LaborHistory, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2000

Local Rank and FileMilitancy: The B attle for TeamsterReform in inthe Early 1960s

DAVIDWITWER*

It wasa warm night onAugust 15th, 1962 in Philadelphia. AtSpring Gardenand Front Streets,the of® ce building ofTeamsters Local 107 was® lled with unionof® cers, shop stewardsand their supportersholding adinnermeeting torally supportfor theunion ’s incumbentleadership. Suddenly,around 8 PM,an angry crowdof union dissidents andtheir neighborhood supporters,numbering somewherebetween 300 and 500 people,boiled upout of the streets of the nearby working-classcommunity ofFrankford. The dissidentscharged towardthe union hall. Asthe crowd came upthehill, thefrightened of®cers inside the local hall barricaded their doorsshut. For thenext hour thedemonstrators fought toget insideand grapple with their of®cers. Over 100 police arrived toseparate thecontending forces, but the dissidents and their supportersdid not leave until Fire Department water cannonsdrove them from the area. The ®ghting onSpring GardenStreet came about after along string ofacts of intimidation against dissidentTeamsters in Local107. Rank and® le Teamstersand their supportersmarched onAugust 15th toexpress their outrage over abeating recently receivedby oneof their members.Symbolically andliterally, thedissidents werestanding up to people they had always feared.The march occurredduring the high tideof Teamster reform effortsin Philadelphia during theearly 1960s. Reformers soughtto oust both their local leadership andto escape the control of the national unionpresident, Jimmy Hoffa. 1 The scenethat night in Philadelphia contradictsmany commonassumptions about theTeamsters Union in theage ofHoffa. The mostpopular accountshave always

*Anearlier version of this articlewas deliveredat the 17th Annual North AmericanLabor History Conference,ª Community and Culturein WorkingClass Historyº(October 1995). I would liketo thank the participants ofthat conference,particularly KarenMiller and KevinBoyle, fortheir very helpful comments and suggestions.Others who have offeredmany usefulsuggestions on succeedingdrafts of the paper include:Lucy Barber, CatherineRios, MelvynDubofsky, Richard Morris,and an anonymous reader for LaborHistory .Toeachof them Ioffermy heartfeltappreciation. 1David Witwer,ª Secessionin the Ageof Hoffa,º chapt. 8in ªCorruption and Reformin the Teamsters Union, 1898±1991º (unpublished PhD dissertation, Brown Univ., 1994).Among those who have written on the Teamstersand includedbrief descriptions of the insurgentmovement in Philadelphia includethe following: Ralph and EstelleJames, Hoffaand the Teamsters:A Study ofUnion Power (NewYork: Van Nostrand, 1965),204± 209; Dan E.Moldea, The HoffaWars: Teamsters, Rebels, Politicians, andthe Mob (NewYork: Paddington Press,1978), 113± 114 and 146;, The Fall andRise ofJimmy Hoffa (NewYork: TheSaturday ReviewPress, 1972), 188± 190 and 238,262, 274, 278, 281; Arthur A. Sloane, Hoffa (Cambridge, MA: TheMIT Press,1991), 269± 270.

ISSN0023-656X print/ISSN1469-9702 online/00/030263±16 Ó 2000Taylor &Francis Ltd on behalf of The Tamiment Institute 264 D. Witwer

portrayed themembership thenas either apathetic about their unionor committed to agroup ofleaders who might have beencorrupt, but who continued to win good pay andcontracts for themembers. 2 TheNew YorkTimes assertedin 1961, ªMostTeamsters seem perfectly contentto ride along with Mr.Hoffa in his cynical convictionthat anything goesso long ashe keeps delivering higher wagesand fatter bene®ts to his members.º 3 Arecentbiography ofHoffa, by Arthur Sloane,assures readersthat nosigni® cantopposition to Hoffa, in factno signi® cantrank and® le dissent,existed in theunion by the1960s. Sloanewrites of Hoffa, ª Whenhe was almost anyplace within thedomain ofthe 1.6 million-member labor organization, he wasamong rabid partisans.º 4 This picture ofa quietand contented membership clasheswith newhistories of reform groups,such as the Teamsters for aDemocratic Union,which formedduring the1970s and1980s. While theseanalyses have broadenedour understanding of the unionduring thosedecades they mistakenly conveyedthe idea that thereformers ofthe 1970s arosein aunionwith nostrong tradition ofdissent. 5 Along andcomplex history ofstruggle by Teamster members tosecure their rights in theearly 1960s andbefore has beenoverlooked. Dissidentsin Philadelphia andelsewhere mounted a powerfulchallenge to theleadership ofthe Teamsters in theearly 1960s. They createda neighborhood- basedorganization andpushed for secessionfrom thenational union.By moving towardssecession, the dissidents in Philadelphia, andelsewhere, drew on earlier traditions ofdissent within theTeamsters. After the passage ofthe Wagner Actin 1935, this tactic gained theadded advantage ofallowing dissidentsto draw the federal government intotheir electioncontests. Secession campaigns in theearly 1960s threatenedTeamster leadersat thelocal andthe national level. Anexamination ofthe struggle in Philadelphia, placedwithin itshistorical context,highlights theissues that motivated reformers in this era. Sucha studyalso reveals thetactics they used andthe dif® culties that thesereformers facedin mounting effectiveopposition. In theend, the changing natureof Teamster contractsdoomed the viability ofthe reformers’ strategy ofsecession. The generation ofdissidents who followed the rebels in Philadelphia learnedfrom this defeatand adopted a newset of tacticsand organiza- tional forms. * * * * * *

2Seefor instance Steven Brill, The Teamsters (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1978),397± 399. 3The New YorkTimes ,July 8, 1961,18. 4Sloane, 316.Other accounts at the time which emphasized the complacencyof rank and ®leTeamsters includePaul Jacobs, The State ofthe Unions (NewYork: Atheneum, 1963),3; A.H. Raskin, ªWhy They Cheerfor Hoffa,º The New YorkTimes Magazine ,Nov. 9,1958,15, 77± 79; Raskin, ª `Hoffa’ll Take Care of Hoffa,’ º The New YorkTimes Magazine ,Mar.26, 1961, 9, 93±95; Philip Taft, ªTheResponses of the Bakers, Longshoremenand Teamstersto Public Exposure,º Quarterly Journal ofEconomics , 74 (1960), 395;James, 194±209. 5For example, in his excellenthistory ofTeamsters for a DemocraticUnion, Dan LaBotztakes just 10 linesto describeall Teamsterdissident movements before1967. He dismisses the dissidentsin Philadelphia and elsewhereas ªsel®shº and assertsthat theirefforts were purely locally oriented.Dan LaBotz, Rank andFile Rebellion: Teamstersfor a Democratic Union (NewYork: Verso,1990), 23 and 26. For otherdiscussions of reformers in the Teamsterssince the 1970s,see Moldea; Samuel R.Friedman, Teamster Rank andFile: Power,B ureaucracy, andRebellion at Workin aUnion (NewYork: Columbia UniversityPress, 1982); Kenneth C. Crowe, Collision: How the Rank andFile took Back the Teamsters (New York: Charles Scribner ’sSons, 1993);Aaron Brenner,ª Teamstersfor a DemocraticUnion and the Rank and FileUpsurge, 1967± 1975,º paper presentedat the AmericanPolitical ScienceAssociation Annual Meeting,Sept. 1, 1990,San Francisco,CA. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 265

The rank and® le insurgentsin Philadelphia belongedto a long tradition ofdissent within theInternational Brotherhood ofTeamsters (IBT). In 1905, twoyears after the unioncame intoexistence, a factionof delegates at theunion ’sconventionsought to unseatthe incumbent ® rstPresident, Cornelius Shea. As has beenthe case for mostof the union’shistory, national of®cers were elected by avoteof the delegates assembled at thenational convention.Though hewas the target ofallegations involving bribery andextortion, Shea managed towin a closereelection contest at theconvention, but his opponentscharged that theelection had beenfraudulent. 6 Whenthe defeated delegatesreturned to their local unionssome mounted a campaign toconvince the IBT toadopt proceduresfor areferendumand the direct election of the national of®cers. To forcethe hand of the national leadership, dissidentdelegates encouraged local unions tosecede at least temporarily from thenational organization. 7 While this secessionmovement petered out in afewmonths, a year later amuch more successfuleffort began following another stormy IBT convention. 8 Shea and his allies had disquali® edenoughof the opposition delegates in 1906 toassure a comfort- able reelection.This time his opponentsacted during theconvention; on the third day ofthegathering thedissident faction, now quite large, exited thehall enmasse and set uparival unionacross town. They called their breakaway group theUnited Teamsters ofAmerica (UTA). 9 Eventually, theUTA representedsome 8500 teamstersÐabout one-®fth ofthe total IBT membershipÐ basedin locals that stretchedfrom St.Louis to New York.10 Whenthe IBT met for its annual conventionin 1907, theembattled Shea again faced strong oppositionfrom within theunion. With thethreat oflosing therest of his union tothe breakaway UTA,Shea andhis supporterschose not to disqualify their oppo- nents.The electioncontest progressed smoothly andby all accountsfairly. Shea was defeatedby adelegate from Bostonnamed Dan Tobin whowent on to lead theIBT until 1952.11 Though criticized ascantankerous and conservative by some,Tobin ’s

6VictorE. Soares, ªReforminga Labor Union,º The WorldTo-Day ,10(Jan. 1906),92± 97; Daily Tribune,Aug. 6,1906,2, Aug. 8, 1905,2, Aug. 9, 1905,4, Aug. 10,1905, 2, Aug. 11,1905, 1, Aug. 12, 1905,1, Aug. 13,1905, 1; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 8, 1905,1, Aug. 11,1905, 14, Aug. 12,1905, 2, Aug. 13,1905, 2, Aug. 15,1905, 14, Aug. 16,1905, 2. 7Chicago Record-Herald ,Sept. 9, 1905,2, Sept. 11,1905, 4. Dissidentsbrie ¯yput out theirown newsletter,entitled ª Teamsters ’ WeeklyReview.º A copy ofit was printedon the back pageof the Union Advocate .Thedissidents ’ own accountof their goals can be found in Michigan Union Advocate , Sept. 1,1905,3, Sept. 8, 1905,3, Sept. 15, 1905,3. Thedescription of their movement fromthe IBT ’s national leadershipis in TeamsterMagazine ,3(1) (Nov. 1905),2± 4. 8Apparently thesereformers enjoyed some successamong small Midwesternlocals, but then, failingto gainadherents in the largercities, the movement lost momentum and fellshort offunds. Michigan Union Advocate,Sept. 22,1905, 3, Oct. 13,1905, 3; Chicago Record-Herald ,Sept. 19,1905, 7, Sept. 23,1905, 4; TeamsterMagazine 3(1) (Nov. 1905),2± 4. 9Chicago Record-Herald ,Aug. 7, 1906,9, Aug. 9, 1906,5, Aug. 10,1906, 7, Aug. 13,1906, 14; Proceedings ofthe Fourth Annual Convention ofthe International Brotherhood ofTeamsters: Held at Chicago, , August Sixth to Thirteenth (inclusive) Nineteen Hundredand Six (: Cheltenham Press, 1906),16± 19, 56± 59. 10Proceedings ofthe Fifth Annual Convention ofthe International Brotherhoodof Teamsters: Held at Boston, , August Fifth to Thirteenth (inclusive) Nineteen Hundredand Seven (Indianapolis: Cheltenham Press,1907), 35± 39. 11ª Shea’sReignOver,º Team Owners’ Review 6(5) (May 1907),25. Regarding the vulnerability ofthe IBTto furthersecession see Proceedings of1907 IBT Convention ,35±39; Thomas Hughesto Frank Morrison,Oct. 30,1906, American Federation ofLabor Records: Gompers Era ,micro®lm, TeamstersFile, Reel36. For newspapercoverage of the 1907Teamsters Convention see Boston Herald ,Aug. 5, 1907,4, Aug. 6,1907,24, Aug. 8, 1907,10, Aug. 9, 1907,2, Aug. 10,1907, 3. 266 D. Witwer

national administration ofthe union remained untouchedby scandal. 12 With their reform goals achieved,the breakaway UTAlocals rejoinedthe IBT in 1908. The ®rst useof secession in theTeamsters to force reform onthe national unionhad suc- ceeded.13 Dissentcontinued in theTeamsters during later decades,but the next generation of rank and® le insurgentsfocused on unseating local leaderswho were seen as corrupt. In NewYork City, for instance,dissidents working in anumberof different locals publisheda reform journal entitled IBT News.In 1938 aspart oftheir reform efforts thesedissidents mounted a campaign toremove theleaders of Local 202 whowere reputedto be under the control of Josephª SocksºLanza, a gangster tiedto theMa® a. In locals like 202, reformers enjoyedvarying degreesof success, their effortsalways publicized by the IBT News which continuedpublishing into the1940s. 14 In thelate 1950s andearly 1960s anewgeneration ofreformers,who opposed both local andnational leaders,emerged in theTeamsters Union. Like their predecessorsin 1905± 1907 this generation ofdissidents utilized thetactic ofsecession. They eschewed attempts at defeatingthe national adminstration at theunion ’sconventions.Instead they wagedcampaigns at thelocal level which soughtto both ousttheir local ’s leadership andpull their unionsout of the Teamsters. If enoughlocals pulled out,a newrival teamstersunion, like theUTA, would emerge andthis couldprovide an effectiveway toforce reform onthe national administration. The insurgencyin Phildelphia ’sLocal107 formeda crucial part ofthis strategy. Likedissidents elsewhere in theTeamsters during this era, therebels in Philadelphia objectedboth totheir local leadership andto the national presidencyof Jimmy Hoffa.Their campaign tookaim at both targets. This waveof reform began in theyears after Daniel Tobin retired from of®ce in 1952. In 1957 Jimmy Hoffabecame President of the Teamsters Union and the main target ofthe U.S. Senate ’sSelectCommittee on Improper Practices in theLabor and ManagementField, better knownas the McClellan Committee. This committee,led by its ChiefCounsel Robert Kennedy,found a range ofcorrupt practicesbeing committed bysomeTeamster leaderson the local level. 15 The committee ’sinvestigation ofHoffa, however,turned up less clear-cut violations. Accordingto the committee, he had given someof the union ’shealth insurancebusiness to the son of a reputedgangster on

12Seefor example ª TheI.B.T.C.W.H. ofA.,º Fortune Magazine ,23(May 1941),97± 102, 135± 142, and Robert D.Leiter, The TeamstersUnion: AStudy ofIts Economic Impact (NewYork: Bookman Associates,1957), 35± 47. 13Daniel Tobin to Samuel Gompers, Dec.5, 1908, AFLRecords:Gompers Era ,Reel36. For amore completehistory ofthis earlyreform struggle see Witwer, 43± 174. 14IBT News,Nov. 1938,1, Feb. 1940,3, April 1940,3, June 1940,1, 5, July 1940,4. Newspaper coverageof the electioncontest and the criminal trialsthat linked Local202 ’sleadership with Joseph Lanza includes The New YorkTimes ,Dec.5, 1938,4, Dec.11, 1938, 6, Jan. 9,1941,23, Jan. 10,1941, 38, Jan. 18,1941, 17, Jan. 8, 1943,27, Jan. 13,1943, 25; Daily Worker ,Dec.7, 1938,4, Dec.15, 1938, 3. For ageneraldiscussion of reform efforts organized around IBT News seeWitwer, 237± 282. 15Severalobservers have notedthe mixedmotives ofthe McClellanCommittee, and moreimportantly the criticalrole that the committee ’s®ndingsplayed in the evolution ofpublic opinion regardinglabor and the newrestrictive legislation created in 1959,the Landrum± Grif®n Act. Alan K.McAdams, Power andPolitics in LaborLegislation (NewYork: Columbia UniversityPress, 1964); William H.Miernyk, Trade Unions in the Age ofAf¯ uence (NewYork: Random House,1962), 64± 67, 71± 73; Melvyn Dubofsky, The State &Laborin ModernAmerica (Chapel Hill, NC: TheUniversity of North Carolina Press,1994), 217±223. A goodsurvey of the way in which unions have in generalbeen tarred with the label ofcorruption isWilliam J. Puette, Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the MediaView OrganizedLabor (Ithaca, NewYork: ILR Press,1992), esp. 59±73, 153± 158. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 267 inordinately pro® table terms.His wife had beeninvolved in atruckleasing business arrangement with aunionemployer; this businessreaped windfall pro® tssoon after Hoffasettled a strike in favor ofthat sameemployer. What thecommittee emphasized mostof all, however,were the ties between Hoffa and the most corrupt local Teamster leadersall aroundthe country. He protected and sponsored those leaders, the com- mittee charged, andused their supportto maintain controlover thenational union. 16 Thus,as in thedays of Shea, reform at thelocal andnational level wereinextricably linked. Onelocal leader whomthe McClellan Committee had focusedon was Joseph Glimco thehead of taxicab drivers Local 777 in Chicago. During hearings heldon Glimco in 1959 thecommittee foundevidence that Glimco wasin facta high ranking member ofthe Chicago Ma®a. Under his administration moneyhad beenembezzled from thelocal unionto pay for theremodeling ofGlimco ’shouse.Other unionfunds paid for acountryclub membership andthe legal feeswhich Glimco accumulatedwhen hefaced trial for his alleged involvement in extorting moneyfrom Chicago ’s produce dealers.17 Presentedwith this evidence,Hoffa refused to take any action against Glimco.In fact,Hoffa later campaigned in supportof him. 18 The revelations ofthe McClellan Committee led dissident members ofLocal 777 toform anopposition movement. They called themselvesthe Democratic Union Organizing Committee(DUOC). Believing that noelection run by thelocal union of®cers would ever befair, DUOCinstead gathered enoughpetitions to have the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)run a decerti®cation election.If theinsur- gentswon, then DUOC would become a newindependent union. 19 Aftera number ofdelaying tacticsused by theIBT, theNLRB election® nally tookplace in July 1961; DUOCtriumphed andChicago ’scab drivers launcheda newsecession movement.20 Reformers,like thosein DUOC,worried about both corrupt local leadersand the national presidentof their union.Hoffa ’ssupportfor local leaders,like Glimco,made it apparent torank and® le dissidentsthat real reform for their unioncould not occur while Hoffaremained in charge. Evenin honestlyrun locals reform-orientedTeamsters came tosee the need for achange in national leadership. Hoffa ’snearly unanimous reelectionas President of the IBT at theunion ’sJuly 1961 Conventionhas obscured theextent of this opposition.Only afewscattered delegates at that conventionstood up

16The® ndingsof the committee ’sinvestigationsinto Hoffaare contained in aseriesof reports. U.S. Senate, SelectCommittee on ImproperActivities in the Labor and ManagementField (hereafter McClellanCommittee), Interim Report ,85th Cong., 2ndSess., Report No. 1417(Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Of® ce, 1958), 162± 249; McClellan Committee, Second Interim Report ,86th Cong., 1stSess., Report No. 621(Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Of® ce, 1959), 1± 207; McClellan Committee, Final Report: Part3 ,86th Cong., 2ndSess., Report No. 1139(Washington, DC: Government PrintingOf® ce, 1960), 570± 723. 17McClellanCommittee, Final Report: Part3 ,514±530, 548± 554, 564± 569. Allegations of Glimco ’s Ma®a membership canbe found in Chicago Tribune ,Sept. 3, 1954,2; U.S. Congress,Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, OrganizedCrime and Illicit Traf®c in Narcotics: Hearings, Part2 , 88th Cong., 1stSess., Oct. 10,11, 15, and 16,1963 (Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Of® ce, 1963), 508± 511. 18The New YorkTimes ,Sept. 3, 1959,1, Sept. 29,1959, 33; Sheridan, 135±136. 19Chicago Tribune ,April 3, 1959,1; Chicago Sun-Times ,April 3, 1959,6. 20Chicago Tribune ,July 18,1961, 3; Charles Remsberg,ª Tough Toppler ofHoffa ’sTeamsters,º True (1964), 2±6, clipping ®les,Chicago HistoricalSociety. 268 D. Witwer

andsupported an oppositioncandidate. 21 The reluctanceof delegates to publicly join theopposition at theconvention, however, cannot be taken as a ®rm indication that they approved ofHoffa ’sleadership. Mostdelegates, who themselves were of® cers of local unions,chose not to express any disagreementwith thenational administration. Recalcitrant local leadersfaced the possibility that their local unionsmight beput in trusteeship.Or, thenational of®ce might sponsoran opposing slate at thenext local elections.Grievances heard at theconference level might suddenlyall bedecided against thelocal union.All ofthese practices made it lesslikely that dissentwould be actively expressedduring theconvention. 22 Local leaderswho belonged to this generation ofreform facedthe choice of either abandoning their oppositionor ®ndingsome way toescape the retribution ofthe national administration. James Lukenexempli® edthe dilemma facedby theseoppo- sition delegatesin 1961. The Presidentof a milk drivers local in ,Luken wentto the convention knowing it wasa lostcause, but determined to make apublic standagainst Hoffa. 23 Afterwards,he believed that his local facedretribution for his opposition.He expected Hoffa to impose a trusteeshipover his local unionand so by August1961 heasked his members toapprove an NLRBdecerti® cation election,like theone that DUOChad wonthe preceding month. The local agreed tothis plan and in spiteof a personal campaign efforton the part ofHoffa, the members ofLuken ’s local unionpulled outof the IBT in late 1961. 24 Dissidentsin Chicago andCincinnati identi® ed these NLRB electionsas both away toreform their local situationand to strike at Hoffa.As acab driver in Chicago tolda reporter after theNLRB ballot in that city: ªThis losssure might hurt Hoffa.He may beokay for somepeople, but not for me.He ’sfor himself, notthe little fellow.º 25 The leader ofDUOC, Dominic Abata, assertedthat other local movementswere waiting to follow theexample setin Chicago. ªI ’ll tell youwhat this electionmeans to Jimmy Hoffa.This morning therewere members offour other Chicago Teamster locals in here asking howwe didit, howwe got outof theTeamsters. They ’re de®nitely interestedin

21Although aNewJersey Teamster leader, Milton Liss, did runagainst Hoffa at the convention, only ahandful ofdelegates stood duringthe longroll call vote to support his candidacy. Following atradition in Teamsterelections, the chairman ofthe conventionmoved that the electionbe declaredunanimous by acclamation. Proceedings ofthe 18thConvention ofthe International Brotherhood ofTeamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen andHelpers ofAmerica, Miami B each,, July 7,1961: Fifth Day ,35±49. Examples of the newspaperreaction to this electioninclude ª Sad Day For Labor,º Washington Post ,July 12,1961; ªDemocracya la Hoffa,º ChristianScience Monitor ,July 12,1961; ª Hoffa ’sImperial Rule,º News , July 12,1961, clippings in Folder4, Box3, James Riddle HoffaClipping Collection, MSS 255,State HistoricalSociety of Wisconsin, Madison. 22Onedelegate explained to areporterhis failureto oppose Hoffaat an earlierconvention this way: ªEven ifI wantedto object, Ican ’tseewhere it would do any good. Jimmy has the organization, and he has the votes. Icouldend up on the outsideÐand with nothing gainedºin Clark Mollenhoff, Tentacles ofPower: The Story ofJimmy Hoffa (Cleveland, OH: TheWorld Publishing Company, 1965),225. Other descriptionsof the powerof retribution Hoffa could wield in the grievanceprocedure include Clyde Summers, ªTeamsterJoint GrievanceCommittees: GrievanceDisposal Without Adjudication,ºreprinted from the Proceedings ofthe Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting ofthe National Academyof Arbitrators (Washington, DC: Bureauof National Affairs,Inc., 1985),323± 330; Sam Romer, The International Brotherhoodof Teamsters: Its Government andStructure (NewYork: John Wileyand Sons, Inc., 1962),84± 96; James, 178±185. 23Cincinnati Enquirer ,July 8, 1961,1. 24Cincinnati Enquirer ,Aug. 16,1961, 1, Aug. 21,1961, 1, Aug. 28,1961, 1, Oct. 21,1961, 1, Dec.24, 1961, 2A. 25WallStreet Journal ,Aug. 1, 1961,1. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 269 pulling outtoo. That ’swhat it meansto Hoffa.º 26 James Lukenpushed secession by offering advice andassistance to rebels elsewhere in theTeamsters Union, including the insurgencyin Philadelphia. 27 By theend of 1961, in spiteof his solidreelection victory at theIBT ’sConvention, Hoffaappeared vulnerable. Dissidentsin Chicago andCincinnati had pulled outand other groups ofcab drivers in Detroit, St.Louis, and San Diego weremoving to secede.28 Further victories by insurgentsraised thepossibility ofanother danger for Hoffa.The AFL-CIO had respondedto the revelations ofthe McClellan Committee by expelling theTeamsters in 1957. Though thelabor federationhad notworked actively tounderminethe Teamsters by sponsoringa rival organization, it might dosoif further evidenceof dissent emerged. 29 If thetrucking locals,the strategic centerof the TeamstersUnion, began tosecede, then the danger ofan effective rival union,a latter-day UTA,supported by theAFL-CIO couldbecome serious. 30 Giventhis contextevents in Philadelphia constituteda turning point for reform. In January 1962, agroup ofinsurgents in Philadelphia ’sLocal 107, following theadvice ofJames Luken,began topush for secession.Unlike the locals that had previously seceded,Local 107 wasa trucking local, in fact,it wasthe fourth largest local unionin theentire IBT. 31 Secessionhere might well have ledto the emergence of a rival union. The march onLocal 107 ’sunionhall onthenight ofAugust 15th, 1962 marked the high tideof this reform effort.Frustrated with their local andnational leaders,the insurgentsin Philadelphia wageda powerfullocally basedcampaign. They pushedfor secessionas a way towin an honest election and as part ofaneffort to undercut Hoffa ’s national administration. Their history highlights theoften overlooked role ofrank and ®le dissentin this period.Their ultimate failure explains why secessionwas no longer aviable methodof reform in theunion by the1960s. The people whostormed the hall that night either belongedto or supportedan insurgentgroup knownas The Voice ofTeamsters ’ Democratic Organizing Com- mittee.This group had sprungup in Local 107 in oppositionto thelocal ’s incumbent leadership, andespecially thelocal ’sSecretary-Treasurer, Raymond Cohen.Opposition toCohenhad grownwithin thelocal since1958. That year theMcClellan Committee helda seriesof public hearings onCohen ’smanagement ofthe local. The McClellan Committeefound irregularities in howCohen was elected. They also uncoveredfraud involving theunion ’s®nances.Evidence presented during thehearings, andlater used toconvict Cohen in acriminal trial, indicatedthat heregularly dippedinto union

26Ibid. 27Interviewby author with SteveLuken, May 2,1991and interviewwith William Luken,April 18,1991; PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Jan. 15,1962, Sept. 14,1962; PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Mar.6, 1963.The leaderof Chicago ’sDUOC, Dominic Abata, also servedas an advisor to the Philadelphia rebels;see PhiladelphiaDaily News ,June 18,1962 (the News articlesare from an unorganizednewspaper clipping collectionheld at the Seafarers ’ InternationalUnion Archives, PineyPoint, MD, hereafter,SIU Clipping Files); Remsberg,6; John Bunker, ªThePhiladelphia Story,º Seafarers’ Log,45(1) (Jan. 1983),34± 35. 28The New YorkTimes ,Feb. 28,1965; AFL-CIONews ,Nov. 7, 1964; Baltimore Evening Sun , Feb. 12, 1962,clipping scrapbook, vol. 81,Seafarers ’ InternationalUnion Archives, PineyPoint, MD(hereafter SIUScrapbook). 29Inthe caseof the InternationalLongshoremen ’sAssociation, the Laundry Workers ’ International Union, and the Bakery and ConfectioneryWorkers ’ InternationialUnion, the AFL-CIO did move to charternew rival national unions afterthese organizations had beenexpelled for corruption. SeeTaft, 393± 412. 30WallStreet Journal ,April 22,1963, SIU Clipping Files. 31PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Jan. 15,1962, June 18,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 270 D. Witwer fundsto buy himself avariety ofluxury items,from tastefulcharcoal grey suits,to medium sizedyachts. Other testimonyindicated that hehad negotiateda more lenient contractin returnfor apayoff from alarge employer. 32 Initially it appeared, however,that theSenate ’sallegations presentedno great threat toCohen. The national leader ofthe union, James Hoffa,himself atarget ofthe McClellanCommittee, refused to take any signi® cantaction in responseto the evidenceof Cohen ’simproprieties. In fact,as was the case with Glimco andother similar cases,Hoffa supported Cohen against local opponents.He even backed Cohen for higher of®ce in thenational union. 33 Nor didCohen ’spositionwith his local members seemimmediately tobe in jeopardy.At a local unionmeeting Teamstershanged Senator McClellan in ef®gy. Sevenmonths after theconclusion of the hearings, Cohenand the rest of his slate of of®cers won reelection in thelocal ’sregular election.Cohen ’s5to1 margin ofvictory seemedto be apersonal vindication. Outsideobservers saw his reelectionas yet another example ofTeamster apathy andcynicism. The PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin explained that, ªWhat theelection appeared totell Cohenwas: keep bringing homethe bacon: we don’tcare about thecorruption charges.º 34 Watching what seemedto be a familiar pattern ofTeamster toleration for corruption, mostobservers failed toseethat anopposition movement had emergedwithin thelocal. During thehearings agroup calling itself theTeamster BettermentCommittee printed bulletins calling for Cohen ’s ouster.35 After Cohen’sreelectionin 1958 this samegroup raised public complaints about howthe election had beenconducted. They charged that Cohen’sslate had postedstrong-arm menbeside the union ’sballot boxesand forcedmembers todisplay their ballots beforecasting them. 36 Aswith similar reform effortsin other Teamsters ’ locals, this oneseemed doomed to obscurity andfrus- tration.37 Their lack ofsuccess, and that ofother similar reform groups,I wouldargue,

32TheMcClellan hearings on Cohen and Local107 are U.S. Congress,Senate, SelectCommittee on ImproperActivities in the Labor orManagement Field, Investigation ofImproper Activities in the Laboror Management Field,Part 27 & 28 ,85th Cong., 2ndSess., April 23,May 6, 7, 8,and 9, 1958(Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Of® ce, 1958).Regarding trial testimony on the union ®nances,the yacht, and the payoff, seethe followingnewspaper reports in the SIUClipping Files: PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin , April 6,1963,April 11,1963, April 15,1963, April 16,1963; PhiladelphiaDaily News ,April 11,1963, April 15, 1963,April 17, 1963; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,April 11, 1963,April 16, 1963.His conviction ® nally cameon July 15th; see PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,July 15,1963, in PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin Clipping Files, TempleUniversity Archives, Philadelphia, PA(hereafter Bulletin Clipping Files). 33PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Feb. 22,1959, June 11,1959, Aug. 27,1959, Sept. 19,1959, Nov. 29, 1959,Dec. 6, 1959in Bulletin Clipping Files. ªTeamstersNotes,º Box 15, Daniel BellPapers, NewYork UniversityTamiment/ WagnerArchives, NewYork. For the storyof Hoffa ’slargerpattern of supporting localTeamster leaders who werecharged with wrongdoing,convicted of it, and oftenopposed by their members, seeWitwer, 344± 387. Other accounts include U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations, JamesR. Hoffaand Continued UnderworldControl ofNew YorkTeamster Local 239:Report ¼ ,87th Cong., 2ndSess., SenateReport No. 1784(Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Of® ce, 1962); Brill, 31±75, 124± 155; James, 19±23, 62± 64; also Sloane, 109±121, 185± 186. 34PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Dec.5, 1958,1. 35107Teamsters Record ,Aug. 1959and Sept. 1959,in the ®lesof the Association forUnion Democracy, Brooklyn, NewYork. 36PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Dec.9, 1958,24. 37Descriptionsof other stymied reformmovements within the Teamstersat that generaltime canbe found in Witwer,454± 456; also, Moldea, 113±119; Brill, 133±142; Robert S.Gallagherand Ronald Semple, ªTheLife and Timesof Tony Pro,º The Reporter ,29(4)(Sept. 12,1963), 37± 40. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 271 stemmedfrom their vulnerability. Isolated individuals couldbe physically intimidated. In Local107 any act ofopposition drew a quick,and often physical reprisal. Those members whohanded out the Teamster BettermentCommittee ’snewssheets were sooncaught at ajobsiteand beaten up in frontof other unionmembers. 38 The representative ofthe group that had ®ledan election protest received so many death threats that hewas placed under 24-hour police guard. 39 If theinsurgents could rally enoughmembership support,they coulddefend each other from actsof intimidation, butgenerating acritical masswas dif® cult. Cohen, like other Teamster leaders,could very effectively dampenpublic opposition.The spaces wheremembers usually expressedsuch opposition and sought support were also spaces in which Cohenenjoyed a predominanceof power. For instance,dissidents might try torally supportfor their causeat thelocal ’sregular monthly meetings.But Cohen or oneof his supporterschaired thosemeetings and decided who could speak and who wasout of order. Those meetings were also usually packedwith shopstewards, business agents,and others who had beenappointed by Cohen.Other members couldand did attend,but clearly they felt themselvesto be on Cohen ’sturf.Members who sought to voice complaints in theunion hall wereshouted down, ruled out of order, and sometimesambushed on their way outthe door. 40 Asa pamphlet by theVoice putit, ªWenever had any uniondemocracy.º 41 Teamster Unionmembers facedspecial obstaclesin building anopposition move- ment.Unlike insurgent factory workerswho could have usedtheir jobsiteas an alternative organizing site,Teamsters worked in relatively small groups at warehouses andtruckyards scatteredacross the city. Ateach jobsite, the steward, often a Cohen appointee,wielded a powerfulrestraining in¯uence. 42 Despitethese barriers, from 1961 to1963, apowerfulopposition movement did emerge in Philadelphia. In thespring of1961, anewgroup formed,calling itself the Voice.They spentthe next several monthscampaigning tohave anoutside agency monitor futurelocal elections.When Cohen ’sgroup refusedthat reform, andno help from thenational of®ce of the union appeared likely, theVoice movedtowards secession.43 They gathered enoughsignatures from Local 107 members toforce the

38PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Sept. 14,1959, Bulletin Clipping Files. 39PhiladelphiaInquirer ,April 22,1959, 1, April 24,1958, 4. 40Seethe testimony offormer opponents ofCohen in McClellanCommittee, Hearings: Part27 , 10403±36. It should also be notedthat this kind ofspace dynamic held truefor most localunion leaders. As otherlabor observersand historians have notedmost localleaders are caught between two con¯icting roles.On the onehand they areto actas the leadersof a democratictown meetingwhere everyone gets asay, but they arealso to be generalsleading a unitedhost that must do battle with the employers. Warren R. Van Tine, The Making ofthe LaborBureaucrat: Union Leadershipin the , 1870±1920 , (Amherst, MA:TheUniversity of Massachusetts Press, 1973), 33± 56, and Will Herbert,ª Bureaucracy and Democracyin Labor Unions,º Antioch Review ,3(3) (Fall 1943),405± 417. Writing in the early1950s, LeonardR. Sayles and GeorgeStrauss notedthat evenwell-meaning labor leadersfound themselvesstage managing theirlocal union meetingsin the interestof getting things done. LeonardR. Sayles and George Strauss, The Local Union: Its Place in the Industrial Plant (NewYork: Harper& BrothersPublishers, 1953), 167±189, 244± 249. 41The Voice HandbookFor Organizers ,2. Another descriptionof a Local107 meeting can be found in ªAVoiceof Truth Extra!!: Report on the Local107 Meeting,º SIU Clipping Files. 42Seefor instance the descriptionof the jobsite in PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,April 14,1963, in Bulletin Clipping Files. 43The Voice HandbookFor Organizers . Also, PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 19,1962; PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin,Sept. 14,1962, in SIUClipping Files. Voice¯ ierfrom the fall of1961, ª Dictatorial Unionism orDemocratic Unionism,º in ®lemarked ªMTLR: Investigationof Objections,º Box No. 1248, 272 D. Witwer

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)to hold adecert®cation election.If theVoice wonthat vote,then most members ofLocal 107 wouldbecome members ofa new independentunion, called theVoice. 44 The Voice had evengained aunioncharter from theAFL-CIO in preparation for winningthe NLRB election. 45 The Voice overcame thehurdles blocking many other insurgenciesbecause they drew onastrategy that combinedfederal interventionÐin theform ofthe NLRBÐ and local solidarity. Akey tactic herewas secession. In thepost-Wagner Act era thetactic of secessionallowed insurgentsto draw the federal government intotheir cause.By staking thecontest on adecerti®cation election,the Voice insurgentshad founda way tomake surethat an outsidegroup, theNLRB, monitored the fairness of theelection process.46 The rebelsin Philadelphia, however,were well aware that secessionalso presentedthe national of®cers of theTeamsters Union with aseriousthreat. Asone of thelargest trucking locals in theunion, the secession of Local 107 ’smembers couldset apowerfulexample. If theVoice succeededin pulling outof theTeamsters, and other trucking locals chosea similar path, it couldthreaten the strength and stability ofthe IBT. Hoffahad supportedCohen in spiteof the allegations raised against him, butnow hewatchedthe struggle in Philadelphia with alarm. 47 For their part Voice activists made it clear that they opposedboth Cohenand Hoffa. At Voice meetings,a mockcof® n was displayed near thestage anda sign above it read,ª Reservedfor Hoffa.º 48 Secessionproved tobe a potenttactic becausethe Voice combinedit with an appealing messageto the members. The Voice campaigned ona platform that called for anend to union corruption andthe leadership ofCohenand Hoffa, but the group also soughta more militant union.They adoptedas their slogan, ªDignity, Decency,and Democracy.ºThey argued that amore democratic local wouldbe more honestand that it woulddo more toproperly enforcethe terms of the contract. 49 As the Voice’s

FileNo. 2, in CaseFile No. 4RC5059,NLRB, National Archives, Suitland, MD(heraftercited as NLRB Files). 44PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,June 25,1962, Oct. 14,1962, in Bulletin Clipping Files. 45PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Jan. 18,1963, in SIUClipping Files. 46Teamsterinsurgents always arguedthat gettingthe electionmachinery out ofthe hands ofthe incumbents was criticallyimportant. Seefor instance the statementof a Chicago Teamstercab driverafter the reformersthere won an NLRB electionin 1961.The driver told anewsreporter, ª Itjust shows what asecretballot cando. Ifthat electionhad beenheld in ourunion hall, therewouldn ’thave been10 votes forAbata [thedissident candidate].º WallStreet Journal ,Aug. 1, 1961,SIU Clipping Files. 47WallStreet Journal ,Nov. 15,1962, Nov. 19,1962; The New YorkTimes ,Nov. 16,1962; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin ,Nov. 13,1962; Business Week ,Nov. 24,1962, in SIUClipping Files. For Hoffa ’s reactions,James, 204±205. 48Duringa televisedreport on aVoicemeeting, one member ofthe groupcan be heardsaying in reference to Hoffa: ªTo mehe is aparasite; he is abloodsucker. He ’stryingto suckthe blood fromthe truckdrivers throughout the nation.ºª InsideJimmy Hoffa,º DavidBrinkley ’s Journal (TV) NBC, January 4, 1963, T84:0203,at the Museumof Television and Radio, NewYork City. 49The Voice ofTruth ,1(1) (May 1962)and VoiceHandbook forOrganizers, in SIUClipping Files. Another recentwork which emphasizes the connectionbetween strong enforcement of work rules and workermilitancy is PerryK. Blatz, Democratic Miners:Work and Labor Relations in the Anthracite Coal Industry, 1875±1925 (Albany, NY: State Universityof New York Press,1994), 1± 8. Abroaderdebate about whetheror not this emphasis on breadand butterunion issueslike work rules and grievanceprocedures representeda failureof the post-World WarII labor movement ora properand important goalcan be found in NelsonLichtenstein and HowellJohn Harris,eds., Industrial Democracy in America:The Ambiguous Promise (NewYork: Woodrow Wilson CenterPress and Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), 113±41 and 176±205. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 273 literature explained it, what wasat stakewas more than dollars andcents. It wasquite simply theability ofthe members toenjoy a measureof dignity in their working lives. Oneissue of their newsletter,for instance,focused on theunion ’shiring hall. Asthe Voice explained theunion had driftedaway from its earlier militancy onthis andother issues.ª Whenthe union came toindustries that required this type ofinstitution, the employer’sright topick andchoose and to pay what hechose was stopped, the Union brought tothe Hiring Hall threeelements that are knownas Dignity, Decencyand Democracy.ºBut now, the Voice complained,many employers freely violated theterms ofthe contract and bypassed the hiring hall. Mengot jobsby asking for favors; companiespicked pliant workersover thosewith more seniority. The Voice called for amore strict enforcementof the contract, asserting that aunionmember ªshouldn ’t feelthat heisthe last `resort’ for theemployer orthat hewill have toprostrate himself andhis God-givendignity asa human being tocurry favor by payoffsor any other methodin order toget workto feed his family.º 50 Usingsimilar language theVoice called for reforms andstricter enforcementin other areas ofthe union ’scontracts.They wantedgrievances processedmore quickly and effectively,work rules better enforced, and elected shop stewards to represent them. In this way theVoice linkedthe issue of union corruption with acall for amilitant union. 51 This militant messageresonated with themembership ofLocal 107 whogave the Voice thekind of visible supportthat previous oppositiongroups had lacked.Members ofthe Voice receivedbeatings, they losttheir jobs,and had their carsvandalized, but this time noneof those tactics stopped the group from attracting support.When the NLRBheldits decerti®cation electionin November 1962, theVoice received3274 votes,only 500 lessthan Cohen ’sTeamsters.Previous oppositionefforts within Local 107 had nevergathered more than afewhundred votes. This time, in spiteof all oftheir advantages andmany actsof intimidation, theTeamsters had squeakedthrough with only 51% ofthe vote. 52 Andthanks to the numerous violent incidentsthat had attended theelection campaign, theNLRB ruled that arerunelection would have tobe held in April 1963.53 The November electionthus gave theVoice achanceto prove its strength andthe opportunity togather itsforces for a®nal victory in afewmonths. While thetactic ofsecession, and the message of traditional unionmilitancy helped make this preliminary successpossible, the third andmost important elementin the Voice’spowerwas its rootsin thecommunity. The Voice baseditself securelyin the working-classneighborhoods of Northeastern Philadelphia. 54 The in¯uence of insur-

50The Voice ofTruth ,ªTheHiring Hall As ItShould BeRun,º 1(3) (July 1962),2, in NLRB Files. 51Voice Handbookfor Organizers ,in SIUClipping Files. 52PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Nov. 19,1962. Regarding ® nances,it latercame out that Hoffaand the national union had givenCohen aªblank checkºto win the ®ght and had pumped in over$180,000 for this electionbattle; see Evening Bulletin ,May 7,1963,in Bulletin Clipping Files. 53PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Mar.28, 1963, Bulletin Clipping Files. 54Inhis portrait ofPhiladelphia, historian Sam Bass Warnerreferred to the Northeast neighborhoods ofthe city, alineof communities alongthe DelawareRiver including Kensington, Richmond, and Frankford, as akind ofª giantmill town setdown in the midst ofthe metropolis.ºHe continued that, ªFar frombeing a placeof a mass ofisolated and alienatedmetropolitan workers,the residentsof the northeast had morehabits oforganized activity than those ofany otherdistrict. Northeast Philadelphia was the home ofbene® t associations, craftunions, fraternalorders, and ethnicclubs.º Sam Bass Warner,Jr., The Private City: Philadelphiain Three Periodsof Its Growth (Philadelphia: Universityof Press,1968), 178±183. Descriptions of this areain the post-World WarII decadescan be found in Carlyn Adams et al., Philadelphia:Neighborhoods, Division, andCon¯ ict in aPost-Industrial City (Philadelphia: Temple UniversityPress, 1991), 73 and 127;a portrait ofthese neighborhoods c.1970sis Peter Binzen, White-Town U.S.A. (NewYork: Random House,1970). 274 D. Witwer

gentsin their neighborhoodsgave them asafe-zonein which toorganize andrally their supporters. 55 Insidethis community theusual dynamics of union opposition were reversed.Typically, whena unionmember stoodup in oppositionat theunion hall, he or shedrew immediate attention,and often a swiftreprisal. Asa resultfew people actually didstand up, and members generally perceiveddissidents to be a somewhat frightened minority. In theseNortheastern Philadelphia neighborhoods,though, whole crowdscould ® ll upthe local meeting halls. For the® rst time, unionmembers could physically seethemselves as part ofa larger group that wasdissatis® ed with howthe unionwas run. Philadelphia insurgentsconsciously drew on this community-basedstrength. They soughtto publicly root their movementin theneighborhood in anumberof ways such asholding meetingsat thelocal Polonia Hall, or sponsoringHoly Communion breakfasts for members andtheir wivesat thelocal Catholic church.Funds were raised byselling raf¯eticketsat thedoor of the meetings. 56 In theneighborhoods of Kensing- tonand Frankford, asthe PhiladelphiaB ulletin noted,the Voice becamea ªtight-knit organizationºable tomobilize its membership through anª ef®cient communications grapevine.º 57 Voice members tookpains toincrease their visibility in theseneighborhoods. They woredistinctive yellow andpurple windbreakerswith ªThe Voiceºemblazoned on the back.Their cars all carried Voice stickers,this in spiteof the fact that suchstickers often made theautomobile atarget for roving bandsof vandals whoslashed tires andbroke thewindshields of such well-identi® ed targets. 58 Butperhaps their greatest demonstrationof strength and visibility in thecommunity came onthenight ofAugust15, 1962. The march that night resultedfrom trouble that had beguna fewdays earlier. Prominent Voice members had beenfacing harassment at thejobsite for sometime. Whenone of the top leadersof the group, Walter Wolf, was® redon August 13, for what wasperceived to be only apretext, theVoice decided totake astand.They posteda picket line aroundWolf ’s employer’struckyard. And, whenother employers ®redthose Voice members whohad takenthe day offwork to walk thepicket line,their ®rms toowere struck by Voice activists. Eventually, by the 15th, thedispute came toinvolve 16 differenttrucking ®rms. 59

55Inhis comparitive history ofthe two longshoremen ’sunions, the InternationalLongshoremen ’s Association and the InternationalLongshoremen ’sand Warehousemen ’sUnion, HowardKimeldorf also notesthe important rolethat astrong,working-class community canplay in promoting worker insurgencies.On the otherhand, Kimeldorflater argues that while strongethnic neighborhoods in San Pedrostrengthened reform efforts, in NewYork City they only ªbalkanizedºthe effortsof dissident ILA members. Hesees the issueof neighborhood lessin termsof an alternativeto the union hall and more in termsof its in¯uence on the pool oflabor recruitsinto the industry. Kimeldorf, Redsor Rackets: The Making ofRadical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (:University of California Press, 1988),19± 51. 56The Voice ofTruth ,1(1) (May 1962),4, in SIUClipping Files. 57PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Nov. 23,1962, in Bulletin Clipping Files. 58PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Aug. 13,1962; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 19,1962, Nov. 10,1962, in SIUClipping Files. Also agoodsummary ofthe warof visibility and the retributionVoice cars often sufferedcan be found in the NLRB ’sown internalreport on the election;see Report and Recommendations on objections to Election,Case No. 4-RC-5059,dated Jan. 24,1963, in ®lemarked ª#1º, Box1249, in NLRB Files. 59PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 14,1962, Aug. 16,1962, Aug. 17,1962; PhiladelphiaDaily News , Aug. 14, 1962,Aug. 16,1962, in SIUClipping Files. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 275

Violencebroke outthat night. The Voice helda meeting at Polonia Hall, and Cohen’sstalwart supporterssponsored a dinnerat theunion ’shall afewblocks away. Sometime in thelate afternoon,a 58-year-old Voice adherenthad beensingled out and beatenby agroup ofCohen ’ssupporterswho worked him over with baseball bats. Whennews of that attack reachedthe Voice meeting,the entire crowd was galvanized. Voice members andsupporters stormed out of the meeting hall andmarched over to the union’sheadquarters,where they wereonly driven away hourslater by Fire Department water cannonsand police dogs. 60 The Voice leadership sawthis encounteras a great victory. Asthegroup ’s newspaper later explained, ªwedisplayed thetype ofunity andsolidarity that amazed thegoons.º 61 The group’sattorneysoffered a more cautionary compliment afterwardswhen he told them,ª Anypoint whichyou had toprove has beenproved.º 62 Indeedthey had very visibly establishedtheir strengthand unity within thecommunity. In thedays that followedthe ® redVoice members wereall reinstatedin their jobs. 63 By thefall of1962, theVoice had built apowerfulinsurgent movement within the TeamstersUnion. They had combinedthe tactic ofsecession with amilitant message anda strong local baseto create an organization that couldovercome the obstacles that usually doomedrank and® le insurgencies. Askeptic,of course, might questionwhether or notthe militant demandsof these insurgentswere just campaign slogansthat maskedsome other basis for aninternal union® ght. Wasthis, for instance,a contestbetween two different ethnic groups? Certainly theparticipants neverpictured it that way.Robert Rispo,a Voice member, describedit asa political ®ght over substantiveissues. He lookedback at thecontest in 1989 andremembered, ª It waslike aregular campaign betweenlike Republicansand Democrats.You went around and said what waswrong with theTeamsters and they wentaround and said what waswrong with theVoice.º 64 The namesof the Voice leadership indicatea mix ofethnic backgrounds: Charles Meyerwas Chairman; Gerald Dunn,John Clark, Francis Arnold,Andrew Kozak, Patrick O ’Donnell,Frank Amoroso,and William Wickert wereall onthe two main leadership committees. 65 The namesof the top leadersat Local 107 also donot highlight any clear ethnicidentity. Ray Cohen,the union ’stop of®cial, sharedauthority with EdwardWalker, Joseph Grace,Edward Battis® ore,and Michael Hession. 66 The rank and® le membership ofthe Voice also appears tohave beenethnically diverse.While theVoice met in Polonia Hall, aPolish-American institution,Robert Rispo,an Italian-American, remembers joining upwith theVoice largely becauseof the in¯uenceof his brothers,several ofwhom had signedon aswell. 67 Voice members who wroteto complain tothe NLRB about Teamster harassmenthad family namesthat suggesta mix ofethnic backgrounds. Finally, areview ofthe Teamsters who signed

60Af® davit ofJohn Fuest, datedDec. 6, 1962in FileNo. 1, ªInvestigationof Objections,º Box 1248, NLRB Files; also PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 16,1962; PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Aug. 16,1962, Aug. 17, 1962; PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Aug. 16,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 61The Voice ofTruth ,1(5) (Sept. 1962),1, in SIUClipping Files. 62PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Aug. 17,1962, in Bulletin Clipping Files. 63PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Aug. 18,1962, Aug. 19,1962; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 18,1962; PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Aug. 18,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 64Deposition ofRobert Rispo, Jan. 19,1989, in U.S. v. InternationalBrotherhood ofTeamsters, Case No. 88CV 4486, U.S. DistrictCourt, Southern Districtof New York, 118. 65The Voice ofTruth ,1(3) (July 1962),1± 3, SIUClipping Files. 66PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Dec.13, 1962, April 6, 1963,April 9, 1963, Bulletin Clipping Files. 67Deposition ofRobert Rispo, 131. 276 D. Witwer

NLRBpetitionsin favor ofa decerti®cation electionÐ a sign ofsome support for the VoiceÐ indicatesno pattern ofethnicity. 68 Onemight also betempted to see this asa generational dispute.In his studyof the formation ofUnited Auto Workers Local229 in the1930s, Peter Friedlander noted that early activists in that uniondrew on amix ofmotives dependingon their age and background.Some of the activists in Friedlander ’sstudywere second-generation Polish teenagerswho apparently had switchedtheir enthusiasmfrom local streetgangs to ®ghting for theunion. 69 Aspectsof the Voice suggesta similar pattern at workin Philadelphia. Newsreports picture young Voice adherents,proudly wearing their emblazonedjackets, seemingly justlooking for a®ght. 70 Butjust as Friedlander ’s study didnot indicate that youth andtoughness could explain theemergence of Local 229, neither canthe Voice beexplained in simple generational terms.Charles Meyer,the leader ofthe group, was35 years oldin 1962. Other activists, like JohnFuerst whose beating ledto the August 15th riot, werein their 50s. 71 And® nally, thethree Voice members hospitalized after theAugust 15th march wereaged 36, 37, and53. 72 This doesnot seem to have beenparticularly ayoung man ’s game. Finally, oneneeds to ask howmuch simple ambition might explain thecampaign of theVoice. Winning unionof® ce, after all, doesallow oneto earn aneasier andmore lucrative living than driving atruck.Ambition musthave played somepart in this struggle. Butfor theleaders of the Voice therewere surely lessonerous and less risky waysto advance their careers,and those other avenuesobviously had agreater chance ofsuccess.As Paul Jacobs,a frequentwriter onunionaffairs in this period,noted, ª If aTeamster member doesdesire to be a unionleader, he rarely pursueshis goal through challenging theexisting administration. Rather heseeks to becomepart ofthe adminis- tration andattach himself toa leader in power.º 73 For therank and® le ofthe Voice ambition is aneven more problematic explanation. Only somany people couldhope to beof® cers, but participation in theVoice carried with it great risks for everyone involved. Robert Rispo,a simple foot-soldierin thestruggle, rememberedhow clearly heunderstood that risk. Back then,he said, he knew his participation in theVoice wouldmean that after theelection he ª couldn ’tget ajobsweeping the ¯ oors.º 74 Onemust conclude therefore that both theleaders and the rank and® le ofthe Voice weredeeply committedto the ideals whichtheir movementproclaimed. Amilitant unionmattered tothem. It mattered enoughto risk agreat deal,when they might have insteadstayed quiet and collected steady paychecks. The Voice fosteredthis commit- mentand a broad level ofparticipation by basing its effortson a solidfoundation in the local neighborhood. In theend, however, the Voice ’sstrength in theneighborhood didnot prove suf®cient to win the larger ®ght. By 1963, secessionand community solidarity faced newobstacles as tactics for organizing workersin thetrucking industry.In theyears

68Seelist of66 affadavits containedin FileNo. 1, ªInvestigationof Objections,º Box 1248, and petition lists in ®lemarked ªVoiceList of Cards,º Box 1249, NLRB Files. 69PeterFriedlander, The Emergence ofa UAWLocal 1936±1939: A Study in Classand Culture (Pittsburgh: Universityof Pittsburgh Press,1975), 3± 70 and esp. 35and 42±43. 70Seefor instance the descriptionof one Voice meeting in PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,Aug. 13,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 71PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Aug. 16,1962; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Aug. 19,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 72PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Aug. 16,1962, in SIUClipping Files. 73Paul Jacobs, The State ofthe Unions (NewYork: Athenaeum, 1963),60. 74Deposition ofRobert Rispo, 120. TeamsterReform in Philadelphia 277

sincethe 1930s trucking had becomemore andmore ofan interstate enterprise. Firms nowshipped freight all along theEastern Corridor andacross the country. A local freightyard in NortheasternPhiladelphia waslikely tobe part ofa networkof trailer exchangesthat stretchedup to Boston and down to Florida. Underthe leadership of James Hoffa,the Teamsters had capitalized ontheinterstate and inter-regional nature ofthis businessto build uplarger andlarger contractgroups. By 1964 Hoffawould sign the® rst-everNational MasterFreight Agreementthat wouldcover mosttruckdrivers andwarehouse workers from coastto coast. 75

75Donald Garnel, The Rise ofTeamster Power in the West (Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1972);Sloane, 53±292. 278 D. Witwer

In 1963, Hoffaused these changes in thetrucking industryto offer the Voice the ultimate challenge. Hewarned the members ofPhiladelphia ’sLocal 107 that if the Voice wonthe coming electionin April 1963, hewould see to it that thebig regional trucking linesbypassed Philadelphia ontheir routes.Transfer pointswould be relocated outsideof Philadelphia andemployment for Philadelphia truckersand loaders would plummet.76 In addition tothis threat, Hoffaalso offeredan incentive. He promised Local 107 members more generousfuture contract terms and better pensions, and he ® nally steppedin andforced through anumberof reforms in Local107. Cohenwas publicly nudgedaside and something very muchlike atrusteeshipwas imposed. 77 Thanks tothis combination ofthreats andentreaties, the Voice lostthe NLRB ’s rerunelection in April by avoteof 4893 to2550. 78 It wasa signi® cantloss and in Philadelphia it spelledthe end of the Voice asan effective reform group. The string of secessionmovements, which had begunin Chicago in 1961, taperedoff. Hoffa now seemedvery securein his positionin theunion. The defeatof the Voice canbe seen as a vindication ofthe common views of Teamster Unionmembers aslacking in militancy andinured to cynicism. I think, however,that thetwo elections and the march onAugust15, 1962 indicatesomething very different.That 2500 Teamster members votedto risk their futureemployment in theinterest of a local insurgency,I wouldargue demonstratesan impressive commit- mentto reform. The menwho voted for theVoice in April 1963 andthe people who marched downSpring GardenStreet on August 15, 1962 caredintensely about their union.The similar reform movementsthat existedelsewhere in theTeamsters also suggesta widespreadfeeling ofunrest and militancy. Onthe other hand,the defeat of the Voice didindicate that thetactics insurgents usedcould not achieve thedesired goal. To gain asecurespace dissidents had turned tosecession and local organization. But,given theinterstate nature of the trucking industry,a local organization benton secession found itself vulnerable toeffective pressurefrom thenational union.Economic changes and new contract patterns ended theviability ofa reform tactic that had long allowed Teamster dissidentsto pressure the national union ’sleadership. Futureinsurgent movements would have toturn to other tactics.

76This threatwas made in apublic meetingwith studentsat Trinityand was widelyreported in the local newspapers. PhiladelphiaDaily News ,Feb. 27,1963; PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Feb. 27,1963; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin ,Feb. 26,1963, in SIUClipping Files. 77PhiladelphiaInquirer ,Mar.20, 1963, April 10,1963, April 14,1963; PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin , Mar. 20,1963, in SIUClipping Files. Agoodsecondary account of Hoffa ’smoves at this time is in James, 204± 209. 78PhiladelphiaInquirer ,April 30,1963; PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin ,April 28,1963, in SIUClipping Files.