Theory and Evidence on the role of Social Norms in Voting Patricia Funk1 SITE Stockholm School of Economics September 2005 Abstract This paper investigates social norms and voting behavior. I argue that social norms create incentives for signaling, i.e. voting for the purpose of being seen at the voting act. Empirical evidence on signaling can be gained by looking at the introduction of optional postal voting in Switzerland. Even though the possibility of mail voting reduced vot- ing costs substantially, it didn’t increase turnout. Consistent with my model’s predictions, voter turnout decreased more in the smaller com- munities, but in the meantime, the share of cooperators (= interested voters) was more positively affected there. Therefore, modern voting tools may decrease average turnout, but nevertheless increase the qual- ity of the voting outcome. Current models predict the opposite, but ignore the effect of different voting systems on the incentive for signal- ing. JEL H0, Z13. Keywords: Signaling, social norms, voting, mail voting, modern voting tools. 1Patricia Funk, SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Tel.: ++ 46 8 736 9684, E-Mail:
[email protected]. For comments and discussions, I thank Aleksander Berentsen, Matthias Hagmann, Christian Hilber, Peter Kugler, Yvan Lengwiler, Carlos Lenz, Steven D. Levitt, participants at the 2005 Public Choice Conference in New Orleans, seminar participants at Stockholm School of Economics, at Universidade Nova de Lisboa and at University of Bern. 1 Introduction The fact that people vote is a longstanding puzzle to economists. Since instrumental benefits are close to zero, but not so the costs from going to the polls, a rational individual should abstain from voting.1 The “Voting Paradox” describes the fact that in spite of the economic prediction of a very low voter turnout, a fairly large amount of people goes to the polls.