Protecting America's Ports: Promising Practices
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The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices Author(s): Antony Pate ; Bruce Taylor ; Bruce Kubu Document No.: 221075 Date Received: January 2008 Award Number: 2003-IJ-CX-1021 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices A Final Report Submitted by the Police Executive Research Forum to the National Institute of Justice Antony Pate Bruce Taylor Bruce Kubu November 20, 2007 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Acknowledgments Our acknowledgments must begin with Dr. Rexford B. Sherman, Director of Research and Information Services at the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), with whom we established an extremely productive relationship early on in this project. Rex became our greatest resource, sharing his expertise on the nature of the maritime industry and the roles of the various actors involved in port security. He also helped us formulate the particular questions we would attempt to answer in this report. Rex provided access to decision makers at critical ports, and helped us to make introductory visits. He also helped us identify and recruit members of our advisory board. Throughout the project, Rex has been there when we needed him, giving us advice, providing us access, and inviting us to AAPA port security meetings. Thank you Rex. This report would not have been possible without your assistance. Rex also introduced us to the members of the Security Committee of the AAPA, a group of security professionals responsible for protecting our nation’s ports. As it turned out, this “introduction” was akin to having your father “introduce” you to swimming by throwing you off the pier. We were asked by the chairman of the committee, Captain Ralph Tracy of the Port of Los Angeles Port Police, to explain the goals and expected products of our work. If the committee agreed to cooperate with our effort, they would lend their support. If they did not agree, we would be on our own. The lack of support, we recognized, would amount to a sea change in our voyage,--the difference between a successful launch and a sunken vessel. After making our pitch, we were told to leave the room while the committee deliberated. Fortunately, the committee agreed to support our effort. From that moment on, the Security Committee, and the AAPA, gave unstinting assistance to our work. Committee members answered our questions, gave us advice, provided contacts, and in every conceivable way made it possible to conduct this difficult project. We express our inestimable gratitude to Captain Ralph Tracy of the Los Angeles Port Police and all of the other members of the Security Committee for their assistance. Armed with advice from the Security Committee, our readings, our attendance at port security conferences, and the insights gleaned during familiarity visits to the ports of Baltimore, Miami, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Long Beach, we began to assemble a project advisory board. We tried to “cover the waterfront,” representing the broad range of stakeholders in the port security community. We relied on this group in reviewing our research plan, critiquing our site visit protocol, suggesting sites to be visited, and assisting us in setting up site visits. Because they came to our rescue in countless ways, we acknowledge our profound gratitude to all of them. The group, in alphabetical order, consisted of: • Edward Badolado, Executive Vice President of Homeland Security, Shaw Group1; • Charles (Chuck) Carroll, Jr., Executive Director, National Association of Waterfront Employers; • Carlos Cortez, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; • Stan Deno, Security Director, International Council of Cruise Lines; 1 Now President of Integrated Infrastructure Analytics, Inc. 2 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. • Paul Hankins, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security; • Betty Kelepecz; Chief of Police, San Diego Harbor Police2; • Joe Lawless, Public Safety Director, Massachusetts Port Authority; • George Lerner, Chief of Police, Port of Stockton; • Timothy Mann, Captain, Supervisor, Port Security Assessment Team, U.S. Coast Guard; • Bruce Marquis, Chief of Police, Norfolk, Virginia; • R. Douglas Rhoads, Vice President, Operations; Manuel, Daniels, Burke International; • Todd Ripley, U.S. Maritime Administration; • Robert Rowe, Director of Development, ASIS International; • Martin Rojas, Executive Director, American Trucking Associations; • Ted Thompson, Executive Vice President, International Council of Cruise Lines; • Mike Toddington, Executive Director, International Association of Airport and Seaport Police; • Bill Wanamaker, Director, American Trucking Associations; and • Barry Wilkins, Managing Director, National Cargo Security Committee. We owe particular thanks to Captain Mann of the U.S. Coast Guard, who served as our liaison with his agency and made it possible for us to meet with the Captain of the Port in each of the sites we visited. With the assistance of all of those mentioned above, we made successful site visits to 17 ports: Boston, Charleston, Galveston, Houston, Jacksonville, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, Port Lauderdale, San Diego, Savannah, Seattle, Tacoma, Tampa, Texas City, and Virginia. In each port, we relied on the cooperation and assistance of countless persons. To prevent the Acknowledgments from approaching the length of the report itself, we will simply say that we express our appreciation to all who helped us arrange the visits and our sincere thanks to all who allowed us to interview or accompany them. Dr. Donald Faggiani, who was Senior Research Associate at PERF at the time this project began, contributed significantly to the start-up efforts involved. Although he has moved on to other endeavors, we extend our appreciation for all the help he provided. Last, but by no means least, we express our profuse and warm appreciation to our project monitor at the National Institute of Justice, Lois Mock. She got her sea legs along with us on many of our site visits, guided us through difficult and sometimes stormy waters, and had the patience to not jump ship before we completed our assignment. Antony Pate Bruce Taylor Bruce Kubu 2 Now retired. 3 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Introduction II. Literature Review III. Research Methods IV. Research Findings: Promising Practices • Awareness • Prevention • Preparedness • Response after an attack • Recovery after an attack V. Conclusion 4 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices Executive Summary I. Introduction The massive flow of shipping containers around the world provides the backbone for the world’s economy. The global shipping system is a critical infrastructure, but it is very vulnerable. The contents of less than 2 percent of all containers are checked, according to official estimates. Containers have been used by criminals to transport all sorts of banned goods, and even people. In recent years, the illegal transport of goods and people has become a particularly worrisome problem in light of world terrorism. Terrorists could, for example, use containers to transport dangerous materials or weapons, or they could use the containers themselves as weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the September 11 attacks, these threats were not “front burner” issues for seaport officials. Before September 11, 2001, seaport security agencies focused on general criminal activity and physical security and access control, cargo security, passenger and crew security, and military mobilization security. Although the maritime community acknowledged the threat of terrorism prior to 9/11, very few comprehensive security measures were taken to deter or undermine a maritime terrorist threat. Nevertheless, a number of ideas for improving seaport security had been proposed prior to 9/11, including: developing port security plans, developing new ways to track cargo, “pushing the borders of the nation out,” sealing the supply chain by taking steps to ensure that cargoes are controlled and “sealed” at each step of their journeys, designating a lead agency for port security, and using public-private partnerships to carry out security tasks. In general, these port security efforts lacked urgency.