Working paper Tender competitiveness and project performance in India’s PMGSY scheme Jonathan Lehne Jacob N. Shapiro Oliver Vanden Eynde February 2019 When citing this paper, please use the title and the following reference number: S-89447-INC-1 Tender competitiveness and project performance in India’s PMGSY scheme † ‡ § Jonathan Lehne Jacob N. Shapiro Oliver Vanden Eynde 6 February 2019 Abstract As part of India’s e-governance revolution, details of tenders for rural road construction programmes were made publicly available. We analyse these tender data for six states, covering more than 20,000 road projects undertaken under India’s flagship rural roads development scheme – PMGSY. We find that matching these tender details to other administrative data sources on the completion of these projects is challenging, and we examine to what extent data quality correlates with road characteristics. We also analyse the relationship between the competitiveness of the tendering process and the cost and quality of the roads constructed. Greater competition in both the technical and financial evaluation is associated with lower cost overruns and better performance on quality inspections. Nonetheless, we show that even after the introduction of e-procurement a large proportion of tenders remain uncompetitive. Keywords: public procurement; infrastructure; auctions JEL Codes: D72, D73, L14, O18 † Corresponding author; Paris School of Economics; Boulevard Jourdan 48, 75014 Paris, France;
[email protected]. ‡ Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Robertson Hall, 20 Prospect Ave, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA;
[email protected]. § Paris School of Economics; Boulevard Jourdan 48, 75014 Paris, France;
[email protected].