The Perfect Storm: Using Pinard and Irving to Explain the Canadian 2011 Election “Orange Crush”

by

Alexander Thomson Houston

Thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of Arts (Politics)

Acadia University

Spring Graduation 2015

© by Alexander Thomson Houston, 2014

This thesis by Alexander Thomson Houston was defended successfully in an oral examination on October 10th, 2014.

The examining committee for the thesis was:

______Dr. David MacKinnon, Chair

______Dr. Lori Turnbull, External Reader

______Dr. Rachel Brickner, Internal Reader

______Dr. Cynthia Alexander, Supervisor

______Dr. Andrew Biro, Head/Director

This thesis is accepted in its present form by the Division of Research and Graduate Studies as satisfying the thesis requirements for the degree Master of Arts (Politics).

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I, Alexander Thomson Houston, grant permission to the University Librarian at to reproduce, loan or distribute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats on a non-profit basis. I, however, retain the copyright of this thesis.

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Author

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Supervisor

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Date

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Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the unending support and guidance of my friends and family. I owe my thanks to them for their unending love, humour, patience, and understanding.

To the professors and staff at Acadia University, I would like to express my gratitude and thanks for your assistance in my education, university endeavours, and for the knowledge I have picked up along this journey. This has been a process of personal development and growth as much as it has been an academic experience. I would simply have not made it to where I am today without your efforts.

I would also like to thank the examining committee for their advice and input which helped me develop this thesis further.

Dr. Ian Stewart and Dr. Cynthia Alexander, you have been incredible supervisors.

This thesis would not have developed to where it is today without your outstanding contributions, guidance, and patience. Through the months of getting this thesis started, to keeping it on track, editing, and guiding research, you have been with me every step of the way. Thank you.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………Page vii

Chapter One:

“The 2011 Canadian Federal Election: The Upsurge of the and the Orange Crush”………………………………………………………………….....Page 1

I. Theory……………………………………………………………………….Page 8

II. Methodology………………………………………………...... Page 11

III. Structure and Chapter Outline……………………………………………..Page 13

Chapter Two:

“Prairie Dust and Political Change: A Brief History of the CCF/NDP”………………………………………………….………………...……….Page 16

I. Origins of the CCF: The Birth of in …………….Page 17

II. and the Early Years of the CCF………………………...... Page 21

III. Broadbent and the NDP: Taking the Party Forward……………………….Page 25

IV. Alexa McDonough and the Renewal of the NDP……………………….....Page 27

Chapter Three:

“Maurice Pinard’s Conducive Structural Theory and the 2011 Election: From the Rise of the Reform Party to the “Orange Wave”……………………………………...... Page 33

I. Maurice Pinard and the “Conducive Structural Theory”……………………Page 34

II. Political Situation in in 2011: Finding Connections to Pinard…….Page 37

III. Economic Conditions of Quebec in 2011: Connecting the Dots…..………Page 40

IV. Unemployment, Alienation, and Cynicism: The Impact of the Discontent Quebec Voter…………………………………………………………………………....Page 46

V. Disparity and Household Income: The Power of Money and Voting Behavior……………………………………………………………………..…Page 49

VI. The 2011 Federal Election and Mobilization of Young ……….Page 51

VII. A Gap in Pinard’s Theory: Gender and the Rise of the NDP…………….Page 56

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VII. Indigenous Votes and the Rise of the NDP…………………………….…Page 63

IX. The Influence of Media Technology: Advertising, Social Media, and the Orange Crush……………………………………………………………………..…….Page 68

Chapter Four:

“John A. Irving’s Leadership Theory and the 2011 Election: The Inspirational Politics And Successes of “Smilin’/ ‘Bon’ Jack”………………………………………….…Page 77

I. Irving’s Leadership Theory and the Rise of Third Parties………………Page 78

II. Setting the Stage: and the NDP…………………………....Page 80

III. Layton as Leader of the NDP: How he Compared to other Leaders in the ROC………………………………………………………………….Page 83

IV. The “Layton Effect”: “Bon Jack” and the Province of Quebec……..…Page 87

V. Layton and the Leadership Debate: Does a Good Debate Translate to Votes?...... Page 90

VI. Time on the Air: Jack Layton’s Presence on Television……………....Page 93

VII. Stepping Into Little-Known Territory: Internet Advertising, Social Media and Layton………………………………………………………..……….Page 97 VIII. Political Values, Integrity, and Public Opinion: The Public Perception of Layton………………………………………………………………….....Page 101

Chapter Five:

“The Electoral Impact of Leadership and the Catalyst in Quebec: Using Both Pinard and Irving to See the Bigger Picture”……………………………………………..Page 107

Bibliography……………………………………………………….…………..…….Page 116

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List of Tables

Table 1: Election Results since Forming of NDP………………...………………...Page 31

Table 2: Federal Election Results in the Province of Quebec by Election Year….Page 38

Table 3: Quebec Sales Tax Rate by Time Period…………………………...………Page 44

Table 4: Unemployment Rates of Canada and Quebec……………………………Page 48

Table 5: Household Income in Canada and Voter Turnout……………………….Page 50

Table 6: Voter Participation by Level of Education………………………………..Page 54

Table 7: Voting Trends in Canada 2011 (female)…………………………………..Page 62

Table 8: 2011 Election Indigenous Voting…………………………………………..Page 65

Table 9: Influence on Voter/Non-voter Decisions………………………….……….Page 69

Table 10: Sources of Information on the 2011 Election……………...…………….Page 72

Table 11: Perception of Political Leaders in ROC During 2008 and 2011 Election ………………………...………………………………………………..……………...Page 84

Table 12: Perception of Political Leaders in Quebec during 2008 and 2011 Election………………………………………………………………………………..Page 88

Table 13: Voter Choice in the 2011 Federal Election……………………....………Page 91

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Abstract

This thesis compares and contrasts the conducive structural theory of Maurice Pinard and the leadership theory of John Allan Irving to determine what conditions were present and contributed to the New Democratic Party’s (NDP) success in the 2011 Canadian federal election.

In this thesis I make the argument that the conducive structural theory of Maurice Pinard and the leadership theory of John Allan Irving, when used together, provide an effective analytical lens to identify the condition(s) necessary for the success of the NDP in the 2011 election that is otherwise not possible when either theory is used in isolation.

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Chapter One

The 2011 Canadian Federal Election: The Upsurge of the New Democratic Party and the Orange Crush

“My friends, love is better than anger. Hope is better than fear. Optimism is better than despair. So let us be loving, hopeful and optimistic. And we’ll change the world.”1 - Jack Layton (1950 – 2011), leader of the federal NDP in his last letter to Canadians

“Before the last federal election, no seasoned political observer would have dared to bet on a reversal of fortunes for the New Democratic Party in Quebec.”2 -Vincent Geloso, C2C Journal writer, December2011

The 2011 federal election in Canada was a major shock to the political party system of Canada, shaking the Liberal Party and Bloc Quebecois at their very core and reducing them to the power of a third party. A third party is “a political party which does not have the electoral strength to form government or Official Opposition.”3 Historically, there have been numerous third parties in Canada such as the Green Party, the New Democratic Party

(NDP) prior to 2011, the , and the Marxist-Leninist Party. What made the

2011 election remarkable is that it marked a time when a third party, the NDP, was able to gather more seats in the House of Commons than one of the “mainstream” political parties.4

1 Jack Layton, in CBC. “Jack Layton's Last Letter to Canadians,” August 22, 2011, accessed June 24th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 2 Vincent Geloso. “The Rise of the NDP or the Confusing Heritage of the Quiet Revolution,” C2C Journal, December 12, 2011, accessed June 25th, 2014. http://c2cjournal.ca/ 3 Maria Mavrikkou. “The NDP and the Third Party Curse in Canada” (Master’s thesis, University of Waterloo, 2009). 2. 4 Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan. The Canadian General Election of 2000 (: The Dundurn Group, 2001). 14.

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The focus of this thesis is to assess how the social, political, and economic conditions in Quebec along with political leadership contributed to the NDP’s recent political victory in the 2011 election. In this analysis, I will address the role of leadership, with a focus on what role Jack Layton, former leader of the federal NDP, played in the 2011 election success.

Furthermore, I will analyze voting patterns and trends in Quebec and the rest of Canada

(ROC) and identify the differences. I will also examine what major issues the NDP were able to handle well, or that the Liberals and Conservatives were unable or unwilling to deal with that allowed the former “third party” to expand their voter base. Finally, the analysis seeks to find from where those voters came from: Liberals, Conservatives, Bloc Quebecois, or the Greens?

The 2011 election stands as an exciting point of great change in the history of

Canada’s political party system. For the first time in their history, the New Democratic Party

(NDP) became the Official Opposition in the House of Commons with an astounding 30.6% of the national vote.5 In contrast, the Conservative Party was able to achieve a majority government with 39.6% of the national vote.6 The 2011 election granted the NDP a total of

103 seats, the Conservatives with 166, and the Liberals with a mere 34 seats and only 18.9% of the popular vote.7 The figures presented may not seem to be of any significance at first glance; however, it is vital to note that in the context of prior elections, the 2011 federal election was a landmark event for the NDP. The 2008 election, for example, showed a remarkably different landscape in Canada with regards to the level of electoral success for the NDP. In 2008 the NDP only received a meager 37 seats in the House of Commons, with

5 . “Elections,” accessed June 25th, 2014, http://www.sfu.ca/ 6 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 7 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/

2 only 18% of the national vote with the Conservatives leading with 143 seats and 37.6% of the popular vote, and the Liberal party following in second with 76 seats and 26.4% of the popular vote.8 The 2011federal election was an upset within the Canadian political arena and a first for the NDP and for third parties in Canadian federal politics.

The other political parties in Canada such as the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) took a major hit in the 2011 election. Similar to the exceptional defeat of the Liberal Party, the Bloc was also hit hard, dropping from 60 seats in the 2008 electoral period, to a mere four seats after the 2011 election.9 For the first time in their history, the Green Party was able to win a seat in the House of Commons with , leader of the party, winning a seat in British

Columbia.10 Although the Green Party in the 2011 election will not be addressed in this thesis as the focus will be almost exclusively on the NDP, it is vital to note that the Green

Party of Canada suffers from many of the ailments of third parties. The Green Party receives very little media attention, was, (and arguably still is) marginalized in federal politics during

Question Period and other political events in the House of Commons, and was even excluded from the 2011federal televised leadership debate.11

The role of leadership in the 2011 election, especially regarding the impact of public perception of political party leaders, was instrumental in the rise of support for political parties. This thesis defines “charisma” in the context of political leadership the term as a person’s natural, inspirational and influential characteristics. The popular, charismatic political leadership of Jack Layton enabled him to rally voters more effectively in the 2011

8 Jay Makarenko. “2008 Canadian Federal Election: Results and Summary,” October 21, 2008, accessed June 24th, 2014, http://mapleleafweb.com/ 9 Makarenko. “2008 Canadian Federal Election: Results and Summary,” http://mapleleafweb.com/ 10 Simon Fraser University. “Elections.” http://www.sfu.ca/ 11 Katie Driedger. “Do We Even Care About Elizabeth May,” The Quill, October 14, 2013, accessed August 6th, 2014. http://www.thequill.ca/

3 election over other leaders with a poor public perception or lack of charisma such as Liberal leader, .

The leaders in the 2011 election were: Conservative leader, , who is currently prime minister and has been leader of the Conservatives since the 2003 unification of the and Canadian Progressive Conservative Party12; Liberal leader,

Michael Ignatieff, a prominent academic who also taught at both Harvard and the , who led the Liberal Party as leader from 2009 to 201113 and was the successor of the unpopular Stephane Dion, who was also an academic and led the Liberals from 2006 to

2008.14 The leader of the Bloc Quebecois was (who had resigned as leader following the 2011 election) who led the BQ since 1997.15 The leader of the New

Democratic Party was Jack Layton who led the NDP from 2003 to August 22, 2011when he passed away.16 The was led by Elizabeth May who has been leader of the party since 2006 and won her own seat, defeating Conservative incumbent, Gary Lunn in

Saanich – Gulf Islands, in 2011.17 Just as the 2011 election initiated a change in political leadership for some parties, and strengthening of others, it also marked a shift in Canadian voting trends. Along with upsetting the balance of power in , the

2011 election revealed a remarkable shift in voting behaviors.

The overwhelming support for the NDP was not universal across Canada. Instead, its vast surge in support came instead, overwhelmingly, from the province of Quebec, with 59 of its total 75 seats; that is roughly 78% of the seats in the province, and 57% of the NDP’s total

12 . “Prime Minister Stephen Harper,” accessed June 24th, 2014, http://www.pm.gc.ca/ 13 Parliament of Canada. “ Michael Ignatieff,” accessed June 25th, 2014, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 14 Parliament of Canada. “The Honourable Stephane Dion,” accessed June 25th, 20114, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 15 Parliament of Canada. “Gilles Duceppe,” accessed June 25th, 2014, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 16 NDP. “Jack Layton “1950 – 2011,” accessed June 25th, 2014, http://www.ndp.ca/jacklayton 17 Amanda Bittner and Royce Koop. Parties, Elections and the Future of Canadian Politics (: UBC Press, 2013). 211.

4 seats coming from Quebec.18 The other province to provide a large number of seats for the party was , however, of the total 106 seats, the NDP were only able to take 22, while the Conservative Party netted 73 seats. Interestingly, the Liberals who have historically had a strong presence in Ontario, thereby traditionally netting a high proportion of seats, received only 11 seats despite having 25% of the popular vote while the NDP received double the seats with 25.6% of the vote, a distortion of the single member plurality (SMP) system in

Canada.19 This electoral system provides a seat in the House of Commons to whoever wins an election in a constituency.20 This system in Canada privileges more mainstream political parties over others. This can be seen in the case of the 2004 election where the Green Party had received 582,247 federally, netting them no seats, yet the Liberal Party was able to get

472,247 votes in the Maritime provinces alone, winning 22 seats. 21 With smaller political parties having marginal success in a variety of ridings but never exceeding the support for more mainstream ones, third parties receive a disproportionately low number of seats in the

House of Commons. The Greens in the 2011 election received only a single seat, yet netted nearly 4% of the popular vote across Canada.22

To illustrate the distortions caused by the Canadian SMP system further, in 2008 the

Greens received no seats, yet had 6.8% of the popular vote.23 Similar to the Greens, the NDP have been victims of the single-member plurality system. In 2008, the NDP received 37 seats federally, with nearly 20% of the vote, while the Bloc Quebecois managed to win 49

18 Simon Fraser University. “Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 19 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 20 R. Kenneth Carty. “Canadians and Electoral Reform: An Impulse to Doing Democracy Differently,” Representation, 40:3, 173. 21 Dennis Pilon. The Politics of Voting: Reforming Canada’s Electoral System (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publishing, 2007). 1. 22 Simon Fraser University. “Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 23 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/

5 seats with only 10% of the vote, only half of the NDP’s vote share federally.24 Although electoral reform is not the focus of this thesis, it is nonetheless important to understand the fundamental distortions in Canada’s electoral system to understand better the boundaries in place or preventing third parties from growing. A prominent political scientist with expertise in the field of Canadian political parties, Alan Cairns, has stated in his seminal paper, “The

Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965,” that “[there is] stark evidence of institutional impact [by the electoral system] on the party system.”25

Although support for the NDP was largely a result of the wave of support in the province of Quebec, and to a lesser extent, Ontario, they also netted 12 seats in British

Columbia, thrashing the Liberals’ three seats. The NDP did not meet with much success in the Atlantic provinces of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (PEI), and

Nova Scotia, with a total of six seats in all of the provinces combined in contrast to 12

Liberal seats, and 14 Conservative seats.26 The Prairie provinces of , Manitoba, and

Saskatchewan also produced poor results for the NDP, contributing only three seats in comparison to the Liberals’ two, and the Conservative Party’s 51 seats.27 The territories of

Nunavut, the Northwest Territories (NWT), and provided the NDP a single seat (from the NWT), while the Conservative Party won the remaining two seats.28 The NDP therefore received most of their seats in the 2011 election in the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and

British Columbia. The NDP in the 2011 election had a higher proportion of the popular vote than in any other election.

24 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 25 Gerald Kernerman and Philip Resnick. Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 39. 26 Simon Fraser University. “Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 27 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 28 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/

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The mean average of popular vote29 for the NDP in the 2011 election was 28% per province.30 The mean average is a figure determined by adding the percentage of popular vote for the NDP and dividing by the number of provinces. This was a marked increase in comparison to the 2008 election where the NDP received a mere 12% of the popular vote in

Quebec, earning a single seat. In the 2011 election, the NDP held 42% of the popular vote and 59 seats in Quebec.31 The mean average for support for the NDP in the 2008 election was only 18%.32 The astounding support for the party in Quebec, Ontario, and British

Columbia seen in the 2011 election was not present in the 2008 election period, where the province received only 27 seats from these three provinces during the election in contrast to

93 seats in the 2011 election. It is therefore quite clear that there was a “breakthrough” in

Quebec. The expansion of support for the party in Ontario and British Columbia is noteworthy, but not nearly as dramatic an increase as was evident in the province of Quebec.

In this thesis I will argue that the 2011 federal election was a hallmark period for the

NDP which was made possible as a result of the dire economic, social, and political conditions in Quebec in 2011along with the incredibly popular leadership of Jack Layton.

This thesis will explain how the leadership of Jack Layton and the structurally conducive conditions in Quebec provided the environment for a perfect storm that allowed for the

NDP’s historic landslide victory in the province. By comparing and contrasting the theories of Maurice Pinard and John Allan Irving, I illustrate how both theories proved to be vital in defining how the NDP were able to make a breakthrough in the 2011 election.

29 The term “popular vote” is used to define the proportion or number of votes for a candidate or political party. 30 Simon Fraser University. “Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 31 Simon Fraser University. “Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 32 Simon Fraser University. “2008 Canadian Election Results,” accessed June 25th, 2014. http://www.sfu.ca/

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Some of the questions that will be addressed in the subsequent chapters include: what was the role of charismatic and influential NDP political leaders such as their former party leader, Jack Layton, in their success? What role did conducive factors such as unemployment, student debt, and one-party dominance in Quebec play in building support for the NDP? Finally, how did voting patterns vary from province to province and are there any remarkable voting trends evident in the data? Addressing such questions provides an opportunity to delve into what factors proved to be conducive in building support for the

NDP in the province of Quebec. To understand why it was Quebec over other provinces such as British Columbia, that the NDP was able to gather such a large voter base it is critical to identify the distinct social, political, and economic conditions in the province.

Theory

This paper will use the theoretical framework of Maurice Pinard, a professor of

Sociology at McGill University where he still teaches since he began his career as a professor in 1963. Pinard is among the most prominent scholars in the field of third parties in

Canadian politics. The book in question, which will be drawn upon for the theories in which

Pinard illustrates his theory is, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics (1975).

This book identifies the factors behind the dramatic rise of support for the Social Credit Party in Quebec in 1962 (economic factors, one party dominance, voter apathy, upsurge of young voters). It should be noted that the work of Pinard, and in particular, his “conducive structural theory” has surprisingly received little feedback or responses from other academics, scholars, or intellectuals in the field of Canadian political science. This may be due to Pinard’s expertise in sociology rather than politics, but regardless of his area of study, as will be illustrated in this thesis, Pinard has provided the groundwork for a very descriptive

8 theory of how it is that third parties are able to become “mainstream,” and rise in power. As

I will demonstrate in this thesis, the work of Maurice Pinard remains ever-relevant, and is deserving of greater attention in the field of Canadian political science.

The second theorist whose works and theories will be drawn upon is John Allan

Irving (1903 – 1965). He was a professor of philosophy at Princeton, the University of

British Columbia, and became the head of the Department of Philosophy at Victoria College in Toronto. In contrast to Pinard, Irving’s theory is founded on the importance of charismatic leadership, effective use of political advertisement and other factors that allow third parties to rise in popularity and power in Canada. While Pinard’s work is focused on the rise of the

Social Credit Party in Quebec, Irving centers his analysis on the growth in support for the

Social Credit Party in Alberta in the 1930s. The leadership theory of Irving is presented in his book, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta and will be used to assess if it was the role of leadership more so than the conducive factors outlined in Pinard’s “conducive structure theory” that allowed for the NDP’s rise in power in the 2011 federal election.

I seek in this thesis to bring the works of both Pinard and Irving and their arguments to the context of the Canadian 2011 federal election to assess whether the conditions for a third party’s success as defined by the two theorists were indeed met thereby supporting the validity of Pinard and/or Irving’s theses, or if there were other criteria for this event that had taken place that were not accounted for in their theories.

Although Irving’s text was published in 1959, and Pinard had finished his book in

1975, thereby making the texts somewhat dated, their arguments and theories remain ever- relevant in the 21st century. This thesis will illustrate the startling accuracy of the two

9 theories. My analysis of the 2011 election suggests that more attention should be drawn to more dated theories outside of the discipline of politics. These theories may present ideas that prove to be particularly effective at describing or defining contemporary political phenomenon and further developing contemporary literature.

What makes Pinard and Irving’s theories useful in the context of this thesis in contrast to the works of other prominent and leading theorists in the field of political leadership, political parties, electoral politics, and third parties in Canada (such as Eric Belanger, Andre

Blais, Alan Gagnon, Herman Bakvis, or Brad Walchuck among others) is that Pinard and

Irving provide original theories in the context of the rise of third parties in Canada. Although the literature on the rise of political third parties around the world is vast, the number of books delving into the details of how Canadian third parties come to power is limited.

Therefore, Pinard and Irving’s theories were chosen as the framework for this thesis and the analysis of the rise of the NDP in the 2011 election as a result of their substantial contributions to the surprisingly limited body of literature surrounding third parties in

Canadian politics. Pinard provides an in-depth analysis of how the rise of third parties in

Canada is due to the conducive structural conditions present at the time. Few political theorists on this subject have provided the level of analysis that Pinard does on this subject, making him invaluable and the theorist of choice when considering the larger body of literature surrounding Canadian political parties. Irving’s theory is focused primarily on the impact of political leadership on the rise of third parties. Although the body of literature surrounding the influence of leadership on political parties’ electoral success is vast, the same cannot be said for the body of literature on leadership and Canadian third parties. In this

10 light, Irving provides a very original and useful theory in his work which is vital to this thesis that is not provided by other theorists.

Methodology

This thesis argues that both the conducive structural theory of Maurice Pinard and the leadership theory of John Allan Irving are necessary to understand better the context and reasons behind how the NDP in the 2011 Canadian federal election was able to achieve the highest level of electoral success in the party’s history and become the Official Opposition.

In this thesis I draw upon a wide array of data, surveys, and polling information gathered in the Canadian Election Studies, a large body of data gathered through mail and internet surveys regarding voting behavior patterns, conducted by Patrick Fournier, Fred Cutler,

Stuart Soroka, Dietlind Stolle, and Eric Belanger. This data source provides information from a series of surveys and interviews through questionnaires with Canadian respondents regarding their: political affiliations; gender; vote intent; province they live in; etc. The

Canadian Election Studies data provide a great deal of information, allowing researchers to compare and contrast sets of data to find trends and patterns. For instance, one can use the

Canadian Election Studies to compare datasets for voters who chose to vote NDP with gender or age to determine, of the 4,300 people involved in the study, what percentage of female voters voted for the NDP, Liberals, Bloc, Conservatives, Green, or did not vote. This dataset has been a crucial asset to this thesis and has provided a wealth of statistics and information which is otherwise not available in books, journals or news sources. One drawback of the Canadian Election Studies is that the amount of information one can derive from the dataset is constrained by the subsets of information and questions asked in the study. For example, there are no questions asking if respondents live in rural or urban

11 communities, thereby not allowing researchers to compare voting patterns of people living rural or urban settings. In using the Canadian Election Studies, I have been able to gauge public opinion on parties, leaders and policies, and assess their impact on the election results.

This analysis would not have been possible without the use of this database.

Information available from respondents in provinces or territories with a low population was expectantly limited. With less than one thousand respondents from Prince

Edward Island, or the territories, the data available regarding voting patterns or affiliations by these low population provinces and territories are limited, and the few people who were included in the study were able to “sway” the data by the virtue of only having a few hundred people from these areas responding to the questionnaire. This means that trends or patterns could be made disproportionately clear or not evident at all in these regions, as even a few stray respondents can throw off the data due to a smaller pool of people represented in their region or group. It is for this reason that I have steered clear of survey questions and data which have fewer than one thousand respondents. At the same time, this has biased what research I was able to do in this thesis based on what questions and data met these criteria.

This thesis makes extensive use of news articles, newspapers, books, journals, and other print-based sources (both academic and non-academic) to develop, strengthen, or challenge and inform my analysis and arguments. Online sources and articles from prominent news organizations such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, , Gazette, and among other mainstream sources have provided a means of providing additional data and information for my analysis. It should be noted that the majority of my news sources are from major news outlets rather than alternative sources such as blogs. This was done primarily as the larger news providers have

12 conducted their own surveys, analyses, and investigations into the 2011 election and thus have contributed a great amount of information to this thesis. Smaller news outlets and blogs have contributed to this thesis as well, but in a different way. While larger news organizations tend to not focus on issues of gender, race, and class in politics, this is not true for many independent or smaller news programs or websites such as the First Perspective. In this way, independent news sources have helped shed light on the issues of gender and

Indigeneity which are addressed in this paper, but are used sparingly as the primary focus remains the analysis of the theories of Pinard and Irving in the 2011 election. In this thesis, news sources and other resources outside of the Canadian Election Studies were used primarily for a qualitative analysis of the 2011 Canadian Election, however a great deal of quantitative data was also available in using these sources. In using a variety of sources, I was able to compliment the Canadian Election Studies and fill in the gaps left in the data.

The data from the primary and secondary sources in this thesis are utilized to find if the theories of Pinard and Irving regarding the conditions necessary for a third party to break its “third party status” and become a mainstream political party are indeed met. In this sense, the data provide a means to see if the “check-list” of conditions outlined in the literature are met, thereby validating the theories and their relevance in 21st century Canadian politics.

Structure and Chapter Outline

This thesis paper is organized into five chapters, including this introductory chapter.

The brief intro to the 2011 federal election has explained why the results of the 2011 election were so remarkable and merit scholarly attention.

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Chapter Two of my thesis provides a brief history of the NDP. The brief overview will go as far back as the founding of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the years of the Great Depression. After giving a background of the CCF/NDP and their leadership with an emphasis on Tommy Douglas, , and Alexa McDonough, and how the party has evolved into the NDP over the years, it will be clear how the NDP has changed over the years. This chapter provides an excellent backdrop for comparing the party’s success in 2011 versus previous elections, and why the federal election in 2011 was such a monumental and historic event for them.

Chapter Three of my thesis is focused on the theoretical framework of Maurice

Pinard. This chapter provides an outline of and elaborates on the arguments made by Pinard in his theory regarding the rise of the rise of third parties which in the context of Pinard’s work was the upsurge of the Social Credit Party in Quebec in 1962. In doing so, I will assess the role of economic, social, and political factors in Canadian voting behaviors according to

Pinard’s conducive structural theory which states that the factors of one-party dominance, economic, social, and political turmoil, and effective use of political advertisements by third parties contribute to and are vital to their success in Canadian elections.

In contrasting public opinion and views on various policies, events and ideas along with data on the economic and political reality of Quebec, I gauge the extent of which the conducive structure theories of Pinard are helpful in explaining the success of the NDP in the

2011 election. Some of the factors illustrated in Pinard’s work that this thesis will draw connections to in Quebec in 2011 include high unemployment, economic disparity, and dominance of the Bloc Quebecois in the province, among other factors. This chapter will also address any themes or patterns in voting in Quebec or the ROC (rest of Canada).

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In Chapter Four, my focus turns to the role of leadership in the rise of the NDP. This section will bring the theory of John Allan Irving who in his theory places emphasis on leadership and effective use of political advertisement (radio, television, newspapers) rather than on social and economic factors as being the prime reason for the rise of third parties.

This chapter will analyze the polling and survey data on the 2011 election, and data from prior elections, to identify any themes or patterns that strengthen or weaken Irving’s leadership theory in the context of the 2011 election. Additionally, an examination of the impact and role of leadership in public opinion and voting patterns in the 2011 Canadian federal election will be provided. The focus of this chapter will primarily be on the role of

Jack Layton, and to what extent his charisma and influence as a leader led to the increased support for the NDP in the election.

Chapter Five concludes this thesis by reiterating my argument that both conducive structural conditions and powerful leadership were necessary for the NDP’s success in 2011, rather than using only one theoretical lens and missing the bigger picture in the peripherals.

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Chapter Two

Prairie Dust and Political Change: A Brief History of the CCF/NDP

“The roots of Canada's social welfare system were planted when a new political party, the ‘Co-operative Commonwealth Federation’ (CCF) emerged from the Prairie dust during the darkest days of the Great Depression.”33 -Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), 2001

In order to understand why it was that the 2011 federal election was such a breakthrough for the NDP, and why they were in the position of a third party to begin with, it is critical to have an understanding of the party’s history. This chapter will provide a brief history of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and how they have evolved ideologically and structurally from a “decentralized ‘movement’ seeking a thorough-going transformation to a bureaucratized ‘party’ inordinately interested in electoral power.”34 The role of the NDP historically since their origins as the CCF has been “to improve the redistribution of income, wealth, and power.”35 The NDP has been influential in Canadian politics, even as a third party, as seen in the party’s long history which is the subject of this chapter. The leader of the CCF/NDP who are considered in detail in this chapter are individuals who had a large impact on the evolution, or success, of the party. The focus is to gain insight into how the party has evolved over time. These political figures will include:

Tommy Douglas, Edward Broadbent, Alexa McDonough, and a section dedicated to Jack

Layton later in this thesis.

33 CBC. “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation: Canada's First Emerges from the Prairie Dust Bowl,” 2001, accessed July 19th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 34 Alan Whitehorn. Canadian : Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). 296. 35 Andrew Armitage. Social Welfare in Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 152.

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The NDP has deep roots in Canada as the political party that has provided one of the pillars closely associated with Canadian’s political identity, the universal, publicly funded healthcare system.36 The party consistently held a minority of seats in Parliament prior to the

2011 federal election, and had long advocated of the expansion of social welfare programs such as pensions, medicare, and affordable housing long before any other political party in

Canada had done so.37 By the 1980s, the fundamental values and the way that the NDP operated in Parliament and provincial politics began to change as they became more powerful, gaining more seats and influence as a part of the Official Opposition. With the

NDP becoming more influential at the federal and provincial levels, the realities of finances and budget deficits became clear, and the party began to have increased difficulty acting out their desired vision for governance in Canada.38

Origins of the CCF: The Birth of Social Democracy in Canada

From humble origins as the CCF in the 1930s, the modern day NDP emerged to later become a mainstream political party in 2011 as the Official Opposition rivalling the near monopoly of power in Parliament held by the Liberals and Conservatives. Yet, despite how the party has changed ideologically, it has remained constant in the strength of its ties with labour, as illustrated in the following quotation: “The labour links were the big transforming feature between the CCF and the NDP… The CCF was chronically penniless and the NDP would be chronically penniless without labour support.”39 The NDP has managed to divert itself away from its original ideology to become more “mainstream” but still maintains a

36 Armitage, 152. 37 Ibid., 152. 38 Ibid., 152 – 153. 39 Nick Vikander, “Reconquering the NDP,” The New Federation, 6.2 (2001): 7 – 10.

17 strong bond with its core supporters, labour organizations, which were vital to the party’s development as the CCF.

The backdrop for the creation of the CCF in Alberta was the Great Depression. It is well-documented that the Great Depression was a devastating period of time in the 1930s in both Canada and around the world in which unemployment, poverty, desperation, and financial ruin was rampant. The Canadian and American stock market prior to the

Depression was fuelled by borrowed money. In many cases during the Great Depression,

“brokers would sell stocks for as little as 10% of their value, using the shares as collateral.”40

The interest rates on loans were very high, however, most clients did not mind as the profit from the stocks was enormous. In the first two months of 1929 one could “buy a hundred shares from a company called Home Oil for $350 with a down payment of less than $50 and sell them in March for $1,575…but hardly anyone sold because everyone believed stock prices would continue to rise.”41 On October 24, 1929 (known as “Black Thursday”) thousands of stocks were dumped into the market and prices plummeted causing people to panic and sell their stocks out of fear of collapse.42 Over the course of six minutes wheat prices dropped from $1.40 a bushel to $1.31 a bushel causing millions of tons of wheat to be dumped into the market.43 This crash in wheat prices had a devastating effect on Canada’s

Prairie provinces.

The Prairies of Canada were hit particularly hard by the Depression in comparison to the rest of the country. The period of the early 1930s marked a time of poor wheat market

40 Pierre Berton. The Great Depression: 1929 – 1939 (Toronto: Pierre Berton Enterprises Limited, 1990). 29. 41 Berton, 30. 42 Ibid., 32. 43 Ibid., 32.

18 prices, dust storms, droughts, and failed harvests compounded with the effects of the

Depression.44 During the Depression, had the lowest wheat prices in the province’s history and was in deep debt along with the other Prairie provinces of Alberta and

Manitoba.45 Prior to World War II there was no “social safety net” or social programs in place to ensure that the farmers and those affected most by the Depression would have a means to provide for themselves and their families. At this time with social and economic chaos (note the correlation to Pinard’s theory discussed later in this thesis) the formation of alternative political parties began. Among the most prominent of these were the Social

Credit Party and Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation which would later become the

NDP.46 The CCF was brought into existence in Calgary, Alberta on August 1, 1932 by an organization of farmers and worker/labour groups, who would remain the core supporters of the CCF/NDP. The farmers and labour organizations who met in Calgary were from

Saskatchewan, the province hit hardest by drought and crop failure. As many as two-thirds of farmers from Saskatchewan needed federal government assistance after the “dust bowl” left.47

The early founders of the CCF were primarily academics representing the League for

Social Reconstruction, worker union representatives, farmer groups, and religious leaders.48

The new political party did not formally use the name “CCF” for the party for provincial

44 Canada History Project. “The Great Depression: New Political Parties in the 1930s,” accessed July 20th, 2014, http://www.canadahistoryproject.ca/ 45 Alvin Finkel, Margaret Conrad, and Veronica Strong-Boag. History of Canadian Peoples: 1867 to Present (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1993). 378. 46 CBC. “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation: Canada's First Socialist Party Emerges from the Prairie Dust Bowl,” http://www.cbc.ca/ 47 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 48 Michel Sarra-Bournet. “The CCF-NDP in Quebec: The Lessons of History,” August 5, 2014, accessed July 20th, 2014, http://www.revparl.ca/

19 usage until 1935; instead they referred to themselves as the Commonwealth Party.49

American Sociologist, Seymour Lipset states: “The new CCF was to remain essentially a federation of provincial parties, each of which had its own approach to socialism… the creation of a mass socialist party in Saskatchewan was not therefore, the local extension of a new national movement.”50 James Shaver Woodsworth, a Member of Parliament, social activist, farmer, and Methodist minister, was elected in 1932 by the members of the CCF to become the first president of the Federation. He immediately brought other organizations into the CCF such as the United Farmers of Ontario and the League for Social Reconstruction.

Woodsworth was a firm advocate of the view that rather than individuals being responsible for economic downturn, it was systemic problems with the capitalist market system. To

Woodsworth, the implementation of socialism and removal of capitalist structures in Canada would result in improvement of human equality in the country. Woodsworth asserted: “A severe condemnation still rests upon indifference... We have tried to provide for the poor.

Yet, have we tried to alter the social conditions that lead to poverty?"51 Through the efforts of Woodsworth, the old-age pension was introduced in Canada, put in place as a bargaining chip with the governing Liberals under Mackenzie King to ensure that CCF Members of

Parliament would support and vote alongside the current government at the time.52

The CCF may seem to have been a “radical” political party for its time; however, the formation of the CCF was one among a tide of other radical, or protest parties such as the

Communist Party in the , the Socialist Party of America, the Pelletanist Party

49 Seymour M. Lipset. Agrarian Socialism: Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968). 134. 50 Lipset, 134. 51 James Shaver Woodsworth in CBC. “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation: Canada's First Socialist Party Emerges from the Prairie Dust Bowl,” accessed July 17th, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/ 52 Frank H. Underhill. Canadian Political Parties (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1974). 18.

20 and French Section of the Labor International in France53 and many others around the world.

The CCF was therefore, not a movement exclusive to Canada but rather a part of the global emergence of third parties and socialist movements. The CCF proposed fundamental changes to improve human and economic equality in Canada and overturn capitalistic economic structures and market systems within Canadian government and society in hopes of improving equality at a time when poverty and desperation influenced Canadians to consider other political alternatives to help alleviate the suffering in their lives.

Tommy Douglas and the Early Years of the CCF

The new Federation in 1933 adopted a code which the CCF would adopt as their official platform. The document the CCF created was known as “The .”54

The manifesto was composed of fourteen major points, the first of which identifies the need to establish in Canada a…

[n]ew social order at which [the] aim is not one in which individuality will be crushed out by a system of regimentation. Nor shall we interfere with cultural rights of racial or religious minorities. What we seek is a proper collective organization of our economic resources such as will make possible a much greater degree of leisure and a much richer individual life for every citizen.55

The CCF was therefore not a radical Communist party as they were often associated with in the media at the time, but rather a party dedicated to preserving and enhancing individuality,

Canada’s diverse breadth of cultures, and equality.

53 Gerd-Rainer Horn. European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 17. 54 Sarra-Bournet. “The CCF-NDP in Quebec: The Lessons of History,” http://www.revparl.ca/ 55 The Regina Manifesto in Socialist History Project. “The Regina Manifesto (1933) Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Programme,” accessed July 20th, 2014, http://www.socialisthistory.ca/

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Perhaps the most prominent of the leaders of the CCF and influential Canadians was

Tommy Douglas (who placed third out of ten in CBC’s June, 2014 list of top ten Canadian heroes).56 A former Baptist preacher, Douglas entered the political scene in Saskatchewan and in the 1935 federal election was elected to become a Member of Parliament among the six other MPs elected from the CCF in that same year.57 In 1935 the CCF nominated a total of 117 candidates, receiving 386,253 votes (8.78% of the popular vote) federally.58 Douglas was charismatic, engaging, and had an excellent relationship with his constituents, and with the CCF, becoming its leader once the governing Liberals of Saskatchewan called an election. Douglas and the CCF received a great deal of hostility from the press and media with piercing statements such as “the only thing that separates the CCF from Hitler’s

National Socialists is its lack of the swastika and the goosestep.”59 Douglas’ charisma, and appeal to local farmers, workers, and families who were traumatized by the Depression elected the CCF of Saskatchewan in 1944 (winning 47 of 53 seats with 53% of the vote) as the first socialist government in North America with Douglas as their premier.60 Douglas was well-known for his eloquent speeches in Parliament, especially regarding social issues.

One speech by Douglas in the Saskatchewan Legislature on March 18, 1947 on the issue of social spending and social programs illustrates his power in oratory:

against that philosophy of life stands the CCF philosophy of life. We believe that every man is his brother’s keeper. We believe that those that are strong enough ought to help bear the burdens of the weak. We believe that any society, most of all a Christian

56 CBC News. “Top 10 Canadian heroes List Includes , Jack Layton,” June 15, 2014, accessed July 12th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 57 Claude Belanger, “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),” Marianopolis College, August 23, 2000, accessed July 20th, 2014, http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/ 58 Ibid., http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/ 59 CBC. “Tommy Douglas: The Preacher Turned Politician Fights to Bring a Socialist Government to Canada,” 2001, accessed July 20th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 60 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/

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society, is measured by what is does for the aged, for the sick, the orphans and the less fortunate who live in our midst.61

As is clear in his speech, Douglas was a committed advocate of human solidarity and providing social services to reduce disparity in Canada Douglas stood firm with his beliefs despite hostility from the media and other politicians labelling him as a radical or communist.

It should be noted that despite the successes of the CCF in the Saskatchewan provincial election, in the 1935 general federal election (and later the 1945 [28 MPs elected],

1953 [23 MPs elected], and 1957 federal elections [25 MPs elected])62 the CCF was largely unable to achieve electoral success in Quebec largely due to criticism of the party by the

Catholic Church. This was due to the CCF’s controversial association with socialism and communism which the Church opposed.63 What Douglas was best known for, and perhaps one of his greatest contributions to Canada, was not his skill in public speaking or even leadership of the CCF, but his efforts in establishing Canada’s healthcare system.64

As , Douglas was a fierce advocate of socialized healthcare, believing that Canadians’ health should not be dependent on their financial status.65 This ideology was likely derived from an experience in his childhood where Douglas had injured his leg and developed osteomyelitis, an inflammation of his bones which would have cost him his leg (as his parents could not afford to pay for surgery and medical care) if it was not

61 Tommy Douglas in L.D. Lovick. Till Power is Brought to Pooling: Tommy Douglas Speaks (Lantzville: Oolichan Books, 1979). 106. 62 Belanger, “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),” Marianapolis College, http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/ 63 Sarra-Bournet. “The CCF-NDP in Quebec: The Lessons of History,” http://www.revparl.ca/ 64 Doris French Shackleton. Tommy Douglas (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975). 231. 65 Canadian Museum of History. “Tommy Douglas,” March 31, 2010, accessed July 21st, 2014, http://www.historymuseum.ca/

23 for Dr. R.J. Smith, a surgeon who offered to do the treatment for free.66 On April 25, 1959

Douglas announced that his Saskatchewan government would introduce a universal medical insurance program in the province which became a reality in July 1, 1962.67 This program was “the first government controlled, universal, comprehensive single-payer medical insurance plan in North America.”68 This led to increased tensions in the province as it was a highly polarizing issue resulting in a famous doctor’s strike in July 1 – 23, 1962.69

In 1962 Douglas re-entered the federal political arena, under the union of the CCF,

Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and the newly formed New Democratic Party (modern day

NDP) and became its first leader. Many CCF politicians in Saskatchewan, led by Woodrow

Lloyd, refused to join the NDP due to the newer political party’s movement away from socialist ideology and the principles of the Regina Manifesto. Woodrow and the last branch of the old CCF met a sound defeat in in the Saskatchewan 1964 election, closing the curtains on the CCF.70

With the wave of popularity and success from the Saskatchewan healthcare program sweeping the country, pressure was placed on federal politicians to implement a similar system across Canada. On December 8, 1966 the National Medical Care Insurance Act was passed in the House of Commons at a vote of 177 for, and two against.71 By 1971 all provinces in Canada had established their own programs which met the criteria of the 1966

66 Ibid., http://www.historymuseum.ca/ 67 Canadian Museum of History. “Tommy Douglas,” http://www.historymuseum.ca/ 68 Lorne Brown. “The Birth of Medicare,” Canadian Dimension, July 3, 2012, accessed July 21st, 2014, http://canadiandimension.com/ 69 Brown. “The Birth of Medicare,” Canadian Dimension, http://canadiandimension.com/ 70 Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan. “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),” accessed July 21st, 2014, http://esask.uregina.ca/ 71 Brown. “The Birth of Medicare,” Canadian Dimension, http://canadiandimension.com/

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Act.72 In 1972, having accomplished his monumental goal, Douglas resigned as NDP leader, but continued his work in the party, until 1979 when he retired. Douglas passed away on

February 24, 1986 as the memorable figure in both the NDP and in Canadian history as one of the chief founding figures of the CCF, NDP, and a critical aspect of ,

Canada’s healthcare system.73 Indeed, to many Canadians, healthcare is viewed as not only a fundamental part of their identity, but is seen as a right of citizenship. A 2002 survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at found that 93% of

Canadians interviewed stated that they believed healthcare was a “right” in Canada.74

Tommy Douglas’ legacy in Canada remains ever-present in 2014. Political leaders such as Ontario Premier and leader of the Ontario Liberal Party, Kathleen Wynne draw upon his legacy, and the positive connotations associated with it. For example, after her recent

2014 electoral victory, Wynne stated that she “walks in the footsteps of Tommy Douglas.”75

What is interesting to note is that Premier Wynne has made reference to her legacy as continuing in the footsteps of Douglas while the provincial NDP leader in Ontario, Andrea

Horwath had not, leading some scholars such as Charles Pascal, editor at the Social Policy in

Ontario organization, to claim that the Ontario provincial NDP has lost its identity.76

Broadbent and the NDP: Taking the Party Forward

Another prominent leader of the NDP after the time of Tommy Douglas and David

Lewis who led the NDP from 1971 – 1975 was John Edward Broadbent. Born on March 21,

72 Ibid., http://canadiandimension.com/ 73 Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan. “Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),” http://esask.uregina.ca/ 74 Victoria K. Crites. “The Canadian Identity and the Right to health Care: From Waitlists to Social Citizenship” (honours thesis, University of British Columbia, 2002). 1. 75 Kathleen Wynne in Charles Pascal. “Ontario’s NDP Needs to Rediscover its Core Values,” Social Policy in Ontario, June 21, 2014, accessed August 6th, 2014. http://spon.ca/ 76 Ibid., http://spon.ca/

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1936, Broadbent graduated from University of Toronto with a PhD in philosophy in 1966.77

Broadbent continued his education and career and became a professor of political science at

York University in Toronto in 1965.78 Broadbent was elected as an NDP Member of

Parliament in the -Whitby riding in Ontario in1968, and held the riding for over 21 years (an impressive 23 years total service in federal politics).79 In 1975 “Ed” became leader of the federal NDP. Under Broadbent’s leadership the NDP achieved an astounding 41% public approval rating in 1980 (even beating Prime Minister Trudeau), the highest the party had ever achieved in its history up to that point compared to the Liberals’ 35% and

Conservatives’ 23% approval rating.80 Adding to his success as leader of the NDP, in the

1988 federal election Broadbent led the NDP to win 43 seats, the highest number of seats up to that point in the party’s history.81 After 14 years as party leader, Broadbent resigned as leader of the NDP in 1989, but later returned to politics and won back his riding for another term from 2004 to 2005.82

Edward Broadbent’s accomplishments are not exclusively tied to his service as a federal politician. He founded the Broadbent Institute, promoting economic equality, the

“greening” of Canada’s economy, and democratic rejuvenation among other goals.83 He was also the founding president of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic

Development, (ICHDD) an organization established by an act of Parliament to promote democratic development, human rights, and equality. The ICHDD was shut down in 2012 by

77 Parliament of Canada. “John Edward Broadbent,” accessed August 4th, 2014, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 78 CBC News. “Ed Broadbent’s Career in Politics and Public Life,” October 9, 2012, accessed August 4th, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/ 79 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 80 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 81 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 82 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 83 Broadbent Institute. “Issues,” 2014, accessed August 4th, 2014, https://www.broadbentinstitute.ca

26 the Conservative government in an attempt to cut back on government expenditures.84 As a testament to his legacy in politics and humanitarian efforts promoting democracy, fair trade, equality, and assisting refugee women, Ed Broadbent received the prestigious Order of

Canada on October 18, 2001.85 Broadbent was well-known for his speeches regarding human rights. One passage which highlights his position well on the issue can be found in his address on May 29, 2010 at the Congress of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and

Social Sciences during which he stated that “once we are out of the current crisis [recession], if we keep promoting more growth instead of more equality, we will continue to foster only more negatives in health and social behavior such a policy could hardly be more dysfunctional.”86 Broadbent’s popularity amongst Canadians and strong belief in human rights, equality, and promotion of social programs to reduce disparity in Canada would also be shared by Jack Layton. Broadbent contributed to the legacy of the NDP by building support for the party in the 1970s and ‘80s, providing the party with strong, charismatic leadership, and skills in public speaking and through his efforts helped to keep the NDP relevant in the realm of Canadian politics.

Alexa McDonough and the Renewal of the NDP

Alexa McDonough was another prominent and influential leader of the federal NDP.

McDonough was born in Ottawa on August 11, 1944.87 Notably her father was Lloyd Shaw,

84 Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada. “Minister Baird Announces Closing of International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development,” April 3, 2012, accessed August 4th, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/ 85 The Governor General of Canada: His Excellency the Right Honourable . “Edward Broadbent,” September 7, 2012, accessed August 4th, 2014, http://www.gg.ca/ 86 Ed Broadbent in “The Rise and Fall of Economic and Social Rights: What Next,” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, May 2010, accessed August 7th, 2014, https://www.policyalternatives.ca 87 Alan Whitehorn, “Alexa McDonough,” accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/

27 a business man and prominent member of the CCF.88 Before her life in politics she was a student, earning her Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees at Dalhousie (in 1965) and the Maritime School of Social Work (in 1967) respectively.89 McDonough entered the political arena in 1980 as the leader of the NDP. Impressively, at the time she was the only New Democrat, the only woman in the Nova Scotia Assembly, and the first woman to lead a major provincial political party in Canadian history.90 In 1981 she was elected for the seat in Halifax-Chebucto and would later be re-elected in 1984 and 1988.

McDonough remained in politics until 2008, with a political career spanning nearly 30 years.

After her political career she accepted a one year term as the interim president of Mount-

Saint Vincent University.91 Alexa McDonough was accredited with setting the stage for the expansion of the NDP into Nova Scotia, having “[made] the biggest step forward in the party’s history.”92

The Halifax MP would later become leader of the federal NDP after the less experienced Audrey McLaughlin led the NDP to a defeat in the 1993 federal election, bringing them down to only nine MPs from 43 in 1988 forcing McLaughlin to resign in

1995.93 When McDonough entered the NDP leadership race in 1995 to replace McLaughlin, there were only two other candidates, British Columbia MP , and

88 Ibid., http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ 89 Susan Monroe, “About Alexa McDonough,” About News, accessed August 24th, 2014. http://canadaonline.about.com/ 90 NDP, “Alexa McDonough,” accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://www.ndp.ca/ 91 Alan Whitehorn, “Alexa McDonough.” http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ 92 Ian Stewart and David K. Stewart, Conventional Choices: Maritime Leadership Politics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007.180. 93 Linda Trimble, Shannon Sampert, Angelia Wagner, Daisy Raphael, and Bailey Gerrits, “In the Running: Globe and Mail Coverage of Female and Male Candidates for the Leadership of the New Democratic Party of Canada, 1975 – 2012,” Canadian Political Science Association, page 3, accessed August 23, 2014. http://www.cpsa- acsp.ca/

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Saskatchewan MP .94 McDonough was victorious in the second ballot at the convention after having defeated Nystrom on the first ballot and Robinson conceding during the second ballot. She would then run for a seat in Halifax as a federal MP and won in

1997.95 Having won her seat in Halifax, and bringing the NDP back from their collapse in

1993, she re-united the party and won an astounding eights seats in the Maritime provinces, and brought the NDP to a total of 21 seats across Canada.96 McDonough was well known her for her energy, and ability to inspire others. Under her leadership she led the NDP to conduct several “renewal conferences” including a 2001 (NPI) convention in to decide the future of the NDP’s ideology, approach to politics and social democracy.97 The NPI took place amidst the political climate around the time of

September 11th, 2001 and ended in 2004. It set the stage for the NDP to critically reform and rebrand itself as a modern socially democratic political party appealing to a wider voter base, rather than a socialist party dedicated to overthrowing capitalism.98

Having provided the grounds for the NDP to reshape itself, and continue forward into the 21st century following several defeats in prior elections, Alexa McDonough resigned as leader of the NDP in 2002, leaving behind a powerful legacy of defending medicare, the

Canada Pension Plan, the unemployment insurance system, advocacy on social issues such as equality and human rights, and reinvigorating the NDP, who would then elect Jack Layton as leader in the following year . Having left behind a strong legacy in

94 Ibid., 3. 95 Alan Whitehorn, “Alexa McDonough.” http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ 96 Ibid., http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ 97 Ibid., http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ 98 Jim Stanford, “The History of the New Politics Initiative: Movement and Party, Then and Now,” November 29, 2011, accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://rabble.ca/

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Canada and the New Democratic Party, McDonough was awarded the prestigious, center piece of Canadian honours, the , in commemoration of her achievements.99

The NDP continued to develop to become more like a mainstream political party into the 1980s, 1990s and 21st century with the extensive use of polling and surveys to help define the language and platform of the party, and backing away from its association with socialism

(the NDP became more “mainstream” than their CCF counterparts in the early to mid-20th century).100 Despite their movement to more mainstream approaches to politics, usage of modern technologies, and the rebranding of the party’s ideology, electoral successes of the

NDP in federal elections were few and far between.

As seen in Table 1 below, the NDP has had a very limited number of successes since the birth of the party in 1961. The 2011 election, more so than any other election period in the NDP’s history stands out as a success. The party for the first time in its history in federal politics managed to overturn the Liberal Party and become the Official Opposition. It is therefore vital that research be conducted on this historic event to identify what conditions were present in 2011 over any other year that allowed this upsurge in NDP popularity and electoral success.

99 Northwood, “Alexa McDonough: Northwood’s Senior of the Year,” May 23, 2013, accessed August 24, 2014. http://nwood.ns.ca/ 100 Ian McLeod. Under Siege: The Federal NDP in the Nineties (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 1994). 22.

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Table 1: Election Results since Forming of NDP101

Year Seats % of Total Vote

1962 19 13.50

1963 17 13.10

1965 21 17.90

1968 22 17.00

1972 31 17.70

1974 16 15.40

1979 26 17.70

1980 32 19.80

1984 30 18.70

1988 43 20.40

1993 9 7.40

1997 21 11.0

2000 13 8.5

2004 19 15.7

2006 29 17.5

2008 37 18.2

2011 103 30.6

101 Elections Canada. “Past Elections,” accessed July 22nd, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/

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Conclusion

This chapter has given a brief introduction to the history of the CCF and how they had evolved and grown from a socialist political party in the years of the Great Depression to a modern political party of the 20th and 21st century. As seen in Table 1, it is clear that the

NDP have had a very limited number of successes, nearly all but collapsing after the devastating 1993 election. The role of influential and charismatic leaders such as Tommy

Douglas, Ed Broadbent, and Alexa McDonough has been vital in energizing the party and improving their electoral success. In reviewing the data, the 2011 election was truly a remarkable event, and made a breakthrough for the NDP into mainstream Canadian politics.

From being a formerly marginalized third party, the NDP was able to put a shock to the

Canadian political structure by, for the first time in their history, becoming the Official

Opposition and overturning the Liberals and Bloc Quebecois in the process.

It is clear from the results of prior elections that 2011 was a year of great change for the party, as in no other election had there been such an unprecedented rise in the NDP’s seats in the House of Commons. The next two chapters in this thesis seek to find the answers as to what factor(s) proved vital in establishing the conditions necessary to allow for the NDP as a former third party to make such a historic growth in popular support in 2011. In contrast to this chapter’s historical perspective, the following chapters will use data from sources such as Elections Canada and the Canadian Election Studies (as a few examples) extensively.

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Chapter Three

Maurice Pinard’s Conducive Structural Theory and the 2011 Election: From the Rise of the Reform Party to the “Orange Wave”

“One element that is often overlooked in this process was the almost complete political destruction of the Bloc Quebecois. The election of NDP candidates in Quebec demonstrated the declining support for separatism in that province. Judging by those they elected, the people of Quebec wanted different political representatives who were focused on more than leaving the country.”102 -Brad St. Croix, reporter at Newschecker, August 22, 2012

The 2011 federal election took place at a very turbulent time in Canada, and especially in Quebec. The works of Maurice Pinard help provide an explanation of how the conditions in Quebec and Canada were conducive to the success of the NDP in the past federal election. Maurice Pinard is a professor at McGill University’s Sociology department and is one of the leading scholars in the study of the development/expansion of “third parties” in Canadian politics.103 Pinard’s primary scholarly work that is used in this thesis is his book, titled The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics104. The analysis in this chapter will use Pinard’s conducive structural theory to assess its relevance to the conditions necessary for the NDP’s success in the 2011 election. Pinard’s work is focused primarily on the growth in support of the Social Credit Party in Quebec in 1962. His scholarship provides

102 Brad St. Croix. “Jack Layton and the Rise of the NDP,” Newschecker, accessed July 10th, 2014, http://newschecker.wordpress.com/ 103 McGill University. “Maurice Pinard,” September 2, 2011, accessed June 28th, 2014, http://www.mcgill.ca/ 104 Maurice Pinard. The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics (Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1975,) 14.

33 a clear framework for why, and how, political parties that were otherwise marginalized (by their own errors or through the efforts of other social or political forces) are able to become relevant to Canadian voters and break the cycle of being pushed to the political sidelines election after election. This theory is referred to by Pinard as his “conducive structural theory.”

The literature focusing on the rise of Canadian third parties is relatively rare as the field of study is much smaller than others in Canadian political science. Pinard’s book, The

Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics has nonetheless provided grounds for other scholars such as Graham White (McMaster University), Mildred A. Schwartz (New York

University), and Patrick Fournier (University of Toronto) to develop (or at least incorporate) the theories of Pinard in their books, One Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard

Theory Reconsidered,105 Party Movements in the United States and Canada: Strategies of

Persistence,106 and “Riding the Orange Wave: Leadership, Values, Issues, and the 2011

Canadian Election,”107 respectively.

Maurice Pinard and the “Conducive Structural Theory”

Maurice Pinard’s theory, as mentioned previously, addresses the conditions necessary for third parties to succeed or more accurately, what conditions have historically allowed for

105 Graham White. “One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol 6, no 3 (1973): 399 – 421. 106 Mildred A. Schwartz. Party Movements in the United States and Canada: Strategies of Persistence (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 107 Patrick Fournier, Fred Cutler, Stuart Soroka, Dietlind Stolle, and Eric Belanger. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, (December, 2013): 863 – 897.

34 third parties to become relevant and successful in Canadian politics.108 These pre-requisites that Pinard identifies include:

 Political conditions that incorporates the dominance of a single political party over

the others over a long period of time; the failure of any other “primary party” to be a

likely alternative for the electorate to vote for, thus leaving third parties as the only

political parties for voters to turn to on election day when they do no seek to vote for

the dominant party.109

 The major parties must have, through their own actions or other conditions, alienated

non-voters who would turn to the third party as a vessel of resistance (thus awakening

a body of formerly apathetic voters).110

 Political instability/turmoil/chaos (structural cleavages), and dire economic

conditions, also contribute to increased support for third parties.111

The political and economic factors for the rise of a third party in Pinard’s conducive

structure theory include:

 A discontented working and middle class (the disdain for current political parties for

not meeting their economic or social expectations/desires motivates voters to seek

political/ideological alternatives).112

 Poor economic conditions/growing disparity affecting a large portion of the

population.113

108 Pinard, 14. 109 Ibid., 29. 110 Ibid., 34. 111 Ibid., 86. 112 Ibid., 94. 113 Ibid., 100.

35

 Rapid social and economic change such as industrialization, urbanization, movement

in labour force, unemployment114 or high taxes leading to grievances and

discontent.115

 Finally, the effective use of television, radio, and other media for the purpose of

advertisement and propaganda is crucial to the success of third parties.116

Pinard concentrates his research and efforts on the 1962 Social Credit Party success in Quebec and from this analysis, he asserts that third parties must effectively mobilize the alienated, discontented, and marginalized members of society to support, or to at least vote for the party during an election. Mobilizing the discontented has historically been done in several ways according to Pinard: expose key groups (the ones most affected by social/economic hardship) to propaganda through magazines, newspapers, and especially television117; provide a platform to promote meaningful change relative to the conditions of the economic classes most affected by economic downturn118; and finally, mobilize young voters (24 years of age or younger, as this demographic has historically comprised the vast majority of the voter base for third parties in Canada).119

This chapter applies Pinard’s framework to identify if the conditions Pinard addresses as being key for a third party to succeed were indeed met in the Canadian 2011 federal election where the NDP rose from their former position as a third party to becoming the

Official Opposition. The focus is primarily on the factors involved with Pinard’s theory,

114 Ibid., 101. 115 Ibid., 112. 116 Ibid., 121. 117 Pinard, 122. 118 Ibid., 152. 119 Ibid., 164.

36 leaving the factor of leadership to the following chapter which will be addressed by drawing from the work of John A. Irving on the subject.

Political Situation in Quebec in 2011: Finding Connections to Pinard

Pinard’s conducive structural theory relies on the theme of “one-party dominance” at the federal level. This condition leads to apathy and voter alienation as those who would have otherwise voted for another primary political party such as the Liberals, Conservatives, or Bloc Quebecois lose hope that their primary choice in voting for a certain party becomes a hopeless endeavour and instead seek out a third party. In the context of the 1962 election in

Quebec, the Conservative Party had a legacy of poor electoral success in the 1957 and 1958 federal elections in the province. The formerly Conservative voting regions of Quebec in

1962 switched overwhelmingly to the Social Credit Party (36% of former PCs switched to

Social credit in the weaker PC districts).120 This theme of one-party dominance was present in the elections prior to the ground-breaking 2011 federal election. The 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2008 federal election results from Quebec show the overwhelming monopoly the Bloc

Quebecois had in the province.

As shown in Table 2 below, the elections preceding the 2011 federal election show an overwhelming majority of seats being held by the Bloc Quebecois (with the exception being the 2000 election), while the Liberals and Conservatives have, for the most part, held only a small minority of the seats in the province, rendering them unable to compete with the BQ effectively. With no mainstream political party alternative to choose from, voters who once voted Liberal or Conservative (and even Bloc Quebecois) turned to the NDP. In the 2011

120 Pinard, 30.

37

election, 86.8% of people who voted for the NDP voted for a different political party in the

previous 2008 election.121 In contrast, 59.4% of Conservatives voted for the party in prior

elections, while 43.4% of Liberals, and 55.0% of Bloc voters displayed the same trend.122

Rather than having a consistent voter base, the election in Quebec was grounded in newer

voters,123 and voters who had switched their voting practices since prior elections.

Table 2: Federal Election Results in the Province of Quebec by Election Year124

Year Bloc Conservative Liberal NDP Green Other Total Quebecois Party Party Party Seats

2000 38 1 36 0 0 0 75

2004 54 0 21 0 0 0 75

2006 51 10 13 0 0 1 75

2008 49 10 14 1 0 1 75

2011 4 5 7 59 0 0 75

The NDP handily defeated the Bloc Quebecois (which had won a majority of Quebec

seats in six elections prior to 2011) in part due to their ability to handle the issue of national

unity more efficiently than their Bloc adversaries, who continued to hammer the issue of

separation and nationhood home despite there being less support of the issue following the

121 Fournier, et. al. 868. 122 Ibid., 868. 123 The term “new voters” refers to people (primarily the young) who had, in 2011, voted for their first time. 124 Simon Fraser University. “2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 Election Studies,” accessed July 4th, 2014, http://www.sfu.ca/

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2008 recession. The NDP were thus able to address the issue of economic disparity, healthcare, unemployment, while the Bloc, as stated by Jack Layton was “a party of hockey defencemen that couldn't put the puck in the net.”125 Gilles Duceppe’s Bloc Party slogan,

Parlons Quebecois, and party platform quickly became the object of criticism by the

Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP. The Bloc was displayed in NDP television ads in Quebec as a hamster in a wheel, spinning, yet not accomplishing their desired goals. This set the

Bloc up to Quebec voters as the political giant which had been given a mandate since 1993, but was unable to achieve its goals.126 This narrative was more effective in 2011 over other election periods due to the persisting effects of the 2008 recession and decline in popularity of the issue of sovereignty. The only viable political alternative in Quebec for the “soft nationalists,” moderates, federalists, and those concerned with the economy, healthcare, and the rate of unemployment was the NDP as the Liberals were discredited due to scandal and the Conservatives have historically been unpopular in the province. The NDP to Quebeckers was the party made that substantial considerations to accommodate the needs of Quebec regarding language laws, the usage of Bill 101, and did not want to open up the constitutional debate regarding Quebec’s relationship with the Constitution.127

A political trend which was noteworthy in the 2011 election in Quebec, but was not addressed by Pinard, is the divide between urban and rural vote. The electoral patterns in

Quebec after the 2011 election show several remarkable trends. Apart from the urban centres of Montreal, Quebec, Gatineau, Saint-Laurent, and Trois-Rivieres in southern Quebec, and

125 Jack Layton in Charlie Smith. “Building the Orange Wave Shows How Jack Layton Brought Federal NDP Back From Brink of Ruin,” Straight, December 26, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.straight.com/ 126 Murray Cooke and Dennis Pilon. “Left Turn in Canada: The NDP Breakthrough and the Future of Canadian Politics,” Rosan Luxemburg Stiftung: New York Office, page 15, October 2012, accessed July 12th, 2014, http://www.rosalux-nyc.org/ 127 Christopher Dornan and Jon H. Pammett. The Canadian Federal Election of 2011 (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011). 121.

39 the ridings of Roberval-Lac-Saint-Jean, won by Conservative MP Denis Lebel, and Haute-

Gaspesie-LaMitis-Matane-Matapedia won by Bloc Quebecois MP Jean-Francois Fortin, the rest of Quebec was swept up by the NDP.128 Even with the NDP winning nearly all seats

(with the exception of Roberval-Lac-Saint-Jean) in Montreal, , Gatineau and

Trois-Rivieres, the other parties had won no seats in the rest of Quebec. Notably the Liberal

Party had won seats only in Montreal and Gatineau, while the Bloc Quebecois won their only seats in the Drummondville area, and their lone seat in Montreal and Haute-Gaspesie-

LaMitis-Matane-Matapedia. Although information is limited on the trend of why it was that the NDP was able to captivate nearly the entirety of rural Quebec, and the Liberals and Bloc were able to hold onto support in the cities, the trend is nonetheless notable in the 2011 election period. Further studies on the subject may illuminate interesting findings on a possible urban-rural divide in voting behavior in the province of Quebec.

Economic Conditions of Quebec in 2011: Connecting the dots

As a subset of “issue voting,” economic voting had a drastic impact on the results of the 2011 election. Economic voting is when a voter evaluates a political party incumbent based on the change in economic conditions from when they were elected to the day of the election. Voters can then “reward [or punish] the incumbent with re-election [if conditions improved or not]”129. Quebec in 2011 was in the midst of financial crisis/chaos. The financial state of the province during this time put a great deal of strain on Quebec families as the province was reaching the point where it could no longer afford the social services and

128 Election Mapper. “41st General Election Standings in the House of Commons,” accessed July 19th, 2014, http://www.electionmapper.ca/ 129 Anderson and Stephenson, 6.

40 programs (the Quebec daycare program is among the best in Canada)130 it had been providing to Quebeckers. Although the duties of the Quebec provincial government and Canadian federal government are different, the pressure on Quebec’s provincial social programs led voters to seek the federal NDP as a political alternative to improve the Canadian economy, and in doing so, improving Quebec’s. It should be noted that the social programs and

“” in Quebec is a critical part of the province’s sense of nationalism and pride.131

Quebec’s relative independence in its social programs from the rest of Canada, such as its

“five dollar a day” daycare program provides a degree of freedom from federal interference, and thus allows for a development of Quebecois identity by political elites to help identify the province’s unique nature separate from the rest of Canada.132 The “reform [of daycare and other social services] clash with the sense of distinctiveness underpinning sub-state nationalism. The notion of abandoning or even tinkering with the ‘Quebec model’ is seen as a betrayal of the province’s identity.”133 With social programs such as the provincial daycare program coming under threat due to financial concerns, the conditions were ripe for the NDP as a political party to offer change in the province and to preserve the social policies and programs which were near to so many Quebeckers.

130 Dafna Kohen, Susan Dahinten, Saeeda Khan, and Clyde Hertzman. “Childcare in Quebec: Access to a Universal Program,” Canadian Journal of Public Health, vol 99, no 6 (2008): 454. 131 The Globe and Mail. “The Quebec Diaries: Why Daycare Trumps the Economy,” August 2, 2012 accessed August 4th, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 132 Daniel Beland and Andre Lecours. “Sub-State Nationalism and the Welfare State: Quebec and Canadian Federalism.” Nations and Nationalism, vol 12, issue 1 (January, 2006): 77 , accessed July 23rd, 2014, onlinelibrary.wiley.com 133 Beland and Lecours. “Sub-State Nationalism and the Welfare State: Quebec and Canadian Federalism,” 77. onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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In 2011, Quebec had the fifth highest ratio of gross public debt to gross domestic product in the world.134 In comparison, only Japan, Italy, Greece, and Iceland had a higher debt ratio than the province. Canada ranked in at spot thirteen with a debt to domestic product ratio of 69.7%.135 It is important to note that the problem of having expensive social programs and healthcare systems are not exclusive to Quebec as many other provinces in

Canada have high debt ratios as well. The extent to which Quebec’s programs taxed individuals or families far surpassed the others. In 2011 a single income family earning over

$80,000 in Quebec with two children would pay roughly $23,000 in tax compared to only

$19,000 in Ontario, or $17,000 in Alberta.136 The overall level of tax payer debt in the province of Quebec rose an astounding 6% from 2010 to 2011.137 In 2011 the Quebec sales tax was raised from 7.5% to 8.925%, and an increase to 9.975% was announced to occur on

January 1st, 2012.138 Increasing tax levels has been a contentious issue in Canadian politics long before the 2011, election, but what made taxes key in 2011 was how high they were raised over a short period of time. It is rarely an electorally wise decision for a political party to announce that they are raising taxes in an election year, let alone shortly following a recession. Although the popular belief in Canada is that the Conservative Party has the best record with improving the economy, and reducing taxes, the Conservatives had limited success in province historically, and was therefore, not a viable political alternative. Thus, despite the economic conditions in Quebec favoring the Conservatives, due to their poor

134 Nocolas Van Praet. “Crushing Debt Jeopardizes Quebec’s Welfare State,” Financial Post, November 4, 2011, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/ 135 Ibid., http://business.financialpost.com/ 136 Ibid., http://business.financialpost.com/ 137 Van Praet. “Economists Warn Quebec Needs to Act on Debt Quicker,” Financial Post, November 24, 2011, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/ 138 Grant Thorton. “Quebec Sales Tax Rate Increases on January 2, 2011,” December 2010, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.grantthornton.ca/

42 results in the province historically and resentment by many Quebeckers against the

Conservative Party, they were overshadowed by the rise of the NDP, and thus were unable to achieve electoral success in 2011.

Data from the 2011 Canadian election study show that of the 4,300 voters interviewed, over 91.4% expressed that the tax rates should remain the same or decreased.139

Furthermore, in this same study, of the same 4,300 respondents, over 83% responded that over the past year (2010 – 2011) their financial situation has remained the same, or even deteriorated.140 It is clear that following a recession and high unemployment in Quebec, announcing higher taxes would put further strain on Quebec families and businesses.

Nonetheless, with greater economic strain on the province to maintain its expensive social programs and services among other things, higher taxes would be inevitable. Regardless of the necessity of having higher taxes, talks of having to take more money from voters wallets is rarely a sound political decision around election time.

Although the province of Quebec in 2011 had some social programs which were not in place in other Canadian provinces, they came at a great cost (especially following the 2008 recession). The Quebec daycare program from 2010 to 2011 ran a $126 million deficit.141

Following this trend, it is not surprising that the data reveals that Quebec voters showed greater resistance to increased taxes over voters in the rest of Canada. In contrast to the rest of the country, voters in Quebec in 2008 had a -0.38 correlation (all figures in this manner are on a scale from -1 to +1) to want high taxes. The negative correlation in this figure

139 Patrick Fournier, Fred Cutler, Stuart Soroka and Dietlind Stolle. “2011,” The 2011 Canadian Election Study, accessed June 28th, 2014, http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 140 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 141 Van Praet. “Crushing Debt Jeopardizes Quebec’s Welfare State,” http://business.financialpost.com/

43 indicates their negative attitudes towards a higher tax rate.142 This trend expanded in 2011 to a -0.40 correlation (interestingly, in the rest of Canada, the correlation was only -0.29 in

2008, and -0.33 in 2011, an indicator that as tax rates were much higher in Quebec, there would be greater resistance to higher rates). This explains how the province of Quebec, more so than other regions in Canada, displayed a greater resistance to higher taxes despite having more expensive social services. The data illustrate that taxation was a contentious “hot water” electoral issue for the Bloc who needed to declare that they were raising taxes to pay for the expensive social programs in the province. Quebeckers did not want higher tax levels, yet the Bloc had to raise them. The threat to Quebec’s social services in 2011, higher taxes, and the mounting debt of the province all contributed to the Bloc’s dynasty in the province beginning to fall apart.

Table 3: Quebec Sales Tax Rate by Time Period143

Period of Time Tax Rate

July 1, 1992 – May 12, 1994 4%

May 13 1994 – December 31, 1997 6.5%

January 1, 1998 – December 31, 2010 7.5%

January 1, 2011 – December 31, 2011 8.5%

January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2012 9.5%

142 Patrick Fournier, et. al. ““Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, December, 2013, 880. 143 Revenu Quebec. “Tables of GST and QST Rates,” December 31, 2012, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.revenuquebec.ca/

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The expanding debt of Quebec forced an increase in tax levels, putting increased pressure on Quebec families, and driving the narrative of the province away from issues of sovereignty, or nationalism, but instead to the economy and healthcare. This trend supports

Pinard’s conducive structural theory as the political turmoil in the province caused increasing economic strain on Quebeckers and provided grounds for the NDP to overcome the once unstoppable political machine of the Bloc Quebecois whom to the end of the election period, pressed forward the issue of sovereignty rather than employment, the economy or healthcare.

The correlation between Quebeckers’ likelihood to vote based on their stance on Quebec sovereignty had declined substantially from 2008 to 2011, from a decline of 0.13 since the

2006 election in 2008 to a decline of 0.19 in the 2011 election.144 This was further compounded by the rise of political disaffection in Quebec during this time. In 2008, the correlation for voter disaffection was only 0.15, but grew to 0.23 by 2011 (in contrast to

ROC, where the ratio was only 0.11 in 2008, and 0.12 in 2011).145 This illustrates how voters became increasingly disaffected and alienated from the Bloc Quebecois with rising economic strain on the people in the province of Quebec. With the Bloc having been in power since 1993, yet remaining unable to effectively reduce the province’s debt levels,

Quebeckers began to seek out political alternatives that would provide the change they desired. The party of change they would elect was the NDP.

Unemployment, Alienation, and Cynicism: The Impact of the Discontent Quebec Voter

With tax rates in Quebec increasing at an alarming rate, the looming threat to provincial social services and programs, and mounting provincial debt beyond any other

144 Fournier, et. al. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 880. 145 Ibid., 880.

45 province in the country, the economy and healthcare were among the top priorities of

Quebeckers. Nonetheless, the Bloc Quebecois continued to press the issue of sovereignty, cultural values, and language rights in their party platform. Nowhere is this clearer than in the party’s 2011 policy statement, Parlons Quebecois. The language and word choice in the document is confrontational and intended to create a divide between Quebec and the rest of

Canada (ROC) thus acquiring the support of Quebec nationalists. The Parlons Qc states,

“Quebec will only truly be free once it has decided to create a sovereign nation. In the meantime, we must maintain as strong a presence as possible in Ottawa. We must fight the

Conservative threat head-on by forming a united bloc.”146 The document goes on to outline what the party believes to be Quebec’s values, interests and beliefs. Although the party does take a clear stance on the issues it sees as important, in doing so, it isolates large portions of the population with statements such as the following: “our nation has a national language –

French – and Québec’s language laws must be enforced right across Québec, and that includes companies under federal jurisdiction. The Bloc Québécois is clear: Québec operates in French.”147 This passage isolates speakers of English, and many other languages in the province of Quebec. Additionally, another confrontational and controversial passage further highlights this theme: “our nation has the right to freely develop an integration policy that is best suited to it. The Bloc Quebecois is not reluctant to say: Quebec must opt out of

Canada’s multiculturalism policy.”148 What, for example are the implications of this statement by the Bloc mean for the Indigenous communities of Quebec or for recent immigrants? Markedly, the NDP received 38% of the non-white vote in Canada, and over

146 Bloc Quebecois. “Parlons Qc,” Policy statement, 2011, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.pdac.ca/ 147 Ibid., http://www.pdac.ca/ 148 Bloc Quebecois. “Parlons Qc,” http://www.pdac.ca/

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41% of the vote from immigrants who have lived in Canada for less than ten years.149

Despite the title of this section of the document being, “All Quebeckers Without Exception

Form a Nation,” it is clear that who the Bloc believed to be “Quebeckers” did not stem from an all-inclusive, egalitarian vision of the province.

Political alienation in the province of Quebec increased from the 2008 to 2011 period.

The polarization of the Bloc Quebecois along with reports of corruption and scandal such as the SNC – Lavalin construction project scandal brought increased scepticism from the public regarding the reliability and integrity of the government. The SNC – Lavalin scandal was a scheme by the SNC – Lavalin corporation (a major engineering firm) to increase construction project costs in the province to raise profits at the expense of the Quebec tax payers (which as discussed previously had already been subject to steadily increasing tax rates). The catch was that the companies would be allowed to do so, only as long as they paid donations to the political party in charge.150 The increasing rise of support for the NDP in the province of

Quebec can be directly to rising voter alienation and cynicism to the former Liberal and Bloc parties in the province. In Patrick Fournier, et al.’s “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership,

Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” the authors identify an increased correlation of cynicism reported by voters who had identified as voters for the NDP in the 2011 election

(from +0.12 in 2008 to +0.27 in 2011).151 From this finding, it appears that the NDP acted as a form of political escapism from the major parties present in the province at the time. With the Liberals and Conservatives being seen as hopeless and hapless contenders for first place,

149 Douglas Todd. “How Religion and Ethnicity Shaped Canada’s 2011 Election,” May 9, 2011, accessed August 6th, 2014, www.vancouversun.com 150 Huffington Post. “Quebec Corruption Inquiry: SNC-Lavalin Linked To Scheme To Raise Construction Project Prices,” Business Canada, January 25, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 151 Fournier, et. al. ““Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 880.

47 the NDP offered a new and arguably “fresh” approach to politics in the province. The advantage of the NDP not having been in power in previous years was that they had no history of corruption or misspending of tax payers’ money, raising taxes. In this instance it is the advantage of the third party, with no history in power, that gives it a protection from critique that the political parties in power lack.

The dissatisfaction with the Bloc Quebecois’ dominance in Quebec was very strong.

Quebec non-voters were the most likely in the country to report that they did not vote because they felt that their vote would not make a difference (35% of non-voters reported this as their primary reason for not voting).152 Importantly, Quebec had among the lowest number of people who had not voted on account of having a poor political candidate or leader available (7.5%).153 From this it is clear the one-party dominance of the Bloc

Quebecois in Quebec along with poor political and economic conditions led to increased scepticism and alienation amongst Quebec voters. With Quebeckers no longer seeing the

Bloc as a viable regime, voters began to turn to the NDP as a political alternative.

Table 4: Unemployment Rates of Canada and Quebec154

Year Canada (average) Quebec

2006 6.4% 8.2%

2008 6.0% 7.2%

2011 7.3% 7.6%

152 National Post. “Reasons for Not Voting,” July 5, 2011, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/ 153 Statistics Canada. “Reasons for Not Voting,” accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ 154 The Globe and Mail. “History of Regional Unemployment Rates in Canada,” September 16, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014,

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Another contributing factor to the discontent and alienation of the working and middle class in Quebec was the persistently high unemployment rate in the province. It should be noted that historically in Canada, employed individuals had a higher voter turnout rate (66% in 2011) than the unemployed (57% in 2011).155 The effects of consistently higher unemployment than the rest of Canada are compounded by the other conditions in the province mentioned earlier. Along with higher unemployment, in 2011, the median income of the average Quebec family was $ 68,170, over $4,000 less than the Canadian average.156

As discussed in Maurice Pinard’s conducive structural theory, increased unemployment, lower family incomes, and economic strains motivate citizens to turn to other political alternatives, especially if the political parties in power have been unable to change the political, social, and economic circumstances effectively for the people in the province.

Disparity and Household Income: The Power of Money and Voting Behavior

The impact of economic and social conditions in Quebec on the 2011 election becomes clearer when considering the increasing disparity and its effect in the province of

Quebec. With middle and working class families’ income remaining relatively stable (in between $40,000 and $60,000), the after tax income of members of the top tax bracket had grown from $130,000 in 2006 to over $140,000 in 2011.157 The ratio of income disparity in

Quebec in 2011 was the fourth highest in the country behind British Columbia, Ontario, and

Alberta respectively. In Quebec, families in the top 20% tax brackets had more than 8.2

155 Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, “Making Votes Count Where We Live: Creating a Culture of Civic Engagement,” March 2014, accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://www.coalitionottawa.ca/ 156 Statistics Canada. “Median Total Income, by Family type, by Province and Territory,” July 23, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ 157 Employment and Social Development Canada. “Financial Security - Income Distribution,” August 10, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/

49 times the amount of money as those in the lowest 20% tax bracket on average.158 The connection between income level and voter/political participation is evident in a survey on the subject conducted by Elections Canada. The study found that of those who self-reported as having voted or not voted in the 2011 election, those in the higher brackets of wealth had a much higher voter turnout than those who were less affluent.159

As Table 5 shows below, although the number of wealthy respondents in the data outnumbers those who were less affluent, the trend remains ever-present: disparity has a direct impact on voter participation. The wealthier someone is the higher the likelihood that said person will engage in voting over someone who has less financial resources.160

Table 5: Household Income in Canada and Voter Turnout161

Houshold Income Number Per cent Number of Per cent of

(Participants) (Participants) Voters Voters

Under $20,000 135 13% 94 70%

$20,000 to $40,000 124 12% 89 72%

$40,000 to $60,000 157 15% 113 72%

$60,000 to $80,000 136 13% 104 76%

$80,000 to $100,000 128 12% 103 80%

$100,000 and over 231 22% 193 84%

158 Employment and Social Development Canada, http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/ 159 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May 2011 General Election,” June 13, 2014, accessed July 6th, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/ 160 Sharankit Uppal and Sebastien LaRochelle-Cote. “Factors Associated with Voting” in Statistics Canada, catalogue no 75-001X, accessed July 23rd, 2014, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ 161 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May 2011 General Election,” http://www.elections.ca/

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As the data show in the 2011 election (the group respondents from Quebec in the

Canadian election studies) 22% of self-employed people and 20% of wage earners voted

NDP.162 This trend was not present in other provinces where the ratio of working class voters simply did not display the same level of support for the party. For instance, Ontario, another province which showed a growth in NDP support and elected NDP MPs only 9% of self-employed people and 11% of wage earners voted for the NDP in the election.163

The 2011 Federal Election and Mobilization of Young Canadians

An important phenomenon with regards to the NDP voter base was the marked rise in voter support among students (in college and university) and young people (first time voters).

In the province of Quebec, nearly 30% of students who voted in the 2011 election in Quebec voted for the NDP.164 Likewise, of the voter base for the NDP in Quebec, an astounding

64.7% of voters who had voted for the NDP were first time voters, or had voted for another party in the previous election.165 Considering that in the ROC, only 36% of new voters voted for the NDP, the situation in Quebec was truly unique. The NDP in the 2011 election claimed 33% of Green Party support from the previous election (only 2.1% of Quebec voters voted for the Green Party, the third lowest in the country behind Newfoundland and

Nunavut),166 24% of Liberal Party support and held 80% of their voters from the previous

162 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 163 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 164 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 165 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 166 Simon Fraser University. “2011 Election,” accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.sfu.ca/

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2008 election.167 Students comprised a large number of these new voters which had given disproportionate amount of support to the NDP over other parties (more students voted for the NDP in Quebec than all other parties combined). This supports Pinard’s theory and shows that in times of financial uncertainty, the unemployed, young, and those with dependents become increasingly engaged with third parties, seeing them as a means to improve the conditions of their lives.

The average tuition fees for a student in Canada between 1990 and 2010 had grown from $1,271 to over $5,000.168 The average total student debt upon graduating in Canada in

2011 was $28,000.169 Interestingly, the university student debt in Quebec was remarkably lower ($15,195) due to a tuition freeze, however what had mobilized the students in the province was not tuition increases, it was unemployment. In the period following the 2008 recession to 2011, student unemployment in Quebec had reached 13.7%.170 In one instance

Quebec students did take to the streets in February, 2012 in an episode of political demonstration and disobedience known as the “Maple Spring” against a 75% proposed tuition increase by the Quebec provincial government.171

When the data are reconfigured to examine the impact education level has on voting patterns in Quebec during the 2011 election, the results reflect how students hit hard by unemployment had a much higher tendency to vote for the NDP than other political parties.

167 National News Watch. “Explaining the 2011 Federal Election : Who Switched to Whom, and When,” Pundit’s Guide, June 15, 2012, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.punditsguide.ca/ 168 United Food and Commercial Workers Canada. “By the Numbers: Student Debt in Canada,” April 13, 2013, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://ufcw.ca/ 169 United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, http://ufcw.ca/ 170 Marlene Leung. “Ontario Youth Unemployment Among the Worst in Canada: Report,” CTV News, March 13, 2012, accessed July 5th, 2014, http://www.ctvnews.ca/ 171 Ingar Solty. “Canada’s “Maple Spring: From the Quebec Student Strike to the Movement Against Neoliberalism,” Global Research Project, December 31, 2012, accessed July 24th, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/

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The NDP was the most popular above all other parties among those students who had some technical college experience, some university, a bachelor’s degree, or master’s degree reported being in a poor financial situation/unemployed.172 The data set for the other provinces does not display this same trend, and varies wildly. In Newfoundland, the NDP was overwhelmingly popular among those who had completed elementary school, or college, while in Ontario, there was a much more even distribution regardless of education level.173

With the fact that most people in Quebec with college, or university education voted NDP in mind, it is fruitful to review the data, regarding the percentage of people who vote based on their level of educational attainment.

Table 6 below illustrates how those with a higher level of education have a higher voter turnout that those with a lower level of education. The data were derived from the

Canadian Election Studies from 3,362 respondents. The correlation of people with higher education having a higher voter turnout was conducive to the success of the NDP as their popularity amongst university and college graduates gave them an advantage over other parties that were popular among people who did not have a post-secondary education which statistically had a lower voter turnout. The data from this chart were gathered from a survey conducted by Elections Canada of over 1,270 respondents. Respondents self-reported their level of education, and if they had voted or not in the past 2011 general election. The data show that there is a correlation between a person’s level of education and their likelihood to vote in federal elections. The trend highlights how those with a higher level of education tend to vote more than those who have only elementary or high school educational backgrounds.

172 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 173 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

53

Table 6: Voter Participation by Level of Education174

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Less than High School Some College or Some Completed Grade 12 College or trades university university trades school degree school

Note: X Axis: level of education. Y Axis: percentage of voter turnout.

Of the students who voted in the election, a striking 59% voted for the NDP.175 Even in the ROC, the NDP came in among the top of the preferential parties among youth voters.176 Of the youth who had voted in 2011, 46% reported that the NDP addressed issues they cared about the most.177 The only exception for the NDP being the most popular party voted for by youth and students was Alberta where the Conservative Party received 53% of the vote from young voters.178 Unlike the Conservatives, Liberals, and Bloc, the NDP

(according to young respondents to the surveys) best managed to address issues that the young people of Canada were concerned with such as healthcare funding, social services, and

174 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May 2011 General Election,” accessed July 6th, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/ 175 Innovative Research Group. “Youth Voter Turnout,” Historica Dominion Institute, page 2, April 2011, accessed July 6th, 2014, https://www.historicacanada.ca 176 The term “youth” refers to Canadians aged 18 - 34 years of age. 177 Innovative Research Group. Page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 178 Ibid., page 2, https://www.historicacanada.ca

54 especially tuition rates and education.179 Conservative young voters chose their party as a result of the Conservative’s goal of strengthening the economy, providing jobs, and tax cuts.180 Liberals supported their party largely due to their promises of financial assistance, and tuition cuts.181 Green supporters tended to vote for the party almost exclusively as a result of their and emphasis on environmental solutions and issues.182 Finally, youth voted for the Bloc around the issue of sovereignty and defending Quebec’s interests.183

Coincidentally, as youth felt more engaged with, and saw potential in the NDP in the

2011 election, their voter turnout rate was remarkably higher in the province of Quebec as compared to previous years. In 2011, of young respondents (aged 18 – 24 in the case of the study by the Innovative Research Group) who were interviewed, 85% voted in the election in

Quebec, with Ontario and British Columbia having the lowest turnout rates of only 72%.184

As addressed in Pinard’s work, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics, youth, in economic hard times, become much more ideologically motivated than middle aged or senior voters.185 This theme was ever-present in the 2011 election among young voters where the most common reason why young voters were favorable to the NDP in their campaign was a result of their ideology (notably Jack Layton and his charisma came a close second).186 In contrast, the Conservative Party distanced younger voters as a result of their

“platform and perceived socially conservative values.”187 In contrast to the NDP, young

179 Ibid., page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 180 Ibid., page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 181 Ibid., page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 182 Ibid., page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 183 Ibid., page 3, https://www.historicacanada.ca 184 Ibid., page 2, https://www.historicacanada.ca 185 Pinard, 165. 186 Innovative Research Group. Page 4, https://www.historicacanada.ca 187 Ibid., page 4, https://www.historicacanada.ca

55 voters were not drawn to the Liberal party as a result of Michael Ignatieff and his poorly perceived leadership skills.188

A Gap in Pinard’s Theory: Gender and the Rise of the NDP

Although not directly addressed directly in Pinard’s conducive structural theory, the impact of women in the 2011 federal election cannot be overlooked with regards to their contributions to the success of the NDP. The NDP had the highest number of female candidates than any other party at the time in the 2011 election, with 63 of the 75 candidates in Quebec being female. Historically in Canadian elections both at the federal and provincial levels, women have shown higher proportions of voting for the Liberals and NDP while more men had voted Conservative, Reform, or Canadian Alliance.189 Although the presence of women in the federal level of Canadian politics is still growing, it is far from being proportional to the number of men present.190 The growing presence of women in Canadian politics has drawn a great deal of attention and voter support from women as seen in the 2011 election.191 This trend is not unique to Canada and is present in other countries such as

Norway and Sweden (among other liberal democracies) where an “increase in women’s political party activities was correlated with the number of female MPs.”192

188 Ibid., page 4, https://www.historicacanada.ca 189 David McGrane, “Socio-Economic Determinants of Voting Behaviour in Canadian Provincial Elections from 1988 to 2006” (presentation, Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 30th, 2007). 190 Commonwealth Secretariat Gender Affairs Department. Women in Politics: Voices From the Commonwealth (London: Commonwealth Secretariat Publishing, 1999). 48. 191 Linda Trimble and Jane Arscott. Still Counting: Women in Politics Across Canada (Peterborough, Broadview Press Limited, 2003). 43. 192 Christine Cheng and Margit Tavits. “Informal Influences in Selecting Female Political Candidates,” Political Research Quarterly, 64 (2) (2011): 461.

56

Notably, there has been a significant gender gap in political knowledge in Canada

(among other countries) but this has been shrinking over the past few years to a correlation of

-0.068 from 1997 to 2004 according to the study, “The Effect of Federal Election Campaigns on the gender Gap in Political Knowledge” by Janine Giles, a professor of political science at the University of Calgary.193 This study shows that women are becoming more engaged with Canadian politics through voting compared to previous generations. The percentage of women who voted in the 2011 election surpassed the rates of male voter turnout among all age groups under 65.194 The difference in voter turnout amongst the younger to middle aged demographics of men and women is alarming. Women in 2011 had a higher turnout rate by

4% for people of 18 – 24 years of age, 5.2% for the 25 - 34 bracket, 6% for the 45 – 54 bracket, and 1.5% for the 55 – 64 demographic.195 This trend reverses in the older age groups where women have a voter turnout rate 4.3% lower in the 65 – 74 bracket, and a

15.3% difference in the demographic of people older than 75.196 This increase in younger to middle aged female voter turnout is due to the changes in women’s historical role in the domestic sphere. Women have historically not been engaged in politics (with the exception of municipal politics) to the same degree as men due to the lack of female representation in government197, and given the persistence of long-standing social standards/cultural norms of women remaining in the home and not engaging in conventional forms of politics such as

193 Janine Giles. “The Effect of Federal Election Campaigns on the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge” (presentation to Canadian Political Science Association, University of Victoria, BC, June, 2013), accessed August 7th, 2014, http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ 194 Elections Canada, “Estimation of Voter Turnout By Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General Election,” April 2012, accessed August 20th, 2014. http://www.elections.ca/ 195 Ibid., http://www.elections.ca/ 196 Elections Canada, “Estimation of Voter Turnout By Age Group and Gender at the 2011 Federal General Election,” April 2012. http://www.elections.ca/ 197 Manon Tremblay, “Women's Representational Role in Australia and Canada: The Impact of Political Context,” Australian Journal of Political Science, 38:2 (2003): 223. Accessed August 23, 2014. www.tandfonline.com

57 voting.198 Despite the findings of the study conducted by Giles, “context matters: where the conditions are encouraging for political engagement, women can overcome the larger power dynamic which often leads them refraining from their full participation, expression, and articulation of political facts.”199

In the Canadian election studies, the findings are quite alarming and show a distinct divide in voting trends based on both region and gender. In Quebec, over 39% of female respondents (totalling 242 of 1008 from across the country) reported voting NDP, likewise, similar trends are seen in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island (PEI), Nova Scotia, New

Brunswick, and British Columbia (42%, 27.7%, 35.9%, and 36.1% respectively).200 What is intriguing is that the provinces west of Quebec show the inverse, a strong tendency for female voters to vote Conservative. The vote for Ontario stands at 36.5%, 35.6% for

Manitoba, 57.6% for Saskatchewan, and 76.2% for Alberta.201 Interestingly, only the trend for higher support for the NDP by female voters in Quebec was mirrored by the male vote.

In no other province, save Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, was the NDP vote substantial

(in comparison to the per cent of female voters) with regards to the percentage of the male vote. The 2011 election marked a period of high proportions of female voters choosing the

NDP in Quebec along with the electing of the highest number of female MPs in Canadian history to a total of 76, up from 69 in the 2008 election. Slowly but surely, the “gender gap” in the Canadian Parliament is beginning to close.

198 Giles. “The Effect of Federal Election Campaigns on the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge,” http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ 199 Ibid., http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ 200 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 201 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

58

Another factor that likely played into the high number of female NDP voters is that there is an ideological “gender gap” in voting behaviours between men and women in

Canada. This trend is also seen in other democracies such as the Netherlands, United States,

Japan, Ireland, , Austria, Norway, and Sweden among others.202 This trend for female voters to choose more “left-leaning” political parties was not always the case, in the

1960s for example, the number of women in both the United States and Canada who voted for more Conservative politicians outnumbered (percentage – wise) the number of men who voted more conservatively.203 With more educational opportunities, evolving social standards, and women entering the unionized workforce in large numbers, particularly in education, healthcare, and welfare services, the voting trends of women in many industrial societies including Canada has changed drastically.204 In Canada, women are more sceptical

“about the workings of the free enterprise system and more supportive of the welfare state than Canadian men.”205 The circumstances of women’s stronger affiliation with political parties who are “left – leaning” is in part due to women’s lives often being more “closely linked to the government’s redistribution policies than men’s.”206 As the NDP ideologically aligns most closely to these beliefs than the other political parties in Canada, it is clear that on matters such as social welfare and free trade, they would be more likely than the

Conservatives to attract female voters based on this trend.

202 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective,” International Political Science Review, vol 21, no. 4 (2000): 449. 203 Inglehart and Norris, “The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective.” 445. 204 Ibid., 446. 205 Elisabeth Gidengil, Andre Blaid, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte, “Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences,” in Gender and Elections in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1. 206 Manon Tremblay, “Women in Political Participation in Canada,” Elections Canada, accessed August 21st, 2014. http://www.elections.ca/

59

In a series of interviews conducted by Elisabeth Gidengil, Andre Blais, Richard

Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte in Gender and Elections in Canada, the importance of having female MPs or politicians in drawing more attention to women’s issues among female voters is illuminated. When asked in an interview/survey of over 3,600 people if the Canadian federal government should do more for women, 66% of female respondents answered yes, while 55% of men answered yes.207 Furthermore, 56% of female respondents answered that having more female MPs is the best way to protect women’s interest while only 36% of male respondents answered yes.208 These beliefs manifest themselves in the data surrounding the high proportion of female candidates in Quebec and higher than usual female voter turnout for the NDP. With greater representation of women in federal politics through the NDP, women in Quebec were able to become engaged to better represent women’s issues through the electing of female NDP candidates which were otherwise not available in the same numbers in prior elections.

Fundamental changes in Canadian politics to represent women and women’s issues are possible through increased representation of women in politics. This can be seen in the case of the 1991 Saskatchewan provincial election where, under the NDP government of Roy

Romanow the percentage of women in the legislature had jumped from 8% to 18%, the highest in the province’s history, paving the way for the creation of the Department of

Women’s Affairs, expanding employment equity programs, and Sexual Harassment

Prevention Program.209

207 Gidengil, et al. “Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences,” 29. 208 Ibid., 29. 209 David McGrane, “A Mixed Record: Gender and Saskatchewan Social Democracy,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol 42, no. 1 (Winter, 2008): 194.

60

In contrast to the Liberals and Conservatives, the NDP had a much higher percentage of female candidates. Of the total 308 candidates in the election, 204 were men, and 123 were women (39.9%, making the NDP the party with the highest number of female candidates in the 2011 election).210 This is a six per cent increase over the 2008 election when the NDP only ran 104 female candidates out of a total of 308.211 These figures address the national picture, and what party ran a more equal proportion of female candidates, at the provincial level, particularly Quebec, the numbers are astounding. In Quebec, 63 of the total

75 seats had a female NDP candidate running, meaning that an impressive 84.0% of ridings in the province had a female candidate.212 Although the NDP in the 1960s was largely dominated by men (due to their association with the movement and labour), however, this trend has reversed to a degree, and the support of female voters and candidates has led to an large emergence of female representation and voter support, especially in the province of Quebec.213

The information in Table 7 below was drawn from the Canadian Election Studies.

The data represents the responses of 2,393 female respondents regarding how they voted in the 2011 general election, and which province they live in. What is key to note from Table 7 below is that there is a remarkable trend (or at least a pattern) which shows that between the sexes, women have shown increased support for the NDP especially in Quebec and the eastern provinces (along with British Columbia) in the 2011election.214 The data do not provide for an explanation as to why women voted the way they did. One important detail to

210 Simon Fraser University. “Women and Elections,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 211 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 212 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 213 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 214 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

61

note (and a likely factor) in the high levels of support of the NDP in comparison to other

parties was the high level of female and young candidates put forward by the party in

contrast to other political parties. In the 2011 election the Conservatives ran 307 candidates,

68 of whom were female, while 239 were male (only 22.1% of candidates were female).215

Likewise, only a little over a quarter of the Liberal candidates in the election were female (a

total of 308 with 218 men, and 90 women).216

Table 7: Voting Trends in Canada 2011 (female)217

Political Party Nfld PEI NS NB Que Ont Man Sask Alb B.C

Other, 0 0 0 0 1.5 0.9 0 0 1.1

Liberal 30.3 12.8 25.6 7.1 12.6 32.2 40.0 9.1 3.2 10.8

Conservative 12.1 38.3 23.1 32.1 18.3 36.5 35.6 57.6 76.2 36.7

NDP 42.4 27.7 35.9 39.3 39.3 24.5 17.8 27.3 14.3 36.1

Bloc 0 0 0 21.8 0 0 0 0 0 0

Green 0 0 0 0 1.1 2.1 0 0 0 0

Did not vote 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0

None 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0

Don’t know 0 2.2 6.6 0 0 0.7 0 0 0 0

Refused 11.7 12.9 14.8 13.0 3.1 4.0 4.2 10.8 2.1 8.6

Note: numbers are percentages

215 Simon Fraser University. “Women and Elections,” accessed July 6th, 2014, http://www.sfu.ca/ 216 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 217 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

62

Indigenous Votes and the Rise of the NDP

Along with the impact of the vote by women, another factor that was conducive to the

2011 electoral success of the NDP, particularly in Quebec, that is not addressed in great detail in the literature, or even identified as a major factor in the rise of third parties in

Canada by Pinard, is the contribution of the Indigenous peoples of Canada. The term

‘Indigenous’ used in this thesis will be used to incorporate the First Nations, Metis, and Inuit peoples. Although historically little attention has been paid in the literature to the voting trends and impact of Indigenous voting (and studies and information is rather difficult to find) it is nonetheless vital to study Indigenous voting trends,218 patterns, and impact to provide a better understanding the political culture of Quebec, Canada, and the Indigenous peoples who live here.219 Since the 1960s, the trend amongst Indigenous communities and peoples has been that voter turnout has been below the national average.220 According to

Elections Canada, this is because “it often takes several decades for newly enfranchised people to exercise their right to vote at a rate similar to that of the majority”221; this pattern is also present in other communities such as the African – Canadian community.222 Noticeably, in their efforts to better represent the various groups within Canada including better representation of women, the NDP had the most Indigenous candidates of all of the other

218 Indigenous peoples in Canada were finally able to vote in elections after a revision to the Indian Act in 1960 by the Diefenbaker government. 219 Elections Canada. “Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Federal Elections: Trends and Implications,” June 10, 2010, accessed July 8th, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/ 220 Pieter Bevelander and Ravi Pendakur. “Social Capital and Voting Participation of Immigrants and Minorities in Canada,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol 32, issue 8 (2009): 141. 221 Elections Canada. “Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Federal Elections: Trends and Implications,” http://www.elections.ca/ 222 Ibid., http://www.elections.ca/

63 political parties with a total of ten, in contrast to the Conservative Party’s five, Green Party’s eight, and Liberal Party’s eight.223

The data in Table 8 were was drawn from Elections Canada in a country-wide study to identify the voter turnout for Indigenous people in the 2011 election. No survey sample was identified in the data, likely due to the information being drawn from sources country- wide where nearly all on-reserve Indigenous voters were represented in the data. It should be noted that the data in Table 8, below, only display voting patterns among Indigenous peoples and communities on reserves. From the data it is clear that in the 2011 federal election, among Indigenous peoples, there was a universal rise in support for the NDP (most notably in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta).224 The average of the self- reported turnout rates among on-reserve Indigenous peoples was 65.9%, notably higher than the Canadian average of 61%.225 The average voter turnout rate among the various

Indigenous groups in 2011 when broken down was 60.4% among Aboriginal respondents,

55.9% among First Nations, 72.4% among the Inuit, and 68.4% among Metis respondents.226

Although information is fairly scarce on the subject of why Indigenous voters voted for a political party or not, it is clear that there was a universal breakthrough for the NDP among

Indigenous populations across Canada that, considering (particularly in Quebec, Ontario, and

Manitoba) that Quebec was home to nearly a quarter (23%) of Canada’s population in 2011,

223 Tim Fontaine. “An Aboriginal Who’s Who of Canada’s 2011 Federal Election,” April 7, 2011, accessed August 7th, 2014, http://www.mediaindigena.com/ 224 The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 225 Elections Canada. “Aboriginal Electoral Participation in Canada,” June 13, 2014, accessed July 8th, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/ 226 Elections Canada. “Aboriginal Electoral Participation in Canada,” http://www.elections.ca/

64 their contribution (both in Quebec, and at a federal level) was both valuable and a key part of the NDP’s success.227

Table 8: 2011 Election Indigenous Voting228

Political B.C Alb Sask Man Ont Que Atlan Canada

Party

Con 45 (-1) 53 (-13) 35 (-12) 20 (-34) 25 (-19) 13 (-4) 41 (+3) 37 (-3)

NDP 38 (+5) 30(+13) 52 (+20) 55 (+29) 54 (+28) 57 (+14) 30 (=) 43 (+12)

Liberals 8 (+5) 11 (+2) 5 (-4) 23 (+6) 18 (-7) 9 (-5) 26 (-3) 12 (-7)

Bloc N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 19 (-4) N/A N/A

Quebecois

Green 8 (=) 5 (=) 8 (+5) 2 (-2) 3 (-1) 2 (=) 3 (=) 6 (+2)

Ind/Other 1 (=) 1 (=) 0 0 1(=) 0 0 1 (=)

Note: numbers represent percentages with +,-, and = representing change in since the previous election.

Fournier and Loewen, after reviewing the data from the Elections Canada study found that Indigenous voting is affected by several factors:

 If others in the same household had voted (75-80% of Indigenous people on reserves

who had voted, had a family member who also voted).229

 Access to political resources (ie: voting stations, advertisement and political information

available to them).230

227 TD Economics. “A Demographic overview of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada,” accessed July 8th, 2014, http://www.td.com/ 228 The Globe and Mail. “Infographic: NDP Dominated Native Vote in 2011 Federal Election,” January 15, 2013 accessed July 8th, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 229 Toronto Dominion Economics. “A Demographic overview of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada,” http://www.td.com/ 230 Ibid., http://www.td.com/

65

 Employment status (employed Indigenous peoples had a turnout rate average nearly a

third higher than unemployed people).231

 What province they lived in (Quebec had the lowest Indigenous voter turnout than any

other region in Canada).232

 Age (older Indigenous peoples had a higher voter turnout than youth).233

It should be noted that Indigenous peoples have among the highest proportion of young people in their demographic than any other group in Canada.234 This trend may contribute to the long-standing trend of low Indigenous voter turnout, as young people have historically had a low voter turnout in Canada.

Voter turnout amongst Indigenous youth was markedly lower than middle aged or older Indigenous peoples.235 The number of youth engaged in voting was directly related to their engagement in their community, education, and their identity within Canada.236

Taiaiake Alfred (et. al.) interviewed Indigenous youth from different cultural backgrounds, education levels and communities, and found that many Indigenous youth are engaged in politics, not at the federal level, but rather in their community and traditional forms of governance. Furthermore, (similar to the feeling among Quebeckers of alienation from mainstream politicians), many Indigenous youth simply find that their voices are not heard in the federal government, and that voting makes little difference in the grand scheme of an

231 Ibid., http://www.td.com/ 232 Ibid., http://www.td.com/ 233 Patrick Fournier and Peter John Loewen. “Aboriginal Electoral Participation in Canada,” Elections Canada, November 2011, accessed July 22nd, 2014, http://www.elections.ca/ 234 Fournier and Loewen. “Aboriginal Electoral Participation in Canada,” Elections Canada, http://www.elections.ca/ 235 Taiaiake Alfred, Brock Pitawanakwat, and Jackie Price. “The Meaning of Political Participation for Indigenous Youth,” Canadian Policy Research Networks, June 2007, accessed July 23rd, 2014, http://cprn.org/ 236 Alfred, et al. “The Meaning of Political Participation for Indigenous Youth,” http://cprn.org/

66 election, or improving their lives.237 Although there was a great deal of overlap in the situation with low Indigenous voter turnout among the younger population, as addressed previously, there are many features that distinguish their condition as unique from non-

Indigenous Canadians such as their strong feelings towards their Indigenous identity over that of a Canadian identity.

The factors outlined here regarding voter turnout rate amongst Indigenous peoples are in many ways similar to the factors associated with voter turnout amongst non-Indigenous groups as well. What is noteworthy here, however, is that Indigenous reserves in Canada exist in states of poverty and disrepair disproportionate to non-Indigenous communities. As a result, their access to political and economic resources is constrained. Despite having a very high proportion of Indigenous peoples voting for the NDP in the 2011 election, the results were constrained (and distorted) to an extent by the capacity of Indigenous peoples to access the resources to participate in the election and vote. It is therefore highly likely that should the living conditions in Indigenous communities improve, and unemployment rates decline, the number of Indigenous voters who would have voted would increase. Furthermore,

Indigenous voter turnout rates are much higher when they “are encouraged by their elders and Aboriginal organizations/agencies… [When Indigenous peoples] are supported and welcomed here, and realize voting is connected to their everyday lives, they are more likely to vote.”238 Indigenous voters in Quebec and across Canada proportionately supported the

NDP more so than any other political party, but with the exception of the 2011 election,

Indigenous voter turnout remains consistently low and will require co-operation from both

237 Alfred, et al. “The Meaning of Political Participation for Indigenous Youth,” http://cprn.org/ 238 Coalition of Community Health and Resource Centres of Ottawa, “Making Votes Count Where We Live: Creating a Culture of Civic Engagement,” http://www.coalitionottawa.ca/

67 community leaders and the provincial/federal governments to improve it. It has yet to be seen if the 2011 election acts as a “blip in the radar”, or a turning point in Indigenous voter turnout in Canada.

The Influence of Media Technology: Advertising, Social Media, and the Orange Crush

One of the major factors involved in Pinard’s theory regarding the rise of third parties is the effective use of television, and other forms of media to advertise, spread propaganda, mobilize the discontent or disaffected, and build public awareness regarding the platform of the third party (in the context of Pinard’s work, the Social Credit Party in Quebec was able to advertise using television and radio with great success).239 The 2011 general election was no exception to this rule. A useful study which illustrates this was conducted by Elections

Canada which reported on the people, groups, and influences on people’s voting decisions.240

The impact of media and political advertisement on voter turnout was substantial. The

NDP in the 2011 election successfully presented their leader, Jack Layton, as an agent of change who could offer the people of Quebec an opportunity to break the power center the

Bloc Quebecois had in the province. Through their efforts in making the party more public and well-known,the NDP successfully appealed to students and the young through intense advertisement on social media, and social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and

Twitter, but had also, through their active engagement with television and radio, had reached a much larger demographic (notably the middle aged and older generation of Quebeckers who spend less time on the internet).241

239 Pinard, 122. 240 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May, 2011 Election,” http://www.elections.ca/ 241 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May, 2011 Election,” http://www.elections.ca/

68

Table 9: Influence on Voter/Non-voter Decisions242

Influences Voter Response: Strong Non-voters: Strong

Influence/Some Influence Influence/Some Influence

Politicians in general 65% 37%

Media 51% 35%

Family (not including spouse) 48% 30%

Friends or peers 38% 36%

Partners or spouse 25% 16%

Teacher/Professor 12% 17%

Vote mob(s) 7% 5%

Endorsement by a famous 3% 4% person

Table 9 displays data from a survey conducted by Elections Canada regarding vote/non-voter’s perceived impact from among several factors on their final voting decision.

Data here are derived from 1,389 respondents in the survey. The data are arranged to display the respondents’ choices in a format representing the percentage of people reporting a certain factor having either a positive or negative impact on their final decisions. This means that each person can indicate multiple factors as being significant or unimportant in their final voting choices.

242 Ibid., http://www.elections.ca/

69

Note the influence that individual politicians and the media (television, radio, etc) have on voter decisions. This corresponds well, and provides an insight into the success the

NDP had in the 2011 election, as the party led an aggressive and persistent advertising campaign, particularly in Quebec.243 For the first time in the NDP’s history as a political party, they ran “clever, funny, appealing TV ads in French, like the one featuring leader Jack

Layton responding to comments made on the street: ‘Isn't he too nice to a politician?’ ‘Hasn't he got himself too close to real people?’ Those Quebeckers who did not know Jack got a great introduction.”244 With televised debates, a successful appearance of Jack Layton on a

Quebec Sunday night talk show, Tout Le Monde En Parle (which drew large audiences), ads on Youtube, and other popular websites, the scope of the audience the NDP could reach expanded greatly, and allowed the political party to become more “public.”245 So successful was the NDP’s television, radio, social media, and internet campaign advertising that six brand new NDP candidates spent no money at all in their campaigns and still won the election. , an NDP candidate in Quebec and former “campus pub manager in Ottawa, never even set foot in her riding of Berthier-Maskinonge before the election.”246 These members spent no money on lawn signs, or billboards; instead, the message for the NDP in Quebec was so successful through the media, that signs and other forms of advertisement were not necessary.247

The impact of media and political advertisement on voter turnout was substantial.

The NDP in the 2011 election successfully presented their leader, Jack Layton, as an agent of

243 Ibid., http://www.elections.ca/ 244 Duncan Cameron. “How Jack Layton’s NDP won Quebec,” May 24, 2011, accessed July 7th, 2014, http://rabble.ca/ 245 Cameron. “How Jack Layton’s NDP won Quebec,” http://rabble.ca/ 246 Steven Chase. “Six NDP Rookies Won Their Quebec Seats Without Spending a Cent,” May 22, 2012, accessed July 7th, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 247 Ibid., http://www.theglobeandmail.com/

70 change who could offer the people of Quebec an opportunity to break the power center the

Bloc Quebecois had in the province. The NDP successfully, through their efforts in making the party more public and well-known, appealed to students and the young through intense advertisement on social media, and social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and

Twitter, but had also, through their active engagement with television and radio, had reached a much larger demographic, notably the middle aged and older generation of Quebeckers who spend less time on the internet.248

It is important to note that the Canadian national voter turnout rate was only 61.4% in the 2011 general election.249 With this in mind, and comparing the average to the data in

Table 10, those who were engaged with, or use social media, television, magazines, blogs, and websites on the internet had a much higher voter turnout rate than the national average.

Thus, television, newspapers, and the internet were excellent advertising areas, as there was a greater probability of an advertisement campaign on a medium such as television, magazine, or website would have much higher traffic (and therefore people viewing the advertisement) as well as reaching out to people who are more engaged politically and vote more than

Canadians who do not use these mediums. With the NDP’s advertising campaign more aggressively reaching out to newer modes of communication and information sharing such as social media (the implications of social media will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Irving’s leadership theory), and the internet, it is clear that, similar to the conditions for the Social Credit Party’s success in the 1962 election in Quebec, the NDP was able to rally a greater body of support for the party, and at the same time, effectively criticize and harm the support for their rival parties in the province, mainly the Bloc Quebecois and

248 Elections Canada. “Participation in the May, 2011 Election,” http://www.elections.ca/ 249 CBC News. “Voter Turnout Inches up to 61.4%,” May 3, 2011, accessed July 7th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/

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Liberals. The NDP led an aggressive advertising campaign and made themselves public in television programs, the internet, social media, and the like. They were therefore able to appeal to a large demographic of people who use these mediums, and had a high voter turnout.

Similar to Table 9, the data in Table 10 below are derived from a survey conducted by Elections Canada from 2,412 respondents. Each respondent could only indicate one main source in which they receive their political information, thus the numbers in the “Total %

Using” column total one-hundred per cent.

Table 10: Sources of Information on the 2011 Election250

Primary Source of Political Total % Using % Voted

Information

Television 42% 68%

Media Website, blog or web source 20% 88%

Newspaper/Magazine 11% 88%

Family/Friends 9% 58%

Government and/or political party 4% 93%

website

Radio 4% 72%

Social Networking sites: Facebook, 3% 74%

Twitter, MySpace, etc

Other 5% 57%

250 Ibid., http://www.elections.ca/

72

Interestingly, the Conservative Party’s television advertisements in Quebec contributed to the Bloc’s downfall, but also deepened many Quebeckers sense of political alienation and distanced them from the Conservative Party. “This campaign however highlighted the Conservatives’ ridiculous ignorance of the political motivations of

Quebeckers; they didn’t vote for the Bloc because they thought it could get in power; they voted for it because they felt there was no other choice.”251 As discussed previously in this chapter, the feeling of political alienation and isolation in Quebec was stronger than in the other regions across Canada. The NDP criticizing the Bloc Quebecois (the political party many Quebeckers hoped that would represent Quebec’s interests and counter-act the pressures from the other major federal political parties), making them seem irrelevant.

Quebeckers then turned to their alternatives. The federal Liberals had a poor reputation in the province, and were thus discounted by voters as a viable alternative. The NDP before the

2008 election was relatively alien. People from Quebec did not “know them well,” but with the efforts of Jack Layton and his advertisement campaigns, they were able to become the political party to voice Quebec’s interests and thereby, replacing the Bloc.252

Conclusion

Maurice Pinard is one of the principal social scientists who had developed a very thorough and detailed theory regarding the conditions necessary for “third parties” in

Canada’s political structure to become “mainstream.” Pinard’s “conducive structural theory” outlines the necessity of one-party dominance in a province, the failure or decline in

251 Life in Quebec. “The NDP and Jack Layton: Why?,” August 22, 2013, accessed July 8th, 2014, http://www.lifeinquebec.com/ 252 Ibid., http://www.lifeinquebec.com/

73 legitimacy/reliability of the governing political party and the other mainstream competition, an alienated voter base, discontent among the working and middle class, youth/students, growing disparity, unemployment, and economic crisis, and the effective use of television and radio by the third party to build support.

Although the work of Maurice Pinard was grounded in the political, economic, and social climate in the 1960s, focusing particularly on the rise of the Social Credit Party in

Quebec in the 1962 election, his theory remains nonetheless effective in identifying the key trends that have allowed for the NDP to become successful in the recent 2011 federal election, particularly in Quebec. For this reason, the theory remains as relevant as ever, and has provided grounds for identifying common themes in Canadian federal elections and politics, but also, the unique political culture, and voting patterns in Quebec.

As seen in the analyses of this chapter, the conditions outlined in Pinard’s work as being vital to the success of the Social Credit Party in 1962 are ever-present in the 2011 federal election. What is not described in detail in the literature however, and what has been introduced in this thesis is the interesting gender voting patterns in the 2011 election.

Although Maurice Pinard did not reference gender as being a unique trend to aid in the success of the Social Credit Party in 1962, the same cannot be said for the NDP in 2011. The number of female voters in the province of Quebec (and notably in all of the provinces east of Quebec) showed disproportionate support for the political party over male voters, and was thus paramount to the NDP’s success in the election. Likewise, it should be noted that this trend was reversed in all provinces west of Quebec except British Columbia.

74

Additionally, the unique contribution of students to the success of the NDP is also noteworthy. Although students may in some regards be categorized as “youth,” the distinct trends in voting patterns distinguish them from other people in their age group. The momentous support for the NDP among youth with college or university education in contrast to those without, is worthy of note, and was not accounted for in the literature by

Pinard.

Furthermore, although not addressed in the literature by Pinard, and not greatly addressed in many other academic studies or research projects, the 2011 election marked a noticeable wave of support among Indigenous voters across the country. The largest increase of support for the NDP in the election generated from Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. Although Indigenous peoples in Canada have historically had a lower voter turnout in comparison to non-Indigenous voter participation, there was substantial increase of on-reserve Indigenous voters in the election. While there is not enough data to suggest that this was the result of economic conditions, political alienation, the charisma of

Jack Layton or not, it would provide an excellent field of study in the future to see what was the reason for Indigenous voters to support the NDP, and why the boom in support occurred in the 2011 election over previous elections.

In sum, the works of Maurice Pinard remain relevant in the 21st century. Many of the factors addressed in his work have shown to be both present and conducive to the electoral success of the NDP in the 2011 federal election. Although Pinard does not necessarily address all factors involved with the success of the NDP in the recent election (that would be very difficult to do with the lens and perspective of the 1962 election as Canada and its people have changed since then) he has nonetheless, provided a theoretical framework with

75 which social scientists can identify the conditions necessary for the rise of a third party in

Canadian federal politics. Building on the works of Pinard by providing the same conducive structural test to provincial politics may also prove to be fruitful to identify if the theory is universal and telling not only of the conditions necessary for the rise of third parties in federal politics, but in provincial elections as well.

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Chapter Four

John A. Irving’s Leadership Theory and the 2011 Election: The Inspirational Politics And Successes of “Smilin’/ ‘Bon’ Jack”

“One could argue that the inspiration for the NDP’s sizable turn in the last election had to do with Jack Layton. I think Jack Layton made the NDP a comfortable choice for Quebeckers. But his legacy is actually much bigger than that. He gave political strength to a movement in the province of Quebec which will last, I think, for a considerably long period of time”253 -John Wright, Ipsos Reid pollster, August 12, 2012

John Allan Irving was a professor of ethics and social philosophy at Victoria College in Toronto who passed away in 1965.254 Similar to the situation with Pinard, Irving stands as one of the chief theorists in the field of the rise of third parties in Canadian federal politics.

What distances Irving from Pinard is his emphasis on the role of charismatic and influential leadership (particularly that of William “Bible Bill” Aberhart) as being fundamental to the success of a third party more so than the conducive structural factors that form the body of

Pinard’s theory. In contrast to Maurice Pinard’s focus on the successes of the Social Credit

Party in the 1962 election in Quebec, Irving instead grounds his work in the Social Credit movement in Alberta which had a fascinating, and historical breakthrough in Alberta in 1935

(a little more than a month after the political party’s formation in which they received an astounding 54% of the vote.)255 In comparison to the situation with Social Credit in Quebec which had a limited lifespan, the party remained in power in Alberta remarkably until 1971.

253 Tobi Cohen. “A Year After Jack Layton’s Death, NDP Rides High. But for how Long?,” O Canada, August 19, 2012, accessed July 12th, 2014, http://o.canada.com/ 254 University of Toronto. “Manuscript Collection,” accessed July 13th, 2014, https://fisher.library.utoronto.ca 255 Irving, 3.

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This chapter will use the leadership theory of Irving to determine if leadership proved to be the most vital asset conducive to the NDP’s success in the 2011 election.

Irving’s Leadership Theory and the Rise of Third Parties

Irving’s work addresses the momentous contributions and importance of having strong political leadership guiding and leading a third party to success. In the case of the

Social Credit Party in Alberta, Irving states that “it is impossible to think of that movement in

Alberta without thinking of William Aberhart.”256 Furthermore, he describes the sudden landslide victory of the party as being possible only so long as there was a strong leadership figure present. “Whatever interpretation may be offered [of Social Credit’s success], the central figure in the events of that fateful campaign was William Aberhart. In his struggle for power he gave full value to the populace. His colorful techniques stirred the imagination of an electorate satiated with stereotypical politics.”257 There are many parallels between both Jack Layton and William Aberhart, especially how they were able to define themselves as agents of change to motivate and inspire voters.

The study of leadership and its impact on the success or failure of political parties is by no means a narrow field of field of study. Others such as John H. Redekop, a professor of political science at and Trinity universities claims in his text, Approaches to

Canadian Politics: Second Edition that “political leaders are the focal point of our

[Canadian] political system.”258 There is a vast and diverse breadth of studies, articles, and books on the subject of political leadership and its impact (both positive and negative)

256 Irving, 8. 257 Ibid., 290. 258 John H. Redekop. Approaches to Canadian Politics: Second Edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc, 1983). 267.

78 ranging from the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany to the impact of American presidential candidates in the success of their respective political parties during election period. What is unique about Irving’s work is that it is among the few works dedicated to the rise of third parties in Canadian politics, and more specifically, helps to fill in the blanks left in Pinard’s work (the lack of emphasis of leadership in his conducive structural theory). In retrospect, it would be difficult to imagine the success of the NDP in the 2011 federal election without the influential leadership of Jack Layton.

Irving’s leadership theory focuses on explaining how the rise of third parties is the result of several factors. Firstly, an influential, inspiring, and charismatic leader must be present to head the political party. This person must be able to engage the electorate at a time when the other political parties have been discredited due to either political blunders, or failures as perceived by the public (Aberhart began his campaign following shortly after the

Great Depression, a time of economic disparity, social unrest, poverty, and political alienation and proposed a new economic, social, and religious order that gave people hope.)259 Secondly, there must be an effective advertisement program to spread the message, and present the leader to become familiar, recognizable by the public, and to distance him/herself from other political figures. This can be done in a great variety of ways.

Aberhart was part of a bi-monthly magazine, the Prophetic Voice, held Bible Institute Study classes that acted as an opportunity for Aberhart to use his impressive skills in oratory, but also instruct people on the principles of Social Credit, and finally, broadcasted via radio on the station CFCN known as “The Voice of the Prairies.”260

259 Irving, 4. 260 Ibid., 31.

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This chapter explains, in a similar fashion to the previous chapter on Maurice

Pinard’s conducive structural theory, whether the conditions outlined in Irving’s leadership theory were indeed met by Jack Layton in the 2011 election period to identify that he was influential as a leader, and swayed people’s voting behaviors. This chapter seeks to identify if Jack Layton was able to present himself on forms of media, or in the public eye that was beneficial to the public’s perception of him, and helped to both build support for his party, but also to distance himself from the political mainstream, thus allowing voters to see voting

NDP as a way to reform politics, and promote change rather than continuation of past political regimes.

Setting the Stage: Jack Layton and the NDP

Before engaging with the events, trends and figures of the 2011 election, it is important to have a grasp on a brief history of Jack Layton, the man who will be the primary subject of this chapter. Layton was born in Montreal on July 18, 1950. His family had a history in politics. His grandfather was a member of ’ Unione Nationale, and his father, Robert Layton, served as a cabinet minister in ’s Progressive

Conservative federal government in the 1980s.261

By 1970, Layton had graduated from McGill University with a bachelor’s Degree with Honours in Political Science. During this time he also served as premier of Quebec’s youth parliament in Quebec City.262 After graduating, Layton moved to Toronto to study at

261 CBC News. “Jack Layton: A Timeline of his Accomplishments,” August 22, 2011, accessed July 11th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 262 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/

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York University in their master’s degree program in political science. It was at this time, in

1971 that he became a member of the New Democratic Party (NDP) inspired by their leader,

Tommy Douglas (who in the 2014 Canadian Heritage Heroes survey by the CBC, ranked third behind and Pierre Trudeau. Jack Layton notably ranked seventh in the list of the top ten Canadian heroes.)263 In 1974, Layton took a teaching job at Ryerson Polytechnic

Institute, which is now . In 1982, with the help of the local NDP branch,

Layton won the position of elected alderman in downtown Toronto against incumbent

Gordon Chong. During his time in office in Toronto, Layton took up many political issues, including workers’ rights, critiquing the Toronto SkyDome project, and supporting affordable housing and anti-poverty programs.264 Over the course of his life, Jack Layton had authored many books including: Capital and the Canadian State: Foreign Investment

Policy: 1957 – 1982, Community Inquiry Into Fires in Alexandra Park, Homelessness: How to End the National Crisis, and Speaking out Louder: Ideas That Work for Canadians among others.265 All of these books by Layton focus on ways to improve the social, economic, and political conditions in Canada and provide a critique of both the current and past governments run by the Liberals and Conservatives. Speaking out Louder: Ideas That Word for Canadians stands out as a very powerful book which sets out the groundwork for how

Canada can become a world leader in preventing the spread of AIDS, expanding childcare, housing, and ensuring that Canada meets its obligations to Indigenous peoples.

Layton continued his political career in municipal politics, serving as president of the

Atmospheric Fund, chair of the environmental task force, chair of the cycling committee, and

263 CBC News. “Top 10 Canadian heroes List Includes Pierre Trudeau, Jack Layton,” http://www.cbc.ca/ 264 CBC News. “Jack Layton: A Timeline of his Accomplishments,” http://www.cbc.ca/ 265 Parliament of Canada. “Jack Layton,” accessed August 6th, 2014, http://www.parl.gc.ca/

81 vice-chair of Toronto Hydro. Furthermore, he came a close second in his attempt to run as mayor of Toronto in 1991, and was fully backed by the provincial NDP, but lost to June

Rowlands in part due to Layton’s opposition to Toronto’s bid to host the 1996 Olympics

(which ended up failing anyways) that damaged his popularity.266 In 2003 Layton won in a bid for the leadership race for the role as leader of the federal NDP (winning on the first ballot with 53.3% of the vote.)267 In the 2004 election, the NDP came out with only 19 seats, winning his own in Toronto – Danforth (which he kept until he passed away in 2011) and in the following 2006 election, the NDP won 29 seats, in part due to Layton’s distancing of the NDP from the Liberals who had been the center of attention due to scandal in

September of the same year, Layton won an overwhelming 92% approval rating at the 2006

NDP leadership convention in Quebec City.268

In 2008, Jack Layton became even more active in the Canadian Parliament, putting increased pressure on the Conservative Party to pull out of , and amend the Clean

Air Act among others. In the election, the NDP gained more seats, taking them to a total of

37.269 On February 5th, 2010 Jack Layton was diagnosed with cancer just as his father had been. Nonetheless, despite this, he continued his efforts in Parliament and in the 2011 election replaced the Liberals as the Official Opposition with the NDP’s new total of a remarkable 103 seats in the House of Commons. Layton passed away on August 22, 2011, having led the NDP through the most successful period in their history as a political party.270

266 CBC News. “Jack Layton: A Timeline of his Accomplishments,” http://www.cbc.ca/ 267 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 268 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 269 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/ 270 Ibid., http://www.cbc.ca/

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With this background, it is clear that Jack Layton had both a long, successful political career, and was engaged with many issues such as healthcare, transportation, and poverty that many Canadians were and still are very passionate about. The following two sections of this chapter will offer an assessment of Canadian’s feelings towards Jack Layton in contrast to other political leaders, and to what extent the perception of Jack Layton translated into votes in the rest of Canada (ROC) and Quebec.

Layton as Leader of the NDP: How he Compared to other Leaders in the ROC

In the ROC, the data show that many Canadians had positive impressions of Jack

Layton during the 2011 election period. Of 3,440 people surveyed (outside of Quebec) in the

Canadian Election Studies, 66.4% (2,294 of the respondents) rated Jack Layton at a 50 or higher on a scale of 1 to 100.271 Approximately 25.2% of respondents (866 respondents) rated Jack Layton at a 75 or higher.272 Regardless of partisanship or political allegiance, many viewed Jack Layton as a good Canadian and political leader.

Table 11, below, identifies that in the ROC, the overall perception of Jack Layton changed little since the previous 2008 election. The ratings for the Liberal and Conservative leaders took a notable drop during this period. This sudden drop in popularity among the

Liberal and Conservative leaders in ROC is remarkable, as it is mirrored in the data. Of

1,986 people (in ROC) interviewed after the election regarding the primary reasons behind voting for a particular political party, 19.3% of Conservative respondents identified their vote choice was based on the leadership characteristics of Stephen Harper, only 5.2% of Liberal respondents reported voting based on Michael Ignatieff’s leadership, and 27.9% of NDP

271 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 272 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

83 voters reported voting because of Jack Layton.273 What is most interesting about the information here is that among NDP voters in the ROC, the leadership characteristics of Jack

Layton acted as the most popular reason for voting NDP (In Quebec it was to end the Bloc’s dominance, with Layton’s influence and leadership coming in a close second). The NDP’s proposed policy and issues came in at a close second in Quebec with 27.2%, and a notable

20.3% of voters choosing the NDP because they did not like the other political parties.274

This data strengthens Irving’s arguments regarding the importance of leadership in the rise of third parties in the context of the 2011 election.

The data in Table 11 was found from a dataset in Fournier’s “Riding the Orange

Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election.” In this survey of 1,986 people, respondents were asked to rate their preferred party leader based on their personal political partisanship on a “thermometer scale” of -1 to +1. The numbers in the table represent the mean average of the responses for each category.

Table 11: Perception of Political Leaders in ROC During 2008 and 2011 Election275

Leader Evaluations 2008 2011

Gilles Duceppe N/A N/A

Stephen Harper +0.26 +0.19

Stephane Dion/ +0.13 +0.18

Michael Ignatieff

Jack Layton +0.16 +0.19

Note: the numbers in Table 11 represent a change in rating of people’s view of a leader on a scale from -1 to +1.

273 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 274 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 275 Fournier, et. al. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 880.

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When organizing the data to identify if there were any increases/decreases in voter support for the NDP on the grounds of the leadership of Jack Layton based on a voter demographics such as: employment status, wealth, or if the person was Indigenous or not, the trend remained constant that approximately a quarter of voters voted for the NDP as a result of Jack Layton.276 The demographic which did not follow this trend was gender. When comparing the variables behind a man or woman’s vote, many trends remain constant, among

Liberals, the primary reason for voting was that the respondent liked their local candidate

(this trend also remains constant when put in the context of income, employment status, or ethnicity.) The one trend that stands out is the higher proportion of women who voted NDP, and associated their vote being based on the leadership characteristics of Jack Layton. In this data, 21.3% of 437 male respondents reported voting based on Jack Layton, while 34.3% of female respondents voted NDP because of Jack Layton.277 Although the impact of gender is not discussed in the theories of John A. Irving, it has nonetheless remained a constant that women consist of a large portion of the NDP voter base, and have shown higher interest and proportional voter support based on the leadership characteristics of Jack Layton. Calgary political organizer Stephen Carter, who ran Calgary Mayor Naheed Nenshi and former

Alberta Premier Allison Redord’s campaigns remarked in a CBC interview on the success of the NDP in the 2011 election how, “women voters played an important role… Jack Layton had the most appeal to women…Stephen Harper does not appeal to women, and I don’t think

Thomas Mulcair is going to be able to hold Jack Layton’s support.”278 What is important in this regard is that the 2011 election showed no major distinctions between male and female

276 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 277 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 278 Stephen Carter in Leslie MacKinnon, “Will 2013 Continue the Boom for Women,” CBC News, January 3, 2013, accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/

85 votes for the Liberal or Conservatives based on leadership; markedly, the only major distinction is with Jack Layton and the NDP. Although this profound and interesting theme will not be discussed to great detail in this thesis, it would nonetheless make an excellent topic for further research.

One of the defining features of Jack Layton over other political leader was his charisma and ability to connect with Canadians. Dennis Bevington, mayor of Fort Smith,

Ontario recalls in an interview with Heather Lange, a reporter at the Northern News Service that “I was attracted to the man [Jack Layton] immediately. I remember when he came into a room carrying his guitar and a sheet of songs. He wanted to get everyone going and he did.”279 Joe Handley, a candidate for the Liberal Party in the Northwest Territories in 2011 during an interview with Lange recalled Jack Layton as a man who,

[w]as 100 per cent determined as a politician and had a lot of resilience, always upbeat. In any meetings I had with him, he gave 100 per cent to everything. It is sad to see someone with his leadership skills and charisma to pass away, especially when he built up the NDP party so dramatically in the last election. I have never seen that before; I guess nobody has. I just found him to be a caring and compassionate person and a politician who wanted to make a difference.280

Jack Layton clearly had made a significant impact on the lives of many Canadians throughout the ROC from his vision of hope and change in the country and his “down to earth” approach to politics. With his charisma and leadership the NDP managed to make a

279 Dennis Bevington in Heather Lange. “Yukon Mourns Loss of Jack Layton: NDP Leader Remembered as Charismatic, Compassionate and Caring,” Northern News Services Online, August 24, 2011, accessed August 8th, 2014, http://www.nnsl.com/ 280 Joe Handley in Lange. “Yukon Mourns Loss of Jack Layton: NDP Leader Remembered as Charismatic, Compassionate and Caring,” http://www.nnsl.com/ 280 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

86 breakthrough in the province of Quebec and onto the stage of mainstream Canadian political parties.

The “Layton Effect”: “Bon Jack” and the Province of Quebec

Although the overall perception and voting trends of the electorate in ROC showed an increase in support for the NDP based on the leadership characteristics of NDP leader Jack

Layton, the perception of Jack in Quebec was truly remarkable. When the Canadian Election

Studies data on the 2011 election are organized to display the perception of Jack Layton by

Quebec respondents, 71.2% rated him at 50 or above (out of a scale of 1 to 100).281 Notably,

33.2% of the respondents from Quebec had ranked Layton at 75 or higher.282 Notably, in

2008, Quebec had a voter turnout rate of 61.1% in the general election which improved only slightly to 62.2% in the 2011 election.283 This marginal increase in voter turnout in Quebec, which saw a massive rise in support for the NDP and Jack Layton indicates that in the context of the 2011 election, the presence of charismatic leadership does not necessarily result in higher levels of voter participation.

In similar fashion to the analysis of the distribution of variables regarding people’s perception of political party leaders in ROC during the 2008 and 2011 election periods, the province of Quebec shows some unique trends not present in ROC. Note that in contrast to data in Table 11 (ROC), Table 12 (Quebec) displays a much higher voter evaluation of Jack

Layton than in the ROC by a considerable margin. What was especially noticeable in the

Quebec dataset is the sharp dive in the popularity of Stephen Harper and Gilles Duceppe.

Although the Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff also fell behind 2008 levels of leader

281 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 282 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 283 CBC News. “Voter Turnout Inches up to 61.4%,” http://www.cbc.ca/

87 evaluations (who would have been Stephane Dion at the time) the differences in Quebec for the Liberals was unique as in the ROC, Liberals’ perception of Ignatieff improved since

2008.284

Similar to Table 11, the data in Table 12 are derived from Fournier’s article, “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election”. However, as the data in Table 12 is grounded in the province of Quebec exclusively, there were fewer respondents with only 1,225 participating in the survey. The data are arranged in a thermometer scale from -1 to +1 with the more positive rating indicating a better impression of the party leader.

As with the case of Table 11, the data in Table 12 are a mean average of the responses in the dataset.

Table 12: Perception of Political Leaders in Quebec during 2008 and 2011

Election285

Leadership Evaluation 2008 2011

Gilles Duceppe +0.20 +0.16

Stephen Harper +0.29 +0.20

Stephane Dion/ +0.20 +0.11

Michael Ignatieff

Jack Layton +0.16 +0.34

Note: the numbers in Table 11 represent a change in rating of people’s view of a leader on a thermometer-like scale from -1 to +1.

284 Fournier, et. al. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 880. 285 Fournier, et. al. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 880.

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Similar to the case in the ROC, Quebeckers had a positive impression of Jack Layton and his leadership style.286 As seen in Table 12, Jack Layton had a much higher growth in

Quebeckers’ personal leadership evaluation of him since the 2008 election. What is unique about this trend is that despite Jack Layton having a much stronger positive impression in

Quebec than the ROC, Jack Layton was not the number one reason why Quebeckers voted

NDP. Another prominent feature in the data is that Layton was the only leader in 2011 to have an improvement in people’s perception of him, in contrast to every other major political party leader, especially Stephen Harper and Stephane Dion whose public perception plummeted. What further marks Quebec’s situation as being distinctive is that 35.5% of

NDP respondents who voted chose the leader as being the primary force driving them to vote for the NDP (27.9% of NDP voters in ROC).287 In a similar fashion to the ROC, the second most popular reason for voting NDP was their policies and issues they addressed that motivated 24.6% of NDP voters (compared to 27.2% in the ROC).288

In contrast to other political parties in Quebec only 10.2% of Conservatives, 14.0% of

Liberals, and 11.6% of Bloc voters voted for their respective party as a result of their leader.289 With this in mind, NDP voters in Quebec chose to vote for the party leader at a ratio nearly three times greater than the other political parties’ electorate.

286 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 287 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 288 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 289 Fournier. “Riding the Orange Wave,” 891.

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Layton and the Leadership Debate: Does a Good Debate Translate to Votes?

In this section, I will address Jack Layton’s success in the leadership debate, the popular Quebec talk show, Tout le monde en parle, and television/radio/internet advertisements and how they had impacted Quebeckers and their votes in the 2011 election.

The leadership debates during election periods in Canada are an excellent opportunity for party leaders to make themselves public, promote party ideology, policies, and promises, and at the same time critique other political party leaders. Debates provide a “visual tableau on which television can tell its story of Canadian politics… [and] play a role in strengthening the personalization of politics and the dominance of party leaders.”290 The English language debate was held on April 12, 2011, and the French one was held the following day, April 13,

2011. The leaders present in the debate were Conservative leader, Stephen Harper, Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff, NDP leader, Jack Layton, and Bloc Quebecois leader, Gilles

Duceppe. The 2011 leadership debates had a profound impact on NDP voters in Quebec. A study by Leger marketing titled, “Sondage Post – Electoral,” provides a wealth of information regarding voters’ responses to the leadership debates, and how it had impacted their perception of political parties, leaders, and their vote.

From the data provided in Table 13 below, several things are clear. Firstly, this information coincides well with the factors regarding voter choice addressed earlier in this thesis, that a majority of NDP voters who had voted in the 2011 federal election were new voters/not members of the NDP (only 34% of NDP voters according to this survey decided to vote NDP before the leadership debate [and only 15% before their campaign began] in

290 Joanna Everitt and Brenda O’Neill, Citizen Politics: Research and Theory in Canadian Political Behaviour (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002). 307.

90 contrast to 55% of Liberals, 65% Conservatives, and 73% of Bloc voters.)291 What was most interesting about this survey with regards to NDP voter behavior was that a total of 64% of

NDP voters had decided to vote NDP following the debate, an increase of 30%, a margin much higher than all of the other political parties.292 Finally, a remarkable 22% of NDP voters decided to vote for their respective party immediately after the leadership debate. This dwarfs the numbers reported from voters of other Parties where only 4% of Liberals, 3% of

Conservatives, 6% of Bloc, and 5% of Green voters were convinced to vote based on the leadership debates.293

Table 13: Voter Choice in the 2011 Federal Election294

PC NDP BQ Liberals Green

Total before the leader’s debate 65% 34% 73% 55% 32%

Before the campaign 46% 15% 62% 34% 3%

At the beginning of the campaign 17% 13% 9% 13% 21%

Before the leader’s debate 2% 6% 2% 5% 8%

After the leader’s debate 3% 22% 6% 12% 5%

In the last week 9% 22% 7% 15% 11%

During the last weekend 5% 6% 2% 5% 1%

The day of the election 12% 8% 5% 8% 18%

In the booth 6% 6% 8% 7% 24%

Do not know 0% 2% 0% 1% 9%

291 Le Devoir. “Sondage Post-Electoral,” Leger Marketing, May 7, 2011, accessed July 14th, 2014. Page 5, http://www.ledevoir.com/ 292 Ibid., page 5, http://www.ledevoir.com/ 293 Ibid., page 5, http://www.ledevoir.com/ 294 Ibid., page 5, http://www.ledevoir.com/

91

What made Jack Layton’s performance so persuasive to Canadians to rally new NDP voters to his party? Layton’s attitude and behavior in the leadership debate was very effective. Rather than engaging in bickering, Layton instead took an approach using well thought out, sharp, witty remarks and comments that were both effective and focused (this was likely done to separate himself from the stigmas of typical politicians). He was particularly effective in criticizing Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff, and Conservative leader,

Stephen Harper (who was the prime target for all three leaders during the debate).295 Jack

Layton made among the most memorable, witty, and damaging remarks throughout the entire debate. Among these memorable moments were his jabs at Stephen Harper. For example,

Layton stated: “I don’t know why we need so many prisons when the crooks seem so happy in the Senate.”296 His attack on Michael Ignatieff’s poor attendance record in Parliament,

“you know, most Canadians, if they don’t show up for work, they don’t get a promotion… you missed 70% of the votes.”297 In the French language debate, Gilles Duceppe was regarded as having largely won the debate, however, Jack Layton also had a fair share of time in the spotlight, and according to an Ipsos poll of French viewers following the debate,

52% said their perceptions of Jack Layton and Michael Ignatieff had improved.298

Likewise, although the 2011 federal leadership debates were presented on television, other programs proved to be very influential in building support of the NDP through the public presence of their charismatic leader, Jack Layton. Although it should be noted that

295 Enzo Dimatteo. “Dissecting the Leader’s Debate,” Now Toronto, April 13, 2011, accessed July 13th, 2014, http://www.nowtoronto.com/ 296 Jack Layton in CBC Digital Archives. “2011 Leader’s Debate,” February 17, 2012, accessed July 13th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 297 Kristy Kirkup. “Layton Puts Egg on Iggy’s Face in Debate,” , April 13, 2011, accessed July 13th, 2014, “http://www.torontosun.com/ 298 Ipsos. “Post French-Language Debate Flash Polls Reveal Duceppe Takes the Night, Harper Stumbles,” April 14, 2011, accessed July 14th, 2014, http://www.ipsos-na.com/

92 television was not a medium that was widely used during the time of William “Bible Bill”

Aberhart, and was not identified as being crucial to Irving’s theory. Nonetheless political advertisement through television and other mediums proved to be a crucial factor in the success of the NDP in the 2011 election, and the building of public support behind Jack

Layton. Layton’s “success” was defined by his ability to distinguish himself from the other political party leaders. “We distinguished our position very clearly by pointing out that it was Mr. Ignatieff and his party that helped Mr. Harper for two and a half years. We have those two old parties with their old problems and their failures.”299 Layton had achieved his goal in the leadership debates of defining both himself and the NDP as the agents for future change in Canada. Through Layton’s stellar performance in the debate, the NDP had defined itself as a party appealing to the politically disaffected or alienated who composed a large proportion of the electorate in Quebec as discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis.

Time on the Air: Jack Layton’s Presence on Television

In analyzing the data provided in Patrick Fournier’s (et. al.), “Riding the Orange

Wave,” it is clear that following the leadership debate, there was a boost in first mentions of the NDP, and Jack Layton in the weeks leading up to the election. In the ROC prior to the election, the NDP and Layton received only on average 12 – 15% of first mentions on news and public television programs.300 Following the debate the NDP soared in popularity (31% of first mentions), surpassing the Liberals, and nearly doubling their television coverage by

May, 2011.301 Nonetheless, the Conservative Party remained the most prominent in

299 Jack Layton in CBC. “Parties, Leaders Spin Victory From Debate Performance,” April 12, 2011, accessed August 6th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 300 Fournier. “Riding the Orange Wave,” 871. 301 Ibid., 871.

93 television advertisement and coverage with 50% of first mentions by May, 2011 (although this is to be expected as they were the party in power at the time, however, their coverage flat-lined following the leadership debate, with the NDP as the only party to have increased coverage over previous levels of television mentions).302

The situation in Quebec was similar in many ways. The Conservative Party’s coverage levelled out at 36 – 38% following the leadership debate, the Bloc Quebecois’ coverage declined from 25% just before the debate to only 15% in late April and just before the election.303 The Liberals, on the other hand, showed a slight increase in air time following the election, from 12% of first mentions to 15%.304 Given Jack Layton’s captivating presence following the debate, the NDP had a surge in coverage, from 16% in mid-April to 30% in late April, just behind the Conservatives’ rate of coverage.305 This boost in coverage improved the NDP’s presence and familiarity with the Canadian public, setting them up to better advertise the party effectively using Jack Layton’s charisma and public speaking skills as a major advertising tool to build on their voter base.

Interestingly, in his article titled, “Cognitive and Motivational Sources of Voter

Susceptibility to Influence,” Robert R. Gilsdorf (University of Alberta) explains that candidates and political parties are more successful in elections when they have a frequent public presence, especially on mediums such as television, radio, and newspaper (internet and social media were not mentioned here as it was not present at the time when the text was written). People who use these mediums of political advertisement frequently have a much

302 Fournier. “Riding the Orange Wave,” 871. 303 Ibid., 871. 304 Ibid., 871. 305 Ibid., 871.

94 higher voter turnout rate as the viewership tends to be more politically engaged and knowledgeable than those who do not read the newspaper or watch political television programs.306 It is for this reason, that the effective usage of television and other mediums to present the leader of a political party and their message is so vital in 21st century electoral politics.

Another factor that contributed to Jack Layton’s growing popularity was his appearance on a widely popular Quebec television talk show called Tout le monde en parle.

Tout le monde en parle is the most popular show on Radio – Canada; indeed, even amidst popular sports events such as the Super Bowl earlier in February of that year retained over

1.2 million viewers. On April 3, 2011 Guy Lepage, and host of Tout le monde en parle had special guest, Jack Layton, on the show. There were over 1.5 million watching the show when Jack Layton made his appearance, making it one of the most popular television shows in Canada.307 Jack’s good sense of humor, charming demeanour and charisma enthralled the

Quebec audience and further cemented the “bon Jack” (a phrase used in Quebec to refer to a good person) persona of the NDP leader as the choice for change.308 “The debate and Tout le monde en parle. Those are the two determinants in the rise of the New Democratic Party

(NDP) in Quebec times’, according to Jack Layton.”309 Historically the NDP had a difficult time trying to get the party’s message, and its leaders on public television, radio, and

306 Robert E. Gilsdorf. “Cognitive and Motivational Sources of Voter Susceptibility to Influence,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol VI (1973): 629. 307 Seevibes. “Who will Crash the Super Bowl Audience,” February 10, 2011, accessed July 15th, 2014, http://www.seevibes.com/ 308 Lauzon. “Did Sovereigntist Guy Lepage Open Doors for Jack Layton?,” http://www.montrealgazette.com/ 309 Jack Layton in Richard Therrien. “Tout le monde en parle: Jack Layton Devant un Public Conquis,” Le Soleil, May 9, 2011, accessed July 15th, 2014, http://www.lapresse.ca/

95 internet,310 however, the Tout le monde en parle show allowed Jack Layton to present the

NDP, and himself in a different light than other politicians or political parties. To many

Quebeckers, Jack Layton’s openness, and friendly attitude provided many with hope that through him, change was possible in politics. Among all politicians, he was the one whom

Quebeckers felt was the most likeable, known to many simply as Jack.311

One of the contributing factors to the success of Jack Layton, and the Canadian public’s good perceptions of him as a leader was due to the NDP’s aggressive advertisement campaign on television, radio, and a newer form of media, which was not utilized to the same extent in prior elections, the internet. Political advertisement has been pivotal to the success or failure of elections at a federal, provincial, and municipal level. In Canada, during the

2011 election period, as outlined under the Canadian Elections Act, each major television broadcaster had to make available up to 390 minutes for political parties to purchase advertising time in the 2011 election period.312 Of these 390 minutes, 103.0 were dedicated to Conservative advertisement, 69.3 minutes for the Liberals, and 48.0 minutes for the

NDP.313 Furthermore, the expenses of the major Canadian political parties display an interesting finding. In the 2011 election period, the NDP and Liberal Party had an expense limit of $21,025,793 each, while the Conservatives had less, despite being the party in power, with only $20,955,088.314 What is shocking is that the NDP had an equal spending limit to the Liberal Party despite the NDP only having 37 seats to the Liberals’ 77. The Green Party

310 Paul Francis Black. “The NDP and the ‘Canadian Way’: A Process of Change or a Change in Process?” (honours thesis, Acadia University, 2000). 88. 311 Laura Payton. “NDP’s Quebec Support Around Layton,” CBC News, August 22, 2011, accessed July 15th, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/ 312 Simon Fraser University. “Canadian Election Laws & Policies,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 313 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 314 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/

96 in the 2011 election period had no seats, yet had a spending limit of $20,764,344, nearly matching the Conservatives.315

Stepping Into Little-Known Territory: Internet Advertising, Social Media and Layton

With the increased usage of social media, the internet and other mediums, politicians and voters have access to a vast amount of information about one another. Polling allows politicians to check “the pulse” of the public, while social media and internet outlets are easily accessible and allow for information (both accurate and inaccurate) to travel quickly.316 Although in the 2011 election campaign, other parties apart from the NDP used the internet as a medium to spread political propaganda, none was able to match the nature of the NDP’s online campaign. From the usage of apps, and texting programs where a person with a cell-phone could “text ‘NDP’ to “101010” to hear a message from Jack Layton, get a few details on campaign promises, donate, sign up for updates and get a link to the Jack

Layton iPhone app, from which you can follow the campaign.”317 The NDP were the only political party to make effective use of quick response (QR) codes, where a person could take a photograph of a black and white square code on an object to receive information or interact with an internet page on a smart phone.318 It should be noted that Canadian political party usage of digital and social media has been lagging behind compared to the American political

315 Simon Fraser University. “Canadian Election Laws & Policies,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 316 Cynthia Alexander. “Plugging Into New Currents: The Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Party Politics” in Hugh G. Thorburn. Party Politics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc, 1996). 596. 317 Brigitte Pellerini. “NDP Using Social Media in Election Campaign,” Toronto Sun, March 30, 2011, July 18th, 2014, http://www.torontosun.com/ 318 Pellerini. “NDP Using Social Media in Election Campaign,” http://www.torontosun.com/

97 parties in the United States, particularly in elections prior to 2011.319 With newer sites such as Twitter (created in 2006), and Facebook (created in 2004), the extent to which Canadians can connect with other people, be exposed to political propaganda and participate in political discourse on-line has never been greater.320

To emphasize the extent to which social media influenced electoral politics in 2011, by March, 2011 more than half of all the Members of Parliament had their own Twitter account, Youtube, or used Flickr.321 The Liberal Party even made a “social media guide” for their candidates to use social media effectively. “Every action a user takes on Facebook is broadcast to their social network. Using Facebook, you can integrate into electors’ day-to- day life and encourage interaction with our party on a local and national level.”322 The guide goes on to explain how to most effectively use each different form of social media (Youtube,

Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and Flickr to the greatest effect by attracting the most attention, writing the most engaging comments, and building a following. Newer programs such as

“Nation Builder” (which was also used in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections in the

United States) have been used in the Canadian 2011 election (and more recently by the

Liberals in the 2013 Ontario provincial election) to systematically design the most effective web pages, e-mail outreach programs, and utilizing a large voter information database.323

“Modern marketing and consumer-research techniques, combined with the tools and

319 Anatolly Gruzd. “Examining Polarization in Political Social Media: A Case of Twitter and the 2011 Canadian Federal Election” (presentation, , Halifax, NS, June 1, 2012), accessed August 7th, 2014, http://www.cais-acsi.ca/ 320 Gruzd. “Examining Polarization in Political Social Media: A Case of Twitter and the 2011 Canadian Federal Election,” http://www.cais-acsi.ca/ 321 Pellerini. “NDP Using Social Media in Election Campaign,” http://www.torontosun.com/ 322 . “Social Media Guide,” 2011, accessed August 6th, 2014, http://liberaluniversity.liberal.ca/ 323 Jeff Beer. “Transform Politics With Big Data,” Canadian Business, March 21, 2011, accessed August 8th, 2014, http://www.canadianbusiness.com/

98 strategies learned from Team Obama, are transforming Canadian politics. Winners will be determined not just by their financial war chest, but by the size of their voter information database.”324 The 2011 election was a first in Canadian politics. More so than any other electoral period in Canada’s history had political parties mobilized and engaged with the internet and social media to attract voters.325

In addition to reaching out to new online mediums before the other political parties, the NDP had made effective use of internet ads reaching out to young people (before the election campaign even began). These ads portrayed Layton as an accessible and caring leader who was out for the best interests of average people. As far back as January, 2011 the

NDP began internet ads, once again, emphasizing the good character and leadership of Jack

Layton and criticizing the nature of other political figures all being the same. The NDP’s ad was inspired by a powerful advertisement used by the Democratic Party in the United States.

This ad showed the Liberal leadership candidates, including Michael Ignatieff, going through a photocopier to all become the same figure. The NDP’s advertisement techniques helped to distinguish the party, and in particular, Jack Layton as being an agent for change in Canadian politics.326 The Conservatives on the other hand made use of their political muscle through devastating attack ads (noticeably, focusing mostly on Michael Ignatieff rather than Jack

Layton) to discredit the legitimacy and reliability of the other leaders.327

Advertising on the internet and television have not only had a profound impact on voting behavior (as mentioned previously in this thesis), but they have also provided an

324 Jeff Beer. “Transform Politics With Big Data,” http://www.canadianbusiness.com/ 325 Ibid., http://www.canadianbusiness.com/ 326 . “NDP Launches ad Attacking Liberal Leadership,” January 27, 2011, accessed July 18th, 2014, http://www.canada.com/ 327 John Ibbitson. “Tory Attack ads pack a Punch that Leaves Liberals Reeling,” The Globe and Mail, February 21, 2011, accessed July 18th, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/

99 opportunity to develop the image of a leader, and foster good perceptions of the leader amongst the public. It should be mentioned that the field of study regarding the impact of political advertising on television, radio, newspaper, and internet is not a new field of study, and many research projects such as those on the impact of Twitter activity and voter turnout for the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States by Jonathan Gromark and

Michael Schliesmann show similar trends to that found in the data for the Canadian 2011 federal election.328 Major social networking and social media sites such as Facebook (which remains the most prominent social networking site in the world with over 500 million users worldwide by 2011) were frequently used by politicians in the election to build support and advertise individual candidates and their political party.329 Although the information is limited on how people’s participation and “following” Canadian political party leaders translates into votes, it is nonetheless a phenomenon in the 2011 election. Jack Layton, more so than any other political party leader in Canada was able to attract an on-line “following” through people following him on Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media and therefore merits further research on this subject to identify in what ways this contributed to/or did not contribute to the success of the NDP in 2011. On major social networking site,

Facebook, Jack Layton had 225,360 fans and followers.330 In comparison, Conservative leader, Stephen Harper only had 114,562 followers and Michael Ignatieff had a meager

89,221 followers up to the May 2, 2011 election date.331 Although these numbers are clearly

328 Jonathan Gromark and Michael Schliesmann. “The Effects of Politicians’ Social Media Activity on Voting BehaviorTwitter Usage During the 2010 U.S. House of Representative Election” (Master’s thesis, Stockholm School of Economics, unknown year), 26, accessed July 15th, 2014, http://arc.hhs.se/ 329 Jon J. Pammett. The Canadian Federal Election of 2011 (Toronto: Dundurn Publishing, 2011). 232. 330 PoliTwitter. “Jack Layton,” July 19th, 2014, accessed July 19th, 2014. http://politwitter.ca/ 331 Ibid., http://politwitter.ca/

100 not directly translatable into votes in this first “social media election”332 it is telling that the nature of political advertising has diversified. Jack Layton made the NDP a much more

“public” political party. The NDP had gained a substantial amount of public support through his representation (in part) via social media. The increased availability of social media both as a form of political advertisement to political parties, and its growing popularity among

Canadians, had provided the perfect backdrop for the rise of the NDP, a former third party in

Canada.

Political Values, Integrity, and Public Opinion: The Public Perception of Layton

In the 2011 federal election neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives were able to effectively portray their party leaders as being as honest, trustworthy, or relatable figures as the NDP were. Notably, 68% of Canadian respondents (who had reported having a high or somewhat high exposure to politically oriented media on the internet or television) in a poll held by Angus-Reid Global reported viewing Harper as being untrustworthy, or having a separate agenda apart from the interests of the Canadian public.333 Likewise, referring back to the data in the Canadian Elections Studies, 49.9% of 850 respondents reported having a poor perception of Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff seeing him as a weak leader.334 What is notable in this finding is that among those people who had less exposure to political advertisements, they generally had a higher perception of Ignatieff. Significantly, 62.9% of respondents who had reported having seen little to no political advertisements viewed him as a fairly good leader showing good leadership traits.

332 Digital Media Zone. “Was Canada’s First ‘Social Media Election’ Influential?,” May 4, 2011, accessed July 19th, 2014, http://digitalmediazone.ryerson.ca/ 333 Angus Reid Global. “Stephen Harper Remains a Polarizing Figure for Canadians,” December 6, 2012, accessed July 18th, 2014, http://www.angusreidglobal.com/ 334 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

101

There was also an interesting trend when reorganizing the data to see people’s reception of Jack Layton. Among 852 respondents who had a high amount of exposure to political advertisement, 80.6% reported as seeing Jack Layton as having good, or very good leadership characteristics.335 There was a noticeable difference with regards to people’s perception of Jack Layton when they are exposed to little or no political advertisement.

Among those who responded having less exposure to political advertisement, only 52.7% reported seeing Jack Layton having good leadership qualities.336 Noticeably among Liberals

(one of the parties in Quebec where the NDP drew support from), 66% reported having a positive impression of Layton, and 67% had a good impression and thought highly of

Igantieff.337 Even amongst Liberal voters, Layton was held in high regards.

The data surrounding people’s perception of Conservative leader Stephen Harper are also revealing. Of those with a high exposure to political advertisements on television and internet, the majority of respondents, 71.6%, reported seeing Stephen Harper as having slightly poor, or slightly good leadership qualities (there was no overwhelming trend or polarization).338 This trend was mirrored almost identically with those who had little or no political advertisement exposure. Among these groups, 75.4% of respondents reported seeing Stephen Harper as having either slightly poor, or slightly good leadership qualities.339

This data reveal several key factors involved in political advertisement in the 2011 federal election. Firstly, both the NDP and especially the Conservatives were able to effectively discredit Liberal leader, Michael Ignatieff (although this strategy was also used to

335 Fournier, et. al. http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 336 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 337 David Coletto, “Federal Election: Party Leader Favourability Ratings,” Abacus Insider, March 31, 2011, accessed August 23, 2014. http://abacusinsider.com/ 338 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/ 339 Ibid., http://sda.chass.utoronto.ca/

102 break Liberal support under Stephane Dion as well), undermining the Canadian public’s perception of him through brutal attack ads with the common tagline labelling him as a politician “who didn’t come back [to Canada from the United States] for you.”340 Secondly, as Stephen Harper’s ad campaign had not made major efforts to convince Canadians of his good leadership skills, and relatable nature, they had, in doing so, allowed for Jack Layton to become more prominent and popular. With no comparable charisma in Michael Ignatieff who was soundly defeated by attack ads, and in Stephen Harper not publicly advertising his skills as a leader, Jack Layton was among the only few viable options for Canadians to relate to, and thus made him stand out from the crowd of other political leaders all the more.

Conclusion

John A. Irving in his book, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta has, despite the age of the book, provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the rise of third parties in

Canada, the impact of strong, charismatic leadership. It was as clear in the 2011 federal election as it was in the 1935 election, that the influential role of an influential, relatable, and charismatic leadership figure was necessary in driving a third party into the political spotlight during election time, leading to their success.

This chapter has covered a brief history of Jack Layton, the leader of the federal NDP during the 2011 election. Likewise, this chapter has outlined his support and popularity (and noticeably the differences in popularity between Quebec and ROC). Perhaps most importantly, and as defined in the works of Irving, the effective use of media and political advertisement was vital in the success of the NDP in 2011.

340 Mark Dunni. “He Didn't Come Back for You: Iggy Returns to Harvard,” Sun News, September 7, 2012, accessed July 19th, 2014, http://www.sunnewsnetwork.ca/

103

The leadership debates, and Jack Layton’s excellent performance on the popular

Quebec talk show, Tout le monde parle (which was initially designed to test him and drill him on the issue of Quebec sovereignty) turned out to be an overwhelming success as

Quebeckers were able to see Jack Layton at a personal level: he was humorous, friendly, and charming, and (in both the debates and talk show) made a conscious effort to distance himself from the many stigmas and stereotypes of a “typical politician.” This stuck a chord with voters, who, as explained previously in the Pinard chapter, were discontent and many felt alienated by the current political regime of the Bloc Quebecois, and their political leadership. Quebeckers wanted a change in politics and “bon Jack” and his New Democrats provided a vessel for change in the province.

The intense and effective use of attack ads by the Conservative Party against Michael

Ignatieff, leader of the Liberal Party discredited the Liberals in both Quebec and the ROC.

With the Liberals discredited in Quebec, the Bloc having been in power since 1993, and the

Conservatives being a hapless and hopeless choice for voters, the NDP was able to effectively sway voters to their party.

Social media (such as Facebook and Twitter), and online advertisement (through mediums such as Youtube) were a prominent and defining feature of the 2011 election. The

NDP, more so than any other political party was able to best utilize and spread political propaganda and information (especially advertisements featuring Jack Layton) to improve their public presence in Canada, and especially in the province of Quebec.

The influence of Jack Layton’s leadership, and excellent public reputation/public perception was pivotal in the success of the NDP in the 2011 election. As pointed out in data

104 earlier in this chapter, the number of voters who had made up their minds and decided to vote

NDP sky-rocketed after the leadership debates and Layton’s appearance on Tout le monde en parle. The data earlier in this chapter shows that Jack Layton appeared on television, radio, and on the internet, the more people associated him with good leadership characteristics, and thought of him as a good leader. The same cannot be said to the same extent for

Conservative leader Stephen Harper or Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff.

In sum, similar to that of Pinard, Irving’s theory on the role of leadership and advertisement as being pivotal to the rise of third parties in Canadian federal politics holds true in the case of the 2011 election. Despite his book being published in 1959, many of the key points and arguments made in The Social Credit Movement in Alberta still remain relevant today. It is clear that Irving could not have accounted for all of the factors involved in political advertisement such as the extensive usage of the internet, social media, and other forms of electronic communication beyond television and radio (as the internet did not exist at that time). Nonetheless, the main argument of Irving’s theory regarding leadership and the necessity of third parties to use television, radio, newspapers, and other political mediums effectively to make the party “public,” and therefore a more viable voter choice still holds true today.

Looking to the upcoming 2015 Canadian federal election, Thomas Mulcair, the current leader of the NDP, is having moderate success with regards to his public perception amongst Canadians. In a 2013 poll by Abacus Data, 30% of Canadians had a positive impression of Mulcair, while Stephen Harper had a 29% positive impression amongst

105 respondents, and leading with 37%.341 The results on the question of respondents’ perception of who is best qualified to be Prime Minister has Stephen Harper leading with 61%, 51% for Mulcair, and 49% for Justin Trudeau.342 This data provide some insight into how Canadians view the current party leaders in the upcoming 2015 election, however, one must always be cautious with regards to the predictive power of polling data.

341 David Coletto. “Trudeau Still Most Popular Federal Party Leader,” Abacus Data, September 18, 2013, accessed August 7th, 2014, http://abacusinsider.com/ 342 Ibid., http://abacusinsider.com/

106

Chapter Five

The Electoral Impact of Leadership and the Catalyst in Quebec: Using Both Pinard and Irving to See the Bigger Picture

In studying politics, it can be very difficult to make an assessment of which theoretical framework proved to be most effective in explaining a political phenomenon, and the case of the 2011 Canadian federal election proved to be no different. In using Pinard and

Irving provide valuable theoretical lenses to identify the circumstances for the rise of the

NDP, revealing the importance of one-party dominance, and the value of leadership and charisma in the NDP’s boom in support in the province of Quebec. At the same time, many factors were not discussed in the literature such as the impact of gender, ethnicity, and social media among others.

The second chapter of this thesis, although it does not directly address the works of

Pinard or Irving, has been vital in showing how the NDP has evolved as a party up to 2011.

The NDP has changed a great deal since its first days as the CCF, and through a process of internal reform and reshaping itself, has managed to become a prominent, modern, and popular Canadian political party. Jack Layton had managed to achieve success due to his own personal efforts, charisma, leadership, planning, and strategies, but also as a result of the seeds sown by the prior leaders of the NDP such as Tommy Douglas, Ed Broadbent, and

Alexa McDonough.

The meaning of this concluding chapter is not to find fault with Pinard or Irving for having gaps in their works. Social media, the internet, and data on the political

107 culture/situation in 21st century Canada were simply not present or available at the time that

Pinard and Irving researched and wrote their books. Therefore, there are some “holes” in the literature, that, due to the nature of “the rise of third parties” being a relatively small field of study in the larger body of Canadian political science, have not been addressed in great detail. Pinard’s The Rise of a Third Party did lead to a more recent (1973) revisiting of the

Pinard theory by Graham White (McMaster University) who wrote an article titled, “One-

Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered”343 which further develops the one-party dominance aspect of Pinard’s theory but still does not build upon or help illustrate the importance of gender, and ethnicity among other factors into the theory.

Looking back at the data assessed in this thesis and provided in the surveys by Leger

Marketing, in Quebec, 45% of respondents who had voted in Quebec during the 2011 election reported voting for the NDP because “they had enough of other parties and wanted change.”344 In contrast, only 24% reported that they voted because they believed that Jack

Layton would be the best political leader.345 This difference indicates quite strongly that the majority of Quebeckers voted in favor of a political alternative due to the long-standing dominance the Bloc Quebecois had in the province; therefore, Pinard’s theory of conducive structural factors, namely one-party dominance, appears to provide a large part of the explanation for the rise of the NDP in Quebec according to the data provided. However, this conclusion fails to recognize why it was in 2011 that the Bloc Quebecois was removed and not in a previous election. If Quebeckers voted primarily to remove the Bloc from power in favor of a new party that would breathe new life into Quebec politics, why was this not done

343 White, “One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered,” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 399 – 421. 344 Le Devoir. “Sondage post-électoral,” Leger Marketing, page 7, http://www.ledevoir.com/ 345 Ibid., page 7 http://www.ledevoir.com/

108 in the 2008 or 2006 elections? Clearly, the answer may reside in the conducive structural social, political, and economic factors which were unique to the 2011 electoral context over

2008, or 2006. For instance, as discussed in the Pinard chapter, the issue of sovereignty lost a great deal of support in Quebec during the 2008 to 2011 period. After the 2008 recession, the economy, unemployment, healthcare, and social programs became the focus of Quebec politics, yet the Bloc still lingered on the issue of sovereignty in their party platform, thus distancing them from many voters.346

What Pinard’s conducive structural theory fails to address however, is to what extent political leaders are able to distort or guide the issues that the public deems relevant and important at the time. Determining to what extent a political leader could direct or influence public issues delves into the realm of the study of public policy/political culture and is difficult to determine, but is nonetheless very much relevant to determining if the rise of the

NDP in 2011 was more influenced by political leadership or by the social, economic, and political conditions in Canada (and particularly Quebec) at the time.

The impact of political leadership is alluded to in the Canadian Election Studies data, which is used extensively in Patrick Fournier’s (et. al.), “Riding the Orange Wave”. In the section on the dynamics of vote intentions, the study illustrates how before the leadership debate and Jack Layton’s appearance on Tout le monde en parle, the NDP’s popular vote support in Quebec (in late March and early April) hovered between 20 – 25% of the share of the popular vote.347 After the leadership debate and appearance on Tout le monde en parle,

346 The Economist. “The Irrelevance of Separatism: A More Confident Quebec has Other Things to Think About,” June 23, 2011, accessed July 26th, 2014, http://www.economist.com/ 347 Patrick Fournier, Fred Cutler, Stuart Soroka, Dietlind Stolle, and Eric Belanger. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 867.

109 their support skyrocketed to approximately 49 – 50%.348 This indicates that either it was

Jack Layton who was the primary drive behind Quebeckers voting for the NDP, or that Jack

Layton was able to address social, political, and economic issues in Canada and Quebec in such a way that motivated those who were discontent with the Bloc Quebecois majority in

Quebec to vote NDP as a political party that would bring about change. In this latter possibility, Jack Layton acts as a catalyst for Quebeckers to vote NDP, rather than as the primary drive and reason for why people would vote for the NDP.

In both of these possible outcomes for why voters in Quebec chose the NDP as their party of choice rather than the Liberals, or Conservatives, Jack Layton acts as one of the driving forces behind the political phenomenon of the 2011 election. Jack Layton had been party leader of the NDP since 2003, and had been leader of the NDP in the 2004, 2006, and

2008 elections prior to the 2011 general election. In the 2000 election prior to his leadership, the NDP came out with 12 seats (approximately 12.2% of the popular vote), only one of which was in Quebec.349 In 2004 (the first election that Layton was leader of the NDP in), the NDP came out of the election with 19 seats (15.7% of the popular vote) and none of these was from Quebec (only 4.6% of the popular vote in Quebec).350 Likewise, the 2006 election shows relatively low numbers (29 seats total). The NDP finally won one seat in Quebec in the 2008 election (a total of 37 seats).351 The answer therefore resides not only in the leadership of Jack Layton, but also in the conducive factors involved in the context of the

2011 election period (discussed in the Pinard chapter) that provided unique the perfect storm for the NDP to take advantage.

348 Fournier, et al. “Riding the Orange Wave, Leadership, Values, Issues and the 2011 Election,” 867. 349 Simon Fraser University. “Canadian Election 2000 Results,” http://www.sfu.ca/ 350 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/ 351 Ibid., http://www.sfu.ca/

110

Although the task of asking “what ifs” in political science is like trying to look into a crystal ball to predict what may or may not happen in the future, it is very likely that if Jack

Layton (or some other charismatic and relatable leader) were not present, the NDP would not have had the success that they did in the 2011 election. It was the leadership of Jack Layton that provided grounds for Quebeckers to see opportunity for change in their province which was not possible through other political mainstream parties, whose leaders were either discredited or seen as not having good leadership traits (Michael Ignatieff and Stephen

Harper as examples of this as seen in the Irving chapter).

In the elections prior to 2011, where Jack Layton was still leader of the NDP, he and his party were unable to tap into the political climate of Quebec, which was not occupied with the desire to have a change in political leadership. Stability in the province in the period prior up to 2011 allowed little room for the NDP to provide alternatives of political leadership. Although Jack Layton had still had the charisma and leadership skills he had in

2011, Quebec, in years prior was not in a position in which the Bloc had overstayed their welcome.

There were no data present that helped to isolate to what extent voters chose the NDP over other political parties as a result of Jack Layton’s leadership compounded with the conducive factors present in Canada in 2011. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to completely isolate data to find how successful the NDP would be without Jack Layton as their leader at the time (once again, this delves into questions of ‘what ifs’). Would the NDP have been as successful as they were in 2011without the conducive factors in the province

(outlined in the Pinard chapter)?

111

Simply put, the 2011 election was a “perfect storm.” The NDP were able to successfully woo Quebec voters as a result of both the economic, political, and social conditions in the province, and had a very charismatic, friendly, and relatable political leader through Jack Layton, who, with his presence on television, radio, social media, and the internet was able to better connect with the public. This was done both by becoming more

“public” as a political figure by reaching out in popular mediums such as Tout le monde en parle, the leadership debate, and political advertisement. Throughout the election, Layton was able to distance himself from his political opponents, thereby avoiding the stigma of a

“typical” politician, and in so doing, becoming a vessel for change in politics which was desired in Quebec after a long lasting Bloc regime. The 2011 Canadian general election and the rise of the NDP cannot be accounted for by looking through the lens of Pinard and Irving on their own. If the 2011 election is analyzed using only one perspective (either leadership or conducive factors) the larger picture is missed in the peripherals. Neither leadership, nor conducive factors in Quebec and the rest of Canada provide adequate explanation for the political phenomenon of the Orange Wave alone.352 Instead, in order to be able to see clearly how the NDP rose in power, one must observe both the coincidental and fortuitous mixture of both popular and charismatic leadership and conducive economic, social, and political factors in Canada (and particularly Quebec) at the time.

Looking to the 2015 federal election and making predictions is difficult, and often avoided in the realm of political science. However, recent polling data has provided some unique and helpful insights into revealing how Canadians view the current party leaders, and

352 The term “Orange Wave” is used frequently to describe the historic rise in NDP popularity and votes (resulting in 103 seats in the House of Commons) in many news sources and academic works surrounding the 2011 election.

112 what this may mean for election day in 2015. As demonstrated in this thesis, political leaders have a significant impact on how people see political parties, and influence voters’ choices.

A study conducted by Nanos Research of 1,000 respondents from across Canada by phone found that the NDP’s leader, Thomas Mulcair is beginning to lag behind in public opinion polls compared to the other political party leaders.353 On the question of who Canadians would prefer more as Prime Minister, Stephen Harper was chosen by 33% of respondents,

Justin Trudeau followed in second with 29%, and NDP leader, Thomas Mulcair lagged behind with only 20% of respondents stating that he would make the best Prime Minister.354

Another poll conducted by Ipsos Reid which included some 8,268 Canadian respondents in an on-line poll found that in Alberta and Manitoba, the Conservatives unsurprisingly have a massive lead in support over the other parties. British Columbia is a three-way race between the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP with the Conservatives leading slightly with 33% support, followed by the NDP at 30%, and Liberals at 28%.355 The Liberals according to the poll have a distinct lead in the Atlantic provinces, is in close competition with the

Conservatives over Ontario but have an impressive lead of 46% in the Greater Toronto

Area.356 The Liberals and NDP are battling in a close race in Quebec where the Liberals lead with 32%, the NDP in close second with 29%, and Bloc with 21% of the poll’s votes.357

What is noteworthy to take away from the data are that many of the provinces are currently in a deadlock between the three parties, especially vote-rich Ontario, and British

Columbia. However, Quebec, which in 2011 was a stronghold for the NDP, is now turning

353 Ryan Maloney, Huffington Post, “Stephen Harper, Conservatives Have Momentum, Polls Suggest,” December 4, 2014, accessed December 10, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 354 Ibid., http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 355 Ibid., http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 356 Ibid., http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/ 357 Ibid., http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/

113 to support the Liberals. Although polling data is not necessarily representative of what will happen on election day, it appears from current figures and data that the NDP will struggle in

2015. Their current leader does not have the public support and appeal that the party had with

Jack Layton back in 2011, and furthermore, the Liberals now have a polarizing, and very popular leader who has seemingly helped to undermine the breakthrough the NDP had made in Quebec the election prior.

Questions for further research on the impact of political leadership or conducive structural factors on Canadian elections may ask whether Justin Trudeau will be able to achieve high levels of popularity and be successful in the 2015 election through his own charisma and leadership style to bring the Liberal Party back into power in Ottawa? Has the

Liberal Party been marginalized to a third party status over the long term (or is it only temporary), and how will they maneuver to break free of their condition if this is the case?

Finally, are the economic, social, and political conditions in Quebec still favorable to allow the NDP to remain in power, or can the Bloc, which has been reduced to third party status, recover in 2015 should the NDP fail?

The 2011 election has tested the theories of some of Canada’s most prominent theorists in the field of political third parties. Likewise, the upcoming 2015 election will truly be putting these theories to the test.

Never before in Canada’s history has the NDP been able to assume the role of

Official Opposition. The 2011 election was a period of political achievement and failure.

With the rise of the NDP came the fall of the Liberal Party which between them and the

Conservatives have had a near monopoly on forming government in Ottawa. Just as the 2011

114 general election posed many deep and thought provoking questions on the nature of

Canadian politics to political scientists, the 2015 election will no doubt bring many more.

Canada is a great country, one of the hopes of the world. We can be a better one – a country of greater equality, justice, and opportunity. We can build a prosperous economy and a society that shares its benefits more fairly. We can look after our seniors. We can offer better futures for our children. We can do our part to save the world’s environment. We can restore our good name in the world. We can do all of these things because we finally have a party system at the national level where there are real choices; where your vote matters; where working for change can actually bring about change. In the months and years to come, New Democrats will put a compelling new alternative to you. My colleagues in our party are an impressive, committed team. Give them a careful hearing; consider the alternatives; and consider that we can be a better, fairer, more equal country by working together. Don’t let them tell you it can’t be done.358

358 Jack Layton, “Letter to Canadians,” August 20, 2011 in CBC News, “Jack Layton's Last Letter to Canadians,” August 22, 2011, accessed August 23rd, 2014. http://www.cbc.ca/

115

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