The Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (批林批孔) and the Problem of “Restoration” in Chinese Marxist Historiography
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INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript Pas been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissenation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from anytype of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely. event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material bad to beremoved, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with smalloverlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back ofthe book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell &Howell Information Company 300North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI48106-1346 USA 313!761-47oo 800:521·0600 THE LIN BIAO INCIDENT: A STUDY OF EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AUGUST 1995 By Qiu Jin Dissertation Committee: Stephen Uhalley, Jr., Chairperson Harry Lamley Sharon Minichiello John Stephan Roger Ames UMI Number: 9604163 OMI Microform 9604163 Copyright 1995, by OMI Company. -
January 04, 1939 Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified January 04, 1939 Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov Citation: “Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov,” January 04, 1939, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI f. 82 op. 2 d. 1238, l. 176-182. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli and translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121890 Summary: Governor Sheng Shicai expresses gratitude to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov for the opportunity to visit Moscow. After reporting critical remarks made by Fang Lin against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, Sheng Shicai requests that the All-Union Communist Party dispatch a politically experienced person to Urumqi to discuss Party training and asks that the Comintern order the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang to liquidate the Party organization. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation Scan of Original Document Top Secret Copy Nº [left blank] TRANSLATION OF A 4 JANUARY 1939 LETTER OF GOVERNOR SHENG SHICAI TO CDES. STALIN, MOLOTOV, AND VOROSHILOV "Deeply respected Mr. STALIN, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars MOLOTOV, and Marshal VOROSHILOV! Although a quite long four-month period has passed since I left Moscow, recalling my stay in Moscow, it seems that it was not long ago at all. When my wife and I were in Moscow, you gave us a good reception and devoted much of your valuable time to us. My wife and I were not only grateful to you for this, but were also left with an unforgettable deep impression. -
October 02, 1959 Discussion Between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified October 02, 1959 Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong Citation: “Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong,” October 02, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), f. 52, op. 1, d. 499, ll. 1-33, copy in Volkogonov Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088 Summary: Khrushchev and Mao discuss current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation Present at the conversation: Cdes. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko. Cdes: Deputy Chairmen of the CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhao Enlai and Lin Biao; Members of the Politburo Peng Zhen and Chen Yi; Member of the Secretariat Wan Xia Sang. Today, together with cde. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko, I paid a visit to Mao Zedong at his request in his residency. Mao Zedong: We acquainted ourselves with the content of the message from Eisenhower to you, Cde. Khrushchev, which at your instruction was passed to us this morning. N.S. Khrushchev: Good. Besides, we would like to acquaint you with the excerpt concerning China from my conversation in the US with President D. Eisenhower on 27 September 1959, and after that let us exchange opinions on the issue regarding my trip to the US and on the issues of relations with America. Most advisable would be if the above mentioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower would be translated here orally by the interpreter. -
China: a Country Study
Historical Setting Nationalists and Communists soon resumed. Realizing that Ameri- can efforts short of large-scale armed intervention could not stop the war, the United States withdrew the American mission, headed by General George C. Marshall, in early 1947. The civil war, in which the United States aided the Nationalists with massive eco- nomic loans but no military support, became more widespread. Battles raged not only for territories but also for the allegiance of cross sections of the population. Belatedly, the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular support through internal reforms. The effort was in vain, however, because of the rampant corruption in government and the accom- panying political and economic chaos. By late 1948 the Nation- alist position was bleak. The demoralized and undisciplined Nationalist troops proved no match for the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Communists were well established in the north and northeast. Although the Nationalists had an advantage in num- bers of men and weapons, controlled a much larger territory and population than their adversaries, and enjoyed considerable inter- national support, they were exhausted by the long war with Japan and the attendant internal responsibilities. In January 1949 Bei- ping was taken by the Communists without a fight, and its name was changed back to Beijing. Between April and November, major cities passed from Guomindang to Communist control with minimal resistance. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. After Chiang Kai-shek and a few hundred thousand Nationalist troops fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, there remained only isolated pockets of resistance. -
“Young Guards”: the Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles)
Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles) Cheng Li The continuing consolidation of power has been the most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. Undoubtedly, a key component in this strengthening of both Xi’s personal power and his new administration’s authority has centered on the military domain. Xi has gone about the consolidation process through several important political and tactical moves, including the purges of the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration on corruption and other charges; the arrest of over 40 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; large-scale reshuffling of generals between regions, departments, and services; ongoing efforts to reform the PLA structure and operations; and, most importantly, the rapid promotion of “young guards” (少壮派) in the Chinese military. All of these bold measures will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in preparation for the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the trajectory of civilian-military relations in the country and for the assessment of China’s military modernization. The first installation in this series focuses on the recent purges and reshuffling of military leaders, which has significant consequences in the political dynamics of present-day China. It is an old saying in the history of the Chinese Communist movement that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”1 Although this famous Mao Zedong slogan emphasizes the Communist doctrine that the party commands the army in seizing and retaining state power, a top party leader’s consolidation of personal power cannot be achieved without strong support from the military. -
Images of Confucius in the Cultural Revolution Deborah A
Religious Studies Faculty Publications Religious Studies 2007 Images for Iconoclasts: Images of Confucius in the Cultural Revolution Deborah A. Sommer (司馬黛蘭) Gettysburg College Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/relfac Part of the Chinese Studies Commons, and the Religion Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Sommer, Deborah. "Images for Iconoclasts: Images of Confucius in the Cultural Revolution." East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies 7.1 (2007): 1-23. This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/relfac/14 This open access article is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Images for Iconoclasts: Images of Confucius in the Cultural Revolution Abstract Confucius died and was buried in 479 B.C.E., and he was never seen again. Or so one would think. “You may forget me as I once was,” Confucius reminds us in the Zhuangzi, "but there is something unforgettable about me that will still live on." Confucius’s physical frame was concealed from sight below ground, but his body and face were not forgotten either by his followers or his detractors, each of whom remembered him (or remembered him) in different ways. People created semblances of Confucius that reflected their own visions of the past, and constructions of his body took on many lives of their own over the succeeding centuries. -
Ohiou1343397183.Pdf (1.22
The Photographically-mediated Identity: Jiang Qing (1914—1991) A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Fine Arts of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Yi Liu August 2012 © 2012 Yi Liu. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled The Photographically Mediated Identity: Jiang Qing (1914—1991) by YI LIU has been approved for the School of Art and the College of Fine Arts by Marion Lee Associate Professor of Art History Charles A. McWeeny Dean, College of Fine Arts 3 ABSTRACT LIU,YI, M.A., August 2012, Art History The Photographically-mediated Identity: Jiang Qing (1914—1991) (91.pp) Director of Thesis: Marion Lee This thesis is a study of Jiang Qing’s 江青 (1914-1991) published photographic works in Chinese national magazines from early 1950s to 1976. Dividing her works into three categories in chronological order, I will investigate how she continuously fashioned her own identity through the manipulation of photography in her pursuit of recognition, fame, and power before and during the Cultural Revolution, a socio-political campaign launched by her husband Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893—1976) to regain power and consolidate authority through the revolutionary campaign in ideological spheres, such as class struggle and eradication of old culture and custom. By regarding her works and her association with photography as text, based on which the historical context can be reconstructed, I purport to examine her role in the Cultural Revolution, concluding that her primary perceived identity as Mao’s wife facilitated her rapid rise to power but also curbed her self-fulfillment and resulted in her final downfall soon after Mao died. -
Introduction to the Cultural Revolution Communism and Should Focus More on Promoting a Revolutionary Adapted from Jonathan Spence, the Search for Modern Spirit
http://spice.stanford.edu Fall 2007 Introduction to the Cultural Revolution communism and should focus more on promoting a revolutionary Adapted from Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern spirit. Lin Biao, the head of the national army (called the People’s China, 2 0 0 1 Liberation Army or PLA), was perhaps Mao’s strongest ally. Lin organized hundreds of Mao’s quotes into a book called Quotations from Chairman Mao, better known as the “Little Red Book.” Lin The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” usually known required every soldier to read the book and emphasized adherence s i m ply as the Cultural Revolution (or the Great Cultural to the Party line and loyalty to CCP leaders in the Army. Mao Revolution), was a “complex social upheaval that began as a praised the PLA as an example for the Chinese people, and Mao’s struggle between Mao Zedong and other top party leaders for status and image reached new heights when all Chinese began to d o m inance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and went on to study his book of quotations and memorize passages of the book; affect all of China with its call for “continuing revolution.” 1 This Mao became a prophet-figure in the minds of many Chinese. social upheaval lasted from 1966 to 1976 and left deep scars upon Chinese society. The Beginning of the Cultural Revolution When Jiang Qing and her allies complained in late 1 9 6 5 t h a t Background v a r i ous cultural productions were openly criticizing the The roots of the Cultural Revolution date back to the early s. -
The China Quarterly Nanjing's “Second
The China Quarterly http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY Additional services for The China Quarterly: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Nanjing's “Second Cultural Revolution” of 1974 Guoqiang Dong and Andrew G. Walder The China Quarterly / Volume 212 / December 2012, pp 893 918 DOI: 10.1017/S0305741012001191, Published online: Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741012001191 How to cite this article: Guoqiang Dong and Andrew G. Walder (2012). Nanjing's “Second Cultural Revolution” of 1974. The China Quarterly, 212, pp 893918 doi:10.1017/ S0305741012001191 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY, IP address: 171.67.216.21 on 25 Jan 2013 893 Nanjing’s “Second Cultural Revolution” of 1974* Dong Guoqiang† and Andrew G. Walder‡ Abstract China experienced extensive civil strife in 1974, as elite factionalism during the “criticize Lin Biao and Confucius” campaign revived popular contention in the provinces. Past research has characterized these conflicts as a “second Cultural Revolution”–an offensive by resurgent red guards and rebels to resist the restoration of purged civilian officials to powerful posts. In Nanjing, however, the conflicts were of an entirely different nature. Civilian cadres directed the campaign against army officers who still domi- nated civilian government throughout the province. Popular protests in Nanjing were not led by former rebels, whose ranks had been decimated by unusually harsh military suppression campaigns, but were instead pro- tests by ordinary citizens who had suffered in the purges and rustication campaigns of the late 1960s. While the campaign in cities like Hangzhou and Wuhan was an offensive by resurgent rebels against civilian officials, in Nanjing civilian officials used the campaign to ensure their victory over military rivals. -
Mao Zedong Proclamation of the PRC, October 1, 1949.Pdf
Mao Zedong Proclamation of the Central People’s Government of the PRC October 1, 1949 The people throughout China have been plunged into bitter suffering and tribulations since the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang reactionary government betrayed the fatherland, colluded with imperialists, and lunched the counter-revolutionary war. Fortunately our People's Liberation Army, backed by the whole nation, has been fighting heroically and selflessly to defend the territorial sovereignty of our homeland, to protect the people's lives and property, to relieve the people of their sufferings, and to struggle for their rights, and it eventually wiped out the reactionary troops and overthrew the reactionary rule of the Nationalist government. Now, the People's War of Liberation has been basically won, and the majority of the people in the country have been liberated. On this foundation, the first session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, composed of delegates of all the democratic parties and people's organization of China, the People's Liberation Army, the various regions and nationalities of the country, and the overseas Chinese and other patriotic elements, has been convened. Representing the will of the whole nation, [this session of the conference] has enacted the organic law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, elected Mao Zedong as chairman of the Central People's Government; and Zhu De, Lui Shaoqi, Song Qingling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan, and Gao Gang as vice chairmen [of the Central People's -
October 01, 1949 Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified October 01, 1949 Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC Citation: “Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC,” October 01, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Renmin ribao (People's Daily), October 2, 1949. English translation from Michael Y.M. Kau, ed., The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Volume I, September 1949- December 1955 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 10-11. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121557 Summary: Upon the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong claims that the "government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty." Credits: This document was made possible with support from the MacArthur Foundation. Original Language: Chinese Contents: English Translation Chinese Transcription The people throughout China have been plunged into bitter suffering and tribulations since the Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] Kuomintang [Guomindang] reactionary government betrayed the fatherland, colluded with imperialists, and lunched the counter-revolutionary war. Fortunately our People's Liberation Army, backed by the whole nation, has been fighting heroically and selflessly to defend the territorial sovereignty of our homeland, to protect the people's lives and property, to relieve the people of their sufferings, and to struggle for their rights, and it eventually wiped out the reactionary troops and overthrew the reactionary rule of the Nationalist government. Now, the People's War of Liberation has been basically won, and the majority of the people in the country have been liberated. -
April 03, 1969 Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, 3 April 1969
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified April 03, 1969 Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, 3 April 1969 Citation: “Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, 3 April 1969,” April 03, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Zhou Enlai's Military Papers] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), vol. 4, pp. 554-555. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110405 Summary: Original Language: Chinese Contents: English Translation Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, 3 April 1969 Chairman [Mao] and Vice Chairman Lin: It is estimated that the Soviet military border garrisons acted and put forward their demands to follow the instruction from the Soviet Party Center to respond to the public announcement of the opening of our Party's Ninth Congress. They intended to make an empty show of strength, a show that was designed for others to watch. Our proposals are: (1) Our border garrisons should not respond to the demands of the Soviet border garrisons. (2) We should adjust the positions of our cannons, aiming at the enemy's artillery posts and concealed concentration areas for T-62 tanks and armored vehicles. After the enemy artillery has fired for a few days, we should suddenly fire back, causing heavy casualties for them. We should then issue our protest statement. The timing [for taking this action] should be on the eve of the publication of Vice Chairman Lin's report. We are waiting for Chairman [Mao]'s instructions on whether or not this idea is appropriate.30 Zhou Enlai.