September-October 2002

Limited vs. Total War Once More Unto the Breach

Thoughts on the edge of the breach: As this nation Our cover this month depicts limited war verses total approaches the anniversary of 9-11, we can all be proud war. CPT Brian Brennan’s examination provides histori- of how this nation responded to this horrific terrorist at- cal analysis and examples of the difference between the tack. We grieved, we mourned, we cried, and then we two, and his conclusion offers debate on how we should methodically sought justice. Our Armed Forces system- approach, and to what extent we should fight future atically, with a special thanks to our CIA field operatives wars. I also hope you enjoy Jody Harmon’s symbolic and courageous Special Forces soldiers, destroyed the illustration on the front cover relating to this article. Taliban and sent the al-Qaeda network running like rats in a sewer. Our nation can be very proud of the men and In this edition, several of our articles will provide some women who turned this cowardly attack into a renais- sage advice on IPB, the S2 and ISR planning. There are sance of national patriotism. times when we rely on the S2 to provide all the answers or shun the section all together, but that is a dangerous The winds of war are now blowing stronger in South- and lazy precedence on the part of the battalion staff as west Asia, and if you listen to the various media pundits, a whole and armor officers specifically. MAJ Kevin Ja- you would think we will have a Desert Storm redux. It cobi writes on the importance of commanders to visual- seems the media and all their experts have developed ize the battlefield and to understand what components their own course of action based on past plans. WWII influence commanders’ decisonmaking. French General Maxime Weygand, wrote, “Often, in- deed, after a successful war the victor has fallen asleep Trends from the NTC continue to support the fact that in a fallacious assurance of his superiority, while his op- units are habitually underutilizing the S2 section in R&S ponent, striving to work out the causes of his defeat, operations and doing the IPB planning in a vacuum with struggles to recover from it. Hence, the victor of today, little guidance from the commander, executive officer, or becomes the vanquished of tomorrow.” I surmise he was S3. I can remember 15 years ago when the same com- thinking about the French victory over the Germans in ments were being made at a task force AAR during my WWI and correlating that with the devastating French unit’s rotation at the NTC. defeat to Germany in 1940. I believe our military leaders Two additional articles will add some tools to your kit are savvier than what the media portrays. Just as the bag. One article, “The Cavalry Team: Scout-Tank Inte- world was surprised how quickly our military vanquished gration,” provides some useful techniques for employing the Taliban, the pundits will again be surprised. Check scouts and tanks into the hunter-killer mode. The other your frequent flyer miles, because it looks as if some of article, “Armor and Mechanized Infantry in Built-Up Ar- us will be making a curtain call. eas,” provides excellent TTP’s for employing tanks in ur- Despite the negative reports about the quality of our banized settings. combat units and the lessons we don’t seem to learn at Well, time is getting short, and I want you to enjoy the the Combat Training Centers, we still have the finest edition. One final thought, keep the articles coming, I leaders and soldiers, the most extensive training pro- know we have some great thinkers and doers out in the grams, and the best equipment in the world. I have no field who would like to share their lessons learned and doubt, when and if called upon, our combined arms team scholarly thoughts. will deliver the knockout blow, and they will do so with cavalry and tanks leading the charge. – DRM

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 0217502

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-02-5

Editor in Chief LTC DAVID R. MANNING Features 8 Limited vs. Total War Managing Editor by Captain Brian W. Brennan CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 12 Keeping the Sword Sharp by Major Harold M. Knudsen Commandant 17 Thinking Outside the Maneuver Box MG R. STEVEN WHITCOMB by Captain Michael R. Evans

21 Battle Command to ISR Planning ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by Major Kevin L. Jacobi monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 1109A Sixth Avenue, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 26 The Cavalry Team: Scout-Tank Integration by First Lieutenant Leif Nott and First Lieutenant Ryan Popple Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 32 The Brigade Deep CASEVAC Plan the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Captain David Meyer the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information 34 Applying Expertise: Tankers, S2s, and presented in other official Army publications. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Official distribution is limited to one copy for by Major Chris Tatarka, Major Casey Carey, and Major Brian Poe each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- 37 Tanks, Battleships, and the Future of Armored Warfare ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron by Nader Elhefnawy headquarters, reconnaissance squadron head- quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- 39 Attrition vs. Maneuver and the Future of War pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest A. Szabo the United States Army. In addition, Army li- braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for 42 The Training Support Brigade’s History, Mission, and Role armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, by Captain Joe Redmon organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by 45 Armor and Mechanized Infantry in Built-Up Areas! sending a request to the editor in chief. by Major Rich Rouleau, Sergeant First Class Wesley Wyatt, and Sergeant First Class Martino Barcinas Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Ar- 48 A Technique for Preparing the M1 Series Tank for MOUT Operations mor Center has proponency. That proponen- cy includes: all armored, direct-fire ground by Major Richard Rouleau and First Sergeant Carl A. Pope combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclu- 53 Enforcing the Nametag Defilade Standard sively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of Back Army Accepts First Stryker MGS equipment which armor and armored cavalry Cover ARMOR Staff organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and informa- Departments tion concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry 2 Contacts 7 Driver’s Seat units at the brigade/regiment level and below, 3 Letters 50 Reviews to include Threat units at those levels. 6 Commander’s Hatch Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. September-October 2002, Vol. CXI, No. 5 USPS 467-970

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Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC David R. Manning 4087 MG R. Steven Whitcomb 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Robert W. Mixon 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Robert T. Gahagan 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Staff Illustrator Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM William J. Gainey 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Production Assistant Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 COL Henry Joe Hughes III 5050 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in COL Douglas L. Fletcher 7809 editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed E-mail: [email protected] or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Cavalry and Armor Proponency Office (ATZK-CA) Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please LTC(P) Timothy R. Reese 1050 indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape E-mail: [email protected] captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Aubrey Henley 5155 [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) address and daytime phone number. COL Randal Milling 1315 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per E-mail: [email protected] issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7955 your article to only one Army journal at a time. E-mail: [email protected] GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. (Please do not COL Timothy D. Cherry 4009 send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use Power- E-mail: [email protected] Point for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or Assistant TRADOC System Manager photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) LTC J. B. Iddins 3519 CHANGE OF ADDRESS-PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ST. E-mail: [email protected] GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser- vice, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards in- Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development formation, contact Connie Stiggers or Darlene Kennedy, United COL John D. Rosenberger (ATZK-TD) States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: [email protected] 8247 E-Mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web- site at www.usarmor-assn.org. U.S. Army Armor School UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com- Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) mercial: (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the free dis- CSM James E. Dale 7091 tribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor E-mail: [email protected] in Chief. NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- CSM George DeSario Jr. 5150 ARM, Bldg 1109A Sixth Avenue, Room 371, Fort Knox, KY E-mail: [email protected] 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine COL George Lockwood 7848 website at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL John L. Ballantyne 8736 doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 ARMOR — September-October 2002

ACCC Proposal Contains year, does not seem like the type of through- I believe that changes to the ACCC curricu- Fundamental Flaws put we need to sustain troop strength in line lum will not solve the problems they are units. Furthermore, if the country were to go meant to solve, unless we first address the to a wartime mobilization, on a scale that our problems in the personnel system. I propose Dear Sir: grandfathers did during World War II, this incorporating CPTs Slider and Goin’s Phase I read with interest the letter written by CPT phase utterly falls apart. Additionally, OC cer- II into the existing ACCC program. Although Jim Dunivan in the July-August 2002 issue of tification is a weeklong course, and must be the distance-learning concept is intriguing, it ARMOR magazine. Having served with CPT completed prior to the rotational unit arriving is unproven. I can honestly say that the ACCC Dunivan before, I am familiar with his dedica- for draw week, allowing OCs to linkup with was the most challenging course I’ve attend- tion to leader development, as well as his their units. This means that Phase III would ed. I quite literally “didn’t know what I didn’t dedication to providing candid feedback. In- actually last between 4 and 5 weeks, not the know” about our doctrine. A firm foundation deed, his wingmen could always rely on him 2 weeks outlined in the article. in doctrine is absolutely essential in leader development. We simply have to know “what to draw fire away from us during command CPTs Slider and Goin then proceed to out- and staff meetings. right looks like” before we move into the field line the challenges of training leaders in the for experience. Classroom instruction has its Be that as it may, I found that the article, emerging C4I systems. In their article, they merits, and should not be brushed aside in a “Refocusing the Leader Development Lens,” state that the recent DCXs showed that, “lead- rush to attain the field experience our lead- by CPTs Slider and Goin only strengthens ers lack confidence in digital C2 and SA sys- ers should receive while serving in their CPT Dunivan’s arguments against the pro- tems ... (and) consistently migrated back to units. Let’s tackle the root problem first: per- posed changes to the Armor Captains Ca- traditional analog methods.” I find this state- sonnel turnover. reer Course. As I read their article, I reached ment to be very troubling. As I understand it, the soldiers of 4ID had a thorough and ardu- CPT DAN ALEXANDER the same conclusions outlined by CPT Duni- Medical Holding Detachment van in his letter to the editor in the same is- ous train-up prior to the DCXs to ensure that they were in top form and able to demon- Fort Hood, TX sue. CPTs Slider and Goin rightly point out that, “leadership does not come from a book, strate the systems’ true capabilities and lim- but from experience, circumstance, and op- itations. If 4ID did not have enough time to Current ACCC Curriculum portunity.” They further outline a plan to give attain competency on these systems, then Needs Only Small Changes junior leaders the experience they lack at the systems are far too complex. Units that battle school. Although, I'm sure this article will field these systems in the future will have Dear Sir: outlines the course in a very general way, I a fraction of the time 4ID received to attain competency, and the training they receive in I am writing to reinforce CPT J.D. Dunivan’s noticed fundamental flaws in the first and letter regarding the coming changes in ACCC. third phases of the proposed course. battle school will also deteriorate before the skills are put into practice. I do acknowledge that I am a student in CPT In his letter, CPT Dunivan points out the Dunivan’s small group, but it has minimal burdens that the distance-learning phase of By the time I finished reading the article, I bearing on my point of view on this issue. My the course would place on the student. As a realized that the battle school concept is comments are my own. commander, I was significantly challenged to treating a symptom, not the disease. Why is I agree with CPT Dunivan’s points com- find time to get my lieutenants to any of the it that our officers are not receiving the “ex- pletely, for several reasons: required weeklong courses that they needed perience, circumstance, and opportunity” to such as air-load planner, arms room, HAZ- develop leadership skills? I do not believe • ACCC is already too short. With all the MAT, NBC, and maintenance supervisor. Ad- that the problem lies with our approach to taskings placed on students, time spent learn- ditionally, the concept that any SGI would be leader development, but in the way we man- ing vital company and battalion-level TTPs is able to offer “mentoring and coaching” in this age our officers. The best way for a leader to increasingly short. setting is laughable. I fear that this environ- achieve experience is by serving in a leader- • The value provided by a live small-group ment would lead a student with these com- ship position. The current personnel turnover instructor far outweighs the benefits that peting demands and loyalties to “check the rate causes us to move leaders out of their would be provided by “distance learning block” to maintain minimum course require- positions when they achieve competency, technology.” Nothing beats the daily feed- ments while still accomplishing their regular not when they achieve mastery. A typical back and interaction provided by an experi- duties. Furthermore, the doctrine learned dur- lieutenant spends 6 to 9 months as a platoon enced SGI, and no amount of magic virtual ing this phase would “deteriorate” just as leader before they move on to levels of high- technology can replace that. Available tech- quickly as the material taught during the pres- er responsibility. I was fortunate enough to nology should be used to enhance the resi- ent ACCC. As for Phase II, I cannot agree spend 19 months as a tank platoon leader. During that time, I was able to shoot four dent ACCC course, not replace it with an more to the concept as outlined, and I say, inferior death by e-mail program. “let’s execute!” gunneries, as well as participate as either OPFOR or BLUFOR in four TF STXs, six • With the commissioning time to captain Phase III has appeal at first glance. Unfor- company lanes, and seven platoon lanes. being further dropped to 38 months, new tunately, closer inspection shows that it is This type of experience is unheard of by lieu- “shake and bake” captains will need even flawed in several respects. If the purpose of tenants today. more training to be proficient. With training op- battle school is to prepare young captains for portunities being scarce, new captains hav- the rigors of command at the company level, We need to address the problems within ing less lieutenant time (10 months less than I don’t understand how a platoon level focus the personnel system to ensure that leaders it was several years ago) are going to be would benefit them. This concept would be have time to attain mastery in their position. needing quite a bit of extra professional de- very beneficial to a lieutenant right out of the In the 8 July 2002 edition of Army Times, an velopment. The current ACCC provides extra basic course, but a captain needs to focus article titled, “How to Fix My Army,” outlines professional development; distance learning on the company and battalion levels of op- MAJ Donald Vandergriff’s proposal to over- will be hard pressed to do so. eration. Furthermore, our reorganized tank come this very problem. Although I have not battalions have only nine maneuver pla- read his book, the article outlines his pro- • Additionally, thinking that enough ACCC/ toons. A typical NTC rotation consists of two posal to regimentalize the Army and to lock CABCC “distance learning” time will be pro- maneuver battalions, providing only 18 ma- in all personnel in battalions for a 4-year vided to a senior 1st lieutenant or junior cap- neuver platoons for officers to serve as OCs. period. His suggestion would certainly solve tain while still at his unit, I think, is a danger- I do not have a background in personnel the problem of junior leaders attaining ex- ous mistake. Experienced junior officers in a management, but a program that graduates perience, but it is perhaps more transforma- battalion are a valuable asset, much too val- only 18 captains a month, and only 180 a tion than the Army is willing to bear. uable to not be used by their superiors. So, ARMOR — September-October 2002 3

what kind of quality training will a new cap- officers, survey officers, special projects offi- (yes, the same you see strapped around tain get while he is still at his battalion? (Per- cers, casualty assistance officers, or as an Patton’s neck in pictures) in my arms room, haps while he is in a primary staff position, or assistant S3, S4, or S1, the list goes on. We how is that for technology and equipment on numerous taskings.) Taking a new cap- may say, “No, this will not happen, the offi- upgrades? tain out of a unit environment to provide ad- cer will be focused on his schooling and that vanced-level professional training is a must. is his priority,” but when that officer is still on As I remember it, the Armor Captains Ca- our books, the unit will not receive a re- reer Course was one of the best courses I Finally, I would like to say that the current placement for him until he PCS’s. A DL re- have ever taken, aside from the Cavalry ACCC, in my opinion, is the finest military quirement will inevitably conflict with an offi- Leaders Course. The curriculum or the struc- course that I have experienced. It is a 95 cer’s unit responsibilities. The Army will not ture of each “volume” was not what made percent solution, and only small changes provide a replacement to fill an officer’s posi- the course a good one. It was sharing ideas, would make it better. It is the first and only tion while he works on his DL requirements, experiences, and lasting friendships made course that is committed to professional so even a marginally professional officer will over the 6 months of schooling. To this day, development of officers, and its methodolo- be compelled to try and balance both require- almost 3 years removed, I keep in contact gies are sound. Distance learning followed ments. with my SGI and other captains from AC3; by a chaotic gauntlet meat grinder will result not only from the mighty 2-Bravo, but the in the opposite: garbage in, garbage out. If I The new concept of online schooling does other small groups as well. We share experi- were a battalion or brigade commander, I not help to reinforce team building or inter- ences and ideas and continue to foster new would take a personal interest in the prod- personal communication skills. This method ideas and better concepts for training, war- ucts of ACCC/CABCC that the Armor School does reinforce and teach captains that it is fighting, and family and soldier readiness. will be sending me in the future. all right to lead from behind a desk and issue In the words of LTC Calvert, “All of us are orders and guidance via e-mail. I have been BRETT D. LINDBERG better than one of us;” if this all holds true privileged to command and lead troops in CPT, Armor then, all of us in a classroom at Knox for 6 two organizations and will stand on my soap Student, SG5N, 3/16 Cav months is better than one of us at home sta- box and say that as a leader, a commander, tion looking at a computer with a courtesy you must be out with the men, in the motor TDY trip to Knox. I am just a self-proclaimed pool, in the field, checking training; you must Don’t Transform the Advance Course “knuckle-dragging warfighter” and these are share their hardships, take responsibility for the opinions of a humble cavalryman. I Dear Sir: their failures and enjoy their success. You would like to thank LTC Eden, MAJ McLamb, learn this by communicating, face to face, As I read the July-August 2002 issue of CPT Hollis, CPT Clark, and CPT Schrick for with peers and small group instructors in the ARMOR, I enjoyed the intellectual battles their inputs and ideas. fought between LTC Szabo and LTC Eden, schoolhouse, on TEWTS, on the PT track, both of whom I have worked for in past po- on the intramural field, and heaven forbid, MIKE KIRKPATRICK sitions. However, my stomach turned with over a beer. A shortened course will elimi- CPT, Armor each word and concept I read in the article nate the time necessary for officers from Commander “Refocusing the Leader Development Lens,” different units to develop the relationships HHT/1/2ACR & IRON/3/2ACR written by CPT Jason Slider and CPT William necessary for the cross-fertilization of infor- Goin. In addition, I wholeheartedly agree with mation and ideas. It is my feeling, and most much of CPT J.D. Dunivan’s letter to the likely that of current and past SGI’s, that a Approbation for “The Blind Men...” editor. shortened course will deny the SGI the time necessary to build the relationship necessary In “Refocusing the Leader Development for successful “coaching, teaching, and men- Dear Sir: Lens,” the authors’ concept of a distance toring” (a phrase one might arguably replace I refuse to believe that our senior leaders learning phase, a 4-week residence phase, with the more simple “effective leadership”). I think that anything less than cohesive and and a 2-week O/C phase at a CTC is novel, will speculate that it takes a month or so to capable units are necessary to winning the at best. It seems that the authors are “look- learn the strengths and weaknesses of each nation’s wars with the least cost in lives. ing out for number one” and not for the good student in the small group. The SGI can then Further, I am certain they recognize that of the Army with this concept. The authors place special emphasis on subjects that the such units do not arise through accident or proclaim that, “Leadership does not come small group needs as a whole, and individual solely through the impact of their leaders, from a book, but from experience, circum- training as needed. The SGI will leave last- however well trained and capable these stance, and opportunity.” And that “leaders ing impressions on a young captain. You will individuals may be. No, they know that co- will need a more inclusive, broader base of see, as the course goes on, the small group hesive and capable units come to be only experience.” I could not agree more. How- will take on the personality of the SGI. That when their personnel are stabilized, which ever, I disagree on their concept of how to captain will choose to incorporate communi- allows them to train collective go-to-war attain their goal of producing trained and cation techniques, training strategies, values, tasks repetitively, as LTC Tim Reese states confident captains ready to lead the nation in and officership that he inadvertently learns in his May-June ’02 article, “The Blind Men battle. What better form is there to gain this from the SGI and his peers throughout his and the Elephant.” If this can be taken as broader based experience than the struc- career. Bottom line, SGI’s need more than axiomatic, then one may surmise that the tured small group with a strong, qualified one month to train the future commanders of reason we appear to do so little to create captain as the mentor for 5 months? I be- our troops, companies, and batteries. So, if such units is that we have made a conscious lieve that transforming the advance course we continue to place quality officers, such as decision not to do so. This is sad, at best, by integrating a 4-week distance learning McLamb, Felty, and Seigrist, in SGI posi- and morally reprehensible, at worst. I enthu- course, from current duty station, followed by tions, then this is good for the leaders of a month long resident phase, and then a 2- armor, cavalry, infantry, and the Army. siastically second Reese’s assertion. More- week CTC rotation as an O/C is not only det- over, I believe that our march toward an rimental to interpersonal communication and The article in question and MG Whitcomb’s objective force is woefully imbalanced, if we team building, but also unit readiness. response to CPT Dunivan refers to bringing do not simultaneously pursue a holistic and the Career Course “up to speed” and that revolutionary transformation in personnel The officer that is enrolled in distance learn- “our education system must advance at the management. An institution that can produce ing is exempt from duty in his troop, compa- pace of the U.S. Army’s transformation in incredibly forward thinking in materiel, or- ny, squadron, or battalion...by concept. First, doctrine, materiel and equipment, and or- ganizations, and to a lesser extent, doctrine, I will argue that this in fact will not be the ganization.” Well, my brothers, I have 158 surely ought to do more than “tinker on the reality, these officers will be used as USR pairs of PVS-5s and a pair of M19 binoculars margins” with personnel management. 4 ARMOR — September-October 2002

I anticipate that Reese will have detractors. if one wants to argue that battlefield success tion “X-ers” in our ranks, or to a rise in OP- I expect that some will argue that we don’t illustrates the problem to be less than Reese TEMPO as some surveys and researchers need units able to fight like the OPFOR at suggests, do not use Desert Storm as evi- suggest. The truth is that soldiers and offi- our CTCs when our future battlefields and dence. cers today will perform well and honorably, enemy are infinitely more variable and un- as well as contentedly, under the worst con- predictable than theirs. Such arguments miss Soldiers and officers want to train to fight ditions as long as they believe they are the point. Cohesiveness and tasks drilled to and they want to be a part of a unit that is committing themselves to something worth- become second nature are intangibles that good at it. I concur with Reese’s assessment while, day in and day out, and as long as the transcend any particular conditions of METT- of our fine professional education system folks above them demonstrate a daily com- TC. I have noted a growing legion of such and the soundness of our training doctrine. mitment to making this the case. When we, thinkers, who seem to be either apologists He also poses the question of whether we as an Army, do not appear to aspire to the for or blind to the downward trend in unit have our tactical and operational doctrine ideals of our training doctrine and to manage readiness apparent in CTC rotations since correct. I believe we do, but like him, I say personnel in a way that supports it, we will immediately after the Gulf War. I observed this is not relevant if we do not train properly reap the seeds of disaffection that we sow. this trend first-hand as an NTC observer- to execute it. When he states, “many have trainer in the 2 years following Desert Storm argued that we do not follow our own training LTC KEVIN W. WRIGHT and no one I have spoken with since has doctrine,” he has grasped the essential is- Fort Leavenworth, KS given me cause to reconsider. Rather than sue. Today, there are tremendous pressures addressing the problem, many now argue on brigade and battalion commanders to look up, rather than down, and establish the SAMS — The Indirect Approach that CTCs are simply not as relevant as they Over the Direct Approach once were. kind of units that are committed to warfight- ing training as their number one priority. The

A short time ago, I spent 2 years observing better commanders resist these pressures, Dear Sir: the Israeli army as a liaison officer. The Is- but many others do not. raeli Defense Force (IDF) has a fraction of I was sorry to read Bill Lind’s remarks about our resources and even more warfighting Not long ago, I read an article in Army mag- SAMS in the July-August 2002 issue of training distracters, yet it is able to field co- azine by a former tank battalion commander. ARMOR. He’s right and wrong. Right that it hesive and capable units. Its success is not In his article, he states that he would do has been more than 10 years since he vis- due to better trained individuals, combat ex- three or four things differently, including that ited SAMS, and wrong that we teach (or ever perience, or even to higher quality unit train- he wished he had invested more time in taught) attrition warfare as the solution to ing. It succeeds because it values personnel training platoons in the field. I was dumb- military problems. I first met Bill Lind at the stability and has systemized it over the life- founded when I read this. I have long be- Marine Amphibious Warfare School in 1981. time of a training cycle, just as Reese pro- lieved that battalion commanders should At the time, he and the tactics instructor, poses. The IDF is more than 80 percent re- focus on developing strong fighting platoons Marine Colonel Mike Wiley, were leading an servist and has a compulsory service re- and, likewise, brigade commanders must effort to reform how the students thought quirement that keeps most of the active force necessarily focus on developing their com- about warfare and military operations. Bill’s young and in service a maximum of 3 years. panies. The solution is not simply to carve efforts, to include a tremendous elective he Another aspect of IDF personnel manage- out and protect time for subordinate units to taught on maneuver warfare, had a profound ment worth considering is that its component train, but also provide them the focus and effect on how I think about military opera- branches have great autonomy over the resources to succeed. In my mind, the for- tions, wrenching me away from attrition war- service life of their soldiers and officers, up mer battalion commander was admitting at fare and toward maneuver (in the fullest to and including selection for battalion com- failure in one of his primary reasons for be- mental and physical meanings of the term). mand. This decentralized aspect of person- ing; “training platoons to fight as they will in Bill and Mike Wiley’s grasp of the theory and nel management further enhances cohesion war.” While dismayed, I was not necessarily history of warfare showed me I had much to and stability. surprised. I suspect his shortcoming is true learn and served as a catalyst for my deci- of most battalions and brigades. It takes a sion to attend SAMS. I diverge from Reese on one point, but my special breed of division and corps com- disagreement strengthens, rather than de- mander to create a climate where the sub- At SAMS, I learned how to think through tracts from, his central argument. I do not be- jective and often intangible single measure military problems and come up with creative, lieve that the Gulf War, in any great meas- of success is platoons, companies, and bri- yet workable solutions. Our study of Russian ure, affirmed our Army’s ability to execute gades ready and able to fight. theorists, such as Triandivilov and Tucha- small-unit tactics. Across the land forces, the chevski, guerrillas such as Mao and Giap, prevailing tactic was not to engage through Relative personnel stability will go a long and cavalry officers from Grierson to Patton, fire and maneuver, but rather to stop, en- way in enabling us to be more faithful to our confirmed the value of the indirect approach gage at maximum stand off, and employ ar- training doctrine, but even then, there are over the direct approach; of multi-dimension- tillery as much as possible. I was assigned to other endemic problems we must address. If al operations over slugging it out in the close the advanced guard for VII Corps, which anyone is of the opinion that our technology, fight; and of mental and moral disintegration employed artillery batteries down to TF level resources, superior leadership, or lack of a over physical destruction. and, at first contact with the Iraqi Republican viable enemy allows us to assume risk in Guard, brought companies and battalions on managing personnel in a less-than-perfect Today, having put maneuver warfare into line. This was in concert with the prevailing way, shame on them. If we say that people practice (to the best of my ability) in troop tactic and a strong desire to avoid fratricide, are our most important resource, then we and battalion command, at the NTC, CMTC, but it was not the employment of company ought to behave as though we believe it. A and Bosnia, I have arrived at SAMS as the and platoon tactics. In fact, I noted a great problem is that so much of our attention is director. In the post-11 September environ- reluctance to fire amongst our small units, let focused on the individual, meeting his or her ment, we are teaching students how to think alone maneuver. This was, after all, the first needs or wants, rather than on the larger through problems creatively and effectively, combat for these soldiers and their platoon problem of meeting the individual’s real not how tactical processes work. As we and company commanders. Accounts where needs by making the units and organizations transform our Army, SAMS is inspiring our small-unit tactics were forced on outfits as a to which they belong the best they can be. officers to be agents of change, much as Bill result of chance engagements, such as the The disaffection among troops and junior Lind and Mike Wiley were reformers in the Battle of 73 Easting, demonstrate the reso- company and field-grade officers that had Marine Corps. SAMS is also leading concept luteness of small units, but not any particular our attention in pre-9-11 days was real. This skill in platoon and company maneuver. So, disaffection is not due to the frailty of genera- Continued on Page 48 ARMOR — September-October 2002 5

Major General R. Steven Whitcomb Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

First Stryker MGS Accepted

In late July, I was honored to accept ing the teeth and claws the SBCT needs diers helping with development), Gen- our first Stryker Mobile Gun System to treat ’em rough. It is important to eral Motors Defense, and General Dy- (MGS) at a ceremony in Muskegon, understand the capabilities that the namics Land Systems effectively col- Michigan. This weapons system was de- MGS brings to the Stryker Brigade, and laborated to develop this first system, veloped in response to our Army Vi- therefore, to combatant commanders, which we will now test extensively. sion for the 21st century. Our Chief of the joint force, and our nation. While the Staff, General Shinseki said, “we must Stryker Brigade needs the rapid, direct- We will also benefit from the contribu- provide early entry forces that can op- fire punch that the MGS will provide, it tion that MGS makes designing the Fu- erate jointly, without access to fixed also needs the digital capability that en- ture Combat System (FCS). One mem- forward bases, but we still need the ables enhanced situational awareness ber of our FCS family of systems will power to slug it out and win decisive- and joint interoperability. Our Army has be a mobile gun system that is network ly.” The MGS will be an integral part been working this diligently for almost enabled and capable of direct fire; both of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team a decade. That capability must reside in line of sight and beyond line of sight, (SBCT). With its 105mm gun, technol- the Stryker Brigade as well to mass le- and indirect, nonline-of-sight fire. The ogy upgrades, and rapid deployability, thal joint and coalition precision effects lessons we learn from Stryker MGS Stryker MGS provides combatant com- on an adversary. It is the combination development, testing, fielding, and use manders with a much-needed capability. of lethality and rapid deployability that by soldiers will help design more effec- makes this system such a valuable con- tive and lethal systems in the near fu- The rollout of the Stryker MGS is an tributor to our joint force. The Stryker ture. important event because of the capabil- Brigade provides flexibility to the com- Our Stryker MGS development work ities that it brings to our soldiers and mander and will be deployable as a isn’t finished. I challenge everyone in- the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and fighting force within 96 hours of alert, volved in the program to work the re- the options it provides our nation. We prepared to fight when it arrives, and ca- maining issues. We need that fight-off- sought a ground maneuver platform that pable of delivering firepower and agil- the-ramp capability, with a basic level provides infantry soldiers with rapid ity to the soldier in the fight where and of round-defeating protection for our direct fire to punch through walls, de- when he needs it most. soldiers. I’m confident we’ll get there. stroy enemy bunkers, machine guns, The Interim Force, of which the MGS What has been done so far is truly re- and sniper positions — to provide punch is a part, is another step on our path to markable. In just over 2 years, the Stryk- in the close fight. The Stryker MGS er MGS team progressed from a signed also has to be C-130 transportable, giv- Army Transformation. Combat develop- ment work at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, operational requirements document to ing our Army and combatant command- and other places in our Army led to the delivery of the first MGS. This is one ers the flexibility of rapidly deploying of the shortest timelines ever for a de- it, with intratheater assets, to the battle- MGS capability of hosting, and effec- tively integrating, existing and planned velopmental vehicle. Further, we plan to field. Intratheater transportability will command, control, communications, field this vehicle by September 2004 to make it tougher for an enemy because our first Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. it opens up too many options for him to computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. By any measure, this is a remarkable template our most likely points of entry. achievement for a combat vehicle to go Our transformation plan to rapidly field from concept to the battlefield in less The Stryker MGS gives our soldiers a 6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams called than 5 years! Even Ford Motor Com- vehicle specifically built to provide rap- for very little time to develop, test, and pany took 45 years to reinvent its new id and accurate direct fire to enable of- build such a system — the first purpose- “T-bird two-seater” and it doesn’t have fensive operations in complex and ur- built infantry mobile support weapon to survive the rigors of the battlefield! ban terrain. The MGS fills a capabili- since World War II. But our systems ties gap for the Stryker Brigade, provid- managers (the PM and our own sol- FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT! 6 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Transforming U.S. Forces Korea by CSM William J. Gainey, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Hello from the home of Armor, good ception of Korea, not because I spent ole Fort Knox, Kentucky. As the Unit- three days there, but because the sol- ed States Armor Center Command Ser- diers that I spoke with shared how they geant Major, I would like each and feel about this training paradise. every one of you to know that I am South Korea has experienced a posi- very proud of our Armor Force. We tive and dynamic social, political, and continue being the best in the world and it’s all because of YOU! economic growth over the past few de- cades. This country serves as a model I would like to share an adventure that for struggling democracies around the my team, SGM Rollie Russell from world to emulate. Fort Knox and SFC Michael Clemens CSM Wheeler spoke about his soldiers from PERSCOM, and I had from 31 United States Forces Korea is no ex- like family, and there was pride in his ception and continues to build on its July to 5 August 2002. This adventure quality of life goals. In the past few face with every word. CSM Wheeler, took us to a far and distant country. A thank you for inviting us to Korea! place that many of us have heard noth- years, restoration and modernization funds have allowed the command to ad- We departed for Camp Garry Owen ing but horrible stories about, a place dress maintenance and structure needs. where I was greeted by the 4/7 Cavalry that many soldiers have misconceptions about. Soldiers at Camp Garry Owen have new commander, LTC William Hill, and barracks, with more on the way. Other Command Sergeant Major Ralph Mid- In this country, training is not a pas- installations have seen new community dlebrooks. I was asked to tell you old time; it is a way of life. The soldiers activity and physical fitness centers, soldiers that Camp Garry Owen does not and leaders that I met during this trip along with maintenance and training fa- look the same as it did when you were spoke continuously about how it is to cilities. there years ago. Modern facilities have live with the constant fact that they There is an ongoing phased renova- replaced most of the post-war Quonset could be fighting on a moment’s notice. huts. This is a great command and the They have a saying, which goes some- tion program to improve the quality of soldiers are full of motivation and pride. family housing. Families occupying thing like this, “We take our mission these quarters are elated over the im- One PFC told me that he thinks Korea seriously, because we could be fighting has received a bad rap and he is glad tonight.” provements already made and enthusi- that he didn’t believe half the stories asm continues to spread through the I guess you are wondering where it is military communities. The first project that other soldiers had told him about it, because they are not true. We enjoyed that a soldier soldiers 24/7, honing his will be completed by fiscal year 2003, lunch with this fine cavalry squadron, or her combat skills to a razor’s edge. with additional family housing projects My fellow soldiers, this place is Korea. under design and construction. and its NCOs addressed the team about their concerns. Like many of you, I thought Korea The past 50 years have taken a toll on should be put in the same category as a Our next stop was Camp Casey where four-letter word (even though it has U.S. military facilities in Korea, but the commander of the 1st Combat Bri- much has already been done to improve five). I now have a totally different per- quality of life. The United States Forces gade, 2d Infantry Division, COL An- thony Ierardi greeted us. His command Korea is diligently working on trans- sergeant major, CSM Joseph Zettlemo- forming its force into a capabilities- based force, where training and quality yer, escorted us. You only have to be in the same room with COL Ierardi and I am very interested in re- of life is first rate. ceiving concerns, comments, CSM Zettlemoyer for a very short time and suggestions from sol- As we drove from Yongsan to Camp to fully understand why the soldiers of diers out in the field. Please Red Cloud, I was amazed at how the the 1st Brigade are so motivated. They send all questions and com- local people drive, and at the many are emulating these two leaders. After a ments to the following email fortified bunkers, and even fighting po- very interesting talk, we went to the 2d address: sitions along the route. I had a great Battalion, 72d Armor where Command visit with the 2d Infantry Division com- Sergeant Major Clarence Keithley wel- [email protected] mand sergeant major, CSM Wheeler, comed us. We had a very good visit Two or three questions will who gave us a complete mission lay with the NCOs of this battalion and be selected and featured in down that his soldiers face daily. This they were also afforded the opportunity each edition of ARMOR. briefing was not conducted in a confer- to express their concerns to the team. ence room, but in a bunker, which really stressed the seriousness of the situation. Continued on Page 31 ARMOR — September-October 2002 7 Limited vs. Total War

by Captain Brian W. Brennan retain its dominant role in world af- tle and to break his will to continue the fairs, it will have to look back at past conflict. total war strategies and incorporate Limited war is entirely different. At them into future operations. Since 1776, the U.S. Government and, the dawn of the Cold War, when the more specifically, the U.S. Army have Soviet Union entered the nuclear age, struggled with how best to fight our na- The concept of total war is fairly sim- the Truman and Johnson administra- ple. Total war is best defined by the old tion’s wars. Soviet definition for a “Total ‘Naya tions were concerned that a war of any Voyna kind would risk global nuclear annihi- Though the terms “total war” and ,” or “foreign or total war,” lation, so a limited warfare policy was “limited war” are relatively new and which states that a total war is “an all- were developed to describe the United embracing imperialist war, waged by developed. States’ efforts to minimize civilian ca- all manner of means, not only against The policy’s goal was “to exact good sualties, prevent global nuclear annihi- enemy armed forces, but against the behavior or to oblige discontinuance of lation, and engage the enemy only in entire population of a nation, with a mischief, not to destroy the subject specific, politically driven battlefields, view to its complete destruction.”2 It is altogether.”3 This type of warfare, how- their concepts have been debated for in this kind of war that almost every ever, was not at all in accordance with centuries.1 It is through the lens of mil- citizen of that nation is mobilized to what had become America’s way of itary successes that we can truly exam- drive the war effort. Automobile facto- war. In fact, its citizens and its military ine the validity of limited warfare in to- ries are converted to tank plants; cruise were appalled by what political scien- day’s low-intensity conflict laden world. ships become troop transports; food tist Robert Osgood called the “galling America’s lack of success in campaigns and valuable commodities are rationed; but indispensable restraints” they en- and battles on the modern battlefield and average citizens are conscripted countered in limited war.4 has been the direct result of a shift in into the military to become soldiers and focus from the total war practices of sailors. There are no holds barred in Total Victory World War II and the American Civil total war. Soldiers are killed on the War, to the limited war concepts devel- battlefield — as in any conflict — but The validity of the limited war politi- oped by the Truman and Johnson ad- in a total war, commercial shipping is cal philosophy is best seen when exam- ministrations during the early days of sunk, factories are reduced to rubble by ining the victories and defeats of the the Cold War, and practiced in the jun- bombs and rockets, and civilian popula- U.S. military. Over the past 200 years, gles of Vietnam and the deserts of Ku- tion centers are targeted to deny the the U.S. Army’s war record is testi- wait and Iraq. If the United States is to enemy the means with which to do bat- mony to the importance of the total war 8 ARMOR — September-October 2002

“World War II is one of the best examples of the total war philosophy’s success. During World War II, the United States mobilized every asset available to meet the demands of the immense military machine it fielded to meet the Japanese-German threat.”

philosophy. Numerous battles and cam- over 300 miles per hour.7 This seem- When offered the chance to save them- paigns have been won or lost simply ingly large number of civilian casual- selves from “the devastations of war because the combatants either were or ties paled in comparison to the 90,000 preparing for [them], only by with- were not able to completely destroy the civilians killed in Hiroshima when the drawing [their] quota out of the Con- enemy or render him incapable of United States dropped the first nuclear federate Army, and aiding [General mounting military operations. device, and the 35,000 killed in Na- Sherman] to expel [the Confederate Ar- gasaki when they dropped the second my] from the borders of the State,” the World War II is one of the best exam- one.8 By bombing these cities, the Unit- Georgian government remained indig- ples of the total war philosophy’s suc- 12 cess. During World War II, the United ed States and her allies showed the nant. Axis Powers that they were willing to States mobilized every asset available go to any length necessary to achieve Sherman then razed Atlanta and pro- to meet the demands of the immense ceeded on his historic march to the military machine it fielded to meet the complete and total victory. There would sea, again, destroying everything in his be no negotiated peace. There would Japanese-German threat. By 1945, the be total, unconditional surrender, or the path. As Sherman’s march continued, U.S. Army had 891,663 officers and he slowly eroded the Confederacy’s 7,376,295 enlisted personnel, and was Allies would continue to fight, as was ability to wage war, and in April 1865, necessary in the case of Adolf Hitler’s producing over 2,400 tanks per month Germany, where the Soviet Red Army General Lee, finding himself and his — a far cry from the mere 14,186 offi- army between two Union Armies, sur- cers and 175,353 enlisted personnel it was forced to fight all the way through rendered to General Grant at Appomat- Berlin. had in 1939, while spending a mere 2 tox Court House. The Army of the Con- percent of the nation’s gross national America’s Civil War can also be used federacy laid down their arms, parked product on defense.5 to demonstrate one of the many suc- their artillery and went home, never The total war goal for World War II cesses the U.S. Army has had using to- again to take up arms against the Fed- tal war philosophy. The United States’ eral Government. was the unconditional surrender of It- transition from limited to total war can aly, Germany, and Japan. No other op- Limited Defeat tions were acceptable. The United States be seen by reviewing the Union’s loss- es in the early days of the war when the and its allies could not, and would not, government was, according to General The United States has not always be defeated. The degree to which the adopted the total war philosophy for var- allies pursued their goals is best sum- William T. Sherman’s memoirs, “ex- ious reasons. The U.S. military adopted tremely wavering and weak.”9 marized in a 1944 British report that a limited war strategy for the Korean states: “In five years of drastic labor American losses at battles, such as War in the early 1950s. The fear of es- mobilization, nearly every man and Ball’s Bluff and Bull Run, revealed a calation and global nuclear war between every woman under fifty without young Union Army unwilling to go complete- communist China and Western Allies children has been subject to direction ly to war with the Confederacy. At the caused the U.S., under the leadership of to work….The hours of work average onset of the war, Congress was unwill- President Harry S. Truman, to refuse the fifty-three for men and fifty overall; ing to admit that Union forces were use of nuclear weapons against North when work is done, every citizen…has going to have to adopt a total war strat- Korea and its Chinese allies, as well as had to do forty-eight hours a month egy to defeat the Confederates and re- refuse to invade China. After 3 years of duty in the Home Guard or Civil De- store the Union. This was possibly due fighting, the U.N. forces, under which fense.”6 to the fact that at the very beginning of the U.S. fought, were only able to re- the war, “many of the Southern repre- establish prewar conditions along the Civilian and economic mobilization, however, were not the only aspects of sentatives remained in Congress, shar- 38th parallel. ing in public councils, and influencing the allied campaign that adhered to the Today, this cease-fire agreement re- legislation.”10 total war philosophy. The strategic mil- mains fragile, occupying a great deal of itary planning involved in World War Regardless of the causes of this pol- U.S. military power, and allowing North II also demonstrated total war charac- icy, such political decisions as the gov- Korea’s government to retain its adver- teristics. Not only did the Allies bomb ernment’s refusal to immediately adopt sarial role in Western politics. For the major German and Japanese industrial Winfield Scott’s “Anaconda Plan” that first time, U.S. military leaders were re- centers to cripple their respective war entailed naval blockades and the sei- stricted in both the weapons they were machines, they also fire bombed major zure of the Mississippi River, served to permitted to bring to bear against the population centers, such as Hamburg, lengthen the war.11 The strategy that enemy, and the geographic areas in Dresden, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima, to finally ended the war was that of total which they were permitted to operate.13 break the population’s will. In Ham- war. As Grant’s army held the Confed- Politicians and multinational organiza- burg alone, British efforts to “dehouse” eracy at bay in the eastern United tions now dictated strategic and, at the German population resulted in the States, General Sherman’s army pene- times, tactical decisionmaking. War was deaths of 30,000 to 40,000 civilians as trated deep into the southern states, now conducted to meet political goals the city reached temperatures in excess destroying every Confederate military and create conditions necessary to ne- of 1,000 degrees and winds blew at and economic asset along the way. gotiate agreements and attain certain ARMOR — September-October 2002 9 “The U.S. military adopted a limited war strategy for the Korean War in the early 1950s. The fear of escalation and global nuclear war between communist China and Western Allies caused the United States, under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman, to refuse the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and its Chinese allies, as well as refuse to invade China.”

political concessions from the enemy, cess. This, however, is not the case The all-volunteer force is the first is- not to destroy it and render it incapable when one examines both the political sue that the U.S. military must address. of future operations. restraints placed on the military during Since the end of the draft in the mid the Gulf War, and the current state of 1970s, the U.S. military has relied on The U.S. followed a similar strategy affairs that exist due to certain unreal- volunteers to fill its ranks. This has during the Vietnam War in the 1960s ized or misplaced goals. Though the caused a rather complicated problem — and early 1970s. So great was the fear Gulf War did resemble the total wars of the military needs to put soldiers in of escalation and nuclear reprisals from the past, in that all aspects of the Iraqi harm’s way to achieve its goals, but in the Soviet Union during this era, that military machine were attacked during doing so, risks eliminating its recruit- the United States proceeded with a lim- the 41-day air war, the fact that a large ment source. In an army in which 41 ited war strategy to suppress the com- amount of the Iraqi Republican Guard percent of incoming recruits enroll in munist North Vietnamese attacks on 14 and other units were allowed to escape the Army College Fund, it is obvious South Vietnam. The U.S. policy of from Kuwait into Iraq, and Saddam that service to one’s country is not the gradual escalation operated under the Hussein was permitted to remain in overwhelming desire of most young assumption that a steady increase in the power, attest to the limiting factors dur- soldiers.19 As soon as the military be- amount of military presence in the re- ing this operation.18 gins to show casualty numbers, the Ar- gion, coupled with an equal increase in my’s image as a relatively safe way to Today, Saddam Hussein is still al- the intensity of the conflict, would even- pay college tuition becomes flawed, tually convince the enemy to comply lowed to play a role in the world com- 15 causing young people to opt for other with U.S. demands. Against an oppo- munity. His refusal to allow U.N. in- means to finance their educations. In nent that was able to match each U.S. spection teams into Iraq, his continuing attempts to smuggle oil out of his coun- this situation, not only does the military escalation and stood defiant in the face lose recruits, it then becomes necessary of increased conflict intensity, this stra- try and into the global economy, and to initiate stop-loss programs to retain tegy was doomed from its inception.16 his constant efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction continue to plague soldiers. U.S. forces were not permitted to en- the post-Gulf War world community. With an army of finite size, “if vic- ter known North Vietnamese refuges The U.S. military may have cured the and attack supply lines in Cambodia symptom of Iraqi aggression, but it has tory, and even a repeated victory do not and Laos. Hanoi, the North Vietnamese bring an end to the war, the question yet to cure the disease, that is, Saddam then arises whether the expense of re- capital city, was not bombed, and its Hussein and his maniacal foreign and harbor not mined. Finally, on 30 April domestic policies. storing an army damaged by its victory 1975, South Vietnam fell after the Unit- is not as important as the victory it- 20 ed States stopped military and financial The Future of Total War self.” The most successful way, then, support to the region. Henry Kissinger, of maintaining a large, dedicated force in his book Years of Renewal, very Today the United States stands in a with which to fight these types of mod- adeptly summarizes the United States’ relatively complicated position. Though ern conflicts would be to reestablish the inability to continue combat operations history has proven that limiting military draft to some degree. The U.S. Govern- in this environment, “Idealism had pro- efforts during conflicts rarely provides ment selective service programs have pelled America into Indochina, and ex- the options necessary to achieve suc- been shown to be less than adequate. haustion caused us to leave.”17 The de- cess on the battlefield and to achieve all With the problems experienced during feat was not only a major embarrass- of the desired political goals, the U.S. activation of National Guard units dur- ment to the U.S. military, but also sig- military must now deal with issues that ing the Gulf War, the U.S. Army would nified a major step back for the West- were nonexistent in the 1800s and ear- be hard-pressed to demand service from ern Allies in their continuing struggle ly to mid-1900s. Today, the military is someone who has no intention of serv- to combat Soviet communist influence forced to deal with issues such as low- ing and does not feel contractually ob- around the globe. intensity conflict, an all-volunteer force, ligated to do so. By maintaining a mod- and maintaining the moral-ethical high erately sized conscripted force, the mil- Even the Gulf War was limited in ground in the world community. Either itary would have a constant influx of strategy and success. Many people be- a decision must be reached regarding new personnel during times that the lieve that due to the relatively dispro- the management of these pressures, or a idea of serving in the military does not portionate losses dealt the Iraqis by vast overhaul of the U.S. military must seem like a life-enhancing opportunity U.S.-led coalition forces, this conflict occur to maintain a force that is capable to average 18 to 25 year olds. Current- should be seen as a total war-type suc- of sustaining total war operations. ly, many European countries have man- 10 ARMOR — September-October 2002

datory 2- to 3-year service obligations, forces in Bosnia and Kosovo routinely forced unconditional surrender. By lim- and with the current war on terror, it assist refugees and other people hurt by iting war, one risks fighting the same may be time for the United States to the war. enemy again and again, and in the follow suit. worst-case scenario, one risks defeat. These are all fine examples of doing the right thing, however, when civilians The war on terror is the next problem allow themselves to be pulled into the facing today’s military. Globally, the Notes fight, they forfeit their rights as civil- U.S. military finds itself conducting 1 ians. If there are command and control Robert A. Doughty, et al., Warfare in the West- numerous peacekeeping and peace-en- facilities beneath a childcare facility, ern World: Volume II, D.C. Heath and Company, forcement operations, in what have be- Lexington, MA, 1996, p. 913. come known as operations other than such as there were in Iraq, then the ci- vilians in that area assume the risk in- 2 war, support and stability operations, John I. Alger, The United States Military His- herent with those conditions. The Unit- tory Series: Definitions and Doctrine of the Mili- and low-intensity conflicts. Conflicts tary Art Past and Present, Avery Publishing such as regional wars, ethnic hatred, ed States needs to realize, as does the media, that it is the responsibility of the Group Inc., Wayne, NJ, 1985, p. 1-2. insurgencies, and terrorism, will not be opposing government to safeguard its 3 viewed by the public or the media as Doughty, p. 913. citizens according to the guidelines set war, but these conflicts will still inter- 4 forth in the Geneva and Hague Conven- Ibid. rupt global tranquility and U.S. inter- tions. Churches, hospitals, and histori- 5 ests in the global community.21 Con- Ibid., p. 719. cal monuments must be honored as safe ducting total war in this arena becomes 6 areas, and it is the responsibility of both Ibid., p. 720. a bit more complicated because there is parties to refrain from targeting civil- 7Ibid., p. 732. not a specific nation-state to attack. ians to the utmost of their abilities, but 8Ibid., p. 838. only to the extent that those structures Problems in places such as Afghani- and locations do not represent viable 9William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General Wil- stan, Bosnia, and Kosovo do not read- military objectives. liam T. Sherman, Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, ily present total war solutions; how- 1984, p. 382. ever, the total war principles remain In 1945, 95,000 Japanese civilians 10Sherman, pp. 382-83. the same. Eliminating the enemy’s abil- were killed to save the lives of hun- ity to make war and create problems in dreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers dur- 11Timothy H. Donovan, et al., The West Point his native region and globally, is in ing World War II. This should be the Military History Series: The American Civil War, keeping with the overall intent of total model for total war of the 21st century. Avery Publishing Group Inc., Wayne, NJ, 1987, war. This does not, however, mean that No longer can the U.S. military be p. 11. the intervening country maintains a placed in a situation like the one in 12Sherman, p. 139. peacekeeping force in the region. By Somalia. It cannot allow the feelings of 13 following total war doctrine, the inter- the world community to dictate the Doughty, p. 873. vening country seeks to militarily elim- policies involved with its military de- 14Ibid., p. 913. inate the combat power and political ployments. Had the Rangers in Somalia 15Ibid., p. 914. leadership of the aggressors in these re- been equipped with the armor support gions. Removing heads of state, such as they so desperately needed, more young 16Ibid., p. 920. Slobodan Milosovic in Yugoslavia, is a men would have come home from Mo- 17Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, Simon key part in the eventual success or fail- gadishu, and the U.S. may have even and Schuster, New York, 1999, p. 463. ure of these operations. The United realized its goals. 18 States must aspire to make peace in General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, U.S. Army Com- these regions, not simply settle for Throughout the past 200 years, total mand and General Staff College Press, Fort Leav- keeping peace if it plans to decrease its war philosophy has shown itself to be a enworth, KS, 1994, p. 315. OPTEMPO and increase its prepared- highly successful means for conducting ness for large-scale operations in future war. Limiting oneself to specific weap- 19Ibid., p. 17. global hot spots. ons, regions, and practices has proven 20Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War, to be costly in terms of human and col- Volume IV: The Dawn of Modern Warfare, trans. Finally, the military must maintain the lateral loses, and ineffective in ending Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., University of Nebraska moral and ethical high ground in the aggression toward the United States Press, Lincoln, NE, 1990, p. 296. world community. While this stance and its allies. If the United States con- 21Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: does require doing away with target- tinues to pursue limited warfare objec- The Post Cold War World, 2d ed., M.E. Sharpe, ing innocent civilians during times of tives in areas such as Somalia, Af- Inc., Armonk, New York, 1995, p. 212. conflict, it does not necessarily dictate ghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, it will that soldiers be placed in more danger continue to have only limited success- to safeguard enemy civilians. One of es. Total war methods not only provide CPT Brian Brennan graduated in this country’s founding fathers inti- a means with which to end conflict and 1998 from the United States Military mated that it was not only the right of eliminate enemies, but also to serve as Academy. After attending Armor Of- the people to do away with a govern- a deterrent to others, who would at- ment that they believed to be criminal tempt to disrupt global tranquility, in- ficer Basic Course, he served as a or morally and ethically devoid, but it terfere with U.S. interests abroad, or platoon leader and executive officer was their obligation as citizens of that attempt to attack the sovereignty of the in A Company, 2-70 Armor. A grad- nation, and as men. During the Civil United States. The United States has uate of the Armor Captains Career War, Sherman’s forces evacuated the been truly successful only when it has Course, he is currently attending city of Atlanta prior to razing it. U.S. completely destroyed the enemy and CAS3. ARMOR — September-October 2002 11

Keeping the Sword Sharp

by Major Harold M. Knudsen

The conclusion of the Cold War ended lighter, quickly deployable elements, has not maintained an adequate force the balance of power once insured by a are plenty of heavy equipment sets structure during peacetime. Kasserine world made up of two armed camps. and enough robust divisions capable Pass, Bataan, and Task Force Smith, The subsequent dissolution of the So- of fighting high-intensity wars — an still loom as somewhat recent examples viet Union left the United States as the Army that has the right mix of varied of this. world’s only preeminent superpower. capabilities. With no monolithic rival, the United The lessons learned from France’s 1940 defeat exist because France’s per- States undertook a military drawdown 1940 – ‘Poor France’ Defeated ceived superiority was an illusion. A in the 1990s and reduced military spend- by a Cult of Complacency ing to provide money to expand domes- current parallel to this thought is that Marc Bloch, French army officer and some contemporary defense observers tic programs that lawmakers thought scholar, wrote in 1940 concerning the perceive the future devoid of large con- were more important. defeat of France that year, “We have flicts, requiring no large standing army. By the late 1990s, the Army went from just suffered such a defeat as no one Another danger is following the popu- a force of 18 divisions, which had three would have believed possible.”1 In his lar belief based on the Gulf War ex- brigades each, down to 10 divisions, book, Bloch outlines what happened to perience, that we would now overcome some of which now only have two bri- a seemingly prepared and robust French opponents’ size advantages with tech- gades. While decreasing in size, the Ar- army that fell victim to a smaller Ger- nology. During the coalition’s war with my saw its commitments and deploy- man army that, although not better Iraq, Soviet General Nikolai Kutsen- ments rise dramatically. The remaining equipped, proved superior in organiza- ko stated, “Iraq’s armament, including force structure gained few upgrades, as tion and doctrine. that which is Soviet made, was primar- the Clinton administration relied on the The French army’s was a defeat fos- ily developed in the 1960s-1970s and Reagan legacy equipment throughout lags at least one-to-two generations its tenure. Thinly stretched resources tered by a cult of thinking in the French behind the armament of the multina- military that France was militarily su- 2 and manpower still tied to the tradi- perior to Germany and that their insur- tional forces.” tional two-theater war requirement, were now coupled with a multitude of peace- ance policy in choice of organization Based on experiences during 1990, the and doctrine was correct. Save that of idea that smaller is somehow more ef- keeping missions, post-Gulf-War the- De Gaulle, military planners believed fective and better across the spectrum ater presence requirements, and a gap- ing need to begin another transfor- the correct use of the tank was as an of operations is a myth. infantry support vehicle, and subse- mation. Various peacekeeping missions quently organized their army such that Becoming the Wehrmacht and the current war in Afghanistan have many proponents of further draw- the tank was relegated to a support role. of 1943-1945? They also built a massive barrier along down fostering the view that future the Franco-German border called the It is important to excel at operational wars will be laser-guided affairs, pri- maneuver, but it should not be the only marily using airpower and small ground Maginot Line, and believed it to be play in the book. Ensuring we have impenetrable. In the years following units. Some of this intellectual inconti- World War I, France believed Germany enough heavy divisional force structure nence declares that large land wars, M1 is just as important as the transforma- tanks, and Crusader howitzers have no could no longer successfully invade its tion toward technological advantage soil. future, and keeping heavy divisions and improved deployability. While it equates to maintaining an obsolete Cold Events proved France wrong. Within a made sense to take down excessive War army. This is complete and utter few short years, Germany built an army force structure in Germany following nonsense. capable of offensive operations. Ger- the decline of the Soviet Union, a mini- man military thinkers favored tank con- mum number of divisions should be The world is a complex and unpre- centrations and organized the first tank recognized as the benchmark below dictable place, and no one knows what the landscape may be in 10 years. divisions, pioneering a style of offen- which the Army will not fall. The rea- sive armored warfare known as Blitz- son for justifying a minimum level While many aspects of Cold War think- krieg. During 1940, they skillfully ma- need not be tied to a formula decided ing can and should be abandoned, the notion that our current force structure neuvered their powerful tank forma- on by think tanks’ en vogue far out tions through and around the Maginot vision of future war. One guideline we of 10 divisions is a Cold War force is line and crushed France in 6 weeks. should first and foremost recognize and erroneous. For the moment, the Army is engaged in a small land war in Af- The United States has no parallel to understand is the timeless reality that at some point quantity has a quality all its ghanistan, but is now somewhat un- France’s 1940 defeat. America has, own. derresourced for a high-intensity con- however, suffered painful beginnings in flict. What are needed, along with com- most of the wars in which it has en- World War II Germany, for example, ponents of transformation composing gaged. Historically, the United States tried to make up the difference against 12 ARMOR — September-October 2002

“Some of this intellectual incontinence declares that large land wars, M1 tanks, and Crusader howitzers have no future, and keeping heavy divisions equates to maintaining an obsolete Cold War army. This is complete and utter nonsense.” the allies’ superiority in resources with divisions and independent brigades can- likely as the superpowers and their al- quality and advanced technology. An not be expected to be effective across lies made such action by a single state excellent illustration of this can be seen the entire warfare spectrum. To avoid difficult, if not impossible. The two in the types of tanks they produced attrition warfare is to set ourselves up armed camps did, in a somewhat posi- during the last 3 years of the war. The for future defeat where an opponent tive way, manage to keep subordinates Panther, Tiger, and King Tiger series who has overwhelming numbers will in line, very often with little effort. tanks and assault gun variants were someday force fewer U.S. formations Today the landscape is different. There extremely powerful vehicles in their into a pitched battle. time, and possessed many advantages exist regional powers that, by virtue of The United States Army is not now in population, resources, and geographical over the two main allied battle tanks: a position like the Wehrmacht of 1943- size, are peers or even eclipse the Unit- the American Sherman, and Russian T- 34. All three German tanks were able to 1945. However, we must realize as po- ed States. India, Pakistan, China, and litically incorrect as attrition warfare several states in the Middle East are stand off the allied tanks easily, as their currently may be, attrition is a facet of also far from peaceful, and regularly high velocity 75- and 88-mm main guns were of greater size and velocity, grant- war that is eternal. More is to come, engage in arms races and confrontation and we cannot avoid it any more than with their neighbors. Any one of these ing them range and hitting advantage. could Rommel at El Alamein, Robert nations could change defensively pos- If the engagement was within allied tank range, their thicker armor gave the Ger- E. Lee at Petersburg, or any other army tured militaries into offensive capabili- that relied solely on maneuver warfare. ties. Even worse, a coalition of such na- mans another advantage, as they could tions, well organized and well led, in a withstand frontal hits without fear of penetration from the allied tanks’ low Maintaining Robust Force few short years could field a coalition Structure in an Uncertain World army so large that it would make that of velocity 76-mm main gun. Admittedly, the United States and NATO pale in there were numerous occasions where Over the past 50 years, the size of the German tank design advantages al- U.S. Army was mostly based on coun- comparison. lowed veteran crews to enjoy successes tering the Soviet Union. This tendency in many tactical engagements, against has led some to think if there is no ma- Do Recent Advancements several times their number. However, jor threat, we can have a smaller Army Rate as an RMA? the larger, thicker armored, harder hit- and rely on advanced technology as Some defense observers suggest a rev- ting Panthers and Tigers still could not America’s ace. Therein lies one major olution in military affairs (RMA) is cur- provide the decisive advantage in the challenge: move away from specific rently taking place, of which the Unit- war. threat assessment as the only justifica- ed States must take advantage.3 Wheth- tion for maintaining a robust standing er or not there truly is an ongoing RMA In the end, attrition wore down the Army, and adopt the mindset that we is debatable. If the theory holds true, German armored formations. The best King Tiger tank battalions still suffered need an Army based on varied capabili- any current RMA would be in the realm ties. of long-distance, precision-guided mis- losses and were pushed back in face of siles, battlefield situational awareness, the overwhelming number of American Now we are at war again. Although or Russian units they were required to Afghanistan’s Taliban army and al-Qae- stealth, and information technology. The United States must continue to use engage. Without time to rest, make re- da terrorist reinforcements have proven these resources to its advantage. pairs, and fill losses, constant allied no match for a small American land pressure took its toll on German front- force, this war does not prove correct The Gulf War did provide (on televi- line formations. Eventually, German any assumption that a large rival will sion) an almost entertaining stage for units became combat ineffective, any not emerge. In actuality, the chance of precise stand-off strikes, leading many advantage of superior equipment was threats emerging today is greater than to believe they were the decisive weap- negated. In contrast, the allies could during the Cold War. Any instigator of ons of the war. In truth, despite the afford heavy losses, pull mauled units a conflict during the Cold War was losses, these weapons inflicted, they out of the line to rest, refit, and replace very likely a subordinate of either the did not drive the Iraqi army from Ku- them with fresh ones. The same is still East or West block. To make war in wait. The tanks, infantry, and artillery true today. An army composed of small this world was, in many instances, less took all the actual ground in Iraq and ARMOR — September-October 2002 13

Kuwait. As stated in a 1996 General larity to Field Marshal Manstein’s Blitz- Changes are needed to transform at Accounting Office report of Gulf War krieg application for invading France in least part of the Army into a force that assessment, “In truth, the results of the 1940 (executed from the right of cen- can be quickly deployed to a troubled air campaign were mixed. The claim by ter) and is a clear reminder that heavy spot or an ongoing commitment. The the U.S. Air Force that airpower alone offensive armored warfare is relevant. current transformation goal is to outfit defeated the Iraqi Army, has not with- The tank organized into divisions, syn- units with lighter, more transportable stood even brief examination. Airpower chronously supported by infantry, artil- vehicles to meet the Army’s goal to failed to destroy 50 percent of Iraqi’s lery, and the other branches will con- deploy a combat ready brigade within armor as advertised.”4 tinue to dominate warfare in the type 96 hours, followed by a division within of terrain that supports such massed 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 Like many other wars in the past cen- forces. days.6 The fact that we have been en- tury, this type of bombardment and preparation is limited in effect. The gaging in these kinds of theaters estab- Transformation Focus: lishes that some of our forces will have artillery preparation by the armada of Deployability & Medium Capability to be redesigned as an adaptation to the allied ships and the air preparation that 7 pounded the German positions along During the Gulf War, the coalition had variation of current commitments. the Normandy coast the morning of the precisely the right instruments at pre- This change is more akin to the exten- D-Day invasion in 1944, were also lim- cisely the right time to deal with Sad- sive use of horse cavalry in the Ameri- ited in their effects. German soldiers dam Hussein — many heavy armored can West following the Civil War, and still had to be cleared from their defen- and mechanized divisions in Europe and using the correct type of force and sive positions by waves of attacking the United States, robust and highly equipment to the corresponding terrain. infantry. The situation in Iraq during trained. These divisions were perfect At the end of the Civil War, large, 1991 was the same. for ejecting the Iraqi army out of Ku- slow-moving regiments and divisions wait. However, the most powerful divi- Thus, it is more accurate to say these sions were garrisoned and logistically of infantry and artillery were the domi- advancements are actually expected im- nant forces, but were unsuited for cam- provements in the ongoing evolution of bound to Germany, as their Cold War paigning against highly mobile Indi- mission was to move out of their garri- military capability, and do not neces- sons, and roll a few hundred kilometers ans over vast spaces. Certainly no In- sarily mean an RMA. The new laser- dian force would have been able to sur- guided bombs, for example, are still to general defense positions in the Ful- vive against a regiment of Confederate da Gap. Moving these organizations to fire support assets that comprise only the Middle East was an unforeseen con- or Union infantry deployed on line, de- part of the larger equation of conduct- livering volleys of musket fire. How- ing a battle or campaign. These weap- tingency that was simply going to take ever, these large infantry organizations time. ons do not win battles and wars single- would have never closed with the Indi- handedly. They are not such an advan- Despite victory in the Gulf War, the ans. Only smaller horse units could tage like the Maxim gun was to the lessons of force projection difficulties cover the ground and pursue bands of British, who defeated the comparative- came home to roost as a significant Indians in the vast Plains environment. ly primitive Sudanese at Omdurman in concern. The Army had one division it Similarly, this is true for the heavy tank 1898, giving rise to an imperialistic could quickly deploy — the 82d Air- division and its relative unsuitability in doggerel of the period, “whatever hap- borne Division because it lacked armor. the Bosnia environment. The heavy M1 pens, we have got the Maxim gun, and Fighting heavy armored forces in a des- tank, for example, is a lumbering behe- they do not.”5 ert environment is the airborne organi- moth when forced to maneuver in tight American air-delivered weapons are zation’s worst nightmare. Fortunately old world Balkan villages, or when trav- for the 82d Airborne Division, the Iraqis eling along muddy mountain roads bare- believed to be decisive because during stopped with Kuwait and left them ly as wide as its width. Large, heavy M1 the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign they were given an unusual spotlight in alone. Lacking heavy equipment, air- tanks are without equal in the former borne troops are easy targets for tank Yugoslavia; their crews need fear no unusual circumstances. and mechanized forces in terrain that encounter with an armored vehicle of affords no cover, other than the fox- the former warring factions. However, Blitzkrieg Was the Last holes that paratroopers can dig. Con- in heavily wooded and hilly terrain, the True Land Warfare RMA versely, while heavy forces dominate M1 is restricted in its movement, and A true military revolution that might the battlefield once in place, moving susceptible to infantry and mines. Just them in a timely manner was a prob- as the cavalry troop was the formation change the complexion of land warfare lem. Airlift was very limited, and most- of choice in the expanses of the 19th- has yet to arrive in a definitive charac- ter. The last true military revolution ly not an option beyond moving a few century American West, medium tanks, select heavy pieces of equipment per such as the Danish version of the Leop- that changed ground warfare was the lift sortie. The roll-on roll-off ships ard I, armored HMMWVs, and other German Blitzkrieg doctrine. Although Blitzkrieg has undergone some name remedied the situation to a degree, but similar vehicles organized into smaller were still too few in number. units, are better suited for operations in changes and modifications over the the Balkans. decades, such as adding the helicopter Contingency operations, such as those in the 1960s, and the American com- in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Thus, the current concept of transfor- bined arms warfare in the 1970s and Haiti, also challenged the military’s mation is to create lighter, more mo- 1980s, it is largely intact. Indeed, the ability to project force quickly, and bile, rapid deploying units by outfitting multiple heavy armored divisions of- further illustrated the unsuitability of them with lighter vehicles for quicker fensive into Iraq in 1991 (while execu- heavy armored forces in peacekeeping transport. Something that bridges the ted from the left) had an uncanny simi- environments. gap between heavy and light, and that 14 ARMOR — September-October 2002

covers the realm of medium operations. field. Too much exposure to the con- bility.10 While threat analysis is always The light armored vehicle (LAV) series stant practice of peacekeeping might paramount in planning, in this period of wheeled vehicles of the new interim bri- diminish our Army’s warrior spirit that no clear rival, we can place less empha- gade combat team (IBCT) would stand is so very vital to successful warfare. sis on past monolithic threats, and es- no chance in an engagement against a tablish doctrine as the most logical de- At the individual level, a soldier’s ca- main battle tank, nor should it. It is a reer should include different and varied terminant for how much force structure vehicle for an interim ground unit is needed. stronger than a parachute brigade, al- experiences — there is more to soldier- ing than fighting. Combat units ear- According to doctrine, we should re- most as quickly deployable, but proba- marked for combat should not be used tain at least two corps of heavy forces, bly not heavy enough for high-intensity conflict. for peacekeeping. A soldier’s tour in comprised of one armored and one such a unit should remain focused while mechanized division each (a total of he is there, and not venture too far from four), for high-intensity conflict in re- We Must Keep Enough the techniques that have been devel- gions that support maneuver and attri- Heavy Divisions oped by armies over the centuries to tion warfare. Two corps would allow Transforming at least part of the Army condition soldiers to overcome their the Army to start a conflict with a thea- into highly mobile units better suited fear of violence and resistance to kill- ter level effort, affording the Army a for complex terrain and quicker move- ing.8 decisive force at the beginning of a ment is a move in the right direction. major conflict, while reinforcements Considerations to commit mainstream However, redesigning forces should not combat troops in military operations are being marshaled within the United be an effort to change the entire Army States. into a force of smaller units comprised other than a war should only be done when deemed vital to the United States, Two corps of light forces would also of lighter, smaller vehicles that can and in such cases, combat units should be maintained, containing two divisions supposedly defeat heavy armor. Force structure choices should not be guided function more like an army of occupa- each, for conflicts and missions in ter- tion.9 When combat troops are sent in rain best suited for these types of units. by a cult belief of an unclear role for to conduct a military occupation, they These two corps would be the doctri- heavy forces in the future. The role of heavy force structure is clear: to fight must make it clear to the soldiers that nally correct strength level to deal with they are occupiers: enforcers of rules a threat decisively. The two heavy and high-intensity campaigns and wars. As set by military authorities, rules that two light corps comprise the first eight we focus on striking the correct mix of heavy, medium, and light force capa- will be obeyed by the local population. divisions, and the two remaining are Soldiers as occupiers are constantly the 101st Air Assault Division, and the bilities, the heavy forces we retain vigilant, and ready to engage in combat 82d Airborne Division; both specialty should not be reconfigured outside of their operational purview. They should when any opposition may arise. divisions that are generally used for quick deployment, and later augmenta- be improved and modernized within The benefits of keeping combat units tion of corps in a theater. their level and type of warfare, and not free from peacekeeping would be many. deployed to, or left in places, such as The regular Army could narrow its fo- Subordinate to the corps and divisions, Bosnia, after the implementation force cus toward the proper force structure and initially separate, are the 15 en- is complete. and create units that will make up the hanced National Guard brigades and combat-capable Army. Equally impor- the IBCT, all used for quicker deploy- Warfighters Fight Wars tant, the training focus could go back to ment to hot spots that do not initially what it should be — honing warfight- require heavy forces. Heavy divisions should stay out of the ing skills and preparing for the next peacekeeping business and focus solely on warfighting. Extensively using troops war. Divisions are the Best Self- Supporting Combat Organizations from heavy divisions for peacekeeping Keeping the Sword Sharp – Focus operations during the 1990s should be on Doctrinally Based Capabilities While creating some independent bri- viewed as something we have success- gades called for in the new transforma- Eighteen active component divisions fully gotten away with, done only when was the force deemed adequate to deal tion concept will allow the Army to no other type of soldier is available. project limited force to a hot spot, the with an assault on West Germany by division as an organization will more The primary reason to avoid sending the Warsaw Pact, and also manage a heavy division combat troops on peace- simultaneous conflict in Asia — most than likely keep its place in modern warfare. It is still the best self-sustain- keeping missions is a hidden danger of notably on the Korean peninsula. To- ing formation for high-intensity warfare eroding high-intensity combat effec- day, however, the Army is performing tiveness that might be a side effect of more missions than during the Cold in a large theater of operations. repeated peacekeeping. Perhaps the War. The 10-division force of today is Doctrinally, divisions are basically most overlooked and detrimental aspect in no way, shape, or form a Cold War comprised of three maneuver brigades: of peacekeeping is how training for and army, and should not be considered an artillery brigade-sized element, an conducting peacekeeping will distance one. There does not need to be a direct aviation brigade, and a brigade-sized the soldier’s psychological focus away correlation between the now obsolete equivalent of logistics direct support to from the battlefield — his most basic two major theater wars (MTW) concept the fighting elements. It is the best purpose as a soldier. The purpose of and how much force structure we fighting organization that bridges the engaging in combat with enemy sol- need. In a more uncertain world, the two gap between the tactical and opera- diers is to kill them, take them prisoner, MTWs concept overinsures the country tional levels of war. It has two head- destroy their units and their will to against the risk of specific regional quarters: one that focuses on the near fight, and seize victory on the battle- conflicts, and detracts from global flexi- fight and is designed to fight brigades; ARMOR — September-October 2002 15

and one that coordinates logistics, and that has served armies over the past 100 that detract from their readiness to en- does most of its planning beyond the years will go away. As far as the next gage in the most vicious, high-intensity current fight. These are capabilities a few decades, at least 10 full-strength scenarios that we can anticipate.

brigade does not have, and it would divisions of either heavy, light, and make little sense to duplicate in a bri- specialty need to remain in the inven- gade-sized area of operations. tory to train and remain ready. Notes 1Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: a Statement of The fact that a division can fight bri- When we look at the world, we see an Evidence Written in 1940, WW Norton and Com- gades means that it can add to its three indescribably complex and infinite ar- pany, New York, 1968, p. 25. organic brigades, and easily manage ray of objects and events, which cannot 2 four or five brigades smoothly, if a 13 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: easily be forecast. Therefore, the right a Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, situation arises where the corps com- road is to abandon overly specific thea- Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1997, pp. 44-45. mander deems it necessary to reinforce ter war scenarios, or overly specific the division that he assigns the mission threat scenarios. But those who believe 3Philip Meilinger, “U.S. Defense Review: For- of main effort. This type of command that high-intensity wars and wars of at- ward to the Past?” Defense News, Vol. 16, No. and control in a high-intensity conflict trition are historical are wrong. Even if 22, 6/4-10/01, p. 17. would be difficult for a brigade operat- we view the absence of the Soviet Un- 4John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, The Gulf ing independently, and depending on ion as a safer period, we should still War Assessed, Arms and Armour, London, 1992, the type of headquarters and staff it has, maintain a minimum of 10 full-strength p. 272. Also see the U.S. General Accounting to effectively control follow-on bri- divisions in the Army. Even unlikely Office Report, titled “Operation Desert Storm: gades. Who is in charge of coordinating Evaluation of the Air War,” Government Printing threat scenarios and the absence of a Office, Washington, DC, July 1996, pp. 4-5. a concentration at the right time is an major rival do not justify further cutting issue when there are several peers who of army divisions. 5Hubert P. Van Tuyll, America’s Strategic Fu- have different perspectives on the situa- ture A Blueprint for National Survival in the Mil- tion. Frankly, when there are two or Accordingly, innovation and technol- lennium, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1998, more of the same size unit, there must ogy that allows us to enjoy superiority p. 20. be a boss such as a higher level head- over many real or potential foes must 6Department of the Army Memorandum, “Sta- quarters with a commander of the prop- not be counted on as decisive by itself. tioning Objectives,” 26 June 2001, p. 13. er rank and experience. Those who believe that M1 tanks, Cru- 7 sader howitzers, and other heavy equip- Van Tuyll, p. 20. Divisions also add enduring surviv- ment are obsolete are also wrong. There 8Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychologi- ability to the Army. For example, dur- is still no substitute for having enough cal Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, ing the 1950s, the Army undertook muscle in the form of heavy units or- Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1995, p. another transformation — the Pentomic ganized into brigades, divisions, and xxix. Division. This organization was based corps that can ultimately compose a 9Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. on five platoons per company, five theater-level war effort when needed. The Military Profession into the Twenty-first Cen- companies per battalion or battle group, tury, Frank Cass, London, Portland, 1999, p. 15. 11 Many military events in the 1990s re- and five combat brigades. This was 10 done so that the division had enough sulted favorably for the United States, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defense Policy Choices despite multiple missions requiring our for the Bush Administration 2001-05, Brookings brigades to survive strikes by Soviet Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 74. tactical nuclear weapons that might Army to do things and go places that render one or more brigades combat in- was not particularly easy. The soldiers 11A.J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era — The U.S. effective. In this atomic age, the Army and leaders still took on the tasks, Army Between Korea and Vietnam, National De- adapted, and accomplished the mis- fense University Press, Washington, DC, 1986, decided to disperse its brigades over a p. 5. larger division area of operations, pre- sions with great success. Difficulties, senting less of a lucrative target and and minor failures were few, and re- 12Ibid., p. 68. regaining a margin of safety against a sulted in no real harm to the force or 13Ibid., p. 82. strike by a tactical nuclear weapon.12 the nation. Even if one brigade was sufficiently damaged by a strike, the division com- Still, we must avoid using the lop- sided victory against Iraq during 1991 MAJ Harold Knudsen is a policy in- mander still had enough units to con- to measure technology’s effectiveness. tegrator for the U.S. Army National centrate on an operation. A division Guard Bureau, Alexandria, VA. He such as the old Pentomic design was We should heed the lessons we experi- enced with the slow force projection has served in various artillery com- most definitely in need of a robust staff during the Gulf War and other contin- and headquarters element to control a mand and staff positions with the widely dispersed group of brigades. The gencies, while we undergo transforma- 8th Infantry Division and the 1st tion. Transformation should enhance Armored Division, including com- brigades, on their own, would be hard deployability, but should retain and con- pressed to continuously and accurately mander of a 155mm SP howitzer know the whereabouts of the other bri- tinue to improve heavy forces that can be called on to fight high-intensity con- battery in Germany; battalion fire gades. flicts. These forces should not be re- direction officer during the Gulf War; However, the division is shaped by duced, they should not be used for mis- and artillery liaison/fire support of- transformation, it will be decades be- sions out of their very difficult spe- ficer with the Scandinavian Brigade fore the basic design of the division cialty, and they should not train in ways in Bosnia during the IFOR mission. 16 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Thinking Outside the Maneuver Box

by Captain Michael R. Evans

There is no teacher but the enemy. No one but the enemy will ever tell you what the enemy is going to do. No one but the enemy will ever teach you how to destroy and conquer. Only the enemy shows you where you are weak. Only the enemy tells you where he is strong. And the only rules of the game are what you can do to him and what you can stop him from doing.1

Orson Scott Card hits on an important ronment also offers new tools that can particularly in regard to team building point in his 1977 science fiction short be used to prepare for that threat. and cohesion.6 The benefits of training story: there are no rules in war, every- Our training tools are multiplying; in this way transcend individual levels thing is fair, and nothing is off limits. of expertise, for they affect the collec- There is not an end of exercise, no after they are generally divided, however, tive skill and cohesion of the organi- into three venues differentiated by the action review (AAR), no demarcated zation.7 Much of this collective benefit environments in which they operate.4 maneuver box, and battles do not occur is lost to personnel turbulence, which in predetermined time limits that allow Each venue has its relative strengths merely highlights the importance of and weaknesses. They are not ends 8 restarts. The scope of the exercise is unto themselves because simply throw- this relationship. The challenge is to infinite, and everything is fair game. expand the collective training benefit of The potential for complacent routine ing tools at a training objective fails to the CTC experience. The CTCs are in- exploit the potential for synergy in that can lead to tactical disaster is combining those tools. The right tools credibly resource-intensive and capable enormous. Training is key to ensuring of only a limited number of exercises. that an enemy does not teach the most from the right venues must be em- It is simply impossible to provide CTC ployed, but they must also be employed costly lessons. in such a way that their effect is not training to all Army units at a rate that would compensate for the ongoing loss U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 25-101, merely cumulative, but complementary. of collective skill to personnel turn- Battle Focused Training, tells us what The challenge is to choose the correct 9 we have all heard and know: that train- combination, maximizing opportunities over. Therefore, if the Army cannot get to the CTCs in sufficient iterations, ing is the commander’s first responsi- while minimizing limitations. then the CTC collective training ex- bility.2 Today this is as true and as chal- lenging as ever. The CTCs best teach interaction with perience should be brought, with great- the complete combat arms and support- er frequency, to the Army. The challenge is to train with the great- ing team. This is best done in a mul- est possible tactical realism and free- tiechelon environment that accurately Collective Training Techniques play, replicating the fast-changing and replicates the interaction of higher, ad- adaptive threat. We have made a good jacent, and subordinate elements. This The U.S. Army employs several tech- niques for collective training, as dis- attempt toward this goal over the past 2 is not an idea unique to the CTCs. FM cussed in FM 25-101.10 Essentially, decades, the most noteworthy being the 25-101 states that, the commanders’ development of the three combat train- responsibility is “...training one level there are three types of collective train- 3 ing, with a fourth technique derived ing centers (CTCs). These premier down and evaluating two levels down; from one of the types: sites provide the most realistic training for example, battalion commanders train available today. They do so, however, company commanders with their com- Field Training Exercise (FTX). The with significant cost in time, space, panies and evaluate platoon leaders FTX is a “high-cost, high-overhead ex- environmental impact, and physical and with their platoons.”5 This is an enor- ercise conducted under simulated com- fiscal resources. Training does not start mously complex process, much more bat conditions in the field.”11 This is the and end in this classic realm of live so than it might seem; it is a three-di- CTC experience. An FTX is intended training. After all, the Army trained for mensional process in which each com- many years without the CTCs. Today’s ponent part affects other individual to exercise all the battlefield operating systems (BOS) functions to their ut- CTCs are merely the acme of the Ar- component parts, often in a nonlinear most, including all assigned and at- my’s live collective training methodol- way. A unit interacts not only with its ogy. The methodology has been with us subordinate elements, but also with tached units functioning as combined arms teams. for some time; today we have new tech- those of adjacent or higher units, and nological tools to enhance that method- even with other units scattered through- Situational Training Exercise (STX). ology. The same technology that has out their battlespace. This interaction is The STX is a “mission-related, limited accelerated change in the threat envi- an integral part of realistic training, exercise designed to train one collec- ARMOR — September-October 2002 17 In an attempt to overcome the limita- tions placed on live training, the Army has increasingly turned to technologi- cal tools, particularly for larger units. Large unit exercises conducted in the virtual venue however, such as a simu- lator-based STX, or in the constructive venue, such as a computer-mediated bri- gade-level FTX, are also limited. They either teach headquarters command and staff interaction; continue to focus on disjointed platoon exercises without in- teraction with higher, adjacent, or sub- ordinate units; or they lack the essential realism that is inserted by getting sol- diers out in the dirt and on the iron. The ironic thing is that we are still conduct- ing multiechelon training — we have

U.S. Army Photo by MSG Larry Lane simply severed the links by conducting the various events in different locations “A unit interacts not only with its subordinate elements, but also with those of adjacent or or in different venues. It is not uncom- higher units, and even with other units scattered throughout their battlespace. This interaction mon for battalions to conduct FTX staff is an integral part of realistic training, particularly in regard to team building and cohesion.” exercises while their companies and pla- toons train in isolation. tive task, or a group of related tasks and and in the depth of the training that it This trend is replicated at all echelons. drills, through practice.”12 This experi- imparts. The LTX trains what to think, 15 In an attempt to reduce overhead and ence is often the most detailed exer- rather than how to think. limit costs, many units have historically cise that a unit can attempt at home substituted events such as training ex- station. STXs are flexible in nature, These training exercises have served ercise without troops (TEWT) and use include drills, leader tasks, and soldier the force well, providing a flexible and wheeled vehicles instead of expensive tasks, and can be modified by units to varied array of tools from which a tracked vehicles. Recently, this has tak- meet their needs. commander can select depending on his en the form of simulations, such as Live Fire Exercise (LFX) resources, level of training, and objec- simulation network (SIMNET) or com- . The LFX tives. The problem is that as the size, is focused on “unit and weapons inte- puter mediated staff exercises, to repli- complexity, and expense of these exer- gration at the company-team level.”13 cate portions of or the entire battlefield. cises increase, commanders’ choices While the various substitutes are valu- LFXs are intended to incorporate both decrease because of resource limita- maneuver and weapons systems using able tools, they often suffer from limi- live ammunition. While these can be tions. The best training venue and the tations inherent to the venue, but most closest to war is the FTX, which is significantly, the different technologi- conducted at home stations, they are epitomized at the CTCs. More impor- often conducted in isolation, partly for cal tools have been employed sepa- safety reasons, partly because of short- tantly, the FTX is the only exercise rately, as isolated training events. In where the interaction of the complete this way, many units train in isolated age of range space, and partly because system of higher, adjacent, and subor- their resource-intensive nature fre- segments such as tank tactical tables, quently limits the employment of sup- dinate elements is exercised. But today, platoon STX or LTX, platoon and com- the FTX is often unfeasible at home pany TEWTs, and the occasional sin- porting, adjacent, and higher elements stations due to the constraints that limit to nontactical supporting roles, if at all. gle-company or single-battalion STX or this type of training to well-funded, but FTX. The most grievous inadequacy of Lanes Training Exercise (LTX). The limited rotations to the CTCs. training executed in these disjointed LTX is a technique of the STX that is segments is the lack of interaction with focused on training “company-size and The resource limitations of home sta- both the full range of BOS elements smaller units on one or more collective tion training are not simply shortages of and with the adjacent, higher, and low- tasks (and prerequisite soldier and lead- training land or physical and fiscal re- er echelons of the organization. There er individual tasks and battle drills) sup- sources. Home station exercises also is no substitute for multiechelon train- porting a unit’s METL; however it usu- lack instrumented feedback, dedicated 14 ing. In addition to learning the true ally focuses on one primary task.” OPFOR, observer/controller (OC) sup- complexities of maneuvering, the com- Simply, the LTX is a mini-STX that port, and the detailed scenarios of the plete organization has the added bene- focuses on fewer collective tasks to CTCs. The lack of these non-TOE com- fits of cohesion and esprit that come focus the training. This added focus is ponents is felt in the tactical realism of from shared experiences and challenges not without sacrifice. Significantly, the the training — what benefit is derived that have been jointly overcome. LTX has no free-play. Opposing force from training without an impartial ob- (OPFOR) organization and actions, and server to provide feedback and experi- The changing scope of technology the friendly force mission and execu- ence-based mentoring? What benefit is now offers us the chance to do more tion are scripted. The intent of the LTX derived from an enemy force who with these venues. Just as an FTX com- is not to train for outcome, but drill the merely replicates U.S. military tactics prises many smaller events, these tech- execution of the task-based process. or who simply acts as a passive tar- nological venue-based events collec- The LTX is self-limited in both realism get?16 tively comprise a conceptually larger 18 ARMOR — September-October 2002

event. The problem lies in the relatively artificial environment. To obtain a col- lective training benefit, the events must be linked the same way that various units are linked, both in echelons and across echelons. By linking simulta- neous isolated events that are already trained in the live, virtual, and construc- tive venues, all echelons can train in the functional equivalent of an FTX. Con- necting the live, virtual, and construc- tive venues is referred to as the synthetic theater of war (STOW). STOW is not a new way of training; rather, it merely links what we are already doing. In a STOW, a battalion could conduct si- multaneous multiechelon training on platoon-maneuver in an LTX, on com- pany-maneuver in a simulator-based STX, and in a computer-mediated bat- U.S. Army Photo by MSG Larry Lane talion FTX staff exercise. “The LFX is focused on “unit and weapons integration at the company-team level.” LFXs are intended to incorporate both maneuver and weapons systems using live ammunition.” That we already do these things sepa- rately and without connection to each lows all parts of a decentralized train- NET requires no new technology, sim- other is significant; STOW is not a new ing scenario to train as if all the parts ply new links and translation tools, a event, but a new way of conducting the were present, even while some parts problem already solved by numerous events we already do. What is new may be separated by large distances or commercial web-enabled systems.18 Em- about this is the conceptual framework. may be present in virtual or simulated ploying the VTP staff, both SIMNET By connecting these exercises so that form only. The NTX expands the scope and Janus offer a turn-key environment each element participates in the deci- of isolated multiechelon exercises be- for Armor School classes and visiting sions, actions, and effects of the others, yond that of mere battle drills. units — an experience that, by adding we construct a networked training ex- the Fort Knox OC team, replicates the ercise (NTX) that is greater than the The pieces of the NTX already exist. CTC training experience complete with sum of its parts. The NTX allows FTX- Virtual, constructive, and live venues a challenging OPFOR and feedback type training, with all its interaction, are available. By adding OC support, it from the experienced OC staff. teamwork, and cohesion building while would be possible to create a CTC-like reducing overhead, resource demands, experience by networking multiechelon The Fort Knox live venue is unique in and time limits by maximizing avail- events into a virtual exercise extending the Zussman Mounted Urban Combat able venues, which replicate a much over an enormous virtual battlespace. Training Site (MUCTS). This is the larger environment. For example, the virtual training pro- only urban operations site in the Army gram (VTP) at the U.S. Army Armor that has been specifically designed The potential benefits exceed that of Center at Fort Knox has operated in all and constructed for mounted warfare.19 simply enhancing current training be- three venues for several years.17 By instrumenting the MUCTS with a cause the STOW can replicate a battle- system, such as the deployable force- space that dwarfs any live environment At Fort Knox, the virtual venue is pro- on-force instrumented range system replicated battlespace. The benefits of vided by the SIMNET mounted warfare (DFIRST) or the deployable instru- linking the various tactical and opera- simulation trainer, which provides ma- mented training system (DITS), the tional echelons cannot be overstated. neuver training to tank and mechanized complex, already carefully networked The modern battlefield makes it almost forces from platoon to task force size. for video and audio AARs, could be impossible to replicate doctrinal dis- Running in the Unix operating system directly integrated into a virtual battle tances on most training areas, and the and employing the Modular Semi-Au- fought in battlespace represented simul- vastly increased battlespace of the in- tonomous Forces application, SIMNET taneously in the live, virtual, and con- terim brigade combat teams will multi- creates a virtual maneuver box in which structive venues.20 An alternate live ply that problem. The NTX is a solu- tank and mechanized combined arms venue would be a dry-fire instrumented tion. Just as the FTX is a “high-cost, teams conduct mission essential task LFX, in which a tank range, instru- high-overhead exercise conducted un- list exercises. mented with DFIRST or DITS, serves der simulated combat conditions in the as an assault, cordon, or attack by fire field.” The NTX will exercise BOS The Janus Mediated Staff Exercise segment in support of a further live functions, including all assigned and at- (JMSE) system, a command and train- ing venue primarily for battalion through exercise in the MUCTS and a larger tached units functioning as combined maneuver venue in the SIMNET/JMSE arms teams, only without the associ- brigade staffs, provides the Fort Knox world. ated space, high-cost, and high-over- constructive venue. Running on PCs, head detriments. Further, by including Janus is a highly flexible battle simula- A typical exercise might include a bat- a free-play and adaptive OPFOR and tion that can run scenarios ranging from talion task force with the mission to at- the honest-broker feedback of OCs in high-intensity conflict to disaster relief tack and seize a defended town. One the NTX, we ensure that we are train- and peacekeeping operations. Creating company team (live) will attack the ing as we fight. This way, the NTX al- a STOW by linking JMSE and SIM- MUCTS at Fort Knox. The other two ARMOR — September-October 2002 19

company teams (virtual) will form a The Army trains for and fights wars. completely retrain every year to maintain a mere cordon around the town, denying en- When training for war we must always average level of cohesion and collective training. emy reinforcement or escape. One of remember that we are in the training 10FM 25-101. these company teams is using simula- business, not the technology business. 11FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exer- tors at home station; another is in the Technology will change, but it is only cises, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Print- SIMNET at Fort Knox. The task force the tool we use to an end, not the end ing Office, 10 September 1984, p. 53. headquarters controls the battle in a itself. Just as a trained worker discovers 12 JMSE from home station or Fort Knox. new things he can accomplish by em- FM 25-101, p. C7. OCs participate at all levels, from pla- ploying old and new tools in new ways 13Ibid., p. C9. toon to task force. For the cost of mov- and new combinations, so must we. 14Training Circular 25-10, A Leader’s Guide to ing two company teams of personnel, Our society excels at rapid and com- Lane Training, Washington, DC, U.S. Govern- and only one company team of equip- petitive adaptation to new opportunities ment Printing Office, 26 August 1996, p. 9. ment, a complete CTC-like experience constantly created by fast developing 15This is an important point, for it touches on has been assembled. information technology. By employing the nature of warfare as a complex adaptive sys- the STOW to conduct the NTX, we can tem (CAS). In a CAS, actions beget adaptive Careful preparation, rehearsal, and a continue to train with the detail and pre- reaction in continuous sequential trees. After only certain amount of imagination and ini- cision that we already apply to LTX and a few iterations of this cycle, the results become tiative will be necessary to make it STX, while adding the interaction and essentially unforeseeable. In this way, it is diffi- work. Conceptually, however, this is no team-building effects of larger scale cult, if possible at all, to predict the future actions harder than the precomputer days of of an enemy or the future nature of war beyond exercises. NTXs will allow units to the first few action-reaction cycles. staff exercises in which junior officers train in CTC-like environments, but at role-played from scripts according to an acceptable cost and greatly in- 16Ideally, an enemy force would be made up of the direction of external evaluator um- creased tempo. It is time to think out- tough, motivated, intelligent, and experienced pires for the benefit of battalion and soldiers told to fight to win, even at the expense side the maneuver box, and realize the of ignoring doctrine. There would be no rules brigade staffs with maps and grease benefits from taking existing tools and pencils. For the troops in the virtual governing their behavior, only the limitations of systems and combining them in new their ability and imagination. environment, all elements will be pre- ways. sent and visible; the only loss is the 17The VTP consists of a standing team of civil- absence of rain, mud, and the smell of ian exercise controllers and OCs who both oper- cordite. For the staff at home station, Notes ate and provide AAR services for SIMNET and Janus events, as well as the Fort Knox OC team, the exercise will be perfectly realistic “The Warthogs,” which provides OC support for — reports coming over the digital link 1Orson Scott Card, Ender’s Game, Tor Books, New York, January 1985. platoon-company team size virtual and urban from the virtual and instrumented live warfare exercises. 2 exercises will be as real as those from a U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 25-101, Battle 18 real battle, lacking only the ability to Focused Training, U.S. Government Printing Of- Indeed, the OneSAF software of rehosted SIM- fice, Washington, DC, 30 September 1990. NET eliminates the need for connecting hardware drive out and see for one’s self. As for and software between the SIMNET and construc- the troops in the live venue, while their 3Historically, U.S. Army units tend to lose, or at tive computer-mediated systems such as Janus. adjacent units may be invisible, they least suffer disproportionate losses, during the 19Only the Fort Knox MUCTS has facilities and first battle of major American wars, the most still know that they are there behind structures built to withstand live fire, demo, con- noteworthy recent occurrences being Kasserine those trees or perhaps on the other side trolled pyrotechnic effects, and even the collision Pass in World War II and Task Force Smith in of the hill. of tanks and fighting vehicles. Structures are built the Korean War. of 200 psi concrete with doubled rebar. For OCs, crosstalk and initiative will 4 From a philosophical standpoint, each venue 20 add to the experience. A certain amount may be regarded as a product of the age of human Both DFIRST and DITS are deployable, mod- of adjudication is necessary in any ex- development that brought it about. See Alvin ular systems, MILES compatible, and allow in- ercise — actual .50 cal. rounds will Toffler, The Third Wave, Random House, New strumentation of remote training areas from a York, February 1980. deployable package. Further, both systems offer a shoot through a building and any occu- complete player tracking and playback-AAR pants, but MILES .50 cal. rounds are 5FM 25-101. capability. stopped by dust, smoke, and leaves. 6 This interaction is of crucial importance, and is Just as an OC will make spot decisions overlooked in much of the Army’s performance- to correct this situation, he can also cor- based training environments. CPT Michael R. Evans received a rect virtual adjacent organizations. For 7Trained soldiers do not make a trained platoon, B.A. from Norwich University and is example, an OC in the virtual venue nor do trained platoons make a trained company. observes that one of the cordon force a graduate of the Naval Postgradu- To understand not only how the entire organiza- ate School. He was commissioned in teams allowed a virtual enemy platoon tion fights, but also how the organization’s parts to infiltrate the town from the west. He interact within it, there must be a common ex- 1993 at OCS and has held various quickly calls his counterpart at the perience base to which the participants can refer command and staff positions in the MUCTS, who sends in a live OPFOR in common. CAARNG, including full-time training platoon from the west. The challenge is 8In a typical cycle, a brigade combat team trains officer, tank platoon leader, mortar to the unit commanders and staff — intensively for a year to prepare for a CTC rota- platoon leader, and battalion S1. will they notice the enemy movement tion. Included in this preparation is the “freezing” Now a Title 10 AGR Officer, he pre- of normal personnel rotations so as to maintain and alert the team in the close fight? viously served on the staff of the Only through multiechelon training is the continuity and cohesion that is formed during this sort of change, interaction, and this high-intensity training. National Guard Bureau in Arlington, adaptation possible in an environment 9Ideally, a unit would complete such training at VA, and is currently assigned as the that teaches the true cause-and-effect a rate congruent with its turnover: a unit with 25 deputy team chief of the Fort Knox rules of the battlefield. percent turnover per quarter, for example, should OC Team, The Warthogs. 20 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Battle Command to ISR Planning

by Major Kevin L. Jacobi

In the midst of Army Transformation and lead, and results from combining commander’s ability to see and under- and the creation of new and emerging the art of command and the science of stand the components of the battlefield doctrine and capstone manuals, it is control. is fundamental to his decisionmaking. challenging to stay abreast of current Although not graphically illustrated in doctrine, much less interpret it and Visualize is the process of achieving a FM 6-0, the commonly accepted com- clear understanding of the forces’ cur- understand its application. This article rent state with relationship to the envi- ponents of the battlefield are terrain, examines battle command and seeing enemy, and self. All three components the battlefield; commander’s critical ronment, developing a desired end state affect each other, and the commander that represents mission accomplish- information requirements (CCIR); tiers ment, and determining the sequence of must understand the relationships be- of reconnaissance; and intelligence, tween them: surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activity that moves the force from its current state to the end state. Com- • Terrain is neutral and affects both planning. manders describe their visualization by enemy and friendly forces; each side Battle Command and participating in the military decision- can use it to their advantage or demise. Seeing the Battlefield making process (MDMP), specifically • through intent, planning guidance, and Enemy actions affect us and our ac- tions affect the enemy. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, commander’s critical information re- Command and Control, defines battle quirements (CCIR). Commanders then • Self includes our own forces and command as, “The exercise of com- choose a course of action (COA) and support as well as other units involved mand in operations against a hostile communicate it through an order. Fi- in the operation. thinking opponent.”1 Decisionmaking nally, commanders lead their units to and leadership are the two sides of bat- mission accomplishment throughout the Visualization, as well as the other parts tle command. This article focuses pri- operations process. of the methodology, occurs in all three marily on decisionmaking. steps of the operations process — plan, Visualization is the single most im- prepare, and execute. In each step of Visualize, Describe, Direct, and Lead. portant part of this methodology. Visu- The latest doctrine states that the com- alizing or seeing the battlefield is by no this process, visualization remains a cornerstone. However, it has different manders’ methodology for decision- means a new concept. It has been em- implications depending on where the making is visualize, describe, direct, bedded in our doctrine for decades. A commander is in the operations cycle.

Planning. During the planning phase, visualization is the most difficult to at- tain as there are a multitude of factors to grasp. Before the commander can begin to visualize how to get to the desired end state, he must first mentally attain situational awareness (SA) using: • Mission. The unit’s mission, task, and purpose and how it relates, or is nested, with the overall brigade and di- vision operations, as well as understand- ing the commander’s intent.

“...the commanders’ methodol- ogy for decisionmaking is visu- alize, describe, direct, and lead, and results from combining the art of command and the science of control.”

ARMOR — September-October 2002 21

“The commander often launches reconnaissance before developing a complete plan. In fact, it is often necessary for reconnaissance to pro- vide additional information on which to base the final plan...”

• Enemy. Initially, how the enemy is The commander will gain SA or initial information as described in FM 5-0, Ar- an obstacle to the operation; subse- visualization as he begins his com- my Planning and Orders Production.3 quently more info will be needed. mander’s analysis of brigade warning Although FM 6-0 is not as clear as FM orders (WO), participates with the bri- 5-0 on the types of information — rou- • Terrain and weather. An absolute key aspect of visualization. Initial un- gade commander in collaboration, and tine, critical, and exceptional — these listens to the brigade operation order types of information are still very rele- derstanding may simply be major as- (OPORD). The final validation or re- vant to how we do business. FM 5-0 pects of terrain and how it will impact options for both friendly and enemy finement of the task force command- states that, “CCIR has three compo- er’s visualization is when he receives nents: priority intelligence requirements forces; subsequently more info will be his staff’s mission analysis — a key (PIR), friendly forces information re- needed. step that the staff must understand. This quirements (FFIR), and essential ele- • Troops and support available. Ini- evolution of visualization will obvi- ments of friendly information (EEFI).4 tially, grasping troops to tasks to iden- ously vary based on experience, train- FM 6-0 drops the third, EEFI stating tify major shortcomings in units or ing, education, and knowledge of doc- that, “Although not a CCIR, they be- support; subsequently more details on trine.2 Not until the commander has come a priority once the commander force ratios, resource allocation, and first gained SA through seeing the bat- states them.”5 Regardless of where EEFI strengths will be needed. tlefield and attains situational under- belongs, CCIR are best understood • standing (SU), can he achieve the high- when viewed holistically. Simply put, Time available. Time available, but er level of visualization. CCIR is about what decisions will be initially how time relates to the process — plan, prepare, and execute; extremes Commander’s Critical made and what types of information a Information Requirements commander needs to make those de- on either end will drive how the com- cisions. Figure 1 graphically explains mander executes the methodology. Before we discuss other aspects of the CCIR, how it is related to seeing the • Civil considerations. Initially, may preparation phase, it is necessary to ex- battlefield, what the elements typically be controlled; subsequently a plethora amine CCIR. The key to understanding drive, and where they are found. of info may be needed. CCIR is to understand the categories of Preparation. FM 6-0 defines preparation as, “activities by the unit before execution to im- prove its ability to conduct the operation including, but not lim- ited to, plan refinement, rehear- sals, reconnaissance, coordina- tion, inspections, and move- ment.”6 It further states that, “re- connaissance is often the most important part of the prepara- tion phase, providing data that contribute to answering the CCIR. As such, the commander should plan and execute it with the same care as any other op- eration. The commander often launches reconnaissance before developing a complete plan. In fact, it is often necessary for reconnaissance to provide addi- tional information on which to base the final plan.7 This idea is not new; it is embedded in our troop-leading procedures at the lowest level. It is, however, eas- ier said than done as demon- strated at our combat training centers (CTCs) and in count- less Center for Army Lessons Learned articles on reconnais- sance planning failures. During Figure 1. Seeing the Battlefield and CCIR Relationship preparation, the commander up- 22 ARMOR — September-October 2002

dates and validates his visualization as as DP-Tiger Trap North, or targeting sors, capabilities, and new digital sys- the results of the ISR operation become based such as a DP to commit field ar- tems that will launch us into the infor- available.8 The commander must de- tillery or air assets to destroy high- mation superiority age, but the reality is termine if new information invalidates value targets. that ISR or R&S planning basics re- the plan, requires adjustment to the plan, main the same. • Tier 4. Occurs after the decisive or validates it with no further changes. operation. Tier 3 is both reconnaissance The earlier the commander identifies Mission Analysis — Developing the need for modifications, the easier focused on future operations answering the Initial R&S Annex general IR, and surveillance to maintain he can incorporate and synchronize contact with the enemy. Tier 4 restarts Upcoming doctrine will probably read, them into the plan. the reconnaissance cycle. “developing the initial ISR plan.” This, Tiers of Reconnaissance in and of itself, will help. “Annex,” al- ISR Planning though doctrinally correct, just does not To better illustrate how the ISR opera- There has been, and continues to be, have the horsepower that “plan” does. tions contribute to the commander’s vi- ISR planning can be examined by fol- sion of the battlefield and what types of an extraordinary amount of energy ex- lowing the collection management cy- pended on ISR planning for several rea- information are needed and when, we sons: reconnaissance and surveillance cle, which includes: developing require- will examine a tactics, techniques, and ments; developing the collection plan; procedures (TTP) whose foundation is (R&S) planning is difficult; current doc- tasking or requesting collection; dis- Tactics, Tech- trine only sporadically addresses how it based on FM 34-2-1, is done; rapid planning maneuver CTCs semination; evaluating reports; updating niques, and Procedures for Reconnais- ISR planning; and executing. sance and Surveillance and Support to are often not conducive to properly Counterreconnaissance, Offensive Re- conducting ISR planning; and units The collection management cycle is a have simply failed to give it the atten- good start to ISR planning but lacks connaissance Planning.9 This FM iden- tifies three general areas when plan- tion required to be successful. For these the operators’ “meat-and-potatoes ap- reasons, our reconnaissance operations proach.” The following is the collection ning for offensive operations; however, have historically produced less-than-fa- management cycle tailored more to- it lends more clarity to view it as four vorable results. Now we find ourselves ward the operators: areas, or “tiers of reconnaissance.”10 replacing the old faithful R&S with the The four tiers of reconnaissance are: new supercharged ISR. An observer Developing requirements. Not count- • Tier 1. Occurs before the opera- may conclude that the renaming oc- ing execution adjustments, collection tion commences. Tier 1 answers voids curred because it is a new thing we do, requirements come from voids in IR in information. They are generally and much more complicated than some and CCIR; the initial event template basic scout missions (route and zone ole’ archaic R&S mission. We now (IR and CCIR); the mature event tem- reconnaissance) that facilitate the unit have, and are getting even more, sen- plate (from the wargame) that spawns getting from the assembly areas or attack positions to the objec- tive — often called “the ap- proach march.” TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3 TIER 4 (BEFORE) (BEFORE & (DURING) (AFTER) • “APPROACH DURING) “CONFIRM “FUTURE Tier 2. Occurs preferably MARCH” “CONFIRM BRANCH OPS” before, but may also occur as OR DENY PLANS” the main body begins execu- EMPCOA” tion. Tier 2 confirms the ene- Targeting/ Branches Voids in info(IR) IR CCIR Voids in info(IR) my’s COA and validates the (CCIR) task force’s base plan of attack. Tier 2 answers CCIR, such as for decision point (DP)-Tiger NAI Strike North or Tiger Strike TAI South. Tier 2 also answers in- formation requirements (IR), such as maneuver event driven + targeting information required + to support the task force indirect TAI fire plan. + + • Tier 3. Here is where units + + OBJ often fail. Tier 3 is primarily sur- HAWK veillance and occurs during the operation. Tier 3 confirms the enemy’s reaction to our base LOA plan and provides the command- LD er with the CCIR that he needs to arrive at a DP. Tier 3 DPs are usually maneuver based, such Figure 2. Tiers of Reconnaissance ARMOR — September-October 2002 23

the decision support template (DST) Developing the plan. Now that we our doctrine says initial reconnaissance for CCIR; and external requirement — know what ISR assets do initially, the is supposed to do — and give it time to higher IR or CCIR and lower requests staff integrates all the ISR assets into a do it? Is it possible that all our high- for information (RFI). plan such as developing a COA. There speed planning guides that say one to are a plethora of considerations such two hours to mission analysis brief are Once the commander receives the new as availability, capability, vulnerability, wrong? Or are they right and we just mission, he immediately begins formu- performance history, cueing, redundan- have not cracked the code on getting lating an initial visualization through cy, mix, and integration. Once the staff the ISR plan done in time? Maybe the commander’s analysis of brigade WOs, has developed the plan, it must make reader has some TTP that will help or collaboration with the brigade com- all provisions necessary for its success bridge the gap, or perhaps the new FM mander and listening to the brigade — the scheme of support, better known 5-0 or FM 3-55, Intelligence, Surveil- OPORD. During this early stage, the as a wargame. Several issues must be lance, and Reconnaissance, will lend commander and staff will identify gaps addressed, to include: other reconnais- some clarity to this dilemma.11 Read- in information that need to be filled. sance assets in the AO; location, mis- er’s comments are welcome. Some of these voids may be answered sion, and specific instructions to scouts; through RFIs to brigade, while others maneuver support, fire control meas- Tasking or Requesting Collection can be handled through the task force ures, or extraction considerations; air organic assets. The majority of these Tasking collection is done through the defense artillery and Army airspace ISR order. Whatever TTP is used to voids are probably Tier 1, but poten- command and control measures; what tially Tier 2. Once the commander and kind of fire support scouts need; does it communicate the order, such as matrix, staff complete the initial assessment of written, sketches, or a combination, it have to move to support them; is there must be flexible and user friendly to the new mission, the commander issues a requirement for essential fire support his initial guidance. tasks, fire support coordination meas- accommodate receiving new tasks and instructions. These additional tasks and The commander’s initial guidance for ures, mobility, countermobility, and sur- instructions may occur throughout the reconnaissance is based on information vivability assets; what kind of logis- tics do they need; do they need Class I, operation, but we know for sure that voids identified by him and his staff. additions will be added after the task The commander’s initial guidance could III, or V medical and maintenance sup- force completes COA analysis and the include: how to abbreviate the MDMP; port and evacuation; what about com- munications and long-range commo; DST. In a time-constrained environ- initial time allocation; initial ISR plan- ment, the initial ISR order may be as ning guidance to staff and/or initial re- does retrans need to move; and does simple as an ISR graphic with matrix con to begin, usually based on move- the tactical operations center (TOC) need to move? These are just a few issued to scouts and other assets. How- ment; authorized movement; and addi- ever, when time is available, it is pref- tional staff tasks. questions, but the questions will not be erable for ISR assets to be briefed by asked unless the staff wargames the action. This wargame is not a democ- the task force staff in addition to re- At this point, the staff is in a whirl- ceiving the graphics and order. This wind analyzing tactical problems as ratic COA analysis however, there is no method is also preferred because it well as beginning ISR planning based time for that, it is a synch drill of the battlefield operating system to ensure gives the task force commander an op- on the commander’s guidance. Once portunity to personally convey his fo- the staff conducts intelligence prepara- ISR operation is not just successful, but cus for reconnaissance to his scouts. Up- tion of the battlefield, it will generate actually supports the commander’s de- cisionmaking. on completion of COA analysis and the terrain IR and enemy PIR. DST, fragmentary orders (FRAGO) are Terrain IR is used to assess task force Once the task force commander is used to refocus and add requirements to elements, such as the task force’s abil- ready to receive his staff’s mission anal- the ISR executors, based on the DST ity to move tactically through mobility ysis, including the proposed initial ISR architecture. This is vital because it pro- corridor 1 — or is it a defile; the task plan, his SA has evolved into SU — vides the scout with critical Tier 3 col- force’s ability to cross a creek any- not only can he see the battlefield, he lection requirements that support the where — are they restricted to fords or understands it — which has perpetu- most up-to-date CCIR. The method of just two bridges; or can they use the ated his visualization. He will describe dissemination is probably frequency area for an attack position? that visualization as apart of his plan- modulation or digital. Due to the criti- ning guidance. However, the mission cality of ISR assets receiving and un- Enemy PIR is the contrast between analysis, particularly the ISR portion, is derstanding these requirements, it is situation templates, which will yield the critical to ensure that the commander paramount this skill is trained regularly initial event template. The initial event has a full appreciation for the battle- between the TOC and the scouts. Un- template will only focus on identifying field, and the staff has properly identi- derstanding, familiarity, and good stand- which COA the enemy has adopted — fied the tactical problems. During the ing operating procedures between the primarily a Tier 2 focus. The staff com- brief, the staffs’ analysis helps the com- TOC and the scouts will help this cru- bines the commander’s initial guidance mander verify his visualization. The cial communications exercise be suc- for reconnaissance and the initial event commander approves, or approves with cessful. template, which includes named areas additions, the initial ISR plan during of interest that indicate a particular ene- the mission analysis brief. Once ap- Dissemination. The ultimate goal of my course of action (PIR) with any ter- proved, reconnaissance can begin. Ac- dissemination is to get the right infor- rain IR and external IR to form the ini- complishing all this at mission analysis mation into the hands of the decision- tial ISR plan. The initial event template is obviously the challenge. What is re- maker in time for him to make a sound is the base graphics for that plan. alistic, yet timely enough to do what decision. Planners arrange direct dis- 24 ARMOR — September-October 2002

semination whenever possible. For ex- formation invalidates the plan, requires Although this examination of theory is ample, information regarding NAI 1 that him to adjust it, or validates it with no based on doctrine, it is permeated with triggers target area of interest (TAI) 1, further changes. He balances the loss the author’s interpretation and opinion. the task force allocation of close air of synchronization and coordination As the Army continues to transform support (CAS) should go directly to the caused from changing the plan against and move into the information supe- task force commander on the task force the problem of trying to execute a plan riority age, it is appropriate to revisit command net, the battle captain and S2 that no longer fits reality.12 Changes in what we already know as a point of are checking the information against the the plan will result in changes to the in- departure into unknown territory. “Re- CCIR/decision support matrix to see if telligence requirements or adjustments connaissance has always been, and will it meets the criteria and is what the com- to the collection timeline. continue to be, the precursor to all op- mander wants to target. The fire support Updating intelligence, surveillance, erations. As such, we must plan with officer, air liaison officer, and air de- and reconnaissance planning. As stat- the same care as we do for any other fense officer are monitoring and are operation.”14 Anything less will hinder beginning to lean forward. The battle ed above, the ISR plan will require ad- the commander’s ability to see the bat- justment during execution. The follow- captain and S2 quickly agree and the ing factors could drive changes to the tlefield and make decisions at the right battle captain pushes to talk and makes time and place. ISR plan: the recommendation to the commander • to execute DP 1 — CAS in EA HAWK The commander generates new CCIR Notes to destroy the MIBN reserve. A good as he refines or adjusts the COA to fit ISR plan directs the collectors on what the current battlefield situation. 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command net information is to be passed and to • An SOR is satisfied or overcome by and Control (DRAG Edition), U.S. Government whom. The other mark of a good ISR events and frees an asset for other op- Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 2001. order is that it’s not only included in erations. 2Ibid., p. 2-4. the task force OPORD, but it is inte- • grated with maneuver to ensure a full A single asset has unexpected suc- 3FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Produc- synchronization between maneuver and cess, freeing redundant assets for other tion, GPO, Washington, DC, TPB. ISR. operations. 4 • Ibid. The last topic to remember about dis- An asset cues the task force staff, 5 but requires confirmation that requires FM 6-0. semination is perishabilty. During exe- 6 cution, most information from recon- dynamic retasking of other assets. Ibid. naissance elements sitting in Tier 2 and • Timing the operation has become 7Ibid., p. 6-12. Tier 3 is combat information. Combat desynchronized which requires modify- 8Ibid., p. 4-12. information is unevaluated data, gath- ing the latest time information is of ered by or provided directly to the tac- value (LTIOV) or changing priority. 9FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- tical commander that, due to its highly • dures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and perishable nature or the criticality of the Higher headquarters orders the task Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, force into an unplanned operation. GPO, Washington, DC, 19 June 1991. situation, cannot be processed into tac- tical intelligence in time to satisfy the Executing. During execution, the com- 10Ibid. user’s tactical intelligence requirements. mander’s ability to see the battlefield 11FM 5-0; and FM 3-55, Intelligence, Surveil- feeds his SA of terrain, enemy, and self; lance, and Reconnaissance, GPO, Washington, Evaluating reports. Throughout prep- a clear mental picture of these facili- DC, TBP. aration, the scouts are sending vital tates his SU. The commander’s SU is 12 information to the task force. The task fleeting — he may slip in and out of it FM 6-0, p. 6-13. force XO oversees the S2 and battle depending on his ability to accurately 13Ibid., p. 6-25. captain who track the status of each see the battlefield. If the commander’s 14Quote from Major Gregg Athey, Chief, Cav- specific order and request (SOR), and visualization is accurate and still ap- alry Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine analyze specific IR and PIR. They pay plies to the tactical situation, his CCIR Development. particular attention to which assets are are valid and he continues to follow the not producing the required results. It is plan and the execution decisions al- very likely that the staff’s assumptions ready identified in Tier 3. However, the MAJ Kevin L. Jacobi is a student about the threat COAs will not prove commander’s assessment of the opera- at the U.S. Army Command and entirely correct. The XO, S2, and S3 tion may change his visualization to fit General Staff College, Fort Leaven- assess the value of the information a changed tactical situation, such as ex- worth, KS. He has served in various from collection assets and refine SORs ploit an unplanned opportunity, counter command and staff positions, to to fill gaps during execution. The com- an unexpected threat, or change it from include: RSTA doctrine writer, U.S. mander’s evaluation of this information an unsuccessful decisive operation to a Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY; 13 is also very critical to his visualization. more successful shaping operation. commander, C Company, 1-77 Ar- As friendly assumptions prove true or These are called adjustment decisions, mor, 1st Infantry Division, Schwein- false, as reconnaissance confirms or and require a commander to describe denies enemy actions and dispositions, the new visualization to subordinates furt, Germany; commander, HHC, and the status of friendly units change, and staff so that they understand the 1-77 Armor, 1st Infantry Division, the commander adjusts or aborts his intent and can adjust the execution and Schweinfurt; and G3 plans officer, plan to account for the current situa- exercise initiative in their area of re- 24th Infantry Division, and assistant tion. He determines whether new in- sponsibility. S3, 4-64 Armor, Fort Stewart, GA. ARMOR — September-October 2002 25

The Cavalry Team: Scout-Tank Integration by First Lieutenant Leif Nott and First Lieutenant Ryan Popple

“The reconnaissance detachments are responsible for seeking out and re- porting as much as they can, without drawing attention to themselves. They must be speedy and agile, have a good range, possess good means of com- munication, and be responsive to command... If their task demands something heavier in the way of fighting capacity this must be forwarded to them.”1 – Major General Heinz Guderian

The armored cavalry troop is the best • Reconnaissance missions include trained and best equipped unit in the route reconnaissance, zone reconnais- U.S. Army to win the reconnaissance sance, and area reconnaissance. fight. The combination of cavalry fight- • Security missions include screen- ing vehicles, main battle tanks, and heavy mortars, make the heavy cavalry ing, area security, and convoy security. troop one of the most powerful and • Economy of force includes offen- flexible elements on the modern battle- sive operations such as hasty attack, at- field. While there is much information tack, and movement to contact; defen- available on the doctrinal employment sive missions such as defending a bat- of the cavalry troop, scout platoon, or tle position and defending in sector; tank platoon, the scout-tank team is an and retrograde missions such as delay. often practiced yet doctrinally neglect- The tank and scout platoons in each ed organization. This article explores several useful tactics, techniques, and cavalry team work together to accom- plish troop missions, though their roles procedures for developing and execut- are not the same. In most missions, the ing effective scout-tank cooperation. cation is not exposed to enemy recon- tank and scout platoons have very dif- naissance. Using combined arms cooperation at ferent roles. It is the simultaneous exe- the lowest unit level ensures that the cution of these two different elements During economy of force missions, cavalry troop retains the initiative dur- that ensures the cavalry team’s success. the tank platoon is the main effort. All ing the reconnaissance and security offensive operations revolve around al- fight. The most important benefit of During reconnaissance, the scout pla- lowing the tank platoon to maneuver to toon is the main effort. The scout pla- a tactically advantageous and decisive scout-tank cooperation is that it allows toon’s mission tends to be identical to the cavalry troop to use the most ap- spot on the battlefield to maximize its propriate system against a threat, which the troop’s mission, with task and pur- combat power. During the defense, the pose being the same. The tank platoon tank platoon anchors in the troop de- leads to greater survivability and an mission should emphasize its ancillary economy of force. If the scout and tank fense while the scout platoon covers the platoons successfully cooperate on the role to the scout platoon, emphasizing flanks. that the tank platoon follows and sup- battlefield, the tanks will be in the right ports its sister platoon until substantial place at the right time to maximize Cavalry Team Task Organization combat power and the scouts will be enemy contact is made. The tank pla- toon prepares a hasty attack or defense The cavalry team’s flexibility allows free to continue reconnaissance and not to preserve the scout platoon’s combat become decisively engaged by superior it to array its individual vehicles to ac- enemy forces. power. complish the diverse missions of divi- During security missions, the relation- sion cavalry units. In some tactical si- ship between the scout and tank pla- tuations, an immediate response across Missions of a Cavalry Troop: the entire forward line of own troops Tank and Scout Platoon Roles toons remains unchanged. The scout platoon’s mission is still identical to the may require a cavalry team’s tanks to The heavy cavalry troop is a unique troop’s mission. The tank platoon gives spread out behind scout sections. In organization that allows troop com- depth to the security mission. While not other tactical situations, the factors of manders flexibility to accomplish vari- expected to make first contact with mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, ous missions. The diversity of its or- enemy forces, the tank platoon is ex- and civilians may dictate that the tank ganic elements affords the troop com- pected to react quickly and violently. It platoons be massed to most effectively mander this flexibility. The missions of is also important to note that during respond to greater enemy threats. The a heavy cavalry troop are reconnais- security operations, the scout platoon scout and tank platoon leaders must sance, security, and economy of force: must ensure that the tank platoon’s lo- organize their cavalry team to meet 26 ARMOR — September-October 2002 different situations. This article identi- sister tank platoon while continuing re- the tank platoon. Scouts also need to fies two methods of task organizing a connaissance, allowing tanks to destroy continuously update the tank platoon cavalry team: the hunter/killer concept the enemy. Used successfully, both on the location of each scout element and the quick reaction force (QRF). The scout and tank platoons maintain mo- to prevent fratricide and decrease re- authors have successfully employed mentum. The distance between the sponse time. Tanks should use covered both methods during many tactical sce- scout and tank platoon is not fixed. The and concealed positions to avoid enemy narios. tank platoon should not be so close that detection. Tank platoon leaders should it makes contact with the enemy at the also minimize using formations, as they During the Vietnam conflict, heavy same time as the scouts, but should not tend to expose armored vehicle move- cavalry troops were composed of pla- be so far away that it cannot be in posi- ment. The tank platoon should also keep toons designed for the hunter/killer tion to quickly destroy the enemy. the scout platoon leader informed on concept. These platoons were one-half Hunter/killer is most effective during the tank’s location, activity, and RED- M48/M60 tanks (the killers) and one- CON level. half M113 Armored Cavalry Fighting reconnaissance missions, where enemy Vehicles (the hunters). Tankers and contact is most likely at the individual The advantages of the hunter/killer scouts worked together at the platoon vehicle or section level. Due to this concept lie in decentralized decision- level. Modern cavalry troops are com- limited enemy contact, it is possible to making. The concept also provides ad- posed of pure tank and scout platoons. divide a tank platoon into sections ditional resources to the reconnaissance While this change facilitates training without jeopardizing its combat pow- effort. Most reconnaissance forces in focus on specific MOS and weapons er. Additionally, it further disrupts the the security role will allow superior platforms, the cohesion necessary for enemy’s counterreconnaissance objec- contact to bypass their positions. The effective cavalry team operations is re- tives because the enemy is unable to tanks provide an additional reconnais- moved. identify the cavalry team’s focus. To sance team with thermal-sight capabili- further disrupt the enemy’s counterre- ties to find and destroy these elements. Hunter/killer works by providing the connaissance, scouts and tanks should The tank section should never assume scout section tank support in the imme- continuously communicate with each an area is clear of enemy presence af- diate area. This denies the enemy the other. Scouts should look for ideal tank ter the scouts have moved through the ability to react, because the enemy will routes, hide positions, and fighting po- zone. Enemy reconnaissance forces will be unable to maintain contact. The sitions as they maneuver through a also follow engagement criteria, and it scouts will make contact with the en- zone. As these routes and positions are is often to their advantage to allow the emy and call for tank support from the identified, they should be reported to scouts to bypass their positions and tar- ARMOR — September-October 2002 27

platoon quickly reacts to a specific lo- or has decided to bypass the observa- cation and type of enemy contact. tion posts.2 Rather than gambling on Using the QRF technique places the the enemy choosing to bypass friendly scouts, it is favorable to never let the scout platoon leader in tactical control enemy decide. The scouts’ concealment of the tanks during the counterrecon- naissance fight. It frees the tank platoon must be so thorough that the enemy will not detect them with or without leader to conduct parallel operations, thermal sights. The above consideration establishing the engagement area and timing the possible routes through the reinforces the importance of terrain analysis in choosing where to establish zone. While the scouts maintain secu- the engagement area and the observa- rity and reconnaissance, the tanks set the conditions for engagement. The tion posts. In certain terrain and ther- mal conditions, it is simply not possible level of preparation that the tanks may to hide a platoon of scout vehicles along execute depends on several factors, including time available, enemy situa- the suspected avenues of approach. tion, observation into the sector, addi- If the terrain allows the scouts to de- tional assets available to the tank pla- ploy forward of the proposed engage- toon, and the threat of indirect or air at- ment areas, then the tanks are given the Figure 1. Hunter/Killer Technique tack. Ideally, the QRF technique max- initiative in engaging the enemy. This imizes the effects of preparation during situation gives the tank platoon ample the security mission. When the condi- time to prepare for the enemy entering get tanks. This is especially true of dis- tions of a security mission require the an engagement area. The only disad- mounted guided missile teams. screen to be set immediately, a QRF vantage is the possibility of losing en- approach enables the tanks to continue emy contact. If the terrain allows the The disadvantage of the hunter/killer priorities of work while the scouts pro- enemy to infiltrate the zone, then the technique is lack of mass and flexibil- vide early warning. scouts must ensure that they maintain ity. Since tank sections are divided some form of enemy contact after the across a scout platoon’s front, it makes The QRF technique ensures that the tanks deploy into combat in mass. The enemy has bypassed the scout hide po- it untimely and difficult to mass them sitions and observation posts. In most on one location. If either platoon begins tank assets of the heavy cavalry troop situations, the terrain does not permit taking casualties, it is very difficult to are limited, and their proper employ- ment is essential to defeating armor placement of six concealed vehicle maintain momentum without losing se- observation points. Any scout vehicles curity. To avoid some of the tactical threats to the scout platoon. Whenever not placed directly on the forward risks of becoming decisively engaged possible, mass should be used to pro- vide concentration of fires, shock ef- screen line are used to provide depth to by a superior force, the engagement, the screen. Thus, contact can be passed bypass, tank mass, and troop mass cri- fect, and survivability. The QRF tech- from scout to scout, and then to the nique makes tank mass possible be- teria must be thoroughly briefed and tanks. rehearsed. In these situations, the troop cause of the reconnaissance informa- abandons the split-vee hunter/killer or- tion provided by the scouts. This in- Another major consideration in plac- ganization and prepares for an econ- formation allows the commander to ing the engagement areas behind the omy of force mission. analyze the tactical risk of concentrat- screen line is the risk of fratricide. Al- ing the tanks. The scouts also allow the though vehicle identification can pre- A second option in task organizing tanks to fight in multiple engagement vent some types of fratricide, there is and executing the scout-tank cavalry areas and to continuous- team is the quick reaction force (QRF) ly ambush, engage, and technique. The QRF structure uses the destroy the approaching tank platoon as a potent and flexible enemy. reserve to the scout platoon. The QRF technique is most often used in security Using the QRF tech- missions, especially on the screen line. nique, the engagement In this structure, the scout platoon es- areas can be behind or tablishes a screen line forward of the ahead of the scout no-penetration line to observe all infil- screen line. The avail- tration routes into their assigned sector. ability of concealed po- It also selects displacement routes that sitions is the primary do not interfere with the tank platoon’s consideration in decid- engagement areas. Depending on the ing where to place the terrain, weather, and visibility factors engagement area. If the of the assigned area, the tank platoon engagement areas are establishes routes, platoon battle posi- established behind the tions, and engagement areas. The trig- screen line, as shown gers for the tank platoon are determined in Field Manual 17-97, by either the troop commander, the Cavalry Troop, then it scout platoon leader, or engagement is assumed that the en- Figure 2. An example of the QRF technique. Scout platoon, in criteria outlined in the operations order. emy will not detect two sections, arrayed along a screen line while the tank platoon, When the conditions are met, the tank scout observation posts in a hide position, prepares to engage in EA A or EA B. 28 ARMOR — September-October 2002 destroy them. Displac- not deploying at all. Additionally, in a ing the scouts is also a heavy troop, scouts must remember that more simplified tacti- they are an armored reconnaissance cal task in this sce- unit, capable of destroying significant nario because the tanks enemy contact. Troop commanders and are forward to sup- scout platoon leaders should select en- press and destroy the gagement and hand-off criteria that advancing enemy. As efficiently balance the capabilities of the tanks make enemy the scout and tank platoons. contact, the scouts can General Tactics, Techniques, concentrate on surviv- and Procedures ability and movement rather than maintain- The key to an effective cavalry team ing enemy contact. If is in the approach the scout and tank displacement is a tac- platoon leaders take to bring the two tical necessity, the platoons closer together. Along with scouts can guard the training, developing cohesion, and con- Figure 3. An example of a QRF technique in which the engage- flanks or support the ducting preparation together, the two ment areas are established behind the screen line. The primary tanks with long-range platoons must also execute as one ele- considerations are concealing the scouts, maintaining contact with TOW missile fires. ment. There are several techniques, the enemy, and preventing fratricide. The scouts should not tactics, and procedures that give the risk fighting along cavalry team this sense of unity. The side the tanks unless soldiers of each platoon must under- also the risk of tank main gun rounds their additional firepower is required. stand the benefits of the cavalry team. penetrating enemy vehicles and con- The ability of the tank platoon to sur- This is accomplished through team- tinuing into friendly scouts. A major vive and win direct fire engagements is building and collective training. Social terrain feature must be used to backstop vastly superior to the scout platoon. and sporting events, garrison details, the engagement area if the scouts must The scouts must ensure that they sur- physical training, or any tasking that remain on the forward screen line. If vive to provide their critical task on the requires manpower, are opportunities to the scouts have met their displacement battlefield — reconnaissance. pair up members of the two platoons. criteria, there is also the risk of pass- ing through the tank engagement area The disadvantage of this technique is During field training, combining the while in contact with the enemy. the difficulty of moving the tanks into troop leading procedures also results in position to intercept the enemy. The unit cohesion. The scout and tank pla- Various techniques exist to aid the tanks must be prepared to move to any toon leaders must develop a scheme of tanks in identifying the displacing location on the screen line to engage maneuver together. During plan devel- scouts. These techniques include gun- enemy armor. During an extended opment, they should constantly consider tube orientation, combat identification screen mission, a tank platoon might the other platoon’s actions throughout panels, chemical lights, infrared lights, support a 10-kilometer section of the the mission. Another technique is to signal pyrotechnics, and radio coordi- screen line. In certain terrain, tank have soldiers from both platoons build nation. Regardless of the technique movement is severely restricted. The one large terrain model. The tank and used, it is thoroughly rehearsed and un- tanks should time the routes to each scout platoons can stagger their opera- derstood by every soldier in the troop. possible engagement area to provide tions order time and brief from the This type of operation is a major tacti- the scouts with their requirement of same terrain model. Later, they can cal risk for the scouts due to the diffi- how early they must identify enemy gather both platoons together at the culty of displacing while maintaining contact. The longer it will take the terrain model and conduct rehearsals. contact with a superior enemy force. tanks to deploy to the correct engage- This maximizes Bradley and tank com- The troop mortars and air cavalry heli- ment area, the further out the scouts mander interaction, and ensures that copters can be of great assistance in must identify the enemy. Proper vehicle everyone understands the same plan. this situation. The risks to the scout identification from the scouts is critical During reconnaissance missions, this platoon are lowered if they choose a to avoid a premature commitment of allows tank and Bradley commanders route that avoids the tank engagement the tanks. The scouts must win the to know the specific vehicles that are area, but this makes the task of main- counterreconnaissance fight to ensure mutually supporting one another. It taining enemy contact much more dif- that the tanks win the armor fight. If the increases response time during the mis- ficult. tank platoon is repeatedly committed to sion. For example, Green 2 (tank) is in- destroy enemy reconnaissance vehicles, formed that Blue 3 (scout) has made If the terrain and other mission factors the risk of the enemy properly identify- contact. He immediately knows which preclude the troop from establishing the ing the screen line and disabling tanks direction to move without any further engagement area behind the scouts, with indirect fires or close air support information, because during the rehear- then another form of the QRF tech- increases. sal, Green 2 learned where Blue 3 would nique can be more effective. Establish- be operating. ing the engagement areas forward of In a QRF concept, preparation and tim- the scouts reduces several tactical risks. ing will determine the cavalry team’s During mission execution, additional The importance of placing the scouts in success. Scout platoon leaders must procedures create a stronger cavalry perfect hide positions is lowered be- develop a sense for tactical patience team. The key consideration is situ- cause the enemy will never be allowed and timing. Prematurely deploying a ational awareness. Although digital to close with the scouts and bypass or tank platoon can be as ineffective as equipment, such as Force XXI battle ARMOR — September-October 2002 29

command battalion/brigade and below indirect fire support, air support, and sional cavalry squadron has two troops alleviates some of the voice reporting engineer support. Organic to the troop, of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors. At any traffic, the scout and tank platoons need a cavalry team has a 120mm mortar time, a cavalry team can count on one to constantly communicate and share section. Organic to the squadron, OH- to two helicopters in its area of opera- information. Monitoring each other’s 58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters are a tions. Air scouts have many practical radio net is essential. In a QRF tech- powerful asset for the cavalry team. ways of improving the cavalry teams’ nique, a tank platoon leader can react Finally, attached assets, such as engi- situational awareness. Generally, air instantaneously to scout contact if he neer units, broaden the capabilities of a scouts will be the first to observe an monitors the scout net. In the hunter/ cavalry team. area of operations. They are effective at killer concept, one of the scouts can clearing terrain from a distance as the keep the tank platoon frequency in the It is important to focus on the indirect cavalry team begins its zone recon- second radio. This allows the scout to fires due to the troop-organic mortar naissance. Air scouts also do a great job guide the tanks directly to contact, in- section and the attached fire support of quickly clearing lateral avenues of creasing effectiveness to close with officer (FSO). Scout and tank platoon approach. They can clear natural ob- and destroy enemy contact. Any com- leaders and platoon sergeants should stacles like riverbeds, wadis, and can- bination of overlapping the tank and become well versed in the capabilities yons. Additionally, they can clear dead scout radio communication space through which a cav- can be effective as long as alry team may not be able to it reduces time between maneuver. Finally, air scouts scout contact and tank ac- improve maneuver through tion. overwatch. During passage of lines, air scouts can provide Using guide vehicles en- security or maintain contact sures that tanks and scouts are mutually supportive. In as scouts displace rearward. They allow for smooth transi- certain low-visibility terrain tions between a cavalry team or weather conditions, using a scout guide vehicle makes and a follow-on task force. a tank section’s or platoon’s Engineer assets work with movement quick and syn- cavalry teams much the same chronized with the scout way they support any maneu- platoon’s movement. This al- ver element. Mobility, coun- so reduces fratricide among termobility, and survivability scouts and tanks because the all are augmented through en- guide vehicle can set the gineer units. During recon- tank section or platoon in a Scout and tank platoon leaders conduct combined rehearsals. naissance missions, minelay- hasty battle position as well er platoons work very well at as orient the tank’s field of sealing off avenues of ap- fire. of the mortar section. Understanding the proach or named areas of interest. Dur- technical aspects of mortar fire, such as ing security missions, engineer assets Another technique lies in the conduct ammunition selection, range, and rate of casualty evacuation. Traditionally, have even more uses. Digging assets of fire, allow for better integration of allow a tank platoon to build more sur- platoon sergeants are responsible for indirect fires and maneuver elements. vivable battle positions. Mine layers the casualty evacuation of their pla- Additionally, scout and tank platoon toons. If both platoons take casualties, can canalize enemy avenues of ap- leaders should ensure a positive work- proach, allowing scout platoons to exe- each platoon sergeant conducts casualty ing relationship with the troop FSO. cute an extended screen line or allow- evacuation, reducing the combat power Primarily, it is through the FSO that a of the cavalry team by at least two cav- ing tanks to build a more effective en- cavalry team will be calling for indirect gagement area. The engineers can also alry fighting vehicles and two tanks. A fires. Scout platoon leaders especially deceive the enemy as to the strength, cavalry team can maintain more com- should brief the FSO on the cavalry bat power in the fight by designating composition, and disposition of the team’s scheme of maneuver. Together cavalry troop. Deception fighting posi- the scout platoon sergeant (or any Brad- they should develop a fire support plan tions, which are shallow and quick to ley commander) to evacuate all casual- that assists the maneuver of the scout ties. This maintains the most combat build, can deceive the enemy recon- and tank platoons. Scouts should learn naissance as to the location and number power possible to continue the mission. how to select a good mortar firing of tanks in the sector. Scout vehicles, such as a Bradley, are point. This allows the scouts to inform better suited to carry litter patients, the mortar tracks on the terrain ahead Regardless of the type of attachment while tanks are more useful in the di- and expand their options when the mor- augmenting the cavalry team, scout and rect firefight. tars are required to jump to their next tank platoon leaders must do every- Additional Assets firing point. In the same manner, scouts thing possible to incorporate these as- should report to the FSO on suitable sets. They must exchange information In the heavy cavalry squadron, there observation points for the fire support with the attachment leader, teach them are many assets, organic and attached, team vehicle. about the cavalry team and learn de- that enhance the cavalry team’s combat tailed asset capabilities. This maximiz- power. Three additional assets often at- Air cavalry support is especially use- es the combat power of the cavalry tached to the ground cavalry team are ful during limited visibility. A divi- team, but most importantly, leads to suc- 30 ARMOR — September-October 2002

cessful operations. Preventing fratricide The assets of the scout platoon allow cal training to build a lethal cavalry is another consideration when integrat- for hasty reconnaissance and move- team. The rewards of such teamwork ing attachments. Soldiers need to be ment, while the assets in the tank pla- are evident in improved camaraderie familiar with all friendly equipment on toon allow for rapid destruction of en- and decisive battlefield maneuver. the battlefield. Leaders should not only emy forces. Combined correctly, the exchange information with each other, two elements facilitate expedient move- Notes but they should share that same infor- ment and decisive actions on contact. mation with platoons and sections. Armored reconnaissance is difficult and 1Guderian, Heinz, Achtung-Panzer: The Devel- Leaders should also find ways to rein- seldom successful without close coor- opment of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and force this knowledge. If an air defense dination between the scout and tank Operational Potential, Arms and Armour Press, section were attached to a scout pla- platoons. London, 1992, p. 164. 2 toon, the platoon leader could coordi- To accomplish the mission and sur- U.S. Army Field Manual 17-97, Cavalry Troop, nate to boresight with the new vehicles. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, This forces the scout crews to view vive, the cavalry troop must locate, out- DC, 1995. maneuver, and decisively engage the unfamiliar vehicle at long ranges with enemy reconnaissance forces. If the multiple sights. heavy cavalry troop loses a fight, it no 1LT Leif Nott is a 2000 graduate Armored and mechanized forces are longer provides critical intelligence in- of the U.S. Military Academy. He designed to advance quickly on the formation to the commander. The scout attended the Armor Officer Basic modern battlefield. The cavalry units and tank platoons must provide detailed that support these forces must accom- reconnaissance information while main- and the Scout Leader Courses. He plish the reconnaissance mission quick- taining combat power. These two dis- served as a scout platoon leader ly and carefully. The combination of tinct platoon elements greatly enhance and an executive officer in the 1st speed and caution is difficult to bal- each other’s ability to accomplish the Squadron, 10th U.S. Cavalry. ance. All mechanized units face the mission. An effective scout-tank cav- 1LT Ryan Popple is a 2000 ROTC problem of maintaining security while alry team embodies the finest virtues of rapidly advancing toward the mission’s cavalry tradition — speed, responsive graduate of the College of William objective. This problem is an even great- maneuver, and leverage. This team is and Mary. He attended the Armor er challenge to an armored reconnais- most deadly when it retains the initia- Officer Basic Course and the Scout sance unit because they must quickly tive and chooses the engagement area. Leader Course. He served as a advance, often lacking specific knowl- The platoon leaders and noncommis- tank platoon leader and support edge of the terrain or enemy situation sioned officers in each platoon should platoon leader in the 1st Squadron, to the front. seek opportunities in garrison and tacti- 10th U.S. Cavalry.

SEAT continued from Page 7

It’s interesting to note that some of the every soldier is given the opportunity to Finally, I would like to personally thank NCOs feel much like the young PFC be successful. COL Ierardi and CSM Zettlemoyer for and are concerned that soldiers are not allowing us to talk to their soldiers. The coming to Korea because of the bad, We also visited the dining facility, to 1st Brigade leaders are an example of and sometimes not so truthful, informa- eat lunch with some young soldiers and how direct and personal involvement tion that they receive from other sol- talk to them about their tour in Korea. I with your soldiers can and does make a diers. spoke with a few soldiers who were ex- difference. It is very refreshing to see cited about going home after 12 months. such leaders. The next morning we went to Rodri- Some of the Korean soldiers, who are guez Range, a state-of-the-art multipur- required to serve 26 months, were just Again, I would like to say that I feel pose tank range, and were greeted by as excited about finishing their tours. extremely fortunate to be your Armor the 1st Battalion (1st Tank as they say), They also call it “going home.” Not one Center Command Sergeant Major. I 72d Armor commander, LTC Christo- of the U.S. soldiers said that they dis- look forward to hearing from you. Your pher Queen, and his command sergeant liked Korea, but felt that a year is a comments and concerns surrounding major, CSM James Williams. We sat in long time to be away from home. I as- the Armor community are very impor- the tower (a platoon was going through sured them that all soldiers have the tant. We are continuing to look for Tank Table XI) while LTC Queen and same feelings about being separated ways to improve our armor force and CSM Williams shared with me the in- from their loved ones. Before we de- want to assure you that the welfare of depth process that they go through to parted, we met with the NCOs of this our soldiers will always be our main ensure tank crews are combat ready. fine unit and gave them the chance to priority. Although technology is very During my 27-year career, I have never vent. important, our soldiers continue to be seen anything like it. It was a true art of the main factor for success. personnel management to ensure that We all need to be proud of these men the tank commander and gunner com- and women who are defending freedom Always seek self-improvement, keep bination was correct. I was once again daily. I have never seen a more focused your head up, even pump out your thoroughly excited at how much energy group of soldiers and only wish that I chest a little and remember, “PRIDE IS these two leaders put into ensuring that could be a part of this great mission. CONTAGIOUS!!” ARMOR — September-October 2002 31

The Brigade Deep CASEVAC Plan

by Captain David Meyer Annex L. This officer must understand the capabilities and limitations of the brigade’s ISR assets, how to work with Since the inception of reconnaissance, the medical planner, and the capabili- commanders have been faced with how ties and limitations of medical assets. to evacuate deep assets and how to In authoring the plan, the ISR planner convince scouts that they will survive must ensure several tasks are assigned the next battle. Extended distances, to subordinate units: timing, and the lack of authorized per- • sonnel and equipment all contribute to Ensure the brigade has sufficient medical treatment facilities to accept the calculus problem — intelligence, and treat casualties in support of ISR op- surveillance, and reconnaissance evacu- ation. erations. This preparation represents a major change in timing for the brigade Evacuating casualties from the brigade medical units, who are generally pre- “Battalions must be prepared to escort security zone continues to be a chal- pared to receive casualties just prior to evacuation assets forward to the CCP/ lenge — one of connectivity and access. the main battle. Given this new re- AXP with ground combat power. CAS- If casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is quirement, medical assets must be pre- EVAC from an Echelon I to an Eche- to be successful in the brigade security pared to support ISR operations as a lon II treatment facility in the brigade zone, the brigade must create a positive component of transitioning from one support area is accomplished by com- link between the soldiers conducting operation to another, and 24 hours soon- bining ground and air transport...” deep reconnaissance and the medical er than they are currently accustomed. assets required to save their lives. This • requires the commitment of the entire Work together to allocate sufficient dedicated evacuation assets to the bri- brigade. port area is accomplished by combining gade security zone evacuation effort. ground and air transport according to The brigade security zone can be pop- This may be an M997 front line ambu- the brigade’s SOP. ulated by a diversity of ISR units, oper- lance from the forward support medical ating across the full spectrum of com- company or an M113 armored ambu- To fully synchronize the efforts of all mand and support relationships. Battal- lance from one of the task forces. The units involved in deep CASEVAC, the ion scouts are an organic battalion asset specific type and origin of the asset is brigade uses two forums, the ISR and and have interior lines with counter- up to the planners based on unit re- combat service support (CSS) rehears- reconnaissance forces, which directly quirements, maintenance status, and a als. The ISR rehearsal occurs first and link the scouts to the battalion treat- host of other intangible factors. As long a representative from each unit in the ment teams and Echelon I care. The as the requirement for dedicated evac- brigade is present. This representative brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), the uation assets is recognized, tasked, and should come prepared to discuss, in de- combat observation lasing team (COLT) filled, the brigade has fulfilled its re- tail, the execution of their unit’s ISR platoon, and the ground surveillance quirements. plan. Additionally, this representative must come to the ISR rehearsal with radar (GSR) platoon are typical resi- • The brigade must direct the battal- dents of the brigade security zone and the proposed location of their unit CCP, have no direct connection between the ions along the LD to perform several which will later function as the ISR tasks. The LD/FEBA will be secured, AXP. Details, such as radio frequencies point of injury and an Echelon I treat- and the units securing it must conduct ment facility. To establish this connec- and call signs of all recon and counter- tion, the brigade must leverage assets CASEVAC of brigade ISR assets from recon forces, the type and number of a predetermined point, established by vehicles assigned to the units tasked from all its units. Responsibilities must the battalions, and fully disseminated to be clearly delineated during planning to conduct the evacuation, and spe- and supervised during execution. all involved units. In effect, this prede- cific procedures for linkup at the AXP, termined point then serves two pur- should also be disseminated. These de- The Plan poses. The battalions use it as a casu- tails are critical as a fratricide preven- Before the first ISR asset ever crosses alty collection point (CCP) for their tion measure designed to mitigate the own organic ISR assets, and the bri- risk incurred by converging units ap- the line of departure (LD) or forward gade uses it as an ambulance exchange edge of the battle area (FEBA), the proaching one another forward of the brigade must be prepared to support point (AXP) where evacuation assets LD/FEBA, possibly during hours of supporting the brigade ISR operations limited visibility. their infiltration and recovery. This is can be met and casualties can be trans- accomplished through Annex L (ISR The brigade ISR planner must ensure Operations) of the brigade operations ferred to battalion evacuation assets and entered into the medical system. that the combat health support (CHS) order (OPORD) and through the re- Battalions must be prepared to escort planner briefs the brigade CHS plan. hearsal process. evacuation assets forward to the CCP/ Additionally, the medical planner serves The brigade will generally designate a AXP with ground combat power. CAS- as another set of eyes to ensure the bri- staff officer as an ISR planner, who EVAC from an Echelon I to an Echelon gade’s medical plan can support the primarily constructs and disseminates II treatment facility in the brigade sup- width and depth of the brigade’s opera- 32 ARMOR — September-October 2002

BDE BN RHOL RHOL

BRT COLT OP 1 BRT tion. The brigade CSS rehearsal works 1 OP 2 the problem from the opposite end. Cri- OP 2 BDE CCP BDE GSR BN tical players in the brigade CHS system … … ISR OP 1 SCT AXP are present at the CSS rehearsal. The PLT medical commander of the forward sup- 3 BRT CTR COLT BAS PSG BN RCN port battalion and a medical platoon OP 1 Lvl I R&S CO/TM leader from each battalion must be pre- CCP sent. The BRT first sergeant (1SG) at- BSA tends this rehearsal to coordinate all ac- COLT OP 3 tions established during the ISR re- BRT hearsal with the brigade logistic execu- COLT OP 4 1SG 2 C- Med tors. The BRT 1SG must leave the CSS BRT ATLS OP 3 BDE Lvl II rehearsal with the confirmed grid loca- BDE CCP ISR tion of every treatment team, CCP, and … AXP BN … 4 AXP in the brigade, along with the time SCT GSR PLT BRT BRT OP 2 BN they will be established. OP 4 PSG ISR CTR BAS CCP RCN Lvl I CO/TM The Execution The methods of brigade security zone Figure 1 CASEVAC can be broken into two main categories: evacuation from the point of injury to a unit casualty collection point and the evacuation from that casualty collection point to an AXP. Figure 1 Self-recovery to the AXP. This would the casualty to the evacuating unit, and depicts a typical brigade security zone. occur if the compromised OP was clos- the casualty enters the medical system. er to the AXP than the unit tasked to Evacuating casualties from the point provide evacuation support from a CCP The key to successfully transporting of injury to a CCP is the responsibility to the AXP. In Figure 1, this method casualties to the AXP is synchronizing of the affected unit. Using organic as- could apply to GSR OP 1. the movement of the battalion evacua- sets, the BRT, COLT, or GSR must re- Evacuating casualties from a CCP to tion team forward while the BRT 1SG cover their wounded and evacuate them moves rearward. The brigade ISR plan- to the appropriate CCP. During the ISR, the AXP is the responsibility of the unit ner must ensure that the shift battle medical planners can map CCP routes controlling the brigade security zone. This is generally the BRT. When prop- captain or noncommissioned officer is by using Terrabase, or similar terrain fully versed in the plan and is prepared mapping systems, to determine covered erly resourced, the BRT has the com- to contact the battalion or brigade for mand and control capability and evacu- and concealed points on the battlefield additional guidance. for collection. These points and routes ation assets required to conduct a rear- are then included in the OPORD. A ward passage of lines with evacuation Studies conducted at the National fragmentary order (FRAGO) is issued assets to the designated AXP. The pri- mary executor of transport is the BRT Training Center by the Rand Corpora- with the approved locations of the adja- tion have conclusively demonstrated cent unit CCPs and the brigade ISR 1SG. The 1SG is equipped with an M998 the links between success in reconnais- AXPs determined during the ISR and cargo HMMWV and is accompanied by the medical evacuation assets, which sance and success in battle. The brigade CSS rehearsals. There are basically three cannot win without the ISR assets and ways to transport casualties: recovery can evacuate up to seven litter casual- those ISR assets cannot survive without by a BRT platoon sergeant to the CCP; ties at once. When notified of a casu- alty, the troop command post notifies the support and dedication of medical self-recovery to the CCP; and self- and maneuver assets from the entire recovery to the AXP. the nearest battalion to activate their brigade. ISR AXP on the brigade operations and Recovery by a BRT platoon sergeant intelligence radio net. This alerts the (PSG). The BRT PSG is centrally loca- battalion to prepare its casualty treat- ted and is equipped with an M1026 ar- ment system to receive a casualty, and CPT David Meyer is a 1994 distin- mored HMMWV, armed with an MK19 alerts counterrecon forces that the 1SG guished military graduate of Frost- machine gun. The PSG can move for- is arriving with a casualty; again, as a burg State University. He has served ward, recover wounded personnel in his fratricide risk reduction measure. Once in various command and staff posi- vehicle, and evacuate them to the pre- confirmation is received by the troop, tions, including platoon leader and determined collection point. In Figure the 1SG moves forward from a central 1, this method would apply to BRT S3 Air, 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry location to the local CCP, links up with Regiment; XO, HHC, 1st Brigade, observation posts (OPs) 1 and 2 and to the PSG or individual, and transports COLT OP 1. 1st Cavalry Division; commander, D the casualties through the battalion se- Troop, 10th Cavalry (BRT); and com- Self-recovery to the CCP. If the com- curity zone to the AXP. Once at the mander, B Company 2-69 Armor, 3d promised OP is closer to the CCP than AXP, the 1SG must drop to the radio the BRT PSG, the injured unit assumes net of the company conducting the Brigade, 3d Infantry Division. CPT responsibility for its recovery. In Figure evacuation to conduct final coordina- Meyer is currently assigned to the 1, this method would apply to COLT tion for the linkup. The 1SG meets the National Training Center as the bri- OP 2. evacuation assets on arrival, transfers gade reconnaissance troop trainer. ARMOR — September-October 2002 33

Applying Expertise: Tankers, S2s, and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

by Major Chris Tatarka, Major Casey Carey, and Major Brian Poe

“There are only two results to military erations, and this often-repeated phrase appreciation for the enemy and see operations: maneuver successes or mil- serves as both a motivator and a chal- what the enemy is likely to do. As one itary intelligence failures.” lenge for the intelligence BOS and mil- experienced commander notes, “You – A battalion task force S3, itary intelligence professionals. Being have to focus on the enemy. You have the proponent for IPB and having the to think like the enemy, and that’s BCTP rotation responsibility of being the enemy staff really the most critical piece of battle

expert means that battalion/brigade S2s planning. But we pooh-pooh that all the “Hey S2, go do some of that IPB crap play a critical role in the commander time.”2 Unfortunately, this often hap- and tell me what the enemy is going to and staff’s ability to not only see the pens as a result of how the enemy is do!” enemy, but also to determine how to depicted by the S2 and staff during the use friendly forces to defeat him. MDMP. – A maneuver brigade commander, JRTC rotation To be an effective S2, the intelligence Ultimately, the battalion staff is re- officer must be an excellent enemy S3 sponsible for telling the maneuver com- Although these quotes are meant to be and see the battle from the enemy’s per- mander where the task force should kill humorous, both frequently reflect the re- spective. Unfortunately, as numerous the enemy. During an attack, the staff lationships between maneuver experts anecdotal war stories and CALL pam- provides a template of how the enemy and their intelligence battlefield operat- phlets note, maneuver commanders and will be arrayed in the defense. Con- ing systems (BOS) counterparts. Too their S2s frequently fail to gain a solid versely, during defense, the task force often, staff officers and noncommis- sioned officers (NCOs) relegate intelli- gence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to the S2. Frequently, the S2 sec- tion fails to integrate their maneuver counterparts’ expertise into the IPB process. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) recently noted that during training at the National Training Center (NTC), “Brigade S2s generally conduct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) without any input from any of the other brigade staff members.”1 Unfortunately, this lack of teamwork results in too many intelli- gence failures. This article provides insight into why and how armor officers and noncom- missioned officers must provide invalu- able expertise to the S2 to ensure that maneuver operations, at all levels, are successful for the entire combined arms team. Since our military decisionmaking pro- cess (MDMP) begins with the S2 repre- senting the enemy and terrain, it is crit- ical that other staff members provide 4th Brigade, 85th Division (TS) Photo input for the IPB process. Ultimately, the battalion staff is responsible for telling the maneuver commander where Seeing the Enemy the task force should kill the enemy. During an attack, the staff provides a template of how the enemy will be arrayed in the defense... the S2, bolstered by the other staff Intelligence officers learn very early in members’ opinions, must “put the bony finger on the map” and recommend to the com- their careers that intelligence drives op- mander where the task force should focus its efforts. 34 ARMOR — September-October 2002

cannot defend everywhere; the S2, bol- enemy course of action development.3 ture operations with an extremely small stered by the other staff members’ This is unfortunate for many reasons, section. It is important to note that the opinions, must “put the bony finger on including the S2’s lack of experience enemy the S2 is trying to see is not the the map” and recommend to the com- and scarce manning of the S2 section. static doctrinally bound force that too mander where the task force should many military professionals would pre- focus its efforts. The sequential nature Usually, battalion and brigade S2s have fer to fight. In other words, neither their of the MDMP ensures that if the S2’s less than 8 years of experience as com- plan nor ours survives first contact with “bony finger” is inaccurate or his read missioned officers. Although some S2s the enemy. The enemy, like our forces, of the enemy incomplete, the ensuing have maneuver experience as a branch will only follow his most likely COA plan and execution will be corrupted detailed officer, many have never actu- until it becomes untenable, at which from the onset. A great plan based on ally spent any appreciable amount of time he will audible, based on knowl- an inaccurate enemy course of action is time in a tank turret. However, these edge of friendly forces through recon- likely to fail when an S2 does not have generally inexperienced officers are the naissance and tactical success or fail- an appreciation for the enemy’s capa- proponents for arguably the most criti- ure. This clearly requires the S2 to re- bilities in certain types of weather and cal aspect of the MDMP — enemy main close to the current fight during terrain. courses of action (ECOA). tactical operations, which will hamper the section’s ability to determine en- Tankers Must Help the S2 Time hinders the S2 section’s ability to devise a comprehensive ECOA. In emy COAs for future operational plan- See the Enemy ning. Given these limitations, plus track- most maneuver units, the S2 section is ing enemy battle damage assessments Since intelligence drives operations, smaller and less experienced than the and units and their maneuver com- S3 section. After receiving a mission, and generating intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) for higher and subordinate manders often fail to see the enemy, the S2 must create a lengthy array of units, CALL finds it miraculous that then certainly the S2’s ability to suc- graphic IPB products, determine enemy cessfully do his job is as critical to the capabilities and his most likely and most S2s can do a reasonably good job of seeing the enemy, templating his ac- tankers’ success in an engagement as dangerous courses of action, develop a tions, and staying in the current fight.4 ensuring there are enough main gun collection/reconnaissance and surveil- rounds on hand. However, CTC data lance plan, and analyze and update in- Although unit S2s can adequately tread suggest that many S3s and other staff coming information and intelligence. If water during operations, the idea is for experts are frequently reluctant to get the unit is engaged in a fight, the S2 sec- involved in the S2’s IPB process and tion must execute both current and fu- the intelligence BOS to move forward — swimming into future operations. This is where the armor community can play a role. Instead of watching S2s pull out their hair and virtually drown beneath the crush of preparation for mission analysis, armor and other staff BOS experts should participate in the IPB process, just as our doctrine states.

Where S2s Need Help At the same time the S2 section con- ducts its IPB, a number of subject mat- ter experts are on hand in the tactical operations center (TOC). Tankers, en- gineers, and air defenders can provide valuable input into IPB and preparing ECOAs. For example, very few S2s can truly understand the impact of terrain on armor operations better than an ar- mor officer or NCO who has spent con- siderable time in a tank. A quick glance around a battalion or brigade TOC will show that a number of these experts, such as battle captains, assistant S3s, and staff NCOs, are on hand. However, units fail to capitalize on the available After receiving a mission from a higher headquarters, S2s have very little time to carry expertise. Since S2s are the staff pro- out their required duties before the mission analysis briefing. IPB is a methodical, step- ponent for IPB and enemy templating, by-step process...What does not help is a pool of experts rushing over to offer opinions this lack of integration is often blamed about the enemy as soon as the order is received from the higher headquarters. on the S2. However, pointing fingers ARMOR — September-October 2002 35

after the battle is lost will not turn a tegrate the expert knowledge into IPB, 3CALL, TA 5.2.1 NTC Trends Compendium 3d unit’s failure into a success. the S2 can look at the information, ana- Quarter FY 98-4th Quarter FY 99. lyze it, and ask necessary questions. This 4Ibid. Where/How the Armor Officer or works far better than an expert provid- NCO Can Provide Expertise ing information during the IPB process 5CALL, Joint Readiness Training Center Lead- er Training Program (LTP) Observations (March After receiving a mission from a high- when the S2 is too overwhelmed to process the data. This method is also 2001), online at http://call.army.mil/products/ er headquarters, S2s have very little far superior to forcing the S2 to seek newsltrs/01-4/page7.htm time to carry out their required duties before the mission analysis briefing. out the experts who have a myriad of other tasks for which they are responsi- IPB is a methodical, step-by-step proc- ble; the other soldiers in the TOC are ess in which steps cannot be skipped or MAJ Chris Tatarka is currently an shortcuts taken. S2s generally know frequently under demanding time con- assistant professor, Department of straints as well. how to conduct IPB and where to save Behavioral Sciences and Leader- time. What does not help is a pool of Likewise, this technique is elegant in ship, U.S. Military Academy, West experts rushing over to offer opinions its simplicity. It does not require lengthy Point, NY. He received his com- about the enemy as soon as the order is briefing or discussion, but rather passes mission in 1990 from Gonzaga Uni- received from the higher headquarters. the critical, expert based, IPB informa- versity and holds a Master’s degree Instead, the armor — and other staff tion to the IPB proponent — the S2. The from California State University-San BOS experts — should allow the S2 the only challenge of implementing this Bernardino. He has served in vari- time and space to go through the IPB system is forcing officers and NCOs to ous command and staff positions, process. One technique that will aid the adopt this new procedure, and then en- including infantry officer, 25th In- S2 section is for the staff to provide suring that each expert develops an un- fantry Division, Schofield Barracks, short bullet comments on a 5x8 note derstanding of the strengths and weak- nesses of their S2 sections, so that the HI; and military intelligence officer, card or a preformatted reverse BOS 172d Infantry Brigade, Fort Wain- worksheet to the S2 section as each information passed fills the gaps in the staff element does its own IPB. The S2 section’s experience/knowledge base. wright, AK. intent of the reverse BOS worksheet is to see the terrain and weather from the The IPB process is far too important MAJ Casey Carey is currently an enemy’s perspective, thus taking advan- to a unit to be left solely in the hands of English instructor at the U.S. Mili- tage of the knowledge available from the unit S2. Armor units should use tary Academy, West Point, NY. He the S2’s peers in the TOC.5 their expert knowledge in battalion and received his commission in 1989 brigade TOCs by ensuring that IPB is The comments on these note cards or done by the entire staff. Because the from University of Wisconsin-White- worksheets do not need to be exhaus- S2’s development of an ECOA is the water and holds a Master of Arts tive and need not state the obvious. first critical step in developing the degree from Northern Illinois Univer- Comments like, “Enemy tanks are in- friendly unit plan, an error in this proc- sity. He has served in various com- capable of fording the river with a ess corrupts the unit’s entire plan and mand and staff positions, including depth of fifty feet,” are unnecessary. It execution. tank platoon leader, B Troop, 4-8th is more useful to identify any subtleties Cavalry, 3d Armored Division; as- that are only apparent to an expert. A One significant way to improve IPB sistant S3 and support platoon lead- good example might be a tanker who and ECOA development is to use the ex- er, 2-68 Armor, Baumholder, Ger- notes in the enemy capabilities section perts in the TOC to help facilitate IPB. of the reverse BOS worksheet, “be- The push/pull technique of reverse BOS many; commander, HHC, 3d Battal- cause of the narrowness and shallow worksheets or IPB note cards will go a ion, 73d Armored Regiment, 82d Air- depth of the river at this point, the en- long way in developing good ECOAs borne Division; and S2, 505th Par- emy will mine the potential ford site and success in planning and execution. achute Infantry Regiment. and cover it with direct fires.” In the They may also help ensure that every equipment/capabilities section, appro- mission is not just a military intelli- MAJ Brian Poe, currently a French priate information may be something as gence failure or maneuver success. instructor at the U.S. Military Acad- simple as, “enemy tanks can’t navigate emy, West Point, NY, received his through the terrain at WA123456, but commission in 1990 from the U.S. recon vehicles can, and probably will, Notes Military Academy and holds a Mas- use this route. This may be a good NAI 1 for counterrecon.” Center for Army Lesson Learned (CALL), TA ter’s degree from the University of 5.2.1 NTC Trends Compendium 3d Quarter FY Maryland, College Park. He has This technique works because it pro- 98-4th Quarter FY 99 (May 2001), online at served in various command and http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/01-11/01- vides information to the S2 in a system staff positions, including tank pla- that is both push and pull. Experts push 11toc.htm toon leader, executive officer, as- information about the enemy to the S2. 2 Rick Lynch, “Pick Up the Red Pen First,” 66 sistant battalion S2, and liaison of- He can then use this information when- Stories of Battle Command, Command and Gen- ever he needs it within the methodical eral Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, ficer between the National Security process of IPB. When he is ready to in- 1999. Agency and the U.S. Army. 36 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Tanks, Battleships, And the Future of Armored Warfare

by Nader Elhefnawy

In 1950, Basil Liddell Hart observed that the conflicting imperatives of in- creasing a tank’s mobility, protection, and firepower were bound to create “an increasingly clumsy monster.” His pre- diction appears to have been accurate. The cycle of heavier guns, thicker ar- mor, and bigger engines, which for so long propelled the development of the tank, enters its last phases. A similar cycle, the life story of the battleship, completed itself more than a telligence has long accounted for more systems. The present requirement for half century ago. This article contends than the shell’s advantages in naval con- the FCS is that no unit can be larger that the evolution of the warship holds flict, despite the use of smart shells to than 20 tons, in the interest of mobility. important clues to the long-term future extend the effective range of guns. The However, they may be much smaller of the “landship,” as conceived by tank rate of missile fire is limited less by the because each unit only has to be big theorists such as J.F.C. Fuller. This number of gun tubes than the capacity enough to perform its specialized func- change points in the direction of a “net- of its fire control system, so that a mis- tion. centric,” missile-firing tank — a point sile-firing combat system could simul- well worth discussing given the Army’s taneously lock on to and destroy sev- The dispersal of sensors and weapons plans to field a net-centric future com- eral tanks before a battle tank like the among different vehicles would extend bat system (FCS). Abrams destroyed even one tank. War- striking-power range and help eliminate ships, of course, still carry guns, be- blind spots, allowing more options in Rocket-Firing Tanks cause they are inexpensive and useful target designation, or massing fire with- for self-defense at close range, secon- out necessarily massing forces. As for- Hart suggested a lighter, smaller, and midable as a barrage of missiles fired less-expensive rocket-firing tank. Since dary targets, and fire support. Conse- quently, even if the tank gun has a fu- from a single tank may be, several sal- then, tanks have become bigger, heav- ture, the tank’s future depends on its vos of missiles launched at once from ier, and more expensive. However, the several different fire vehicles would be warship developed much like Hart de- ability to incorporate the missile into its armament, and to defeat it. The net- all the more overpowering. The poten- scribed, ceasing to rely on armor for centric tank appears to be crucial to that tial that such a system has for modular- protection and relying primarily on mis- capability. ity will make it easy to configure for siles for armament. Additionally, small- different types of terrain and for par- er vessels built around new armament, ticular missions. Assuming that an all- such as missile boats, have proliferated. Net-Centric Armored Warfare purpose missile system is not developed, While this was a logical direction, Hart also advocated developing a re- a wide variety of missile launchers could mounting fewer and smaller guns in mote-controlled tank for achieving a be attached to the unit as needed. favor of missiles entailed a trade-off. breakthrough, but technological devel- Taking such an approach, even the The shell packed a greater punch than opments that he did not anticipate allow any conventionally armed missile. Shells future armor to go even further. Infor- smallest tank units could have their own, independent surface-to-air missile are also cheaper, which is why cannons mation technology has made it unnec- and even artillery capability, dramati- are used for fire support. Nevertheless, essary for firepower, sensors, and con- the advent of more powerful explosives trols to be united in a single, discrete cally increasing their independence and offensive power. Warships do not rely and inexpensive missiles — due to in- package. Such thinking has made the on airpower as an independent, separate creasing research and wider production U.S. Navy increasingly net-centric by — may change that. Another contribu- tying ships, aircraft, and even subma- component launched from a distant base for support. Instead, airpower is an in- tion was miniaturizing missiles and rines more closely together; this is also tegral part of the unit, so warships may their launchers to allow more rounds to the premise underlying the net-centric be carried. tank. have their own drone carriers. The net- centric tank’s ability to disperse would Even without such developments, the A dispersed tank is not a singular unit, go a long way in creating a tank suited missile’s longer range and greater in- but several smaller units — a system of to an urban environment where the ter- ARMOR — September-October 2002 37

rain is highly fragmented, isolation is tional weapons would deliver a heavier tirely ruled out. Creating a laser weap- all the more dangerous, the capacity to blow. It may also be better to conserve on that is compact, powerful, and ef- interface with infantry and strike tar- the laser’s punch for self-defense, at ficient enough to be a tank’s primary gets outside the line of sight is crucial, least in high-threat environments. In weapon will require yet another re- and compactness is imperative. short, laser weapons would function as thinking of the tank, and perhaps the Where the battleship relied on the the shield, missiles as the arrow. missile. The same applies to the advent of infantry equipped with armored exo- thickness of armor to protect it, today’s Separated into units, such tanks would skeletons and much-enhanced weapons, warships take a more active approach, be swifter on the ground and able to use relying instead on their ability to con- bridges that could not bear the weight since these may themselves become the new tanks. fuse and destroy missiles that threaten of heavier tanks. They would also be their existence. Stealthy features, such easier to transport by air because they Even if these predictions prove inac- as lower silhouettes, surfaces that re- take up less space in the holds of air- curate, the reality is that the rate of tech- flect and absorb radar, and electronic craft, and at least some of these com- nological advance and political change warfare capabilities, are being incorpo- ponents can be airdropped or moved by often outrun the speed at which major rated into warship designs. Antimissile helicopter. Fewer combatants would be new weapons systems can be acquired defenses have found their ultimate ex- on the firing line because of automa- and absorbed. The end of the Cold War pression in the outer air battle strate- tion. deprived a great many weapons sys- gy, which interposes rings of fighter tems of their original mission, while the The logistics imposed by this large aircraft and surface-to-air missiles be- number of vehicles may be less than war on terror has made apparent a tween a massed missile attack and the greater need for systems suited to mis- aircraft carrier at the center of a battle they appear. Developments like condi- sions such as homeland defense. Con- tion-based maintenance will simplify group. It has been suggested that future the task, and a net-centric approach of- sequently, while one of the inherent battle groups will use directed-energy strengths of a dispersed, modular tank weapons, such as microwaves, particle fers certain advantages over old-fash- is its mutability, even the dispersed tank ioned armor. It would be easier to re- beams, or laser beams, to perform this place individual elements of the net- has limitations which will eventually be function, enabling the ships to best po- superseded. sition themselves to launch their mis- centric tank than to pull a battle tank out of action for repairs. Smaller vehi- siles. cles, and reducing or even eliminating References The future tank may go a similar route, armor, would allow greater leeway to relying on evading, rather than absorb- experiment with new types of power Stanley C. Crist, “The M1A2 Abrams: The Last ing, blows. In the case of a dispersed sources, which would ease the logistics Main Battle Tank?” ARMOR, July-August 1997, tank, an enemy would have to hit sev- strain that modern tanks impose on pp. 14-16. eral small targets designed to have the armies, and revolutionize logistics as Federation of American Scientists, “Future Com- smallest possible radar and infrared well as precision. bat System,” online at http://fas.org/man/dod- signatures and a better capability to 101/sys/land/fcs.htm. exploit natural cover than a single large Beyond the Dispersed Tank George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of vehicle. They may increasingly rely on War, New York: Random House, 1996. jamming sensors and launching decoys For all its advantages, a dispersed tank which mimic tank signatures in the will lack some of the assets of older- J.F.C. Fuller, Armaments and History, New event of an attack, though dummy ve- style tanks, just as guided-missile de- York: De Capo Press, 1998. hicles may also be included in forma- stroyers lack some of the battleship’s Basil Liddell Hart, Defence of the West, West- tions. Assuming that the multiplicity of strengths. The dispersed tank will lack port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970. sensors and weapons launchers would the shock effect of a 70-ton Abrams. It create redundancy, making the system may be more vulnerable to electronic William C. Martel, The Technological Arsenal, survivable, especially given the high warfare because it relies on electronic Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, rate of attrition warfare where both sides links, which may even make older- 2001. are capable of fighting an information- style, unitary tanks more practical un- Ralph Peters, “The Future of Armored Warfare” based war. Though it is inconceivable der certain conditions. Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59. that the manned vehicles will be unpro- Moreover, it should not be assumed Mike Sparks, “A Crisis of Confidence in Ar- tected, the protection afforded by armor that the net-centric tank is the final mor?” ARMOR, March-April 1998, pp. 20-22, may be increased by improvements in 44. materials rather than by the bulk or word in armored warfare, any more than today’s guided-missile destroyers weight of armor. Patrick Wright, Tank, London: Faber and Faber, are the final word in naval warfare. The 2000. Like the carrier groups of the future, a actual practice of net-centric armored net-centric tank may eventually include warfare will undoubtedly raise prob- a directed-energy weapon for counter- lems that have not been considered. Nader Elhefnawy received a B.A. ing air and missile threats, and even ar- For instance, deploying directed-energy tillery-fired submunitions. While a la- weapons capable of neutralizing attack- in International Relations from Flor- ser weapon, for instance, can be used ing missiles and shells may bring about ida International University where against ground targets, its inherent inef- a stalemate on the battlefield. Armored he is presently pursuing a graduate ficiency and high power consumption vehicles capable of flight and aircraft degree. He previously published in would mean that the tank’s more tradi- capable of ground combat cannot be en- The Submarine Review. 38 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Attrition vs. Maneuver And the Future of War

by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest A. Szabo

“The supreme excellence lies opponent. The article cites many his- fight. We will then settle in for what we not in defeating our enemy in torical examples to demonstrate that think is a long war of attrition only to battle, but in defeating him most wars are won by attrition. While it find our opponent waging a thousand without a battle.” addresses many interesting points, the small maneuver battles against us. thesis is wrong. – Sun Tzu The logistics of mechanized warfare Maneuver warfare is not dependent up- may require a secure rear area, but our on technology. In fact, we are far more enemy is unlikely to grant us that lux- What will warfare in 2032 look like? likely to have it inflicted on us by a ury. We will have to fight each and ev- Will it be the future of a revolution in technologically and economically infe- ery day to secure our lines of commu- military affairs promised by Force XXI? rior foe than we are to wage it against nication. The larger our rear area, the Will we see transformational U.S. for- him. Second, while war between evenly more forces we will have to detail to ces destroying legions of mechanized matched opponents does often degener- secure it. The greatest battles of the enemies beyond visual range? Will we ate into attrition warfare, we are very next war are likely to be fought by CS see the rise of a peer opponent who unlikely to meet a peer opponent who and CSS units and reaction forces rath- matches us tank for tank, computer for can force us into a war of attrition. er than major commands. If this “death computer, and forces us into a higher Last, even if destroying an opponent by by a thousand cuts” process sounds like tech version of the battles of attrition attrition is feasible, it is unlikely to be attrition, it may be from our point of which we saw in the Civil War, view. From our enemy’s, it WWI, and WWII? Or will it be will be maneuver 101. the urban chaos of Chechnya and the West Bank? How do we pre- “Maneuver warfare is not dependent upon Asymmetric warfare from dict the future, and how do we technology. In fact, we are far more likely our perspective may mean, “I plan and prepare for it? Of all the have tanks and you do not.” possible scenarios, which is most to have it inflicted upon us by a techno- likely and which is most danger- logically and economically inferior foe than Asymmetric warfare from our we are to wage it against him.” enemy’s perspective means, ous? “you have tanks and I blew up your 5,000-gallon fuel tank- Attrition or Maneuver? ers.” Attrition - The reduction of the effec- considered acceptable or suitable by the In addition to simple physical maneu- tiveness of a force caused by loss of American people. ver, such as envelopment and disper- personnel and materiel.1 sion, by an enemy, we must also plan If we do not see the need for maneu- Maneuver for enemies who maneuver against us - Employment of forces on ver warfare, our enemies certainly will. off the battlefield. Maneuver warfare the battlefield through movement of The fans of transformation and Force combat forces in relation to the enemy, means to dislocate an enemy or to gain XXI often talk about how technology a positional advantage so that he cannot supported by fire or fire potential from will enable us to outmaneuver our op- effectively respond to your attack. How all sources, to gain potential advantage ponents. This may be true, but the con- from which to destroy or threaten de- many different ways can future ene- verse is not true. Technology will not mies maneuver against us using the struction of the enemy to accomplish prohibit our enemies from maneuvering media, terrorism, NBC weapons, and the mission.2 against us. Our enemies will adapt to electro-magnetic, political, or economic A recent article, “Three Cheers for At- avoid our sensors and other technology measures? How will we respond if we trition Warfare” (March-April 2002 is- and will still arrive on our flanks and in have not thought about them ahead of sue of ARMOR), argues the inevitabil- our rear when least expected. A compe- time? ity of attrition. The article seeks to dem- tent enemy will not mass his mecha- onstrate the futility of planning esoteric nized forces for JSTARs to detect, and None of this is an argument for scrap- concepts of maneuver warfare based for ATAACMS and an Apache Long- ing heavy forces. It is a fallacy to think on a revolution in military affairs. The bow to destroy. He will disperse his ar- that wars of attrition will be fought with article’s thesis is that the most likely mor in cities and complex terrain and heavy forces while wars of maneuver and most dangerous type of warfare strike our CSS units once we pass. We will be fought with light or transforma- likely to be faced by American soldiers may enter the war planning a grand tional forces. Nothing in Force XXI or in the future would be a war of attri- campaign of maneuver only to find our any of the transformation process will tion against a massed, mechanized peer opponent unwilling to stand up and eliminate the need for heavy forces. ARMOR — September-October 2002 39

“Attrition warfare may be feasible, but it is rarely suitable or acceptable. While style does not count in war, casual- ties do count. The greatest numbers of casualties in bat- tle are inflicted once an enemy has been defeated and is attempting to withdraw.”

The Army will always need a full spec- The most likely course of action is that that made up the bulk of their armor trum of forces to deal with a full spec- we will be able to maneuver against our were built in the ’60s and ’70s. When trum of threats. Even if all our enemies enemies and that they will find a meth- were the Chinese and Soviet factories eliminated their tanks, we would still od of maneuvering against us. that produced them constructed? When need them for the same reason they did these tanks go into development? were first invented, to allow us to ma- Lack of a Peer Opponent neuver across a killing zone against a We knew long ago that our M1s would What about the most dangerous course dug-in enemy. be facing T-72s, we just did not know of action? What happens when all of where. Which nations now have, or are The ability or necessity to conduct ma- these potential differences go away? The developing, the industry to rival the neuver warfare is not simply a question result can be a deadlock that results in U.S.? Look for the steel mills and fac- of technological or economic differ- a war of attrition. For this reason, we tories and your potential mechanized ences. Schlieffen’s quote about “a per- should also study doctrine for attrition opponents fall out quickly. Russia and fect Cannae requiring both a Hannibal warfare. But how likely is it? Who will China, or a client state, are the two and a Varro” is pithy, but half wrong. have the ability to fight us to a stand- most likely. India is possible. The only Maneuver warfare requires a mobility still in the next 30 years? other countries with the capability to differential between the forces. One side produce large numbers of mechanized has to be more agile than the other. This While none of us can name whom we will fight in 2032, we can predict how units are in Western Europe and Japan. can come from a difference in abilities Even they cannot or will not produce of the commanders, but there are many they will fight. We can do this by look- ing at world economies. We cannot pre- the integrated systems that would allow other sources. In addition to leadership them to take part on equal footing with at the top of an army, there is also the dict the political insanity and delusions that cause war; we can predict the eco- the U.S. during the campaigns in Yugo- quality of the soldiers, their subordinate slavia and Afghanistan. leaders, and their training. Many of the nomic power that supports war. Who famous maneuver battles were not due has the means to create a massed mech- Which nation will wrest air superiority to brilliance of the generals but to the anized army? While, our enemies will away from the U.S. Air Force? Where quality of the troops who were able to likely have some number of tanks, no are their thousands of fighters, dozens execute complex courses of action be- country will have enough to challenge of AWACS, hundreds of refueling tank- yond the capability of the enemy sol- us as a peer opponent. There is no ers, and the global command and con- diers and units. country or coalition of countries with trol system to synchronize this air bat- the industrial base to challenge the U.S. tle? The bottom line is they don’t exist The early success of the German army in a mechanized war in the next 30 and will not exist before mid-century. in WWII was largely due to the qual- years. If any country is going to fight a We can trade gold for blood at a pace ity of its soldiers and junior leaders massed, mechanized war in 2032, they no mechanized enemy can match. Our compared to their opponents. When the need to be building that army today. enemies will be forced into campaigns British army made their frontal attack The tanks, personnel carriers, SP field of asymmetric maneuver to stay alive. on the Somme in 1916, they did not artillery, and hundreds of trucks will intend to needlessly waste their sol- not need to go into production for an- Is There Ever a Time for Attrition? diers lives. However, their leaders were other 10-15 years, but the factories afraid that the recently raised levies that make them are currently behind If we are forced into battles or cam- would be unable to execute a more com- schedule. paigns of attrition in future war, it plicated maneuver and chose a battle of should generally be against our will. attrition as their only viable course of One of the reasons that Iraq lost so Attrition warfare may be feasible, but it action. quickly was that the thousands of ar- is rarely suitable or acceptable. While mored vehicles in its inventory were Beyond military specific training, there style does not count in war, casualties purchased rather than manufactured. do count. The greatest numbers of ca- are also cultural differences that may The Iraqi nation did not have the means sualties in battle are inflicted once an allow one side to obtain a significant to produce its war machines internally mobility advantage over an opponent. It enemy has been defeated and is at- and did not understand them. They tempting to withdraw. Whether the ini- was the American soldier’s ability to could not properly crew their vehicles tial battle was maneuver or attrition, the use machines as much as the machines or employ them en masse. They could themselves that gave us a mobility ad- loser is generally destroyed once he ac- not replace what was destroyed. cepts defeat and attempts to get away. vantage and allowed us to conduct ma- neuver warfare in WWII and in Iraq. While we did not know we would The greatest past victories have oc- Maneuver warfare requires a mobility fight Iraq in 1962, we did know that curred when an encircled or cut off en- differential between opponents. It can tanks and other weapons were being emy was destroyed in open terrain or come from technological, economic, produced and that we would someday began to surrender en masse. It is al- leadership, training, cultural differences, fight a massed, mechanized opponent. ways easier to take an enemy prisoner and more. Many of these differences The T-72s that Iraq used in 1990 were than to kill him. In breaking an en- are already evident or can be predicted. built in the 1970s and ’80s. The T-55s emy’s will to fight, it is important that 40 ARMOR — September-October 2002

casualties occur quickly and visibly, Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh. In the nature. First we must study history to rather than slowly. A unit that defends first, the French were frustrated by their understand the nature of war, which is a fortification may suffer 50 percent inability to bring the Vietnamese to bat- unchanging. This is because the nature casualties over a period of weeks, yet tle. The enemy possessed a significant of war depends on human nature, which still defend effectively because it has mobility advantage over the French and changes at an evolutionary pace. We had time to adjust to the losses. The was able to avoid decisive engagement still kill each other for the same reasons same unit that finds itself flanked or with the superior firepower of the our ancient ancestors did. We must com- encircled in the open will often break French. The French thought that by oc- bine this study of the historical nature and run or surrender after suffering 25 cupying a fortified position in the heart of war with the study of technological percent casualties in the first few min- of enemy territory, they could force the change. For technology determines the utes. Battles of attrition, which attempt Vietnamese to fight. The French could characteristics of war and this changes to destroy the enemy before he begins then bleed their enemies white as the at an ever-increasing pace. In combin- to withdraw, will run up body counts Vietnamese impaled themselves against ing the two, we can better understand almost as high for the victor as the van- the French positions. However, the the how and why of future war. quished. “Meat grinder” battles such as French did not have the firepower to We know that we will fight some- Petersburg, Verdun, Aachen, and the withstand the resultant siege, and it was where at least every 20 years, if not Huertgen Forest leave the victors as they, not the Vietnamese, who marched exhausted as the vanquished and unable into the POW cages. The fact that the more often. We know that our wealth and technology will give us the ability to pursue or exploit the victory. French may have inflicted nearly equal to move against and strike large distinct numbers of casualties on the enemy did Will the American people support such not alter the result. They lost the battle, enemy forces from a relative advan- bloodlettings? Battles of attrition de- tage. We know that our enemies will and it was the political fallout rather respond to this by dispersing, and in stroy more than lives. They destroy than the losses in men and materiel that economies, infrastructure, and often the caused France to lose the war. other unpredictable ways that will ne- society itself. How many of our Allies gate or limit the effects of our weapons. We know that we will fight in other will submit to having their countries Less than 20 years later, the U.S. mili- destroyed to save them? Americans are tary attempted a similar attrition strat- population centers under the media’s impatient people and value their chil- scrutiny. We know that our enemy’s egy. We occupied a fortified position at culture is likely to be far more tolerant dren’s lives. They have always and will Khe Sanh. Like Dien Bien Phu, it was always demand that wars be won quick- on a valley floor in the northern part of of the prolonged and indecisive nature ly and at the lowest human cost possi- of attrition warfare than our own. We our area of operations in a place that know that our soldiers and our people ble. We know that future wars will be the enemy could not abide us owning. broadcast live to the world by the me- We would then bleed the enemy white do expect us to win with style, that is, dia. We will have to explain our actions quickly, with as few casualties as pos- as he tried to assault our position. We sible. Attrition can happen and we must in real time. We will constantly be asked thought we had learned from the French. if we could not have found a better way Unlike the French, we owned the hills be prepared for it. But, it is our duty to to resolve any tactical problem. avoid the bloodlettings and find ways around the airstrip. Unlike the French, to maneuver to defeat our enemy quick- Attrition is generally what happens we had the firepower to defeat every attack and the airpower to resupply the ly and at the lowest cost. when our plans fail and we can no longer maneuver. If maneuver is the position, despite heavy losses. Unlike essence of the art of tactics, then attri- the French, Khe Sanh was never in dan- Notes tion is the absence of art. It is important ger of being overrun and was evacuated 1Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5- to remember that maneuver should not by ground after inflicting many thou- 1, Operational Terms and Graphics, U.S. Gov- be reduced to formulas based on corre- sands of casualties while suffering rela- ernment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 30 Sep- lation of forces and means (COFM) or tively lighter losses ourselves. Yet, like tember 1997, p. 1-14. the French, we also lost this battle. We historical examples. Maneuver is not 2Ibid., p. 1-96. always the “indirect approach” of Lid- did not lose it in the hill fights or on the dell Hart. Sometimes the best maneuver airstrip. We lost it a little bit every day might be a frontal attack on a wide sec- on the six o’clock news when the news- man reported how many Americans LTC Ernest Szabo currently com- tor, if the enemy is disorganized but mands 3-362 AR (TS) at Fort Car- will recover if given time. Other times had died that day, the XXX day of the it might be to disperse into small ele- siege of Khe Sanh. son, CO. He was commissioned in ments over a wide area to deny the en- Armor from S.U.N.Y Oswego in 1984. emy targeting systems a lucrative tar- So what does the future hold? All of He served as a platoon leader and get. The goal is always to create a these historical examples do not prove XO with 2d Armored Cavalry Regi- situation in which you can strike at the that we will fight wars of maneuver any ment in Bindlach and Nuernburg; as enemy while limiting his ability to more than the examples of the previous commander, C/4-8 Cav in Gelnhau- strike at you. There may be times when article on attrition prove that it is inevi- sen and Desert Storm; as division table. We cannot deduce a theory of it is tempting to create a scenario that plans officer, 4ID and XO, 1-66 AR, will allow us to bleed the enemy white, war from historical examples since we can never know all of the tiny variables both at Fort Hood, TX. He holds a however, these have rarely turned out Masters in Education from Canisius as planned. that cause a battle to be won or lost. Nor can we predict the future through College, Buffalo, NY, and a Masters Examples of ineffective attempts at purely technical analysis since techno- in Advanced Military Studies, CGSC, battles by attrition were the battles of logical change has an unpredictable. Fort Leavenworth. ARMOR — September-October 2002 41

The Training Support Brigade’s History, Mission, and Role

by Captain Joe Redmon

You are a sergeant first class (19K) stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado. You have been a successful company master gunner and are currently the bat- talion master gunner. The “old man” loves you, your wife and kids are hap- py, and you even like your quarters. Your branch manager calls you at your 30-month mark and reassigns you to an AC/RC slot at TSB Shelby with duty in some small town in Mississippi. You looked for the town on a road atlas and can’t even find it. You think that your career and life are over. You are a tank company commander at Fort Hood, Texas, and you have just completed 3 weeks of very successful OC/T teams coach, teach, train, mentor, and assess U.S. Army Reserve and Army gunnery training. You have been in com- National Guard combat, combat support, and combat service support units to en- mand a year and you have just about hance their combat readiness. figured it out. The telephone rings, its Armor branch and the assignments of- thorities could not commit U.S. military were assigned according to geographic ficer suggests that you pack your bags forces to long-term operations without location. Battalions east of the Missis- because you’re PCSing to TSB Knox or mobilizing reserve forces.2 Second, doc- sippi River were assigned to First Army TSB Stewart in a few months. Which do trine needed to be inculcated across all and battalions west of the Mississippi you prefer? You innocently ask, “What’s branches and components.3 The con- River were assigned to Fifth Army. The a TSB”? cept of a total army was inspired by les- RTBs provided training support to the Both of these outstanding soldiers are sons learned from Vietnam experiences renamed enhanced readiness brigades entering a new world — Training Sup- and was a conscious effort to “prepare and other high priority units. Training port XXI and the training support bri- for the next war, not the last.”4 The To- Support XXI (TS XXI) went into effect gade (TSB). tal Army would be incapable of con- in October 1999, and changed the RTBs ducting sustained combat operations to training support brigades (TSBs) and without significant mobilization of the expanded their mission requirements to The Training Support Brigade RC. include training support to enhanced separate brigades, while providing the During 1961, reserve forces were mo- Readiness groups were eventually con- same training support to all others units bilized in response to the Berlin crisis. stituted to train reserve forces.5 How- within a clearly defined geographical As in earlier mobilizations, failure to ever, to some extent, the Berlin crisis area.8 TS XXI absorbed the force struc- attain peacetime training objectives and replicated itself in 1990 and 1991 dur- shortages of equipment proved to be ing the Gulf War buildup. It became ap- ture of the readiness groups and used it to stand-up more TSBs to cover spe- major problems that generally prevent- parent to all that past attempts to train ed mobilized units from meeting post- cific areas.9 TS XXI placed training 1 and prepare reserve forces for mobi- mobilization readiness objectives.” lization and ultimate mission accom- support battalions under the command and control of the TSB commander.10 The TSB’s story begins with the U.S. plishment had fallen woefully short.6 Army and its leaders recovering from Today, the mission of the TSB can be Readiness groups continued to operate divided into three distinct areas: train- the Vietnam ordeal, dealing with an in- in place for most RC units; however, creasingly turbulent society, operating AC division commanders took a greater ing support; mobilization assistance and within severe fiscal constraints, and support; and military support to civilian interest in training their round-out bri- authorities. mapping a strategy to reinstate an all- gades.7 This greater interest became volunteer force. This shift was part of a known as Operation Bold Shift and led The Mission — Training Support larger strategy and would have some to the establishment of resident training The TSB provides world-class train- clear implications. First, the Army need- detachments (RTDs). ed to be closer to the nation it served. It ing support to RC units through a mo- would do this, in part, by decisively By 1995, Congress pushed for, and bile operations group. The TSB is de- linking its Reserve Component (RC) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORS- ployable, unconstrained by terrain, and and Active Component (AC) in a total COM) instituted and manned, regional capable of providing higher control army concept. National Command Au- training brigades (RTBs). These RTBs with both digital and voice communica- 42 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Observer controller teams stay in a training environment, working con- tinuously with soldiers and leaders, observing the same training that they would execute in an MTOE unit. This is very much a muddy boots assignment. tion capabilities to brigade-level units and below. This enhances the combat fitness and combat readiness of RC units by providing comprehensive as- sistance with the planning, preparation, and scenario development of multiech- eloned lanes training at the platoon, company, battalion, and brigade levels, while simultaneously providing the sup- ported training unit chain of command a complete external evaluation. The TSB’s mission is simple: observer tive mission essential task list (METL)- George W. Bush firmly dig the foun- controller/trainer (OC/T) teams coach, based training. Ideally, the OC/T begins dation for the Department of Home- teach, train, mentor, and assess U.S. the mentoring process with his coun- land Security. We proactively visual- Army Reserve and Army National terpart commander early in the plan- ized that homeland security could not Guard (ARNG) combat, combat sup- ning process and coaches him toward a be achieved without the RC. port, and combat service support units successful training event during annual TSBs immediately dispatched mobili- to enhance their combat readiness. The training. The intended end result is a better unit, measured objectively against zation assistors to ARNG units through- intent is continual improvement and the out the country to assist commanders emphasis is on doctrinal training to mission training plan standards, and with the task of mobilizing and to serve standard, not simple evaluation. verified through an AAR. For example, a tank battalion would have a minimum as liaison officers for TSB command- This training support mission is large- ers. Simultaneously, TSB S2s and intel- post-mobilization training goal to re- ligence officers at the MACOM level ly accomplished through a mentoring ceive a “P”-rating on each of its collec- relationship between the OC/T and his tive METL tasks (platoon, company, began to analyze and describe the threat training counterpart, and is verified by facing ARNG commanders as they as- and battalion) and qualify each of its sumed their post-mobilization duties aggressively using after action reviews tank platoons on Tank Table XII. Giv- (AARs) at all collective levels of train- en today’s training environment, this and prepared to mobilize. As directives ing. During TSB AARs, the OC/T fa- began to arrive from FORSCOM, TSBs goal would be ambitious for most AC began to identify individual and collec- cilitates a focused, doctrinal discussion tank battalions. However, ARNG tank on collective training that may or may battalions are doing much of this as a tive tasks that needed to be trained. not have gone well and leads the train- Mobilization plans called for TSB com- matter of course as they prepare their manders to certify mobilized units as ing unit to discover why the training units for CTC rotations. results were positive or negative and trained and prepared to accomplish the how to sustain or improve that training. Many have questioned the efficacy of mobilization mission. assigning valuable training rotations at OC/Ts stay in a training environment, When units are mobilized within a the CTCs for ARNG battalions. How- TSB commander’s area of responsibil- working continuously with soldiers and ever, if the growing role and increasing ity (AOR), the mobilization mission leaders, observing the same training responsibility of reserve forces for our 11 that they would execute in an MTOE takes priority over all other missions. nation’s real-time defense is to be ade- The TSBs, incorporating guidance from unit. This is very much a muddy boots quately addressed, assigning those valu- assignment. able resources would seem very rea- higher headquarters and analyzing the training units’ post-mobilization mis- OC/Ts develop training scenarios which sonable indeed. sion, quietly developed a post-mobili- are approved by higher-level unit com- The training support mission is not zation training plan to support ARNG manders, and then used to facilitate the limited to annual training; it is a year- commanders as they busily mobilized training unit’s collective training. OC/Ts round process incorporating functional their units in response to the attacks. are also expected to doctrinally operate assistance visits during inactive duty TSBs developed what are now known within the parameters of these training training (IDT) weekends, OC/T involve- as homeland security individual readi- scenarios. OC/Ts with a solid working ment in IDT collective training events, ness training (HSIRT) lanes, and secu- knowledge of doctrine will hone their and mobilization files review. rity and stability operations (SASO) doctrinal skills and quickly become doc- lanes to support the commander’s post- trinal experts. Mobilization Assistance mobilization training intent. In a TSB, OC/Ts do not merely ob- September 11 was a wake up call for HSIRT lanes train soldiers and units serve training execution, set the tactical the entire country, and the TSB was no in individual and team tasks such as and doctrinal conditions for collective exception. As the towers of the World checkpoint operations, vehicle search, training success, and facilitate an AAR, Trade Center fell that tragic Tuesday personnel search, force protection, me- they also assist training units in the plan- morning, we anticipated new, challeng- dia awareness, clearing a weapon, and ning and preparation of their collec- ing missions. We watched President processing a detainee. Additionally, dur- ARMOR — September-October 2002 43

ing HSIRT, all soldiers receive a brief- TSB support of RC units has been ex- ence to communicate how we fight to disparate ing on rules for using force (RUF) from tremely expensive in terms of trained and far-flung components within our institution. the provost marshal’s office. manpower taken from our force struc- 4Ibid. ture, as well as dollars spent in support. TSB Knox, 4th Brigade, 85th Division 5Readiness groups were not the only tool avail- (TS), developed a SASO training event The dedication and application of these able to commanders to increase the combat read- incredible, immeasurable resources have iness of reserve forces; however, readiness groups to serve as the culmination of a unit’s had indisputably positive effects. As post-mobilization training for homeland were a direct precursor of regional training bri- defense mobilizations. We used the our military continues to transform and gades and, finally, training support brigades. evolve during our nation’s war against Even today, FORSCOM Regulation 220-3 retains world-class, multimillion dollar mount- terrorism, a top-down cost-benefit anal- provisions written with the readiness groups’ lack ed urban combat training facility at Fort ysis would seem logical. of resources in mind: the training assessment Knox to give the commander a realistic model evaluator requirement to observe and eval- training experience. The responsible The mission of the RC is currently in uate training for a battalion or squadron is three training support battalion tailored the flux. The homeland defense and home- personnel. training scenario to closely replicate the land security missions could easily be 6Lieutenant Colonel Richard Stouder, “Round- mission that the ARNG commander viewed as an insatiable drain on the Out Brigades — Ready or Not?” Military Review, would be executing after completing current force structure. Viewed within June 1993, online at https://calldbp.leavenworth. post-mobilization training. The training the context of an omnipresent war — army.mil/calldb.html; Major Craig Chapman, “The replicated as much of the security mis- sometimes hot, sometimes cold — cur- RC and the Gulf War: Non-Deployed Round- sion as the TSB could envision, from the rent RC force structure would seem Outs,” Military Review, September 1992, online tedium of standing guard post to han- woefully inadequate. Its organization at https://calldbp.leavenworth.army.mil/calldb. html. The perception crystallized by RC readiness dling the media and suspected threat would also seem outdated. failures at Fort Polk and the National Training operations. Finally, in reference to the two young Center predominates here. The mobilization mission is a devel- soldiers at the beginning of this article, 7Round-out brigades can be traced directly to oping story. Units will soon be demobi- they are entering a dynamic training the Vietnam experience. Theoretically, placing lizing and will be replaced by other environment not much different from one-third of a division’s combat power in the RC units requiring HSIRT and SASO train- the one they are leaving. The profes- would achieve the intent of forcing that brigade’s ing and certification. Demobilizing units sional dedication they have brought to mobilization in case of general war. It didn’t will process through their mobiliza- bear in their current positions will pay work. tion stations, providing lessons learned big dividends for themselves, our insti- 8Lieutenant General George Fisher, “Training to TSB personnel, as well as lay the tution, and the TSB. They will coach, Support XXI,” Military Review, May-June 2000, groundwork for future mission essential teach, train, and learn more about doc- online at https://calldbp.leavenworth.army.mil/ task list training. trine than they realize. As Lieutenant calldb.html. General Fisher points out, “they will 9For example, in 1996 and 1997, RTB Knox cov- Military Support to ered the 53d SIB (FLARNG) and the 155th IN (M) Civilian Authorities return to the force better for the experi- ence. They will gain an acute apprecia- (MSARNG). When TS XXI came into effect, In the event of a presidential-declared tion for the special challenges facing TSB Shelby assumed responsibility for training support for the 155th and TSB Patrick took re- disaster, the TSB stands ready in coor- their counterparts in the RC and will sponsibility for the 53d. dination with the Federal Emergency undoubtedly provide the best training Management Agency (FEMA) to pro- support possible.”13 10The RTDs were formally assigned to the AC vide disaster relief assets in support of division associated with the enhanced readiness brigade and personnel were taken from the divi- local civil officials. Under provisions of Notes sion’s MTOE. TS XXI focused all training sup- the Stafford Act, the TSB — as the 1American Military History, Hermes, Chapter 27. port through TSBs. DOD action agency — coordinates and 11 controls DOD assets at the request of Undoubtedly, this solidified DOD Secretary Mc- Commanding General, First Army, Yearly Train- 12 Namara's well-documented bias against reserve ing Guidance, 2002. This is a longstanding situa- FEMA to meet state and local needs. forces, online at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/ tion. This mission requires much planning books/amh/AMH-27.htm; and MG Bruce Jackobs, 12The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and and coordination and is directed by a “Tensions Between the Army National Guard and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288), as amend- special component of the TSB staff, the the Regular Army,” Military Review, October ed, authorizes the U.S. President, Executive Or- 1993, online at https://calldbp.leavenworth.army defense coordinating element (DCE). der 12673, to provide financial and other forms .mil/calldb.html. The DCE is highly flexible, continually of assistance to state and local governments, cer- exercised, and prepared for immediate 2On a strategic level, nations fight wars, armies tain private nonprofit organizations and individu- deployment throughout the TSB AOR. are the instruments used by nations. This com- als to support response, recovery, and mitiga- mitment of America’s reserves would represent tion efforts following presidential-declared major The TSB’s Future Role far more political and strategic value than the disasters and emergencies, online at http://www. The challenges of maintaining combat sum total of the forces’ capabilities; it would fema.gov/r-n-r/pa/papd/105.htm. signal the nation’s commitment to fight and win, readiness with a maximum of 39 train- 13Fisher, “Training Support XXI.” ing days per year are enormous. To ver- forcing the National Command Authorities to formulate and communicate clear goals for win- ify this statement, we should look no ning and ending future conflicts. further than the AC battalion com- 3 CPT Joe Redmon is assigned to manders as they rotate from command- “Major Paul Herbert, “Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DuPuy and the 1976 the 4th Cavalry Brigade, 85th Divi- ing ARNG modified table of organiza- Edition of FM 100-5, Operations,” Leavenworth tion and equipment battalions. Their sion (TS), TSB Knox, Fort Knox, KY. Paper #16, “…authoritative fundamental princi- His career spans almost 20 years, experiences and judgment would seem ples by which military forces guide their actions,” critical to the future role that TSBs can online at https://calldbp.leavenworth.army.mil/ with his most enjoyable assign- and will play in providing effective calldb.html.”). I would add that doctrine gives us a ments being in Germany, Fort Ri- training support to the RC. common language and a common frame of refer- ley, Kansas, and Fort Knox. 44 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Armor and Mechanized Infantry in Built-Up Areas!

by Major Rich Rouleau, Sergeant First Class Wesley Wyatt, and Sergeant First Class Martino Barcinas

The tank platoon roared up the road my Lessons Learned Newsletter 98-10, Mechanized Infantry Company Team, and stormed into Shughart-Gordon. As “Light/Heavy Fighting in Restricted and additional planning considerations.2 the M1s sprayed heavy machine gun Terrain,” outline integrating the light There are four phases to offensive fire at lower windows and doors, Brad- infantry and mounted forces.1 leys hosed upper floor windows and MOUT operations: recon the objective, roofs. The surprise and speed of the Because of these diverse requirements, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, tank penetration shocked the OPFOR. the heavy team must be a multifunc- and clear the built-up area. First, we A gleeful heavy team commander swag- tional unit capable of operating as part must look at MOUT planning consid- gered toward the brigade commander, of the brigade task force, battalion task erations and how they impact the heavy expecting a well-earned slap on the force, or independently down to sec- team as it applies to supporting a light back, maybe even a mention at the AAR. tion level. The heavy team can have up infantry brigade. The planning consid- He was surprised to see the colonel’s to four maneuver platoons, a company erations outlined in FM 71-1 are valid face darken with concern as the bri- headquarters section, and a brigade liai- for the JRTC fight and should be fol- son team with a robust combat service lowed as well as translated to the in- gade combat team commander talked 3 to his lead infantry unit. and support slice. The tank platoons fantry task force commanders. Offen- have four M1A1 or M1A2s. The mech sive techniques in MOUT start with task Meanwhile, back in the MOUT com- platoons have four M2s and three dis- organization. plex, the armor platoon occupied the mount squads. The headquarters sec- Task Organization. The heavy team street like a beached whale waiting to tion has either two M1A1s or two M2s. be carved for its blubber. This time, Force XXI infantry company headquar- must plan on being task organized however, no Eskimo would do the cut- down to section level. The heavy team ters also has a weapons squad consist- commander should assume the role of ting; Geronimos of the 1-509 crept up ing of three sniper teams. The heavy to the windows overlooking the tanks. team also has a maintenance contact breach commander of the penetration Their “knives” were smoking satchel force. The heavy team commander team, communications team chief, med- should have control of two penetration/ charges hurled onto the decks of the ics with vehicles, engineers, air defense, exposed Abrams tanks. Yep, the heavy and a heavy combat service support breach teams to maintain the momen- team would make the AAR all right. tum and redundancy of the combat package from its parent battalion. team. Team headquarters would have a To apply these TTPs, you must under- headquarters tank section, an engineer Heavy team is the combined arms ar- stand the phases of offensive MOUT platoon, a smoke platoon, and company mor/mechanized company team of the in accordance with FM 71-1, Tank and trains. Teams 1 and 2 would each have Joint Readiness Training Center’s rota- tional light infantry brigade. It func- tions as the heavy initial ready com- pany for brigades during unit rotations Ideal grouping is 4-5 infantry per vehicle, to the JRTC. The heavy team can be this is not always possible. Four is the minimum. tank heavy, mechanized infantry heavy, or a balanced team with equal tank and mechanized infantry platoons. Each has a specific MTOE, depending on wheth- er it has a tank company headquarters or an infantry company headquarters. Because of this unique MTOE, each Protection team moves out where the – team can develop its tactics, techniques, threat originates covering antiarmor team and procedures (TTP) for operations in and sniper approaches. built-up areas. There are more generic TTPs that can be adopted or modified, regardless of MTOE. They are not in- tended to be the only solution, merely to illustrate how one unit can get the job done and complement existing field manuals. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps’ Project Metropolis provided a During mounted movement, the protection team rides on the top of the tank and the back of the wealth of information and TTPs that Bradley, dismounting as soon as the vehicle stops can be adapted by Army mechanized or slows. This is only applicable when there is no forces to enhance crew and dismount- light infantry platoon attached. ed infantry survivability. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and Center for Ar- Figure 1. Tank and Bradley Protection ARMOR — September-October 2002 45 TM 2...

Figure 2. Breaching Method 2 TM 2... a light infantry platoon, a section of two tanks with plow and roller, a section of two Bradleys with dismounts, a mine clearing line charge (MCLC), and an en- Figure 3. Breach Complete Method 2 gineer squad. Platoons 3 and 4 would each have two sections of tank/Bradley MCLC. Avoid using the MCLC if there ing the Bradley section with the tanks wingmen. are overhead hazards such as power as wingmen provides local vehicle se- The remaining two platoons are as- lines; this highlights the need to have curity of the tanks and Bradleys as signed the roles of outer cordon and a sapper squad available to conduct a shown in Figure 1. This option pro- combat team reserve. Due to this aus- manual breach. The MCLC is a tempt- vides the greatest security to armored tere task organization, the heavy team ing target for the OPFOR and its de- vehicles from satchel charges and other must be given a clear and concise task struction can greatly hinder BLUFOR dismounted threats. The armored vehi- and purpose, be prepared to assume sev- operations. cles, in turn, will be available to pro- eral roles, and conduct centralized plan- vide mutual support to the dismounted ning and decentralized execution. For extremely restricted terrain, the infantry platoons as they attempt to breach force might have one tank and provide far side security or secure a one Bradley, plus dismounts with MCLC foothold. Task, Purpose, Role, and and engineers as a re- Mission of the Heavy Team dundant means to breach. “Team Heavy” will be part of the task The support force con- force that secures a foothold in the sists of the remaining town. It may have a follow-on mission tank and Bradley. The as- to support clearing the built-up area. sault force is the light For this purpose, the team is task or- infantry platoon. Team 2 ganized with its assets into a breach is kept in reserve with a force, assault force, and a support force. follow-on and assumes a Because of the restricted terrain, the follow-on and support team’s operation could be limited to role. Additionally, Team super-sized platoons or teams that exe- 2 can be OPCON to the cute the breach. They might conduct clearing battalion. This assaults and possible support missions keeps a redundant means on their own. In some cases, if the ter- for breaching and ex- rain is sufficiently restricted, the com- poses the fewest number pany can execute the breach in its en- of friendly forces to the tirety. enemy. After Team 2 se- cures the foothold, it can For example, the breach force and sup- support clearing the built- port force come from Team 1. The up area. breach force consists of the tank/Brad- ley section with dismounts for local se- In either scenario, the curity and MCLC with engineers for heavy team still has its mechanical breaching. The support force remaining two platoons is the remaining tank/Bradley section to support the combat with dismounts and a light infantry pla- team’s cordon of the toon. Team 2 provides the assault force. town and can assist in A thorough recon and overlay of the clearing the built-up area town should identify hazards for the or as the reserve. Team- Figure 4. Clearing BUA Method 2 46 ARMOR — September-October 2002 Reinforcement/escape route

Isolation vehicles Scouts Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry and Rifle Platoon and Squad, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 April 1992, Change 1, 1 March 2001; Center for Army Les- sons Learned Newsletter 98-10, “Light/Heavy Fighting in Restricted Terrain,” Fort Leavenworth, KS. = Fire Team 2FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Com- pany Team, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Killing area Printing Office, 26 January 1998. behind outer buildings 3Ibid.

Support tanks MAJ Richard R. Rouleau enlisted in the Army National Guard in 1982 Initial penetrations and transferred to active duty in 1984 as an M60A1 armor crewman, serving in various assignments, in- Figure 5. Combined Arms Clearing cluding 133d Engineer Battalion, 2-6 Cavalry; 2-72 Armor; 2-12 Cavalry; and 3-16 Cavalry. He was commis- How might it work? The commander light than the AN/PAC-4C and can be responsible for securing the foothold distinguished with the trained eye. It, sioned as an armor officer in 1991 determines where the penetration will however, is not the cure for all lasing from Niagara University. His assign- occur through reconnaissance. Team tasks. ments have included scout platoon leader, 2-127 Armor; tank platoon Heavy moves forward and makes the Command and control of the beast is initial penetration using one of the leader, XO, and BMO, 2-37 Armor, above listed methods. Figures 2 and 3 probably the heavy team commander’s greatest challenge. Where is the best 3d ID; commander, A Troop, 3-17 illustrate breaching method 2, with location for him and with what com- Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division; and Team 2 OPCON to the clearing task senior armor/mech company and pla- force. Another key issue in mechanical mand and control platform? There is no right answer and it is probably person- toon observer/controller at the Joint breaching is the number of hits the ality driven. Historically, we find that Readiness Training Center. Current- roller can sustain and when to bring the MCLC forward to enhance its surviv- the commander that goes into the built- ly, he is attending CGSC. up area in his tank becomes a fighter. ability. In Figures 4 and 5, Team 2 sup- He loses perspective of the team fight ports the clearing task force using the SFC Wesley Wyatt enlisted in the tanks to protect the light infantry as when he becomes engulfed in personal U.S. Army in 1983 as a 19E. He has survivability. Therefore, the combat served in various assignments, in- they move from building to building. team loses its momentum and opera- The Bradleys provide mutual direct fire cluding 3-73 Armor, Fort Bragg, NC; support to limit collateral damage, and tions grind to a halt. In this scenario, the commander’s primary purpose is to 2-77 Armor, Fort Lewis, WA; 5-68 dismounts from the Bradleys provide breach and secure a foothold, along Armor, Germany; tank commander, armored vehicle security. The other two TF 1-10 Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; platoons assist in cordoning the built- with passing follow-on forces through. The heavy team commander may find squad leader, 1-4 Infantry; platoon up area. himself occupying a room in a secure sergeant and first sergeant, 1-35 Ar- There is no definite method to keeping building with the ramp of his first ser- mor, Germany; and observer/con- dismounts and armored vehicles alive geant’s M113 up against a window, re- troller at the Joint Readiness Train- in a MOUT environment. However, us- moting his communications while syn- ing Center. Currently, he is assigned ing combined arms techniques greatly chronizing casualty evacuation and ob- to 2-16 Cav as a senior instructor/ enhances their chances. stacle reduction. writer for AOB. Refinements. All operations can be The days of bypassing all built-up ar- improved. Equipment shortages or lack eas greater than 1 kilometer are gone SFC Martino A. Barcinas is current- of the proper tools is nothing new. for armor forces. Throughout the world, ly an observer/controller at the Joint Those needs often stimulate force de- urban sprawl and modernization has Readiness Training Center. He en- velopment. For example, sniper rifles made MOUT a fact of military life. would enhance operations for the tank These operations require unit leaders to listed in the U.S. Army in 1982 as a company or its mechanized infantry carefully applying doctrine, training, 19D reconnaissance specialist. He platoons. They provide excellent over- leader development, organization, ma- has served in various assignments, watch with minimal risk of collateral teriel, and soldiers. Finally, the unit including 2-11 ACR; 5-12 Cavalry; damage. Marking systems for ground- should continuously refine its TTPs for 2-67 Armor; 1-509 PIR; 3-73 Armor, to-air assets is another shortfall. The combat drills and its ability to meet 82d Airborne Division; and 1-17 Cav- AIM-1 laser provides a higher density MOUT challenges. alry, 82d Airborne Division. ARMOR — September-October 2002 47 A Technique for Preparing the M1 Series Tank for MOUT Operations

by Major Richard Rouleau and First Sergeant Carl A. Pope

In an environment of combat teams, tank. Procedures for attaching this sys- flanks of the tank, blocking their view task forces, and expeditionary forces, tem can be found in the Center for of the opposite side. Using an engine the need for understanding combined Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 98- exhaust deflector, such as the one arms operations continues to be a chal- 10, “Fighting Light/Heavy in Restricted currently used to support M1s towing lenge during real world contingency Terrain.” M1s, is a possible solution that would missions and at the Joint Readiness permit the infantry dismounts to follow Training Center. Preparing the M1-series Protecting tanks from the enemy can behind the tank. The heat is either tank for MOUT with units that rarely be accomplished by attaching concer- forced straight up or straight down, train together continues to challenge tina wire and chicken wire around the which allows dismounts to stack be- tank crews and their supported infan- tanks’ skirts, including the rear. This hind for maximum protection. The Sep- try. There are some simple tips on protects the tank without risking se- tember 1999 PS magazine has the in- TTPs for preparing the M1 and its sup- vere injury. formation necessary to accomplish this. ported infantry for MOUT operations. A modified ski boat recovery ladder It is also available in Appendix D–20- Using existing stocked supply items, attached to the bustle rack will allow 1-5 of the technical manual. off-the-shelf items, as well as locally friendly dismounts as well as the tank manufactured materials, you can pre- crew to access the tank when the tur- The combined M1 and dismounted in- pare the M1 for MOUT operations. ret is traversed over the side. This sys- fantry team is a lethal force to be reck- tem can be initiated by the loader who oned with in a MOUT environment. Us- There is no current system on the M1 ing some good old-fashioned Ameri- that allows the tank commander to folds out the ladder and retrieves it as necessary. can ingenuity, the M1 can easily be communicate with supported dismounts configured to overcome shortcomings without using radios or hand and arm One of the M1 crew’s top priorities is in current operational requirements. signals. Communications with the dis- protecting the company/team dismounts. The U.S. Marine Corps is the Depart- mounts remain a challenge, but can Current configuration of the M1 does ment of Defense proponent for MOUT be accomplished by mounting a C- not allow for dismounts to follow be- operations and their publications and 2296 vehicle radio communications in- hind it because of the exhaust system. TTPs offer excellent sources for armor tercom control unit on the back of the Dismounts are forced to follow on the soldiers.

LETTERS continued from Page 5 development for what will be the doctrine of likely, NCOs and officers will judge these and the gunner must track the vehicle the Objective Force, and it is certainly not former-IBCT soldiers and make assess- throughout the missile’s flight. The maximum attrition warfare. We teach and embrace the ments of their tactical and technical skills, range of the TOW missile is 3,750 meters, science of chaos and theories of complexity, and then judge the training standards in the and at maximum distance, the missile’s flight with an understanding that all warfare is IBCT brigades. time is 27 seconds. asymmetrical and that linear thinking must The MGS platoon belongs to an infantry be a thing of the past (something most caval- The ITAS optics system is the greatest com- company composed of 171 personnel. The rymen knew instinctively long ago). I will con- bat multiplier of the TOW ITAS. The same infantry company has three infantry platoons, tact Bill and invite him out to SAMS. It has optics system is used on the M1A2 SEP, the a headquarters platoon, a sniper team, a been far too long, and I think we still have Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3, and the long- much to learn from each other. mortar section, a fire support team, and the range acquisition system, but without the MGS platoon. same magnification power. Presently, there COL JAMES GREER At full strength, an MGS platoon has only are no bunker-buster or fire-and-forget mis- Director, SAMS siles available for the TOW system, but the Fort Leavenworth, KS one officer, five noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and six soldiers, E-4 or below. Pres- vehicle can be mounted with an M-2 .50 cal- iber machine gun. ently, six of the nine platoons have platoon leaders and the average strength is five Are 19Ks Best Suited NCOs and three soldiers. All TOW gunnery training is conducted with for the MGS Platoon? MILES, and the live-fire allocation for a TOW Each platoon has three vehicles; each ve- company is one round per vehicle, annually. Dear Sir: hicle has a driver, a loader, a gunner, and a vehicle commander. Currently, the MGS The vehicle, originally intended for the MGS Aside from the interim brigade combat platoon vehicle is a HMMWV, Series 1121, platoon, is a Stryker with a 105-mm cannon. teams (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, few mounted with a tube-launched, optically This vehicle only requires a three-man crew, people are concerned with the Mobile Gun tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system. and the fourth man on each vehicle is a System (MGS) platoon. In the near future, The TOW system is fitted with the improved back-up loader; the MGS vehicle has an this discussion will expand to many voices target acquisition system (ITAS), which al- autoloader. The vehicle can carry 18 ready when more armor soldiers and officers are lows daytime visual enhancement from 8- to rounds of 105-mm rounds and shoot at a 6- assigned to such units. More discussion will 12-power magnification, and allows night second cyclic rate. According to a June issue emerge when 19K and 19D soldiers leave vision enhancement from 8- to 24-power of Army Times, this vehicle is currently 4,000 the IBCT brigades and are absorbed back enhancement. To fire the TOW ITAS weap- pounds over the Department of the Army’s into a more conventional MOS role. Most ons system, the vehicle must be stationary mandated weight, which requires all combat 48 ARMOR — September-October 2002

vehicles in the 3d Interim Brigade Combat keep them there is doing them and the ar- Memories of the Huertgen Forest Team to be air deployable. mor community a disservice. Dear Sir: Presently, the MGS platoon can accomplish Our first recommendation is to replace four missions independently — attack by fire, 19Ks with 11-series soldiers or 19Ds. With- Captain Sullivan’s article in the May-June support by fire, ambush, and convoy escort. out need for much explanation, 11-series 2002 issue of ARMOR on Huertgen Forest With support from an infantry platoon or soldiers are more at home in the infantry brought back many unhappy memories for me. section, the MGS platoon can operate traffic company than 19Ks and, like those in the control points or perform hasty route recon- brigade antitank company, are able to per- At that time, I had just turned 20 and was a naissance. form all the same tasks as the MGS pla- member of CCR of the 5th Armored Division, Obviously, the MGS platoon is very differ- toons. Also, 11-series soldiers can train in which was the first U.S. unit to breach the ent from the traditional tank platoon, espe- areas that 19K soldiers cannot, such as the Siegfried Line at the Our River, between cially technically. Until the MGS Stryker vari- expert infantry badge. Luxemburg and Wallendorf, Germany, be- tween the 15th and 25th of September, 1944. ant is fielded, 19Ks do not belong in the Another option we feel is viable for manning MGS platoon. While assigned to an MGS This is where I earned a Purple Heart from a the MGS platoon is the 19D. Two of the shrapnel wound. platoon, a 19K misses required training, three of us spent time as platoon leaders of therefore the chance to improve technically a RECCE scout platoon, and our opinion is In Huertgen, CCR was given the mission to and tactically. Although attack by fire and that 19Ds are better suited for the day-to-day attack, seize, and hold the towns of Huert- support by fire are important armor platoon operations of an infantry company. They are gen and Kleinhau, then Brandenburg and tasks, they are not conducted in the same more accustomed to dismounted operations. Bergstein. CCR lead elements consisted of: way due to the survivability of the different The traditional 19D tasks do not differ much 10th Tank Battalion, minus B Company and vehicles and the tracking and reloading ca- from those of the MGS soldiers, especially in plus A and C Companies from 47th Armored pabilities of the TOW system. This contradic- the route reconnaissance missions. Many Infantry Battalion, plus Company C, 628 Tank tory mission training from an armor platoon 19Ds understand the TOW system and how Destroyer Battalion; and 47th Armored Infan- is especially important for younger soldiers. to fight from a HMMWV, training they may try Battalion plus B Company, 10th Tank Bat- In three platoons, there are six soldiers who have received in past units, and training that talion, plus 1 platoon, Company C, 22d Ar- will have served with MGS for a minimum of may prove valuable in their next units. Espe- mored Engineer Battalion, minus the A and three years before a permanent change of cially for those 19Ds serving in a reconnais- C Companies from above. station. They will arrive at their next duty sance, surveillance, and target acquisition station (most likely a conventional armor squadron, their working knowledge of MOUT The weather was miserable with rain, sleet, unit) as sergeants or senior specialists with- operations further enhances the effective- snow, and freezing cold, causing many non- out having shot a Table VIII gunnery, or ness of a platoon that is designed to support operational casualties such as trench foot served only as a loader on one Table VIII a company that fights in this environment. and pneumonia. The roads went from bad to gunnery. They have no experience in per- Eventually, 19Ks will have a place in infan- worse, and tracks either slipped off the side, forming maintenance on an M1 platform, and try companies. When the MGS platoon can hit a mine, or were hit by enemy direct or indirect fire. they do not know how to break track. Al- train for precision gunnery (MOUT or non- though platoon leaders and platoon ser- MOUT) on a biannual schedule and can ef- The attack started on 29 November 1944, geants have a responsibility to maintain tra- fectively support the infantry with the proper and from CCR’s after action report at the end ditional 19K skills, the primary focus is to equipment, no soldier will fulfill this role like of the day on 6 December 1944, the married train personnel to accomplish the tasks of an a tanker. 10th Tank Battalion Task Force had 10 op- MGS platoon. By placing these soldiers in erational tanks, 70 infantrymen and 1 tank the MGS platoon, platoon leaders and pla- Another recommendation that will maintain destroyer. CCR achieved its objective, but at toon sergeants have been put in the contra- the effectiveness of the MGS platoon is to a big cost. So much for armor in Huertgen dictory position of training what is necessary have armor officers, rather than infantry of- Forest! to accomplish the platoon’s mission, while ficers, as platoon leaders. Based on training also training what is important for the indi- received at the Officer Basic Course, armor I personally was a crewman on a tank de- vidual soldier to succeed in his next unit. lieutenants have a better understanding of stoyer of Company “C,” 628 TD Battalion This is not an issue that traditional armor the mounted mission than infantry lieuten- and was one of the lucky ones, since we platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have ants. This is not true of infantry officers as a only were disabled after hitting a mine. When had to face. whole — armor officers do not have the we were relieved, I went to a hospital for 10 Not only does this contradictory mission market on maneuver warfare. days with trench foot. When I was released, I affect a soldier’s professional skills after he went back to my company, which had been The recommendations we have made are reconstituted and was attached to a para- leaves an MGS platoon, but it also affects based only on our personal experiences. We retention. By no means are we saying that chute regiment of the 82d Airborne Division feel that at present, 11-series soldiers or on the north side of the Bulge. 19Ks cannot meet the standard in an infantry 19Ds better meet the mission requirements company. On average, our platoons are the of the MGS platoon. Once the platform and After the Bulge, we reverted to CCR control best disciplined in the company. Our NCOs equipment allow the MGS platoon to support and ended up on the Elbe River, the closest know more about maintenance and motor the infantry according to its original design, U.S. unit to Berlin. There we were stopped pool operations than most infantry NCOs. 19Ks will have a place. Until then, placing because of the Yalta Agreement. But, 19Ks — especially those who are com- 19Ks in this role negatively affects the armor Armor proved to be highly effective in win- ing to these platoons from other units — community. Future MGS and RECCE offi- have different ideas of combat: they stay ning World War II, despite the problems en- cers will be the final decisionmakers as the countered in the Huertgen Forest. CCR re- mounted, they do not see much use in ruck IBCT proves its effectiveness during real- marching, and they like to shoot big guns. Is ceived a Presidential Unit Citation for the world deployment. Armor branch has an Huertgen Forest action and a French Croix it important that soldiers enjoy what they do? important role in the success of these units, Not necessarily. But, if you ask an armor or de Guerre for action at Walendorf, Germany. and as armor officers, we can make it more I am proud to have been a member of CCR, cavalry officer to take command of the bri- successful. gade laundry platoon, he will perform to the 5th Armored Division, and a small of our country’s proud military history. best of his abilities; after a year or two he 1LT JOSH JONES, might rethink his interest in the Army. 1LT WALT REED, ROBERT W. HERMAN As MGS platoon leaders, we feel that 19Ks and 1LT JOHN WHEELER LTC, Armor, Ret. are not needed in the MGS platoons, and to Fort Lewis, WA Folsom, CA ARMOR — September-October 2002 49

From Normandy to the Ruhr: With the Wehrmacht. Mistakes are as clearly ana- Battleground Europe: Cambrai - The 116th Panzer Division in World War II lyzed as successes, and Guderian does not Right Hook by Jack Horsfall and Nigel by Heinz Gunther Guderian, Aberjona flinch from describing the suffering that sol- Cave, Pen and Sword Books Limited, Press, New York, 2001, 648 pp., $39.95. diers endured to compensate for the miscal- South Yorkshire, England, 1999, 176 pa- culations of their leaders. The accounts of Mortain and the Ardennes are particularly ges, $16.95. The English-speaking student of military gripping in that regard, and the discussion on If you’ve ever attempted to conduct a staff history — and armored warfare — is well handling armored reserves during the Nor- ride, you have no doubt asked yourself this served by numerous thoughtful and stirring mandy landings is particularly instructive. I question on one or more occasions: “Why accounts of the fighting in France, the Low was also fascinated by the account of the doesn’t some smart guy gather all the rele- Countries, and Germany during 1944-45. division’s twin efforts at Aachen to fight off vant historical data and some good maps of Building on the base established by definitive American attacks while simultaneously shel- this battle and put them all into a single official histories, these accounts, collectively tering its commander from apprehension by source book, preferably one that will fit in my considered, illuminate virtually every aspect the Gestapo. This vignette provides a vivid il- pocket?” Apparently, the folks at Pen and of the Allied experience at every organiza- lustration of the damage the Nazi regime rou- Sword Books have also asked that question. tional level. The translated picture of the Ger- tinely inflicted on the German army. Fortunately for those with an interest in man experience is less complete, however, World War I, Pen and Sword went one step and generally has been refracted through the The quality of the translation bears favor- further — they hired smart guys to actually prism of Allied interpretation. Eyewitness able comment as well. Ulrich and Esther do the work. anecdotal accounts from private German Abele have done an excellent job, and Gud- soldiers and reflective memoirs from senior erian himself approved the English text when The result is a series of compact guide- German leaders are reasonably available, complete. Ulrich Abele previously translated books to the major battlefields of World War I but treatments concerning the broad middle Five Years, Four Fronts: The War Years of in Europe. The series is organized with ma- range of how brigades, divisions, and corps Georg Grossjohann, Major, German Army jor battles broken into small increments, cre- put together their battles — the subjects (Retired). Readers who have enjoyed that ating three series within a series of guide- books. Currently, the publishers offer guide- books for three major battles: the Somme (1 master book and 15 individual guidebooks), Ypres (1 master book and 5 individual guide- books), and the Hindenberg Line (1 master book and 4 individual guidebooks). Each guidebook fits easily into a large pocket, con- tains significant historical background, pro- This photo of a hunt- vides plentiful maps, includes photos of the ing Panther tank de- battlefield as it existed then and as it looks stroyer of Panzer Reg- now, and provides information about park- iment 16 in the Ruhr ing, lodging, and dining in the battlefield Cauldron in April 1945 area. appears in From Nor- Cambrai represents the series. The authors mandy to the Ruhr. devote 110 pages to the story of this rela- Photo used by permission, tively short battle, which marked the first Heinz Guderian and Kurt Wendt massed use of tanks. The historical material includes more than a dozen maps with over- lays, short character studies of the more most of interest to our own mid-grade offi- fine piece of work can anticipate what they significant participants, orders of battle for cers — are woefully thin. have to look forward to in From Normandy to both forces, and a surprisingly detailed ac- the Ruhr. count of the battle itself. The remainder of From Normandy to the Ruhr: With the the book is devoted to five separate battle- 116th Panzer Division in World War II by From Normandy to the Ruhr is a must read field tours. Each tour includes additional his- Major General (then Major) Heinz Gunther for the serious student of WWII or armored torical information, one or more maps with Guderian, the son of the famous panzer vi- warfare. It should not, however, be the first recommended stops identified, a short dis- sionary, does much to fill this need. The or only book one reads about the Wehr- cussion of the significance of each of the younger Guderian was the division’s First macht’s Western Front. The tactical detail recommended stops, and photos of both the General Staff Officer and, in that capacity, that is the book’s greatest strength could be modern battlefield and the war zone as it weathered such epic struggles as those in lost on a reader who does not have a rea- existed during the battle. The guidebook also Normandy, Argentan, Falaise, Arnhem, Aach- sonable appreciation of the larger campaign. provides specific information about local fa- en, the Hürtgen, the Ardennes, the Reich- Similarly, the cartography — featuring 26 cilities to support each tour, including ad- swald, and the Ruhr. The 116th Panzer Divi- maps — is detailed, in black and white, en- dresses and phone numbers. sion was organized in 1944 from elements of gagement specific, and uses European mili- other units and fought exclusively on the tary conventions. Maps or atlases depicting The only drawback to this excellent re- Western Front. Its adversaries included such the flow of the campaigns will be helpful to source is that it is currently limited to only famous outfits as the American 1st, 4th, the reader as well. That said, I strongly rec- those battles fought in Europe during World 28th, 29th, and 30th Infantry Divisions and ommend this book to anyone who truly wants War I. Compact, easy to read, and full of the 2d, 3d, 5th, 7th, and 8th Armored Divisions. to understand the campaigns in France, the most important historical data, these guide- Its engagements were some of the most fa- Low Countries, and Germany, and to anyone books should be high on the list of priority mous of the war. who wants to understand how battles are purchases for any military professional trav- fought at the division level. eling to Europe. They are also great exam- Guderian went on to a distinguished career ples of a staff ride handbook. in the Bundeswehr and writes in a clear, JOHN S. BROWN straightforward style. In his candor, he pro- BG, USA MAJ JOSEPH S. MCLAMB vides a useful antidote to those prone to Chief, U.S. Army Center CGSC uncritical adulation of the fighting skills of the of Military History Fort Leavenworth, KS 50 ARMOR — September-October 2002

The Decorations, Medals, Ribbons, erate armies in the field; the lenient policy knowledge due to access to the once-secret Badges, and Insignia of the United toward surrendered rebels, formulated by Lin- state archives. Historians, researchers, and States Army: World War II to Present coln and implemented by Grant; the capture even enthusiasts have taken advantage of by Colonel Frank C. Foster (Ret.), Med- of Jefferson Davis and the fleeing Confeder- that access to write a wide number of books ate government; and the assassination of and pamphlets covering a myriad of sub- als of America Press, Fountain Inn, SC, Lincoln — or rather the failure of this shatter- jects, and military history has fared very well 2001, 148 pages, $24.95 (softcover). ing event to derail the closure of hostilities. at their hands. The only sad thing about it is that too much of it remains in Russian, and Colonel Foster sets out to write a fairly The author certainly captures the grand too few people in the West read the lan- comprehensive, but still manageable, refer- dramatic sweep of the last month of the war, guage to enjoy how the Russians have taken ence to the plethora of awards and devices and forces even the knowledgeable reader advantage of this change to write about the used by the U.S. Army since WWII and suc- to rethink the significance of individual ac- missing pieces in their own history. ceeds admirably. He describes most medals, tions on subsequent events, but this re- ribbons, and badges authorized since WWII, viewer ultimately found his argument uncon- Armor history is a good case in point, as including the criteria for earning the device vincing. While Winik demonstrates that a many past mysteries are being sorted out and a brief history of each. Also discussed dystopian outcome was possible, he fails to regarding the history of Russia’s mighty tank are some of the most common patches and prove that it was likely — I still do not believe industry. The former Soviet Union produced other uniform insignia over the same time that the South possessed the material or more tanks than anyone else prior to WWII, period. The material is well organized and spiritual resources (or the motivation, for that and overall, they probably account for more contains a surprising amount of detail giv- matter) by mid-1865 to continue the fight, than 50 percent of all the tanks ever built. en the publication’s brevity. It is a decided- even as bushwhackers and guerrillas. How- But until researchers gained access to the ly thorough guide to U.S. Army and joint ever, though he indulges in breathless prose archives, people in the West only saw very awards since WWII and, although clearly not from time to time, this is a good read and convoluted histories — most of which read intended as a particularly rigorous historical a refreshing interpretation of a momentous like U.S. auto ads from the 1950s — bigger, work, it is still an informative reference for period. stronger, faster, best in the world. every soldier. Readers looking for a military history of the Most of these publications have a set for- This book contains full color reproductions last days of the Confederacy may be disap- mat: a history of the development of the ma- of every award or other device mentioned in pointed. Though he does provide a good chine which is the subject of the book, a de- the text, is serves as a useful guide to award overview of the final campaigns — particu- tailed description of the most common ver- precedence, and contains black and white larly of Johnston’s fight in the Carolinas — sion’s interior workings and design, and a illustrations of many other items discussed in there is little new here and his analysis of short combat history of the vehicle. This is text. While the author fails to cite the sources tactics and strategy is simplistic, to say the usually accompanied by a large number of for his historical information, he does provide least. Winik concentrates instead on person- photographs, cutaways from the original op- a solid bibliography, and a casual reader will alities, so that the fighting becomes some- erating manual for the vehicle with callouts, find little controversy in his information. This thing of a dramatic backdrop for the protago- and plans of the vehicle in either 1/35 or 1/76 is a laudable effort by a reliable field expert, nists. scale, which are extremely useful to model- and a book that should find its way to every LTC STEVE EDEN ers. They may have a small number of color soldier. Fort Knox, KY views of the vehicles in service to show their service markings and paint schemes as well. SGT MICHAEL A. ROSS, USMCR World Basic Information Library The T-72 Tank: Yesterday, Today, To- In the first book on the T-72, the author (who appears to have been on the Soviet Foreign Military Studies Office morrow (in Russian) by Sergey Suvo- Ft. Leavenworth, KS General Staff at one point in his career) rov; a Tekhnika-Moledezhi/Tankomaster sticks to the classic Russian formula, provid- Publication, Moscow, 2001, 64 pages, ing a very sketchy overview of the develop- $17.95 from East View Press (ISBN 5- April 1865 by Jay Winik, HarperCollins mental history of the T-72. It was created 93849-002-7). from the T-64 as a backup using the V-45 Publishers, New York, 2001, 461 pages, 12-cylinder vee-type diesel, the evolutionary $32.50. The book’s advantages include good, clear follow-on to the legendary V-2 diesel of photos of the most recent T-72 models. It’s WWII. But the design team, headed by Leo- Jay Winik believes that America faced a fork disadvantages include mundane text with to- nid Kartsev at the Nizhniy Tagil tank plant, in its historical path during the last month of tally unsourced and unimpressive history; no hated most of the features of the T-64 and English captions or translations. the Civil War. One road, the road eventually replaced them with ones of their own design, taken, led to national reconciliation and a which resulted in a totally different tank. real peace. The Reconstruction Period, al- The Unknown T-34 (in Russian) by I. Equipped with the V-46 production version of beit troubled, nevertheless laid the founda- Zheltov, M. Pavlov, I. Pavlov, A. Serge- the big vee diesel, and Nizhniy’s own design tion for modern America — unified, rich, and yev, and A. Solyankin; Eksprint Publish- of autoloader and running gear, the T-72 powerful. The other road led to continued ing Center “Military Museum” series, Eks- emerged as a competitor to the T-64 rather conflict; rather than the honorable surrender print, Moscow, 2001, 184 pages, $31.95 than its consort. of Confederate arms, a smoldering, endless from East View Press (ISBN 5-94038- All of this is glossed over in the book, and guerrilla war that impoverishes the North and 013-1) devastates the South. The implications of Suvorov does cover it in passing. He also endemic warfare, weakening the Republic, The book’s advantages include clear, con- covers many of the foreign-built versions and delaying westward expansion, and exacer- cise history of the creation and use of the T- the modifications made to them — if you bating, rather than extinguishing, regional 34 tank, covering many unknown models of want to dramatically improve a T-72, think hatreds would have had incalculable conse- the tank and its combat history. The only dis- France. quences for American and world history. advantage this book has is that only the pho- tographs are captioned in English. The history section is awful, as it reads like Winik argues that either outcome was pos- Soviet propaganda from 1955. Most U.S. sible, and that the hinge of fate turned on Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many of tankers, especially those from B Company, four key events: the decisions by Robert E. the secrets of the former Soviet Union — 4th Tanks, USMC, would be interested to Lee and Joe Johnston to eschew partisan “enigmas,” as Winston Churchill once de- know that Iraq only lost 14 T-72 tanks in warfare and surrender the last two Confed- scribed them — are becoming common combat, the rest were either blown up by ARMOR — September-October 2002 51

their own crews or destroyed by naval gun- dom. He takes them through the depths of unfailing will, but also with a glimpse at the fire. Those lost in Chechnya were lost due to imprisonment and returns them to an exalted heights of our own endurance. Undoubtedly, overwhelming odds, not poor protection. paradise. His book seems modest in pre- no reader can set down this book before Overall, it would seem Suvorov failed to ob- sentation, dominated by the deceptive title completion. tain information relating to honest reports on and a simple, blurred picture of barbed wire. the tank’s failures, and the fact that the T- At first glance, Lyons Press has produced an JASON A. LIBBY 72BM tank had to be renamed after Desert unobtrusive journal of a man’s search for 1LT, Armor Storm (to T-90) as sales fell when the Coali- freedom, not unlike many others. However, Support Platoon Leader tion took the Iraqi army apart in 1991. He sim- Rawicz captures the reader as easily and ply states that T-72BM and T-90 are virtually decisively as the barbed wire on the cover, the same tank. which readers abruptly realize imprisons China Attacks by Chuck DeVore and them. The wire blurs, and the distance fades, Steven W. Mosher, Infinity Publishing, To its credit, the book does have a lot of nice before it reaches more than a few inches; Haverford, PA, 2001, 415 pages, $19.95. color photos of recently seen T-72B and T- the rest of the world does not exist. 72BM tanks, as well as currently offered vari- Historically, victors do not learn nearly as ants such as BREM-1 and foreign variants. Lyons Press designed the few pages lead- well as losers. Generally, battlefield embar- The T-34 book, on the other hand, covers ing to Rawicz’s journal to draw the reader rassment or looming threats make military much more — it’s three times as long with further into Rawicz’s state of mind as he transformation easy. The post-9/11 environ- smaller print. But the T-34 book is a “warts begins his trek. It begins with a simple two- ment proves we have both criteria. Terrorists and all” view of the tank, and covers its pro- word quote on the cover, “Positively Ho- executed unthinkable acts and China At- tracted development history from 1937 to the meric,” solidifying the project’s sense of tacks provides a clear depiction of a loom- ing threat. end of WWII. It uses the classic formula, but scale. Opening the cover and finding the title helplessly scrawled on an overwhelmingly much better and with more respect to its China Attacks is an astonishing novel por- white page, the massive sense of isolation subject than to the book’s propaganda value. traying a People’s Republic of China (PRC) settles on the reader. Lyons Press follows invasion of Taiwan. The authors describe nu- The authors of this book are all Russian with the only illustration — a map spread clear-driven, electromagnetic pulse bombs armor enthusiasts, which means they do not across two austere pages, encompassing — ICBMs. Post-9/11 perspectives must pre- bring a lot of corporate baggage into their the whole of Asia. A 7,000-mile black line face that these are no longer unthinkable writing and analysis. They cite the CC CPSU represents the hard odyssey of a man into acts but dangerous courses of action, mak- resolutions that brought the T-34 into being, and out of freedom, which stretches from ing China Attacks a realistic and bracing look as well as all of the letters and documents Moscow to Siberia, and down to India. that cover the vehicle’s convoluted produc- at the threats to the United States and her tion path. Richard Downing, the original translator, allies. Moreover, the depicted actions on part introduces us to Rawicz briefly and quietly, of the PRC match what many analysts sug- The history section covers the tank’s use preferring to leave the weight of the warning gest as the outcomes of actual PRC actions. during WWII, from the first battles on the to Rawicz, whose carefully chosen words Fortunately (for Taiwan), the American fight- Western Front through its high watermark at create a more lush image than any photo- ing spirit and ingenuity repulsed the PRC’s Kursk, and on to its final battles in the East graph could. “I had to tell my story as a plans to reclaim its “renegade province.” against the Japanese. The reader gets an warning to the living, and as a moral judg- As an intelligence officer, DeVore has done idea of just what the T-34 really meant to the ment for the greater good (Rawicz, xii),” his research and has portrayed the most dan- Red Army as both a weapon and a symbol adds Rawicz in his foreword. Then we delve of its determination. gerous course of action. As a reported mem- swiftly into the story of a Polish cavalry offi- ber of Congressman Christopher Cox’s staff, The casual reader and armor enthusiast cer captured by the Soviets on his return the portrayed weapons capability of the PRC can at least follow the history of the vehicle from fighting the Germans, tried at Lubyanka leads me to believe that he was involved in because the photographs are captioned in Prison and convicted of spying for Poland, creating the January 1999 Cox Report de- English. Modelers will be delighted with the and finally sentenced to 25 years in a Sibe- scribing the acquisition of United States’ nu- fact that it contains nice, fresh 1/35 plans for rian prison camp. The extraordinary displays clear secrets by the PRC. Perhaps he used six different stages of the life of the T-34 of endurance, just to survive the deadly jour- the report to highlight the effects of PRC in- from its beginnings as A-32 tank prototype ney to imprisonment, across the whole of telligence activity against the United States. Number 2 to T-34-85 Model 1944. Russia, goes a long way to establish that the Mosher’s regional expertise probably picked Soviets threw many decent men into Siberia. up where DeVore’s background left off, pro- It’s just a shame that they are not all avail- viding the extensive cultural background for able in English, and the Russians have shown Throughout the resulting escape, untar- this endeavor. only lukewarm interest in translating them or nished by time and unblemished by vain- having them translated. The information is glory, Rawicz unflaggingly turns the lives of A lesson learned from China Attacks is really quite useful, and when presented hon- his companions into his warning, and much that, when preparing for future operations, estly, as in the T-34 book, clears up many more. He sends the reader through Siberian we should not focus on how we could better myths that are still taken as fact today. winter nights, the Gobi Desert without food do what we have tried. We must look at our or water, across the length of China, over the actions through a transformational lens. We CW3 (RET.) COOKIE SEWELL crests of the Himalayas, and into the liberty must ask how we can do things differently. Armor Modeling and of British India. He successfully avoids paint- Militaries on the losing end of historical turn- Preservation Society (AMPS) ing a pessimistic view of the whole of hu- ing points fail because they did not adapt manity. Rawicz unassumingly presents a to new environments. The terrorists of 9/11 The Long Walk by Slavomir Rawicz, story of great men overcoming tragic events, wrote the new history. They executed the The Lyons Press, Guilford, CT, 1997, forcing us to wonder what those men could unthinkable. China Attacks provides us with 242 pages, $14.95 (paperback). have achieved in the absence of tragedy. looming threats of immobilizing tactics. In Rawicz very successfully presents his warn- China Attacks, the PRC stole the initiative. ing. Transformation is on us; we must maintain Rawicz’s humility might briefly mislead read- the initiative. ers who find the most recent version of his Rawicz’s The Long Walk should sit on WWII struggle for freedom, but they will be- every person’s shelf, not just those of us in JOHN P.J. DEROSA gin a journey that represents the most thor- the military. His journal not only provides us 1LT, Armor ough warning against an overthrow of free- with ample warning and motivation for our BMO, 1-77 AR 52 ARMOR — September-October 2002

Enforcing the Nametag Defilade Standard

The U.S. Army has made quantum leaps in track vehicles execute complex or unplanned missions by using them as since the M48-series tanks. Technological advances have pro- basic building blocks in planning and executing missions. vided computerized fire control systems, thermal sights, laser Battle drills are a form of risk management because they can range finders, and suspension systems that allow tanks to enhance command and control, reduce uncertainty, and in- maintain a steady platform over rough terrain. sert risk management into the military decisionmaking proc- Although technology has improved the tank’s lethality, it has ess during the planning and rehearsal stage of an operation. not changed the need to have a bird’s-eye view of the situa- Consider risk management in all that you do. You do not tion; vehicle crewmembers still stand in hatches of moving need a written product to conduct risk management. When vehicles with their bodies exposed. you are sitting in your assembly area, take a moment to think Training Circular 21-306, Tracked Combat Vehicle Driver about the types of missions that you could receive. Training, recommends all vehicle commanders stay below Take time to consider environmental effects, such as weath- chest (nametag) defilade in moving vehicles. When standing er, terrain, time of day, and sleep deprivation, when executing in the hatch of a moving vehicle, applying the nametag defi- missions. Identify and assess the reasonably expected haz- lade standard provides ease of dropping down in the vehicle, ards of the operation, and possible ways to reduce the effects which greatly reduces risk in a rollover situation and gives of those hazards as you execute the mission. less exposure to enemy fire. Ignoring the nametag defilade standard has been the cause This hazard is not unique to M1-series tanks and Bradley of many accidents where soldiers have been injured or killed. fighting vehicles, it applies to trucks with ring-mounted weap- Just in the past year, two soldiers died in accidents because ons, HMMWVs, M109s, recovery vehicles, and many other they were not following established procedures during the tracked/wheeled vehicles. Leaders at all levels must conduct operation of a combat vehicle. In the first accident, a M1A1 a risk assessment to determine if it is mission essential for tank commander (TC) lost his life when his tank slid off a soldiers to stand in hatches of vehicles. Leaders must also concrete turn pad and rolled over, crushing the TC in the ensure that vehicle crews practice rollover drills until it be- process. While there were other factors involved in this acci- comes reactive for soldiers standing in hatches to drop down dent, the TC was not at nametag defilade. and brace for a rollover. The second accident occurred when a Bradley commander, The nametag defilade standard is as old as tracked vehi- standing waist defilade in the commander’s hatch, received a cles, but still requires constant enforcement by leaders at all blow to the face from a tree limb that was 22 inches in cir- levels. The Army needs hard-charging, motivated soldiers to cumference. Had this soldier been at nametag defilade, the enforce standards, execute battle drills, and incorporate risk branch would have passed harmlessly over his head rather management into everything we do. than crushing it. Proactive leaders can reduce the risk of injury, or even death, Information for this article was provided by the U.S. Army by training and executing battle drills, which allow leaders to Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

INCORRECT INCORRECT

CORRECT CORRECT M1 Photos by Robert Stevenson Army Accepts First Stryker MGS

Following a 27-month development phase, the U.S. Army received the first Stryker Mo- bile Gun System in July 2002. The MGS is a version of General Motors’ LAV-III 8x8 chas- sis, armed with General Dynamics Land Systems’ 105mm low-profile turret. The MGS was developed as a rapidly deployable direct fire weapon system for the Army’s Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). One of 10 configurations being fielded to the Stryker BCTs, the MGS is designed pri- marily to provide direct fire support to dis- mounted infantry. It can be deployed by C- 130 with minimal preparation. It moves at speeds up to 60 mph and is agile enough to work within tight quarters, such as urban war- fare. The Stryker MGS is crewed by three sol- diers — a driver, a vehicle commander, and a gunner. The MGS’s other characteristics include: · Embedded training capability · On-board diagnostics · M68A1E4 cannon with 18-round autoloader · Integral 14.5mm armor and spall liner · Full solution M1-like fire control · Scaleable RPG armor package. · Fires all NATO standard 105mm tank ammunition · The MGS is 275 inches in length; 107 inches wide; and 7.62mm M240C coaxial machine gun, with 3,400 106 inches in height. It is equipped with a 350 hp en- rounds · gine; a 6-speed transmission; a 2-speed transfer case; 4 Commander’s M2 .50 caliber main gun, with 400 automotive differentials; an 8-wheel hydro pneumatic in- rounds · dependent suspension with height management system; Independently stabilized Commander’s Panoramic full-time 4-wheel drive, with an 8-wheel drive selection; Viewer with target hand-off capability and power brakes with ABS on rear three axles. · 60 mile-per-hour top speed · 9-second 50 meter dash speed Eight preproduction vehicles will be provided to the Ar- · 78 inch gap crossing my over the next five months. These vehicles will un- · 23 inch vertical climb dergo Production Qualification Tests (PQT), user evalu- · 330-mile cruising range ations, and contractor testing. This test program will pro- · Projected 41,300 pounds full combat weight; 38,000 duce the first durability, reliability, and maintenance in- pounds C-130 transport weight formation on the MGS. The MGS is expected to be field- · Embedded, interactive electronic TMs (IETM) ed to the Stryker BCTs beginning in FY05.

ARMOR The Professional Development Bulletin Periodicals Postage of the Armor Branch Paid at Louisville, KY U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARM Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210

PB 17-02-5 PIN: 080063-000