69 ACRONYMS ADFL Alliance Des Forces Démocratiques Pour La
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ACRONYMS ADFL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo CDR Coalition pour la Défense de la Republique. Extremist party during Habyarimana’s regime that had a key role in the genocide CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) CNDD Conseil National pour la Defénse de la Démocratie (Burundi) DIP Division of International Protection (UNHCR) DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) DSP Division Speciale Présidentielle. Elite force in the Zairian army ex-FAR Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises. Former Rwandan Armed Forces under late President Habyarimana FAZ Forces Armées Zairoises ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross Interahamwe Means “those who work together”. Civilian militia of MRND, during Habyarimana’s regime. Had a key role in the genocide. Another militia, called Impuzamugambi, was organised by the CDR MNF Multinational Force MRND Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie. Habyarimana’s party NGO Nongovernmental Organization NSC National Security Council (U.S.) PRM Population, Refugee, and Migration Bureau (U.S. State Department) RDR Rassemblement pour le Retour et la Démocratie RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front RTLMC Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (Rwanda) SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General (U.N.) SURB Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi. Set up within UNHCR Geneva as focal point for the crisis in the Great Lakes region UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme ZCSC Zairian Camp Security Contingent. Deployed in eastern Zaire to improve security in refugee camps 69 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE RETURN OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM EASTERN ZAIRE JULY 1994 - DECEMBER 1996 Joel Boutroue1 “In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works. Very often therefore truthful analyses are bound to have a critical ring, to seem like exposures rather than objective statements….For all students of human society, sympathy with the victims of historical processes and skepticism about the victors’ claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology.” Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1966), 523. INTRODUCTION July 1994, the horror of the genocide in Rwanda was overtaken by pictures of an unprecedented exodus of Rwandan Hutus, led into Zaire by the iron and bloody hands of their leaders. The refugee emergency phase that started on 13 July 1994 was contained by the end of September. The two ensuing years witnessed a flurry of initiatives to find a way out of a refugee situation that, after the genocide, had all the ingredients to further poison the political and ethnic crises that had been brewing in the Great Lakes Region of Africa for some time. The stalemate eventually came to an end in October 1996, when a military offensive led by a coalition of rebel groups from eastern and southern Zaire resulted in a massive return of some refugees and the scattering of others. This offensive ultimately brought the rebel leader, Laurent Desire Kabila, to Kinshasa where he appointed himself President of the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This paper has two purposes. First, it seeks to set out and explore the political dynamics that characterized the role of the international community2 in the refugee crisis from July 1 I wish to thank UNHCR, and Mrs. Sadako Ogata and Eric Morris in particular, for giving me the opportunity to go on study leave and undertake research in Cambridge, U.S. to complete this study. Professor Myron Weiner of MIT had the patience to guide me through my research and gave crucial advice during the painful writing process. Special thanks are due to Dr. Karen Jacobsen of Regis College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, who was instrumental in clarifying my ideas, reviewing various drafts, and editing them. Without her assistance, this paper would have looked very different indeed, and would be far less readable. I received key support from friends who wish to remain anonymous. Still, their role is gratefully acknowledged here. I am also indebted to the numerous colleagues in UNHCR, at the various universities and colleges in Cambridge and Boston, and officials within the U.S. Government and in Congress, who took the time to see me and patiently answer my queries. 1994 to end 1996, and specifically the position of the main actors as regards the return of the refugees. We present their respective positions, fully aware that the actors interplayed and that their perceptions of one another affected these positions. Our second purpose is to try to balance the popular perception, by outsiders and more knowledgeable observers alike, that the international community did little to solve the refugee crisis. Although it is a globally fair assessment as concerns political actors, we will show that humanitarian agencies on the whole, and UNHCR in particular, recognized that the situation was exceptional and needed untraditional treatment. However, realization that extraordinary measures were needed occurred several months after the massive influx into Goma, at a time when the refugee leadership had reorganized and made any initiative to erode their influence extremely difficult. The situation inside Rwanda had also solidified around conflicting views on the repatriation of Rwandans in exile. As extremists who had participated in the genocide asserted themselves in the refugee camps, extremists within the Rwandan government also gained strength. Further, humanitarian agencies had to rely almost entirely on their own limited power. In the absence of concrete actions on the political front, UNHCR launched initiatives that often went beyond its traditional mandate. The initiatives described below are not always known, contrary to the author’s original perception, which might explain the popular perception that UNHCR was failing to act. It shows that steps to improve information sharing are still needed. Although most of the main international actors agreed that peaceful repatriation of the Rwandan refugees was, by far, the best solution, they proved incapable of playing a positive role in facilitating such a movement. Beyond the rhetoric, few attempts were made at the political level to create conditions, both within Zaire and in Rwanda, that would have made possible a peaceful and organized refugee return. Initiatives within a multilateral framework were neutralized by an international environment characterized by rivalries and a relative indifference to events in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Failure of joint concerted actions left the door open to unilateral initiatives, favoring one party to the conflict over another, thereby sowing seeds for future outbreaks of violence. The fact that the parties to this conflict seemed to obey the same logic of a zero-sum confrontation made matters worse. One of the main findings of a recent evaluation of the international response to the Great Lakes crisis is that although “the international community cannot be held solely accountable for the non-return of refugees, nonetheless, many of its acts of omission and commission have contributed to the repatriation stalemate and political instability in the region where the camps are located.”3 2 The international community or “major players/actors,” in the context of the Great Lakes crises, is understood as including the United States of America, France, the United Nations, and the countries of asylum (DRC) and of origin (Rwanda). 3 David Milwood (ed.), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Odense: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996. Volume 4: “Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda,” 92. Not only did the genocide in Rwanda and the resulting refugee situation take a heavy toll on the Rwandan, and to a lesser extent Congolese, populations but it led to developments that very few persons would have predicted in 1994. Had the refugees returned sooner and the camps been dismantled, the profile of the regime in Rwanda and political developments in Zaire would have been radically different. It follows that, had the international community played a more constructive role in the return of the refugees than was the case, the situation in the whole of the central Africa region and beyond might have been dramatically different. However, the political actors left it to humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR to “deal with the issue” without giving them the necessary political (and at times military) support. Beside “saving lives,” the crucial component of the refugee situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa was the initiatives, often by humanitarian actors, to find a way out of an intractable and open-ended refugee situation that was threatening a region already severely jeopardized by widespread ethnic conflicts. Most of the initiatives were geared towards prompting a return of the refugees. Some of them, detailed below, could have ended the stalemate—and almost did—but would have required more political will than existed at the time. Lack of interest