The Catalyst
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 4
2012 Ulterior Motives: Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 Jacob Key University of Southern Mississippi
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Recommended Citation Key, Jacob (2012) "Ulterior Motives: Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989," The Catalyst: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 4. DOI: 10.18785/cat.0201.04 Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst/vol2/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in The aC talyst by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. radical than the Ulterior Motives: MPLA, UNITA Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 had the backing of the Western Jacob Key powers. UNI TA was nearly uba has promoted the exportation of its revolution ever destroyed in the since Castro declared his Marxist-Leninist beliefs in the autumn of 1975, but surviving Cyears after Fulgencio Batista's retreat on New Years Day leaders managed to regroup and 1959. Cuban specialists were spotted worldwide in the second half form a second government at of twentieth century, spreading political dissention in Latin Ameri Huambo in central Angola. The ca and overseas. The movements supported by the regime generally second government controlled took the form of grassroots guerrilla campaigns similar to Cuba's the Ble Plateau, home to the own. There was, however, one notable exception: the full-scale de capital of Huambo and much ployment of Cuban troops to the former Portuguese colony of An of the country's agriculture. gola in 1975. This was completely unprecedented in the realm of UNITA continued to oppose the Cuban foreign policy. Common explanations for Castro's interven MPLA government despite con tion include ideological zeal and a desire to please his Soviet back tinual defeats in both guerilla ers, but careful analysis of contemporary evidence suggests another and conventional spheres. motivation entirely. The National Front for the The country of Angola sits on the west coast of Africa, imme Liberation of Angola (FNLA) diately south of the Congo and north of Namibia. The colony was appeared in 1962 as a separat scheduled to pass from Portuguese to local rule in November 1975. ist movement in the north of However, the Portuguese government was reluctant to specify a Angola. Taking a backseat to specific group to empower, choosing instead to create a coalition the larger conflict between the government from the three major factions left over from the war for MPLA and UNITA, the FNLA independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola , was decisively crushed by the The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and the MPLA government and most of National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Soon after the found its leaders exiled or killed. The ing of the coalition, the Popular Movement maneuvered itself into remnants of the group merged total control, beginning a bloody, decades-long civil war for control with UNITA in 1975 as part of of post-colonial Angola. the alternative government. The Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngo la (MPLA) was Cuba entered the conflict founded in 1956, making it by far the oldest of the three factions. in late 197 5 as a response to The socialist movement was based in the capital of Luanda, and a South African push through was composed of much of that city's intellectual community. The what is now Namibia. At the Marxist ideology officially adopted by the group in 1976 gained peak of the initial conflict, Cuba much support from the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites. had 36,000 troops on the ground, Consequently, this move also brought the ire of the Soviet Union's more troops, proportionate to enemies, leading to Western Europe's and the United States' patron the population, than the United age of UNITA and the eventual progression of the conflict into a States had deployed in Viet Vietnam-scale proxy war in the 1980s. nam.1 Cuban troops numbered The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNI- 40,000 in 1986, and 50,000 by TA) was formed in 1966. Populist in nature, and far less the time of the final withdraw-
14 al in 1989. Cuba's successes gestion further solidified by the sponsored by the United States; in those first years were many; third rule. indeed, Cuba could not have South Africa was pushed back, The rule of bargaining stat asked for a better scenano, Cuba became a major player in ed that support for revolutions ideologically speaking. But for African politics, and the Soviets abroad could be either cur the intervention to qualify un 2 were appeased. tailed or accelerated as a way der rules two and three, there Scholar Jorge Dominguez to bargain with other nations must have been something in lists four "rules" that guided for "specific advantages."4 This it for Castro. The most obvi any decision Castro or his cabi rule, like the one that precedes ous answer is that Castro sought net made concerning the sup it, gives priority to practicality to impress his Soviet contacts; port of revolutionary move rather than ideology. Indeed, however, diplomatic relations ments abroad. They are the rule the rules of precedence and bar between the Soviet Union and of internationalism, the rule of gaining superseded the rule of Cuba had been stretched quite precedence, the rule of bargain internationalism in almost ev thin for around a decade. "The ing, and the vanguard rule. The ery case.5 Soviets may now be close to los ing their patience, and the Cas rule of internationalism basi The fourth and final rule is troites never had very much to cally is that Cuba officially sup the vanguard rule, which states begin with," reads a CIA memo ports revolutionary movements. that Cuban support for move Castro gave a speech in 1966 dated 21 November 1967. "Bre ments abroad .are contingent on zhnev thinks that Castro is some concerning revolutions in Latin that movement's willingness to kind of idiot, and Castro prob America, Asia, and Africa: "For defer to Cuba on ideological ably isn't too fond of Brezhnev Cuban revolutionaries the bat matters. This rule is perhaps either."6 tleground against imperialism the most interesting, and almost 3 encompasses the whole world." certainly the most self-serving. Cuba had in previous years Marxism-Leninism and revolu If Cuba only allows govern become very vocal about per tion are often grouped together ments loyal to its ideals to come ceived Soviet failures both in the popular consciousness, to power, how then does Cuba's at home and abroad. The Cu but it should be noted that for foreign policy differ from that ban government criticized the Castro, one does not necessar of the capitalist nations it so fre USSR's domestic polices and ily demand or imply the other, quently attacked? If these fo ur expressed disappointment for a fact made clear by the second rules are any indication, it can its handling of Vietnam. On the rule. be argued that Cuba's motives other hand, the Soviets were The second rule is the rule abroad were more often than tiring of its near-fruitless spon of precedence, which makes not errands of selfishness rather sorship of Cuba, its "socialist 7 any effort abroad secondary to than nobility. beacon" in the West. Indeed, aside from propaganda, the sup the survival of the Cuban state. Holding the intervention in port and economic aid offered This means that Cuba would Angola up to Dominguez's four by the Soviets made little profit. not intervene in any situation rules offers a vision of Cuba's The Soviet Union was hemor where the outcome would im actions that is alternately con rhaging money keeping up with pede Cuba's progress as a state. fusing and enlightening. The all of its satellite states, not just This rule, however practical and intervention fulfills the first rule Cuba; Cuba however received realistic it may be, still lends an easily. Antonio Neto's MPLA some special consideration due air of opportunism to Cuba's was a Marxist group operating to its revolutionary beginnings foreign policy decisions, a sug- aga in st fac tion s and its proximity to the United 15 States. The largest aid the So less violent positions in favor granted the MPLA by the Soviet viets offered were subsidies in of more patient ones, insist Union, as well as the planning sugar and petroleum: Soviets ing the revolution wait for the of the Soviet Union's "exten overpaid for Cuban sugar and proper conditions before pow sive" intervention into the con undercharged for Soviet petro ering ahead. "Marxist-Leninists flict itself. 13 This view can be leum. Since almost all of Cuba's have always understood that so contradicted on multiple fronts. economy was based on its sugar cialism cannot be transplanted Joseph Smaldone, in the same plantations, the most practical from one country to the other book, quotes statistics from the way to keep Cuba afloat was by means of armed force," said United States Arms Control and to buy its sugar. The Soviets Brezhnev. 10 All of these factors Disarmament Agency demon were paying 482 pesos per ton contributed to Castro's frustra strating the value of arms deals in 1975, as compared to 71 per tion with his country's reliance between the Soviet Union and ton in 1958. By a variety of African na the same token, All of these factors contributed tions. Angola from 1967 the easiest way to 1976 received $190 to keep Cuba's to Castro's frustration with his million worth of weap plantations run country's reliance on Soviet aid. ons and equipment, mak nmg smoothly ing it the fourth largest was to offer it recipient of Soviet aid. extremely low prices on petro on Soviet aid. In 1968, a par However, this amount pales in leum, on average of 70 pesos ticular low point in relations comparison to Egypt or Libya, per ton compared to worldwide with the Soviets, Castro gave which received $2.3 billion and price of 200 per ton. 8 These two a speech, exhorting his coun $1 billion in aid. The four na major subsidies, as well as a trymen to "struggle bravely, " tions behind Angola- Somalia, plethora of specialists and tech and to "to minimize [Cuba's] Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda nical advisors, cost the Soviets dependence on everything from averaged $95.2 million in aid. 14 an average of $300 million per abroad . ...Let us fight for the This amounts to $19 million in year during the sixties.9 The Cu greatest independence possible, equipment annually, roughly bans were just as frustrated by whatever the price."11 6.3% of the amount the Sovi this arrangement as the Soviets It can thus be safely assumed ets offered the Cubans in sugar were; their complete reliance on that Cuba's actions, while self subsidies in the same period. the USSR meant that Castro's serving, were meant in no way These totals demonstrate the nation could never truly be au to impress or seduce the Soviet Soviets' miniscule commit tonomous, and that Cuban pol Union. Until recently, this has ment to the Angolans and also icy was constrained somewhat been the historian's prime ex shows by comparison the level by the wishes of its benefactor. planation for the occupation. of its commitment to Castro's The main area of conflict be The Angolan Civil War "was to Cuba, which by the same token tween the two Communist na lead to a Soviet-backed Marxist demonstrates just how uncom tions was their attitudes toward minority regime gaining con fortably attached to the Soviet the spread of revolution. Castro, trol," wrote Ian Greig in 1977. 12 Union Cuba was. of course, believed in the export In Soviet and Chinese Aid to Af Nineteen million annually of violent revolution from Cuba rican Nations, published 1980, simply was not enough to spon to the rest of the world; the Thomas Henrikson describes sor a full-scale conflict, and Soviet Union instead adopted the "lengthy and massive aid" MPLA officials were quick to
16 complain of it to the Cubans. by Cuba. The United States be It has been shown that what Agostinho Neto and Castro's lieved quite the opposite, cling ever Castro hoped to gain from representatives met for the first ing to intelligence proving the Angola, it was certainly not ap time in Luanda in August 1973. use of Soviet IL-62 transport plause from the Soviets. There "In this conversation they also planes to shuttle Cubans into must have been something complained of the little amount Angola. 17 A Cuban Ministry of more, not only because of the of aid from the Campo Social Revolutionary Armed Forces four rules, but also because of ista, and if Campo Socialista memo from the time shows, the sheer size of the Cuban ef wouldn't help them, it wouldn't however, that those ten flights fort. While Cuba had always help anyone."15 Neto told the were chartered because the U.S. expounded the idea of violent Cubans that whi le arms trade had pressured many govern revolution, it had always en with the Soviets had resumed ments to disallow Cuban use couraged guerrilla tactics simi since a lull in 1972, they were of their air facilities, and even lar to those that had overthrown very small ($19 million, accord more importantly, that those Fulgencio Batista in 1959. But ing to Smal m 1975, when open fighting done above) Angola is today one of erupted in Angola, Cuba sent and were not the world's top producers in a full-fledged invading army. suitable for Cuba, suffering under econom their "vast of petroleum ... ic depression, could not afford needs."16 The such an incursion based on amount of brotherhood or the prospect of aid was so paltry that the talks flights made up the entirety a pat on the back from Premier at the meeting turned towards of the Soviet contribution to Kosygin; there must have been further dividing the conflict into Cuba's intervention. 18 Another some golden incentive, some imperialist and socialist sides in memo, written by Vice Minister objective of incredible value the hopes of gaining increased of the Interior Pineiro Losada that Angola could offer the Cu assistance from the Soviets. In and dated 22 November, 1972, bans. terestingly, the memo describ proves that Cuba was already Angola is today one of the ing this meeting, from which researching the revolutionary world's top producers of petro these quotations are derived, movements in Angola, and had leum, ranked 14th worldwide in twice calls the MPLA a progres already received requests for terms of crude oil production, sive faction. Whether or not this help from the young MPLA. according to the United States had any effect on either nation's Most interesting about this doc Energy Information Adminis patronage can only be speculat ument is Losada's request for a tration. From 1975 to 1999, oil ed, but it is certainly something survey of the locations where production in Angola increased to think about considering Cas battles might be fought: "We by 500%, from $1 billion to $5 tro's professed radicalism and suggested that we thought it billion, despite the oil bust of general reluctance to sponsor was a good idea to send some the 1980s.20 Angola interesting moderate leftists. of our comrades to the interior ly enough is one of several oil The Soviet Union's general of Angola to learn about the producing states wherein Cuba disinterest in Angola before the terrain of battle and to shoot a tried seriously to incite a revo 19 1980s strongly suggests, con film." This evidence suggests lution; Venezuela, Bolivia, and intense interest in Angola and 11 trary to previous scholarship, Zaire (Congo) are ranked 1Ot , that the decision to invade An the MPLA, and also a very high 57th, and 66th respectively.21 Re gola was one made primarily degree of foresight. call that Cuba found the MPLA 17 to be the more moderate politi tivities in the Congo only by fields. If the United States' sev cally of the three warring fac way of Guevara's diaries, and en-year invasion of Iraq is to be tions, odd in the context of that he had shown little interest in called imperialistic, so too must country's more common radical Guevara's Bolivian campaign, Cuba's fourteen-year interven agenda. Is it then coincidence which proved a spectacular fail tion in Angola. that the first moderate move ure. Fidel Castro is too much of ment that Castro ever supported This evidence, while certain a pragmatist for the 1975 in after a long history to the con ly compell ing, is more circum vasion of Angola to have been trary was the one that controlled stantial than it is direct. Howev launched on purely ideologi the oil fields? Northern Angola er, as Dominguez suggests with cal grounds. His opportunistic was home to hundreds and hun his four rules, Castro was not nature and rejection of Soviet dreds of oil wells controlled by one to let ideological concerns hegemony suggest that Angola the MPLA. Indeed, much of the overshadow practicality when offered Cuba a reward worth MPLA's funding came from oil it came to foreign affairs. As fourteen years of conflict. An 22 profits, up to 80% in the 1990s. he puts it, "Ideology explains analysis of what Angola had Angola certainly had the oil, but the continuity in Cuban support and what Cuba did not suggests was the petroleum worth a war for foreign revolutions; strategy that petroleum was Castro's for Castro? accounts for Cuba's choices of primary goal in the interven Castro's distaste for his coun movements to support."24 The tion, contrary to most scholar try's reliance on Soviet oil has decision to invade Angola was ship concerning the conflict. An already been shown, and in that a strategically sound one; Cas abundance of compelling cir context it makes sense that he tro could not have foreseen the cumstantial evidence lifts this would take any opportunity to length of the conflict, or that suggestion beyond the realms break away from Soviet hege Cuba's efforts would ultimately of suspicion into a hypothesis mony, especially if the effort it not matter, as the Berlin Wall worthy of consideration. Cas self would be pleasing to Soviet was to fall only about a year af tro's invasion may therefore be Union, as was the case in An ter the Cubans withdrew from seen as an errand of imperial gola. Castro was obsessed with Angola. What makes Castro's ism, a fact that suggests ideol the war's progress, spending up move so compelling is its very ogy's secondary role to pragma to 14 hours a day in a war room capitalistic overtones; that very tism in Castro's running of his in Havana and in constant con sort of economic exploitation revolutionary state. tact with his men on the ground was the sort of the thing that the in Angola. Friend Gabriel Gar anti-colonial MPLA despised cia Marquez later wrote that in the Portuguese government Castro's "absorption in the war it overthrew. The parallels be Endnotes was so intense and meticulous tween Cuba's adventure m I Jorge Dominguez, To Make A that he could quote any statistic Angola and the United States' World Safe for Revolution: A Cuban For eign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard Uni ver relating to Angola as if it were dubious engagement m Iraq sity Press, 1989), 152. Cuba itself, and he spoke of its are staggering; in both cases, a 2 Jan Greig, The Communist towns, customs and peoples as if more developed nation endors Challenge to Africa (Richmond: Foreign he had lived there all his life."23 es a minority party with a simi Affairs Publishing, 1977), 246-275; Piero Castro had not kept up with pre lar ideology, then dispatches Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa 1959-1976 (Cha vious projects of subversion so troops halfway across the world pel Hill: University of North Carolina carefully; he was familiar with to keep that party in power and Press, 2002), 246-272; Domi nguez, 152- Ernesto Guevara's guerrilla ac- to pro- teet the oil 159. 18 ~------.. 3 Dominguez, 116. gwu.edu /~ nsarchiv / NSAEBB / 4 Ibid., 120. NSAEBB67/>, accessed 25 Octo 5 Ibid. , 120. ber 2010, 2. 6 Central Intelligence Agen- 18 Ministry of the Revolu- cy Board of National Estimates, tionary Armed Forces, "Conversa "Bolsheviks and Heroes: The tion with the Soviet Ambassador", USSR and Cuba", GWU National GWU National Security Archive, Security Archive,