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Philang 2021 Department of English and General Linguistics Institute of English Studies University of Łódź Seventh International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics PhiLang 2021 Łódź, 14-16 May 2021 Organising Committee: Piotr Stalmaszczyk (chair) Aleksandra Majdzińska-Koczorowicz Wiktor Pskit Martin Hinton Ryszard Rasiński Miriam Kobierski Special Session PhilArg: The Philosophy of Argumentation Convenor: Martin Hinton Book of Abstracts edited by Martin Hinton, Wiktor Pskit & Aleksandra Majdźinska-Koczorowicz Łódź, 2021 Contents Plenary lectures ............................................................................................ 7 Brian Ball .................................................................................................................................. 8 Thought and talk about iterated attitudes Katarzyna Kijania-Placek ....................................................................................................... 9 All the faces of proper names. A polysemous account Genoveva Martí ...................................................................................................................... 10 X-Phi results and (armchair) philosophical theorizing Steve Oswald ........................................................................................................................... 11 Pragmatics and argumentation Isidora Stojanovic ................................................................................................................... 12 Exploring valence in judgments of taste Main Sessions .............................................................................................. 13 Tibor Bárány & Miklós Márton ........................................................................................... 14 “Total signification”, utterer’s meaning, and what is said Filippo Batisti .......................................................................................................................... 15 Ontology and naturalism in linguistic theory David Bordonaba-Plou .......................................................................................................... 16 Expressing disagreement in different ways: A study of experimental philosophy of language Mark Bowker .......................................................................................................................... 17 The cognitive context-sensitivity of generic generalisations Leïla Bussière .......................................................................................................................... 18 Communicating with colourings Laura Caponetto & Bianca Cepollaro ................................................................................. 19 Bending as counter-speech Victor Carranza ...................................................................................................................... 20 Varieties of affected meaning Tadeusz Ciecierski .................................................................................................................. 21 Actions, products, demonstrations 2 Ludovica Conti ....................................................................................................................... 22 Empty names and abstract objects Laura Delgado ........................................................................................................................ 23 The logic of polyreference Matej Drobňák ....................................................................................................................... 24 On the inferential roles Gabriel Dupre…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….25 The faculties of language Izabela Duraj-Nowosielska .................................................................................................... 26 Butler’s problem in the light of the Polish words intencja ‘intention’ and zamiar ‘intention, intent’ Dominik Dziedzic .................................................................................................................... 27 Demonstratives from the perspective of multidimensional semantics Jacopo Frascaroli ................................................................................................................... 28 Meaning as experience. On the analogies between linguistic and perceptual meaning-making Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu ............................................................................... 29 Illocution and the expression of mental states Grzegorz Gaszczyk ................................................................................................................. 30 Lying with subordinate speech acts Chris Genovesi ........................................................................................................................ 31 Circle takes the square: Pragmatics, hermeneutics, and utterance interpretation Mindaugas Gilaitis ................................................................................................................. 32 On some objections to the normativity of meaning J.P. Grodniewicz ..................................................................................................................... 33 The representational structure of linguistic understanding Justyna Grudzińska ............................................................................................................... 34 Lexicon-semantics interface: a case study Rory Harder ............................................................................................................................ 35 Understanding demonstratives together José V. Hernández-Conde ..................................................................................................... 36 An expectation-based view of human communication 3 Leopold Hess ........................................................................................................................... 37 Inferentialist semantics for lexicalized social meanings Antonina Jamrozik ................................................................................................................. 38 Anaphora: an inquisitive approach Zuzanna Jusińska ................................................................................................................... 39 Slur reclamation and meaning change Tom Kaspers ........................................................................................................................... 40 Asserting and alethic pluralism Filip Kawczyński .................................................................................................................... 41 Reference-shifting of proper names Joanna Klimczyk .................................................................................................................... 42 The quasi-disagreement problem for contextualism about epistemic modality Philipp Kremers ..................................................................................................................... 43 De-Platonizing counterpossibles Chang Liu................................................................................................................................ 44 That’s not what I meant: toward an ethics of interpretation Josep Macià ............................................................................................................................. 45 Presupposition cancellation and the semantic view of presuppositions Filipe Martone ........................................................................................................................ 46 Polysemy is not a problem for referential semantics Andrei Moldovan .................................................................................................................... 47 Persuasive presuppositions Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska ............................................................................................... 48 Faultless disagreement, weak assertives, and commitments Eduardo Pérez-Navarro ........................................................................................................ 49 Indexical relativism? Alexandru Radulescu ............................................................................................................. 50 On detonating Wojciech Rostworowski ......................................................................................................... 51 Anaphora-based theory of complex demonstratives Jakub Rudnicki ...................................................................................................................... 52 Relativist semantics for demonstratives 4 Krzysztof Sękowski ................................................................................................................ 53 What the problem of deviant realisations tells us about the role of semantic intuition in thought experiments Aeddan Shaw & Piotr Wesołowski ....................................................................................... 54 “You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means”. Challenging the notion of competent speakers in contemporary ordinary language philosophy Charlie Siu .............................................................................................................................. 55 Against the coarsening approach to imprecision Katja Stepec ............................................................................................................................ 56 Focus on interlinguistic relations Maciej
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