Shirking and Sharking: a Legal Theory of the Firm
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Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm Eric W. Ortst Introduction ................................................................................................... 266 I. Agency Law and Agency Costs ............................................................... 270 A. Legal Agency: Authority, Power, and Hierarchy in the Firm ..... 271 B. Agency Costs: Classical Shirking .................................................... 275 II. Principal C osts .......................................................................................... 278 A. Sharking Defined: Opportunism of Principals Within Firms ...... 279 B. Agency Chains: Quasi-Principals and Superior Agents ............... 280 III. Firm s and M arkets ................................................................................. 282 A. The Paradox of Methodological Individualism ............................. 283 B. Consumer Markets and Organizational Metamarkets ................. 286 IV. Economic Theories of the Firm ........................................................... 289 A .Transaction Costs ............................................................................. 289 B . C ontracts ............................................................................................ 291 C . Property .............................................................................................. 295 D . Em ploym ent ...................................................................................... 296 V. A Legal Theory of the Firm and Its Boundaries .................................. 298 A. Control: Enterprise-Organizing and the Sole Proprietor ............ 300 B. Ownership and Employment: Horizontal and Vertical Firms ..... 301 1. H orizontal O wnership ................................................................ 301 2. V ertical A uthority ....................................................................... 303 C. Property: Ownership of the Firm's Capital .................................... 306 t Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Leuven. For comments, I thank Stephen Bainbridge, John Boatright, David Butz, Alfred Conard, Deborah DeMott, Thomas Dunfee, Allison Feder, Merritt Fox, Eric Gauvin, Robert Hamilton, Peter Hammer, J.B. Heaton, Leo Katz, William Klein, Bruce Kogut, Naomi Lamoreaux, Kyle Logue, Ronald Mann, Daniel Raff, Tyler Robin- son, Richard Shell, Alan Strudler, Edward Swaine, Kent Syverud, Randall Thomas, William Tyson, Joseph Vining, and others who participated in discussions of earlier drafts at the Whar- ton School, the Western New England School of Law, the University of Michigan Business School, the UCLA School of Law, and the University of Michigan Law School. Later versions were presented at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Department of Management, and the University of Gothenburg, School of Economics and Commercial Law. The Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School provided funding. For inspiration, I thank my wife, Janet, who loves Bleak House, and my students at Wharton and the law schools of Penn, UCLA, and Michigan. Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 16:265, 1998 1. D ebt .............................................................................................. 307 2. E quity ........................................................................................... 308 D. Complex Firms: The Corporation .................................................. 309 E. Complex Groups: Relational Firms ................................................ 312 F. The Legal Boundaries of the Firm .................................................. 313 VI. Shirking, Sharking, and Fiduciary Duties ............................................ 315 A . Constraining Shirking ....................................................................... 315 B. Constraining Sharking ...................................................................... 317 1. Oppression of Minority Shareholders ....................................... 318 2. Excessive Executive Compensation .......................................... 320 3. Downgrading Creditors .............................................................. 323 4. Financial Reengineering ............................................................. 325 C onclusion ..................................................................................................... 327 INTRODUCTION Shirking and sharking, in all their many varieties, have been sown broadcast by the ill-fated cause; and even those who have contemplated its history from the outermost circle of such evil, have been insensibly tempted into a loose way of letting bad things alone to take their own bad course, and a loose be- lief that if the1 world go wrong, it was, in some off-hand manner, never meant to go right. This Article reexamines economic theories of the firm from a legal perspective. These theories are said to have "dominated" and produced a "revolution" in legal scholarship in recent years,2 particularly in the field of enterprise organization.3 In this Article, I accept the insights of this 1. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK Housa 21-22 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1901) (1852). 2. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corpo- rate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 213 (1993); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, ParticipatoryMan- agement Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 659 (1996) (describing the economic theories of the firm as "now the dominant paradigm in corporate law"); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporationfor the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513, 515 (1993) (arguing that analysis based on agency costs "still reigns supreme in the academic literature"). For some leading examples of this genre, see Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); William J. Carney, ControllingManagement Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 385; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corpora- tions and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); and Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freerid- ers in Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 59-80 (1982). 3. I use the term "enterprise organization" to include legal agency, employment, partner- ships, and corporations. For a casebook written along these lines, see ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1987). See also Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enter- prise Organization,96 MICH. L. REV. - (1998) (book review) (arguing in favor of this broad conceptual approach). The term also includes nonprofit associations. Cf. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations,105 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1992). Although some of the analysis offered here may be applied to nonprofit organizations, the topic is left outside the scope of this Legal Theory of the Firm scholarship, but recommend a significant expansion of its theoretical premises. In contrast to most economic accounts, I argue that legal the- ory is needed for an accurate description of the business firm. In particu- lar, I contest economic theories of the firm that fail to appreciate the im- portance of legal relationships of agency authority, power, and hierarchy. My main claim is that a recovery of traditional legal principles helps to clarify some problems in economic theories of the firm. These prob- lems include omissions of both a descriptive account of how authority, power, and hierarchy are created within firms4 and a prescriptive discus- sion of how this authority, power, and hierarchy may be misused A le- gal perspective can also help to resolve the conundrum in economics of distinguishing between firms and markets.6 The legal theory of the firm and its boundaries offered here brings together elements of various eco- nomic theories within a unified framework. My analytic style is the reverse of the usual article in "law and eco- nomics." Most law-and-economics scholarship begins with a legal prob- lem and then applies economic analysis to find a solution. Instead, I begin with an economic problem-namely, conflicting theories of the firm- and use legal analysis to overcome conceptual difficulties.8 In this endeavor, some problems of conflicting terminology become apparent. Economists and lawyers often use the same terms differently. I argue for a precise use of terms such as "agency" and "contracts" that have legal origins and meanings. At the same time, any discussion of the "firm" must include an understanding of how economists have used the term given the roots of the idea in economic theory. The debate is not only semantic. A combination of legal and economic analysis opens the door for other disciplines besides economics to describe the social nature of the entities called firms.9 Article. The focus here is on the business firm. 4. See infra Parts I, II, IV. 5. See infra Part VI. 6. See infra Part III. 7. See infra Parts IV, V. 8. This methodology is consistent with a recent recommendation for a synthesis in legal scholarship to include "the microanalysis of institutions." Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). Rubin describes a willingness to recognize the importance of noneconomic factors as characteristic of a "Post-Chicago School of Law and Economics." Id. at 1404; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 426-43 (1995)