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Monism P16ff 1 Intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā Submitted by Sümeyye Parıldar to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies In June 2014 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 2 ABSTRACT The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that ‘there are things that do not exist’. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul. Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality. Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul’s action of creating mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical. Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It is a pleasure to thank many people who made this thesis possible. I shall thank the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey whose funding allowed me to spend my doctorate years in England by working on a topic I am passionate about. I am also indebted to my guarantors Ayse Ceker, Murat Cilesiz and Ali Parildar. I cannot thank them enough for their almost blind faith in me that I will finish this project. I am greatly thankful to my supervisor Professor Sajjad Rizvi who welcomed me and my research question. He not only was very patient with the slow growth of the writing material and development of ideas but also generous in sharing his precious books and strong knowledge on the latest publications. Moreover, he had been very supportive of my methodology. This gave me enough space and independence to discover my own interpretation of Ṣadrā. Especially during the completion process after the draft was finished, he offered much time and input than was expected for which I am most appreciative. I cannot thank him enough for his constant support without which I would not have been able to undertake such a project. I am also grateful to my examiners Professor Peter Adamson of the LMU in Munich and of King's College London and Dr. István Kristó-Nagy of IAIS at University of Exeter for their exceptional input and helpful comments. I am very grateful to Dr. Ibrahim Kalin who introduced me to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In terms of the contemporary questions in this research, my education in Birmingham has been inspiring. I would not be as deeply interested in modern theories of mind and metaphysics if I did not attend Dr. Philip Goff and Dr. Nikk Effingham’s classes and without Dr. Darragh Byrne’s hard work on my development of philosophical thinking and writing. My family has been the biggest support. I would like to dedicate this study to my grandparents Nuriye, and Mustafa, Hilmi and Gülizar and their gorgeous children Ahmet Ali and Hafize. They taught me that love is real and the unending quest for wisdom is sacred. Even when I had to leave school twice for my religious choices, they encouraged me to continue and seek for knowledge and to think outside of the box. Anything good in my doing is their work. All else is my own. My warmest thanks to 4 Amine, Akif, Yasin, Büşra, Nesibe, Musab, and Asım for their patience and making me happy whenever I was down. Some golden hearted people made my stay in Exeter worth the isolation: Thanks a lot to Lara, Sherry al-Ghareeb, Agata, Jamila, Veronica Bascella, Gulay Dagdas, Pinar Celebi, Ridvan and Nurcan Kilic, Meryem Uke, Tuba Kor, Emily Lygo. I shall single out Peter and Dorinda Hulton for my special thanks, as they became a second family to me. Merve Kutuk, Cihat Arinc, Elif Tokay and Prof. Ismail Hacinebioglu know every single up and down during the rollercoaster of my PhD. Their support were with me at very critical points of my thesis. I shall lastly thank some material helpers, such as Exeter Tennis Centre, and Northcotte Theatre, Uncle Benny’s Rice, Fries To Go, and all beautiful coffees of the world and coffee houses in Exeter, especially Spire’s. 5 LIST OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3 ABBREVIATIONS 7 CHAPTER I 10 INTRODUCTION 10 1.1 WHY? 10 1.2 SOURCES AND PREVIOUS STUDIES 25 1.4 HOW? 32 1.5 THE CHAPTERS 39 2 CHAPTER II 42 HISTORY OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON INTENTIONALITY AND THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY 42 2.1 BRENTANO AND HIS HISTORIOGRAPHY 43 2.2 ON THE SOUL 48 2.2.1 Defining the Soul and its Relation to Body and the Question of Immateriality 48 2.3 SENSE PERCEPTION 60 2.4 IMAGINATION 74 2.5 CONCLUSION 97 3 CHAPTER III 100 PERCEPTION AND THE SOUL 100 3.1 EXTERNAL SENSES 103 3.2 MULLĀ ṢADRĀ AND THE EXTERNAL SENSES 116 3.3 THE UNITY OF THE SOUL 139 3.4 CONCLUSION 148 4 CHAPTER IV 152 LANGUAGE AND LOGIC 152 4.1 MULLĀ ṢADRĀ’S IDEA OF THE SOUL 156 4.2 PROPOSITION 164 4.2.1 Proposition in relation to Conception and Assent 164 4.3 SUBJECT AND PREDICATION IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER 178 6 4.4 EXISTENCE AS PREDICATE 185 4.5 TASHKĪK: IS IT HOMONYMY? 190 5 CHAPTER V 197 ONTOLOGY 197 5.1 PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE 200 5.2 PROOFS OF MENTAL EXISTENCE 211 5.2.1 1st Proof and Particularity of Mental Existents 211 5.2.2 2nd Proof and Fictionals 213 5.2.3 3rd Proof and Generalizations as a Proof of the Mental 214 5.3 WHAT IS AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT? 215 5.3.1 Meinong and Introduction of a Theory of Objects 215 5.3.2 Reductionist Answers to the Problem of Intentional Objects: Russell and Quine 220 5.4 QUEST FOR A DIFFERENT FRAME TO THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY: MENTAL EXISTENCE 223 5.4.1 Concept of Existence 223 5.4.2 Non-existence 226 5.4.3 Universals as Objects of Mental Existence 228 5.4.4 Quiddity as Objects of Mental Existence 231 5.5 CONCLUSION 236 CONCLUSION 239 BIBLIOGRAPHY 250 Primary 250 Secondary 254 7 ABBREVIATIONS Aristotle In Aristotle, (1984, 1991) The Complete Works of Aristotle, (ed.) Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press): MR De Memoria et Reminiscentia DSS De Sensu et Sensibilibus DSV De Somno et Vigilia DA De Anima GA De Generatione Animalium DI De Interpretetione Cat.AR Categories In (ed.) Badawī, A. R., Mantīq Aristū, (Cairo: Matbaʿāt Dār al-Kutub al- Misriyya): Kat.AR Kategurias IbAR al-Ibāra/ Peri Hermenias PoAR Post Analytics Fārābī Ib.FR ʿIbāra Md.FR Madkhal DI. FR De Interpretatione Short Commentary Madīna al-Madīna al-Fāḍila Avicenna ShI Shifāʾ Ilāhiyyāt ShI tr. The Metaphysics of the Healing ShMd Shifāʾ Madkhal ShIb Shifāʾ ʿIbāra ShN Shifāʾ Nafs/ Avicenna’s De Anima ShKat Shifāʾ Kategurias/ Maqūlāt ShST al-Samāʾ al-Tabīʿī ShST tr. The Physics of the Healing Najāt Kitāb al-Najāt fī al-ḥikmat al-manṭiqiyya wa al-ṭabīʿiyya wa al-ilāhiyya Ishārāt Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt 8 IshRT Avicenna, Rāzī, Ṭūsī (1377-9) al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, maʿa al-sharḥ lil-muhaqqiq Nasīr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī wa Sharḥ al-Sharḥ li-Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar al-Rāzī IshM Logic tr.
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