Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 Jacob Key University of Southern Mississippi
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The Catalyst Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 4 2012 Ulterior Motives: Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 Jacob Key University of Southern Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst Recommended Citation Key, Jacob (2012) "Ulterior Motives: Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989," The Catalyst: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 4. DOI: 10.18785/cat.0201.04 Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst/vol2/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in The aC talyst by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. radical than the Ulterior Motives: MPLA, UNITA Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 had the backing of the Western Jacob Key powers. UNI TA was nearly uba has promoted the exportation of its revolution ever destroyed in the since Castro declared his Marxist-Leninist beliefs in the autumn of 1975, but surviving Cyears after Fulgencio Batista's retreat on New Years Day leaders managed to regroup and 1959. Cuban specialists were spotted worldwide in the second half form a second government at of twentieth century, spreading political dissention in Latin Ameri Huambo in central Angola. The ca and overseas. The movements supported by the regime generally second government controlled took the form of grassroots guerrilla campaigns similar to Cuba's the Ble Plateau, home to the own. There was, however, one notable exception: the full-scale de capital of Huambo and much ployment of Cuban troops to the former Portuguese colony of An of the country's agriculture. gola in 1975. This was completely unprecedented in the realm of UNITA continued to oppose the Cuban foreign policy. Common explanations for Castro's interven MPLA government despite con tion include ideological zeal and a desire to please his Soviet back tinual defeats in both guerilla ers, but careful analysis of contemporary evidence suggests another and conventional spheres. motivation entirely. The National Front for the The country of Angola sits on the west coast of Africa, imme Liberation of Angola (FNLA) diately south of the Congo and north of Namibia. The colony was appeared in 1962 as a separat scheduled to pass from Portuguese to local rule in November 1975. ist movement in the north of However, the Portuguese government was reluctant to specify a Angola. Taking a backseat to specific group to empower, choosing instead to create a coalition the larger conflict between the government from the three major factions left over from the war for MPLA and UNITA, the FNLA independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola , was decisively crushed by the The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and the MPLA government and most of National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Soon after the found its leaders exiled or killed. The ing of the coalition, the Popular Movement maneuvered itself into remnants of the group merged total control, beginning a bloody, decades-long civil war for control with UNITA in 1975 as part of of post-colonial Angola. the alternative government. The Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngo la (MPLA) was Cuba entered the conflict founded in 1956, making it by far the oldest of the three factions. in late 197 5 as a response to The socialist movement was based in the capital of Luanda, and a South African push through was composed of much of that city's intellectual community. The what is now Namibia. At the Marxist ideology officially adopted by the group in 1976 gained peak of the initial conflict, Cuba much support from the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites. had 36,000 troops on the ground, Consequently, this move also brought the ire of the Soviet Union's more troops, proportionate to enemies, leading to Western Europe's and the United States' patron the population, than the United age of UNITA and the eventual progression of the conflict into a States had deployed in Viet Vietnam-scale proxy war in the 1980s. nam.1 Cuban troops numbered The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNI- 40,000 in 1986, and 50,000 by TA) was formed in 1966. Populist in nature, and far less the time of the final withdraw- 14 al in 1989. Cuba's successes gestion further solidified by the sponsored by the United States; in those first years were many; third rule. indeed, Cuba could not have South Africa was pushed back, The rule of bargaining stat asked for a better scenano, Cuba became a major player in ed that support for revolutions ideologically speaking. But for African politics, and the Soviets abroad could be either cur the intervention to qualify un 2 were appeased. tailed or accelerated as a way der rules two and three, there Scholar Jorge Dominguez to bargain with other nations must have been something in lists four "rules" that guided for "specific advantages."4 This it for Castro. The most obvi any decision Castro or his cabi rule, like the one that precedes ous answer is that Castro sought net made concerning the sup it, gives priority to practicality to impress his Soviet contacts; port of revolutionary move rather than ideology. Indeed, however, diplomatic relations ments abroad. They are the rule the rules of precedence and bar between the Soviet Union and of internationalism, the rule of gaining superseded the rule of Cuba had been stretched quite precedence, the rule of bargain internationalism in almost ev thin for around a decade. "The ing, and the vanguard rule. The ery case.5 Soviets may now be close to los ing their patience, and the Cas rule of internationalism basi The fourth and final rule is troites never had very much to cally is that Cuba officially sup the vanguard rule, which states begin with," reads a CIA memo ports revolutionary movements. that Cuban support for move Castro gave a speech in 1966 dated 21 November 1967. "Bre ments abroad .are contingent on zhnev thinks that Castro is some concerning revolutions in Latin that movement's willingness to kind of idiot, and Castro prob America, Asia, and Africa: "For defer to Cuba on ideological ably isn't too fond of Brezhnev Cuban revolutionaries the bat matters. This rule is perhaps either."6 tleground against imperialism the most interesting, and almost 3 encompasses the whole world." certainly the most self-serving. Cuba had in previous years Marxism-Leninism and revolu If Cuba only allows govern become very vocal about per tion are often grouped together ments loyal to its ideals to come ceived Soviet failures both in the popular consciousness, to power, how then does Cuba's at home and abroad. The Cu but it should be noted that for foreign policy differ from that ban government criticized the Castro, one does not necessar of the capitalist nations it so fre USSR's domestic polices and ily demand or imply the other, quently attacked? If these fo ur expressed disappointment for a fact made clear by the second rules are any indication, it can its handling of Vietnam. On the rule. be argued that Cuba's motives other hand, the Soviets were The second rule is the rule abroad were more often than tiring of its near-fruitless spon of precedence, which makes not errands of selfishness rather sorship of Cuba, its "socialist 7 any effort abroad secondary to than nobility. beacon" in the West. Indeed, aside from propaganda, the sup the survival of the Cuban state. Holding the intervention in port and economic aid offered This means that Cuba would Angola up to Dominguez's four by the Soviets made little profit. not intervene in any situation rules offers a vision of Cuba's The Soviet Union was hemor where the outcome would im actions that is alternately con rhaging money keeping up with pede Cuba's progress as a state. fusing and enlightening. The all of its satellite states, not just This rule, however practical and intervention fulfills the first rule Cuba; Cuba however received realistic it may be, still lends an easily. Antonio Neto's MPLA some special consideration due air of opportunism to Cuba's was a Marxist group operating to its revolutionary beginnings foreign policy decisions, a sug- aga in st fac tion s and its proximity to the United 15 States. The largest aid the So less violent positions in favor granted the MPLA by the Soviet viets offered were subsidies in of more patient ones, insist Union, as well as the planning sugar and petroleum: Soviets ing the revolution wait for the of the Soviet Union's "exten overpaid for Cuban sugar and proper conditions before pow sive" intervention into the con undercharged for Soviet petro ering ahead. "Marxist-Leninists flict itself. 13 This view can be leum. Since almost all of Cuba's have always understood that so contradicted on multiple fronts. economy was based on its sugar cialism cannot be transplanted Joseph Smaldone, in the same plantations, the most practical from one country to the other book, quotes statistics from the way to keep Cuba afloat was by means of armed force," said United States Arms Control and to buy its sugar. The Soviets Brezhnev. 10 All of these factors Disarmament Agency demon were paying 482 pesos per ton contributed to Castro's frustra strating the value of arms deals in 1975, as compared to 71 per tion with his country's reliance between the Soviet Union and ton in 1958.