled. poverty line which neglects the Israel’s social problem, as perceived in the public poorest poor is not and professional discourse in Israel and abroad worthy of its name. One until the summer of 2011, had been the scope cannot claim to do justice and scale of poverty. Israel’s poverty rates are when the most vulnerable excessive—double the rates in developed are left out of the policy’s scope.” countries—as are its inequality indicators. !ese 2. Poverty Out, Middle Class In indicators portray Israel as the land of deep social gaps not because of low income in the middle class, !roughout the last decade, and more intensely but because of lack of income at the bottom of the ever since Israel was accepted as a member of ladder. “Even the healthy growth that characterized the Organization for Economic Cooperation the economy in six out of the last seven years has and Development (OECD), poverty and income failed to improve fundamentally the state of the inequality, which is a reﬂection of poverty, have poor,” Dr. Gottlieb wrote in the preamble to the been highlighted as the paramount problem aforementioned report on poverty. Here lies the of Israeli society. Public committees have been social tragedy of Israel: the great tidal wave of established to discuss poverty, the media have economic growth in the mid-2000s skipped the devoted thousands of articles and reports to poor, and actually made their situation worse. poverty, and even the OECD’s reports on Israel Did it also skip the middle class? have mostly focused on its social deﬁciencies. In the poverty reports issued by the National Security !e Central Bureau of Statistics publishes an Institute, as well as in reports by other NGOs and Annual Review of Income, which is the only state bodies, there was ample and clear statistical reliable source for drawing comparisons over time.

160 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e Bank of Israel has reprocessed the bureau’s for encouraging Arab women and Haredi men figures—having had access to the raw data as to seek employment were at the center of public well—and summarized them in the section discussions and recommendations by numerous dedicated to welfare policy in its latest annual committees that addressed the issue, including report. !e tables and analyses indicate that the National Economic Council a#liated with between 1999 and 2009/10, the middle decile's the O#ce of the Prime Minister. Already in 2007, share of the income pie has not changed, remaining Olmert’s government adopted a socio-economic at the level of 51.5% with minor fluctuations. !e agenda outlined by Professor Trajtenberg, who was lowest decile’s share decreased steadily, whereas then head of the Council. !at agenda prioritized the highest decile’s share climbed. National Security increasing Haredi and Arab participation in the Institute analyses yield similar findings. !e third labor force as the most to seventh deciles were consistently getting about e"ective way to increase !e Bank of Israel: 41% of the income pie; the third to eighth deciles the income of families !e increase in were getting about 51.5% of the net income, and in the lowest quintile gaps during the approximately 46.5% of the gross general income. (20%) of population last decade was !is share remained unchanged over the years. and to reduce the scope influenced mainly of poverty. Toward !e Bank of Israel did a breakdown of the by the increased the end of the Olmert components of the income inequality index inequality between government’s term, (known as the Gini Index, which expresses the non-Haredi Jews the National Economic level of inequality in income distribution: when & Haredim Council published another the index equals 0, everyone has the same income; and Arabs when the index equals 1, all income goes into important document, the pockets of a single person), and found that which outlined labor among non-Haredi Jews of working age, the index market reforms and changes in the state’s attitude is about 15% lower than the general inequality toward the Haredi community required in order to index. !at is, the distribution of income among motivate yeshiva students to join the labor force. non-Haredi Jews is fairly equal. Bank of Israel Only 4.8% of non-Haredi Jewish families with a economists state that the increase in gaps during single wage earner are below the poverty line. the last decade “was influenced mainly by the !is may be the sociological explanation for the increased inequality between non-Haredi Jews glaring absence of poverty from the discourse of and Haredis and Arabs.” In other words, the key to the summer protest. reducing inequality is narrowing the income gap When the indicators of inequality over time between Haredi Jews/Arabs and non-Haredi Jews. were broken down into two factors—the market !e solution: seeking proper employment for fair and the government—it turned out that it wages. Suggestions for incentives and methods was the government, and not the market, that

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 161 was responsible for the widening gaps. !e could not have mobilized the masses. !e inequality in gross economic income distribution change was brought on by the protest of mid- (inequality produced by the market) has actually range wage earners. decreased since 2002, while the taxation policy, !e Trajtenberg Committee seems to have and allowances in particular, have grown much di#culties in finding an economic explanation for less progressive. !is negative change began at the outburst of social protest. !e Committee’s the same point in time when Netanyahu, then report often reads as a middle-class manifesto, finance minister, introduced his restraining and high on poetic phrasing and low on data, curtailing economic policy, in 2003. Haredi numbers and information. !e Committee points families were adversely a"ected by the cutback to an “economic distress” of the middle class as in allowances, and their the main reason for the protest, but furnishes situation has been !e Haredi only a single piece of evidence: “the average wage deteriorating steadily community increased very little in the last decade, at a rate ever since. It could be is currently much lower than the per capita product, so that said that the price of not harboring an the average citizen did not get to enjoy much of joining the labor force has inordinate the growth.” !is “proof” does not hold water. gone up since 2003, but it accumulation !e proper measure of economic capability is not is the Haredi community of social in real wages, but the disposable real income of that is forced to pay this dynamite a wage earning family, adjusted to the number high price, while its rate of persons; and that income has increased at of participation in the approximately the same rate as the per capita labor force remains low. national income. From 2000 to 2010, the real !e gap between the income (minus inflation) of the average family Haredi community and increased by about 17.5%. Consumption per the non-Haredi public capita rose by about 20% and the GDP per capita is widening, even—and particularly—when the grew by about 18% during the same period. !e head of the family is employed for meager wages. real income of the average wage earning family !e government-initiated price increases and grew at the same rate. the soaring prices of food have severely eroded the Haredi community’s dwindling purchasing !e picture across an entire decade may be power. !e Haredi community is currently misleading, however, those in their thirties now harboring an inordinate accumulation of social held a totally di"erent personal status in 2001. It is, dynamite. therefore, better to examine what has happened over the last five years. !e real GDP per capita !e Haredi population’s plight is, however, grew between 2005 and 2010 by 12%, and the net limited in scale and geographical scope, and income of salaried households grew by 9%. Can

162 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE this gap, which does reflect a relative worsening national income—but not in recent years. !e in the economic status of a large group of wage return on capital did increase sharply and the earners, explain the multi-dimensional and return on labor to wage earners did decrease massive outbreak of protest? !e quoted data sharply until 2005, but there has not been a from the Central Bureau of Statistics contradict significant change since then. the claim that an Israeli family cannot "close the Minister of Finance Dr. Yuval Steinitz was also month." !e gross income of an average salaried unaware of the economic di#culties of the household last year was NIS 16,700/month, the middle class, but he did act vigorously, within net income was NIS 13,900, and net expenditure budgetary limits, to improve the net income was about NIS 12,000. of poor wage earners. Since the Ministry of !e Adva Center, a distinctly left-leaning socio- Labor was dismantled economic research institute, has examined the and incorporated in the distribution of income by strata: upper, middle Ministry of Industry, its and lower. !e researchers found that during focus has been directed Netanyahu was 2000-2009, the share of the middle stratum in toward creating jobs surprised when the total income of Israeli economy decreased by in the economically the protest about 0.2%, with most of the decrease occurring and socially vulnerable turned from in the first half of the last decade. Could this be periphery. !e Ministry "Anti Prices" the incendiary fuel of social protest? of Welfare catered to to "Anti Bibi" !e Trajtenberg Committee report mentions needy populations. In another possible cause for the protest: capital the social discourse has grown at the expense of labor. All or most space, no argument was of the fruits of growth have been plucked ever made for directing by capitalists. !e report does not refer to more state resources any statistical source to corroborate this to the middle class. Among all the o#ciating claim; instead, it contains condemnations of politicians, it was Prime Minister Netanyahu “tycoons.” !is is regrettable as data regarding who was first to sense the plight of the young the distribution of the national income middle class and urged his government to take between return on labor and return on capital steps to lower housing prices. !e tent protest are published regularly by the Central Bureau did not take him by surprise; he was surprised, of Statistics, and are easily accessible to any however, when the protest turned from “anti- economist. Such data indicate that corporate prices” to “anti-Bibi,” and he regarded it as a profits, defined as “local operational surplus political conspiracy designed to overthrow him without crediting home owners’ income,” through street rallies. have indeed taken a considerable share of the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 163 3. So What Powered the Revolt of public pressure, the tax was revised, limited in the "Undeprived"? time, and eventually buried quietly. But the rage did not subside. It was now re-directed at the !e social protest was not driven by the economy, water utilities, which were and are still perceived or at least not by the issue of income distribution. as responsible for the high price of water. In this It was driven by rage. Rage against the government, matter, however, the victory of public opinion was which is broadly perceived as indi"erent to marginal, and the utilities remained intact. public sentiment, failing to maintain an ongoing At the beginning of 2011, the anger intensified dialogue with the public, making decisions with once more, lashing out against petrol prices, and a total disdain for public particularly against the high taxation of gasoline. !ere is opinion, being arrogant Led by discussion groups on the Internet, the a prevailing and aloof. !e rage protest failed on the ground: demonstrations were sense that stems from a sense of small and no real decline in sales at the pump was there is frustration, alienation, a registered. Still, the protest won a major political no one belief that “they’ve stolen victory. An intended raise of the excise tax on to count on, our country.” !e National petrol was revoked, and government-initiated neither the Robustness Index, taken increases were put on hold. from surveys before politicians nor From gasoline, the rage rolled on to other areas related even the the Sderot Conference on Society, revealed to the cost of living. !e intense public rage over the welfare and upsurge in housing prices reached the government, social systems increased distrust in the majority of government forcing the prime minister and his cabinet ministers agencies among the most to hastily advance emergency plans for de-freezing stabilizing and formative stratum of Israeli society. land, revising the housing tax, and creating schemes !ere is a prevailing sense that there is no one for building rent-controlled public housing projects. to count on, neither the politicians nor even the In June, the rage surprisingly reached the price of welfare and social systems. food, and especially of dairy products (cottage !e first inklings of this rising anger appeared cheese). Surprisingly, not because the Israeli food when, two years ago, Netanyahu’s government basket is cheap—it is still expensive in comparison announced its intention to impose a value added to other countries—but because most of the tax (VAT) on fruits and vegetables. !e public big increases in food prices took place in 2010 outcry nipped the initiative in the bud. A year and the year preceding it. But at that time, the and half ago, when the same government decided citizens of Israel had other things to worry about: to increase the price of water (the drought tax), unemployment was still high, and the wounds of it almost caused a tax revolt. Under mounting the financial crisis had yet to close up.

164 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE During the “Cottage Protest,” the Knesset’s of households to withstand future crises, thereby Research Center examined the changes in price exacerbating the sense of insecurity. and wage indices. !e findings indicated that in !ese two trends—lower taxes and less current prices, wage earners’ salaries rose from 2005 saving—enabled the middle class, until 2011, to to 2011 (May) by about 23%. At the same time, keep their heads above water and perhaps even the consumer price index rose by 18%, resulting a bit higher than that. But these trends have in a 4% increase in the real wage, measured as the ended in the last couple of years. Concurrently, ratio between gross wage in current prices and the households have been burdened by credit as never average rate of inflation. !e net wage has probably before. Encouraged by the low interest rate and increased at a slightly more significant rate, due to due to the need to take large mortgages, the non- the ongoing income tax reform (see below). business private sector’s debt soared. Disposable !e decrease household income, after 4. Why in 2011? in savings paying mortgage, has has financed If this is indeed a multi-year trend, what happened shrunk considerably, the increase in 2011 to propel hundreds of thousands to take to and the discrepancy in living the streets to demonstrate? Why did the rage, kept between expectations standards, but back till then, suddenly burst forth? In order to to maintain or raise the has exacerbated provide a rational answer, one must delve into an standard of living and the sense of analysis of the typical budget of a young middle- the actual financial ability insecurity class family. As said, in the last five years, the real of the average salaried income of the average (and median) family rose household widened and by 4%. At the same time, the income tax burden became intolerable. of wage earners was significantly reduced: a family Especially badly hit were households whose of average wage earners now pays only about 9% consumption basket largley consists of food. !e income tax (just 6% in the periphery), compared food price index rose from 2005 to May 2011 by to 13% in 2005. !is tax relief has created a fiscal more than 32% - more than double the rise in the avenue for maintaining the standard of living. general food price index in the eurozone – while Middle-class households have also decreased their the fruit and vegetable price index rose by 38%. savings: in 2005, an average salaried household Young households saw their food purchasing saved about 15% of its income, compared to only power erode by 11%. 10% in 2011. While the decrease in savings has A similar examination of a shorter and more financed the increase in living standards, it has relevant period for the causes of the protest, also jeopardized, and still jeopardizes, the ability from May 2006 to May 2011, indicates stagnation

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 165 even in terms of the average statistical income: 5. Uncontrolled Housing consumer prices rose by 15%, and the average wage rose by 16.5%, whereas real wages rose by Housing prices in Israel rise and fall in a multiyear a negligible 1.25%. At the same time, food prices business cycle. When they go up, buyers believe it rose by 25%. Cottage cheese, the main o"ender, will last forever. When they are down, sellers believe which triggered the initial 2011 protest, took the they will never stop descending. Shifts in the trend, cake: in four years, its price went up 33%. thus, always come as a surprise. Between the mid- 1980s and the second half of the 1990s, housing How is it possible that young heads of household prices increased by about 100% in real terms. were forced to ask themselves in the summer Demography took its toll: the massive immigration of 2011, that following this wonderful period from the former Soviet Union required permanent of economic growth, housing solutions. Encouraged by the government, Between the why can my family not fearing the spreading of protests (yes, non-home mid-1980s a"ord to buy the same owners demonstrated even then), a massive and the food basket it could buy national construction project began, designed to second half five years ago? And if build 150,000 flats (double the necessary quantity) of the that family did not own in two years. In 1997, the industry was hit by a 1990s, housing a home, its chances of recession and then crashed. It took another blow prices increased ever owning one were during the Second Intifada. !e real price of an by about 100% dramatically diminished. average flat in 2007 was 22% less than its price in According to data 1997. Housing developers and contractors, many published by the Ministry of whom were left with a stockpile of empty flats of Finance, in the first half and went bankrupt, scarcely began new builds. !e of 2011, a young couple relatively low rents drew singles and young couples needed 140 monthly to the big cities. About half the households in Tel (net) paychecks in order to buy a second-hand Aviv were, and still are, renting. flat in Tel Aviv and the Sharon region, compared to about 90 monthly paychecks to purchase a In 2009, with the emergence from the recession similar flat in 2007. !e Mishkan Index, which brought on by the financial crisis in the US, reflects the economic purchasing power of the residential real estate trend reversed once potential homebuyers, deteriorated from early again. Veteran Israelis, who were disillusioned 2008 to early 2011 by 26%. !e yearned-for flat with investments in financial assets whose became a pipedream. value eroded drastically, used their savings to purchase residential real estate. So did foreign residents. French Jews, for instance, discovered the (as yet) cheap flats in Netanya. Low mortgage

166 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE interest provided an incentive for families who neediest were o"ered housing assistance, the rest could a"ord it to move from renting to owning. had to fend for themselves in the free market. And Demand soared but the supply lagged behind. what does one do when the free market goes mad, A temporary shortage of new builds drove the as it often does in the residential real estate sector, prices up. Between 2009 and 2011 the price of an and as it did in 2010/11 in Israel? Wait for the average flat in central Israel rose by 55%, and from market to calm down, according to government 2007/2008, by 65%. Young salaried couples saw spokespersons. Wait patiently for prices to begin to their goal of owning a flat fade into the distance. fall once more. For young couples with children, this Even massive assistance from their parents was answer was unacceptable. Tired of the preaching no longer enough. and the learned explanations, they took to the Netanyahu’s government did not create the streets to demonstrate disparity in the housing market, it inherited it. But for “A"ordable Public the government was reluctant to take substantial Housing Now,” along with steps to alleviate the situation. It took a year and hundreds of thousands Next to a half for the new government to even o#cially who shared their feelings. the tents, acknowledge the existence of a real estate !e emphatic calls they a#xed bubble. Many more months passed before the for “A"ordable Public the slogan: first governmental plans, designed to slow down Housing Now” captured "A"ordable the pace of price increases by accelerating the the young middle-class Public Housing marketing of state-owned land, taxation revisions imagination, but failed Now!" to promote the selling of empty flats, streamlining to crystallize into a set the process of obtaining building permits, etc., of practical and realistic were finally publicized. But by then, young non- demands. !e concept home owners were tired of waiting for long-term of “a"ordable” was not solutions. !ey ventured out of their rented flats defined, perhaps because a definition would have and put up the tents. Next to the tents, they excluded the majority of protesters in terms of a#xed the slogan “A"ordable Public Housing entitlement criteria. Based on income per capita, Now.” the first on the list for public housing would be !is was a challenging innovation. !e government large Haredi families, who were not represented in of Israel stopped financing, initiating or building the protest movement and even served as a target public housing a long time ago, when the wave of for criticism (“Why do Haredi families get housing FSU immigration subsided (although construction when we do not?” some of the protest leaders of public housing continues unabated beyond the challenged Shas Housing Minister Ariel Atias). Green Line). Residential land was marketed—at a !e prime minister and the finance and housing very slow pace—to the highest bidders. Only the ministers claimed—rightly, to a large extent—

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 167 that they were doing their best to accelerate and 6. From Rage to Politics promote housing construction. "Please be patient," they asked, "a turning point is just around the Both the Knesset’s Research Center and a special corner." committee appointed by the Ministry of Industry to examine food prices have failed to furnish a Indeed, the turning point did arrive. Housing plausible explanation for the excessive prices prices began to drop almost immediately after of food, or to provide a valid comparison of the tents were dismantled, and those who did not food prices in Israel vis-à-vis other developed have a home to return to, returned to dwelling in countries. Various hypotheses were advanced, streets, parks, public spaces and building lobbies. with their respective culprits: the farmers who According to Finance opposed the exposure of agricultural produce to On the issue Ministry figures, new competing imports, the dairy farms that exploited of housing, home prices dropped the Israeli obsession for white cheeses, the retail the protest 1.2% in September 2011 chains that greedily widened their profit margins, lagged behind compared to August. the deregulation of food prices, and consumer the reality. According to Central indi"erence, in that order. Meanhwile, it took two It did not Bureau of Statistics weeks for the producers and distributors of dairy make its figures, the price of all products, cottage cheese in particular, to realize mark on the housing, new and existing, that they were heading for a consumer tsunami. government’s went down by 0.2% in After a few futile attempts to meet the challenge, decisions September—the first real they succumbed and cut prices. Every link in decrease in three years. the cottage cheese production and distribution On the issue of housing, chains agreed to take part in lowering the unit the protest lagged price from 6 to 5 shekels. Toward the High behind the reality. It did not make its mark on the Holidays (Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur), several government’s decisions. !e politicians anticipated retail chains launched special sale promotion it and manipulated it to their own ends. campaigns, and the public enjoyed lower prices for a limited time. By late July and early August 2011, the protest movement was thus divided. One faction, delighting in the achievements in terms of price reductions, decided to focus on the consumer aspect and turn the protest into a consumer watchdog, similar to the American magazine Consumer Reports, which publishes

168 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE recommendations to readers on where and demonstrate against dairy farms or farmers, but what to buy and what to avoid. Other targets they did not hesitate to join the rallies against what for boycotting were announced: diapers, ATMs, they perceived as outrageous social injustice and prams, household products, etc. !e calls for fundamentally flawed socio-political priorities. boycott proliferated and lost their e"ectiveness. As numerous observers and commentators have Concurrently, and in opposition to this apolitical pointed out, the politicization of the protest and anti-corporate faction, a much more undoubtedly attracted the entire spectrum of ideological and political leadership emerged, opposition to Netanyahu’s government, for reasons which declared a new goal: changing the order of that were not necessarily economic. Itzik Alrob, a priorities on the government’s economic-social young Haredi man (a few Haredim participated as agenda. !e group’s spokespersons appeared individuals, however, as in the mass media and upheld, first tentatively indicated above there was !e politicization and later boldly, the demand for social justice. no group Haredi protest) of the protest !e direction changed, and so did the tone and who ignited the cottage undoubtedly the emphases. It was no longer about specific cheese protest, wrote that attracted the solutions to particular problems, but an overall “in the central tent city entire spectrum change in the state’s economic-social policy. !e on Rothschild Boulevard, of opposition rage became political, and focused primarily on a single desire prevails: to to Netanyahu’s Prime Minister Netanyahu. topple the government.” government Who was raging? !e first wave of idealistic tent In a position paper dwellers were joined, physically or in spirit, by published by the Israel legions of young people, aged 25-35, who have Democracy Institute di#culty raising 2-3 children on two full or one- website, Yair Sheleg wrote: “!e sense of a dead end and-a-half salaries. Like their parents before them, in the negotiations with the Palestinians has been they carry the yoke of Israeli society on their replaced on the national agenda by civic issues … backs, along with the burdens of everyday life: the outburst of protest on Rothschild Boulevard spending hours in huge tra#c jams on their way in Tel Aviv sprung from the protest leaders’ to work in the morning and on their way back feeling that the government and the majority in from work in the evening, struggling to pay the the Knesset have declared war on them and their monthly mortgage, and the exorbitant prices of ideological (leftist) ilk … one sector positions itself daycare facilities and education, and coping with a clearly as the adversary of the protest: the religious shortage of social services provided by any modern right, and the settlers in particular.” welfare state. !is is the second generation of In those scorching days of August, there was a Israeli natives unhindered by considerations of sense of great public apprehension in light of the ethnic origin. Many of them were reluctant to impending Palestinian UN bid for statehood; the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 169 government seemed at a loss, and a certain drop !is economic-political analysis, penned by in the prime minister’s popularity was discernible. Prof. Avia Spivak, who was appointed head of On Saturday, August 6, the first national anti- the protest’s advisory team, was adopted by government demonstration took place. !e its leaders in its entirety. !ey were no longer organizers were astounded by the massive turnout demanding greater competition in order to of citizens demanding change. Not a change in improve the functioning of Israeli capitalism, prices—a change in policy. At this point, the now they demanded a thorough revision government’s spokespersons and ministers were of its tenets in order to steer it closer in the still trying to deflect the anger to “tycoons,” direction of the social-democratic ideal of the “market concentration” and other enemies of free founding fathers of socialist Zionism. Many competition, and divert of the youngsters leading the protests and it from the government’s speaking out in town squares came from Labor Citizens gates, but to no avail. movement backgrounds; their yearnings are demanded understandable. change. Not In a slim pamphlet a change published by the Van Leer !e rage of the young middle class united many, in prices — Institute in Jerusalem, “!e driving hundreds of thousands to the streets. a change Economy of Protest,” the After a number of blunders and misguided in policy question was “How did publicity moves, the prime minister reacted with we get here and what can great wisdom: he established a public committee be done?” And the answer and appointed Manuel Trajtenberg, a leading was: “!e tent protest that economics professor who was a#liated with the began in July 2011 is clearly previous Kadima-led government. !e committee’s the outcome of the policies inauguration day marked the dying out of the of Israeli governments … a protest in its public, demonstrative form. When the policy entrenched in the belief that the free market Trajtenberg report was published and submitted is the only solution for most of the societal issues in late September, many middle-class families that concern the Israeli public … !e struggle is felt that it had indeed improved their financial about the shape of the country for years to come … situation somewhat, and dropped out of the !is is not the protest of spoiled brats because their protest. !ose left made tactical mistakes typical toys were taken away from them … !e current of young people intoxicated by their own sense of situation is a direct result of government policy, power: they rejected the Trajtenberg Committee’s a policy aimed at slashing the public sector and recommendations out of hand, without giving encouraging the business sector to take its place, reasons, using rude, juvenile language. reducing the government’s budget and selling o" government and public assets.”

170 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 7. Breaching the Budget did not address: infrastructure development in Arab municipalities, assisting weakened local Concurrently, and much belatedly, the protest authorities, construction and maintenance of leaders were persuaded to create their own public housing projects, expansion of the public economic policy paper. !ey recruited an health system and social allowances, including impressive team of economists, headed by old-age pensions, income support and a negative Professor Joseph Ze’ira of the Department of income tax. !e authors justified the massive Economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem rechanneling of resources from private income to and included Prof. Avia Spivak, Prof. Arie Arnon, public expenditure as a remedial move designed Prof. Lea Ahdut, Tamar Bar-Yosef, Boaz Sopher and to correct the policy of recent governments, which others. have “drained the public sector as justification for At the core of the protest team’s recommendations, privatization.” labeled “Change of Course,” were expanding the The advisory team’s existing budgetary framework, the allocation of recommendations on the !e team of tens of billions of shekels more to social projects, issue of “socio-economic economists and financing the additional expenditures democratization” were set up by the through a dramatic increase in income taxes, just as far-reaching. protest leaders as well as a host of changes in labor relations, In order to enhance recommends price controls, and the regulation of savings, transparency and civic expanding trust and pension funds. !is was contrary to participation in the the existing the Trajtenberg Committee’s recommendations, economic decision- budgetary which were based on strict adherence to existing making process, the framework and budget limits and redirecting resources to social team recommended the dramatically projects solely through sharp cuts in the defense abolition of the bi-annual increasing budget. budget in favor of annual income taxes As a starting point, the protesters’ advisory budgets, and the shelving team led by Prof. Ze’ira recommended the of the rule of thumb that augmentation of public spending (state budget) predetermines the volume of public spending as by NIS 20 billion within three years, far beyond a function of governmental debt, arguing that the the layout agreed to by the government and state's budget must reflect its society’s needs. legislated by the Knesset. !e team suggested On one hand, the recommendations and that the additional NIS 20 billion be directed suggestions of the protestors’ advisory team were toward financing important social projects, far more extensive, inclusive and less sectorial than which the Trajtenberg Committee—bounded as those made by the Trajtenberg Committee, which it was by the existing budgetary framework— focused on providing benefits to young middle-class

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 171 families with children. !e implementation of these protesters were and still are fundamentally di"erent recommendations could reduce income distribution from other protest movements in other countries. inequality and poverty indicators significantly. On As a result, they have enjoyed a much greater public the other hand, they were articulated using a dry sympathy, and more substantial gains. and highly complex professional economics jargon and totally devoid of the youthful spirit, enthusiasm and originality of the tent protest. !e Israeli middle 8. From Movement to Awareness class found these detailed recommendations too far- fetched and reeking of socialism, which is anathema What’s left of the protest? On the practical to them. !e middle class prefers a market economy level, there is a significant reward in terms of to massive governmental taxation policy: a new tax on high incomes, an intervention, although extraordinarily high tax (the highest rate in the !e young their version is a market world) on capital gains, and a corporate profit tax Israeli protesters economy that is not totally that is also very high. Conversely, taxes on gasoline were and unrestrained, but regulated were lowered and benefit points were granted still are and fair, capitalism with a to working fathers of young children. Roughly fundamentally human face. In contrast, calculated, this represents a shift of about 0.5% di"erent from many of the protest leaders in GDP. All the other recommendations, both by other protest wanted socialism with a the Trajtenberg Committee and the Committee movements in human face. for the Enhancement of Competition are still other countries being discussed, but their essence is clear: they Eventually, under much are designed to enhance competition in the Israeli internal and external economy. To this end, they provide the regulating pressure, the social protest authorities with new instruments for injecting movement submitted its enhanced competition everywhere and in every detailed answer to the question “So what is it that sector. !eir main concern is the Israeli consumer you really want?” but by then it had only a handful and the Israeli investor—not the Israeli worker, not of listeners. !e economic-practical part of the the Israeli producer. protest had already died out. “Trajtenberg” stole the show. !e tents on Rothschild Boulevard and !e leaders of the social protest movement, on their in other sites across the country were gradually part, maintain that they do not regard unrestrained evacuated and dismantled, with no significant perfect competition as a panacea for every societal violence. !e good kids who put up the tents flaw or as a transcendent social ideal. !ey warn that remained good kids as they took them down. striving to maximally intensify competition would foment further division and segmentation in Israeli In their total avoidance of violence (except for a few society. “Our protest,” they insist, “did not demand pranks) and obedience to the law, the young Israeli

172 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE more competition among businesses; it demanded the Israeli discourse or popular culture. !ey will be more public investment in housing, education, health there for years to come. !e present government and welfare — more equal opportunity for weakened and its successors will find it much harder to populations in the periphery and disadvantaged implement economic and social policies without communities — more consideration for the working first consulting “the people.” !e masses that took to middle class — a more participatory decision-making the town squares to say, “Hey you up there, it’s time process concerning critical economic issues — and you listened to us down here,” have accomplished more accountability. A greater solidarity. All of this something. !e grass-roots pressure of the group has no trace in the government’s discussions and on the masses did prove e"ective: not in terms of its resolutions.” !ey find the term “benefits,” as used by capacity to generate the profound transformation the government’s o#cial spokespersons, very telling: the protestors had hoped, it means that priorities have not been changed, just a but certainly in its capacity !e face few perks handed out in order to restore calm. "Have to scare those at the helm, of the you been protesting this summer? Now go and buy to make the decision- state's economy a thousand shekels’ worth of duty-free goods on the makers wary of the remains the Internet and shut up." electorate’s wrath. same - but !e face of the state’s economy remains the same. !e die has been cast. !e something did In terms of raising awareness, what’s left of the struggle for social justice, change in the protest is much more significant. For a considerable whatever it means exactly, collective Israeli period of time, the issue of social justice occupied has already begun. It is a consciousness the top of the political and media agenda in healthy and democratic Israel. People talked, argued, and went out to the struggle, as long as it does streets to demonstrate their support of abstract not breach a boundary. concepts such as “social justice” and “changing !at boundary is hate; priorities.” !e heroes of TV reality shows were— hate, the mad o"spring of justified social rage. If we albeit temporarily—shoved aside by the heroes of all restrain ourselves in our speech and criticism, social revolt. And although entertainment quickly and if we keep our discourse factual and stay away regained its hold on the electronic media space, from demagoguery and agitation, Israel may be which was so exhausted by the protest as to regard spared, in 2012, the emergence of a social-populist it as a mere transient curiosity—a shift did occur; hate movement like the Greek anarchists, Le Pen’s something did change in the collective Israeli successors in France, or Finland’s Real Finns. !is consciousness. danger is much more imminent and substantial than is generally believed. !e summer of protest and its young leaders—young women in particular—are not going to vanish from ttt

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 173 Protest – Not Only in Israel figures, cultural figures, film stars, senior media personalities—all of these and many others A few months after the tent city on Rothschild endorsed the protests enthusiastically. Boulevard came into existence, tent cities sprouted So why did the protest achieve so little? !e answer in US cities as well, first in New York and later in is that although in public surveys more than a university towns across America. !e American third of Western countries’ citizenries sympathize protesters adopted the slogans “Occupy Wall with the protestors, they have di#culty grasping Street” and “!e 99%,” explicitly targeting the what they seek to accomplish. !e movement’s movement’s arch-enemy: the upper percentile— messages are disorganized and vague, sometimes the one percent of America’s richest, many of unrealistic, and sometimes populist. Veterans whom are bankers. of the deep radical left tried to hijack the Protests in a similar vein Protests in spontaneous movements, ready even to join forces soon erupted in Britain, Greece, Spain, with the right-wing social-populist strand. It turns France, Holland and other and Italy did out that the Western middle classes, albeit so countries as well. !eir not stop the badly hit by the economic crisis, are cautious and active phase was relatively governments reluctant to be dragged into rallies that are mere short, and none of them from adopting rituals denouncing capitalism: protest movements succeeded in forcing their and enacting in Greece, Spain and Italy did not stop the respective governments fiscal austerity governments from adopting and enacting fiscal to change one iota in policies austerity policies, on a scale unseen in Europe in their budgetary policies. the last two generations. In countries where the protest took on a more Against this background, the achievements of the violent nature, such as Israeli social protest movement seem even more Greece and Spain, it accomplished the opposite remarkable. After a few weeks of confusion, the result: the collapse of socialist governments. Israeli protest adopted important principles: No to extremism and fanaticism; no to gallows for the !e failure of the protest movements in America rich; no to taking over the stock exchange and the and Europe to change the economic policy of banks; but Yes to defined and specific demands, their governments is remarkable both in view of aimed mainly at the government. !e Israeli protest the economic situation there—double the Israeli demanded—and got—state assistance for young unemployment rate, harsh budget cuts, insolvent/ couples with children, food basket price cuts, a bankrupt governments—and in light of the progressive change in taxation composition, and massive mobilization of liberal public opinion to public participation in social policy-making. !is is support the protest. Trade union leaders, heads a resounding and exciting success. of NGOs and social organizations, artists, public

174 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE On a single Saturday, our social protest drew about Street protest movement has not been able to draw 400,000 Israelis out to the streets to peacefully more than a few tens of thousands of protesters to protest for social justice, or, to be precise, for ﬁve the streets, and its inﬂuence has been limited to or six concrete, non-revolutionary, not far-fetched invigorating the political discourse ahead of the demands. In contrast, the American Occupy Wall November 2012 elections.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 175 Notes Selected Sources [in Hebrew]:

!e archives of Yediot Ahronot, Ynet and Calcalist. Internet and Facebook websites. Central Bureau of Statistics. Bank of Israel’s Research Department. OECD Statistical Database, Paris. Annual Reports of the State’s Revenue Administration, Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Housing Monthly Reports.

Selected Publications [in Hebrew]:

“Protest Economy: How We Got Here and What Can Be “Social Robustness Index.” Sderot Conference, 2011. Done”. Avia Spivak and Tal Wolfson, Van Leer Institute, Main Points in the State Budget 2011-2012, Ministry of 2011. Finance, 2010. “Toward Shaping a More Just Israeli Society.” Report by the “Report on the State of the Nation: Society, Economy and Committee for Economic and Social Change, headed by Policy.” Dan Ben-David (ed.), Taub Center, 2010. Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg, 2011. “Layout for Strengthening the Middle Class and the “Addressing the Economy’s Fundamental Problems.” Reduction of Poverty and Inequality.” Position Paper by Position Paper by Prof. Eran Yashiv, Tel Aviv University, Daniel Gottlieb, Miri Endveld and Alex Fruman, National 2011. Insurance Institute, 2011. Poverty Reports for 2009 and 2010, National Security “Socio-Economic Agenda for Israel, 2008-2010.” National Institute. Economy Council, 2007. “Team for Examining Competition and Price Levels in “!e Haredi Sector in Israel: Empowerment through Food Products.” Interim Report, Ministry of Commerce Employment.” National Economy Council, 2009. and Industry, 2011. “!e Social Protest: A Cautionary Note.” Yair Sheleg, the “Change of Course.” Protesters’ Economic Advisory Team, Israel Democracy Institute, 2011. Concluding Report, Tel Aviv, 2011. “!e Rise in Food Prices in Israel.” !e Knesset’s Research and Information Center, 2011.

176 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e People's Army? Orthodox Soldiers and 10 Religious Dilemmas in the IDF

Alongside the public debate regarding Israel’s ceremony of the state’s 53rd Independence Day social and economic divisions, which emerged (more than a decade ago!).1 along with a wave of protests last summer, another About a month after the Yizkor controversy broke discursive strand has also surfaced. It focuses on in the media, fuel was added by two further events. the impact of religion on Israeli society, with the !e first, the farewell letter of General Avi Zamir, IDF—as a manifestation of Israel’s complex human outgoing IDF head of human resources, in which mosaic—right in the eye of the storm. he urged the curbing of religious radicalization in In late spring 2011, Chief of Sta" Benny the IDF triggering a flare-up among both secular Gantz approved a standard version of the and religious groups. !e second was a study by Dr. Yizkor (Remembrance) prayer in military Neri Horowitz, commissioned by the chief of sta"’s commemoration ceremonies. His decision women’s issues adviser, which also warned against generated great controversy (and was later revised accepting rabbinic demands and further religious at the recommendation of a special committee radicalization in the IDF. In September 2011, the Gantz himself appointed ). !is was the latest in issue was once again a top news story when four a long-standing debate about which form of the religious o#cers’ course cadets were discharged— prayer should be used in o#cial IDF memorial and five more disciplined—after walking out of an ceremonies. Should it be the o#cial version event commemorating Operation Cast Lead, in stipulated in General Sta" Orders and based defiance of orders, when women soldiers went on on Berl Katzenelson’s eulogy in memory of the stage to sing. fallen in the Battle of Tel-Hai (“Yizkor Am Israel,” !e four were expelled from the o#cers’ course i.e., “May the Nation of Israel Remember”), or for refusing orders, failing to return to the hall, the version proposed by Rabbi Goren (“Yizkor and for expressing no remorse for their actions. Elohim,” i.e., “May God Remember”) the traditional Subsequently, other cases have surfaced, some religious version, which has gradually crept into involving local frictions and others of a more military texts, and has been in use since the o#cial ideological-political nature, including street

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 177 rallies and protests, speeches in the Knesset and the People" model advanced by David Ben-Gurion, discussions in the O#ce of the Chief of Sta". All who maintained that the military was an apolitical of this illustrates the extreme tension that attends state body for which the obligation to serve must the integration and growing involvement of apply to every segment of the population in order religious soldiers in the IDF. to achieve equality. Instead of creating closed units for religious youth, basic mechanisms should be !is is not the first time charges of religious takeover instituted to enable religious soldiers to integrate or IDF radicalization have been raised. !e causes in the army and serve without jeopardizing and headlines that had fueled previous episodes are their faith and lifestyle.4 Ben-Gurion, however, quite similar to this most recent eruption. In 2008, consented to the request of Agudat Israel’s leaders, three religious soldiers were jailed after refusing to and already in 1948 had agreed to postpone the attend a course taught by a female instructor.2 In draft for yeshiva students defined under Toratam 2005, a headline shouted Omanutam (full-time Torah Study as Vocation). “IDF Presents: Modesty A primary At the time, only a few hundred students were Guards.” And there was objective of the classified as such. In 1977, with the ascent of Likud a public outcry in 2002 new pre-military and the establishment of a new coalition led by when Yoel Marshak, the preparatory Menachem Begin, the Haredi Agudat Israel party Kibbutz Movement’s colleges is to was approached to join the new coalition, and as head of the Department provide religious part of those negotiations it was agreed that the of Projects urged kibbutz young people a quota restricting the number of military service youth to aspire to and way to integrate Toratam Omanutam deferrals would be lifted. strive for o#cer roles in the into regular IDF Because of these political agreements, and despite army, “in order to prevent tracks special arrangements introduced into the IDF a situation in which a at its establishment (such as keeping kosher and few years from now the observing the Sabbath), in the early years of the majority of the junior state, the recruitment rate among the National- o#cer echelon would be manned by ‘skullcap Religious was lower than their share of the general wearers,’ [Orthodox men,]” a phenomenon that population. !is was primarily due to their anxiety he called inconceivable in a secular country.3 !ese that military service would lead to the corruption stories and many similar ones in the last decade of religious youth through their exposure to an have captured headlines and provoked agitated undesirable environment of cultural and social responses. Several recent events—their severity, influences they perceived as negative. intensity, and the sentiment manifest in reactions to them—have been noteworthy. After the War of Independence, the Nahal battalion served as the primary framework for the integration !e historical relationship between religion and the of religious-Zionist youth in the army, thanks to military has largely been influenced by the "Army of

178 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the program’s unique features, a combination !ey encouraged National-Religious youth to stand of military training, agricultural training, and at the forefront of the national project, to settle settlement. Although Kerem B’Yavneh Yeshiva was and protect the land, and to defend the territories established in 1953, it was only in 1965, following already liberated.8 !e establishment of the protracted negotiations between National- Hesder Yeshivot was a great boost in logistical and Religious faction rabbis and army commanders, a technical terms, and the founding of Gush Emunim historic compromise was reached, which granted provided the spiritual motivation and drive behind the yeshiva recognition as a Hesder (arrangement) the increase in the number of yeshiva student IDF Yeshiva.5 As part of the compromise, the army recruits. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s, despite committed to assign religious recruits designated a substantial increase in the number of National- Hesder students to closed, homogenous units and Religious yeshiva recruits, shorten the active duty period of their service, in a both sides remained IDF leadership scheme similar to the Nahal. In return, the rabbis frustrated. The army complained agreed to table their demands for exempting all leadership complained that most yeshiva students from military duty.6 that most religious religious inductees did not enroll !e establishment of the Hesder Yeshivot was not inductees did in o#cer courses, were the only factor leading to increased recruitment not enroll not prepared to assume rates among religious Zionists. !e Yom Kippur in o#cer command responsibilities, War, which led to the negotiations over the terms courses of a ceaseﬁre—including the possibility of Israeli and, in general, served demobilization from the Suez Canal and the Golan much shorter terms Heights, thereby threatening the territorial integrity than required in the of “the Greater Land of Israel,” was the catalyst for the regular training program. founding of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) Conversely, religious movement in 1974. Gush Emunim’s ideology was inductees expressed an eagerness to join combat based on the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Yitzhak units and to become o#cers, but their abbreviated Hacohen Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. program made these positions di#cult to achieve. !ey believed that the establishment of the Jewish At the time, many of the graduates of National- state contained a messianic, redemptive meaning Religious educational institutions (more than 70%) that had evinced their key tenets, divinely inspired who chose to join the army as general recruits, took commandments to settle, annex and safeguard o" their skullcaps during their military service, “Greater Israel.”7 Gush Emunim members saw which alarmed their parents and teachers. themselves as the vanguard with a mission to point A desire to change the situation led to reinvigorated the right way to other Zionists, arouse the Jewish thinking about integration strategies, and in 1987, People of Israel and snap them out of their weakness. the ﬁrst religious pre-military preparatory college

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 179 (Mechina) was established in the Shomron region number of religious-Zionist IDF recruits in general, settlement of Eli.9 !e primary objective of these new and into combat units and command positions in colleges was to prepare religious soldiers to assume particular. Although the social composition of the leadership positions in the IDF by providing a robust IDF is a well-kept secret, partial data indicate that, in religious-ideological program designed to orient 1990, the share of religious combat soldiers among them to cope with secular inﬂuences. At the same graduates of advanced infantry o#cer training time, high-level IDF o#cers engaged in discussions courses was 2.5%, by the end of the 1990s it was with the Hesder Yeshiva leaders to extend the scope around 15%, in 2008 it reached 26%, and in the of Hesder programs, so that the length of religious latest infantry o#cers course it was 42%. (According soldiers’ military service could be extended to to the 2010 Israeli Statistics Abstract, in 2009 the approximate the length of the regular service period. share of non-Haredi Orthodox aged over 20 in the Today, according to Ministry of Education ﬁgures, general population was 11.7%).11 Other data suggest there are 17 religious and 18 secular pre-military that more than a quarter of company and regiment colleges recognized and accredited by the IDF and commanding o#cers are religious, and about a third other state authorities.10 !ese new frameworks of o#ces course graduates, in the last decade, have have contributed to a substantial increase in the worn skullcaps.12

Share of Combat Soldiers out of Preparatory Share of O#cers out of Preparatory Pre- Pre-Military Colleges and among General IDF Military Colleges and among General IDF Recruits 2001-2004 (males only) Recruits 2001-2004 (males only)

Combat Support Did not Non- Did not Year Framwork Year Framwork O#cers Soldiers Troops Serve O#cers Serve 2001 Preparatory 82.8% 16.1% 1.1% 2001 Preparatory 25.9% 73.0% 1.1% IDF General 38.4% 61.6% - IDF General 9.3% 90.7% - 2002 Preparatory 76.7% 21.4% 1.9% 2002 Preparatory 22.3 75.8% 1.9% IDF General 39.3% 60.7% - IDF General 8.6% 91.4% - 2003 Preparatory 80.0% 16.9% 3.1% 2003 Preparatory 23.0% 73.9% 3.1% IDF General 40.2% 59.8% - IDF General 8.2% 91.8% - 2004 Preparatory 80.1% 18.2% 1.7% 2004 Preparatory 20.5% 77.9% 1.7% IDF General 40.8% 59.2% - IDF General 7.1% 92.9% -

Data taken from B . (2010). !e place of skullcap wearers in IDF’s tactical command. Maarachot, 432, p. 55.

180 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Combined, the substantial increase in the number 2. Social and Cultural Gaps: Fundamental of observant recruits and their integration in di"erences between the secular and religious command roles, along with a concomitant decline communities and the di#culties in bridging in other sectors, have forced the military to make the gaps between them in inherently rigid and certain compromises designed to reduce tensions demanding frameworks such as the military and and to ensure the continued recruitment of highly observant Jewish religious practice have led to motivated youth who regard their military duty as perceptions that the religious pose a threat—the a mission to fulfill their ideals. “other” who attempts to impose his ideology on the military and Israeli A Number of Factors May Explain the society writ large. In this Today, the Worsening Crisis in Religious-Secular context, one must bear number Relations in the IDF: in mind that religious of combat 1. Numeric Disparity in Recruitment and Sharing Zionism is a legitimate soldiers, the Defense Burden: Between 1985 and 1996 the stream of Israeli society commanders, rate of participation in combat forces and command that attempts to integrate & o#cers from programs declined from around 90% willingness to and exercise influence in religious-Zionist enlist to about 70%. !is phenomenon is known as Israeli society in general circles far the "motivation crisis." A key manifestation of the and the IDF in particular exceeds their crisis was the drop in the rate of volunteering for (as do other groups, such share of the combat service in IDF select units by members of as women who advocate population the "old elites," including kibbutzim and top high full gender equality in school graduates in urban centers.13 Religious- the military). Religious Zionist youth who, in that period secured extensive Zionists are not trying to rebel against state accommodations facilitating their IDF service, structures, but to instill them with more of their comprised the primary demographic to fill this own conceptions and beliefs. Another important vacuum, and today the number of combat soldiers, distinction must be made between di"erent views commanders and o#cers from religious Zionist and trends within religious Zionism itself, which circles far exceeds their share of the population. At is hardly monolithic and is composed of several least for the short term, the deal has paid o" for distinct sub-groups. At one end of the spectrum all concerned: Israeli society and the IDF benefit are the Haredi-nationalists (Hardalim), whose from a greater reservoir of highly motivated, more extremist members are drawn as negative capable recruits, while religious-Zionist voices caricatures of religion in the mainstream Israeli more fully participate in the national consensus. In consciousness. At the other end are the “Modern the long run, however, this could have far-reaching Orthodox” who actively oppose the Hardalim, and implications for the “Army of the People” model.14 advocate liberalism, openness, and moderation.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 181 !e majority of the religious-Zionist public is mass civil disobedience, let alone extreme violence. somewhere in the middle, blending characteristics !e religious leadership accepted IDF involvement, from both poles.15 and the number of religious o#cers has continued 3. Political and Ideological Gaps: Many Israelis to grow since. associate the religious-Zionist camp with Gush Disagreements and predictions regarding the Emunim and the right wing. !is gains currency future conduct of religious-Zionist youth continue when the army is faced with di#cult concrete to concern Israeli decision makers and IDF leaders, tasks such as dismantling settlements and policing and academics and political scientists who study the West Bank. !e main concern in this context the subject are looking for solutions. !ere are still is that, to quote Yoram Perry, “under controversial pressing concerns and gloomy predictions that political and military future settlement dismantling will not be tolerated !e Gaza circumstances, the gap quietly in religious-Zionist quarters. Some argue disengagement between one's military that the lesson religious-Zionist youth took from showed that and ideological stances the Gaza disengagement is that quiet struggle fails, collaboration could be blurred.”16 and that, in the event of future evacuations, they between IDF !e execution of the must be much louder and consider more violent commanders Gaza disengagement forms of resistance. As mentioned above, religious and religious- in the summer of 2005 Zionism is not a monolith but a broad collection Zionist leaders showed that, in reality, of people, attitudes and beliefs, and in attempting prevented collaboration between to imagine scenarios and create forecasts, we must disobedience IDF commanders and take the silent (and moderate) religious-Zionist within IDF ranks religious-Zionist leaders majority into account.17 could yield solutions 4. !e Dual-Hierarchy Mechanism: In the that prevent mass public process of shaping the historical relationship outcry and disobedience within IDF ranks. As between religion and the military, a dual system the Gaza evacuation was being prepared, the was created, with IDF encouragement, in which IDF High Command issued explicit orders not religious soldiers are subject to both military to compel religious soldiers to take part in commands and the wishes of their rabbis. !is the operation. At the same time, considerable poses significant di#culty—first and foremost— e"orts were made in the civic and religious to individual soldiers, as they try to navigate this arenas to create and encourage dialogue. dual-management model and figure out where Bleak predictions about the disengagement their loyalties lie—whether they should obey the proved false thanks to the caution shown by the military framework of which they are a part, or IDF, along with the patience and reserve exhibited the rabbis who sent them to the IDF and continue by many religious-Zionist leaders. !ere was no to support them during their military duty. A

182 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE recent example of this dilemma can be found in in combat forces by protesting their integration as statements by Rabbi Elyakim Levanon, head of instructors, to Kol B’Isha Erva (the female voice has the Alon Moreh Hesder Yeshiva, regarding the an erotic quality)21 controversy, which outraged controversy over women singing at IDF events much of the Israeli public and spread outside the and ceremonies: “[IDF rabbis] are bringing us close army into a broad-based protest.22 !e tension to a situation in which we will have to tell [male] between a growing feminist consciousness that soldiers, ‘You have to leave such events even if a cannot consent to the exclusion of women in the ﬁring squad is set up outside, and you will be shot public sphere, on one hand, and the purported to death.’”18 !is dual authority is problematic for infringement of religious customs on the other, are the army as well, since the present framework major factors in the current escalation of the crisis gives inordinate power to yeshiva heads, who between religious Zionism and the IDF, and within maintain an ongoing dialogue with the army over religious Zionism itself.23 the terms and nature of their constituents’ service 6. Ambiguity in IDF “Appropriate Integration” and have free access to army bases where they are rules: In 2003, a high- stationed.19 !e yeshiva heads’ bargaining power level committee headed Yeshiva heads' and suasion with the IDF increase proportionately by General Yiftah Rontal, bargaining with the rising rate of recruitment and volunteering then commander of IDF power with for combat duty among religious youth. ground forces, issued the the IDF 5. Increase in the Number of Female Soldiers policy paper “Appropriate increases and their Incorporation into Combat Units: As Integration.” Its guidelines proportionately pointed out by the sociologist Yagil Levi,20 the clash stipulate that, in every with rising rates between women and religious soldiers is multi- training exercise or course of religious dimensional. Some prominent dimensions involve aimed at both sexes, soldiers the desire within each group to instill its cultural where there is the risk of in combat values in the other to create an environment physical contact—Yihud positions more suitable to its side. Other dimensions in Halachic terminology are less obvious, such as the desire to set the —religious soldiers would national agenda and maximize inﬂuence, and be assigned to single-sex units; it is adamant that the perception of military duty—by both liberal religious soldiers must not be forced to serve in feminism and the religious sector—as a vehicle for mixed-gender combat units. In addition, the paper accumulating power, social mobility, and political sets out ground rules regarding matters of modesty, capital outside the army, or at least to clear some separate accommodations in army barracks, and of the obstacles to accessing such resources. more.24 Today, more than ever before, it seems !ese ideological clashes are evident in countless that Appropriate Integration policies are causing everyday IDF activities—from objecting to women problems: on one hand, the many grey areas in

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 183 its phrasing are forcing low-ranking field o#cers religious Zionist youth, mainly in postponing their to deal with many broad and complex dilemmas, army service during their studies in Hesder yeshivot which the army refuses to resolve. On the other and Mechinot. It should be noted that a similar hand, in recent months it is increasingly argued arrangement serves secular youth who volunteer that the very implementation of Appropriate for a “service year” or enroll in secular Mechinot. Integration policies erodes the status of women !e great fear is that the bill’s structure creates a in the IDF. In response to the problem, Prof. dilemma among religious youth, or perhaps even Yedidia Stern, the Israel Democracy Institute’s vice a negative incentive, to leave Hesder yeshivot and president for research, has suggested that “what is opt for the "Torah Study as Vocation” arrangement needed is a multi-faceted policy of setting limits instead. while allowing commanders to be flexible… On 8. Dedicated Frameworks for Religious-Zionist the other hand, the carrot needs to be used along Recruits: Many religious-Zionist recruits enlist with the stick: After setting limits, the army should at a later age, having studied in Hesder yeshivot/ go the extra mile on behalf Mechinot, and they stay a#liated with these !is framework of religious soldiers, and mediating structures, which are governed by is a force allow prudent o#cers civilian rabbis. !is framework, especially at this multiplier for the flexibility to deal with youthful stage of life, is a force multiplier for the 25 the rabbis’ specific issues." rabbis’ influence, on their young adherents as well influence on 7. !e Arrangement— as the army; this rabbinical influence tends to their young " To r a h S t u d y a s dwindle among older/adult religious Zionists. adherents and Vocation": Having been 9. Growing Media Involvement: Many issues, the army enforced as a temporary which previously were resolved within individual regulation since the army units, are currently talked about publicly in days of David Ben- a loud and widespread debate playing out in the Gurion, the arrangement media. One of the key problems is that due to the was crystalized in the nature of media coverage, most of the events on Tal Bill (2002), which the agenda tend to focus on the sensational—the stipulates that youngsters whose only vocation most visible and extreme voices make the news, is Torah learning, and who are eligible under the while more moderate voices of the majority are law, may be granted postponement of military ignored. duty for one year. !is postponement may be extended in additional one-year increments, up to full exemption from military duty. Designed specifically to accommodate the needs of the Haredi community, the arrangement serves many

184 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE !e overall picture, however, is not so already functioning as fair mediators, generally bleak, and there are some reconciliatory capable of looking at both sides of the divide factors in play as well: between the IDF and the religious Zionist youth and compassionately comprehending the di#culties 1. !e Army of the People: !e IDF constitutes a and limitations of each. In addition, they act as human mosaic of cultures, which reflects the whole role models, and their experience in navigating the of Israeli society, and is perceived as a catalyst for system’s inherent di#culties sets an example and integration and communication between sectors. can provide a basis for finding middle ground. Despite an erosion in the army’s status in recent years, this idea remains at the core of national 4. !e Existence of Authority Structures and consensus, and many vehemently object to any Decision Rules: !e IDF provides several structures breach of the Army of the People principle.26 and rules designed to minimize frictions or 2. Mediating Structures: !ere are a number of !e IDF o"er solutions. !ese such structures in the Israeli system interfacing is a include adjustments that between the army and the people. Some human mosaic had been made in the operate outside the military system but with its of cultures, past and the Appropriate endorsement and encouragement, such as the which reflects Integration Order (from Hesder Yeshivot and pre-military preparatory the whole the legal aspect), and IDF colleges, and other mediating structures exist of Israeli institutional structures directly under IDF auspices, such as its Yeshivot society such as the Yeshiva Section and the Military Rabbinate. !ese bodies Section and Military assist in bridging gaps between the secular and the Rabbinate. Despite the religious and regulating pressures between them. many grey areas that exist, Experience shows that when their disagreements most of the problems are are made public they foster a hostile atmosphere, adequately addressed within existing frameworks. whereas settling disputes in the reconciliatory and tolerant settings these mediating bodies provide 5. A Liberal Culture that Promotes Tolerance decreases hostility levels often enabling the parties and Reciprocity: Despite the many di#culties to achieve an arrangement acceptable to both.27 and the inherently rigid military setting, military leaders, state o#cials, and the mainstream of 3. Increased Numbers of Religious Soldiers in religious Zionism, have all called for finding Command Positions (including senior o#cers): In solutions amicably, with consideration and respect recent years there has been a substantial increase in for di"erent views and beliefs. the number of ‘skullcap wearers’ in key IDF command positions which has also proven to be a significant One must not underestimate the rapid succession of rapprochement enhancer. !ese commanders are events that have taken place within the IDF recently.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 185 In the State of Israel, military and political elites It is the government, and not the security agencies, are intertwined through both the incorporation that is responsible for paving the way for drawing of the military elite into political decision-making up a social-cultural contract to provide rules, tools processes, and in its function as a human resources and guidelines related to the state’s vision of the reservoir for the political system (and, more and complex relationship between religious and secular more, the business sector as well). Revisions and groups in Israel, and especially with respect to the decisions introduced in the military arena carry state and its national agencies. In this way we could major social and political implications for Israeli potentially avoid future internal conflicts, or at society as a whole. As former Chief Military Rabbi least alleviate tensions, to create a more tolerant, Brigadier General (Ret.) Avihai Rontzki astutely liberal and supportive Israeli society. described it, “the struggle over control of the IDF is a battle over the shape of Israeli society.” !e IDF is at the forefront of a culture clash between opposing ttt forces, each vying to impose its approach and normative values. But this “Price Tag” is not the only front, nor !e Second Axis of the Clash: attacks began the last. !e Religious Right, the IDF, to appear in and the Government !e responsibility for 2008, to create finding solutions and Although it is beyond the scope of this writing to balance of terror coping strategies for this address the causal-ideological connection between to dissuade the social challenge cannot the religious radicalization of parts of the religious- government rest solely on the shoulders Zionist faction and their radicalized rightwing from of IDF commanders. !e political leanings, recent events, including the dismantling army is capable of dealing escalation in violent “Price Tag” acts by extremist certain with the problem within settler groups—against Israelis and Palestinians settlements the military setting by alike—cannot be ignored. solving localized conflicts Price Tag attacks began to appear in 2008. At first, (using existing means and ground rules and the these acts were aimed at Palestinians as part of the prudent application of conciliatory measures), struggle and competition over land, and as acts of and by setting guidelines for the period of military revenge, sanctioned by a number of rabbis,28 for service (such as the Appropriate Integration order). Palestinian terror attacks against Jews. Although But in order to address the root of the problem, a acts of revenge, on both sides, are nothing new, broader decision is needed, guided by a national the Price Tag acts of violence and vandalism are and social vision from which clear definitions can be distinct because they have been responses to what derived and translated into unambiguous policy. the government and the army have been doing in

186 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE the territories: attempting to demolish structures in Hilltop Youth] are wonderful youth, busy settling outposts and evacuate settlers. !e goal, at first, of and redeeming the land, not wasting their time those planning and executing Price Tag attacks was with drinking and violence. !e establishment to create a balance of terror that would force the of Garinim Toraniyim (Torah Nuclei)30 and the government to reverse its intention to dismantle Teshuva movement are a tremendous process that certain settlements. !en the Price Tag perpetrators will have a massive e"ect on the people of Israel upped the ante and decided on two new courses of who are thirsty for any morsel of Judaism.”31 Rabbi action. One was the use of focused violence against Lior also weighed in on the female singing issue, IDF property (such as destroying military vehicles when a public a"airs body he heads, Beit Horaa at the Benjamin Division base and torching tires), L’Inyanei Tzibur, ruled that orders to listen to and recently also against key army figures (such as women singing are clearly stoning the commander of the Ephraim Division); illegal, and that those the other involves activities inside Israel (among who choose to obey them others, the desecration of Muslim and Christian would be held responsible Rabbi Dov Lior: burial grounds in Ja"a, and mosque torchings in for their actions. Tuba Zangariya in the Galilee, and in Jerusalem). 29 "!e Hilltop !e great fear is that such Youth are Since the late 1960s, two major trends have statements by Rabbi Lior wonderful, characterized radical religious Zionism. One and some of his colleagues busy settling is increasing religious observance—among could inspire further and redeeming other things, in matters of modesty and gender violence by religious- the land” relations—and another is the increased level of Zionist youth, whether political engagement and other activities meant to through direct or indirect preserve the integrity of “Greater Israel.” !e diverse influence. !ere is concern phenomena accompanying these trends are merely too that they may foment di"erent manifestations of the same ideological stigmatization of those religious-Zionist youth conception. Many of the rabbis are responsible who choose to join the army. for this religious radicalization, and for supplying For the most part, the religious-Zionist public has the ideological arsenal and purported Halachic been, and still is, a staunchly Zionistic community justification for political radicalization as well. that is deeply committed to the State of Israel and its Some play a role in the violent activities of settler frameworks. However, the attacks by some within youth, albeit mostly indirectly. One salient example their ranks on the IDF, the state, and its agencies are of this phenomenon can be found in a statement certainly alarming. !ese developments and their by Rabbi Dov Lior, who has repeatedly supported social and political implications will be a focus of and praised the “Hilltop Youth” who, it is alleged, study and analysis in the ongoing work of JPPI. perpetrate "Price Tag" attacks: “Noar Hagvaot [ the

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 187 Notes

1 Perry, Yoram. (2007). A New Military Elite. In Ben Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), "Statistical Abstract Raphael, E., Sternberg, Y., et al (eds.), New Elites in Israel, of Israel 2011," Table 7.4: Persons aged 20 and over, by p 133. religiosity and by selected characteristics: www.cbs. gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton.html?num_ 2 Rothenberg, Hagit, “!e Battle over Camp Sanctity”, tab=st07_04x&CYear=2011> (last access January 8, Channel 7. (14/02/2008). 2012). 3 “Senior Kibbutz Movement o#cial warns against 12 Supra, Perry (2007), p. 26. religious ‘takeover’ of IDF,” Walla editorial board, December 3rd, 2002. 13 For a a discussion, see Spiegel, Udi (2001). Motivation to Serve. !e Knesset Research and Information Center [in 4 Drori, Zeev. (2005). Between Faith and Army: "e Haredi Hebrew]. Levy, Yagil (2007). From the Army of the People to Nahal Battalion: Risks and Opportunities, Floresheimer the Army of the Periphery, pp. 67-68, 85; Perry, "New Elites," Institute for Policy Studies, pp. 13-14. p. 122, 127-127. 5 B. (2010). !e place of skullcap wearers in IDF’s tactical 14 !is opinion was voiced by both sides: in a Arutz command. Maarachot, p. 51 [in Hebrew]. Sheva interview in 2004, Rabbi Eli Sadan said that “if the 6 “… !ere is a need for military people and weapons, religious sector takes over the army it will be a Pyrrhic and equally important, a lot of people of Torah and faith. victory” (Knitted Beret, July 8th, 2004); in a Maariv We have said that two commands are upon us: to be great interview upon completing his term as Paratroops in Torah and to serve in the army to save us from our Division Commander, Brigadier General Herzi Levi enemies” (Drori, 2005, p. 13); Janet O'Dea (1977). Gush said: “Today the situation is distorted, and no one can Emunim: Roots and Ambiguities. Bitfutzot Hagola, No. be happy about it. !e religious population cannot be 79/80, 18th year, Winter 1977, pp. 95-103. boastful and say, ‘great, our share of soldiers and o#cers 7 O'Dea (ibid.). is growing’, because this is not good for anyone. !e short-term gain is a major threat in the long term.” 8 Eldar, Akiva, & Zertal, Edit (2004). "Masters of the Land: Settlers and the State of Israel 1967-2004", p. 265, 269. 15 For more on this issue, see, for instance: Sheleg, Yair (2002). On the brink of division in religious Zionism. 9 Huberman, Hagai, "Knitted Beret". Arutz Sheva, July 8, Haaretz, March 26, 2002; Fischer, Shlomo (Forthcoming). 2004. Turning point or continuity? Torah regime, citizenship 10 Ministry of Education website: and the sources of radical Zionism in Zeev Shavit, www.cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/ Orna Sasson-Levy and Gai Ben Porat (eds.) Identities, Mechinot_Kdam/Mechinot/. Boundaries and Spaces of Classiﬁcation, !e Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Kibbutz HaMeuchad. ; Cohen, 11 !e data regarding the rate of combat soldiers in Asher (2009). !e skullcap and the beret: Image and previous years were taken from B. (2010), p. 53; data reality – the public discourse on religious Zionism and regarding the last advanced infantry training were military service. In Moshe Rachimi (ed.), Sefer Amadot,: taken from Harel, Amos, A di"erent IDF. Haaretz, "e Beret and the Kippa, Orot College, Elkana, pp. 95- November 11, 2011; data regarding the share of 114. religious people in the population are taken from the

188 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 16 Supra, Perry (2007), pp. 133-134. 28 One of the rabbis who explained and even justified revenge acts was Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg, head of the 17 For an elaboration and internal view of the struggle Od Yosef Hai yeshiva in Yitzhar, among others in his within religious Zionism, see: Stern, Eliezer (2009). book Kuntreis Baruch Hagever, which relates to the "Knowing to Disengage." In Massa Kumta: Navigating at massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein in the Cave Eye Level, pp. 193-220. of the Patriarchs. !ese ideas are elaborated in: Fischer, 18 Halevi, Abraham. "Sacrifice the soul over women’s Shlomo (2007)"Nature, Authenticity and Violence in singing, even soldiers are shot to death." Kikar Hashabat, Radical Religious Zionist !ought", in Hannah Herzog, November 17, 2011. Tal Kochavi and Shimshon Zelniker (eds.), Generations, 19 Supra, Levi (2007), pp. 88, 262, 264. Locations, Identities: Contemporary Perspectives on Society and Culture in Israel, Essays in Honor of Shmuel Noah 20 Levi, Yagil (2008). "Proper/Hesitant integration: A Eisenstadt. Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and HaKibbutz Proposal for a multi-dimensional analysis of the women- HaMeuchad, Tel Aviv. (Hebrew). religious struggle in the IDF," Public Space Journal of Politics and Society, Vol. 2. 29 Fischer, "!e State Crisis and Potential for Uncontrollable Violence in Israel-Palestine," Workshop 21 B. Brachot 24a. Kidushin 70a. on Religion, Violence and War, Institute for !eological 22 See, for instance: Ravid, Barak. Netanyahu: !e Inquiry, Princeton !eological Seminary, Princeton, N.J., exclusion of women is an issue the secular public will not October 30 – November 1, 2011, pp. 35-36. concede. Haaretz, November 27, 2001; Liss, Yehonatan, 30 Groups of highly religious and highly nationalistic and Bar-Zohar, Ophir. Proposed bill: Religious soldiers to young religious-Zionist couples who go to urban towns have impunity from women’s singing. Haaretz, November and neighborhoods to intensify religious life. 29, 20011; Bender, Arik. Peres against the exclusion of women: ‘Public spaces must not be made into foci of 31 Katz, Menachem, Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, "Encourage discrimination’. NRG, December 12, 2011. Arab Emigration" Kikar Hashabat, April 16, 2009; also cited in Newsflash, "Rabbi Lior calls for support of hilltop 23 Expressions of the various positions within religious youth," Arutz Sheva, December 7, 2011. Zionism may be found here: Navon, Haim. "Women’s singing: !e world must have gone mad," Ynet, November 20, 2001; Editorial by Elazar Stern: "Less rabbis; less fabricated laws," Srugim, September 14, 2001; Nachshoni, Kobi. "!e army enforces women’s singing? Rather be shot to death than listen," Ynet, November 17, 2001. 24 Supra, Levi (2008). 25 Harel, Amos. "A di"erent IDF," Haaretz, November 18, 2011. 26 Supra, Perry (2007), p. 135. 27 Rosman-Stolman, Elisheva. "Army and Religion as Demanding Systems: IDF and Religious Zionism," Ph.D. Dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 2006.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 189

Science and Technology Policy in a 11 Jewish People Context

Science and Technology and Israel’s Jews are enormously over-represented among Apparently Growing Isolation the greatest scientific minds of modern times. A Jewish scientist received a Nobel Prize for the On October 5, 2011 the Nobel Prize Committee first time in 1905, an Israeli scientist only in 2002, honored Prof. Dan Schechtman of the Technion long after the creation of Israel. Some noted that (Israel Institute of Technology) in Haifa with a the number of Israeli Nobel laureates was very Nobel Prize for his outstanding achievements small compared to the number Jewish laureates in chemistry. He became the fifth Israeli Nobel outside Israel, during a period when the share of laureate in science or economics—or the sixth the world’s Jews residing in Israel grew from around if one includes an Israeli scholar who lives in the 6 percent to more than 40 percent. Naturally, they United States. Schechtman was the sole recipient wondered whether this indicated a basic weakness in chemistry, which is a rare distinction as the of Israeli science that might continue in the future. overwhelming majority of Nobel awards in all disciplines are today shared by two or three Of course, there are other indicators of strength laureates. For a few days, Israelis and many Jews in science and technology (S&T). !e number forgot their usual concerns and celebrated the of scientific publications is one. In less than event. Some recalled that the number of Jews thirty years, Israel has become the latest of the among the Nobel laureates has been, from the “small big powers” in scientific research and beginning, amazingly large. Between 1901 and publications, comparable in many ways to Sweden 2011, 621 scientists or economists received Nobel or Switzerland, countries that are still much Prizes; at least 152 of them were Jews by religion richer and had a century to develop their current or origin. !is is 25 percent. As the proportion strength in science. In 1996/97, Israel contributed of Jews in the world population declined during 2.5 percent of the world’s publications in the 20th century from approximately 0.5 percent mathematics (compared with Sweden’s 1.0 percent; down to 0.2 percent today, one could say that Switzerland’s 1.3 percent), 1.5 percent in physics/ astronomy (Sweden 1.8 percent, Switzerland 2.5

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 191 percent) and 1.2 percent in neuroscience (Sweden at least one sector where Israel currently does not 2.7 percent, Switzerland 1.3 percent). Israel’s seem to be isolated, but where the country’s links scientific publications kept increasing year by and exchanges keep growing year by year: science year in absolute numbers, but by 2009/10 Israel’s and technology (S&T). When it comes to S&T, performance became weaker when measured as Israel’s international reputation is undiminished. percentage of total world publications, in some Its cooperation with foreign countries—big and fields more so than the performance of Sweden small—and multinational research organizations and Switzerland, mostly due to the lack of financial is increasing. !ree significant examples should resources (Mathematics: Israel 1.6 percent, be mentioned. In September 2011 CERN (the Sweden 1.0 percent, Switzerland 1.6 percent; Center of European Nuclear Research) named Physics/Astronomy: Israel Israel as one of five additional countries “worthy” of joining its Large Hadron Collider (LHC). !is !e Cornell- 1.0 percent, Sweden 1.4 is currently the world’s largest collaborative Technion bid percent, Switzerland 2.2 scientific experiment, involving 6,500 scientists came first in percent; Neuroscience: from 80 countries. Isolated boycott calls from a a competition Israel 1.3 percent, Sweden few European militants who did not belong to the between 1.8 percent, Switzerland scientific community were ignored. Israel’s formal seven major 1.4 percent). A third inclusion in this project has certainly increased the universities measure is Israel’s strength country’s prestige in the global academic research and consortia in science-based (high- tech) and defens e community. And in December 2011, the Technion technologies. Israel’s in Haifa, jointly with Cornell in New York, won a defense R&D expenditures bid to build a new applied science campus in New have remained at a high York City. !e Cornell-Technion bid came first in a level during the last competition between seven major universities and twenty years. !ey have generated a number of consortia. City o#cials expressed the hope that the impressive technological innovations not reflected new campus would turn New York into a center of in scientific publications. And last but not least, entrepreneurship and technological innovation to the civilian high-tech sector contributes more than rival California’s Silicon Valley. 40% of the country’s industrial exports, although !ird, agricultural and water technologies have it must be added that Israel’s high-tech exports been among Israel’s earliest—Israeli drip irrigation have weakened since summer 2011 due to the systems hit the global marketplace in the 1950s— economic crisis in the West. and most impactful exports. In May 2011, IDE !us, while Israel’s apparently growing political Technologies, an Israeli water desalination company isolation has become a popular theme among that has designed and built 400 desalination Israeli and foreign news commentators, there is plants in 40 countries, with more than a dozen

192 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE desalination plants throughout Asia, mostly in discoveries that enrich our understanding of nature India, won the “Desalination Company of the confer public prestige and generate expectations Year” Global Water Intelligence award for its work that they will benefit all of mankind—that is, soft on China’s largest desalination facility in Tianjin. power. Some experts predict that the ongoing !e Tianjin plant is distinguished not just by its acceleration of scientific research and discovery size, but also because it employs IDE’s Multi-E"ect will bring, by 2050, more radical change to our Distillation (MED) technology, which harnesses planet than S&T has during the last three hundred waste heat and steam from nearby industry and is years. Whether some of these changes will be seen 50 percent more e#cient, and hence greener, than as desirable or not, S&T certainly gives nations any other thermal desalination facility in operation the ability to influence the long-term course of today. history. How a nation performs in S&T will Israel’s adversaries, too, know the role of S&T in Saudi journalist be one of the main the country’s economic and military strength, Fawaz Al’Ilmi: determinants of its place and its international links. On June 7, 2011, the "Israel is at in the great international Saudi columnist Fawaz Al ‘Ilmi published an article the pinnacle power alignments that in the Saudi daily Al-Watan, comparing Israel’s of scientific lie ahead in the coming achievements in S&T to those of the Arabs. “Israel is research, the decades. Israel’s future at the pinnacle of scientific research, the Arabs at its Arabs at its will be decisively a"ected nadir...!is year, Israel published numerous scientific nadir" studies that put it in first place worldwide in terms by both international of the number of studies...As for the Arab countries, and its own scientific they are all at the bottom end of these statistics...Israel and technological has been forming strategic ties with scientifically developments. advanced countries in order to merge with their research centers...” and so on. Al ‘Ilmi’s long article is a remarkably objective, almost admiring analysis of !e Roots of Israel’s Israel’s success story, which is rare in the Arab media Achievements in S&T and particularly in the state-controlled Saudi press. !ere are many, complex roots of Israel’s scientific What may emphasize the Arab failure even more is and technological achievements, and some of the increase in scientific research in Turkey and Iran them go back to the early 20th century if not much st since the beginning of the 21 century. Al ‘Ilmi does earlier. not refer to these countries. t Israel’s universities: !e high standard of S&T is a key source of both “hard” and “soft” power. excellence and international connectedness of It is indispensable for economic as well as military Israeli research started with the creation of the superiority—that is, hard power. And scientific

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 193 country’s first academic research institutes, the t !e visionary statecraft of Israel’s founder Technion in Haifa (founded in 1912 but actually and first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, opened only in 1924), the Hebrew University who understood the critical importance of of Jerusalem (1925) and the Weizmann science for Israel from the beginning and Institute in Rehovot (1934). Two outstanding also knew that Israel would need a coherent scientists, Albert Einstein and Chaim and forward-looking science policy, meaning Weizmann, who would later become Israel’s government support, long-term funding, first president, were the co-founders and initial priority setting and the creation of an fund-raisers of these institutions. !e pursuit appropriate institutional framework. Ben- of scientific excellence Gurion himself was Israel’s first science policy Veblen: was one of the ideals of maker. A small number of other exceptional !e intellectual early Zionism. According personalities, often concerned scientists pre-eminence to current international with or without an o#cial mandate, have in of the Jews, comparisons, the Hebrew subsequent decades helped to shape Israel’s particularly in University, the Technion, S&T policies with their own initiatives. the sciences, the Tel Aviv University and t Defense-oriented research and technologies: is rooted in the Weizmann Institute !e Ministry of Defense and associated their “Creative are among the fifty to one industries spend more on R&D than any Skepticism” hundred best scientific other actor in the country’s S&T system. !e an d te ch n o l o g i c al authorities do not publish comprehensive research institutes the and detailed figures, but the media have world over. estimated that Israel’s total annual defense t A pre-state immigrant population that budget is near to 20 billion dollars, of which had brought from Europe a high level ten percent or even more is invested in R&D of literacy and respect for all forms of and high-tech acquisitions. Defense R&D learning and knowledge: A specific feature has always been the most e"ective single of the Jewish tradition of learning is a catalyst of Israel’s technological progress. It has critical mind and a sometimes excessive spawned the country’s successful informatics argumentativeness. !ese are cultural sector, transferred important innovations traits that greatly facilitate scientific and to the bio-medical sector, and has entered technological innovation. !e sociologist the energy field. Israel is repeating—albeit !orstein Veblen explained what he called on a much smaller scale—the experience of the “intellectual pre-eminence of the Jews” the United States where many of the main particularly in the sciences by their “creative new technology sectors of the 20th century skepticism” (1919). were direct spin-o"s of defense research (e.g.

194 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE nuclear, electronics and informatics, civilian Israel, this enormous infusion of scientific and aircraft, deep-sea technologies). Most of the engineering talent was both unexpected and spin-o" in Israel has occurred through the invaluable. FSU’s immigrant researchers and transfer of R&D personnel from the defense engineers have played a distinguished role in to the civilian sector. Nevertheless, there are lifting Israel to the level of a “small big power.” complaints that Israel’s civilian industry could benefit much more from the country’s defense R&D if civilian entrepreneurs were more pro- Warning Signs active. But it must also be recognized that it is not always easy to cooperate with the defense !roughout history, leadership in science has establishment for security and other reasons. moved from one civilization or country to another. In the 19th and t Israel’s S&T policies are decentralized th 20 centuries, the world FSU immigrant and follow no national master plan. !ey centers of science were in researchers and are a complex, interactive system where central Europe, the United engineers have government ministries and committees, States and Russia, where played a role in the Knesset, the universities, industry Jews made an enormous lifting Israel to and research foundations play di"erent contribution to scientific the level roles which are often, but not always, discovery and innovation, of a “small complementary. !e main power rests in as said above. Israel’s big power” the hands of the Planning and Budgeting achievements can be seen Committee, which allocates the budget for as a more recent sub- higher education; the chief scientist of the chapter in this sudden Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, who explosion of Jewish talent supports industrial research particularly in in science. Whether Israel the high-tech sectors; and last but not least, will be able to hold and improve its place in the in the Finance Ministry, which has the final global S&T race depends on the factors that largely say on S&T funding. explain Jewish and Israeli achievements of the past. t !e immigration from the Former Soviet Some of these factors seem to be stable while Union (FSU): Between the late 1980s and others are changing. today, approximately one million new immigrants arrived from the FSU. Between t Two stable factors: First, Israel’s research 1989 and 1995, 11,000 scientists (according to universities endeavor to maintain a high level Israeli definition) arrived. Between 1990 and of quality and, if it depended on them alone, 1995, 65,000 engineers and architects arrived, would likely continue to be counted among as did 14,000 physicians and dentists. For

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 195 the best in the world. However, it will not t Second is the qualitative decline of pre- depend on them alone. An important part of university education. Here lies one of the their financing is provided by foreign Jewish country’s great weaknesses in regard to its philanthropy, and this is likely to shrink due scientific and technological future. !e average to the global economic crisis. New ways must level of education and performance in science be found to help universities raise additional and mathematics of Israel’s schoolchildren has funds, lest the long-term pursuit of academic been sinking during the last thirty years by research at current levels be jeopardized. international comparison. In several statistical t Second, the Ministry of Defense will assessments, Israel’s children today score slightly continue to pioneer advanced research and less well than the international average, but development in many this average includes a large number of less advanced !ird World countries. Compared Among the fields from which high- with countries where the children are “front Haredim, the tech and other civilian runners” in science and mathematics (e.g. respect for industries can benefit. Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, learning & t Five changing followed by some of the rich OECD countries) knowledge is factors: First, the Israeli children score substantially less well. When enormous, but traditional Jewish Israel’s level of development and its aspirations only for religious respect for learning (and are taken into account, its schoolchildren should knowledge teaching) and every form do as well as the “front runners.” However, Israel of knowledge has not also has islands of educational excellence. !ey disappeared in Israel but are accessible to those living in the cities of is no longer what it once the coastal plain, who are ambitious and enjoy was. It survives mainly the required financial resources. Whatever among a minority. A excellence Israel shows in S&T originates partly particular problem is the rapid growth of from these islands and partly from immigrant the Haredi population. !ere the respect for families, particularly those from the FSU. learning and knowledge is enormous, but only But Israel is probably missing out on a lot of for religious knowledge. !is population may potential talent from the less well-to-do or from contain exceptional talents, but they will be the country’s so-called “periphery.” Also, the lost for science and technology even if some current situation indicates a high and perhaps join the work force. Top-class science demands increasing level of social polarization, which, if a life-long, exclusive commitment, just like not stemmed, will begin to sap Israel’s strength. Torah study, and the best and the brightest In the long run, improving the scientific and Haredi youth will probably continue to focus mathematical proficiency of Israel’s children is on Torah rather than science.

196 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE a sure way to help them to a better future and decade” for Israel’s science. During these years narrow the country’s social gaps. continuous university budget cuts a"ected t !ird, in the next ten or fifteen years, the the quality of teaching and research and great majority of FSU immigrant scientists prevented the hiring of young scientists. !e and engineers, who enriched Israel so much, data cited above, showing Israeli publications will reach retirement age. Currently, there is in several fields of science declining in relative no prospect of another million well-educated terms by international comparison, are an Jews immigrating to Israel in a short time-span The cuts in to replace them. Moreover, their contribution obvious reflection of the “lost decade.” university to Israeli science and technology was not budgets only at the top level. !e FSU immigration !e trend has now changed and during between 2001- also contributed high-quality middle-level 2009 affected technicians and technical engineers upon the last two years the government has the quality whom Israel's high technological and scientific of teaching & achievement also rests. Due to the upcoming begun to compensate for the shortfalls of research, and retirement of the immigrants who came in the prevented the 1990s, Israel may be facing a shortage of this those years. Alas, as said above, the trend hiring of young kind of valuable personnel. In response, the scientists heads of technical colleges have embarked could turn negative upon a public campaign to secure state again if a predicted funding so as to expand and upgrade their downturn in foreign programs. philanthropic contributions is not made up by other means. Past experience, particularly t Fourth, Israel’s science policy presents a in pre-war Germany and the United States, mixed picture. It was indispensable to Israel’s shows that Jews flourish in science and emergence as a scientific power. Its flexible innovation in countries where they do not and decentralized structure is well-adapted face discrimination, and where such activities to the continuously changing, kaleidoscopic enjoy public prestige, high visibility, and the nature of Israeli society and to the messy, generous financial and moral support of the badly coordinated Israeli governance system. authorities. In fact, in these countries the However, the current system is less well suited relative contribution of Jews to science and to protect the long-term needs of S&T when innovation was and is hugely superior to that changing political priorities or short-term of any other small minority. financial constraints require budget cuts or reallocations. !is was obvious during t Fifth, one should be alert to a possible future the years 2001-2009, now called the “lost (though not yet actual) threat to science

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 197 emerging from the academic boycott calls estimates speak of almost 15,000 Israeli researchers by Western pro-Palestinian militants against working in US industry, academia and government Israel’s academia as a part of the general de- laboratories. What is proven by recent studies legitimization campaign against Israel. So far, the however, is that first-generation Israeli immigrant overwhelming majority of these calls have been researchers in the US remain strongly connected to sounded from professors Israel, their families, friends and former colleagues. and students of the social !e time seems ripe for broadening the framework !e time sciences and humanities, of Israeli science policy. In December 2011, a young seems ripe not of the natural sciences Knesset member who understands the crucial for broadening or technology. But some importance of S&T and education, proposed that the framework of the militants have tried Israel should hold an annual scientific conference at of Israeli to extend their boycott which Israeli scientists who had emigrated abroad science calls to science and could present their work. policy mathematics as well, with Can Jews, particularly in the United States, be a little apparent long-term “force multiplier” for Israeli science, comparable success as indicated above. to their engagement as political force multipliers International interaction is in spite of the—apparent—political distancing the lifeblood of modern science. Isolating Israeli between Israel and a part of America’s mostly science—only a conjecture so far—would have liberal Jewish community? Until now, Israeli dramatic consequences. science has been dwarfed by the scientific research e"orts and achievements of Jews across the world. Between 1948, when Israel was created, and 2011, !e Jewish People as 120 American, Russian, French and other Jews an S&T Resource received Nobel Prizes in science and economics, compared with only six Israelis. In technological Many critical observers and experts have trumpeted innovation the proportion could well be similar, these warning signs, particularly Israel’s educational but is impossible to gauge because the definition shortcomings, which are generating a flood of and statistical assessment of both “technological complaints and policy proposals. However, it seems innovation” and “Jewish innovators” are extremely that nobody has yet suggested a policy framework di#cult. Although it is true that a growing number that could include the Jewish People in the Diaspora of Asian scientists are joining American S&T as a potential S&T resource for Israel. !is resource faculties, Jews remain over-represented, sometimes should, of course, include Israelis living abroad, greatly so, in American academia. a number of whom are outstanding academic Many of Israel’s academic and industrial scientists and researchers. Informal, not yet proven researchers are immigrants, mainly from the FSU

198 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE and the United States. However, when we speak of science policy, or the aging of FSU-educated the Jewish People as an “S&T resource” we do not researchers. But some of them could act as “force necessarily mean that they make Aliyah to Israel. multipliers” for Israel if there is su#cient funding, S&T has been a bridge between the Jewish People policy and institutional support across borders, in the world and the Land of Israel almost since the as well as R&D projects that call for international beginning of the Zionist movement, in most cases cooperation. In that case, S&T could even become not leading to Aliyah. Weizmann’s, Einstein’s and an additional link between Israel and Diaspora Jews. other Jewish scientists’ impact on the foundation Not all S&T endeavors will lend themselves to such of Israel’s main academic institutions was cooperation. Most defense and industrial research already mentioned. In our time, interchange and will probably be excluded because it is competitive cooperation between Israeli and Jewish scientists, and therefore confidential. researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs across Other research might Since the the world continue unabated. !is cooperation target specific and beginning of can go beyond research links. During the last few temporary problems of the Zionist years, Jewish scientists and faculty members in one country that call for movement, various countries have been fighting successfully quick answers. But there S&T has been a against the already mentioned boycott threats are also many long-term bridge between and other de-legitimization e"orts targeting Israeli problems of global as well the Jewish academia. Some distinguished scientists who are as Jewish-Israeli relevance People in the Jewish or of Jewish origin have no link with the that lend themselves to world and Israel Jewish community and no religious, cultural or what could be called a Zionist a#liation with Judaism, but are willing to “Jewish People Science be connected to Israeli academia and scientific Policy.” Addressing such research. Many of them are members of the problems would help Israel “Friends of the Hebrew University,” the “Friends and others, and this is likely to elicit interest from of the Technion,” and similar support groups researchers across the world, not least Jews who existing in most countries with Jewish populations. are concerned about the future of Israel. In such One could conjecture that having abandoned all cases Israel could become the global catalyst of a religious or national links with Judaism, it is as transnational research e"ort as long as the funding if such scientists were happy to have found in and the legal and institutional requirements can science a vocation that allows them also to be be met. Funding could turn out to be the most connected with Jews, particularly those in Israel critical condition, although being a catalyst does who share similar value systems. not necessarily require vast sums of money. Obviously, scientists outside Israel cannot make However, in order to avoid any ethnic connotations up for Israel’s failing educational system, its weak or misrepresentations, such a proposal should

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 199 not be presented as a “Jewish People Science and Eastern oil producers weakens and could threaten Technology Policy.” It would be more appropriate Israel’s geopolitical position. It is an ideal example of to use a neutral term and present it as a “Network- a project that should be “network-based” to attract based S&T Policy” replacing a territorial, “Israel-only the participation and support of international policy.” !is formulation would also make clear that scientists and innovators who may be concerned, the initiative would be among other things, about Israel’s future. !e Israeli During the next open to scientists from all government proposal, as originally formulated, 10 years Israel nations and origins. But the has no Jewish People dimension but calls for plans basic idea, of Israel soliciting international cooperation. Today most countries to raise the participation of Jews consider the latter as indispensable to major civilian $4 billion across the world, should be R&D projects and thus include an international to develop explored and implemented. component in these projects. However, a network- oil-substitution !ere are many ways to do based S&T project would, in this case, go beyond the technologies that, for example through traditional forms of inter-state cooperation because the already mentioned it has one government calling not only on other international friendship governments, but even more on a speciﬁc group of groups supporting Israeli concerned persons all over the world. universities. During the next ten years, Israel plans to raise four billion US dollars, a minor part coming from national budgets, as well as from the more than Moving from a Territorial to a sixty national companies already involved in oil- Network-based S&T Policy: !e substitution technologies. !e goal is to develop Case of New Energies to Replace technologies such as certain bio-mass fuels, gas- Oil as Transportation Fuel. liquefaction, gas production from shale rock, and, in the long term, electric cars that may require In early 2011, the Israeli government launched less oil for energy generation than the current gas- a “National Plan to Develop Technologies that driven cars. Together these could begin to replace a Reduce the Global Use of Petroleum-based Fuels considerable proportion—arguably up to 30 or 40 in Transportation and to Boost Knowledge-based percent—of the world’s current use of petroleum Industries Focusing on this Field.” !is project for transportation. Particular attention should be has great global importance because it aims at paid to the requirements of China and India because increasing energy security for all oil-poor countries these two are the fastest growing oil importers. while also reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. It is Many of the proposed technology sectors are of of even greater importance for Israel and the Jewish course, not new, but experts are conﬁdent that a People because the current dominance of Middle large number of recent discoveries and innovations,

200 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE several of them made by Israeli companies, will crucial economic, strategic and environmental greatly accelerate progress in these fields. needs of most of humankind. Several international energy experts have reviewed Additional Policy Directions: and recommended the Israeli initiative. !is could A Provisional List turn Israel into a catalyst of a slow but major paradigm shift in energy technology and into a In order to include a Jewish People component global knowledge center of oil-substitution S&T. in its oil-substitution project, Israel will have to In addition, adding energy-diplomacy to Israel’s think about, and increase the planned legal, relations with Asia, Africa and Russia would also institutional, financial, foreign relations and other likely strengthen Israel’s international position. policy instruments. !e following list needs to be Finally, an important participation of the Jewish further discussed and supplemented: People in this endeavour might have not only hard, t Formulate a transnational, network-based S&T but also soft power implications. policy and design a global infrastructure for !is project was launched almost at the the purpose of Israel’s oil-substitution project. same time as international energy companies Identify the appropriate government branch began to discover enormous fields of natural to launch this policy (e.g. the Prime Minister’s gas in Israel’s territorial waters in the eastern O#ce). Mediterranean. !ese finds will make Israel, in t Set up, at the same time, a national network in a few years, independent of energy imports and Israel that will connect the relevant academic, could transform the country into an important industrial and other actors who currently do energy exporter. In addition, new technologies not often cooperate. for accessing natural gas in shale rock are being developed, making available additional natural t Create a unit to keep in touch with the gas deposits in the US, China, Poland, Israel, international, mainly Jewish scientific and possibly other places. Do these discoveries community (or re-create the one that make the oil-replacement initiative redundant? existed in the 1950s in the Prime Minister’s Israel has indicated that it plans to continue this O#ce). initiative irrespective of the ups-and-downs of oil t Identify a project leader from among Israel’s and gas prices, contrary to the past practice of respected scientists, science administrators or many countries and companies that abandoned innovators. the search for oil substitutes once oil prices t Select an international scientific advisory receded. Ultimately, oil substitutes will have to be board that would meet twice a year to discuss found, and they will be found. !is initiative does the progress of work. not primarily address Israel’s energy needs, which are minimal by international comparisons, but the t Form an “Investors’ Club” by mobilizing

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 201 American Jewish venture-fund owners, not t Create and o"er scholarships at foreign, necessarily to collect money but to get more particularly American, universities to support people involved and draw their attention to research scientists in the relevant ﬁelds and innovation from oil-replacement S&T. ﬁnance the exchange of students. t Explain to Jewish philanthropists that some t Invite and fund Jewish or other foreign long-term fundamental research is a prerequisite researchers to spend time in Israeli research of major breakthroughs in oil replacement centers that work on oil-replacement technologies, and that such pre-competitive technologies. research would be worthy of their support. t Promote public innovation events to highlight t Encourage large private foundations, which the potential of oil-replacement technologies. fund activities linked to the Jewish and Israeli t Strengthen the teaching of S&T, including new future, to support research and innovation in energy technologies, in Israeli and Diaspora oil-replacement technologies. Jewish schools. t Create an annual prize to raise awareness and provide rewards for S&T achievements in oil- replacement technologies. Set up an expert committee to select the prizewinners.

202 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE PART 5

Developments to Watch

12 Developments to Watch

Public Funding for Religious/ Most non-Orthodox families enroll their children Private Schools in the United States in supplementary (afterschool) Jewish schools with minimal educational levels due to their few A number of prominent leaders in the US Jewish hours, over just a few years. If a "level playing field" community have started a new initiative to lobby in terms of expense were established between members of state legislatures to increase public Jewish schools, public schools, and other private funding for Jewish education. schools it would make sense to plan and construct !e basic idea of the new initiative is for the states a new type of Jewish school that would attract to cover the cost of private and religious schools at non-Orthodox parents and their children. the same level as public schools. !is idea is based Both problems—financial burden and lack of upon the principle that taxpayers are eligible for non-Orthodox enrollment—are reflected in the state paid education for their children, whether Avi Chai Partial Survey of Jewish Day Schools, in public or in private schools. !e support state published in December 2011. It shows that the governments would give private and religious overwhelming expansion of all-day, multi-year schools could take a variety of forms: vouchers, Jewish day school education is occurring in Haredi state tax credits or forms of direct funding. and Chabad schools. From 1998 to 2008, non- !e proponents of the new initiative argue that Haredi Orthodox schools saw slightly increased if their proposal is enacted, it would provide a enrollments, Haredi enrollment increased by 41% response to the high—and even prohibitive—cost (from 86,702 to 121,940) while non-Orthodox full- of Jewish education. Furthermore, it would also day Jewish schools—Conservative, Reform and open the door to a solution to another problem non-denominational community schools—saw facing contemporary Jewish education in the their combined enrollment rise only 4.7% (from United States: the lack of sustained attraction 36,897 to 38,630). Additionally, the component Jewish education has for non-Orthodox families. of non-Orthodox students in Orthodox schools declined from 20% to 10% in the same ten years.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 205 Moreover, since the onset of the financial crisis, non-Orthodox. Since 2008, enrollment in non- non-Orthodox enrollment in these intensive Orthodox day schools has declined by 9.5%. school settings has declined. "In the three years Among the non-Haredi Orthodox it has risen since 2008, following the collapse of the economy, slightly, and among the Haredim it is presumed to non-Orthodox enrollment dropped 9.5%, to just have expanded. Apparently, the high cost of Jewish 34,977. Non-Orthodox enrollment is even lower education together with the economic hardship this year (by 5.2%) than it was in 1998, when Avi engendered by the crisis has caused non-Orthodox Chai first counted."1 parents not to enroll their children in Jewish day schools. !us, lowering the cost of Jewish day !e growth rate of Haredi education comes as no school tuition would seem to be a significant surprise given the high factor in increasing enrollment. Haredi birthrate, which by large far exceeds that of the non- !e leaders of this initiative, though, envision that numbers of Orthodox. !e growth it will accomplish more than merely easing the non-Orthodox rate of 4.7% until 2008, in burden on families whose children are currently Jewish families regard to the attendance enrolled in Jewish day schools. !ey see it as seem not to find of non-Orthodox schools, having the potential to provide a breakthrough non-Orthodox shows that these schools in Jewish education. As indicated above, if Jewish Jewish day were holding their own, schools become roughly competitive with public schools and perhaps a bit more and other private schools in terms of cost, it would attractive than that if we take into be necessary to plan and construct a new type of account the low non- Jewish school that would attract non-Orthodox Orthodox birthrate2 and children in the face of competition from public what appears to be a and other private schools. If the construction of declining percentage of this new type of Jewish school is successful, it could children among the American Jewish population.4 significantly alter the patterns of non-Orthodox Nevertheless, the growth was not overwhelming, enrollment in Jewish schools. and large numbers of non-Orthodox Jewish Despite the potential advantages, there are many families seem not to find non-Orthodox Jewish in the American Jewish community who oppose day schools attractive. !is is despite a widespread these initiatives. !ese factions continue the Jewish communal emphasis on, and investment in, traditional liberal American Jewish commitment day school education since the late 1990s. to keeping a strong wall between church and state, !e second point that arises from this data is ensuring that religion is relegated solely to the that the financial crisis has eroded enrollment private sector. Indeed, many in this large group of in Jewish day schools, again, mainly among the American Jews themselves attended public schools when the singing of Christmas carols and other

206 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE quasi-religious activities were routine and led to A Window of Opportunity feelings of exclusion. !ey fear that any porosity for Aliyah from Europe? in the wall separating church and state will return religion to the public schools. !ese opponents Amid economic and political uncertainty in also detect technical ﬂaws in the initiative. !ey the European Union, the region's continuing claim, for example, that Jewish schools enjoying demographic changes, and the rise in anti- tuition support through state tax credits would Semitism, there is renewed interest in an e"ort to have to accept non-Jewish students.5 It has encourage Aliyah from Western Europe. Among recently been reported, though, that groups that the recent, and for European Jews, unwelcome had traditionally been opposed to public funding developments are the rise of extremist movements for private and religious schools (such as the AJC) in Greece and the electoral defeat of French have recently been reconsidering their opposition.7 President Nicolas Sarkozy, who had maintained a !e Jewish People Policy Institute has undertaken Following hard-line policy against the follow-up steps listed below: the attack Iran and who enjoyed in Toulouse, 1. !e preparation of a cost-beneﬁt analysis of broad support within the France, there the initiative that may serve as a marketing French Jewish community. tool for Jewish communities; were o#cial Following the lethal calls in 2. !e preparation of a vision for structuring new attack on a Jewish school Israel for schools; in Toulouse, France, on European Jews 3. !e preparation of a training plan for school March 19, 2012, there to make principals, administrators, and teaching were o#cial calls in Israel Aliyah personnel. for European Jews to make Aliyah. However, judging from comments made by many French Jews, their desire to move to Israel is muted by their concern over the di#culties involved in the immigration and absorption process. Among middle-class European Jews, and even more among those from lower classes, Aliyah to Israel has become beset by barriers and di#culties. Researcher Ilana Shpaizman asserts that, without serious public debate, Israel's immigration and absorption policy has gradually changed—from a

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 207 universal policy to a selective one that essentially to Israel in order to fulfill their Zionist dream forgoes "weaker" groups and is designed instead to and to assure their children's Jewish identity are attract skilled migrants and "returning residents" university educated with promising careers in their who can contribute to the country's economic countries of origin. When they arrive in Israel, they growth.6 !us, it is likely that at least one of the are forced to deal with three main challenges: 1) factors preventing a significant increase in the the need to have the foreign degrees they hold number of Olim from Western Europe has more to recognized in Israel; 2) placing their children in do with absorption di#culties than motivation. good schools or kindergartens enabling them to integrate socially; and 3) finding jobs. Without a In light of the small number of Olim immigrating broad and supportive network of assistance, and to Israel in recent years, and facing a variety of without reliable information about the chances economic constraints, the Ministry of Immigrant of having their various expectations met, a large Absorption decided to make substantial cuts proportion of potential Olim give up on their in the number of employees speaking western plans. languages who are available to help Olim navigate the web of Israeli bureaucracy. !e importance If we are wise enough to change our approach to of these workers, known as "project sta"," is the immigrant population and recognize them as particularly great given that, even though less people who choose, from among a wide range of than half of new immigrants are arriving from the options, to join the Israeli collective of their own Former Soviet Union, the majority of employees free will, we will likely be able to design e#cient at the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and immigrant services suited to their needs. In such at ulpanim speaks no foreign language other a situation, it is not impossible that Israel could than Russian and has little understanding of the become a magnet for young, ambitious Jews Western immigrants' particular needs. In other willing to undertake the challenge. words, there is a "chicken and egg" situation: the !e solutions that have been proposed to improve small number of immigrants from the West leads the situation fall into four categories: to a reduction in the number of project sta", and the decline in the number of project sta" leads 1) Removing bureaucratic barriers, such as to small numbers of immigrants. !is despite those involved in gaining recognition of the fact that one cannot discount the possibility foreign degrees and professional licenses; and that there is potential for "quality" immigration a reexamination of the military enlistment that is not coming to Israel because of the lack of regulations (for instance, making the suitable assistance and support. compulsory military draft law more flexible) by setting up an inter-ministerial committee/ Unlike immigrants who come to Israel from national authority charged under a cabinet "distressed" countries, most candidates for Aliyah mandate. from Western countries who choose to come

208 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 2) Signiﬁcantly improving the absorption 4) Establishing an operational body that integrates system in Israel. Creating plans for selected the experience of "community Aliyah" projects cities, towns and communities to ensure they and the lessons learned from the recruitment include all absorption services—ulpanim, and absorption of North American Olim— children's education, community activity and that can provide a comprehensive solution to employment. !e plan should be implemented those seeking to make Aliyah from Western by specially-trained project sta" in cities with Europe, and especially from France. high concentrations of Olim. 3) Renewing and expanding "Community Aliyah" projects, including a proactive system of attracting Olim.

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE 209 Notes

1. J.J. Goldberg, "Day Schools Stuck in Neutral," www. forward.com/articles/148762/?p=all see also Jack Wertheim, "Day School numbers not so Bad", www. avichai.org/topics/adipiscing-elit-adipiscing-elit/. 2. !e "e"ective birthrate" of American Jews as a whole is 1.4, far below the reproduction rate. See www. thejewishweek.com/news/new_york/battle_ beanie_counters. 3. See the NJPS 2001 survey, www.jewishvirtuallibrary. org/jsource/US-Israel/ujcpop.html. 4. See for example Marc Stern, "Opportunity Scholarship not Helpful," www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2. aspx?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=6161209&ct=11555691; www.ajc.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=ijITI2 PHKoG&b=6161209&ct=11555691. 5. www.jta.org/news/article/2012/04/18/3093156/ jewish-groups-rethinking-vouchers-tax-credits-to- religious-schools. 6. Shpaizman, Ilana: "!e Privatization of Aliyah Promotion" (2011) a position paper prepared for the Center for Social Justice and Democracy at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem.

210 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE Main Publications of the Jewish People Policy Institute

!e Challenge of Peoplehood: Strengthening the Attachment of Young American Jews to Israel in the Time of the Distancing Discourse, Shmuel Rosner and Inbal Hakman, 2012. Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Jewish-Israeli Identity among Children of Israelis Abroad and their Attachment to the State of Israel and the Jewish Community, Yogev Karasenty, 2012. Policy Paper: Absentee Voting Rights for Israelis Abroad, Yogev Karasenty and Inbal Hakman, 2012. 21st Century Global Forces, !eir Impacts on the Jewish People, Israel and the United States, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Foreword by Martin Gilbert, 2012. Uncharted Waters, Stuart E. Eizenstat, (a special edition for the 2011 Israeli Presidential Conference), 2011. Annual Assessment 2011, Executive, Report No. 7, with special in-depth chapters: Systematic Indicators of Jewish People Trends, De-Legitimization and Jewish Youth in the Diaspora, !e Impact of Geopolitical Shifts and Global Economic Developments on the Jewish People, JPPI Sta" and Contributors, 2011. Jewish Demographic Policies, Population Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora, Sergio DellaPergola, 2011. Mega-Trends and their Impact on the Jewish People, Prepared for JPPI's 2010 Conference on the Future of the Jewish People, JPPI Sta", 2010. Toward 2030: Strategies for the Jewish Future, Background Documents for the 2010 Conference on the Future of the Jewish People, JPPI Sta", 2010. 2030: Alternative Futures for the Jewish People, Project Directors: Avi Gil and Einat Wilf, 2010. !e Triangular Relationship of Jerusalem, Washington and North American Jewry, Background Documents for JPPPI's 2009 Glen Cove Conference, JPPPI Sta", 2009. Muslim Anti-Semitism: !e Challenge and Possible Responses, Emmanuel Sivan, 2009. Background Policy Documents for the Inaugural President's Conference: Facing Tomorrow, JPPPI Sta" and Contributors, 2008. A Strategic Plan for the Strengthening of Jerusalem, JPPPI Sta", 2007. Background Policy Documents for the 2007 Conference on the Future of the Jewish People, JPPPI Sta", 2007. Annual Assessments 2004-2011/2012. Institut de Planification d'une Politique pour le Peuple Juif, Rapport Annuel du JPPPI 2005/2006, Le Peuple Juif en 2005/2006, Entre Renaissance et Declin, Special edition in French, JPPPI Sta" and Contributors, 2006. !e Jewish People between !riving and Decline, To succeed, large resources, judicious coping with critical decision and careful crafting of long-term grand-policies are needed. !e full volume contains analyses of the major communities around the world and in-depth assessments of significant topics. JPPPI Sta" and Contributors, 2005. China and the Jewish People: Old Civilizations in a New Era, Shalom Salomon Wald, Strategy Paper, 2004. !is is the first strategic document in the series: Improving the Standing of the Jewish People in Emerging Superpowers without a Biblical Tradition. Partners and Members Board of Directors and Professional About JPPI of the General Meeting: Guiding Council:

President and Founding Director Avinoam Bar-Yosef

Projects Coordinator Ita Alcalay Executive Report Annual Assessment No. 8 2011-12 Annual Assessment - Jewish People Policy Institute

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT

JPPI's New Dashboard Geopolitical Turmoil in the Middle East Creating Jewish Meaning in the U.S. and Europe Israeli Democracy: Politics and Society

THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY INSTITUTE (Established by the Jewish Agency for Israel) Ltd. www.jppi.org.il (JWBU3BN$BNQVTr10#+FSVTBMFN [email protected] 5FMr'BY