INF.018.002.0001

Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires INF.018.002.0002

Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires PAGE II to download athttp://www.dpc.vic.gov.au Copies oftheReportandSubmissions are available Printed on100%recycled, Australian madepaper 11-19 Lithgow Street, Abbotsford McLaren Press Printed by Emergency Services Commissioner, Victoria Chairman Bruce Esplin Department ofPremier andCabinet Authorised bytheVictorian Government © State Government ofVictoria, 2003 ISBN: 0731114884 Report oftheInquiryinto2002-2003VictorianBushfires INF.018.002.0003 INF.018.002.0004

Letter of Transmission LETTER OF TRANSMISSION REPORT TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2002-2203 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES PAGE III PAGE IV INF.018.002.0005 REPORT TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2002-2203 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES PAGE V LETTER OF TRANSMISSION INF.018.002.0006 PAGE VI INF.018.002.0007 REPORT TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2002-2203 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES PAGE VII TABLE OF CONTENTS INF.018.002.0008 Executive Summary Summary Executive 6161 Overview 62 Conditions Weather Statewide 66 Areas Conditions in the Fire-Affected Weather 69 Burned Areas of High and Low Conditions Among Years Comparison of Weather Conclusions 2828 Overview 30 the Fires for Context – A Key Drought 30 Season The 2002-2003 Fire 37 and Gippsland Fires The North East 37 the Fires Agency Response to 41 Keeping the Community Informed 42 Impacts of the Fires Conclusion 4444 Overview 45 Process and Community Consultation The Submission 45 Origin of Submissions 48 Themes Key 48 1 of Reference Term 50 Land Management/Preparedness 53 Agency Preparedness 53 2 of Reference Term 56 Response 58 Management of Resources 60 Issues Recovery Conclusion 88 Overview 9 Landscape The Victorian 15 Environment in the Victorian Fire 16 Risk Bushfire to and Assets of People Exposure 17 Change and Cultural Population 19 Fire of Unplanned the Threat Response to Victorian Changes in Conclusion 2020 Overview 20 Legislation Victorian 20 Management Act 1986 Emergency 22 Agencies The Fire 27 Management in Fire and Organisations Other Agencies Conclusion 2 A of Part Overview 44 Overview 4 at a Glance The 2002-2003 Bushfires 5 Questions the Fires: After 5 of Reference Terms 7 How the Inquiry was Conducted 7 Aims of this Report 2003 Report: August Interim Chapter 6 61 of 2002-2003 and During the Fires Conditions Before Weather Chapter 4 28 2002-2003 Victorian Fires The Story of the Chapter 5 44 and Community Consultation Submissions Chapter 2 8 Environment The Changing Victorian Chapter 3 20 Arrangements Legislation and Co-operative Current Part A Setting the Scene A Setting the Scene Part Chapter 1 4 Introduction Table of Contents Table PAGE VIII hpe 118Measuring theEffectiveness ofPrescribed Burning 108 Chapter 11 Constraints onPrescribed BurninginForests 92 Chapter 10 Fuel Managementinthe‘Mallee’: Techniques andApproaches 87 Chapter 9 Fuel Managementinthe‘HighCountry’ 84 Chapter 8 Background toPrescribed BurninginForests 74 Chapter 7 Part BTerm ofReference One:Fire andPublicLand hpe 217Traditional BurningPractices ofAboriginalPeople andthePrescribed 117 Chapter 12 1 Conclusions TheImportance ofQuantitative114 Data Philosophical andComparative113 Approaches to Determining Effectiveness Effectiveness113 Measures MeasuringtheEffectiveness109 ofPrescribed Burning Introduction 108 Overview 108 108 Conclusions TheWeather106 Envelope for Prescribed Burning Prescribed BurningRealities:Analyses Undertaken for this Report 103 Constraints onPrescribed Burning 96 Overview 92 92 Conclusions Fire andFuel ManagementintheMallee 90 WhatisMallee? 87 Overview 87 87 Conclusion BurningandGrazing intheHighCountry 86 Overview 84 84 Conclusion Tracks 82 DSE’s Fuel ManagementZones 80 Intervals Between Prescribed Fires 80 Rationale for Prescribed Burning 78 Fire BehaviourandFire Weather 77 Fuel Types andLoads 77 Forest Types 75 ThePrescribed BurningDebate 75 WhodoesPrescribed Burning?Where? 75 Background 74 Overview 74 74 Overview of Part B 72 2 Conclusions Problems122 for ModernFire Management Fire andChangeintheAustralian121 Biota Problems120 ofReconstructing thePast Arrival ofPeople119 andTheirPossible Impacts Overview 117 117 Burning DebateinVictoria INF.018.002.0009 REPORT TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2002-2203 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES PAGE IX TABLE OF CONTENTS INF.018.002.0010 163163 Overview Management Arrangements Emergency of Victoria’s 164 The Development 164 of the Minister Role Management Council 164 Emergency Victoria 165 Management Arrangements The Emergency 165 Response Arrangements Emergency 165 Multi-Agency Exercises Arrangements 166 Recovery Emergency Season the 2002-2003 Fire for 166 Management Preparation Emergency 167 Continuous Improvement Conclusion 139139 Overview Plan 144 Prevention Municipal Fire 144 Planning Arrangements Existing Relating to Concerns Municipal Planning 147 to A New Approach Arrangements Planning in the New 147 Involvement 149 Planning Arrangements Management of the New Conclusion 150150 Overview Season Fire the 2002-2003 Agencies Prior to 151 on Fire Influences External Firefighting for Availability 152 on Water Impact of the Drought 153 Joint Planning 154 Agency Resources of Understanding 158 and Memoranda Agreements 160 Management Costs Information Tracks 161 Roads and Access 162 Aircraft Conclusion 126 C of Part Overview 128128 Overview 2002-2003 Risk for Fire 129 of Heightened Understanding Community or Go? Stay Decision to Options: The 131 Bushfire Understanding Program and Information Education Community 132 CFA Programs Current 136 Four Systems Communication 138 Public Awareness Measure 138 as a Preparedness Insurance Conclusion Chapter 16 163 Preparedness Services Emergency Chapter 14 139 Approach – An Holistic Fire Planning for Chapter 15 150 Agency Preparedness Part C Term of Reference One: Community and Agency Preparedness and Agency Preparedness One: Community of Reference C Term Part Chapter 13 128 and Preparedness Public Awareness PAGE X hpe 120OtherResponseIssues 200 Chapter 21 Development andImplementation ofFire Control Strategies 190 Chapter 20 DidtheIncidentControl System Work? 186 Chapter 19 TheState’s Emergency ManagementArrangements inAction 180 Chapter 18 InitialResponsetotheFires 172 Chapter 17 Part DTerm ofReference Two: ResponseandRecovery hpe 224Aircraft Operations andtheStateAircraft Unit 204 Chapter 22 0 Communications Facilities Firefighting Vehicles202 ManagementofPrivately-Owned202 Firefighting Resources ManagementofFirefighting Resources201 intheField KeepingTrack200 ofFirefighting Resources Overview 200 200 Conclusion UseofBulldozers 198 ‘NoGoZones’197 Briefings 197 Cross196 Border LiaisonandStrategy Development Information Gathering 196 UseofLocal Knowledge196 Consistency ofStrategy194 Aggressiveness193 ofFirefighting Application ofthe Fire191 Control Prioritiesto IncidentActionPlanning Overview 190 190 Conclusion Transferring189 Control from OneIncidentControl Centre to Another IncidentControl Centres188 Qualifications for IncidentManagementTeam187 Members Structure ofIncidentManagementTeams187 RegionalEmergency Co-ordination186 Overview 186 186 Conclusion Deployment ofVictoria185 State Emergency Service Personnel Deployment ofMetropolitan185 Fire andEmergency Services Board Personnel Co-operation Between Agencies 184 State Level183 Co-ordination ofEmergency Response DivisionalEmergency Co-ordination182 Evacuation 181 MunicipalEmergency Co-ordination181 Overview 180 180 Conclusion TheFires thatWere179 NotContained Factors178 Affecting InitialAttack Overview 172 172 Overview ofPart D 170 1 Conclusion Deployment ofAircraft211 DuringOperations State Aircraft207 UnitandManagementoftheState (IFAR) Aircraft Assessment206 ofAircraft Requirements for the2002-2003 Fire Season Integrated Firefighting205 Aircraft Resource Overview 204 204 INF.018.002.0011 REPORT TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2002-2203 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES PAGE XI TABLE OF CONTENTS INF.018.002.0012 Fire-Affected Communities Fire-Affected All Respondents to the Inquiry Respondents to and Meetings Consultations Bushfires, The 2002-2003 Victorian Report of The Inquiry Into Interim 2003 August Data on Public Land - Historical Bushfires in Victoria and Unplanned Fires Weather Climate, 6 Chapter for Figures Supplementary by AVISE, Prepared Resources, A Report on The Aerial Firefighting AM, APTL Nick Le-Ray-Meyer Captain 267 Appendix IV 269 Appendix V 275 Appendix VI 279 Appendix VII 319 of Terms Glossary 240240 Overview 242 Model A Unified Command and Control Proposal 246 the CFA Response to Conclusion 251 Appendix I 255 Appendix II 259 Appendix III 226 E of Part Overview 228228 Overview 229 Management in Victoria Emergency Public Land for and Response 230 Between Prevention/Mitigation The Balance 232 Managing Information Strategy Victoria Safety – Fire 233 Cover Model Of Fire – A New Approach 235 Public Land Stewardship Level at the Local Emergencies 236 Planning For 239 Human Resources Conclusion 212212 Overview with Communication Maintaining The Challenge: 216216 Overview Recovery on Bushfire 216 Taskforce The Ministerial Process 219 of the Recovery Overview Sides of the Same Coin 220 Two Response and Recovery: Consistent Equitable, 222 – Predictable, Relief and Recovery Recovery 223 to A Case Management Approach Works Suppression Fire Land Damage Following Private and Rehabilitation: 223 Fencing Conclusion 213 Victoria 214 in Rural Radio Coverage the Border Across 214 Messages Mixed Announcements Emergency for 214 Accuracy Local Corporation 215 Broadcasting Australian Conclusion Glossary Chapter 26 240 Unified Command and Control Forward: The Way Appendices Part E Term of Reference Three: The Way Forward Way The Three: of Reference E Term Part Chapter 25 228 Planning Forward: The Way Chapter 23 212 Communication with the Community Chapter 24 216 Recovery and Environmental Social, Business PAGE XII INF.018.002.0013 INF.018.002.0014

Executive Summary

Backburn in Big Desert December 2002 – DSE PAGE XIV ebelievethattheoverwhelmingmajorityofVictorians We own agendas. recommendations toapportionblame,andadvancetheir There willbesomewhoattempttousethisreport andits mitigation andresponse. fireVictoria's managementcapability-prevention, fromopportunities tolearn themandfurtherimprove and response tothefires, andinparticulartoidentify established tolookintoallaspectsofthepreparations for, BushfiresThe Inquiryintothe2002-2003Victorian was Summary Executive organisational arrangements. improvements tofire managementoperationalsystemsand programs onpublicland.We havealsolookedatpossible to improve theeffectiveness ofmitigationandprevention management planningonbothprivateandpublicland, to create amore seamless,andastronger approach tofire different. We havemademanyrecommendations intended differently orhandledbetter. Thereport ofthisInquiryisno hindsight, andidentifyareas thatcouldhavebeenmanaged It iseasytolookbackatemergencieswiththebenefitof of fires liketheseoccurringagain. to beimproved andwhatcanbedonetomitigatetherisk understanding thesefires -whatworkedwell,needs appropriately includedintheprocess ofbetter Inquiry, are more interested inensuringthattheirviewsare including thosewhocontributedinsomewaytothe analysis ofthelosses, believethefires were, generally, wellmanagedand We the fires. deaths andinjuries,theproperty lossassociatedwith What issubstantiallyandstarklydifferent isthenumberof are veryapparent. Theareaisalsosimilar. oflandburnt Fires of1939,andthefires of2002-2003,thesimilarities In comparingtheconditionsleadinguptoBlackFriday than tolistwhatwentwell. analysis willbedevotedtowhatcanimproved, rather opportunities forimprovement, itisinevitablethatmore This report mayappearcriticaltosome,butinfocusingon their efforts. the fires of2002-2003.We havenothingbutpraisefor and supportstaff -paidandespeciallyvolunteerfought commitment andprofessional waythemanyfirefighters Finally, theInquirywouldliketorestate itsrespect forthe this bedone. our arrangements,andastrong communitydemandthat and wehaveidentifiedopportunitiestofurtherstrengthen communityareVictorian muchhighernowthanin1939, Wednesday Fires of1983.However, theexpectationsof improvement since1939,andeventheAsh this conclusion.There hasbeenverysignificant and saves , duringthefires supports INF.018.002.0015 INF.018.002.0016

Part A Setting the Scene EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overview Chapter 2 The Changing Victorian Environment The Inquiry was presented with many passionately held views on a broad range of topics relating to bushfires (or Victoria has one of the most fire-prone environments in the ‘unplanned’ fires) in Victoria. Submissions and discussions world due to the combination of its landscape, vegetation, ranged from Victoria’s history, climate, weather, geography, climate and weather conditions. Change in the vegetative topography and the introduction of Europeans into Victoria; cover, land use and management, and population past and present land management policies and practices; distribution across the State have influenced the fire risk. previous reports and inquiries and the command and Victoria’s high population density and increasing permanent control system employed to manage unplanned fires today. and weekend communities in areas of high landscape value Much of the debate was informed; some was not. are often also at high risk of bushfires.

To effectively respond to the Terms of Reference we Victorians have responded to fire events and the threat thought it necessary to explore the background and history of bushfire by progressively building a sophisticated fire of many of these issues to provide a common platform for management system based on organisational advances, future debate and to place the recommendations of this legislative change, the application of technology and Report in perspective. These explorations are in Part A. How co-operative management models. We should not be they impacted on the fire and the fire response itself are in complacent. Parts B to E. That change is constant is evident in our climate and we Finally, in preparing this Report we were not able to explored the pattern of extreme fire weather associated investigate and analyse every anecdote and incident with El-Niño-Southern Oscillation events. This examination brought to our intention; rather we addressed the broad revealed possible increases in fire risk for Victoria as the themes and issues. However there were 5 events that climate warms, supporting the need for adaptable systems. warranted scrutiny and these are considered as case studies and are analysed in Parts C and D. Recommendation

Chapter 1 2.61 That DSE and CFA as part of their long term planning, and in conjunction with the Introduction Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology, consider ways in which evidence for climate change and The Victorian summer of 2002-2003 saw bushfires burn El Niño–Southern Oscillation cycle impacts on the greatest expanse of land (1.3 million hectares) since the likelihood of unplanned fire, can be better the 1939 fires (estimated at 1.5-2.0 million hectares). incorporated into preparedness and response As in 1939 and 1983 the fire season followed prolonged planning. drought.

The scale and duration of the fires across the State tested Chapter 3 the capacity of fire agencies and the community. Response to the bushfires ranged from relief that there was not Current Legislation and Co-operative greater loss, given the potential of the fires, through to Arrangements anger and criticism of Victoria’s public land management and the way the fires were fought. Current Victorian legislative and regulatory arrangements relating to planning and mitigation for unplanned fires, are The Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires complex, requiring a high level of co-operation and was established to examine the effectiveness of communication between the many agencies and the preparedness for the season and the response organisations involved, and do not effectively cover all to the bushfires, as well as to provide recommendations agencies and utilities in terms of broader regional planning. for the future.

There are no recommendations in this Chapter. PAGE XV PAGE XVI There are no recommendations inthisChapter. State’s NorthWest duringDecember2002. approximately 181,400hectares intheBigDesert The nextlargestfire overthe2002-2003fire season,burnt land. Noliveswere lostasadirect result ofthesefires. hectares ofland,includingover108,000hectares ofprivate The NorthEastandGippslandfires1.12million burnt contained. of thefires. OnMarch 7thefires were declared officially milder, reducing fire activityandenablinggradualcontrol behaviour andspread. DuringFebruarytheweatherwas extreme weather, producing intenseanderraticfire increase exponentially. January25and30were daysof the fires begintojoinupandthearea affected bythefires Towards theendofJanuary, deterioratingfire weathersaw effort andtheseare explored indetailChapter17. been criticismsoftheinitialresponse tothefire suppression steep inaccessibleforestThere continuedtoburn. have 14 January, however, asmallnumberoffires, mostlyin second day40fires were containedorundercontrol. By response to,somanyfires wasacomplextask,butbythe 80 fires intheNorthEastandGippsland.Locationof, on7and8January,Overnight adrystormignitedover effects. Thislaterthemeisprogressed inChapter24. immediate impactsandbegintoaddress thelonger-term whole. We provide ananalysisofevents,locations,and volunteers, thosecommunitiesaffected asa andVictorians acknowledges theefforts ofthefire agencies,crews and The ‘storyofthefire’ describesthefire eventand The Storyofthe2002-2003Victorian Fires Chapter 4 There are norecommendations inthisChapter. recommended inChapter14. of theproposed newMunicipalFire ManagementPlan The analysishere isacriticalinputintodevelopment accountabilities. Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)haveclearlegislative the CountryFire Authority(CFA) andtheDepartmentof Metropolitan Fire andEmergenciesServicesBoard (MFESB), The three agenciesthatrespond directly tofires: the the response to,andmanagementof,otheremergencies. The Legislationforsuppression offires isclearer, asitisfor There are norecommendations inthisChapter. management andPartsCDontheremaining matters. throughout theReportwithPartBconcentratingonland Chapter. We respond tothemattersraisedwithusindetail These issues,andtheirsubsets,are detailedwithinthe Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources inthefightingof • Responseissues,thatishowthefire wasfought; • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness, principallyfuel • Principal areasincluded; ofconcern tofarEastGippsland. Victoria were surprisinglyuniformfrom theNorthWest of However, theissuesraisedandmattersofconcern process elicitedmore negativecommentsthanpositive. fire managementarrangements,asexpected,the was askedtorecommend improvements totheState’s groups throughout theState.Whencommunity occurred withover400individualsandrepresentative The Inquiryreceived 273submissionsandconsultations Submissions andCommunityConsultation Chapter 5 40 daysfrom thecommencementoffires). fire perioduntilFebruary22(aofmore than was norainfall>5mmonanydaywithinthe2002-2003 noteonesignificantdifference. IntheNorthEastthere We the fires. wassimilartothat of1983beforepattern andduring supported byevidence.We concludethattheweather The opinionthatthesummer’s weatherwas‘benign’isnot the 2002-2003fire seasonandthoseoverthelast20years. impact ofweatherconditions,includingdrought, leadingto assessing fire riskandinfire suppression. We explored the Weather playasignificantpartin andclimaticpatterns the Firesof2002-2003 Weather ConditionsBeforeandDuring Chapter 6 fires; and reduction onpublicland; INF.018.002.0017 INF.018.002.0018 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Between 1986 and 2002, Victoria experienced a period of very low area burnt by unplanned fires per year with an average to 26,000 hectares per year between 1988 and 1998 compared with the long-term average of around 120,000 hectares. During this time there was an increase in the actual number of fires, particularly in several high fire risk years. Reviewing all relevant parameters, we conclude that successful fire suppression by DSE and CFA is more likely than benign weather as an explanation for this pattern of low burn area years.

Recommendations

6.38 That DSE institute additional routine data storage and analysis to supplement current climate records with at least daily 3 pm values for the Grassland and Forest Fire Danger Index, and Keetch-Byram Drought Index, for selected high quality stations representing a cross-section of environments throughout Victoria.

6.39 That DSE and CFA, recognising that the Bureau of Meteorology does not routinely store all variables required to produce the calculations and indices necessary for research and planning into fire occurrence and behaviour, develop appropriate systems to ensure that such current and historical information is readily available and accessible. PAGE XVII PAGE XVIII debate andinsodoingdispelthemyths. a more objectiveconsiderationoftheprescribed burning some that‘onesizefitsall’.TheseChaptersseektoprovide and peppered withgross exaggerationsandtheviewby prescribed debatehasbeen,attimes,illinformed burning The ChaptersofPartBare quitetheoretical, however, the respect oftheseissues. management purposes.Recommendationsare madein necessary tobestadvantagethisunderstandingforfuture holdings, andlackofrigoringround observations, hampered bybothincompleteandinadequatedata andotherfuelmanagementstrategiesbutwereburning understanding ofthesciencefire behaviour, prescribed agencieshadagrowingThe InquiryfoundthatVictorian enterprises andfires affect themall. fauna, agriculture, tourismandothercommercial waterqualityandquantity,objectives concern floraand solitary, independent,landmanagementobjective.Other because reduction infire proneness andintensityisnota Public landmanagement,asforprivate,iscomplicated private landholdersandurbandevelopments. land useandtheproximity ofpubliclandrelative tothatof as wellvegetation,fuelloadandmoisture content, relationships betweenclimate,topography, aspect,weather, and impactoffire requires understandingoftheinter- Managing publicandprivatelandtomitigatethethreat relation torecommendations forthefuture. in thepresent systemofpubliclandmanagement,andin reader ofthescientificbasisforchoicesmadeinpast, management issuesandinalimitedsense,informsthe demonstrate thecomplexnature offire andland submissions andconsultations.PartBwaswrittento topic elicitspassionateviewsandthisisevidentfrom the of thecomplexmatterfire andlandmanagement.This prescribed debate,however, burning itisreally asubset Part Bexplores thetechnologyandsciencebehind Overview Fire andPublicLand Term ofReferenceOne: Part B There are norecommendations inthisChapter. tracks isaddressed againinPartC,Chapter15 cannot bemaximisedinsuppression activities.Theissueof are wellmaintainedandmappedaccuratelytheirusefulness Comments totheInquirynotedthatunlessessentialtracks tracks andaccesstopubliclandasasignificantissue. suppression purposes.SubmissionstotheInquiryidentified as wellproviding accessforground crews forignitionor can takeplace.Theydefineblocksforprescribed burning, outareasan edgeagainstwhichignitionforburning offuel prescribed aswellforfirefighting. burning Tracks provide Tracks are animportanttoolforthemanagementof regarding theprescribed useoffire. These zonesprovide theframeworkfordecision-making (Zone 1)totheExclusionofPrescribed5). Burning The focusofthesezonesrangesfrom theAssetProtection a strategicapproach tofuelmanagementonpublicland. DSE hasdevelopedfive‘FuelManagementZones’todeliver detail inthisChapter. the event.Anumberofthesefactorsare explainedin and availabilityoftrainedqualifiedcrews tomanage weather, assessmentofrisk, theintervalbetweenburns, fuel types,loadsandcondition,fire behaviour, climateand prescribed are; burning forest orothervegetationtype; variety oflandmanagementpurposes.Factorsthataffect deliberately lightingfires undersafeconditionsfora ‘Prescribed isthetermusedtodescribe burning’ In Forests Background To PrescribedBurning Chapter 7 on anyeffect theymayhaveonunplannedfires. Any approval forHighCountrygrazingshouldnotbebased is outsidethescopeofourdeliberations. or notgrazingshouldcontinueatall,reduced levels, with thevalueofcattlegrazingforfuelreduction. Whether cultural, communityandheritagevaluesofgrazing The practicegeneratesstrong andpassionateviewsonthe Cattle grazingintheHighCountryhasalongtradition. Fuel ManagementInTheHighCountry Chapter 8 INF.018.002.0019 INF.018.002.0020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Burning of the sub-alpine forests by early European settlers 9.32 That the creation of buffers by chaining and to encourage the proliferation of grasses for grazing, then burning swaths of mallee be explicitly appears to have led instead to replacement of grasses by an monitored for: understory of flammable shrubs. Grazing by cattle on High Country grasslands and herbfields, an evolutionary novelty, • The risk of fire escapes during their does not reduce the flammability of associated shrubs – the establishment; most fire prone vegetation - nor appear to prevent the • Their effectiveness as a barrier to unplanned spread of fire above that of ungrazed land. fire under various weather and fuel conditions; and Recommendation • Any adverse environmental effects such as soil mobilisation and loss of biodiversity. 8.25 That, according to available scientific evidence, 9.33 That, as a result of this monitoring, weather a decision regarding cattle grazing in the High conditions for the safe conduct of burning in such Country should not be based on the argument operations should be defined. that ‘grazing prevents blazing.’

Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Fuel Management in ‘Mallee’: Constraints On Prescribed Burning Techniques and Approaches in Forests The number of days that meet the weather prescriptions The nature of the vegetation, its distribution and for fuel reduction burning are few; around 10 on average accumulation in mallee and associated non-eucalypt per year. Therefore everything should be done to maximise shrublands requires substantially different approaches to the opportunities that those days present including burning fuel reduction practices for fire mitigation than those used on weekends, and investigation of the plausibility of for the forested areas of Victoria. burning in Spring. DSE, through mechanisms such as the Draft Mildura Fire A range of variables, apart from weather, can be used to Protection Plan, has formalised fire mitigation practices and advantage to extend the number of days on which fuel activities for the mallee. Relatively new practices such as reduction burning can safely take place. Such variables ‘chaining plus burning’ need to be monitored and include; terrain, fuel load and condition, time of day and evaluated. The practice could replace that used to ignition pattern. create ‘link burns’ between patches caused by recent unplanned fires. DSE gives priority to regeneration or slash burns (following timber harvesting) over burning for fuel reduction or Recommendations ecological purposes. In Gippsland and the North East around 63% of the 4295 planned fires are regeneration 9.30 That if ‘link’ burns continue to be used, then burns, while 33% are for fuel reduction and the remainder on-site weather sequences and fuel conditions are ecological burns. However, prescribed burns account marking successful (‘within explicit prescription’) for more than 90% of the area burnt. and unsuccessful burns be documented. In recent years, areas that have been prescribed burned 9.31 That the success of current buffers in terms of in the North East and Gippsland (regardless of fuel assisting suppression operations be continually management zone) are below rates likely to be satisfactory reviewed, evaluated and documented. either for fuel reduction for purposes of asset protection, or for the ecological needs of plant communities. PAGE XIX PAGE XX management inVictoria. Getting thisrightispivotaltoeffective publicland greater collectionanduseoftargeteddataisrequired. decision-making andestablishappropriateareas, burn is adifficult yetprimarytaskforfire managers.To improve Setting anannualoptimumarea forprescribed burning have toworktogetherminimiseundesirableimpacts. and otheroffsite impacts.Thecommunityandagencieswill unplanned fires themselves.Prescribed fires generate smoke unplanned fires buttheymayescapeandbecome Prescribed fires mayreduce thepotentialriskfrom the riskstolife,property andothervalues. improves thechanceofcontrol andtherefore reduces fire intensity. Thismitigatestheeffects ofunplannedfires, the statusoffuels,whichbydefinitionreduces potential Prescribed reduces burning fuelquantitiesandchanges types offuelmodificationindifferent environments. conditions change,sodothemostappropriate levelsand factors ofclimates,landscapes,technologyandsocial effectiveness ofprescribedAstheinfluencing burning. or immediatechoiceofanappropriate measure forthe There isnocurrent bodyofopinionthatallowsunequivocal Prescribed Burning Measuring theEffectiveness of Chapter 11 10.67 10.66 10.65 and places,especiallyinZone1. for prescribedburningincertaincircumstances whether ornotsomedaysinspringcouldbeused and amodelconstructedtestedtosee spring prescribedburnsinforestsbeassembled That evidenceoftherekindlingorotherwise days suitedtoprescribedburning. and weatherbecreatedtobetterdefinethose between terrain,fuel,ignitionpattern,timeofday That anexplicitformulationoftheinteractions interface), and(ii)ecologicalburns. protection (especiallyatthePublic/Privateland of zonessoastofocusclearlyon(i)asset implemented withaviewtoreducingthenumber That areviewofthefuelmanagementzonesbe Recommendations 11.71 11.73 11.72 Train morecrews,useProjectFirefighters • Developanexplicit,routinesystemof • Measurethetotalareasubjecttoprescribed • Routinelyandexplicitlyreportonmeasures • Providefurthertrainingand/orfieldstaff for • That DSE: Recommendations risk toruralVictoria fromunplannedfires. order tofurtherdevelopanunderstandingofthe than fourhectaresonpublicandprivatelandin That DSEandCFA mapallunplannedfiresgreater response systems. conducive toprescribedburningandfire access, staff, prescribedburningdays,areas respective fuelarrays,terrain,weather, ground its possibleapplicationinVictoria bycomparing prescribed burninginsouthwesternAustraliafor That DSEundertakeaformalstudyofthelevel prescribed burning. firefighters whereappropriate),toundertake extensively (andCFA membersorMFESB of floraandfaunawaterquality. environmental outcomessuchasconservation of prescribedburninginrelationto evaluation, analysisandreportingoftheeffects proportion ofthatareasuccessfullyburned. Zone eachyearalongwiththeaverage burning treatmentineachFireManagement program. of theeffectiveness oftheprescribedburning Hazard Guide). before andafterfireasintheOverallFuel data (quantity, type,conditionandarrangement prescribed andunplannedfires)fuel-array geographic data(mapsoffireextentfor the routineacquisitionandreportingof INF.018.002.0021 INF.018.002.0022 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Chapter 12 Traditional Burning Practices of Aboriginal People and the Prescribed Burning Debate in Victoria

A particular line of reasoning suggests that if we burned the landscape in the same way as the Aboriginal people did in the pre-European period then we would not have the problems we have today with unplanned fires and with conservation of native flora and fauna. To many, this is a highly attractive philosophy. However, to apply this philosophy we would need to know the details of past ‘Aboriginal’ fire regimes so we could attempt to recreate them.

Historical accounts from southern Australia, and direct evidence from central and northern Australia, support the argument that Aborigines used fire as a land management tool. Evidence also suggests that some areas of Australia may not have been subjected to this managed fire because of low human population density and resource availability. Other areas were not burned due to their cultural significance or because they were difficult to burn.

After reviewing the evidence, the Inquiry concludes that we do not know enough about traditional burning in southern Australia to be able to re-create an Aboriginal burning regime. Knowledge has been lost, or is fragmentary, and any use of a ‘traditional Aboriginal burning regime’ in southern Australia would be an experiment in land management and should be recognised as such.

There are no recommendations in this Chapter. PAGE XXI PAGE XXII partnership, ingeneral,workedwelllastsummer. mitigation andsuppression isapartnershipandthis threatened byfire oneveryoccasion.Fire prevention, the fire servicesare notresourced tobeateveryproperty member. Also,aswasevidentlastsummer, inextreme fires, as aninformedandactivelandownerand/orcommunity assistance andcommitmentofthepublic;asavolunteeror fireVictorian agenciescannotsuppress fires withoutthe as adirect result ofthefires. success ofthisendeavour. There were nodeathsinVictoria decisions. Theoutcomesofthe2002-2003fires showthe unplanned fires andempoweringthemtomakeinformed the fire agenciesinpreparing populationfor theVictorian significant andcontinuingeffort bytheGovernment Since theAshWednesday fires of1983there hasbeen Public Awareness AndPreparedness Chapter 13 investigate,commenton,andmakerecommendations We holistic fire prevention planning. could havebeendoneinanumberofareas, particularly events thatfollowed.We concludethattheywere butmore were prepared forthefire seasonof2002-2003andthe andVictorians In PartC,wedeterminewhetherVictoria Overview and AgencyPreparedness Term ofReferenceOne:Community Part C strategies andthetacticstobeemployed. and valueswillbeplanned,asfire suppression Community agreement onpersonalandcommunityassets rather thansimplytherecipient ofthosedecisions. that are takenontheirbehalftoprotect theircommunities, responsibility forfire riskandbepartnersinthedecisions communitywouldshareVictorian anappropriate levelof If ourrecommendations are acceptedandimplemented,the and are unlikelytoeverknow. yes. Would theyhavebeenasextensive-wedonotknow have donebetter-yes.Would thefires stillhaveoccurred - to theeventwasdone.Ifruleswere changedcouldwe legislation, policyandprocedures whatcouldbedoneprior concludethatwithintheparametersofcurrent We land basedfire prevention planningmodels. the fire agenciesinparticular, andthe publicandprivate preplanning bytheemergencymanagementagenciesand in respect tocommunityknowledgeandengagement,the 13.23 13.57 13.56 13.55 13.54 13.53 used whenengagingthepublic. they includegreater clarityinterminologyandlanguage There arefrom lessonstobelearnt the2002-2003fires and readiness andmanagementstrategiesforVictorians. flexible approach toproviding abroader suiteoffire isolated communities.Overall,there needstobeamore suppression modelsmustbedevelopedtoassistsmall, the self-helprole required fire ofthemandalternative However, insomecasesthepublicwere notprepared for the passageoffirefront. emotional impactslikelytobeexperiencedduring inappropriate times,andtheconditions the likelyconsequencesofleavinghomeat incorporate abetterunderstandingofboth supporting thedecisiontostayorgo, That CFA furtherdevelopstheinformation The DecisiontoStayorGo? Understanding BushfireOptions: Recommendations review theirfiresafetyplanannually. That CFA and MFESBencouragehouseholdersto particularly withregardtofire. ensure itisclear, easilyunderstood andconsistent, communication andpubliceducationmaterialto terminology andlanguageincurrent management agenciesreview, byJune2004, Management directsthatallemergency That theCo-ordinator-in-Chief ofEmergency Regularlymeasurewhetheraccessto • Conductanannualsurveyofhouseholdsto • That CFA andMFESB: information programtoruralVictoria. delivering thecommunityeducationand That CFA shouldremaintheleadagencyin and householdself-reliance. aimed atencouragingahigherdegreeofpersonal awareness educationandinformationprogram develop andimplementajointStatewidefire That thethreefireagencies(CFA, DSEandMFESB) Program Community EducationandInformation information leadstosafebehaviours. fire knowledgeamongstVictorians; and test thelevelofawarenessandacceptance INF.018.002.0023 INF.018.002.0024 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Community Fireguard Insurance as a Preparedness Measure

13.75 That CFA, in conjunction with isolated small 13.103 That CFA, in their education and information communities, develop and promote a suite of packages, encourage appropriate insurance cover, appropriate fire readiness and fire management and ensure that insurance becomes a part of the strategies to meet their needs. householder’s annual checklist.

13.76 That CFA reports to the Minister for Police and 13.104 That Government work with the insurance Emergency Services on recommended solutions industry to explore options for incentives such and implementation strategies for isolated small as a reduction in premiums for those who take communities by June 2004. appropriate self-protection measures on their properties, similar to incentives for anti-theft 13.77 That CFA clarifies and restates the roles and home security. function of existing Community Fireguard Groups (including their relationship to the Municipal Fire Prevention Plan) to members, co-ordinators, Chapter 14 Incident Controllers and Municipal Emergency Planning for Fire – An Holistic Approach Resource Officers, prior to the 2003-2004 fire season. This Chapter builds on the review of legislation in Chapter 3 and explores in detail the role of all parties: public and 13.78 That Community Fireguard Group co-ordinators’ private landowners and managers, utility providers and names are supplied to their local municipality for Municipal Councils in fire prevention planning and the 2003-2004 fire season, and are updated mitigation and determines that there is a better way, and annually for use in information exchange should a recommends the establishment of a Municipal Fire Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centre or Management Plan. Incident Control Centre be established. Good faith participation is the key to the development of 13.79 That CFA provides technical advice to Community an effective Municipal Fire Management Plan and we talk Fireguard Groups in the selection and purchase of about the parties who should be involved and their role in appropriate equipment and protective clothing its development. Fire does not respect boundaries; we must for use on their own land. therefore move forward from the traditional model of fire prevention planning based on land type. 13.80 That CFA, recognising the value of the Community Fireguard Group program, undertake a review by We found that utilities and plantation companies are June 2004 to identify opportunities to further generally well prepared to protect their own assets, develop the program to ensure its continuing however, their broader role in regional preparedness needs appropriateness in preparing communities for to be strengthened. They have a range of disparate fire into the future. reporting arrangements that do not ‘mesh’ or nest these planning functions regionally. This may require legislation Public Awareness Communication Systems to ensure appropriate ‘community safety provisions’.

13.93 That the Co-ordinator-in-Chief of Emergency Fully audited Municipal Fire Management Plans should Management directs the Media sub-committee replace the current arrangements, and capture all public of the State Emergency Response Committee to and private land, and all regional assets whether ‘built’ review the use of the Standard Emergency or natural. Warning Signal and its accompanying message.

13.97 That Victoria include an agenda item for both the National Emergency Management Committee and the National Meeting of Emergency Services Ministers recommending that the Australian Communications Authority review both the Commercial Radio Codes of Practice and Guidelines, and Community Broadcasting Codes of Practice, to ensure they provide necessary guidance and obligations on radio stations during emergencies and in relation to emergency warnings. PAGE XXIII PAGE XXIV 14.58 14.57 14.47 14.46 Considerexistingrightsofneighboursin • Ensureconsistentapproachestoplanning • That MunicipalCouncils: and distributedbytheIndustry. for PlantationsbyJune2004,tobethenpromoted develop andagreeonFirePreventionGuidelines That CFA andthePlantationIndustryjointly of theplantationcompany. and thatdecisionshouldremaintheresponsibility prevention andsuppressionactivitiesoff theirland Forest IndustryBrigadestoengageinfire That CFA shouldnotbegiventhepowertodirect when attendingfiresonpubliclandorinterstate. have thesamepowersandrightsasotherBrigades Brigades, whichareactinginanapprovedmanner, be amendedtoensurethattheForestIndustry Brigades, the That, followingthereviewofForestIndustry Municipal FirePreventionPlan Recommendations planning developmentapplications. for firepreventionandprotection; Country FireAuthorityAct1958 14.93 14.92 14.91 14.96 14.95 14.94 Bringtogetherallstakeholderswithan • ReplacethecurrentMunicipalFirePrevention • amended to: suppression. the planningforfireprevention,mitigationand framework isdevelopedandagreedinrespectto an all-agencyandappropriateindustries’policy establish asub-committeebyJune2004toensure That theVictoria EmergencyManagementCouncil That the mitigation planning. involvement inregionalfirepreparednessand operating withintheStatetoensuretheir That Governmentreviewlegislationforutilities A NewApproachtoMunicipalPlanning Municipal FireManagementPlans. body, orbodies,toundertake theauditof That theGovernmentidentifiesanappropriate CompliancereportingtotheVictoria Emergency • Processofdevelopmentandimplementation; • Content; • the auditofplansincluding: amendment includesappropriateprovisionsfor That theMunicipalFireManagementPlan Management Council. subcommittee oftheVictoria Emergency is informedbythepolicydirectionsof That thenewMunicipalFireManagementPlan private andpubliclandwithinthemunicipality. involvement infiremanagementforboth Committee; and Plan, andMunicipalFireManagement Committee withaMunicipalFireManagement Plan andtherequirementforaFirePrevention Management Council. and Country FireAuthorityAct1958 be INF.018.002.0025 INF.018.002.0026 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Chapter 15 15.12 That DSE investigates whether such agreements Agency Preparedness should exist with other government Departments and agencies, particularly those with officers The Inquiry assessed that CFA and DSE were appropriately located in rural Victoria who may be involved in prepared for the 2002-2003 fire season. They are fire response and support operations in the future, recognised as leading firefighting agencies throughout based on their expertise and experience. Australia and overseas, however, there were many issues 15.13 That DSE commences discussion with the Victorian which had a significant impact on CFA and DSE prior to the WorkCover Authority in respect to employer fire season. All emergency services in Victoria, including liability for those staff being released to, and CFA were assessing their capability to deal with the directed, by another agency in fire prevention consequences of a terrorist attack. CFA and DSE had and suppression activities. already provided firefighters to fires interstate and internationally and both were still involved in implementing the out workings of the Linton Coronal Inquest. Impact of the Drought on Water Availability for Firefighting Despite changes in government organisational arrangements, an array of co-operative agreements 15.23 That Government in the development of its between agencies, levels of government and interstate statewide water policy includes appropriate fire agencies, goodwill and personalities promoted sound consideration of access to water for firefighting. co-operation between the various fire agencies. 15.24 That communities, public land managers, Water The appropriate preparation of public land to mitigate Authorities and Catchment Management fire was canvassed in Part B. Here we note that the costs Authorities jointly identify and implement local associated with fuel reduction burning need to be more and environmentally sound solutions to improve objectively analysed, and more flexible arrangements put the availability of water for firefighting through in place to meet regional fuel management schedules on the Municipal Fire Management Planning process. public land on an ongoing basis. 15.25 That the fire agencies develop contingency plans Finally, we note that there has been a high level of in relation to access to water for firefighting, acceptance of AIIMS-ICS as the Incident Management including where appropriate, the use of static, System for the management of unplanned fires and other large volume water tanks. incidents requiring emergency response and we recommend concerted effort by CFA for full implementation across all its Agency Resources regions and groups. Chapter 19 recommends modifications 15.40 That DSE and CFA review selection and training to the application of AIIMS-ICS. programs for Incident Controllers and Incident Management Team members to ensure that they Recommendations include all necessary competencies in recognition External Influences on Fire Agencies that technical skills are only one component of the Prior to the 2002-2003 Fire Season required attributes. 15.11 That DSE and the Department of Primary Industries Agreements and Memoranda of formalise an agreement by the 2003-2004 fire Understanding season documenting the policies, procedures and financial arrangements relating to the availability 15.54 That the Statewide Fire Control Priorities: of Department of Primary Industries staff to be trained and released for fire prevention and • Be developed annually by CFA and DSE; suppression activities on public land. • Be endorsed by the Victoria Emergency Management Council; • Be incorporated into the co-operative agreement between DSE and CFA; and • Inform the Fire Control Priorities in the Municipal Fire Management Plans. PAGE XXV PAGE XXVI 15.90 15.89 15.88 15.87 15.77 15.76 15.67 prevention planningandpreparedness. appropriate resourcesareavailableforfire for the2004-2005fireseasontoensurethat That GovernmentreviewsthefundingforDSE members. Project Firefighters,CFA volunteersandMFESB undertaken overanumberofweekendsutilising full costrecoveryforprescribedburningtobe That thefinancialarrangementsincorporate management priorities. Future’, andthesubsequentchangesinfire in publiclanduse,particularly‘OurForestsOur That thefinancialmodelsincorporatechanges suppression onpublicland. in firemanagementplanning,preparednessand determine theappropriatelevelofinvestment development offinancialmodelstoanalyseand That Governmentsupportstheimmediate Information Management be consistentwithState-levelarrangements. address geographicallyspecificrisksorissuesmust That anylocallevelagreementsdevelopedto are reviewedannually. of, oracross,Stateborders,andtheseagreements for themanagementoffiresburninginvicinity aid andthedevelopmentofcrossborderstrategy Australia toputinplaceagreementsformutual their counterpartsinNewSouthWales andSouth That theVictorian fireagenciesnegotiatewith 2004-2005 fireseason. Group Structureforfullimplementationbythe complete theintegrationofAIIMS-ICSwith That CFA continuestoworkwithitsBrigades 15.107 15.106 15.105 There are no recommendations inthisChapter. opportunities tostrengthen thesystemorarrangements. reviews followingemergencyeventswillalwaysidentify willalwaysbringwithitadegreein Victoria of risk,and are everperfect,andlivinginafire-prone environment However, noemergencymanagementarrangements are explored inPartE. DSE andMFESB.Opportunitiesforevenclosercollaboration the integratedoperationofthree fire agencies:CFA, notethere hasbeenverysignificantimprovement in We planning completed. carried outanddetailedappropriate pre season 2003 fire season.Acomprehensive riskassessmentwas preparation putinplacebythefire agenciesforthe2002- were Government fullyinformedofthelevel Victorian The Co-ordinator-in-Chief, EmergencyServicesandthe redefining relationships. constantly monitored andtested,bothoperationallyin Victoria’s emergency managementarrangementsare Emergency ServicesPreparedness Chapter 16 management. public land,particularlyinrespecttofire policies relatingtoroadsandaccesstrackson That DSEundertakecommunityconsultationon suppression onpublicland. in firemanagementplanning,preparednessand and determinetheappropriatelevelofinvestment the developmentoffinancialmodelstoanalyse That DSEincludesthecostoftracks,asabove,in existing tracks. recurrent costsofaprogrammaintaining firefighting operations,andcomparethiswiththe temporary tracks,per100km,constructedduring cost ofestablishmentandrehabilitation That DSEassessestheenvironmentalandmonetary Roads andAccessTracks INF.018.002.0027 INF.018.002.0028

Part D Term of Reference Two: Response and Recovery EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overview While there have been suggestions that alternative strategies or priorities should have been established The Inquiry spent considerable time investigating the including more aircraft deployed to firebombing rather effectiveness of the response by the fire agencies to the than reconnaissance in the initial stages, it is not possible fires. This was a pivotal issue for many in our community to conclusively quantify what difference additional aircraft, and elicited emotional, but considered, submissions and or any other changed strategic response, would have recommendations. made once the fires started.

We fully explore the initial response to the fire outbreaks, There are opportunities for improvement in the way in the use of aircraft, the control and management of which DSE and CFA fight fires and these are addressed in resources and the strategies and tactics employed over the recommendations in this and the remaining Chapters 6 week campaign. We found no evidence of substantial of Part C. organisational or systemic failure. We did however find room for improvement in the areas of application of AIIMS- Recommendation ICS, integration of local knowledge into the development of strategies and tactics, and clarity in the emergency 17.51 That an appropriately resourced, national aerial management arrangements as they relate to regional firefighting strategy is urgently required, and that operations and partnership with the Municipal Emergency the Victorian Government make representations to Co-ordination Centres. the Commonwealth to support the Australasian Fire Authorities Council recommendations. We explored recovery processes and concluded that more certainty and flexibility is required in policies and processes. Chapter 18 Finally, we commissioned an independent assessment of the The State’s Emergency Management management of aircraft and the State Aircraft Unit, policies and procedures and present the findings in Chapter 22 with Arrangements In Action the full report at Appendix VII. The principles underpinning the Victorian emergency management arrangements are sound, and have been Chapter 17 assessed as comparable with international best practice. Initial Response to the Fires They provide the appropriate guidance to those agencies involved in the planning for, response to and recovery The Inquiry concluded that given the number, location and from, emergencies in Victoria. accessibility of fires caused by lightning strikes, the fuel load There is a need for some agencies to improve their available to support fire, the prevailing weather conditions understanding of, integration with, and application of these and the suppression resources available, all reasonable arrangements to ensure that their response to emergencies efforts were made by DSE and CFA to contain the fires as is effectively co-ordinated and meets the needs of all quickly as possible. communities affected. Aerial resources can play a crucial role in direct attack on The level of co-operation between all agencies, particularly small fires in remote and difficult terrain, and in holding DSE and CFA during response to the 2002-2003 fires is fires in the early stages until firefighters are available for acknowledged as being a significant improvement on that direct, ground attack. The National Aerial Fire Fighting displayed in the past. Strategy proposed by the Federal Government in 2001-2002, had not been approved by the 2002-2003 fire season. The Inquiry believes this Strategy is urgently required. PAGE XXVII PAGE XXVIII 18.31 18.30 18.21 18.14 18.13 18.12 arrangements. be formalisedintheemergencymanagement Emergency ResponsePlansandthatanychanges co-ordination arrangementsandDivisional the relationshipbetweenfireserviceregional That Victoria Police,CFA andDSEreview emergency managementarrangements. Co-ordination Centres,bereflectedintheVictorian as thecontinueduseofIntegratedMulti-Agency arrangements bereviewedandanychanges,such That existingDSEandCFA regionalco-ordination Divisional EmergencyCo-ordination evacuation remainswiththeIncidentController. evacuation, andthatanydecisiontorecommend understand theVictorian legislationinrelationto That Victoria Policeensureallpolicemembers Evacuation Control Centres. Municipal RecoveryCentreandIncident the MunicipalEmergencyCo-ordinationCentre, the skillsandtestproceduresforoperationsof develop andconductjointexercisesthatpractise Municipal EmergencyResponseCo-ordinatorsto That DSEandCFA workinco-operationwiththe Thereareappropriatetrainingregimesin • WhenaMunicipalEmergencyCo-ordination • That DSEandCFA ensurethat: wherever practicable. Emergency Co-ordinationCentresbecollocated, That IncidentControlCentresandMunicipal Municipal EmergencyCo-ordination Recommendations Co-ordination Centre. Liaison Officer intheMunicipalEmergency to performtheroleofEmergencyServices place toprovideofficers withtheskillsnecessary Centre; and Co-ordination CentreandtheIncidentControl liaison betweentheMunicipalEmergency officer ofthecontrolagencyisappointedas appropriately experienced,trainedandbriefed Centre isestablishedinresponsetoafire,an 18.44 18.43 18.42 18.61 18.57 18.53 18.52 Centre, ifcollocationisnotpossible. the StateEmergencyResponseCo-ordination develop andmaintainstrongcloselinkswith That theStateEmergencyOperationsCentre be explored. the newStateEmergencyOperationsCentre Emergency ResponseCo-ordinationCentrewith That theoptionsofcollocatingState and theStateAircraftUnit. in stages,initiallyincorporatingDSE,CFA, MFESB Victoria. Thiscould,ifnecessary, beimplemented Emergency OperationsCentrebeestablishedfor That asinglestate-of-the-artallhazardsState Response State LevelCo-ordinationofEmergency competencies fortheVICSESVolunteers. includes basicfiresafetytrainingasoneofthe That VICSES,withthesupportofCFA, Service Personnel Deployment ofVictoria StateEmergency appropriate bushfiretrainingforitsfirefighters. That theMFESBcontinuetogivepriority Emergency ServiceBoardPersonnel Deployment ofMetropolitanFireand should trainandexercisetogether. are likelytobedeployedtogethermanagefire, Team membersfromDSE,CFA andMFESBwho That, whereverpossible,IncidentManagement response agencies. arrangements betweenemergency agreements thatdescribejointoperational be amendedtorequirethedevelopmentof That the Co-operation BetweenAgencies Emergency ManagementAct1986 INF.018.002.0029 INF.018.002.0030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Chapter 19 Qualifications for Incident Management Did the Incident Control System Work? Team Members 19.17 That the person appointed by DSE or CFA as The Inquiry supports the continued use of AIIMS-ICS Incident Controller for any incident should have by emergency response agencies in Victoria. However, we formal qualifications and accreditation in the note that the way in which DSE and CFA applied AIIMS-ICS Incident Control System, be fully aware of the during the 2002-2003 fires, and the process and Victorian emergency management arrangements procedures supporting the system were, at times, and have access to local fire prevention and inflexible and restrictive. response planning, including the Municipal The principal criticism - failure to effectively incorporate the Fire Management Plan. knowledge of local personnel may have resulted in missed 19.18 That CFA and DSE provide media training to all opportunities to undertake a more aggressive attack on Level 2 and Level 3 Incident Controllers. the fires in some locations.

The Inquiry believes that DSE and CFA officers appointed Incident Control Centres as Incident Controllers must have a deeper understanding 19.23 That in the review of Incident Control Centre of the Victorian emergency management arrangements and locations, DSE and CFA give due consideration to: the Municipal Fire Management Plan in addition to formal qualifications in Incident Management. • Existing public infrastructure that may provide suitable facilities; and Recommendations • Opportunities for collocation with Municipal Regional Emergency Co-ordination Emergency Co-ordination Centres.

19.6 That the emergency management arrangements 19.24 That DSE and CFA review their joint planning for be amended to require Police Divisional Incident Control Centres to ensure that, wherever Emergency Response Co-ordinators, in consultation safe and practicable, those Centres are located with other response agencies, to establish and close to the fire area. document procedures and structures at regional level in order to ensure there is: Transferring Control from One Incident Control Centre to Another • Effective monitoring of Incident Management Teams; 19.29 That DSE and CFA develop an agreed process for • Effective strategic management of resources; the effective transfer of control from one Incident • Efficient management of information flow Control Centre to another, including processes for within and between agencies, and between communicating this change to fire ground the agencies and the community; and supervisors and local communities. • Liaison between the control agency and divisional and municipal emergency response co-ordinators. Chapter 20 Development And Implementation Structure of Incident Management Teams of Fire Control Strategies

19.13 That the practice of appointing Deputy Planning The Inquiry has formed the view that, overall, the strategies Officer, Deputy Operations Officer and Deputy and tactics applied by the agencies responding to the fires Logistics Officer in an Incident Management Team were appropriate. They achieved the objective of containing be abandoned. This recommendation the fire as effectively and safely as possible, with no loss of acknowledges the benefits of retaining a Deputy life directly related to the fire, no significant injuries and Incident Controller from the support agency (in limited loss of private assets and damage to property when accordance with section 4.2.6 of the Emergency compared to the scale of the fires. Management Manual Victoria), to ensure that the command structure of that agency is preserved. PAGE XXIX PAGE XXX 20.29 20.28 20.27 20.26 20.13 20.12 explained. that thereasons foradoptingastrategyare clearly to firefighters andfire ground commanderstheyensure ensure thatwhentheyare communicatingthesestrategies officers andfire ground commanders.Theymustalso for firefighting theytakeintoaccounttheinputoflocalfire DSE andCFA mustensure thatwhendeterminingstrategies and safelyattackthefire. as such,opportunitieswere missedtomore aggressively, enough tothechangingconditionsonfire ground and, implement thestrategieswere flexibleandresponsive The Inquiryislessconvincedthatthetacticsdevelopedto ground. advantage ofchangedconditionsonthefire Leader begivenflexibilitytoaltertacticstake Commander, SectorCommander andStrikeTeam That personnelassignedtherolesofDivision and tactics. to provideinputintotheselectionofstrategies Leader onthefiregroundareactivelyencouraged Commander, SectorCommander andStrikeTeam That personnelassignedtherolesofDivision included inbriefingsforfirelinepersonnel. personnel involvedinthefirefightandbe tactics, andtherationale,becommunicatedto That DSEandCFA ensurethatagreedstrategyand managers andfiregroundsupervisors. safety astheirhighestpriorityforincident That DSEandCFA continuetostressfirefighter Aggressiveness ofFirefighting Fire ControlPriorities. are consistentwith,andbuilton,theagreed Plans developedbyIncidentManagementTeams That thefireagenciesensurethatIncidentAction fire season. material providedtothecommunitybeforeeach Priorities incommunityawarenessandeducation That CFA andDSEincludeagreedFireControl to IncidentActionPlanning Application oftheFireControlPriorities Recommendations 20.40 20.39 20.38 Use ofLocalKnowledge changes. can bemaintainedatshiftandtourofduty ensure thatamoreconsistentstrategicapproach That CFA andDSEjointlydevelopproceduresto Fire ManagementPlan. ‘Fire ControlPriorities’,andtherelevantMunicipal response shouldreflecttheendorsedStatewide That the‘IncidentObjectives’establishedforany broader organisationalplanning. communities, andareincorporatedintothe firefighters, firegroundsupervisorsandaffected strategies, theseareeffectively communicatedto implement significantchangestoobjectivesand That whenIncidentManagementTeams Consistency ofStrategy incorporated intodecisionmaking. strategies andthatadvicefromthefiregroundis expertise inthedevelopmentoffiresuppression members whocanprovidelocalknowledgeand or appropriatelyexperiencedandqualifiedcommunity have fullaccesstothoseDepartmental,ParksVictoria Incident ControllersandManagementTeams That DSEreviewsprocedurestoensurethatall Recommendation 3fromInterimReport ContinuestoworkwithitsBrigadescomplete • Modifiesitsoperationalprocedurestoallowfor • Modifiesitsoperationalprocedurestoensure • the CFA: That inpreparationforthecomingfireseason, Recommendation 2fromInterimReport structure. the integrationofAIIMS-ICSwithgroup more flexiblemanagementofstriketeams. management. incorporated intotacticalandstrategicfire that localknowledgeisflexiblyandappropriately INF.018.002.0031 INF.018.002.0032 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Information Gathering Chapter 21 Other Response Issues 20.54 That DSE and CFA review methods of gathering and processing fire information to ensure all DSE and CFA have made significant progress over recent methods are pursued to greatest effect. years in resolving many of the problems experienced in the past, particularly with fire ground communications and Briefings the performance of firefighting equipment and vehicles. Therefore many of the major concerns raised with previous 20.61 That DSE and CFA review the standards and protocols for documentation, including mapping, Inquiries in relation to firefighting operations were not provided to fire line managers as part of their seen as significant issues or problems during the briefing notes, to ensure these are concise and 2002-2003 fires. appropriate. There is however, scope for improvement in a number of systems and processes used by DSE and CFA, such as 20.62 That operational briefings in multi-agency fires should, wherever possible, be joint briefings of all protocols for managing firefighting resources. Opportunities agencies involved. for development and refinement of these systems and processes to ensure more effective management of the fire ground are addressed within this Chapter. ’No Go Zones’ 20.67 That DSE and CFA ensure that: Recommendations

• A clear process is established for determining Keeping Track of Firefighting Resources whether a specific location is, or is no longer, 21.8 That DSE, CFA, MFESB and VICSES work a ‘no go zone’ or an area into which it is too co-operatively to establish a common system for dangerous to deploy resources, and that resource tracking during major fires and incidents. affected communities are advised as soon as possible of the determination, the reasons for Management of Firefighting Resources in such determination and what actions they should take as a result; and the Field • Where the Incident Management Team, Division 21.14 That DSE and CFA review the management of Commander, Sector Commander and/or Strike personnel deployed ensuring that: Team Leader identify an area as a ‘no go zone’ or an area into which it is too dangerous to • Shift changeovers of fire line personnel and deploy resources, the reasons for that fire line supervisors are conducted in such a way designation are recorded by the Incident that the fire line is not left inappropriately Management Team in the incident log. unattended; • Management protocols for Strike Teams are Use of Bulldozers made more flexible; and • Strike Team Leaders and Task Force Leaders 20.71 That DSE and CFA work co-operatively to review undertake refresher training in the the management and application of bulldozers in management of resources under their control fire suppression operations to ensure that they are used effectively, appropriately and are adequately Management of Privately-Owned supervised. Firefighting Resources 20.72 That quality control or performance assessments 21.19 That, as a matter of urgency and in consultation are routinely completed post fire season, to ensure with stakeholders, CFA and DSE develop and that contractors who have not performed to an communicate clear guidelines on how and when agreed standard are not re-engaged for the privately owned firefighting equipment should consequential rehabilitation works. be integrated into the fire response. PAGE XXXI PAGE XXXII obligations toaircraft operators. the assessedthreat, budgetconstraintsandcontractual CFA forthe2002-2003fire seasonwasreasonable given The numbersandmixofaircraft engagedbyDSEandthe operators. especially thecontractualarrangementswithaircraft Unit businessprotocols are generallysoundlybased, structured –andhasnopeerinAustralia.TheStateAircraft The conductofaerialfirefighting isgenerallywell inVictoria fire isburning. weather conditions,visibilityandtheterraininwhich However limitationsaffect theiroperationincluding ground firefighters, butrather, complementground attack. used tosuppress unplannedfires. Theydonotreplace on- Aircraft are animportantelementofthemixresources Aircraft Unit Aircraft OperationsAndTheState Chapter 22 21.32 21.31 21.21 communication structures. Frequency andCitizenBandradiosintotheir That CFA developprotocolstointegrateUltraHigh issues. priorities andbusinesscasesareagreedforcritical Safety andCommunicationsStrategy, andthat addressed intheStatewideIntegratedPublic that ruralcommunicationissuesareappropriately Emergency ServicesTelecommunications toensure That DSEandCFA workwiththeBureauof Communications Facilities ‘slip-on’ typeequipment. given tothenumberanddistributionofsmaller in service.Inparticular, considerationshouldbe review themixoffirefightingappliancescurrently That CFA, havingregardtoterrain,continue Firefighting Vehicles 22.63 22.62 22.61 22.60 during andafterfires. services communicatewiththecommunitybefore, for furtherimprovement inthewaywhichfire and accuracyofinformation.Thissuggeststhere isscope of thelackinformationprovided andthetimeliness public meetingsfrom communitymemberswere critical included insomesubmissionstotheInquiryandduring Despite agenerallyverypositiveassessment,comments in Victoria. established anewstandard inemergencyresponse be takentoprepare themselvesforthepassageoffire informed oftheprogress ofthefires andactionsto The efforts ofDSEandCFA tokeepthecommunity Communication WithTheCommunity Chapter 23 22.66 22.65 22.64 by agencyandSAUpersonnel. Aircraft Fleetcontractorsbeconductedjointly That asystematicperformanceauditofState Training andAccreditationprograms. Aircraft Fleetcompositionandtheadequacyof analysed andusedfortheassessmentofState effectiveness ofaerialfirefightingbecollated, That aftereachfireseason,measuresofthe are recorded. outstrips thesupplyofStateFleetAircraftavailable That instanceswheredemandforairsupport effectiveness ofaircraftinfirefightingoperations. performance measuresforreportingthe That thejointagenciesintroduceasystemof Recommendations and procedures. Aircraft Unit’s roles, responsibilities,practices communication anddiscussioninregardtoState That moreemphasisshouldbegivento firefighting capabilitytraining. Incident Controllersshouldincludeaircraft That trainingandcompetencyprogramsfor Authority totheStateAircraftUnit. compliance auditpreparedforCivilAviation Safety a copyoftheirannualindependentregulatory That aviationcontractorsberequiredtosubmit INF.018.002.0033 INF.018.002.0034 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ABC Local Radio was particularly effective in keeping 23.32 That CFA and DSE work with Australian affected communities informed of the progress of the fires Broadcasting Corporation Local Radio to identify and the actions that they need to take to prepare black spots, and explore opportunities to further themselves for the passage of the fire. ABC should be improve coverage for broadcasting emergency complimented for the role it played. information.

Recommendations 23.33 That opportunities be explored to use community radio to complement other methods of The Challenge: Maintaining Communication communication with isolated communities. with All Fire-Affected Communities 23.34 That Interstate Agreements prepared by the 23.21 That in relation to the provision of information fire agencies be reviewed to include protocols for to communities affected by fires and other the joint release of consistent and appropriate emergencies, DSE and CFA ensure that: information relating to fires burning across State borders. • Incident Management Teams understand that one of their primary responsibilities, in co- operation with the Municipal Emergency Chapter 24 Response Co-ordinator, is to keep the Social, Business And Environmental community informed as to where the fire is and its likely path, what is being done to combat Recovery the fire and any preparations the community Recovery must commence when response to an emergency should undertake; commences. They are not sequential events but should • Community Information Units are effectively operate in parallel, or preferably in an integrated way. We integrated into the Incident Management note that infrastructure, such as telecommunications, was Teams; and enhanced during response but quickly dismantled after the • They continue to develop a joint Internet-based fire threat had passed. Such enhanced infrastructure is also communications tool to provide information needed for recovery. and advice to both affected and broader communities during fires. Government policy in relation to support for communities and individuals recovering from an emergency must reflect 23.22 That the model of community engagement the principles of predictability, equity and consistency. Rules developed by DSE and CFA and applied during the and entitlements must be known prior to an emergency 2002-2003 fires is further developed and refined, event so individuals and businesses can effectively plan. particularly in regard to short-duration, rapidly Such support is not a replacement for prudent risk escalating incidents. management. 23.23 That relevant Government agencies including We recommend a case management approach to assisting Emergency Communications Victoria, the Bureau those requiring support. Those requiring support should not of Emergency Services Telecommunications and the have to ‘tell their story’ more than once. Finally, front line Victoria Police Media Unit, evaluate the proposals community development officers and Municipal Councils put forward by the Australian Communications must be provided with flexible support options to assist the Authority with respect to the hearing impaired. community. Radio Coverage in Rural Victoria

23.30 That consideration be given to formalising Australian Broadcasting Corporation Local Radio as the official emergency radio station for Victoria, given it is the only radio station that can cover the whole of the State.

23.31 That Victoria Police Media Unit co-ordinate work with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the emergency service agencies to implement this arrangement. PAGE XXXIII PAGE XXXIV 24.48 24.47 24.34 24.33 24.32 24.31 24.30 24.29 Emergency Management Plans. strategies, are included intheMunicipal associated publiceducationand information recovery activities,andthatsuch plans,andthe of theneedtodevelopcontingency plansfor providers andLocalGovernments bemadeaware That allDepartments,statutory authorities,utility of theMunicipalEmergencyCo-ordinationCentres. and deliveryisanintegralpartoftheoperations same timeasresponseandthatrecoveryplanning That recoveryisrecognisedascommencingatthe Two SidesoftheSameCoin Response andRecovery: disaster orotheremergencyevents. oversee recoveryinsituationsofextremenatural the PremierestablishaMinisterialTask Forceto Emergency Management,orofanotherMinister, Emergency ServicesasCo-ordinator-in-Chief of recommendation oftheMinisterforPoliceand be amendedtoincludeaprovisionthat,onthe That the requiring support. a rangeofproviderstoensurechoiceforthose resources toenablethepurchaseofservicesfrom support andrebuildingincorporatesflexible Development Officers engagedincommunity That GovernmentfundingforCommunity infrastructure toregisterforfinancialassistance. and areunabletoaccesstheappropriate or maynotbeengagedinanemergencyresponse, eligibility forthosewithoutemploymentwhomay the CommonwealthGovernmentthatitreviews That theVictorian Governmentrecommendto events areasefficient aspossible. State andCouncilroadsfollowingemergency identification anddeliveryofremedialworkson procedures andprocessestoensurethatthe That VicRoads andMunicipalCouncilsreview all farmersareawareoftheservicesprovided. service availableduringemergenciestoensurethat within thecommunity, theagriculturalrecovery That DPIactivelypromoteaswidelypossible incidents. the responseto,andrecoveryfrom,emergency available toprovideassistanceandsupportduring develop registersofvolunteerswillingand That MunicipalEmergencyResourceOfficers Overview oftheRecoveryProcess Recommendations Emergency ManagementAct1986 24.67 24.49 24.78 24.77 24.76 A CaseManagementApproachTo Recovery disasters. to recoverfromemergencies,includingnatural equitable policydesignedtoassistthecommunity communicate apredictable,consistentand and financialassistancepolicy, anddevelop That Governmentreviewtheemergencyrelief Equitable, Consistent Relief andRecovery-Predictable, of Victoria, suchasCentrelinkpayments. including mattersthatarenottheresponsibility processes establishedtoassistindividuals– reinforced andcommunitiesareinformedofthe emergency events,toensurerecoveryissuesare in communitybriefingspriortoandduring That allagenciesengagedinrecoveryparticipate consumed inauthorisedfiresuppressionactivity. rehabilitation/restoration ofprivateassetsdamagedor That Governmentdevelopsaconsistentpolicyforthe Recommendation 5fromInterimReport as aresultoffire. and internalfencesdamaged policy forboundary That Governmentinitiatesareviewofthefencing Recommendation 4fromInterimReport Damage FollowingFireSuppressionWorks Fencing AndRehabilitationPrivateLand recovery process. to connectapersonallagenciesinvolvedinthe emergencies, includingasingletelephonenumber shop’ approachwhereverpracticablefollowing explore opportunitiestoestablisha'one-stop- That theStateEmergencyRecoveryCommittee in thedevelopmentofthismodel. That thePrivacyCommissionerbeaskedforadvice to beactivatedatthetimeofanemergency. supported byanappropriateinformationsystem all levelstoincludeacasemanagementapproach government sector, modifyrecoveryplanningat Government departmentsandthenon- That DHS,inconjunctionwithLocalGovernment, INF.018.002.0035 INF.018.002.0036

Part E The Way forward EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overview 25.24 When the research into prescribed burning and optimum fire protection described in Chapter 11, The Stretton Royal Commissions of 1939 and 1944 and the financial analysis of appropriate funding and the Miller Inquiry into the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires levels for prevention and suppression were pivotal in shaping the way Victoria prepares for and recommended in Chapter 15, are completed, suppresses unplanned fires. These Inquiries followed DSE should develop a business case with failure. This Inquiry did not follow a failure. Rather, the Department of Treasury and Finance for assured effectiveness of the preparation and response is a result funding to an agreed level over a three-year of a continuous improvement approach to emergency rolling cycle. management in which the involved agencies review performance after all emergencies to learn for Managing Information future events. 25.37 That all emergency service agencies, CFA and DSE Part E discusses the next development in the State’s in particular, give greater priority to information emergency services capability, applying modern management – especially the collection, organisational thought to individual services. maintenance and quality control of base data sets necessary for planning, operations and program We recommend an ‘all hazards – all agencies’ capability evaluation. within the State to eliminate duplication and streamline decision-making and reporting. 25.38 That Government acknowledge the importance of spatial information as a key element of planning, operations and program evaluation, and support Chapter 25 the Geospatial Emergency Information Network as The Way Forward: Planning a means of ensuring integrated and co-ordinated information management on a whole-of- Effective delivery requires quality information management Government basis. systems and certainty in resources. Here we recommend improvements in both certainty of resourcing for DSE in Model of Fire Cover - 'Fire Safety Victoria' public land management and enhanced analytical tools to support fire agency decision-making. Strategy 25.55 That Government confirms that the Model of Fire We note the complexity in the legislation in respect Cover/Fire Safety Victoria strategy should be a to public land, flora, fauna and native vegetation, and seamless model for the whole of the State and support any initiatives that will assist those charged with include both private and public land. fire prevention planning to work within its boundaries and principles. 25.56 That DSE commits appropriate resources to work with OESC in developing the bushfire component Finally, we express our concern in relation to the long-term of the model. viability of the current model of paid, volunteer and seasonal firefighting capability given organisational changes within government and agencies and the changing Planning For Emergencies at the Local Level demographics of Victoria. We make recommendations 25.88 That CFA, DSE, MFESB, VICSES, Victoria Police in relation to the need to develop more creative and OESC, in consultation with the Municipal approaches to human resource management. Association of Victoria, consult on the proposal to combine Municipal Councils’ current Recommendations responsibilities for the development of an emergency management plan/committee, as The Balance Between Prevention/Mitigation required by the Emergency Management Act and Response for Public Land 1986 and a fire prevention plan/committee as 25.23 That DSE, with adequate resourcing, moves to a required by the Country Fire Authority Act 1958. 12-month cycle of fire management to establish and maintain a more appropriate and balanced work program of prevention/mitigation and suppression. PAGE XXXV PAGE XXXVI hazards –allagencies’combinedStateOperationsCentre. Centres forallthree fire agenciesandargueforone‘all resource management systemsanddifferent Operations notethattheStatecannolongersupportdifferent We other twofire agencies. under the recommend thatDSE bemadea‘prescribed agency’ We control modeloffire serviceagencies. support amore integrated,orunified,commandand related regional operations-intotheCFA. Ratherwe CFA tointegratetheFire ManagementBranch,DSE-and The Inquirydoesnotsupportthemodelproposed bythe Unified CommandandControl The Way Forward: Chapter 26 25.116 25.115 25.114 25.90 25.89 Government. advocate theseinitiativestotheFederal volunteerism, andthattheStateGovernment in supportofthestrategiesforsustainable emergency serviceorganisationsdevelopproposals That CFA, VICSESandothervolunteer-based Controllers. or mentorswithinexperiencedIncident individuals (suchasretiredstaff), toactascoaches the useofsuitablycompetentandexperienced programs; andthatconsiderationbegivento scheme aspartoftheirworkforcedevelopment That allfireagenciesincludeaformalmentoring AdviseGovernmentofthesestrategies. • Developstrategiestoprovideadequateand • That, asamatterofurgency, CFA andDSE: Human Resources Government, industryandcommunities. partnership approachforfiresafetywithLocal That CFA, DSEandMFESBcontinuetodevelopthe any associatedlegislationbyJune2004. 1986 amendments tothe and EmergencyServicesonproposedlegislative That thisgroupreportstotheMinisterforPolice trained andexperienced; sustainable firefightingresources,suitably- Emergency ManagementAct1986 , the Country FireAuthorityAct1958 Emergency ManagementAct joining the and 26.54 26.53 26.52 26.64 26.58 26.57 26.56 26.55 as recommendedinChapter18,PartD. confined tobeingaStateFireOperationsCentre agency centres.Thiscould,ifnecessary, beinitially established toreplacetheexistingseparatefire That aStateEmergencyOperationsCentrebe for anylegislativereformconsiderednecessary. suppression activityincountryVictoria, including be responsibleforoverallcontroloffire for theappointmentofonepersonoragencyto That thisunifiedsystemincluderecommendations Council byJuly2004. endorsed bytheVictoria EmergencyManagement management arrangements,andthatthisbe that betterintegrateswiththeState'semergency develop aunifiedcommandandcontrolsystem That CFA, DSE,MFESBandVictoria Policejointly Response totheCFA Proposal Recommendations agreed byGovernment. implementation strategiesforrecommendations That OESCworkwiththefire agenciesindeveloping Conclusion and exercisesundertaken. significantly increasetheamountofjointtraining That thefireagenciesdevelopaprogramto Management Act1986 the purposesofs21C(1)(a) prescribed asan‘emergencyserviceagency’for That theFireManagementBranchofDSEbe and PrimaryIndustries. VICSES andtheDepartmentsofHumanServices the agenciesmentionedabove,andotherssuchas That indoingso,thisReviewmustconsultwith Evaluateopportunitiestopreplanandestablish • Exploreopportunitiestosignificantlyreduce • Emergency ServicesCommissioner: Treasury andFinancetheOffice ofthe by theDepartmentsofPremierandCabinet That theReviewofemergencyoperationscentres centres attheregionalordistrictlevel. ‘all hazards–allagencies’emergencyoperations centres; and the numberofregionalemergencyoperations . Emergency INF.018.002.0037 INF.018.002.0038

Part A Setting the Scene

Burnt Alpine Ash Forest - North East Victoria – DSE PAGE 2 Lightning North East Victoria 8January2003-DSE Lightning NorthEastVictoria Overview ofPartA scope toadvanceinourpreparedness andresponse. cope withourfire-prone environment butthere isfurther engaged onacontinuousimprovement strategytobetter to bushfire have risk.TheInquirynotesthatVictorians changes haveincreased theexposure ofmanyVictorians interface betweenpublicandprivateland,sincethese ofpopulationdistributionandshiftsinthe patterns past 170years.We payparticularattentiontochanging overthe changes inlanduseandoccupationVictoria togeographyandhistoryweconsider Chapter 2turns and whatithopestoachieve. conducted, itexplainswhytheInquirywascommissioned to thisreport. AswellasdescribinghowtheInquirywas Chapter 1provides anintroduction totheInquiryand allow ustomore criticallyassessresponses tothefires. the 2002–2003fires, tobeinchargeofrelevant facts,and in focus;theyhelpustoframerelevant questionsabout In themain,thesechaptersare explanatoryanddescriptive for ourlaterinvestigations,analysesandrecommendations. Part Acontainssixdiversechaptersthatsetthescene INF.018.002.0039 INF.018.002.0040 OVERVIEW OF PARTOVERVIEW A A SETTING THE SCENE PART One way we can do this is by putting systems in place to Chapter 6 clarifies the contradictory views put to adjust progressively to climatic factors like global warming the Inquiry about the severity of weather during the and El Niño that impact on the likelihood of bushfire. We 2002–2003 fire season and the implications for firefighting make a recommendation to this effect in Chapter 2. response. Our investigations support the Bureau of Meteorology’s findings that conditions were not more In Chapter 3 we outline the legislative framework within benign than in previous, extreme fire seasons such as which firefighters do their work. This is important factual those of 1983 and 1939. context for our analysis of preparedness and response in Parts C and D. We note that current arrangements are This Chapter also considers a second point relating complex, involving a large number of agencies and to climate – the unusually low number of large fires in organisations. Such arrangements can only succeed Victoria from the mid-1980s to 2001 and we conclude if there is a high level of co-operation and communication that improved fire suppression by the Department of between agencies and the community. Sustainability and Environment and the Country Fire Authority is the most likely explanation as to why so few In Chapter 4, we tell the ‘story’ of the fire and summarise fires in these years grew to large size. We make a further its impacts. We offer a broad-brush picture of what two recommendations here regarding improved data happened, where and when. Later in this Report we give storage and analysis for climate records. more detailed and critical accounts of particular fire situations and offer a critical analysis of the emergency response (Part D). Here, we present a balanced view of the achievements and losses, as well as the impacts of the fires on firefighters and communities.

The Inquiry received 273 submissions from groups and individuals. In Chapter 5 we summarise those submissions and document the key themes that came out of the community consultations. Interestingly, those themes – land management preparedness, agency preparedness, response issues, management of resources, and recovery were common across the State. As this Chapter is part of ‘setting the scene’, we make no judgements or assessments about the accuracy of claims. PAGE 3 PAGE 4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 Introduction Chapter 1 broad focusofeachitsParts. then discusstheaimsofthisReportandexplain the Inquirywasconductedandinitialimpressions. We provide thethree Terms ofReference, describehow Bushfire Inquiryandwhatithopestoachieve.We reasons behindtheestablishmentofVictorian 2002-2003 fires andtheiraftermath.Itexplainsthe This Chapterbrieflydescribesthesignificanceof Overview media and Victorians generally.media andVictorians fires also captured unprecedented attentionfrom the personal tolloncommunitiesand firefighters. The and communityresources. witnessedthe Victorians the fire seasontestedthecapacityoffire agencies of theunbroken drought, thelengthandseverityof environmental amenitycompromised. Comingontop Public andprivateassetswere destroyed and more than108,000hectares ofprivateland. 1.1 millionhectares including oflandinVictoria, fires approximately of1939.Theyeventuallyburnt approaching thatofthedevastatingBlackFriday In termsofareathesefires burnt, were ofascale complexes intheNorthEastandGippslandareas. controlled andultimatelyjoinedtoformthefire 11 January),asmallnumberwere unabletobe controlled withinafewdays(17remained by started over80fires. Whilethemajorityofthesewere andGippsland,lightningstrikes East Victoria the predominantly forested andalpineareas ofNorth On 7and8January2003,adrystormsweptacross and privateland. affectingVictoria 181,400hectares ofbothpublic ParkinNorthWest in theBigDesertWilderness experiencing itslargestbushfire in20years,afire The 2002calendaryearclosedwithVictoria almostthreeVictoria, timesthetwenty-yearaverage. (CFA) hadalready attendedmore than375fires in Environment (DSE)andtheCountryFire Authority December 2002,theDepartmentofSustainabilityand early intheseasonSeptember2002.Bystartof recorded history–withthefirstbushfires occurring ongoing drought –oneofthemostsevere in The 2002-2003bushfire seasonoccurred duringan since 1939. across thegreatest expanseoflandinVictoria Over thesummerof2002-2003,bushfires burnt The 2002-2003BushfiresataGlance 1.7 1.6 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.9 1.8 regions suffered losses. employment. Manybusinessesintheaffected them toputasidetheirnormalbusinessesor the firefighting effort foraprotracted periodrequiring Many individualsandcommunitieswere engagedin lived withthethreat offire fordaysandevenweeks. by fire andfeltletdownbythefire services.Others However, somecommunitieswere severely affected fires andinjurieswere minimal. expected. Noliveswere lostasadirect result ofthe were significantlybelowwhatmighthavebeen eventual scaleofthefires, lossofproperty andassets are notassevere astheymighthavebeen.Giventhe into accountsixconsecutiveyearsofdrought –they to extreme fire eventsfrom Victoria’s past–taking When wecompare outcomesofthe2002-2003fires the Bushfires.2002-2003 Victorian Undersection 21cof Commissioner wasinvitedtochairanInquiryintothe It wasinthiscontextthattheEmergencyServices fires were fought. land toreduce fire riskandthewayinwhich these fires, inparticularthemanagementofpublic A rangeofsignificantissueshasbeenraisedabout the fires were suppressed? prevented thesefires? Were there problems withhow have toask:CouldVictoria caused manyVictorians caused bybushfires intheAustralianCapitalTerritory, events inNewSouthWales andthedevastation The fire therepeated experienceinVictoria, fire subject toperiodic,extreme bushfires. a harshreminder environment thattheVictorian is where fires alsofollowedasevere drought; theywere For others,therecent fires were arepeat of1939 management regime overmanyyears. perceived negativechangesinVictoria’s publicland season wasseenasavoidable–theresult of forests. Formanyofthosemostaffected, thefire considerable criticismofthemanagementour generated awiderangeofviews,including It isnotsurprisingthenthatfires ofthisscale After theFires:Questions (prevention, response andrecovery). issue inrelation toemergencymanagement recommendations andreportonany toGovernment of emergencyserviceagencies and toadvise,make Commissioner isrequired tomonitortheperformance Emergency ManagementAct1986 , the INF.018.002.0041 INF.018.002.0042 CHAPTER 1 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

Victoria is not alone in experiencing fire events such as that of last fire season. Parts of Europe and Canada have also experienced extreme fire weather over the summer of 2003. More than 800 forest fires in Canada have burned more than 345,000 acres and resulted in the deaths of two firefighters by the 18th August 2003. On 26 August a fire in British Columbia, Canada approached a heavily populated area, destroyed 200 homes and forced 30,000 to leave their homes. This fire was the eighth fire to threaten a populated area this summer, unprecedented for British Columbia. Portugal has had the worst fire season on record with 19 people killed, and 362,000 hectares burned. In France and southern Italy large areas have been burned. Five people died in France and tens of thousands of hectares of woodland burned. The summer of 2003 has clearly been an extreme fire year in the northern hemisphere with threat to urban areas in Canada and more than five times the average area burned across France, Italy and Portugal.

1.13 The Government requested that the Inquiry report • Professor Neal Enright, School of Anthropology, at the end of September 2003 to allow maximum Geography and Environmental Studies, and opportunity to implement recommendations prior to Executive Director, Office for Environmental the 2003-2004 fire season. Programs at the University of Melbourne. Professor Enright specialises in the fire ecology of plants, re–vegetation and rehabilitation, has been Terms of Reference published widely and has conducted extensive research and consultation. 1.14 The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry were to: 1.16 Their appointment brought a breadth of knowledge 1. Examine the effectiveness of preparedness for in bushfire behaviour and environmental science to the 2002/03 bushfire season, including hazard the Inquiry to complement the expert knowledge of reduction and mobilisation of resources; the Emergency Services Commissioner in the planning 2. Assess the effectiveness of the response to the for, and management of, emergency situations. The 2002/03 bushfires, including emergency Inquiry members were supported by a Secretariat management procedures, cross agency response located in the Department of Premier and Cabinet. and co–ordination and resource deployment; and 3. Provide recommendations for future bushfire management strategies, including any required How the Inquiry was Conducted improvements to existing emergency management arrangements including public communications, 1.17 The Inquiry members approached the task with no community advice systems, infrastructure, training predetermined views about the eventual findings. and overall resourcing. Considerable time was spent building an understanding of the fire events themselves, their Expert Input to the Inquiry impacts on communities and the environment, the quality and efficacy of planning and what was done 1.15 Two independent experts were appointed to the to prevent and suppress the fires. A wide range of Inquiry. They are: issues requiring consideration were identified. A phased process was developed to explore and • Dr Malcolm Gill, Honorary Research Fellow, retired evaluate these issues. from CSIRO Plant Industry, Canberra. Dr Gill has published widely on wildfire and its role in forest ecosystems in Australia and was awarded an Order of Australia Medal in 1999 for his contribution to research on bushfires and the environment; and PAGE 5 PAGE 6 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.18 These are outlinedinChapter5. North West tothefarSouthEastofState. fell intoaseriesofthemesrepeated from thefar around theState,andissuesraisedwithInquiry Comments andcriticismswere surprisinglyuniform recovery couldbeimproved orstrengthened. fire prevention andsuppression andcommunity views ontheTerms ofReference –specifically, how ensure everyonehadasay, anddrawoutcommunity hear anddiscusscommunityindividualconcerns, The publicconsultationsallowedInquirymembersto suppression, andbycommunitymembers. staff involvedinlandmanagementorfire provided inanopenwaybyvolunteersandagency unanimous intheirviewthatinformationwas parliamentary privilege,Inquirymembersare While submissionswere notprotected by their viewstotheInquiry. section ofthecommunityhadopportunitytoput Appendix II.Thisprocess ensured abroad cross individually andinsmallgroups andtheseare listedin In all,Inquirymembersmetover400people,both as wellinMelbourne. PV offices; atshire offices andcommunityhalls– fires; atCFA shedsandfire stations;atDSE,CFA and affected areas onfarmsandplantations;atthesiteof These discussionswere heldatmostofthefire- Departments andagencies,otherorganisations. community members,LocalandStateGovernment This wasfollowedbyaseriesofmeetingswith principal issuesofconcern. agencies), allowedustounderstandthecommunity’s land managers,andstaff andvolunteersofthefire and afterthetouroffire-affected areas (from public substantial volumeofinformationgathered during Appendix I.Thesesubmissions,combinedwitha individuals andorganisations.Theseare listedat The Inquiryreceived 273submissionsfrom arangeof andtheCFA.Primary Industries,ParksVictoria regional andlocalstaff ofDSE,theDepartment talking insitutofirefighters, incidentcontrollers, EastGippslandandGippsland, North EastVictoria, following thepathoffires inNorthWest and consideration. Inquirymembersthentoured Victoria, 30 May2003asawayofframingthekeyissuesfor The Inquirycalledforpublicsubmissionsby 1.25 1.24 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 suppression. making andbetteruseoflocalknowledgeinfire planning, more communityinvolvementindecision greater effort byallpartiestofire prevention spectrum ofviewsbutwere consistentinseeking better forfuture bushfires. Solutionscovered thefull the Inquiryrecommendations toprepare andrespond Communities were askedwhattheywantedtoseein community. in somecases,significantlossoftourismtheir good otherfire suppression workscombinedwith, remaining stock,aneedtorebuild fencingandmake but withlessfeedandwateravailablefortheir fires and,followingthefires, remained indrought – affected communitieswere indrought priortothe opportunity forexpression ofruralanger. Most The Inquiry'spublicconsultationsalsoprovided an this review formpartofthefinalreport (Chapter 22). the fire seasonwasundertakenandtheoutcomesof the managementofaerialfirefighting resources over Additionally, review anexternal oftheeffectiveness of significant bushfires occurred. to previous years,especiallythoseyearswhen existed overthefire seasonandhowthesecompared They alsoexaminedtheclimaticconditionsthat value insuppressing andreducing bushfire intensity. the issuesassociatedwithprescribedandits burning Enright, undertookscientificresearch intosomeof Inquiry members,DrMalcolmGillandProfessor Neal participating inpublicmeetings,thetwoexpert In additiontoconsideringsubmissionsand discussed withindividualsandgroups. six weeksofruralvisits.Emergingthemeswere commenced astheconsultationscontinuedover number ofreturnvisitswere madeandthisprocess truthed' withselectedcommunities.Accordingly, a recommendations wouldbetestedor'ground agenciesthat,totheextentpossible, government Inquiry membersinformedcommunitiesand Departments, agenciesandtheCFA. forward inpartnershipwithLocalGovernment, owning theoutcomes.Communitiesneedtomove a largeextentonallpartiesimplementingand or failure ofthefinalrecommendations wouldrely to services. However, wealsostressed thatthesuccess of thepubliclandmanagementagenciesandfire and would bedevelopedindependentofGovernment The Inquirymadeitclearthatitsrecommendations INF.018.002.0043 INF.018.002.0044 CHAPTER 1 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 1.30 The Inquiry also examined the Emergency 1.36 Among other things, the report deals with many Management Act 1986 and arrangements in of the criticisms made in submissions and in place, the findings and implementation of previous consultations. It cannot, however, engage in point bushfire inquiries and reviews and the adequacy by point forensic analysis of every incident raised with of co-ordination between DSE and the CFA in fire the Inquiry. Instead, we note distinct themes and planning/prevention and response for rural Victoria. commonality of purpose and provide recommendations based on evidence and research. In saying this however, five case studies and the Aims of this Report lessons learnt are discussed in Parts C and D.

1.31 The purpose of the Inquiry has been to learn from 1.37 The report also discusses in detail the efforts of the the recent bushfire experiences in order to further two principal fire suppression agencies, DSE and the improve Victoria’s preparedness and response to CFA, during the North East and Gippsland fires and future fire and other emergencies. their relationship with the other agencies engaged in fire and emergency management. We comment on 1.32 Reviews following any large-scale emergency identify the effectiveness of arrangements now in place and both successes and mistakes. They also identify recommend changes for the future. lessons to be learnt and improvements to be made. In saying that, the Inquiry's purpose has not been to attribute blame nor to engage in the public Interim Report: August 2003 humiliation of individuals working on behalf of their community or organisation, paid or unpaid. 1.38 The Inquiry was invited to present an Interim Report to Government if issues were identified that 1.33 Rather, the Inquiry has identified areas for needed immediate attention. The Inquiry took this improvement in fire prevention planning, opportunity and an Interim Report was forwarded to preparedness and response and developed realistic Government in August 2003. The report contained recommendations to ensure a longer-term continuous six recommendations concerning prescribed burning, improvement strategy is implemented for Victorians. use of local knowledge, fencing policy, rehabilitation Systemic problems and issues requiring policy change and protection of water catchments. The Premier by Government, or changes to the State's emergency released the report on August 26, accepting all management arrangements, were of critical interest. recommendations. The Interim Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires is 1.34 Our report aims, first and foremost, to be a at Appendix III. constructive document that provides recommendations for enhanced bushfire safety in Victoria. The report acknowledges positives such as progress made in Victoria’s Emergency Management arrangements since 1983 and the significant improvement in co-operation and co-ordination across the many agencies involved during and after the fires. To some extent, it also aims to be educative, providing the context for a discussion of fire in the Victorian environment, a framework for rational debate and a way forward based on objective data and evidence.

1.35 The report has five Parts. Part A sets the scene for our later analysis. Parts B and C respond to the first Term of Reference and look at fire on public land and community and agency preparedness. Part D tackles the complex questions of response and recovery and addresses the second Term of Reference. Part E looks forward and makes recommendations for the future in line with the third Term of Reference. PAGE 7 PAGE 8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 Victorian Environment The Changing Chapter 2 the landandpeoplewere (andare) exposed. offiresinfluenced thepattern andfire risktowhich Combined withtheever-increasing population,this considerable changeinthevegetativecover. Extensive clearing,mostlyforagriculture, ledto wascoveredof Victoria byforests orwoodland. estimated thatpriortothe1840s,around 88percent Plantsandanimalsare adaptedtosequencesoffire ratherthanonesingle event;thesesequencesare called‘fire regimes’. E 1 surrounding properties. of fires there over theyears,posingafire riskto the west.Lightninghasignitedasignificantnumber the mainarea offire-prone, ruggedforested rangesin the Grampians.TheGrampiansNationalParkcontains shrubland across partsoftheseuplands,aswellin than 1,000metres. There are areas ofwoodlandand and undulating,withonlyafewpeaksreaching more plateaux andridgeswhichare generallyrelatively low term ‘range’isnotagooddescriptionforthe East oftheState.However, the Victoria, inwestern across totheNewSouthWales border intheNorth series oflowhillsinthewestthatincreases inheight istraversedbytheGreatVictoria DividingRange–a relation tofire risk. landscape andnotesareasin ofparticularconcern This sectionlooksatVictoria’s diversegeographyand The Victorian Landscape circumstances. have systemsinplacetomeetwiderchanging fire weargueitisimportantto riskforVictorians, altered ecosystemdynamicsmayleadtoanincreased temperatures, changesinrainfall,andconsequent fires includingmajorfire events.Giventhathigher demonstrates thattheStateremains athighriskof and managementoffire, therecent fire season Despite advancesinourapproach totheprevention adapted toparticularfire regimes. fire, withmuchofthefloraandfaunanecessarily landscapehasalwaysbeensubjectto The Victorian environment formanyVictorians. rural andregional assets,andwehaveahigh-riskfire relative tootherStates,andthedispersednature of Add tothismixVictoria’s highpopulationdensity and vegetationwithclimateweatherconditions. in theworldduetocombinationofitslandscape hasoneofthemostfire-proneVictoria environments Overview the effects oftheprevious fire event. fires ontheenvironment canbeobservedatthetimebutstate oftheenvironment atthetimeofeachfire islikelytohav 1 It hasbeen 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.10 2.9 used forsheepgrazing. South West, largelyreplacing areas previously during thepastfiveyearshasbeenmainlyin plantations (i.e.100,000hectares) across Victoria land use.Alargeproportion ofthegrowth inprivate over recent yearsithaslessenedwiththeriseofother significantly toVictoria’s wealthinthepast.However, tourism. Theregion’s woolindustryhascontributed major coastalresort areas thatrely predominantly on which haveexperiencedsignificantfires andadjoin with theexceptionofforested OtwayRanges South oftherangesismainlyfarmedcoastalplain, fire mitigationandimpactonlocalcommunities. therefore givenpriorityfrom thepointofview of theseparkboundarieswithprivatelandis Fire hasshapedthislandscape,andthemanagement Sunset Country. the LittleDesert,BigWyperfeldand shrubland, mostofwhichremains intheparkareas of vegetation oftheMalleeismainlysparselyvegetated broadacre cropping andsomegrazing.Thenatural largely flatandincreasingly arid,withlargeareas of riverine plainandtheMalleedunefieldswhichare –the thenorthisarea calledtheWimmera To significant fire risk. encroaching suburbanpopulation,butalsoposea Ranges provide highenvironmental amenityforthe eucalypt forests across theDandenongandYarra asset protection. To the theneareastofMelbourne, these areasforfire makesthemofconcern safetyand forests across thisregion, thegrowing populationin Lerderderg Gorge. Despitethefragmentednature of as MacedonRanges,Wombat StateForest and areas offorest insmallNationalandStateParkssuch mostly byrelatively lowelevationswithscattered areranges northwestofMelbourne characterised proportion ofVictoria’s high-valueagriculture. The extends totheMurrayRiver, supportingalarge North ofthecentralrangesisriverineplainwhich urban areasontheplainstosouth. ofMelbourne therangesbegintorise,with In centralVictoria were asillustratedinTable burnt), 2.1. hectares ofgrassland)and1977(103,000hectares fires occurredmore in1944(burning than1million districtandNorthWest.the western Significantgrass plantations across theplainsandundulatinghillsof Grass fires are arisktopasture, cropland areas and ffects ofindividual e beeninfluencedby INF.018.002.0045 INF.018.002.0046 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART North East Alpine Areas 2.15 The recent history of bushfires demonstrates the nature of disastrous fire in the Victorian environment. 2.11 It is in the North East of the State that the ranges A study in 1986 estimated that in the past 100 years,2 become rugged, mountainous alpine areas. The more than two thirds of Australian bushfire-related region is covered by extensive areas of normally cool, deaths and more than half of the significant bushfire- moist temperate forest such as Mountain Ash, as well related property losses occurred in Victoria. as drier sclerophyll forest at lower altitude and on drier slopes. Moist gullies are filled with tree ferns. 2.16 Particular fire seasons such as 1939 and 1983 tend to These worn, rounded mountains are high by be remembered for their severe impacts. Figures 2.1, Australian standards, reaching over 1,900 metres. 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the areas burnt during the There are many steep slopes making access very 1939, 1983 and 2002-2003 fires. difficult across much of the region. 2.17 The number of fires and the size of area burnt give 2.12 On the high plains, low alpine vegetation and Snow one perspective on the history of bushfires in Victoria Gums predominate across the middle of the highest but the impacts on life and assets provide another. ranges providing the environment for winter snow- Loss of life, property and other assets cannot be solely based recreation and, in summer, tourism and some predicted by the number and severity of fires. Some cattle grazing. But the chief characteristic of their relatively small fires have had a significant impact. terrain is forested mountain ridges interspersed with These fires, as well as large-scale fires, have long river valleys to the north and south, many of contributed significantly to fire-management which contain scattered, isolated farming arrangements. communities that are frequently exposed to high levels of fire risk. These valleys to the south gradually 2.18 Table 2.1 is a summary of significant fire events on all widen to become coastal plains across much of land across Victoria from 1851 through to 2003.3 It Gippsland, although at the easternmost end, the lists impacts on life and assets. forested ranges extend almost to the sea. 2.19 Additional historical information is provided at Appendix IV (Fires on Public Land - Historical Data) Gippsland and details the annual number of wildfires attended 2.13 The population of East Gippsland is relatively low and by public land managers between 1921 and 2003 mostly confined to coastal villages and towns around and the area burnt. a predominantly public estate of forested land. Small pockets of agriculture are interspersed within the steeper terrain. Farmland in central and west Gippsland provides an important source of agricultural income and supports a higher population in towns such as Warragul, Traralgon, Moe and Morwell. The mountain ranges in the east of the State provide much of the water for Melbourne via the Thomson Dam and water from the northern slopes feed Eildon and Dartmouth (to name but two water storages), and the Murray River.

Fire in the Victorian Environment

2.14 Fire has been a natural phenomenon within the Australian and Victorian landscape since time immemorial. However, the extent of fire appears to have increased with European settlement. (Chapter 12 discusses this in more detail.)

2 J. Hickman & M. Tarrant (1986) 'Australian Bushfires and their Real Cost', Fire Science, 4th Australian National Biennial Conference, 21–24 October, Perth, Institution of Fire Engineers, Perth. 3 While there is a lack of accurate information, particularly regarding fires during the nineteenth century, a significant fire event in 1851 reportedly

affected about a quarter of the State. The information has become more reliable during the twentieth century with better record keeping, PAGE especially for fires since 1939. 9 PAGE 10 Table 2.1:Significant Fire Events inVictoria Black Thursday 6February 1851 Date 19 February 1968 21 February–13 March 1965 17 January1965 14 January1962 5 February 1952 14 February 1944 14 January1944 22 December 1943 3–4 March 1942 (December 1938–January1939) Black Friday 13January1939 1932 1926 Early 1900s(esp.1905,1906,1912,1914) Red Tuesday 1February 1898 Thislistisnotdefinitivebutgives anideaofthemajorfire events,particularlyafter1939when thereliability ofinform 4 Benalla area Morwell, Yallourn Central &western districts Wangaratta (burning ona60mile front) Hamilton, SouthGippsland–Yarram Dromana, Yarra Glen, Warburton, Erica Warrandyte, Noojee,Omeo,Mansfield, and thetowns ofRubicon, Woods Point, Gippsland, theOtwayandGrampian ranges Large areas oftheNorthEast and Gippsland Many districts across Victoria, particularly Dandenong Ranges Noojee, Kinglake, Warburton, Erica, Gippsland, Grampians, OtwayRanges South Gippsland Heidelberg Ranges, Westernport, Dandenongdistricts, Wimmera, Portland, Gippsland,Plenty Dandenong Ranges,TheBasin,Upwey Gippsland Longwood Andrews, Hurstbridge, Warrandyte, Mitcham The Basin,Christmas Hills,Kinglake, St Location 4 9 people Many farms andhouses 60 people Varied (100,000hectares in1914) 260,000 hectares 2,000 buildings 12 people Victoria) Approx. five millionhectares (aquarter of Thousands ofcattle One millionsheep Approx. 12people 1,920 hectares 64 homesandotherbuildings 15,000 acres ofgrassland 300,000 hectares offorest More than4,000stock More than60homes/shops 6 houses 7 people (allfrom onefamily) 454 homes More than8people 100,000 hectares Several people Plant, works,opencutmineandbuildings grassland and160,000hectares offorest More thanonemillionhectares of Huge stock losses 500 homes 49 people Thousands ofacres ofgrass country 10 people More than20homes 2 farms 100 sheep 1 person 1.5–2 millionhectares 69 timbermills More than650homes/shops 71 people Losses andarea affected ation increases. INF.018.002.0047 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 11 CHAPTER 2 INF.018.002.0048 Losses and area affected and area Losses 1 abandoned house 181,800 hectares (indirectly) 1 person 41 houses 9,000 livestock 1.1 million hectares 50 houses 1,864 hectares 47 people than 27,000 stock More 2,000 homes/shops Over 210,000 hectares 3 people 182 homes 400 farms 46,000 stock 50,800 hectares 1 person 17 homes than 12,000 stock More forest) (mostly 10,000 hectares 3 people 41 houses 400 hectares 32,000 hectares tanker 1 CFA firefighters, 5 CFA 780 hectares of grassland 29,000 hectares 22 people 230 homes 21 schools/church/halls than 12,000 stock More 250,000 hectares 12,140 hectares 4 people than 100 houses/shops more 200,000 stock Approx. 103,000 hectares 2 people 1 house 6,500 stock 119,000 hectares 250,000 hectares , CSIRO and CFA, 1982; R. Murray and K. White, , CSIRO and CFA, . , AGPS, 1978; Reports of the 1939 and 1944 Royal Commissions; Bushfires in Australia Location Caledonia River area of the Alpine National area River Caledonia Forest State River Carey Park, Linton Dadswells Bridge Big Desert by lightning, started 80 fires Over Gippsland Victoria, North East Avoca/Maryborough, Little River, River, Little Avoca/Maryborough, Springfield, Melton Strathbogie Berringa Heathcote, Dandenong Ranges, Creswick, Gough's Bay Teddywaddy, Bairnsdale and the Big Desert Sunset country Cann River Mt Macedon East Cockatoo, Branxholme, Monivae, Otway Ranges, Mt Macedon, Trentham, Cudgee, Heights, Warburton, Belgrave Framlingham Upper Beaconsfield, 280 fires broke out affecting Lara, out affecting broke 280 fires Darraweit, Bulgana, Yea, Daylesford, Flat, Korongvale Kangaroo Mt Buffalo Creswick, Streatham, Tatyoon, Penshurst, Rokewood, Cressy, Werneth, Pura, Pura River Little Beeac, Mingay, Lismore, The fires of 12 February District of Victoria 1977 in the Western 17–19 December 2000 17–19 December 2002 17–31 December 2003 8 January–8 March 21 January 1997 31 1997–9 January 1998 December 1998 2 December 27 December 1990 27 December 1995 23 Feb Ash Wednesday 16 February 1983 16 February Ash Wednesday 14 January 1985 28 December 1980–6 January 1981 28 December 31 January 1983 1983 1 February 12 February 1977 12 February 15 January 1978 8 January 1969 1972 December Date Sources: CFA website; DPI/DSE website; R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, website; DPI/DSE website; R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, CFA Sources: Cheney and J. Barber, N.P. A.G. McArthur, State of Fire: A History of Volunteer Firefighting and the Country Fire Authority in Victoria, CFA, 1995 Firefighting and the Country CFA, Authority in Victoria, Fire State of Fire: A History of Volunteer PAGE 12 Figure 2.1:The1939Fires reasHgwy S/ABs tatVictoria PublicLand BassStrait Lakes Extentof1939Fires NSW/SA Freeways/Highways Major town INF.018.002.0049 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 13 CHAPTER 2 INF.018.002.0050 Major townExtent of 1982/1983 Fires Lakes Freeways/Highways Bass Strait Public Land NSW/SA Victoria Figure 2.2: The 1983 Fires 2.2: Figure PAGE 14 Figure 2.3:The2002-2003Fires reasHgwy S/ABs tatVictoria PublicLand BassStrait Lakes Extentof2002/2003Fires NSW/SA Freeways/Highways Major town INF.018.002.0051 INF.018.002.0052 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Exposure of People and Assets 2.24 The area of farmland and number of farms has to Bushfire Risk declined, especially since the early 1970s. At the same time, tourism has become a key growth industry in Population Density regional Victoria, particularly in areas of scenic quality. Visits to National Parks have increased between one 2.20 Victoria has the highest density of population in and six per cent per annum for the past 10 years.8 Australia with one quarter of the nation’s population Increased tourism has contributed to greater value occupying just three per cent of Australia’s total land being placed on the natural environment in many 5 area. The population of Victoria at 30 June 2001 was rural areas. 4.83 million, with approximately 1.30 million people living in rural and regional areas outside the Public Land Melbourne Statistical Division (broadly the greater 6 Melbourne area). 2.25 Approximately two thirds of the State’s land area is privately owned and the remaining third, some 7.7 2.21 Most of the people living in rural and regional Victoria million hectares is public land, principally parks and are exposed to bushfires since, apart from regional forests. Heightened community awareness of town centres, bushfires occur across all parts of the conservation issues has led to an increase in the area rural landscape putting lives, houses, farms, of National Parks at the expense of State Forests. The businesses and a range of other public assets at risk. area of protected parks in Victoria (National Parks and People living and working on the fringes of other protected parks and reserves) has progressively metropolitan Melbourne and regional towns are expanded from some four per cent of the State in the also at significant risk as demonstrated by the Ash early 1970s to approximately 16 per cent or 3.6 Wednesday fires in 1983, which resulted in 47 million hectares today.9 deaths. Table 2.1 includes major fires that have occurred on the Mornington Peninsula, the Western grasslands and across the Macedon, Dandenong Timber Production and Yarra Ranges. 2.26 The area of State Forest is 3.5 million hectares, of which just over one million is managed sustainably Agricultural Assets for timber production under the co-ordination of DSE. The remainder is in reserves for ecological and 2.22 Agricultural production currently occupies around recreational use. 56 per cent of the State’s land base. Of this, the major land use is broadacre dryland pasture and 2.27 Commercial State Forests supply timber that in broadacre cropping, approximately 95 per cent of 2001–2002 totalled 2,216,000 cubic metres (gross).10 7 agricultural land. The remainder consists of irrigated From this, 741,000 cubic metres (or approx 33 per pasture, horticulture and plantations. cent of total volume) of sawlogs was produced. Through recent policy developments (Our Forests 2.23 A range of high-value agricultural assets is therefore Our Future released in February 2002), a proposal exposed to fire risk, including stock, pasture, to reduce licensed sawlog volumes by approximately plantations and other crops. Some farmers made the 30 per cent Statewide has been agreed and value of these assets clear to the Inquiry when they implementation strategies are being developed. stated that protection of these agricultural assets was a higher priority than their houses. Similarly, plantations represent valuable assets that are very vulnerable to fire. While there have been changes in agricultural land use across Victoria over the years, particularly the change from grazing to private forestry, the impact of these changes on total fire risk is not clear.

5 Government of Victoria, Atlas of Victoria 1982, J. S. Duncan (ed), p82. 6 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Victorian Year Book, pp 7-8. 7 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural Census 2001.

8 Source: Victoria Research, Parks Victoria. PAGE 9 Department of Natural Resources and Environment – Submission to Linton Coronial Inquiry, Sept 2000 and Park Victoria – State of the Parks 2000.

10 This represents $39,38m and $25.566m respectively product charge invoiced, which is made up of the royalty, roading and silviculture charges. 15 Source: Forests Service. PAGE 16 2.31 2.30 2.29 2.28 population. declining smalltowns,andanageingrural around largemetropolitan andregional centres, areas, contributingtoaconcentrationofsettlement concern intermsoffireconcern risk. problems. Theinterfacealsoprovides asource of forest understories,andofpestplantanimal animals onprivatepastures andcrops, oflivestockon aboutthecross-boundaryconcerns impactsofnative of communitydebateformanyyears.There are of fires, weedsandferalanimals,hasbeenthesource between publicandprivateland,suchasthespread 6T. andTasmania’ Budge,‘Population declineinVictoria in P.W. Newton andM.Bell(eds) 16 5Department ofInfrastructure, 15 3Submission totheInquirybyCountryFire Authority, 13 2DepartmentofInfrastructure, 12 Auditor-General Victoria, 11 State. many ruralareas, particularlyinthewestof industry sector, precipitating populationlossacross changes thatresulted infewerjobstheprimary ofagriculturemodernisation from the1950ssaw second halfofthetwentiethcentury. The nineteenth century, thistrend hasreversed inthe the populationincreased significantlyduringthe changes haveoccurred across While ruralVictoria. Since European settlement,fundamentalpopulation Population Decrease inSomeFire RiskAreas Population andCulturalChange presenting athreat topublicland. noted thatfires dooriginateonprivateproperty, may posearisktoprivatelanditshouldalsobe fought andcontrolled more easily. Whilepublicland providing apointatwhichthefire islikelytobe point where accessiseasierandfuelloadschange, The boundarywithprivatelandissometimesthe vegetated, providing ready fuelforbushfires. lightning strikes,itismore likelytobeheavily This typeofcountryisnotonlymore prone to country thatgenerallyhasremained aspublicland. steeper, more inaccessibleandmarginalfarming valleys andplains,European settlementhascreated across theboundaryintoprivateproperty. Byclearing land, typicallyfrom lightningstrikes,andburning The recent fire seasonsawfires originatingonpublic property. boundaries betweenpubliclandandprivate There are approximately 60,000kilometres of Public LandandPrivateProperty 4T. andTasmania’ Budge, ‘PopulationdeclineinVictoria inP.W.Newton andM.Bell (eds) 14 published byAGPS, 1996pp193–4. published by AGPS,1996pp 193–4. 12 A cycleofdeclinebecamecumulativeinthese 11 Issues associatedwiththeinterface Fire PreventionandPreparedness Regional Matters– Atlas ofRegionalVictoria 2002 Regional Matters–AtlasofVictoria 2002 From theFoothillstoAlpineHeights 2003 , May2003. 2.33 2.32 2.35 2.34 Sydney fires in1994and2001-2002. in 1983,the1997DandenongRangesfires andthe trends continuedespitefires suchasAshWednesday near forest andcoastalheathland. risk ofbushfires, particularlythoselocatedinand population increases haveoccurred inareas athigh farm andrecreation zones.Thismeansthat the majorurbancentres andcoastal,historic,hobby 1991. increases ofaround 38percentbetween1976and rural retreat region, bothexperiencedpopulation commuting region,weekendand andtheMelbourne amenity. Forexample,theextendedMelbourne both regional townsandareas ofhighlandscape areas –in withincommutingdistanceofMelbourne There hasbeensignificantpopulationincrease in Population Increase inSomeFire RiskAreas during thelastdecade. volunteers, hasdeclinedaround 4.2percentyear the numberofCFA volunteers,particularlyrural crews andtheStateEmergencyService.Forexample, communities toparticipateinCFA andDSEsummer in theseruralareas hasbeenthereduced capacityof An importantimplicationofthedecreased population are exposedtohighbushfire risk. urban-ruralfringewhereMelbourne manyproperties and 1991,of122.5percent,wasexperiencedonthe An evengreater populationincrease between1976 protect themselvesandtheirproperty from fire. experience withfire andbeunaware ofhowto Some newerresidents intheseareas mayhaveno 25 percentoftheworkforce insomeareas. tourism-related servicesrepresenting more than throughout regional withemploymentin Victoria There hasalsobeenasignificantincrease intourism , p.27. , pp10-13. 14 Population Shift–Mobility andChangeinAustralia Second homesare generallyfoundinsomeof Population Shift–Mobilityand ChangeinAustralia , p.211. 13 16 These population 15 INF.018.002.0053 INF.018.002.0054 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Cultural Change: Changing Changes in Victorian Response Attitudes to Fire to the Threat of Unplanned Fire

2.36 The search for landscape amenity has been Changes to Legislative and Organisational paralleled by an increased interest in environmental Structures issues and conservation. This is shown by the increased membership of conservation and similar 2.39 The response of early Victorians to the threat of fires groups, including membership in rural areas. For was initially reactive and ad hoc. During the second example, the State Government’s Land for Wildlife half of the nineteenth century, fire brigades and program, in which landholders are supported to volunteer town and bush brigades slowly evolved provide habitat for native wildlife, has grown to over to help protect lives and assets. In 1890, the Fire 5,800 properties in Victoria since 1981. The Victorian Brigades Act19 established the separate responsibilities National Parks Association now has some 16,000 of the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board and Country members and supporters, around half located Fire Brigades Boards and ensured some consistency in outside of Melbourne.17 their funding. However, the country brigades remained relatively small, scattered and inadequately 2.37 A major change has also taken place in attitudes organised to meet the threat of any major bushfires about the place of fire in the Victorian landscape. In as their primary focus was townships and the (then) the early days of European settlement in Australia, fire outer metropolitan area. was an important tool for farmers and many others to assist with clearing and stimulating pasture 2.40 By 1914, a second fire brigade movement was growth. The widespread use of fire, as well as gaining momentum – the bush fire brigades, centred carelessness in its use, is clear from the Report of the on rural landowners. These brigades, the forerunner Royal Commission into the 1939 bushfires. Since to the Rural Brigades,20 were informal and had no then, however, attitudes to fire have slowly changed formal source of funding. In 1928, the Bush Fire so that where fire is used it is controlled and Brigades Association was formed to provide a voice. recognises safety issues. 2.41 In 1926, bushfires led to significant loss of life and 2.38 Nevertheless, reports following the 1939 and 1977 property in Victoria and subsequent efforts were major fires identified apathetic attitudes towards fire made to improve legislation and systems for fire except where danger was immediate.18 Increasing management. However, in 1939 the largest bushfires concern about the impacts and risks of prescribed in living memory occurred, resulting in 71 lives lost in burning – impacts on ecological values and health; one day and considerable loss of assets. risks to property and businesses such as tourism – has 2.42 The subsequent Stretton Royal Commission21 also led to apathy around bushfire prevention. In eloquently highlighted the need for Government to recent years, considerable effort has been put into address wildfire prevention and suppression needs on community education to increase awareness and all rural land in Victoria. The Government of the day preparedness for bushfires. This issue of public did not immediately act on the findings. awareness and preparedness is discussed further in Chapter 13.

17 Source: Victorian National Parks Association. 18 Stretton, L.E.B, Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Bushfires of January, 1939 and Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Occurrence of Bush and Grass Fires in Victoria, 1977. 19 The Fire Brigades Act 1890 established the Country Fire Brigades Board (CFBB) and the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board. The CFBB had extensive powers and responsibilities over volunteer fire brigades that were based more than 10 miles from Melbourne. Funding was provided in equal parts from the state of Victoria, from municipalities and from companies insuring against fire.

20 Bush Fire Brigades were the forerunner to the CFA Rural Brigades and were groups of landowners who banded together to replace the old PAGE informal arrangements. A formal organisation to support Bush Fire Brigades did not exist until 1928 when the Bush Fire Brigade Association was formed. Bush brigades relied chiefly on levies placed on landowners and donations from volunteers and the community. 17 21 Stretton, L.E.B, Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Bushfires of January, 1939. PAGE 18 2.45 2.44 2.43 operation on1January1945. model continuestoday. TheCFA commenced (now theMunicipalFire Prevention Officer). This Local Authoritiesandtheirdesignated‘Proper Officer’ prevention andplanning,theCFA wastoworkwith Board andtheBushFire Brigades.Inthearea offire replaced andsubsumedtheCountryFire Brigades totheCountryFireVictoria Authority(CFA), which Environment [DSE])andtheremainder ofrural Secretary oftheDepartmentSustainabilityand Commission (aresponsibility nowassumedbythe and suppression onpubliclandwenttotheForests arrangements. Responsibilityforwildfire prevention legislated forclarityintheorganisational 3Reportof theBushfire Review Committee onBushfire DisasterPreparedness Australia,Following the andResponseinVictoria, 23 Stretton, L.E.B,Reportofthe1944RoyalCommission. 22 Increased considerationofwildfire intheplanning • Increased investmentinresearch anddevelopment • Increased useandunderstandingoffuelreduction • Increased emphasisonresearch anddevelopment • in theareas of: and administration.Thesechangeshavebroadly been over thelastcentury, sodidthescience,technology structure forfire prevention andsuppression change Not onlydidthelegislativeandorganisational Administration Changes toScience,Technology and management onprivatelandandothersupportroles. staff and57,985volunteersinvolvedinfire 1,129 career (includingsupportandadministrative) firefighting continuestothisdayintheCFA, with However, onprivateland,thetraditionofvolunteer Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard. paid employees,permanentandcasual,ashasthe agencieshavealwaysreliedgovernment primarilyon In managingfires onpublicland,DSEandprevious second Stretton RoyalCommission Following furtherextensivefires in1944anda Fires 16February1983,April1984. schemes andtheBuildingCodes; and buildingdesign; fire onarangeofmaterials,buildingsandproducts into firefighting equipment,clothing,theeffect of detail inPartBofthisreport); intensity andassistinfire suppression (discussedin and otherfire mitigationstrategiestoreduce fire behaviour andthefactorsinfluencingthis; to developagreater understandingoffire into thescienceandecologyofbushfires inorder 22 the Government 2.47 2.46 2.51 2.50 2.49 2.48 the concert todelivereffective outcomesforVictoria. to oneagencyandthatallagenciesmustworkin recognised thatemergencyresponse isnotconfined Commissioner Millarin1984, and thereport oftheInquiryconductedbyPolice Following theAshWednesday fires of1983 five volunteerfirefighters in1998. atLinton,Victoria the AshWednesday fires in1983andthedeathsof important changesinfire managementarrangements: In more recent years,twofire eventshaveledto and LintonFires Changes followingAshWednesday impact onpeopleandproperty. are likelytobe,andtheextentwhichfires might in determininghowsuccessfulfire suppression efforts Weather atthetimeofunplannedfires canbecritical which fires suchasthoseof2002-2003,occur. Climate andweatherprovide thecontextwithin bushfires overcomingyears? us. Butcanweexpectanincrease inthenumberof As wehaveseen,unplannedfires willalwaysbewith Climate ChangeandIncreased Bushfire Risk suppression agencies. paramount intheprioritiesandprocedures offire this tragedywastoensure firefighter safetywas in thedeathsoffiveCFA firefighters. Theresponse to In 1998,arelatively smallfire nearLinton,resulted for bushfires, particularlyduringthe1980s. improve communityawareness andpreparedness progress incommunityeducationprograms to The AshWednesday fires alsoprompted considerable Gradualimprovements ininformationand • Increased emphasisontraininganddevelopment • efforts overtheyears. of whichhavesignificantlyimproved suppression equipment; andtheincreased useofaircraft –all technology, firefighting andcommunications communication technology, theuseofsatellite of allfirefighters, supervisorsandstrategists; Emergency ManagementAct1986 23 the Stateintroduced Ash Wednesday . ThisAct INF.018.002.0055 INF.018.002.0056 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 2.52 Victoria experiences a climate conducive to the 2.58 To summarise here: Our exploratory investigations occurrence and spread of unplanned fires in nearly of the ways that global climate warming and cyclical every summer somewhere in the State. During phenomena such as El Niño drought contribute to fire periods of drought, such as those associated with El risk in Victoria reveal possible increases in fire risk as Niño events, evidence indicates there is an increased climate warms, and a higher likelihood of fire in risk of large fires. Additionally, climate change El Niño drought periods. throughout the present century is predicted to lead to increased temperatures and, with them, a heightened 2.59 It is therefore possible that a higher fire risk future risk of unplanned fire. for Australians will result from higher temperatures, changes in rainfall, and consequent altered ecosystem 2.53 As part of our Inquiry, we investigated whether dynamics (i.e. changed growing conditions for plants, Victoria must plan for an increased frequency of including altered competitive interactions, possible extreme fire weather days as the climate becomes increased biomass production and changed hotter. Specifically, we investigated whether there is fuel types). an increase in extreme fire weather during strong El Niño–Southern Oscillation events in eastern Australia. 2.60 This points to the importance of having systems in place to adjust progressively to changing 2.54 The Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology has circumstances. compiled summary statistics on Australia’s weather and climate and maintains an up-to-date analysis of short and long-term trends in key climate parameters, Recommendation especially temperature and rainfall. To assist analysis, 2.61 That DSE and CFA as part of their long the Bureau provided more detailed climate data, term planning, and in conjunction with the based on individual climate station records Melbourne Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology, consider and other selected locations in Victoria. ways in which evidence for climate change and 2.55 Long-term records for a number of climate stations in El Niño–Southern Oscillation cycle impacts on Victoria were used to estimate the daily 3 pm Forest the likelihood of unplanned fire, can be better Fire Danger Index and the Keetch-Byram Drought incorporated into preparedness and response Index, two measures of environmental conditions planning. widely accepted to be related to the probability of fire ignition and spread. These parameters were then Conclusion analysed in relation to time and to the Southern Oscillation Index to investigate the strength of 2.62 Land use has changed significantly over the last evidence for trends and cycles in the occurrence of 170 years of European settlement in Victoria and, extreme fire danger weather in Victoria. to a large degree, changing patterns of population destination has mirrored this. The interface between 2.56 We also examined the results of relevant public and private land was once an issue for the investigations into extreme fire weather conditions farmer only; this is no longer the case with increasing described in reports and working papers written by growth in both permanent and weekend Bureau of Meteorology staff. communities now at the direct interface with public land. 2.57 Specific findings of our investigation are outlined in detail in the paper ‘Climate, Weather and Unplanned 2.63 Last century, Victorians realised that unplanned fire Fires in Victoria’, attached as Appendix V to this would always be with us and they introduced a range report. of legislative and organisation responses to prevent and suppress fires. There is no doubt that Victorians are significantly more skilled in both these areas and have engaged on a continuous improvement strategy to better cope with our fire prone environment. Much of this report details the significant advances that have been made and opportunities for Victorian to advance further. PAGE 19 PAGE 20 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 Co-operative Arrangements Current Legislationand Chapter 3 • • • • • • September 2002. Department ofNaturalResources andEnvironment, the CountryFire Authority(CFA) andthethen the InquiryisCo-operativeAgreement between responsibilities. TheAgreement ofmostinterest to agencies onhowtheseimplementtheir of Understandingprovide detailfororganisationsand In addition,anumberofagreements andMemoranda • with protecting from Victoria fire. Theseinclude: A numberofotherActsimpactonagenciescharged • • Key legislationincludes: Victorian Legislation 2002–2003 fires. agencies inpreparing forandsuppressing the events. LaterChaptersassesstheeffectiveness of multi-agency preparation andresponse tobushfire This ChaptergivesthelegislativecontextforVictoria’s community. and communicationbetweenagenciesthe only succeedifthere isahighlevelofco-operation large numberofagenciesandorganisationscan Current arrangementsare complex;theyinvolvea those emergenciesonthecommunity. arrangements inplacetominimisetheimpactof in particular, fire. Italsodescribesco-operative relating tothemanagementofemergencies– legislation This ChapterdescribestheVictorian Overview • • • • National ParksAct1975 Catchment andLandProtectionAct1994 Alpine Resorts(Management)Act1997 Environment ProtectionAct1970 Transport Act1983 Flora andFaunaGuaranteeAct1988 Electricity Act1998 Metropolitan FireBrigadesAct1958 Emergency ManagementAct1986 Local GovernmentAct1989 Planning andEnvironmentAct1987 Forests Act1958 Country FireAuthorityAct1958 Country ; ; ; ; . ; ; and ; ; ; and ; ; . 3.8 3.7 3.11 3.10 3.9 Compensationarrangementsofregistered • ‘StateofDisaster’arrangements;and • Recoveryplanningandmanagement; • The utilise fire andemergencyservices. co-operation betweentheagenciestoeffectively (MFESB) andCFA andencouragefacilitate Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard can setandmonitorperformancestandards forthe planning, includingthefire services.TheOESC (OESC) abroad role inemergencyprevention Office oftheEmergencyServicesCommissioner The Emergency ManagementAct1986 predominantly withbushfires. Of these,itisthelattertwoagenciesthatdeal DepartmentofSustainabilityandEnvironment • CountryFire Authority;and • Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard; • Three agenciesrespond directly tofires inVictoria: The FireAgencies Sergeant), locatedwithineachmunicipality. Co-ordinators (usuallyanInspectororSenior sponsorship ofPoliceMunicipalEmergencyResponse their jurisdiction.Thistaskiscarriedoutunderthe to planforemergenciesthatmayoccurwithin including AlpineResortManagementBoards, and responsibilities placedonMunicipalCouncils, including fire. Ofparticularnoteare theobligations response planningandco-ordination foremergencies, specific responsibilities forthedevelopmentof Further tothesearrangements,theActoutlines arrangements forregistered emergencyworkers. Co-ordinator-in-Chief andPart6coverscompensation outlines thedeclaration,powersanddutiesof regional recovery committees.Part5oftheAct Co-ordinator andtheestablishmentofstate co-ordinating agencyforrecovery, aStateRecovery Recovery Plan.Thisincludestheappointmentofa Part 3AoftheActoutlinesStateEmergency emergency workers. (DSE). Emergency ManagementAct Emergency ManagementAct1986 also addresses: gives the INF.018.002.0057 INF.018.002.0058 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Metropolitan Fire and Emergency 3.17 Section 20 of the CFA Act states that the general Services Board duty of the CFA is ‘superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the prevention and suppression 3.12 Under section 7 of the Metropolitan Fire Brigades of fires and for the protection of life and property in Act 1958, MFESB has the function of suppressing case of fires…’.2 However, CFA does not have sole and preventing fire in the Metropolitan Fire District. responsibility for fire prevention in the country area This covers the Melbourne Central Business District of Victoria. It must work with the Municipal Councils through to Laverton in the west, Tullamarine and and public authorities to fulfil its fire prevention role.3 Somerton in the north, Croydon in the east and Both CFA and Local Government have a duty to Clayton and Mentone in the south. This is an area prevent fire. of approximately 1,100 square kilometres with a population of approximately 2.2 million.1 3.18 CFA fulfils its fire prevention role through a number of means. These include the Declaration of Fire 3.13 In the Metropolitan Fire District there are few Danger Periods4 within a municipality or part of a opportunities to engage in fighting bushfires. municipality, and Declarations of Total Fire Bans.5 However, there are some areas of protected public CFA also provides leadership within the fire land – for example, along the Merri Creek and the prevention planning process and provides training, Yarra – which DSE would normally have control of in advice and support to Municipal Fire Prevention respect of fire suppression. Following agreement Officers. CFA undertakes community education between the Chief Officers of the MFESB and DSE, programs to deliver appropriate fire safety and MFESB have assumed control for fire suppression in prevention messages to the community. These these areas. DSE and CFA assist MFESB as required if include intensive face-to-face activities. specific bushfire expertise or equipment is needed. Department of Sustainability and 3.14 While some small pockets of the Melbourne Environment Metropolitan Fire District contain public land and/or abut CFA areas (and could therefore be viewed as 3.19 DSE is responsible for fire prevention and suppression potential bushfire areas), CFA and DSE are the for Victoria’s 7.7 million hectares of public land agencies that deal mainly with bushfire. including forests, National Parks, and protected public lands. Section 62(1) of the Forests Act 1958 states Country Fire Authority that the Secretary’s duty is ‘to carry out proper and sufficient work for the prevention and suppression of 3.15 The CFA is established under section 6(1) of the fire in every State forest and national park and on all Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (CFA Act) and is protected public land…’.6 mandated to provide for the ‘more effective’ control and prevention and suppression of fires in the 3.20 Protected public land is defined in section 3 of the country area of Victoria. Forests Act 1958 and includes State Forests, National and State Parks, wilderness areas and Crown 3.16 The country area of Victoria is defined in the Reserves. This includes areas managed by an Alpine CFA Act to mean that part of Victoria outside the Resort Management Board. Metropolitan Fire District, not including forest, National Park, or protected public land. CFA is 3.21 DSE fire management planning operates at three therefore responsible for fire protection to all other distinct levels: parts of Victoria including outer metropolitan Melbourne and regional centres, rural areas and • Strategic fire plans; plantation forests. This equates to approximately • Fire operations plans; and 15 million hectares of land, approximately one • Individual burn plans. million homes and 2.6 million people.

1 Based on 2001 ABS data. 2 The powers given to the CFA to achieve its suppression and prevention roles are set out at ss20AA, s23, s28, s29, s30, s33 and a variety of ancillary provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act, 1958.

3 s43, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958; S8 and Schedule 1 of the Local Government Act 1989. PAGE 4 s4, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958.

5 s40, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958. 21 6 DSE’s powers to carry out its fire suppression and prevention roles are contained generally in ss63–69 of the Forests Act 1958. PAGE 22 3.26 3.25 3.24 3.23 3.22 of thestrategiessetoutinitsFire Protection Plans. systematic planningapproach totheimplementation unclear. has beentransferred totheCFA, makingdelineation some locationsaround theStatewhere thatpower both control andlightingoffires. Howeverthere are DepartmentofNaturalResources andEnvironment, 8 7 in thesuppression offire. of eachfire andensures theagenciesworktogether ensures there isaclearlineofauthorityinrespect to haveoverallcontrol ofresponse activities.This MFESB) mayappointanofficer ofonetheagencies the ChiefOfficers inrespect offire (includingthe Management Act1986 This arrangementisoutlinedinthe agency isdeemedthecontrol agencyforthefire. When thefire traversespublicandprivateland,one have responsibility oversuppression (seeFigure 3.1). or publicland,eitherCFA orDSErespectively will Depending onwhetherthefire islocatedonprivate CFA andDSESuppressing Fire Together Fire ManagementonPublicLand applying andpromoting the education programs, declaringprohibited periods, DSE undertakesitsfire responsibilities byrunning of anyNationalParkorStateForest. of fire hazards onprivatelandwithin1.5kilometres DSE hasthediscretionary powertodirect theremoval broader community. DSE alsoundertakesfurtherconsultationwiththe Park, DSEhasarepresentative onthisCommittee. adjacent tooradjoinsanypartofaforest orNational Prevention Committee.Where themunicipaldistrictis relevant CFA Group meetingsandtheMunicipalFire strategies forpublicandprivatelandisthrough Communication aboutrespective fire prevention detail inChapter14. the widercommunity. Theyare discussed inmore relevant and stakeholdersincludingParksVictoria developed through aconsultationprocess with plansforspecificlocations.Theseareburn development offire operationsplansandindividual which are developedforeachDSEdistrict,guidethe and priorityforfuelmanagementworks.Theseplans, zones thatprovide aguidetoappropriate treatments Strategic fire plansidentifyfivefuelmanagement 9 Forests Act1958 Local GovernmentAct 1989 ; s65. which provides thatanyof S8 andSchedule1confer thefunctionof“fire prevention and protection” onMunicipal Councils. Code ofPracticefor 8 and through its Emergency 7 This relates to Code ofPracticefor FireManagementonPublicLand,1995 3.28 3.27 3.31 3.30 3.29 arrangements inplace. extensive incidentcontrol andco-operative Fire PreventionandPreparedness detailed intheAuditor-General's May2003report most recently agreed toinSeptember2002and between thetwoagencies.Thisarrangement– with theaimofachievingseamlessco-ordination CFA were putinplacefollowingtheLintontragedy further co-operativearrangementsbetweenDSEand Liaisewithmedia. • Provide informationtoaffected communities • Overseeimplementationoftactics; • Co-ordinate therequests forandmanagement • Co-ordinate communication; • Determineandco-ordinate strategy; • incident control centre isestablishedto: Most importantlyforfire response, ajointly-staffed In additiontothe prevention role inthecountryarea ofVictoria. (and publicauthorities),haveasignificantprimaryfire In conjunctionwiththeCFA, MunicipalCouncils Municipal Councils agencies. requirements for theparticipationofmanythese Current legislationdoesnotprovide Victorian specific Theelectricityindustry, theOffice oftheChief • AlpineResortManagementBoards; and • The79MunicipalCouncils; • OtherpartsofDSE’s portfoliothrough theOffice • Office oftheEmergencyServices Commissioner; • MFESB,CFA andDSE; • of agenciesorbodies: Fire preparedness andprevention involvesamyriad in FireManagement Other AgenciesandOrganisations and thewidercommunity; of resources; some ofthemanyagenciesinvolved. andVicTrackAuthorities, VicRoads, –toname Electrical Inspector, theforest industry, Water Victoria; of Planning,theBuildingCommissionandParks Emergency ManagementAct1986 – setsoutthe INF.018.002.0059 9 , PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 23 CHAPTER 3 INF.018.002.0060 Major townLakes Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW/SA CategoryPublic land Reserves & other Conservation Parks forest State 4.23 million timber production for forest State (1.05 million) (ha) area Approximate million 7.70 3.50 million Source: DSE. Note 1: Total land base for Victoria is 22.83 million hectares. DSE. Note 1: Total Source: used is available and currently of State forest Note 2: 1.05 million hectares for timber production. Table 3.1: Public Land Types for which DSE has for 3.1: Public Land Types Table Management Responsibilities Fire Figure 3.1: Public and Private Land in Victoria Public and Private 3.1: Figure PAGE 24 3.36 3.35 3.34 3.33 3.32 0s62(2) 10 Flora andFaunaGuarantee. Framework andtheimplementation ofthe preparedness suchastheNativeVegetation measures thatimpactonfire prevention and may alsoneedtodealwithother environmental on theirplanningschememaps.Municipalcouncils councils haveWMOsandthisclassificationisnoted treatments tomitigatetheeffects offire. Twenty-six fire intensityishighenoughtowarrantspecial scheme. TheWMOidentifieslandwhere thepotential Management Overlay(WMO)totheplanning Wildfire Act 1987 Clause 15ofthe fire authorities. protection guidelinesandseektheadviceofrelevant affecting identifiedareas, haveregard tospecificfire schemes, considerfire hazards inplanningdecisions councils toidentifypriorityhazards inplanning guideline (thewildfire planningguide)thatrequires Office ofPlanningwithinDSE.There isanoverarching Planning PolicyFramework,administered bythe area. ThisplanningschemesitswithintheStatewide the use,developmentandprotection oflandforan administer andenforce aplanningschemetosetout Act 1987 Under Section14ofthe procedure hasnotbeeninvoked. responsibilities (ss45–46CFA Act).To date,this Authority isfailingtocarryoutitsfire prevention if itissatisfiedthataMunicipalCouncilorPublic a MunicipalCouncil’s fire responsibilities totheCFA the CFA canaskthe Governor-in-Council totransfer to fulfiltheirobligationsundertheCFA Act.However, Municipal Councilscannotbesanctionediftheyfail prevention infringementnotice. may alsoissueafire prevention noticeorafire Council's dutiesinrespect offire prevention, acouncil Prevention Officer (s96AoftheCFA Act).To enforce addition, allCouncilsmustappointaMunicipalFire Act) overseesthedevelopmentofthisplan.In be establishedaccording tosection54oftheCFA The MunicipalFire Prevention Committee(whichmust Municipal CouncilsmusthaveaFire Prevention Plan. statesall Further, section55AoftheCFA Act under itscare andmanagement’. it orunderitscontrol ormanagement;andanyroad the spread offires onandfrom –anylandvestedin occurrence offires on,andminimisethedangerof topreventall practicablesteps(includingburning) the every municipalcouncilandpublicauthoritytotake states‘itisthedutyof Section 43oftheCFA Act 1s33(1) 11 Forests Act1958 Country FireAuthorityAct1958 Country , allowsMunicipalCouncilstoapplya , MunicipalCouncilsare required todevelop, Planning andEnvironment . Planning andEnvironment . 3.38 3.37 3.41 3.40 3.39 of theAlpineBoard ofManagementArea. for managingfuelonpubliclanduptotheboundary undertaken. priortofireVictoria prevention worksbeing a statutoryobligationtoseekagreement withParks and suppression onallNationalParksandalsohas DSE hasstatutoryresponsibility forfire prevention and PortPhillipWesternportBays. the LowerYarra, andPattersonRivers, Maribyrnong responsibilities fortherecreational managementof alsohas parks andopenspacenetwork.ParksVictoria State andregionalmetropolitan parks,Melbourne's with responsibility forNationalParks,Wilderness, portfolio. ItisthelargestlandmanagerinVictoria isaStatutoryAuthoritywithintheDSE Parks Victoria Parks Victoria between DSEandCFA. prevention responsibilities followinganagreement except MountBaware underCFA’s fire and are therefore aDSEresponsibility, allresorts Although AlpineResortsare locatedonpublicland Alpine Resorts Ecologicalsites(forrare andthreatened species). • Culturalsitesrelating toAborigines, earlysettlers • Infrastructure (e.g.management buildings, • assets suchas: includessubstantial Land managedbyParksVictoria DSE toreview thePlans. Finally, anyaggrievedpartycanasktheSecretary, Branch, DSE,review themandresolve differences. andtheExecutiveDirector,Victoria Fire Management Before Fire Protection Plansare finalised,Parks plans anditsstrategicFire Protection Plans. consulted whenDSEauditsitsannualfire operations Operations PlansforeachDSEFire Districtandis in thedevelopmentofFire Protection PlansandFire mine sites,loggingtramtracksandtrails); (e.g. mountaincattlemanhuts)andindustry centres, walkingtrails); accommodation, informationandinterpretive 10 Parks Victoria isamajorstakeholder Parks Victoria 11 DSE stillretains responsibility INF.018.002.0061 INF.018.002.0062 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 3.42 Alpine areas are managed by Alpine Resort 3.47 MWC and DSE entered into an agreement in Management Boards. These Board are deemed December 1995 (shortly after the Melbourne to be a Municipal Councils for the purposes of the Metropolitan Board of Works was dismantled and Emergency Management Act 1986.12 As such, Boards became MWC) that recognises that DSE has the must prepare and maintain a Municipal Emergency primary legal responsibility for fire prevention and Management Plan (under section 20 of the suppression (under the Forests Act 1958) but Emergency Management Act 1986). Such plans are acknowledges MWC's role in this respect (under primarily for emergency prevention, response and section 321 of the National Parks Act 1975). That recovery. While they encompass fire prevention and agreement states MWC must be consulted about, suppression, the plans are cast at a management and agree with, the preparation of Fire Protection rather than operational level. Plans for its water catchment areas. MWC has its own standing fire suppression force of approximately 3.43 Despite this classification, Alpine areas do not have 50 full time staff, which is trained up to DSE to participate in Municipal Fire Prevention Committees standards and which, like DSE’s own force, is and are not required to prepare and maintain supplemented during each fire season. Municipal Fire Prevention Plans and have those plans audited by CFA every three years. They do not need 3.48 Interfacing with the Water Authorities and DSE to appoint a Municipal Fire Prevention Officer. are ten Catchment Management Authorities. Their general responsibilities (outlined in section 4 of the Water Authorities and Catchment Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994) are to Management Authorities maintain and enhance long-term land productivity while also conserving the environment. Catchment 3.44 Providing water is the province of five water Management Authorities aim to maintain and authorities (wholesalers), three metropolitan retailers enhance the quality of the State's land and water (licensees), 15 regional urban authorities, and one resources (and associated plant and animal life). irrigation trust. In the Melbourne metropolitan area They have no explicit statutory responsibility for there is one wholesaler (Melbourne Water) and three fire prevention. The Fire Protection Plans and Fire retailers. In the rest of Victoria there are four rural Operations Plans developed by DSE are required to water authorities, one water trust and 14 regional take into account the special characteristics of the urban water authorities. catchment areas.

3.45 Despite this number of entities, DSE and Parks Electricity Industry and Office of the Victoria are primarily responsible for fire prevention Chief Electrical Inspector and suppression in Victoria's water catchment areas. This is because, for the most part, Victoria's 3.49 The Office of the Chief Electrical Inspector (OCEI) significant reservoirs and catchment areas are has the statutory authority for ensuring that electrical located in National Parks or State Forests. companies minimise the risk of fire to the community. This authority is derived from Part 8 of the Electricity 3.46 Some water authorities (for example, Melbourne Safety Act 1998, which sets out the regime for Water Corporation [MWC] and Goulburn Murray electric line clearance in Victoria, and is backed by Water) also own freehold land on which balancing the Electric Line Clearance Regulations 1999, the storages are located. Because these are located in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations country area of Victoria, CFA has fire prevention and 2003 and the Code of Practice for Electric Line suppression responsibility. The authorities work with Clearance. The regime contained in the Act, the CFA and the Municipal Fire Prevention Regulations and Code requires all electricity suppliers Committees to manage the fire risk on these to prepare a bushfire mitigation plan for the area properties. their supply covers.

12 s5 Alpine Resorts (Management) Act 1997. PAGE 25 PAGE 26 3.55 3.54 3.53 3.52 3.51 3.50 significant holdingsoveramore dispersedarea. as itdoesnotcaterforownerswhomighthave 4Amendments tothe 14 Seesections6.7to6.15of Auditor-General Victoria’s 13 controlled by15different plantationowners. There are now over25suchbrigadesinoperation, plantations. disproportionate burden forfire suppression in set uptoensure CFA localbrigadesdidnotcarrya State-owned plantationswere privatised.Theywere The forest brigadescameintobeingwhenVictoria's brigade. required toestablish,equipandstaff aforest industry plantation withina25kilometre radius,theymaybe plantation ownerhasmore than500hectares of Under amendmentstotheCFA Act,where a The Forest Industry those plansauditedbyanyofbodies. accordance withwiderfire prevention plans,norare that theCodeorBushfire MitigationPlansare in StateEmergencyService(VICSES)toensureVictoria required toconsultwiththeCFA, OESCorthe Practice forElectricLineClearance.OCEIare not recommendations onthepreparation oftheCode relevant stakeholdersprovide adviceand Consultative Committee.Representatives from all OCEI alsooverseestheElectricLineClearance for bushfire mitigationplans. OCEI prescribes thecontentandminimumstandards Electricity Safety(Bushfire Mitigation)Regulations, As of1July2003followingintroduction ofthenew mitigation plan. area andare notrequired toprepare abushfire have anyareas designatedasahazardous fire risk Of themainelectricitysuppliersonlyCitipowerdonot hazardous fire riskarea are auditedannuallybyOCEI. plans forthecompanieswithareas designatedasa Citipower andUnitedEnergy. Bushfire mitigation TXU, Powercor, AGLEnergy, CountryEnergy, company SPIPowerNetandthesixsupplycompanies: mitigation plan.Theseare themaintransmission with OCEI,mustprepare anannualbushfire There are sevenmaincompanieswho,inconjunction 6Pursuant tos11(1)ofthe 16 Specifically, sub-sections 16(1)(a)(b)and(e). 15 7Pursuanttos60 ofthe 17 14 This requirement isopentointerpretation, Country FireAuthorityAct,1958 Country Rail CorporationsAct 1996 Rail CorporationsAct 1996 . 13 . Fire PreventionandPreparedness (s23AA). 3.57 3.56 3.60 3.59 3.58 for roads inthe roads are derivedfrom theirgeneralresponsibilities broader MunicipalFire Prevention Plan. co-ordinate anyroad clearanceworkwithintheir fire prevention agencies,however, MunicipalCouncils ordinate itsroad maintenanceprogram withthemain under theCFA Act. Neitheragencyisrequired toco- with theirgeneralresponsibility forfire prevention the dutiesinrespectVicRoads’ ofroads are containedin private owner. perspective. Privateroads are theresponsibility ofthe safe from afire prevention andriskmanagement Councils are responsible forkeepingroads clearand other localruralroads. andMunicipal VicRoads roads). MunicipalCouncilsare responsible forall roads (suchasmajorarterials,forest roads andtourist areVicRoads responsible formaintainingalldeclared andCouncils Roads: VicRoads maintenance toanothercontractor. Both sub-lesseeshavesub-contractedrailline carrying outVicTrack’s statutoryfire responsibilities. sub-lessees havetheoperationalresponsibility for allowotheroperators tousethetrack.These in turn, railtracktotwomainlessees–who, leased Victoria's Department ofInfrastructure. They, havesub- inturn, head leasetothePublicTransport Divisionofthe VicTrack hasdelegatedthesefunctionsthrough a railway track. obstruction ordangerifitiswithin60metres ofa or remove anytree orwoodthatcouldbean owners andlandoccupiers,requiring themtofell VicTrack alsohasthepowertoserveanoticeon manage andmaintainrailwaysrail Act 1996 a bodycorporateestablishedbythe VicTrack RailTrack, isthetradingnameofVictorian VicTrack includes fire mitigationandprevention work. Although notexplicitlymentioningfire, thisfunction around railwaytracksbekeptclearandsafe. statutory functionandthemeanstorequire thatland Transport Act1983 for furtherdetail. . VicTrack hastheresponsibility toestablish, 17 In otherwords, VicTrack hasthe Local GovernmentAct1989 . 15 Councils’ roles inrespect of Rail Corporations infrastructure. coupled INF.018.002.0063 16 INF.018.002.0064 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 3.61 If fire prevention works are not carried out, VicTrack Conclusion cannot be compelled to carry out works by Municipal Councils or the CFA as it is a public authority and not 3.66 As noted at the start of this Chapter, current subject to the serving of a fire prevention notice by a legislative arrangements are complex and involve Municipal Council.18 However, such a notice may be a large number of agencies and organisations. served on the lessees of railway track, because they Co-operation, communication and goodwill are are private companies. essential for such a complex system to work well.

3.62 The chain of command for fire prevention work 3.67 Chapter 5 notes the many submissions that praised on and around railway track is unclear and, as and criticised the effectiveness of co-operation and the Auditor-General's 2003 Report noted, many communication between agencies and the municipalities are themselves unclear as to who community. In Chapter 16 we assess how well our has responsibility for addressing fire prevention emergency management procedures work within concerns on leased lines. this legislative framework.

3.63 The Public Transport Division of the Department of Infrastructure has a co-ordinated Emergency/Incident Management Response Plan that includes bushfire. The Public Transport Division also holds bi-monthly co-ordination meetings with the rail bodies. The CFA, OESC, VICSES or any other body with fire management experience does not audit this plan.19

Building Commission

3.64 Under the Building Act 1993 and Building Regulation 1994, Councils can identify bushfire-prone areas and apply a WMO. WMO and bushfire-prone areas are now mapped using identical requirements. The effect of building a development in a bushfire prone area is that construction must be in accordance with the Building Code of Australia requirements.

3.65 The Building Code of Australia is generally reliant on the Australian Standard AS 3959 (the Standard) to provide specific requirements relating to construction in bushfire-prone areas. The Standard generally includes requirements for burning debris and ember protection, radiant heat and flame contact protection, controls on the combustibility of external materials, and the protection of openings, such as windows and doors. It is prescriptive in specifying construction requirements. The criteria for identifying the various risk categories in bushfire-prone areas is an aspect of the Standard more open to interpretation.

18 s41(1) Country Fire Authority Act 1958. 19 For further detail, see Auditor-General Victoria, Fire Prevention and Preparedness, 2003, 6.16–6.31. PAGE 27 PAGE 28 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 Victorian Fires The Storyofthe2002-2003 Chapter 4 the DSE follows, basedondetaileddailyrecords prepared by fire eventsfrom December2002toMarch 2003 fires –drought. Achronological narrativeofthekey Premier andCabinetwebsite. records canbe accessedontheDepartmentof Forexample,industryandthe public gavesignificantdonationstofirefighting agenciestohelp withfire suppression andrec 1 affected communities. positive andnegativeimpactsonfirefighters and engagement. We thentellanotherstory–oneof stories ofmulti-agencyco-operationandcommunity of humanresources andequipmentweoverlaythe country, threatened townshipsandtheco-ordination Onto thisstoryofdrought, dramaticweather, remote startbyhighlightinganimportantcontextfor the We of allinvolved. minimal loss–wasamajorachievementonthepart in aflexible,responsive andco-operativeway–with second, ittellsusthatsuppressing theseextreme fires multiple outbreaks andgeographicalspread. And fires were exceptionallysevere intermsoflength, Reference. First,itreminds usthatthe2002–2003 recommendations againstthethree Terms of important contextforourlateranalysesand of thestory2002-2003fires. Itservesasan achievements aswellthelosses,whichwere part This Chapteroutlinessomeofthesignificant broader fire story. were alsoaffected andthey, too,contributetothe communities –industry, themediaandpublic– their ownstoriesoffear, lossandtriumph.Victorian Thousands ofpeoplelivinginfire-affected areas have just tofightthefires, butinmanyothersupportroles. community members.Peopleworkedtogether–not personnel, includingagencyfirefighters and involving 3,000fires andmanythousandsof This wasawidespread, long-lasting,fire season 2002-2003 fire season. responses, successesandchallengesofVictoria’s justice tothemultipleandcomplexexperiences, There canbenosingle,definitivestorythatgives Overview 4 DSE website: Victorian Resources DSEwebsite:Victorian Online. 4 fires as‘formidable’. task ofpiecingtogetherarecord ofthe2002-2003 Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)describedthe CountryFire Authority, From the 3 The2003AlpineFires, DSE,July2003. 2 2 and theCountryFire Authority(CFA). 1 Not surprisingly, theDepartmentof Foothills totheAlpine Heights, 3 Both CFA’s AppendixF. SubmissiontoVictoria’s 2002-2003Bushfire Inquiry, 2003 4.7 4.6 4.12 4.11 4.10 4.9 4.8 restrictions andafurther196hadlowlevels. severe restrictions, 32onmoderatelysevere wereVictoria onwaterrestrictions; sevenwere on West regions. By6December, 235townsacross situation mostsevere intheNorthCentraland severity were inplaceacross withthe Victoria, By theendof2002,waterrestrictions ofvarying water storageslow. and springrainfallin2002keptstreamflows and time in2000and2001.However, thelackofwinter on average,betterinMay2002thanatthesame water supplyissues.Thestateofstorageswas, communities. Thedrought resulted inconsiderable in itssixthyearhadamajorimpactonrural In theperiodleadinguptofires, severe drought for theFires Drought –AKeyContext general counselling. for supportofvariouskindsincluding financialand Understandably, therecovery effort hasseen theneed Defendingtheirownandothers’property from fire • Maintainingbusinesses;and • anincome from Earning otherformsof • Handfeedingandwateringstock; • between priorities,including: source ofhardship. Communitieswere frequently torn doing ithard, thebushfires provided anadditional For manyinruralcommunitieswhohadalready been impact ofthebushfires. economic stress thatleftthemvulnerabletothe season, ruralcommunitiesfacedsignificantsocialand CFA volunteerstoprepare fortheforthcomingfire As theStateaskedcommunities,householdersand and otherwaterqualityproblems. and tourismcreated potentialforalgalblooms Lakes EildonandEppalockimpactedonrecreation Low waterlevelsinstreams, theHumeDamandin lower waterallocationstoirrigators. fruit trees, vinesandotherhorticulture. Itmeant impact onbreeding stock.)Thedrought threatened hadapotential stock tofindfeed.(This,inturn, increased costsforhandfeedingstockandmoving Poorpastures Victoria. meant particularly innorthern reduction infarmincomesandemployment, For thefarmsector, thedrought meantasignificant over alonganddifficult season. employment, sometimesinremote locations; overy. 4 INF.018.002.0065 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 29 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0066 TownFreeways/Highways Lakes NSW/SA Public Land Bass Strait Perimeter Fire Victoria Figure 4.1: Big Desert Fire Area Big Desert Fire 4.1: Figure PAGE 30 4.16 4.15 4.14 4.13 Forexample,theGenoafire, ignitedpriortothemain alpinefires, was classifiedascontainedandtheSale,Erica, Heyfield 6 Atthepeakoffire, over300firefighters, ninebombingaircraft and75vehicleswere deployed. 5 that followed. resources availabletofightthemultipleoutbreaks of resourcing did, however, impactonthelocal The fire wascontainedwithinafewdays.Thelevel supported bybulldozersandfirebombing aircraft. firefighters were allocatedtotheYambulla fire, main fires startedon8January, atotalof180DSE significant firefighting resources. Atthetime fire wasseenasposingamajorthreat andrequired area, NorthWest ofGenoainEastGippsland.The 8 January, lightningignitedafire intheYambulla Two daysbefore thelightningstrikesof7and Yambulla Fire –6to11January resources (Figure 4.1). predominantly publiclandandrequiring significant in20years,affectingin Victoria 181,400hectares of The BigDesertFire was,atthetimebiggestfire dense malleescrub. undulating sanddunecountryandareas of posed achallenge:accesswasdifficult inthe affected paddocks.Notjustweather, butterrain ontoprivateland,runningacrossburned drought- uncharacteristic southerlywinds,fingersoffire edgeofthepark,drivenby On thenorthern ParkandpartofWyperfeldNationalPark. Wilderness had merged,coveringlargeareas oftheBigDesert days,thetwooriginalfires thunderstorm. Within generated bythefire itself,causedalocalised intensity. Atmosphericconditionsintheregion, and erraticwindsfollowed,producing highfire North West. Severaldaysofveryhightemperatures ParkinVictoria’sin theBigDesertWilderness remote On 17December, alightningstormstartedtwofires The BigDesertFire –17to25December Outlook –wentonhighalert. significant riskfollowingtheBureau’s JulySeasonal agencies across theState–already aware ofthe leading uptothe1983AshWednesday fires. Fire Meteorology thatconditionswere similartothose receivedGovernment noticefrom theBureau of a warm,dryspringandtheongoingdrought, the in earlyJanuary. Atthebeginningofsummer, after by thetimeNorthEastandGippslandfires started reported inSeptember. Manyfires hadbeenattended The firstfires ofthe2002-2003fire seasonwere The 2002-2003FireSeason Thosefires inthe NorthEastwere grouped intocomplexes managedbytheOvensandCorryong IncidentManagementTeams. Corryon 7 Management Teams were closedoverthe week withmostfires under control inthearea. Feathertop/Harrietville area. The Razorback/MtCooper fire northofOmeo wasmanagedby theIncidentManagement Team atSwifts threatening tocross theborder from NSW. Ovens managedthe MtBuffalo fire andfivefires intheMtBeauty, MtBogong, andMt managed theCravensville fire andthePinnibar fire neartheNSW border. Thelatterwasmanaged asajointincidentwithNSW, w 5 4.18 4.17 4.22 4.21 4.20 4.19 East –continuedtoburn. fires –mostlyinsteep,inaccessibleforest intheNorth 14 Januaryasmallnumberoffires remained. These break through control lines. inexorable’. Despitetheirefforts, fires continuedto progress ofthe fires atthisstageas‘notragingbut hampered aerialsupport.Firefighters describedthe number andlocationofthefires aswellturbulence attack thefires andconstructcontrol lines.The Mt Feathertop.Handcrews andaircraft continuedto on theMtBuffalo plateau,MtArthur, Razorbackand challenges tofirefighters especiallyAnderson’s Peak Victoria andGippslandfiresVictoria (seeFigure 4.2). January 8isconsidered dayoneoftheNorthEast lightning overtheborder inNewSouthWales. regions andafurther42fires were ignitedby Park. Anothereightfires were reported inother mountainous, forested areas oftheAlpineNational North EastandGippsland.Manywere in lightning strikesthatignitedover80fires inVictoria’s dramatic, drythunderstormsbrought widespread Late onTuesday January7andearlythenextday, The FirstWeek –7to14January The NorthEastandGippslandfires season ahead. border)Victorian provided atasteoftheextreme fire four firesinKosciuskoNationalParknearthe burning The BigDesertfires andtheYambulla fire (aswellas Figure 4.3showsthefireson11January. burning the initialfires were containedorundercontrol. There were earlysuccesses.Bythesecondday, 40of are fullydiscussedinChapter17. weather conditions,compoundedthis.Theseissues country, inwhichtheignitionsstarted,aswell was difficult forthefirefighting agencies.Theremote detection ofthenumberandlocationsomanyfires The situationwasextremely complex.Accurate large numberoffires onbothprivateandpublicland. moved from otherareas. TheCFA alsoresponded toa effort onthefirstdaywithafurther265being Around 280DSEpersonnelwere involvedinthefire 7 These fires presented huge and Yarram Incident ith fires Creek. INF.018.002.0067 g 6 By PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 31 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0068 8-9 Jan Lightning StrikesMajor town Freeways/Highways NSW Lakes Public Land Bass Strait Victoria Figure 4.2: Lightning Strikes 7 and 8 January 2003 7 and 8 January Lightning Strikes 4.2: Figure PAGE 32 Figure 4.3:Fires Burning lc reasHgwy asSri Victoria NSW BassStrait PublicLand Freeways/Highways Lakes Fire Perimeter-11/1/2003 Place Day 4 11January2003 , INF.018.002.0069 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 33 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0070 apman, Holder reached Weston reached The Stanley fire 11 10 On 21 January, six fires started in the vicinity of six fires On 21 January, but the controlled Beechworth. Of these, four were two, known as the Stanley and Eldorado remaining rapidly with south-westerly winds gusting spread fires, very low humidity and per hour, up to 50 kilometres over 30 degrees. temperatures of Bright, Wandiligong, residents On 22 January, warned were that the Mt and Porepunkah Freeburgh was Fire was travelling in their direction. fire Buffalo of Harrietville and the town of within 500 metres Dartmouth was under threat. for the Ban was declared Fire a Total On 25 January, in the North whole of the State and temperatures that temperature in the 40s. (Melbourne’s East were – the second highest on record day was 44.5 degrees in threatened 1939.) Houses were after Black Friday, of Bright. CFA North West the Buckland Valley, of Victoria on the rest attended 237 incidents across some of which had the potential to become this day, large outbreaks. North East and Ban in the Fire Another day of Total The fire on 26 January. Gippsland was declared danger index was one of the highest of the fire and erratic. There behaviour was extreme period; fire at Mt Hotham and to property was continuing threat Dinner Plain; the township of Benambra was houses lost. A further six with three threatened, lost near Cobungra along with sheds houses were and stock. At this time, Harrietville and the Alpine resorts of Falls At this time, Harrietville and the Alpine resorts threatened Dinner Plain and Mt Hotham were Creek, private deployed to help protect were and crews lightning ignited a fire assets. Among other new fires, Gippsland in far-East in the National Park near Tubbut on 17 with New South Wales) (near the border placed further demand on DSE and This fire January. as ‘very described were a time when resources at CFA to whole time’. stretched threatened the outskirts of the Stanley township, threatened of pine four houses and a large area destroying contained by 27 January. were plantation. These fires 4.29 4.30 4.31 4.32 4.28 8 9 with the fires in the Kosciusko National Park (in with the fires and New South Wales); Mt Bogong and Razorback, all of around the fires steep mountain country. in remote, which were Creek at the same time as a tornado. Combined, they resulted in the tragic devastation to Canberra suburbs, including Duffy, Ch the same time as a tornado. in the tragic devastation to Canberra suburbs, including Duffy, at Creek Combined, they resulted burnt 160 000 hectares. and Kambah. Overall, the fires almost 70 per cent of the ACT – around 10 2003. January to March DSE Submission to Inquiry; Victorian Alpine Fires, 11 was established in Beechworth to manage these new fires. An Incident Management Team 8 A9 on nine days during this fortnight for either the North East or the State. ban was declared total fire pine plantations and generated a large, dry thunderstorm and tornadoes. The fire near Canberra destroyed fires On 18 January, there was a major expansion of the fires in Victoria. was a major expansion of the fires there the Razorback (in the Mitta were The largest fires On 18 valley) and Pinnibar (south of Corryong) fires. began to join and those fires and 19 of January, 4.4 very large complexes as shown in Figures create and 4.5. Specifically: • joined; The Pinnibar complex fires • south of Corryong joined The Mystery Lane fires • joined with The Mt Feathertop and Bald Hill fires January 14 saw a significant advance in all directions the Mt particularly toward of the Mt Feathertop fire, both New South from Hotham Alpine village. Fires on 17 the border and Victoria crossed Wales and 18 January. devastated Canberra, On January 18, the day fires The fourteen fires in North East Victoria were grouped in North East Victoria were The fourteen fires An into two complexes: Upper Murray and Ovens. with DSE and staffed Incident Management Team, managed each fire. personnel, CFA The area affected by the fires increased exponentially. increased by the fires affected The area burning than 27,000 hectares on 15 more From than to more increased area the affected January, on the 24 January and around 230,000 hectares by 2 February. 700,000 hectares impacted escalated dramatically as the fires The threat the North on private land and townships throughout East and Gippsland. The Fires Escalate – The Fires 14 January to 2 February and The weather deteriorated over the next fortnight intense and erratic. By behaviour was increasingly fire behaviour was at its most extreme. fire 30 January, The high volume Erickson aircrane, other aircraft and other resources were deployed early to Gippsland to resources were deployed early to Gippsland aircrane, other aircraft and other The high volume Erickson this level of resourcing, Despite private property. there due to the threat to assets and help contain the fire fire south of Sale – burnt and the Emu Track – the Mullungdung fire north of Yarram two Gippsland fires dollars. private plantations worth four million during the first three days, including around 8,000 hectares by 11 significant resources. However, was the largest in the first week, requiring The Mullungdung fire January both these fires were contained. 4.27 4.26 4.25 4.24 4.23 PAGE 34 Figure 4.4:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-18/1/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 11 , 18January2003 INF.018.002.0071 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 35 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0072 , 2003 19 January Day 12 Place Freeways/Highways Lakes Perimeter - 19/1/2003 Fire Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW Figure 4.5: Geographic Areas Affected by Fires by Fires Affected Areas Geographic 4.5: Figure PAGE 36 4.37 4.36 4.35 4.34 4.33 into actiontoprepareanddefendtheirlandassetsundereffective localCFA leadership.Thisincluded: fires revealalargesectionofunburntcountryaroundthetownship,illustratingcommunitywasgalvanised fires forapproximately40days,withthreehouses,grazinglandandstocklost.Yet mapsoftheareaburntby Benambra isinavalleysurroundedbytheAlpineNationalPark.Thetownexperiencedsignificantthreatfrom Organising supportforoperations. Establishing acommunityUHFoperationalnetwork;and Establishing amosteffective Divisionalcommandpostinthetown; fire orspottingactivity; Organising shiftsoflocalpeopletoactaslookoutsatstrategiclocations,dayandnight,reportany 3Thesecontinued tobeproblematic –forexample,on6Februaryspot fires inBenambraand Bindiareas800hectares burnt ofg 13 Forexample,on31January, newfires startednearCannRiver, Tubbut andBonang. 12 Thefire madeanumberofmajorrunsupto • TheBogongandPinnibarfires mergedand • fire seasonwithintenseanderraticfire behaviour: January 30wasprobably thesingleworstdayof Fire Behaviour January 30:IntenseandErratic by fire onthe27January2003. Figure 4.6showsthegeographicarea affected heightened alert. forecasted, anumberofcommunitieswenton deteriorated, withhottoveryconditions townships andprivateproperty. Asweather were focusedonassetprotection inandaround By lateJanuary, suppression efforts intheseareas surrounded byfire foraweek. Freeburgh, HarrietvilleandPorepunkah were ember attack.ThetownshipsofBright,Wandiligong, Swifts Creek; SwiftsCreek experiencedanintense The fire reached withinthree kilometres ofOmeoand thatsawfourhousesburnt. run intoBogongVillage totheedgeofDartmouthtownshipandafireburning complex required sustainedfirefighting withthefire in size.Extreme fire behaviourontheBogongWest Hotham toCanberra.TheMtBuffalo fire grew rapidly created acontinuousarea offire stretching from Mt The PinnibarandBogongcomplexesjoinedthis Wales border towards the SnowyRiver. South east ofMtHopealongtheVictorian-New Gelantipy andWulgulmerang, anotherfrom south near Benambrainasouth-easterlydirection into unprecedented. Oneofthelargestextendedfrom 40 to50kilometres inoneday, speedsthatwere Wales border toHarrietville. stretched over90kilometres from theNewSouth 4.40 4.39 4.38 Planningforrehabilitation offire areas. • Patrolling andmopupinsomeareas; and • Backburning; • Fightingspotfires; • Protecting assets; • Strengthening containmentlines–especially • This meantrenewed effort couldgoto: 31 January, Several newfires were ignitedbylightningon 1 Februaryto7March Reduced Fire Activity– 2 February. Figure 4.7showsthearea affected byfire on fire activityandreduced threat toassets. brought milderweatherwhichgenerallyreduced Fourhouseswere lostinandaround Omeobut • wassubjecttoafire TheMtHothamVillage • numberofcommunitieswere under A • Thefires causedoneormore thunderstormsin • satelliteimageshowsadramatic,intensearea A • around threatened communities; significant property damage. extensive andaggressive firefighting savedfurther within metres ofthebuildingsinvillage. spotting andemberattackwiththefire coming Harrietville. Creek, Cassilis,Bindi,MittaMitta,Eskdaleand considerable threat includingBenambra,Swifts east ofGelantipyintheSnowyRiverNationalPark. East Gippslandwithlightningstrikesoccurring Great AlpineRoad. deep intheDargoRivercatchmentnear of fire approximately tenkilometres wideandtwo 12 however, thefollowingthree weeks 13 razing land. INF.018.002.0073 INF.018.002.0074 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 4.41 Despite this, some areas of the fire continued to Firefighting Personnel create problems for Incident Controllers: 4.48 Fires of this scale and intensity involve very large • The south-west perimeter of the fire from numbers of people and equipment. Abbeyard to Dargo was in very rugged, steep and rocky terrain. A long and protracted campaign was 4.49 In early February, at the peak of the fires, around undertaken to establish control lines, with the fire 3,760 people were involved in the fire effort, continually breaking out for more than a month excluding local CFA brigades. This figure includes 160 before the area was secured. Defence Force staff, over 300 interstate firefighters, • The Tubbut and Deddick valleys experienced weeks 33 alpine firefighting specialists from New Zealand of threat from fires in the surrounding National and 35 personnel from the United States. Park. A long campaign was waged to secure control lines to stop impact on private 4.50 Apart from direct firefighting, staff worked in grazing land. command and control operations, planning operations and logistics, aircraft-related duties, base 4.42 Figure 4.8 shows the areas affected by fires on 9 camp support, media and community liaison, and February 2003. By 10 February, fire had burnt over liaison with police and other agencies. one million hectares of land. 4.51 DSE’s narrative of the North East and Gippsland Fires 21 February to 7 March provides a detailed, day-by-day account of staff and equipment deployed on the fire effort. In that report, 4.43 Rain in most areas across Gippsland helped to quieten DSE also describes an ‘all hands to the pump’ attitude fires. While lightning continued to ignite some fires in in agencies and across government throughout the this region, they were quickly controlled. By 1 March, suppression activities. The utility companies, especially at least 95 per cent of the fire edge was contained. power and telecommunications, also worked Crews and strike teams were rested or released. co-operatively and pro-actively to maintain and restore services. 4.44 On 26 February, storms and localised flash flooding washed a DSE vehicle into a stream in the upper Buckland Valley. Sadly, a DSE seasonal firefighter lost Keeping the Community Informed her life; the other two crew were rescued from the 4.52 The public’s need for information grew exponentially vehicle. During that same afternoon, a fixed-wing fire during the fire event. This need for information is bombing aircraft crashed south of Mt Buffalo, injuring likely to increase during future fire events and the the pilot. resourcing implications of this are discussed in Chapter 24. 4.45 On March 7, the Chief Fire Officer of DSE officially declared the fire contained 4.53 In addition to traditional media such as television, press and radio, a range of flexible and localised Agency Response to the Fires communication strategies kept communities informed and engaged: 4.46 Firefighters attended over 3,000 fires during the December to March period. The total personnel • Over 80 community meetings in the North East directly engaged on the North East and Gippsland and Gippsland to brief residents on the fire fires were 15,725.14 Maintaining effective firefighting situation and a further 172 in non-fire areas at the capacity over such a long period was an exceptional request of residents for information. Over time, achievement on the part of Victoria’s firefighting these meetings moved to recovery issues; agencies. • Specialist call centres set up in response to public demand;15 4.47 In total, over 35 agencies – both government and • Community newsletters updated and distributed non-government – were involved in the North East twice daily by individual Incident Management and Gippsland fires. In addition, DSE and CFA Teams to keep people informed; ‘recruited’ recently retired staff with specialised skills • CFA and DSE’s websites, which were updated in developing containment strategies, mentoring, and several times daily with fire information (the DSE managing the construction of containment lines. website had 106,000 ‘visits’ during the fire period);

14 Country Fire Authority, From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, CFA’s Submission to Victoria’s 2002-03 Bushfire Inquiry, 2003. 15 For example, due to public demand, an enhanced call centre was set up at World Vision headquarters on 24 January. Nine hundred and thirty eight calls were received in the first five and a half hours. On 25 January, 3,554 calls came in over a fourteen-hour period. An additional call

centre was set up in Traralgon to give specific information to east Gippsland residents. PAGE 37 PAGE 38 Figure 4.6:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-27/1/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 20 , 27January2003 INF.018.002.0075 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 39 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0076 , 2 February 2003 , 2 February Day 26 Place Freeways/Highways Lakes Perimeter - 2/2/2003 Fire Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW Figure 4.7: Geographic Areas Affected by Fires by Fires Affected Areas Geographic 4.7: Figure PAGE 40 Figure 4.8:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-9/2/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 33 9February 2003 , INF.018.002.0077 INF.018.002.0078 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

More than half of the estimated 15,725 personnel engaged in the fires were CFA volunteers. 8,595 volunteers from 674 brigades fought a long, difficult campaign often giving up their normal businesses or employment. "Many of our CFA members are dairy farmers. Some had to pay for relief milkers to replace them while they went out to the fire fronts. Others relied on family members to maintain their businesses." Quote from Submission by John R. Cardwell, Captain, Mitta Rural Fire Brigade, Deputy Group Officer, Tallangatta Group. Submission no. 119.

• Information phone lines maintained by CFA, Impacts of the Fires Victoria Police and specific shires; • Media releases to alert residents of threat and 4.57 The 2002-2003 fires affected 1.12 million hectares in advise on appropriate actions and where to get North East Victoria and Gippsland and 181,400 more information; hectares in the Big Desert. Vast areas of forest were • Regional radio and TV stations used effectively burnt, some very intensely. The drought meant that to communicate fire information to rural mountain gullies and southerly slopes that in most communities; and other fires would remain unburnt, were dry enough •CFA ‘phone trees’, a system whereby messages to burn. This extensive impact is second only to that are communicated though the community by a caused by the 1939 fires which also had a substantial series of phone calls from person to person. effect on both people and environment.

4.58 Throughout the fire emergency, the safety of fire The Media’s Role crews and the wider community were afforded the highest priority. DSE is right to claim it is a significant 4.54 The media is a natural partner in emergency achievement that no lives were lost as a consequence situations, imparting information during the event. of what was, at times, extremely dangerous fire It acts as a source of information throughout recovery behaviour.16 and the critical community debrief phase. 4.59 While extensive hectares were burnt, there was 4.55 The media was a valuable partner over the summer minimal damage to structures compared to earlier fire of 2002–2003 and National, State and regional radio events and similar events elsewhere. Some 108,393 stations, print and electronic media, played important hectares of private land (including farms and 2,500 roles throughout the fires. DSE states that the media of plantations), 41 houses, over 213 other structures, generally, but regional radio in particular, assisted over 3,000 kilometres of fences and over 9,100 stock Incident Management Teams to get urgent were confirmed lost.17 information to communities across the fire area. This level of partnership is without precedent. 4.60 While this is clearly serious for those affected, the levels of loss were relatively low given the length of 4.56 In particular, ABC regional radio should be the fire campaign and its severity. This is testimony commended for services to Victorians during the to both the careful preparations by individuals and bushfires. ABC regional radio was a reliable source communities and to the skill of fire crews once the of information for Victorians throughout the entire fire front arrived. summer fire season, most notably in the response effort to the North East and Gippsland fires. Submissions and consultations noted that they provided reliable information.

16 For example, a CFA strike team in the Tambo/Bairnsdale area was in a near-miss situation when their truck became trapped in the fire at Cobungra in an intense ember attack. 17 Country Fire Authority, From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, CFA’s Submission to Victoria’s 2002-03 Bushfire Inquiry, 2003. Appendix G pp 1–3. PAGE 41 PAGE 42 4.64 4.63 4.62 4.61 trs: 7,000houseswithinfivekmofthefireperimeterand12,00010 1,000houseswithinthe perimeter ofthefires Source: CountryFire Authority, At risk: Protected: Lost: 41 houses 9Quotefrom PeterMalkinfrom aCD-ROMproduced bytheCFA: Bushfires 2003,aboutthe experience ofcommunitiesatMtHotham a 19 AlpineFires, DSE,Victorian JanuarytoMarch 2003,p.18 18 problems andreduced infrastructure andamenity. regional economichardship, continuedwaterquality communities are nolesssignificantastheyface their future livelihood.Thecontinuingimpactson significant financialimpactsandimplicationsfor For others,thoselosseswere veryreal, with their homes,property, stock,fencesandland. visibility. Inaddition,theylivedwiththefearoflosing state offire readiness withdecreased airqualityand spent weeksundergreat pressure astheylivedina overwhelming experience.Thoseinfire-affected areas Understandably, manyfoundthefires an the impactoffire onindividualsandcommunities. The Inquiryheard andread hundreds ofstoriesabout Impacts onCommunities fatigue, frustration,stress anddistress. camaraderie andco-operation,firefighters toldusof these observations.Keepinginmindthepositivesof The Inquiry’s consultationsandconversationssupport transpired. Othersexperiencedfear. bewilderment, shockanddisbeliefatwhathad who experienceddanger, there wasoftenasenseof suffered asthefire campaignprogressed. Forthose and aspiritofco-operationcountered this,morale staff wasfatigue.While,earlyinthefire, highmorale the psychologistsstatedthatmainissuefacing managers throughout thefires. Intheirreport toDSE, emotional supporttofirefighters andincident Incident Stress PeerSupportteamstoprovide setbacks anddifficulties. CFA deployedCritical support staff inwhatwasalongcampaignwithmany DSE employedpsychologiststhroughout thefires to Impacts onFirefighters Plain duringthefires. From theFoothillstoAlpineHeights 18 , CFA’s SubmissiontoVictoria’s 2002-03Bushfire Inquiry, 2003.AppendixG. 4.65 4.68 4.67 4.66 latest event.’ 1985 fires butnothingthenprepared meforthis bush fire experienceatHothamwasduringthe continually taketofireproof ourproperties. Mylast that weremain cognisantoftheprecautions wemust nature iscapableofdishingoutandwewillensure came awaywithrenewed respect forwhatmother ‘None ofuswere orare firefighters butwe fire. Apersonfrom MtHothamexpressed thiswell: communities oftheseriousandongoingriskposedby was arenewed andheightenedawareness among Second –andperhapsmore importantly–there community bondswere forgedthrough hardship. highlighted thepositiveimpactsoffires. First, However, manysubmissionstotheInquiryalso Government mustbea priority.Government relationships betweencommunities,agenciesand working togetherandrebuilding productive EffectiveGovernment. recovery musttherefore involve relationships betweencommunities,agenciesand As ournextChaptershows,thefires strained with environmental, financialandpsychologicalcosts. land, ourcommunitiesandfirefighters continues That fire storyisfarfrom over. Theimpactonour 2002-2003 fire story. achievements andlossesthatare partofthe This Chapterhasoutlinedthesignificant Conclusion education programs. informed choicesbecauseoftheCFA’s community individuals affected bythefires were abletomake Consultations showedthatmanycommunitiesand 19 nd Dinner INF.018.002.0079 INF.018.002.0080 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

Health Impacts of Smoke during the 2002–2003 Bushfires The Department of Human Services (DHS) reported the following statistics in relation to the 2002 –2003 bushfires. DHS states there is no conclusive trend in relation to possible direct health impacts of the fires – for example, through acute or chronic smoke inhalation. Total State Hospital Admissions for January to March 2003 (compared to same period 2002) was 265,572 admissions (down five per cent from the previous year). Of these figures there were 6,148 respiratory- related admissions in the same period (up 2 per cent). DHS conducted a study of potential smoke impacts in the North East during these three months. The total admissions for the first three months of 2003 were 7,847 (7,977 for the same period in 2002). Of these, respiratory disease contributed 157 admissions; in 2002 this figure was 161. Source: Department of Human Services

The 2002-2003 Fire Season at a Glance • Over 3,000 fires burned from December to March. • Firefighters worked on the ground for over 70 days. • Over 1.12 million hectares were affected in Victoria’s North East and Gippsland. • Over 181,400 hectares were affected in the Big Desert. • Over 35 agencies were involved in fighting the fires and support roles, as well as interstate, New Zealand and US firefighters. • The total personnel directly engaged on the North East and Gippsland fires was 15,725. A peak of over 3,760 personnel were involved at any one time. • 8,500 people attended over 250 community briefings. • DSE’s website had 106,000 visits during the fire season. PAGE 43 PAGE 44 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 Consultation Submissions andCommunity Chapter 5 Greater consistencyfrom alllevelsof government • Bettercommunicationandplanningbetween • Betteruseoflocalknowledge; • to improve future efforts: decision-making. Theyidentifiedthree keystrategies complex combinationofcircumstances andpoor the fewfires thatgotawaydidsobecauseofa In broad terms,fire-affected assertedthat Victorians to PartEoftheReport. nature buthavebeenusedtoinformPartBthrough they were difficult tocodifyduetheirwide-ranging reference havenotbeenincludedinthisanalysisas The specificcommentsaddressing thethird termof of Reference) andthecommunityresponded tothis. recommendations forawayforward (thethird Term The Terms ofReference required theInquirytogive and recommendations inPartsB,CandD. important contextforourlateranalysis,discussion document areasTheseprovide ofparticularconcern. reader thebreadth, anddepth,ofissuesraisedto consultations. Instead,weaimtoconveythe on theviewscontainedinsubmissionsand Our summarymakesnocommentorjudgement Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissuesrelating tohow thefire was • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness, particularlythe • first twoTerms ofReference. Theseare: in thesubmissionsandconsultations,relevant tothe This Chapterdocumentsthefivekeythemesraised proposed; thuspresenting achallengefortheInquiry. the complexityofissuesraisedandsolutions markedly. Theconsultationsechoedthesubmissions, submissions commentsonissueswouldoftenvary individual critical tonotablypositive.Within submissions were diverse,rangingfrom thehighly 400 peopleasindividuals,oringroups. The individuals andorganisationsspokewithover The Inquiryreceived 273writtensubmissionsfrom Overview and private/publicurban/rural landinterface. on keypolicyissuessuchasfuel reduction burning, the agenciesandlocalcommunity; fought; issue offuelreduction onpublicland; 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.11 5.10 5.9 August 2003. the Inquirycontinuedtotakesubmissionsuntil While thedeadlineforsubmissionswas30May2003, papers andcountryinAprilMay2003. 1) weremetropolitan publishedintheMelbourne The Inquiry’s Terms ofReference (outlinedinChapter terms ofreference oranyaspectofthem’. factual informationorexpress anopiniononthe from personsororganisationswhowishtoprovide The Inquirycalledfor‘written,signedsubmissions Consultation Process The SubmissionandCommunity the fire efforts. appreciative ofthosewhofoughtinandsupported wereshowed thatmanyVictorians sincerely Having saidthis,ourcommunityconsultations informed ourthinkinginPartsBtoE. and theenvironment calmedandagainthishas issues mayhavegainedimportanceastimepassed did notfeature strongly inthesubmissions.These However, someissuesthatarose duringconsultations Meetfacetowiththosewhohadprepared a • Hearfrom thosewhowere unabletoparticipate • Revisitsomeoftherecurrent issuesraisedin • undertook acommunityconsultationprocess, to: In additiontowrittensubmissions,theInquiryalso varied markedly. submissions,commentsonvariousissues Within Terms ofReference. Somewere scientificallybased. specific; otherswere amore generalresponse tothe individual fire brigades.Somesubmissionswere highly the remainder fromauthoritiesand Government, commercial andprivateorganisationsorgroups, with neighbours. Aquarterofallsubmissionswere from experiences ortheoffamily, friendsand Terms ofReference; othersrelated personal individuals orhouseholdscommentingonthespecific Over halfofthe273submissionswere from thoroughly explored. couldbemoresubmission sothattheirconcerns in theformal,writtenprocesses; and written submissions; INF.018.002.0081 INF.018.002.0082 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 5.12 Throughout this Chapter the reader will note that 5.16 To assist with processing and analysing the negative comments outweigh the positive statements. submissions, issues have been grouped under broad This is to be expected when one seeks views from the themes that are derived from the terms of reference. community and specialist stakeholders’ on how to Once again, we make no comment on the validity improve the State’s planning, preparation and or otherwise of the opinions and views expressed response to the threat of bushfires. This process in submissions, but seek to assist the reader in was no exception. understanding the breadth of issues raised. Comments were evenly dispersed across each of 5.13 Finally, it was not possible for the Inquiry to Terms of Reference 1 and 2, with land management investigate in detail every anecdote and incident preparedness and response issues receiving the raised in submissions and consultations. Rather, the most attention from respondents. Inquiry focused on the broad themes and issues that emerged from the submissions and consultations 5.17 Table 5.1 summarises key thematic concerns against and this informed our research, investigations and the first two Terms of Reference. eventually our recommendations. There were however five exceptions. Five case studies relating to specific incidents and lessons that can be learnt from these events are detailed in Parts C & D.

Origin of Submissions

5.14 Figure 5.1 shows the geographic focus of the submissions. Where it was made clear in the submission, they have been grouped according to the fire area of principal interest:

• More than half of the submissions focused on, or came from residents of, the fire-affected areas of North East Victoria and Gippsland. • Remaining submissions covered Victoria-wide issues, specific fire events and issues outside the Terms of Reference. • Submissions from State agencies and business organisations covered a wide geographic area, as did the science and research-based submissions. • A large number of the Statewide submissions came from the Melbourne Metropolitan area. Key Themes

5.15 Figure 5.2 shows the level of comment in relation to the first two Terms of Reference. PAGE 45 PAGE 46 Figure 5.2:Percentage ofCommentsReceived byTerms ofReference 1and2byCategory Figure 5.1:Geographic Focus oftheSubmissions Source: Datacompiledfrom 273submissionsrecieved Bushfires bytheInquiryintoVictorian 2002/2003 Staffing &Training • • Equipment • Planning Agency Preparedness TOR 1 Communication • UseofLocalKnowledge • • Stratagies/Tactics Emergency&Incident • Response TOR 2 Source: Datacompiledfrom 273submissionsrecieved Bushfires bytheInquiryintoVictorian 2002/2003 Chart indicatingthenumberofcommentsmade(positiveandnegative)inrelationtoTerms ofReference(TOR) Management Systems North East Other Fire Areas <1% 28% 18% 35% 43% 10% 27% 29% 10% • Access Tracks Buffers &OtherReduction • FuelReductionBurning • Land Management/Preparedness TOR 1 Availability ofSkilledPeople • Shift/Managementvchange-over • Deployment&ManagementofResources • Management ofResources TOR 2 • Insurance • Economic Impacts RehabilitationofLand • Fences,Fodder&Water • Recovery Issues TOR 2 Statewide East Gippsland INF.018.002.0083 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 47 CHAPTER 5 INF.018.002.0084 urban/rural. - Land rehabilitation; - of public utilities; and Restoration - matters. recovery Other general - management; Plantation - and on public land; Grazing - and – private/public Land management at the interface 4. Management of resources - of resources; Allocation - people; of skilled Availability - Shift changes; - teams; Strike - and personnel; force Use of defence - at night. Firefighting issues 5. Recovery - Fences; - impacts; Economic Five key thematic concerns key Five 1. Land management/preparedness - burning; reduction/prescribed Fuel - tracks; Access 2. Agency preparedness - Planning; - Equipment; - and Training; - and Development. Research 3. Response issues - Strategy/tactics; - and experience; knowledge Utilising local - management arrangements; Emergency - and communication; Public information - and Risk aversion; - protection. Asset Term of reference Term TOR 2 TOR the 2002/2003 to of the response the effectiveness Assess management procedures, including emergency bushfires, and resource and co-ordination multi-agency response deployment. TOR 1 TOR the for of preparedness Examine the effectiveness reduction season, including hazard 2002/2003 bushfire and the mobilisation of resources. Table 5.1: Summary of Five Key Thematic Concerns; Terms of Reference 1 and 2. 1 of Reference Terms Thematic Concerns; Key Summary of Five 5.1: Table PAGE 48 5.24 5.23 5.22 5.21 5.20 5.19 5.18 undertaken variousfuelreduction activities. experiences ofindividualsand organisations thathave comments were constructiveandbasedonthe the role, historyandprocess ofthispractice. Overall, Comments represented awiderangeofviewsabout threat offire attracted considerablecomment. The issueoffuelreductiontoreduce burning the Fuel Reduction/Prescribed Burning management preparedness negative commentsmadeinrespect toland Figure 5.3givesasnapshotofthepositiveand attracted themostcomment. Of these,fuelreductionandaccesstracks burning Landmanagementattheinterface–private/public • Grazingonpublicland;and • Plantationmanagement; • Accesstracks; • Fuelreduction/prescribed burning; • issues: considerable commentandfocusedonthefollowing Land managementpreparedness attracted Land Management/Preparedness preparedness within twobroad themes; first Term ofReference, were grouped andanalysed Submissions addressing, eitherinpartorfull,the reduction andthemobilisationofresources. the 2002/2003bushfireseason,includinghazard ‘ Term ofReference1 respondents were developedintoabargraph. and negativecommentsforissuesidentifiedby For eachTerm ofReference, snapshotsofpositive Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissues; • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness; • thematic concerns: the firsttwoTerms ofReference, thesegroup intofive As stated,thisChapterdetailsthecommentsunder Examine theeffectivenessofpreparednessfor and urban/rural. and agency preparedness land management . ’ 5.27 5.26 5.25 5.30 5.29 5.28 prevent themfrom clearingnativevegetation. in placeundertheNativeVegetation Frameworkthat adjacent totheirown.Theyalsonotedtherestrictions undertaking fuelreductioninpublicland burning Private landownersraisedthepossibilityof Theconsequenthighfuelloadonpublicland. • Resourcing constraintsforfuelreduction; and • Therestrictive criteriaforperformingfuelreduction • perception oflackfuelreduction onpublic A • Submissions primarilyfocusedon: tomitigatetheeffectsburning ofunplannedfires. Bushfire Inquiriesadvocatedtherole offuelreduction acknowledged thatrecommendations from previous used onlyinparticularcircumstances. Submissions inappropriate orshouldbecarefully considered and benefits andpotential,thosewhofeltitwas strongly advocatedprescribednotingits burning, Opinion wasclearlydividedbetweenthosewho private land. and thattheseplansshouldcoverbothpublic partners inbroader MunicipalFire Prevention Plans community andkeyfire agenciesmustbeactive reduction strategies.Theyacknowledgedthatthe A numberofsubmissionssuggestedalternative Suggested Alternatives immediate suppression. come toviewallfires asbadandinneedof wasthatthewidercommunityhad Another concern and environmentalprograms burn wasinadequate. effectiveness orotherwiseofannualfuelreduction Others commentedthatdocumentationonthe this Code. hadnotmetminimumstandardsVictoria under Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)andParks Public LandandcontendedthattheDepartmentof 1995 CodeofPracticeforManagementFire on Some commentshighlightedtheexistenceof burning; land; INF.018.002.0085 INF.018.002.0086 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.3: Land Management/Preparedness

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-40 Strategies Plantations Urban Rural Access Tracks Public Private

-60 Fuel Reduction Management of Other Reduction Clearance Buffers - Clearance Buffers - Clearance Buffers Prescribed Burning -80

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-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.31 Some suggested solutions included: • Older tracks were established on more appropriate gradients and in better fire control locations. This • Reintroduce fire wood collection from public land; made them more stable and, therefore, safer; • Increase slashing and/or controlled grazing along • New tracks created less stable creek crossings; roadsides; • New tracks had a greater potential to introduce • Modify the application of the Native Vegetation plant and soil disease; and Legislation; • Opening old tracks created less disruption to • Include more members of the community in actual natural resources than creating new tracks. reduction operations; and • Involve DSE ‘Project Firefighters’, local landowners 5.34 Currency in access track mapping was also raised, and CFA staff and volunteers in fuel reduction as was the importance of up-to-date fire suppression activities to increase their skills and knowledge. maps, particularly in National and State Parks. Submissions suggested that this would provide Some water authorities with responsibility for water additional opportunities for training, integrated fire harvesting noted they already conduct an active management experience and succession planning. program of access tracks maintenance for firefighting and other requirements. Access Tracks 5.35 Proposals in submissions included opening tracks 5.32 Many submissions were critical of the quality and prior to, and following, the summer fire season so number of access tracks on public land, in particular, that visitors could help park management keep tracks in State and National Parks. Many submissions called clear and report problems. Tracks could be closed off for a review of the maintenance and closure of after this period. access tracks.

5.33 Some submissions asserted that new access tracks were created during fire suppression activities in relatively close proximity to older, established access tracks that had been allowed to fall into disrepair. Respondents preferred to see older, established tracks re-opened because: PAGE 49 PAGE 50 5.42 5.41 5.40 5.39 5.38 5.37 5.36 agencies were forced tofightthefire onprivateland. on publiclandandtheperceived highfuelloads; Respondents saidthatbecause ofinadequatebuffers regimes shouldalsobeaddressed. land topublicandthatprivatemanagement submissions notedthatfire alsotravelledfrom private spread offire from publictoprivateland.Some land clearanceregimes were neededtoinhibitthe public/private landswere inadequateandappropriate The commonperception wasthatbuffers between at thepublic/privateandrural/urbaninterface. A rangeofissuesarose regarding landmanagement Land ManagementattheInterface supportthisposition,somesubmissionsnoted To Country. fuel loads,particularlyintheAlpineandHigh were supportiveofgrazingonpubliclandtoreduce The majorityofsubmissionscommentingonthisissue Grazing onPublicLand management standards. training andthedevelopmentofforestry forestry, includinguseoftheirownbrigadesand minimisation strategiesundertakenbycommercial Other submissionspositivelydiscussedthefire Thecreation ofappropriate buffers andaccess • Improved managementofground fuelsand • minimise thisrisk,forexample: pursuit ofpracticalmanagementsolutionsto risk. Mostsubmissionsonthistopicsuggestedthe isolated ruralcommunitieswere identifiedashigh particular, plantationsadjacenttourbanareas and the planning,designandlocationofplantations.In Submissions identifiedanumberofissuesregarding Plantation Management support theircase. reduction ingrazing,alsocitingscientificevidenceto alpine grazing.However, othersubmissionssoughta support ofgrazingandsuggesteda‘culturalvalue’in scientific findingsandphotographicevidencein of afire. ensure accesstocommunitiesintheevent tracks betweenplantationsandprivatelandto forests; and residue followingtheharvestofcommercial 5.44 5.43 5.48 5.47 5.46 5.45 Research andDevelopment. • Training; and • Equipment; • Planning; • four keyissueswere constant: When commentingonagencypreparedness, Agency Preparedness Developingauniformpolicyonbuffers between • Creating acleared trackonpubliclandadjoining • Developingindividual,co-operativeplanning • Creating buffers thatcouldrangefrom tenmetres • Suggestions included: Proposals prevention activities. conservation wasgivenhigher priority thanfire an influenceintheplanningprocesses. Theybelieved environmentalists had,intheirview, exertedtoogreat section ofthecommunity. Manywere aggrievedthat fire managementplanningmustinvolveawidercross- managed wasoftenraised.Respondentsassertedthat The questionofhowourNationalandStateParksare particularly thoseadjacenttopublicland. account fortheprioritiesofcommunity, impact wasthatDSEplanningdidnotadequately Municipal Councilsforconsultation.Theperceived they were presented tothecommunityand plans were anear-completed product bythetime There wasaperception thatDSEprescribed burning and thelevelofcommunityinputintosuchplans. Councils, therelationship betweentheagenciesplans prevention planningcompletedbyDSEandMunicipal comment. Commentsfocusedontheindividualfire The issueofplanningattractedconsiderable Planning comments madeaboutagencypreparedness. 5.4 givesasnapshotofthepositiveandnegative did offer somesuggestionsforbetterpractice.Figure The majorityofcommentswere notdetailedbut the urbanandruralinterface. could occur;and orothersuppressionwhich backburning efforts private landtoallowimproved access,andfrom arrangements forinterfaces; to twokilometres wide; INF.018.002.0087 INF.018.002.0088 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.4: Agency Preparedness

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-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.49 There was a perception that Local Government did Proposals not fully involve the appropriate stakeholders in 5.52 Respondents offered specific strategies to improve the developing Municipal Emergency Management Plans, planning process: Municipal Fire Prevention Plans, and local area and land management plans. This was seen to limit key • Adequate water storage should be planned and firefighting agency and community input. developed on public land, reducing reliance on private water storages when fighting fires on 5.50 However, comments acknowledged that the public land; Municipal Fire Prevention Plans were developed • Public infrastructure should be considered a primarily by CFA Brigades and Local Government and resource in both response and recovery phases; contended that DSE and the community were not • Planning should identify the priority order of assets actively involved. This was thought to result in lack of for protection – environmental, farming and understanding and ownership and, in some cases, community assets, as well as public and private failure to implement the plans. Similar comments assets; were made regarding the input to, and ownership of, • Planning should address school closures, impact on the Municipal Emergency Municipal Plans. Further to curriculum, bus services to schools and other this, some comments identified the importance of destinations; and using planning tools such as wildfire overlays and • Planning should address community infrastructure adopting relevant building codes in fire-prone areas. concerns and their management during and 5.51 Numerous comments identified the successes and following emergency events – for example, cultural benefits of adequate planning and involvement. heritage sites, power and roads;

5.53 Respondents also suggested that more use of photographic ‘before and after’ evidence would help communicate the importance of effective planning. PAGE 51 PAGE 52 5.60 5.59 5.58 5.57 5.56 5.55 5.54 when powerwaslost)also suggested. (such asportablegeneratorsto maintainoperations increase inqualityandquantityofbackupequipment food storageandtransportfacilities formeals.An Some commentshighlightedtheneedforimproved outside thefire area. and tracks–importantforthosedeployedfrom for betterqualitymapsandsignageaccessroads and fieldcommunicationsystems.Striketeamscalled A commonsuggestionwastostandardise general maps andappropriateness ofclothingforfirefighters. dealt withcommunicationsystems,thequalityof Other equipmentissuesraisedinthesubmissions vehicles were not. required tomeetsethygienestandards; firefighting firefighting vehicles:earth-movingequipmentwas disease) betweenearthmovingequipmentand requirements (tominimisethespread ofsoilandplant Respondents notedaninconsistencyinhygiene selection madeofearth-movingequipment. Further commentswere madeabouttheuseand appropriately fire andheatresistant. whether materialsusedonfire truckswere such asinclinometers.Othersubmissionsquestioned from outsideareas didnothaveappropriate devices promoted. Respondentsnotedthatsomevehicles North EastandGippslandwassupported tankers andslip-onunitsinthesteepterrainof terrain. Thesuitabilityofsmalltomedium-sized better matchbetweenfirefighting vehiclesand Comment alsofocusedontheperceived needfora Havinganappropriate aerialfire detectionstrategy. • Ensuringadequateairstripsandwatersupplies; • Gettingthemixofaircraft right; • earlier. Otherexpressedwere: concerns firefighting –inparticular, theneedto useaircraft Considerable commentfocusedontherole ofaerial circumstance. the rightmixofequipmenttoterrainand A keyissuewithoperationalequipmentwasensuring best toequipthefire servicesforthefuture. Comments were diverseaswere suggestionsonhow especially from thosewhopersonallyfoughtthefires. equipment wasakeyfeature ofsubmissions, Comment ontheadequacy, mixandqualityof Equipment and 5.62 5.61 5.65 5.64 5.63 decline. skills andexperienceoffirefighters wasonthe also aperception across submissionsthatknowledge, being abletoparticipateinthefire efforts. There was burdensome. Theynominatedthisasareason fornot volunteer firefighting wasconsidered too comments claimedthattrainingandaccreditation for appropriate trainingtominimiserisk.However, some service providers alsocommentedonthecasefor benefits oftraining.Various agenciesandutility Respondents were generallysupportiveofthe Training was alsoacknowledged. providing additionaltelephoneandmobilephones private four-wheel drivevehicles.Telstra’s assistancein machinery andtheversatilityofslip-onunitswith Comments were positiveregarding theuseofprivate flow from theappropriate mixofequipment. equipment use,notinginparticularthebenefitsthat The submissionsalsorelated positiveexperienceswith management. provide betterqualitytrainingforforest andfire applying research anddevelopmentoutcomesto fauna andwaterquality. Suggestionsalsoincluded wildfire managementandtheimpactoffires onflora, included improved methodsoffuelreduction and efforts. Areas identifiedforresearch anddevelopment from more substantive research anddevelopment Many submissionsnotedthebenefitsthatcouldflow Research andDevelopment Usefuelreductionasatoolforincreasing burning • Maintainand,insomespecificcases,increase • Increase trainingforCFA andDSEinregards to • Suggestions toimprove trainingincluded: Proposals should bemore trainingforthebroader community. A largenumberofsubmissionsrecommended there the trainingandskillleveloffirefighters. crews; and training forfirefighters, plantationstaff andmedia training formachineryoperators; firefighting, strategicplanning,response and INF.018.002.0089 INF.018.002.0090 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Term of Reference 2 • Unexplained changes in strategy by management during the campaign; ‘Assess the effectiveness of the response to • Poor deployment decisions; the 2002/2003 bushfires, including emergency • The lack of backburning as a fire suppression management procedures, cross agency response strategy; and co-ordination and resource deployment.’ • Occupational Health and Safety issues raised by the Linton Coronial Inquest; and 5.66 Submissions addressing, either in part or in full, • Mineral earth breaks as a firefighting tool on the second Term of Reference were grouped and private rather than public land. analysed into three broad themes; response, management of resources and recovery. Within each Unexplained Changes in Strategy by of these categories, a series of issues were regularly commented on. Response concerns attracted the Management most comment. 5.72 A perception shared by firefighters, fire ground managers and Incident Management Team members, was that changes were made to strategy during the Response course of the campaign, without explanation. In some 5.67 Land management preparedness and agency cases, this led to frustration and a lack of confidence preparedness were the two key themes we identified in decisions. in relation to the Inquiry’s first Term of Reference. Response issues, management of resources and Poor Development Decisions recovery issues are the three broad themes we 5.73 Respondents questioned some deployment strategies identified relevant to the Inquiry’s second Term of and tactics, specifically the level and quality of Reference. consultation between DSE and CFA. Some 5.68 In particular, response issues attracted considerable submissions also asserted that decisions were not comment around the following: being made at the fire front, limiting the input of local knowledge. This was seen to result in poor • Strategy/tactics; tactical and deployment decisions. • Utilising local knowledge and experience; • Emergency management arrangements; Weather Conditions • Public information and communication; • Risk aversion; and 5.74 A number of comments were made regarding • Asset protection. weather conditions as weather plays a significant part in determining fire suppression strategies. Comments 5.69 Figure 5.5 gives a snapshot of the positive and focused on two aspects; the weather conditions negative comments made about these issues. during the 2002-2003 fire season and a comparison of the 2002-2003 fire season weather patterns with Strategies and Tactics past extreme fire events. 5.75 Some submissions asserted that benign weather 5.70 Comments received were both supportive and critical of overall tactics and strategies employed by CFA and conditions were not taken advantage of to DSE but generally asserted that the agencies either aggressively suppress the fires. Other submissions collectively or individually did a good to exceptional noted that weather conditions were extreme, in part job in relation to fire suppression. from the unusual lack of rainfall over the period of the fire. 5.71 However, five key issues were consistently raised in regards to strategies and tactics. These were (in no 5.76 Opinion was divided when weather conditions were particular order): compared to other extreme fire events. Submissions supported the need to more effectively monitor and analyse weather conditions and factor this analysis into planning strategies and tactics. PAGE 53 PAGE 54 5.79 5.78 5.77 Figure 5.5:Response public land. constructed onprivatelandin preference to located wrongly, ofaninappropriate sizeand/or Perceptions were thatmineralearthbreaks were; breaks asatoolinfirefighting onpublic/privateland. Submissions alsocommentedonmineralearth Mineral EarthBreaksasaTool and reduced levelsofbackburning. in amore conservativeapproach tofire suppression on firefighter occupationalhealthandsafety, resulting recommendations andplacedtoostrong anemphasis that agencieshadover-reacted totheCoroner’s Linton Coronial Inquest.Thecommonperception was A numberofcommentsaddressed theimpactof Occupational HealthandSafetyIssues reaction tofindingsfrom theLintonCoronial Inquiry. commented thatthiscautiousapproach mightbea wasachievable.Somerespondentsand backburning when theybelievedweatherconditionswere benign support tacticsproposed byfire ground commanders was particularlysowhenIncidentControllers didnot asafireof backburning suppression strategy. This Dissatisfaction wasexpressed attheperceived lack Suppression Strategy Lack ofBackburningasaFire -160 -140 -120 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 20 40 0 Chart showingthenumberofpositiveandnegativecommentsextractedfrom273submissionsreceived Strategies/Tactics

Utilise Local Knowledge/Experience

Incident Management System AIMS/ICC

Public information/ Communications

Intitial Response 5.81 5.80 and fieldobservationseffectively atcriticaltimes. Management Teams didnotuselocalknowledge Teams. Particularly, somefeltthatIncident provided bylocalresidents toIncidentManagement knowledge andalackofconfidenceininformation of whattheyperceived asthepooruseoflocal A considerablenumberofrespondents were critical Utilising LocalKnowledgeandExperience Greater communityandotherkey stakeholder • and tacticsincluded: relatingFurther issuesandconcerns tostrategies Other Issues perception thatDSEprioritisedconservation A • Bettermanagementofaircraft deployment – • More timelydecisionmaking; • Bettermanagementoffire lines atshift • Integration of Agencies over privateproperty protection. are viewedasfavourable;and in particular, usingaircraft whenlocalconditions changeovers; protected; involvement inidentifyingpriorityassetstobe

Risk Aversion

Asset Protection

Asset Protection INF.018.002.0091 INF.018.002.0092 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 5.82 A large number of respondents identified times where 5.88 During the North East and Gippsland fires, DSE they believed local knowledge and experience were and CFA established Integrated Multi-agency not adequately applied: Co-ordination Centres to co-ordinate the work of Incident Management Teams at Incident Control • Instances were described where an Incident Centres and the deployment of resources across Management Team did not integrate local them. Some submissions raised concerns that these knowledge and experience when developing facilities were developed with minimal planning and firefighting strategy/tactics. consultation. There was also a perception that the • There was a perception that information was Integrated Multi-agency Co-ordination Centres treated differently, in some cases, when it was exerted influence over the Incident Management provided by an individual or group in the Teams operating in the ICCs’ choice of strategy community rather than sourced from local and tactics. DSE or CFA staff. • Some argued that local knowledge was not Municipal Emergency Co-ordination incorporated into strike teams from out of the area. Centres (MECCs) • There was a perception that the experience 5.89 Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centres were and knowledge of retired personnel was not activated in all affected Municipalities. While some consistently incorporated – in particular, their submissions noted that MECCs should have been in knowledge of terrain and fire behaviour. operation earlier, they generally felt the MECCs worked well, once established. Emergency Management Arrangements 5.90 Others commented that the roles and responsibilities 5.83 Many comments on Emergency Management noted of MECCs and Emergency Service Liaison Officers room for improvement. (located in MECCs) were unclear to key personnel, including those in Incident Control Centres. Many 5.84 Some submissions noted confused messages between suggested more training and practice in MECCs key agencies on issues such as road closures and would be beneficial. subsequent access, evacuation procedures and evacuation centres. Respondents claimed that, in Integration of Agencies some cases, established emergency management arrangements and other co-operative agreements 5.91 Respondents both praised and criticised the were not followed. integration of agencies. Specific suggestions were made to: 5.85 However, approximately twenty five per cent of all comments in this category were positive about • Improve the working relationship between emergency management arrangements and related responsible organisations; issues. These submissions noted the effective co- • Identify areas for improvement such as ordination between agencies, systems and plans. arrangements around road closures; and • Improve communication with the media. 5.86 A general feeling was that co-operation at the local level was successful, and respondents commended Initial Response the use of resources such as Red Cross, State Emergency Service, Rural Ambulance Victoria 5.92 Many respondents noted the importance of a quick and the Armed Forces. and appropriate first response. A common criticism in relation to initial response was that resources were Incident Control Centres not used early enough, particularly the use of aerial attack. Given the total resources available and a 5.87 Concerns were noted about the operation of the perception of benign weather, some felt the fires Incident Management Teams at Incident Control could have been put out much earlier. (We consider Centres, in particular lack of consistency in strategic the scientific evidence for this claim of benign directions and tactics between shifts and between weather in Chapter 6.) It was also claimed that, in changes of incident controllers. Comments suggested some cases, there was a lack of skill and experience some Incident Control Centres were too distant from in directing early response activities. the fire front and did not value or use local information and knowledge to full benefit. PAGE 55 PAGE 56 5.99 5.98 5.97 5.96 5.95 5.94 5.93 official assetssuchasvehicles,shedsandhouses. native vegetationreserves andagainstthemore especially around pasture, livestock,plantations, understand theirviewofprotection priorities, landowners feltfirefighters didnotshare oreven This pointwasnotedearlier. Forexample,some developed andagreed uponbefore thefire season. the protection ofpublicandprivateassetsshouldbe A numberofrespondents suggestedthatprioritiesfor Asset Protection of firefighting efforts. reduce thelikelihoodofaconservativeinterpretation considered ‘unsafe’toimprove firefighting safetyand submissions suggestedapriormappingofareas result oftheLintonCoronial recommendations. Some occupational, healthandsafetyconsiderationsasa increased fearoflitigationandunnecessaryfocuson As wenotedearlier, somesubmissionsassertedan negative impactoneffective suppression techniques. A generalsensewasthattheLintonInquesthada the LintonCoronial Inquiry. Many commentsaboutriskaversionreferred backto Risk Aversion the supportreceived from Telstra. role playedbytheABC,particularlyregional radioand of thepubliccommunicationprocess, particularlythe However, somesubmissionsidentifiedpositiveaspects to blackspots.) full radiocoverageinfarEastGippslanddue totheABC.(TheABCdidnothave alternative providing anaccurate,timelyandresponsible commercial newsservicesthatwere notseenas Some respondents questionedtheapproach of the fires –insomecases,more thanadaylate. information ontheprogress andmanagementof radio signalinsomeareas, andadelayinreceiving some poorinformationprocesses, includingpoor information andcommunication.Submissionsnoted Responses were mixedontheissueofpublic Public InformationandCommunication contained. example, atStanleywhere fires were quickly responded wellinparticularcircumstances –for Some submissionsnotedthatthefire agencies 5.102 5.101 5.100 5.107 5.106 5.105 5.104 5.103 Firefighting atnight. • UseofDefenceForce personnel; and • Striketeamsmanagement; • Shiftchanges; • Availability ofskilledpeople; • Allocationofresources; • Specifically, respondents commented on: management were common. the firefighting response, commentsonresource In additiontocommentsabouttheeffectiveness of Management ofResources limited losseswhencompared toprevious fire events. CFA andDSEinprotecting assetsregionally withthe feedback noting,inparticular, thegoodworkof Despite thesecriticisms,there wassomepositive need forrest. suggested greater importanceshouldbegiventothe not fitenoughforthetasksallocated. Respondents There was alsoaviewthatmanyfirefighters were onpubliclandwasseenasdisadvantaged. burning participation. Theapparent declineinprescribed training requirements were abarriertotheir advantage. Otherrespondents assertedthatincreased accreditation andcouldnotbeusedtofull volunteers hadnotcompletedand/ormaintained Further somesubmissionsnotedthatformer were notalwaysusedeffectively. Respondents claimedthosewhowere available of skilledandexperiencedpeopletofightthefires. Submissions consistentlystatedthere wasalack Availability ofSkilledPeople resources were limited. private unitsattachedtotheCFA, especiallywhen Submissions notedthevalueandimportanceof field operationsshort. Incident Control Centres were overstaffed leaving questioned. Onesubmissionassertedthat,attimes, overall adequacyofresource allocationwas resource managementwere successful,however, the A numberofsubmissionscommentedthataspects Resource Allocation resources. negative commentsmadeaboutthemanagementof Figure 5.6givesasnapshotofthepositiveand INF.018.002.0093 INF.018.002.0094 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.6: Management of Resources

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-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.108 Respondents felt this situation was due to increased Strike Teams training requirements and a decline in prescribed burning on public land that meant DSE personnel had 5.112 There was a perception that Strike Teams were less firefighting experience. sometimes poorly utilised and directed. Some respondents noted that strike teams (once in place) 5.109 Supportive comments noted the valuable roles played should have been allowed greater autonomy to make by counselling and therapeutic massage services for tactical decisions regarding how they would organise firefighters (although this was limited) and some to fight the fire. suggested this should be expanded. 5.113 Respondents reported that, in some cases, crews 5.110 The importance of the volunteers was highlighted remained out of firefighting when conditions were frequently, with some submissions mooting a skills seen as suitable for suppression activities. Others register as a valuable tool for the future to match noted that more flexibility was necessary, especially available skills to resource requirements. in regard to the ‘length of tour’ and daily hours.

Shift Changes Defence Force Personnel

5.111 Several submissions suggested shift structures were 5.114 Comments generally supported the use of Defence inflexible and proposed that changes and possibly Force personnel in diverse areas such as co-ordinating briefings should occur at the fire ground; that is ‘hot’ accommodation and meals, machinery, logistics changeovers, preferably in daylight for maximum and engineering. A number of respondents were advantage. Comments also suggested that set and dissatisfied that Defence Force personnel were regular shifts made shift changeover inflexible. not used on the fire line. PAGE 57 PAGE 58 5.120 5.119 5.118 5.117 5.116 5.115 inconsistent andcausedconfusionanger. in applyingthefencingassistancepolicywas Many commentedthattheGovernment’s approach due tobackburning. replacement costoffenceswhere theywere lost shouldpaythefull argued thattheGovernment inappropriately managed.Furthertothis,respondents costs ifthefire originatedonpubliclandandwas should beresponsible forhalfofthereplacement Specifically, respondents arguedthattheGovernment fences whentheyare adjacenttopublicland. has anobligationtoprivatelandownersreplace Comments principallyassertedthattheGovernment attention duringconsultations. submissions. Fencingwasalsothefocusofsignificant providing financialsupportwasasignificantissuein The restoration offencesandGovernment’s role in Fences negative commentsmadeaboutrecovery. Figure 5.7givesasnapshotofthepositiveand Otherrecovery matters. • Restorationofpublicutilities;and • Landrehabilitation; • Economicimpacts; • Fences; • major recovery issues: of recovery. Respondentsidentifiedthe following resources, submissionsalsofocusedonthequestion In additiontoresponse issuesandmanagementof Recovery Issues was alostopportunity. was notwellutilisedinsomecircumstances, and commented onnightfirefighting alsofeltthepractice Thosewho techniques, includingbackburning. potential tofightthefires atnightusingarangeof Most submissionsonthisissuefocusedthe FirefightingOvernight 5.122 5.121 5.124 5.123 opportunity torecover timberfromareas. burnt in fire-affected areas. Somesawaneconomic tourism andothernaturalresources-based industries would bealongprocess, especiallyforagriculture, Several submissionspointedouteconomicrecovery Costofrepairs inrestoring utilityservices. • Lossofnormalbusinessactivities,especiallywhen • Employersnotbeingcompensatedforemployee • Lossofwagestovolunteerswhenfightingthe • Cancellationofmajortourismevents; • Smokeimpactongrapecrops; • Lossofpasture andfodder; • Deathandinjuryoflivestock; • submissions are: the fires were diverse.Examplesoutlinedin Comments regarding theeconomicimpactof Economic Impact Probable impactonsoilstructure, characteristics • Impactonwaterqualityandquantity, especially • impacts duringrehabilitation: inconsistent. Theyidentifiedthefollowingpossible rehabilitation activitieswere tooslowand Respondents alsoexpressed theviewthat pest plantsfollowingthefire were alsoidentified. crossings. Thenewopportunitiestobettercontrol as accesstracks,mineralearthbreaks andcreek in regards tofire control activities privatelandsuch need foranagreement tobereached withagencies rehabilitation afterthefires. There wasaperceived Some constructivecommentswere maderegarding Land Rehabilitation related totheoutageofutilityservices;and hours lostwhenfirefighting; fires; the fire. and ecologyduetohighlevelsofheatduring during rainfallevents;and INF.018.002.0095 INF.018.002.0096 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.7: Recovery

20

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-10 Fences of Land Matters -20 of Utlilities Restoration Pest Control Rehabilitation

-30 Other Recovery Economic Impacts Vermin, Weeds and Weeds Vermin, -40

-50

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-80 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

Restoration of Utility Service 5.129 There was a perception that recovery was more difficult due to public land managers not being ‘good 5.125 Some submissions noted undue delays in restoring neighbours’ as they had not prepared their selected services. However, other comments indicated boundaries to contain possible fires. that some utilities brought in additional skilled crews from other areas to assist in restoration. Centrelink

5.126 Some respondents recommended that utilities use 5.130 Further criticisms focused on the role of Federal fire-resistant materials in high-risk areas as flammable Government support – in particular, Centrelink. materials increased the likelihood of loss of utility Many commented that the support promised by services. Many asserted that mobile phone coverage politicians was difficult to access due to problems in should be improved. the availability of documentation to register. Many claimed Centrelink was not as responsive to the Other Recovery Issues needs of affected families as it should have been. The Importance of Preparation Water Replacement 5.127 The common message across submissions was that recovery appeared less traumatic when people had 5.131 Comments were made about the replacement policy planned and prepared for a fire or other for farm water used in fire suppression. A number of emergency event. farmers asserted that advice on cleaning out dams after the fires and early rainfall events was 5.128 Submissions noted the impact of the ongoing inconsistent and inappropriate. drought on pasture reserves, the decline in animal health and numbers, and the loss of pasture and livestock due to fire, on their ability for pasture to recover to meet their needs. PAGE 59 PAGE 60 5.136 5.135 5.134 5.133 5.132 exemplary underextreme circumstances. view ofrespondents thatfirefighting efforts were comments thanpositive,thiswasbalancedbythe exception. WhiletheInquiryreceived more negative to focusonnegativeeventsandthisInquirywasno In anycallforpublicsubmissions,commentsare likely comment. thosethemes,manyissuesreceived critical Within Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissues; • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness; • community consultations: Five keythemesdominatedthesubmissionsand Conclusion Thecontinuationofeducationforlocalchildren. • Earlierrepair andreopening ofroads andbridges; • Theneedformore counsellingresources; • perceived shortageofveterinaryservices A • Respondents totheInquiryalsoidentified: Other indentifiedissues on floraandfaunawouldbesignificantongoing. challenge. There wassomecommentthattheimpact erosion wasseenasafurtherongoingrecovery an ongoingissueforthenextfewyears.Minimising Comments alsoindicatedthatwaterqualitywouldbe on publicland,specificallyforfire suppression. Others saidthere neededtobemore waterreserves and available forlivestockassessment; INF.018.002.0097 INF.018.002.0098

Chapter 6 Weather Conditions Before and During the Fires of 2002-2003 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Overview Statewide Weather Conditions

6.1 Submissions to the Inquiry varied markedly in their 6.7 The Bureau of Meteorology (2003) reported that the interpretations of the weather conditions surrounding drought prevailing at the time of the 2002-2003 fires the fires in North East and North West Victoria in was one of the most severe in the nation’s history.2 2002-2003. Similar lead-up conditions were experienced prior to the 1939 and 1983 bushfire seasons in which large 6.2 The Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology (Bureau fires affected substantial areas of Victoria. However, of Meteorology 2003) regarded the conditions as the higher than average temperatures through similar to those characterising other years when large autumn, winter and spring of 2002 set this fire fires occurred in Victoria, including 1983 and 1939. year apart from any other. They reported that lead-up conditions of drought, combined with higher than average temperatures, 6.8 From as early as mid-July 2002 the Bureau had set the scene for high fire risk in the 2002-2003 fire early warning that conditions in the summer of season, with the risk of fire spread heightened by 2002-2003 would be conducive to major fire events. extremely dry fuel loads. The coincidence of many This was based on the predicted behaviour of the lightning ignitions and several to many days of Very El Niño–Southern Oscillation with forecasted continued High to Extreme fire weather1 was conducive to rapid drought and early drying of forest fuels. They advised fire spread with a reduced likelihood of successful that rainfall in the Victorian alpine region for the early suppression. remainder of 2002 was likely to be only 50–60 per cent of the average, and higher than average 6.3 As we saw in Chapter 5, submissions from a variety temperatures were also forecast. of other individuals and organisations disputed this assertion. They claimed weather was less severe than 6.9 Extremely dry spring and early summer conditions in the lead-up to and during the 1939 and 1983 fires, (20–40 per cent of normal rainfall) persisted through and that relatively benign weather conditions during January, with some areas by this time recording much of January and February should have been record or near-record low levels for rainfall for the conducive to successful fire suppression. October–January period. The Bureau of Meteorology’s submission notes that another unusual aspect of the 6.4 The Inquiry investigated the relevant evidence for 2002-2003 fire season was the long period without these varying assertions. Our expert analyses support rain after the start of the major fires in the North East the findings of the Bureau of Meteorology. and Gippsland. The lack of significant rain (defined as more than five millimetres in one day) between 2 6.5 This Chapter also considers a second point relating to January and 20 February 2003 – a period of nearly climate – the unusually low total areas burned per 50 days – allowed the fires to remain active. year by fire in Victoria from the mid-1980s to 2001. 6.10 As we noted in Chapter 4, there were heatwave 6.6 We examined the climate evidence in relation to this conditions in many parts of inland Victoria during issue and conclude that improved fire suppression by January 2003, with temperatures of 43–46oC the Department of Sustainability and Environment recorded for a number of locations on 25 January. (DSE) and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) is the most Evaporation over the April 2002–January 2003 period likely explanation of why so few fires in these years was the second highest on record at Hume Weir grew to large size, rather than either benign weather (after 1983). In combination with drought and or decreased fire due to prescribed burning. heatwave this may account for the substantial areas of tree death evident on north and west-facing slopes in Central and North East Victoria.3

6.11 Over the course of the 2002-2003 fire season, the Bureau of Meteorology issued 30 fire weather warnings (20 from October to December and a further 10 in January). This greatly exceeds the number of fire weather warning days reported for the previous three years (17, 19 and 14 respectively for 2000 to 2002).

1 Forest Fire Danger Index in the ranges 24–50 and 50–100, respectively. 2 The Bureau of Meteorology reports droughts on the basis of total rainfall received over a period relative to the proportion of years where rainfall was equal to or less than that total. Here we also report a drought index, the Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI). The KBDI requires more data

than the decile method of the Bureau of Meteorology and so does not cover as long a period at most stations. PAGE 3 At Corryong, for example, the KBDI had reached 160 by January. 61 PAGE 62 6.15 6.14 6.13 6.12 unplanned fires. weather inrelation toriskofignitionandspread of from thedailyclimaterecords andusedtodescribe Keetch-Byram Drought Index(KBDI)were calculated These indexes are described indetailChapter 7. 6 Climatedatawere airports(EssendonandTullamarine; investigatedforthefollowingstations andtime-periods:Melbourne 1951 5 Thesenumbers donotagree with highernumberscitedbyLong(unpubl.)whoinvestigatedextreme fire fors weatherinVictoria 4 temperature. 24 hourrainfall(to9am)andmaximum 3 pmtemperature andwindspeed,relative humidity, For eachstation,dailyinformationwasobtainedfor andGippsland,plusMelbourne. Victoria large fires of2002-2003:NorthWest andNorthEast weather conditionsinthethree areas affected bythe number oflocations.Ouranalysesfocusedon a largearea, weexaminedweatherrecords fora Since thefire covered complexinNorthEastVictoria Appendix VI. locations. Theaccompanyingfigures are in previously recorded fire weather extremes forthese conditions duringthefires of2003compare with the fire-affected areas. Inparticular, itidentifieshow weather conditionsforspecificlocationsinornear This sectionprovides ananalysisbytheInquiryof Affected Areas Weather ConditionsintheFire- 2003. (Forest Fire DangerIndexabove50)respectively in seven andfiveExtreme fire dangerweatherdays andCorryonghadnine, that Mildura,Melbourne location wouldbefewerthanthis,andwecalculate Of course,thenumberofsuchdaysforanysingle Itisthehighestnumberforasingleyearsince • Itisthethird highestannualtotalforMilduraafter • Corryonghasnothadmore thanonedayperyear • Corryong (1973–2003), MtHotham (1995–2003) andOmeo(1957–2003). (1939–2003), Nhill Walpeup (1998–2003),Benalla(1957–2003), Wangaratta (1956–66,1986–2003),Alburyairport (1983 Danger Index. from amountandtimeoflastrainfallgreater than2mm),anditisoftenlower 10,thusreducing the estimatedvalueofF usually closesttoitsmaximumvalueat 3pm,itisoccasionallyhigheratnoonor6pm.We usethetruevaluefordrought factor, and thecalculationofForest Fire DangerIndex forfourtimesofday:9am,noon,3pmand6pm.AlthoughForest Fire for theperiod1971to1999.Thehigher numbersdocumentedbyLongreflect theuseofanassumedmaximumvalue10fordr in 1951. suitable records airportsbegan forMelbourne respectively; and large fires intheGrampiansandBigDesertareas, 1983 and1958,whichwere yearsthatsawvery of Forest Fire DangerIndexcommencedin1973; in thisrangesincesuitablerecords forcalculation 4 oplacethesenumbersincontext: To 5 The Forest Fire DangerIndex(FFDI)and 6 6.16 6.17 Aboveaveragewindspeedscontributedtothe • Overthetwoweeksfrom 17–30 January, there • OnfivedaysinJanuary2003thefire dangerrating • Until22February, there wasnodailyrainfall • Only70millimetres ofrainfellinthefourmonths • Theprevious KBDIJanuarymaximumwaspassed • worst onrecord: At Corryong,thedrought of2002-2003wasthe The NorthEast AllbutsixdaysinFebruarywere alsoabovethe • 18Januaryalsosawrelative humidity equalthe • On18and26January, temperatures exceeded • Temperature andhumiditywere alsoextreme: per hour. January, 3pmwindspeedsexceeded30kilometres elevated FFDIs.Onsixdays,including17and18 (Figure 6.2). followed byonetotwodaysoflowerrating were fourcyclesofExtreme fire dangereach January. was passed,andithigheragainon18 17 Januarytheprevious record foranymonth(58) highest valuerecorded forthatmonth(45.6).On Very High.On7January theratingpassed was Extreme (FFDI>50)and,onfourdays,was the fires. greater than5millimetres withintheperiodof of averageforthatperiod. from October2002toJanuary2003,29percent climb through to20February(Figure 6.1). on 18January2003,andtheIndexcontinuedto per hourat3pm. speedon12Februaryreached 26kilometresWind temperatures andlowhumidity(10percent). February, inthemiddleofalongperiodhigh approached theExtreme levelagainon12 monthly average(30.4°C)andfire danger record lowof9percent. Corryong. 40°C, twoofjustninesuchdaysonrecord for index (calculated Danger Indexis orest Fire –2003), Mildura elected locations ought INF.018.002.0099 –2003), PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 63 CHAPTER 6 INF.018.002.0100 24 Jan 2003 February February Jan 2002 Rainfall (mm) 3pm Relative Humidity Fire Danger Index (FDI) Precipitation to 9am (mm) Precipitation to 9am 3pm wind speed (km/h) Jan 2001 Maximum Air Temperature (ºC) Maximum Air Temperature Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) Jan 2000 January January Jan 1999 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul 0 0 75 50 25 0 80 60 40 20 50 30 10 80 60 40 20 70 100 175 150 125 100 Figure 6.2: Daily Maximum Temperature, 3 pm Relative Humidity (%) and Wind Speed, Forest Fire Danger Index Fire Humidity (%) and Wind Speed, Forest 3 pm Relative Maximum Temperature, 6.2: Daily Figure 2003 January–February at Corryong, and Rainfall Figure 6.1: The Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) and Rainfall at Corryong, July 1998–July 2003 1998–July July at Corryong, (KBDI) and Rainfall Index Drought The Keetch-Byram 6.1: Figure PAGE 64 6.21 6.20 6.19 6.18 Drought indexvalues are loweratMt Hothamthanattheotherstations weexamined,largelybecauseofthelower temperatures 7 have hadhigherFFDIsthanreported here. period 20–25January)meanthat somedaysmay Missing datapoints(forexample, forwindoverthe Lowhumidity(9–17percent),hightemperatures • Temperatures exceeded30°Cmanytimesoverthe • ThehighestKBDIin2003was99on21February, • 1968, 1983and1998(Figure VI.3,AppendixVI): values forKBDIover95havebeenreached in1965, depth toseveralothersintheclimaterecord, where The drought atOmeoin2003wascomparable Gippsland Twenty millimetres ofrainfellattheend • ThehighestFFDIin2003,andtheon • pmwindspeedswere high(approximately 3 • Humidityreached itslowesteverrecorded valueof • givesomeindicationofclimateatthistime: To values recorded inprevious years,othersdidnot. prior toandduringthefires atMtHothamexceeded years). Whilesomeindicatorsoffire dangerweather The climaterecord atMtHothamisshort(eight The Alps Duringthedrought of2003,theKBDIexceeded • and Omeo’s 680mm. rainfall thatresult from its higherelevation.Forexample,average annualrainfallatMtHothamis1,179 mmcompared with Cor February (on14,17,26January, 7February). for sixotherdaysbetween13Januaryand12 hour) contributedtoVery Highfire dangerratings (27–34 degrees) andwinds(15–26kilometres per that day. contributed toaVery Highfire dangerratingon recorded on30 January. Thesetwofactors of thesummer(37kilometres perhour)wasalso VI.4, AppendixVI).Thehighest3pmwindspeed C.(Figure January, shortoftherecord of38.2° 2002-2003 fire season,peakingat35.5°Con30 while thehighesteverwas127inApril1968. month. January and42millimetres hadfallenearlierinthe 26.7°C). temperature recorded atMtHothamisjust and thetemperature peakedat23°C(thehighest low, thewindwas strong (39kilometres perhour), record, was22on21January, whenhumiditywas Appendix VI). 50 kph)on26,29and30January(Figure VI.2, January. 17 percenton12Januaryandagain21 peaking at39on20February. previous records (Figure VI.1,AppendixVI), 7 6.23 6.22 AllbutfivedaysofDecember2002recorded wind • Themaximumdailytemperature dropped below • For15daysduringDecember2002thefire danger • InWalpeup, thedrought wasextreme, withKBDI • North West toSouthWest. persisted duringthistimedespitewindshiftsfrom dry airandmoderatetohighwinds,conditionsthat vegetation andfuelsthere wasextremely hotand A prolonged andintensedrought ledtothedryingof Desert fires represented extreme conditionsforfire. The weatheratWalpeup duringtheperiodofBig 2002 were bothinthelowest10percentofrecords. region overtheperiodNovember2001toOctober since April2000.Rainfallandstreamflow forthe first significantrainfor34days,andthehighestfall 31 December, when30millimetres of rainfell–the until 26Decemberandthefires were declared outon the event.Significantareas continuedtobeburnt hectares ofthefinal181,400hectares reported for to 21December, coveringbythistime160,000 of17Decemberandspreadthe afternoon rapidlyup The BigDesertfires startedfrom lightningstrikeson The NorthWest per houron22December. 15 kilometres perhour, peakingat35kilometres speeds higherthantheDecember3pmaverageof the fires. on 16December, thedaybefore theoutbreak of ever recorded forWalpeup (sixpercent)occurred 11 days,itaveragedpercent.Thelowestvalue Walpeup averages30percentbut,during these 42.6°C. TheDecember3pmrelative humidityat maxima above40°C,peakingon21Decemberat period (24December),andfourdaysexperienced 30°C (theDecemberaverage)justonceinthis Extreme (Figure 6.4). 14 tothe24Decemberwere allVery Highor 18, 20and21December).The11daysfrom the and forfivedaysitwasExtreme (over50on2,16, rating wasVery High (FFDIover24butunder50) of theannualaverage. millimetres ofrainhadfallen,lessthan40percent months priorto16December2002just135 higher thanthisinFebruary1983.Inthe12 2002 (Figure 6.3),althoughKBDIwasslightly reaching 170ofamaximum200inDecember ryong’s 740mm and higher INF.018.002.0101 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 65 CHAPTER 6 INF.018.002.0102 January January Jan 2003 Jan 2002 Rainfall (mm) 3pm Relative Humidity 3pm wind speed (km/h) Fire Danger Index (FFDI) Precipitation to 9am (mm) Precipitation to 9am Jan 2001 Maximum Air Temperature (ºC) Maximum Air Temperature Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) Keetch-Byram Drought Jan 2000 December December Jan 1999 1357911131517192123252729312 1357911131517192123252729312 Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul 0 0 0 80 60 40 20 75 50 25 50 30 10 80 60 40 20 70 100 100 175 150 125 Figure 6.4: Daily Maximum Temperature, 3 pm Relative Humidity and Wind Speed, Forest Fire Danger Index Fire Humidity and Wind Speed, Forest 3 pm Relative Maximum Temperature, 6.4: Daily Figure 2002–January 2003. December at Walpeup, and Rainfall Figure 6.3: The Daily Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) and Rainfall Record for Walpeup, July 1998–July 2003 1998–July July Walpeup, for Record and Rainfall (KBDI) Index Drought Keetch-Byram The Daily 6.3: Figure PAGE 66 6.28 6.27 6.26 6.25 6.24 Mackeyetal.(2002)describetheoretical reasons forastatisticalrelationship betweennumber ofunplannedfires peryearan 8 unplanned fire. was notaccompaniedbylargeareas of data showed1998asayearofhighfire dangerthat the early1990s(Figure VI.5,AppendixVI).Again,the andverylow levelsoffireMelbourne, dangerthrough Omeo hadfewerhighfire dangeryearsthan similar toconditionsintheearly1990s. Conditions priortotheearly1980sfires were Ranges fire and1998oftheCaledoniafire. was theyearofmostrecent, seriousDandenong and 2001fire years.Althoughnotlargeinarea, 1997 expected muchlargerareasinthe1997,1998 burned fire dangerstatisticsandareawewouldhave burned, ofrelationshipBased onhistoricalpatterns between drought indexhasbeenhighthroughout thisperiod. four ofthesevenyearsfrom 1996to2003,andthe (Figure 6.5).Fire danger, onaverage,hasbeenhighin 1998 asinthebigfire yearsof1983and2003 the early1990s,butwasnearlyashighin1997and fireFor Melbourne, dangerwasbelowaverageduring long-term averageofabout120,000hectares. hectares ofpubliclandperyearcompared witha unplanned firesanaverageofjust26,500 burned between 1986and2002–from 1988to1998, in theearly1980swasfollowedbylow-area fire years byunplannedfiresThe largearea burned ofVictoria following discussion. Appendix VI)offer agraphicrepresentation ofthe Figures 6.5,6.6,and6.7below(andFigures VI.5-6, the 1983fires andthe2002-2003fires. Again, comparison canbemadebetweenconditionspriorto the mid-1970stopresent sothatsome This sectionexaminesthenature offire weatherfrom More successfulfire suppression. • Higherlevelsofprescribedthrough burning the • Benignweatherconditions; • following: may havebeenaconsequenceofoneormore ofthe The stringoflow-area fire yearsfrom 1986to2001 Burned Among Years ofHighandLowAreas Comparison ofWeather Conditions per year, andbetweenarea byunplannedfires burned peryearand and/or for theignitionandspread ofunplannedfires; 1980s. Thismayhaveprovided feweropportunities ∑ 6.30 6.29 6.33 6.32 6.31 FFDI 3 . unplanned fires. high FFDIyears,yetsawonlysmallareasby burned years. However, severalyearsinthelate1990swere there mayhavebeenalessenedriskoffire inthose two tofiveyearsindifferent partsoftheState,and that weatherwasmildintheearly1990sforfrom December 2002. despite highfire risk,untiltheBigDesertfire of (excepting the2000fire year)sawnolargefires, unplanned fires, thelate1990sthrough early2000s between highfire dangeryearsandareaby burned 1970s tomid-1980ssawastrong relationship sustained periodsofhighfire danger. Whilethelate (Figure 6.6).Bothoftheseperiodswere followedby danger inthemid1970sandagainearly1990s high withonlyafewyearscharacterisedbylowfire In theNorthWest region, fire dangerwasconsistently 1983 and1985. years incloseproximity shortlythereafter –1981, hand, largefires occurred inthree inpartsofVictoria accompanying largeunplannedfires. Ontheother and inBenalla19791980without danger weatheralsooccurred inCorryong1978 andOmeo.SeveralyearsofhighfireMelbourne unplanned fires. Thisissimilartorecords shownfor high in1998,withoutbeingaccompaniedbylarge show thatfire dangerwaslowintheearly1990sand Corryong andBenalla(Figure VI.6,AppendixVI), Data fortwolocationsintheNorthEastregion, successfully suppressed atanearlystage. they mighthavebeenexpected–orfires were didn’t occurinseveralyearsthelate1990swhen records, except thatignitionsleadingtolargefires distinguish thesetwoperiodsoftimeandtheirfire Taking along-termview, there maybelittleto latter period. total areainasingleyear(2003)the wasburned more than1.5millionhectares, whileaboutthesame that unplannedfires in1981,1983and1985burned from thelate1990stopresent (Figure 6.5),shows inthe early1980swiththeyears years forMelbourne Comparing theverysimilarstringoffire weather byunplannedfires.land burned days, are alsocharacterisedbylargeareas ofpublic and numbersofVery HighandExtreme fire danger sum ofdailyforest fire dangerindex,drought index, In general,yearscharacterisedbyhighvaluesforthe 8 Evidence suggests d sumofdailyFFDI INF.018.002.0103 INF.018.002.0104 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 6.34 Examining the number rather than the area of unplanned fires per year on public land shows that there were more fires, as expected, in the high fire risk years of 1997, 1998 and 2001, but that they did not burn large areas (Figure 6.7). This suggests that successful fire suppression by DSE and CFA may have been the main cause of small-area years through the 1986–2002 period, rather than either a lower number of ignitions, or variations in the effectiveness of prescribed burning programs through time.9 Appendix IV, Fires on Public Land – Historical Data, provides data for the number of fires on public land and area burnt per annum for the period 1921 – 2003.

Figure 6.5: Indices of Fire Weather for Melbourne and Area Burned by Unplanned Fires Per Year Top Graph: • Annual Sum of Daily FFDI (Black Line), Annual Sum of Daily KBDI (Grey Line*) • Number of Extreme (Blue Histogram Bars) and Very High (Grey Histogram Bars) Forest Fire Danger Days Per Year Bottom Graph: Area Burned Per Year by Unplanned Fires in the Local DSE Fire Region (Grey Histogram Bars) and in Total for Victoria (Grey Plus Open Histogram Bars).

Melbourne 100 6000 80 FFDI ∑ 4000 60 40

KBDI/10, 2000 ∑ 20 Number of Days 0 0 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02

South West and Port Phillip

1.2

0.8

Area burnt (’000.000s ha) 0.4

0.0 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02

* Note: This value is expressed as ΣKBDI divided by 10 so that Y-axis values are scaled to allow comparison among all the variables graphed.

9 Appendix IV ‘Fires on Public Land – Historical Data’ documents the number of fires on public land 1921-2003 and the area burnt per annum. PAGE 67 PAGE 68 Figure 6.6:Indices ofFire Weather for Mildura (NorthWest Region)andArea BurnedbyUnplannedFires Per Year

Area burnt (’000.000s ha) ∑KBDI/10, ∑FFDI 2000 4000 6000 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 0 47 88 28 68 09 49 800 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 47 88 28 68 09 49 800 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 North West Mildura 02 02 20 40 60 80 0 100

Number of Days INF.018.002.0105 INF.018.002.0106 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 6.7: Annual Sum of Daily FFDI for Melbourne (black line), and Number of Fires Per Year on public land (green bars) in the State of Victoria, 1972–73 to 2002–03.

1200 3500

3000 1000

2500 800

2000 600 FFDI 1500 ∑ 400

Number of fires 1000

200 500

0 0 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Fire yearFire year

Conclusions Recommendations

6.35 The 2002-2003 fires in Victoria reflect the coincidence 6.38 That DSE institute additional routine data storage of two predisposing factors: El Niño drought and a and analysis to supplement current climate records long string of low fire-area years. Ultimately, high with at least daily 3 pm values for the Grassland lightning activity and extreme fire weather days led and Forest Fire Danger Index, and Keetch-Byram to the ignition and rapid spread of a number of large Drought Index, for selected high quality stations unplanned fires. Overall, the severity of weather in representing a cross-section of environments 2003 was of a similar level to that in 1983. throughout Victoria.

6.36 The long string of years (1988–2002) leading up 6.39 That DSE and CFA, recognising that the Bureau of to 2003 with low areas burned by unplanned fires Meteorology does not routinely store all variables included years of high fire danger weather (e.g. required to produce the calculations and indices 1997 and 1998) accompanied by a large number of necessary for research and planning into fire ignitions. Improved fire suppression by DSE and CFA, occurrence and behaviour, develop appropriate rather than either benign weather or decreased fire systems to ensure that such current and historical due to prescribed burning is the most likely information is readily available and accessible. explanation of why so few fires in these years grew to large size. References

6.37 Estimating fire weather parameters and storing that Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology submission to the Victorian information is important to the ongoing scientific Emergency Services Commissioner’s Inquiry into the 2002/03 bushfires. June 2003. investigation of relationships between climate and fire. It supports advances in our understanding of Long, M. unpublished report. how fires occur and behave and gives us the capacity Mackey, B., Lindenmayer, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, M.A. & Lindesay, J. to improve the managed use of fire. This last point 2002. Wildlife, Fire and Future Climates. CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. is taken up in Part B. PAGE 69 PAGE 70 INF.018.002.0107 INF.018.002.0108

Part A Setting the Scene

Burnt Alpine Ash Forest - North East Victoria – DSE PAGE 2 Lightning North East Victoria 8January2003-DSE Lightning NorthEastVictoria Overview ofPartA scope toadvanceinourpreparedness andresponse. cope withourfire-prone environment butthere isfurther engaged onacontinuousimprovement strategytobetter to bushfire have risk.TheInquirynotesthatVictorians changes haveincreased theexposure ofmanyVictorians interface betweenpublicandprivateland,sincethese ofpopulationdistributionandshiftsinthe patterns past 170years.We payparticularattentiontochanging overthe changes inlanduseandoccupationVictoria togeographyandhistoryweconsider Chapter 2turns and whatithopestoachieve. conducted, itexplainswhytheInquirywascommissioned to thisreport. AswellasdescribinghowtheInquirywas Chapter 1provides anintroduction totheInquiryand allow ustomore criticallyassessresponses tothefires. the 2002–2003fires, tobeinchargeofrelevant facts,and in focus;theyhelpustoframerelevant questionsabout In themain,thesechaptersare explanatoryanddescriptive for ourlaterinvestigations,analysesandrecommendations. Part Acontainssixdiversechaptersthatsetthescene INF.018.002.0109 INF.018.002.0110 OVERVIEW OF PARTOVERVIEW A A SETTING THE SCENE PART One way we can do this is by putting systems in place to Chapter 6 clarifies the contradictory views put to adjust progressively to climatic factors like global warming the Inquiry about the severity of weather during the and El Niño that impact on the likelihood of bushfire. We 2002–2003 fire season and the implications for firefighting make a recommendation to this effect in Chapter 2. response. Our investigations support the Bureau of Meteorology’s findings that conditions were not more In Chapter 3 we outline the legislative framework within benign than in previous, extreme fire seasons such as which firefighters do their work. This is important factual those of 1983 and 1939. context for our analysis of preparedness and response in Parts C and D. We note that current arrangements are This Chapter also considers a second point relating complex, involving a large number of agencies and to climate – the unusually low number of large fires in organisations. Such arrangements can only succeed Victoria from the mid-1980s to 2001 and we conclude if there is a high level of co-operation and communication that improved fire suppression by the Department of between agencies and the community. Sustainability and Environment and the Country Fire Authority is the most likely explanation as to why so few In Chapter 4, we tell the ‘story’ of the fire and summarise fires in these years grew to large size. We make a further its impacts. We offer a broad-brush picture of what two recommendations here regarding improved data happened, where and when. Later in this Report we give storage and analysis for climate records. more detailed and critical accounts of particular fire situations and offer a critical analysis of the emergency response (Part D). Here, we present a balanced view of the achievements and losses, as well as the impacts of the fires on firefighters and communities.

The Inquiry received 273 submissions from groups and individuals. In Chapter 5 we summarise those submissions and document the key themes that came out of the community consultations. Interestingly, those themes – land management preparedness, agency preparedness, response issues, management of resources, and recovery were common across the State. As this Chapter is part of ‘setting the scene’, we make no judgements or assessments about the accuracy of claims. PAGE 3 PAGE 4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 Introduction Chapter 1 broad focusofeachitsParts. then discusstheaimsofthisReportandexplain the Inquirywasconductedandinitialimpressions. We provide thethree Terms ofReference, describehow Bushfire Inquiryandwhatithopestoachieve.We reasons behindtheestablishmentofVictorian 2002-2003 fires andtheiraftermath.Itexplainsthe This Chapterbrieflydescribesthesignificanceof Overview media and Victorians generally.media andVictorians fires also captured unprecedented attentionfrom the personal tolloncommunitiesand firefighters. The and communityresources. witnessedthe Victorians the fire seasontestedthecapacityoffire agencies of theunbroken drought, thelengthandseverityof environmental amenitycompromised. Comingontop Public andprivateassetswere destroyed and more than108,000hectares ofprivateland. 1.1 millionhectares including oflandinVictoria, fires approximately of1939.Theyeventuallyburnt approaching thatofthedevastatingBlackFriday In termsofareathesefires burnt, were ofascale complexes intheNorthEastandGippslandareas. controlled andultimatelyjoinedtoformthefire 11 January),asmallnumberwere unabletobe controlled withinafewdays(17remained by started over80fires. Whilethemajorityofthesewere andGippsland,lightningstrikes East Victoria the predominantly forested andalpineareas ofNorth On 7and8January2003,adrystormsweptacross and privateland. affectingVictoria 181,400hectares ofbothpublic ParkinNorthWest in theBigDesertWilderness experiencing itslargestbushfire in20years,afire The 2002calendaryearclosedwithVictoria almostthreeVictoria, timesthetwenty-yearaverage. (CFA) hadalready attendedmore than375fires in Environment (DSE)andtheCountryFire Authority December 2002,theDepartmentofSustainabilityand early intheseasonSeptember2002.Bystartof recorded history–withthefirstbushfires occurring ongoing drought –oneofthemostsevere in The 2002-2003bushfire seasonoccurred duringan since 1939. across thegreatest expanseoflandinVictoria Over thesummerof2002-2003,bushfires burnt The 2002-2003BushfiresataGlance 1.7 1.6 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.9 1.8 regions suffered losses. employment. Manybusinessesintheaffected them toputasidetheirnormalbusinessesor the firefighting effort foraprotracted periodrequiring Many individualsandcommunitieswere engagedin lived withthethreat offire fordaysandevenweeks. by fire andfeltletdownbythefire services.Others However, somecommunitieswere severely affected fires andinjurieswere minimal. expected. Noliveswere lostasadirect result ofthe were significantlybelowwhatmighthavebeen eventual scaleofthefires, lossofproperty andassets are notassevere astheymighthavebeen.Giventhe into accountsixconsecutiveyearsofdrought –they to extreme fire eventsfrom Victoria’s past–taking When wecompare outcomesofthe2002-2003fires the Bushfires.2002-2003 Victorian Undersection 21cof Commissioner wasinvitedtochairanInquiryintothe It wasinthiscontextthattheEmergencyServices fires were fought. land toreduce fire riskandthewayinwhich these fires, inparticularthemanagementofpublic A rangeofsignificantissueshasbeenraisedabout the fires were suppressed? prevented thesefires? Were there problems withhow have toask:CouldVictoria caused manyVictorians caused bybushfires intheAustralianCapitalTerritory, events inNewSouthWales andthedevastation The fire therepeated experienceinVictoria, fire subject toperiodic,extreme bushfires. a harshreminder environment thattheVictorian is where fires alsofollowedasevere drought; theywere For others,therecent fires were arepeat of1939 management regime overmanyyears. perceived negativechangesinVictoria’s publicland season wasseenasavoidable–theresult of forests. Formanyofthosemostaffected, thefire considerable criticismofthemanagementour generated awiderangeofviews,including It isnotsurprisingthenthatfires ofthisscale After theFires:Questions (prevention, response andrecovery). issue inrelation toemergencymanagement recommendations andreportonany toGovernment of emergencyserviceagencies and toadvise,make Commissioner isrequired tomonitortheperformance Emergency ManagementAct1986 , the INF.018.002.0111 INF.018.002.0112 CHAPTER 1 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

Victoria is not alone in experiencing fire events such as that of last fire season. Parts of Europe and Canada have also experienced extreme fire weather over the summer of 2003. More than 800 forest fires in Canada have burned more than 345,000 acres and resulted in the deaths of two firefighters by the 18th August 2003. On 26 August a fire in British Columbia, Canada approached a heavily populated area, destroyed 200 homes and forced 30,000 to leave their homes. This fire was the eighth fire to threaten a populated area this summer, unprecedented for British Columbia. Portugal has had the worst fire season on record with 19 people killed, and 362,000 hectares burned. In France and southern Italy large areas have been burned. Five people died in France and tens of thousands of hectares of woodland burned. The summer of 2003 has clearly been an extreme fire year in the northern hemisphere with threat to urban areas in Canada and more than five times the average area burned across France, Italy and Portugal.

1.13 The Government requested that the Inquiry report • Professor Neal Enright, School of Anthropology, at the end of September 2003 to allow maximum Geography and Environmental Studies, and opportunity to implement recommendations prior to Executive Director, Office for Environmental the 2003-2004 fire season. Programs at the University of Melbourne. Professor Enright specialises in the fire ecology of plants, re–vegetation and rehabilitation, has been Terms of Reference published widely and has conducted extensive research and consultation. 1.14 The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry were to: 1.16 Their appointment brought a breadth of knowledge 1. Examine the effectiveness of preparedness for in bushfire behaviour and environmental science to the 2002/03 bushfire season, including hazard the Inquiry to complement the expert knowledge of reduction and mobilisation of resources; the Emergency Services Commissioner in the planning 2. Assess the effectiveness of the response to the for, and management of, emergency situations. The 2002/03 bushfires, including emergency Inquiry members were supported by a Secretariat management procedures, cross agency response located in the Department of Premier and Cabinet. and co–ordination and resource deployment; and 3. Provide recommendations for future bushfire management strategies, including any required How the Inquiry was Conducted improvements to existing emergency management arrangements including public communications, 1.17 The Inquiry members approached the task with no community advice systems, infrastructure, training predetermined views about the eventual findings. and overall resourcing. Considerable time was spent building an understanding of the fire events themselves, their Expert Input to the Inquiry impacts on communities and the environment, the quality and efficacy of planning and what was done 1.15 Two independent experts were appointed to the to prevent and suppress the fires. A wide range of Inquiry. They are: issues requiring consideration were identified. A phased process was developed to explore and • Dr Malcolm Gill, Honorary Research Fellow, retired evaluate these issues. from CSIRO Plant Industry, Canberra. Dr Gill has published widely on wildfire and its role in forest ecosystems in Australia and was awarded an Order of Australia Medal in 1999 for his contribution to research on bushfires and the environment; and PAGE 5 PAGE 6 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.18 These are outlinedinChapter5. North West tothefarSouthEastofState. fell intoaseriesofthemesrepeated from thefar around theState,andissuesraisedwithInquiry Comments andcriticismswere surprisinglyuniform recovery couldbeimproved orstrengthened. fire prevention andsuppression andcommunity views ontheTerms ofReference –specifically, how ensure everyonehadasay, anddrawoutcommunity hear anddiscusscommunityindividualconcerns, The publicconsultationsallowedInquirymembersto suppression, andbycommunitymembers. staff involvedinlandmanagementorfire provided inanopenwaybyvolunteersandagency unanimous intheirviewthatinformationwas parliamentary privilege,Inquirymembersare While submissionswere notprotected by their viewstotheInquiry. section ofthecommunityhadopportunitytoput Appendix II.Thisprocess ensured abroad cross individually andinsmallgroups andtheseare listedin In all,Inquirymembersmetover400people,both as wellinMelbourne. PV offices; atshire offices andcommunityhalls– fires; atCFA shedsandfire stations;atDSE,CFA and affected areas onfarmsandplantations;atthesiteof These discussionswere heldatmostofthefire- Departments andagencies,otherorganisations. community members,LocalandStateGovernment This wasfollowedbyaseriesofmeetingswith principal issuesofconcern. agencies), allowedustounderstandthecommunity’s land managers,andstaff andvolunteersofthefire and afterthetouroffire-affected areas (from public substantial volumeofinformationgathered during Appendix I.Thesesubmissions,combinedwitha individuals andorganisations.Theseare listedat The Inquiryreceived 273submissionsfrom arangeof andtheCFA.Primary Industries,ParksVictoria regional andlocalstaff ofDSE,theDepartment talking insitutofirefighters, incidentcontrollers, EastGippslandandGippsland, North EastVictoria, following thepathoffires inNorthWest and consideration. Inquirymembersthentoured Victoria, 30 May2003asawayofframingthekeyissuesfor The Inquirycalledforpublicsubmissionsby 1.25 1.24 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 suppression. making andbetteruseoflocalknowledgeinfire planning, more communityinvolvementindecision greater effort byallpartiestofire prevention spectrum ofviewsbutwere consistentinseeking better forfuture bushfires. Solutionscovered thefull the Inquiryrecommendations toprepare andrespond Communities were askedwhattheywantedtoseein community. in somecases,significantlossoftourismtheir good otherfire suppression workscombinedwith, remaining stock,aneedtorebuild fencingandmake but withlessfeedandwateravailablefortheir fires and,followingthefires, remained indrought – affected communitieswere indrought priortothe opportunity forexpression ofruralanger. Most The Inquiry'spublicconsultationsalsoprovided an this review formpartofthefinalreport (Chapter 22). the fire seasonwasundertakenandtheoutcomesof the managementofaerialfirefighting resources over Additionally, review anexternal oftheeffectiveness of significant bushfires occurred. to previous years,especiallythoseyearswhen existed overthefire seasonandhowthesecompared They alsoexaminedtheclimaticconditionsthat value insuppressing andreducing bushfire intensity. the issuesassociatedwithprescribedandits burning Enright, undertookscientificresearch intosomeof Inquiry members,DrMalcolmGillandProfessor Neal participating inpublicmeetings,thetwoexpert In additiontoconsideringsubmissionsand discussed withindividualsandgroups. six weeksofruralvisits.Emergingthemeswere commenced astheconsultationscontinuedover number ofreturnvisitswere madeandthisprocess truthed' withselectedcommunities.Accordingly, a recommendations wouldbetestedor'ground agenciesthat,totheextentpossible, government Inquiry membersinformedcommunitiesand Departments, agenciesandtheCFA. forward inpartnershipwithLocalGovernment, owning theoutcomes.Communitiesneedtomove a largeextentonallpartiesimplementingand or failure ofthefinalrecommendations wouldrely to services. However, wealsostressed thatthesuccess of thepubliclandmanagementagenciesandfire and would bedevelopedindependentofGovernment The Inquirymadeitclearthatitsrecommendations INF.018.002.0113 INF.018.002.0114 CHAPTER 1 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 1.30 The Inquiry also examined the Emergency 1.36 Among other things, the report deals with many Management Act 1986 and arrangements in of the criticisms made in submissions and in place, the findings and implementation of previous consultations. It cannot, however, engage in point bushfire inquiries and reviews and the adequacy by point forensic analysis of every incident raised with of co-ordination between DSE and the CFA in fire the Inquiry. Instead, we note distinct themes and planning/prevention and response for rural Victoria. commonality of purpose and provide recommendations based on evidence and research. In saying this however, five case studies and the Aims of this Report lessons learnt are discussed in Parts C and D.

1.31 The purpose of the Inquiry has been to learn from 1.37 The report also discusses in detail the efforts of the the recent bushfire experiences in order to further two principal fire suppression agencies, DSE and the improve Victoria’s preparedness and response to CFA, during the North East and Gippsland fires and future fire and other emergencies. their relationship with the other agencies engaged in fire and emergency management. We comment on 1.32 Reviews following any large-scale emergency identify the effectiveness of arrangements now in place and both successes and mistakes. They also identify recommend changes for the future. lessons to be learnt and improvements to be made. In saying that, the Inquiry's purpose has not been to attribute blame nor to engage in the public Interim Report: August 2003 humiliation of individuals working on behalf of their community or organisation, paid or unpaid. 1.38 The Inquiry was invited to present an Interim Report to Government if issues were identified that 1.33 Rather, the Inquiry has identified areas for needed immediate attention. The Inquiry took this improvement in fire prevention planning, opportunity and an Interim Report was forwarded to preparedness and response and developed realistic Government in August 2003. The report contained recommendations to ensure a longer-term continuous six recommendations concerning prescribed burning, improvement strategy is implemented for Victorians. use of local knowledge, fencing policy, rehabilitation Systemic problems and issues requiring policy change and protection of water catchments. The Premier by Government, or changes to the State's emergency released the report on August 26, accepting all management arrangements, were of critical interest. recommendations. The Interim Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires is 1.34 Our report aims, first and foremost, to be a at Appendix III. constructive document that provides recommendations for enhanced bushfire safety in Victoria. The report acknowledges positives such as progress made in Victoria’s Emergency Management arrangements since 1983 and the significant improvement in co-operation and co-ordination across the many agencies involved during and after the fires. To some extent, it also aims to be educative, providing the context for a discussion of fire in the Victorian environment, a framework for rational debate and a way forward based on objective data and evidence.

1.35 The report has five Parts. Part A sets the scene for our later analysis. Parts B and C respond to the first Term of Reference and look at fire on public land and community and agency preparedness. Part D tackles the complex questions of response and recovery and addresses the second Term of Reference. Part E looks forward and makes recommendations for the future in line with the third Term of Reference. PAGE 7 PAGE 8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 Victorian Environment The Changing Chapter 2 the landandpeoplewere (andare) exposed. offiresinfluenced thepattern andfire risktowhich Combined withtheever-increasing population,this considerable changeinthevegetativecover. Extensive clearing,mostlyforagriculture, ledto wascoveredof Victoria byforests orwoodland. estimated thatpriortothe1840s,around 88percent Plantsandanimalsare adaptedtosequencesoffire ratherthanonesingle event;thesesequencesare called‘fire regimes’. E 1 surrounding properties. of fires there over theyears,posingafire riskto the west.Lightninghasignitedasignificantnumber the mainarea offire-prone, ruggedforested rangesin the Grampians.TheGrampiansNationalParkcontains shrubland across partsoftheseuplands,aswellin than 1,000metres. There are areas ofwoodlandand and undulating,withonlyafewpeaksreaching more plateaux andridgeswhichare generallyrelatively low term ‘range’isnotagooddescriptionforthe East oftheState.However, the Victoria, inwestern across totheNewSouthWales border intheNorth series oflowhillsinthewestthatincreases inheight istraversedbytheGreatVictoria DividingRange–a relation tofire risk. landscape andnotesareasin ofparticularconcern This sectionlooksatVictoria’s diversegeographyand The Victorian Landscape circumstances. have systemsinplacetomeetwiderchanging fire weargueitisimportantto riskforVictorians, altered ecosystemdynamicsmayleadtoanincreased temperatures, changesinrainfall,andconsequent fires includingmajorfire events.Giventhathigher demonstrates thattheStateremains athighriskof and managementoffire, therecent fire season Despite advancesinourapproach totheprevention adapted toparticularfire regimes. fire, withmuchofthefloraandfaunanecessarily landscapehasalwaysbeensubjectto The Victorian environment formanyVictorians. rural andregional assets,andwehaveahigh-riskfire relative tootherStates,andthedispersednature of Add tothismixVictoria’s highpopulationdensity and vegetationwithclimateweatherconditions. in theworldduetocombinationofitslandscape hasoneofthemostfire-proneVictoria environments Overview the effects oftheprevious fire event. fires ontheenvironment canbeobservedatthetimebutstate oftheenvironment atthetimeofeachfire islikelytohav 1 It hasbeen 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.10 2.9 used forsheepgrazing. South West, largelyreplacing areas previously during thepastfiveyearshasbeenmainlyin plantations (i.e.100,000hectares) across Victoria land use.Alargeproportion ofthegrowth inprivate over recent yearsithaslessenedwiththeriseofother significantly toVictoria’s wealthinthepast.However, tourism. Theregion’s woolindustryhascontributed major coastalresort areas thatrely predominantly on which haveexperiencedsignificantfires andadjoin with theexceptionofforested OtwayRanges South oftherangesismainlyfarmedcoastalplain, fire mitigationandimpactonlocalcommunities. therefore givenpriorityfrom thepointofview of theseparkboundarieswithprivatelandis Fire hasshapedthislandscape,andthemanagement Sunset Country. the LittleDesert,BigWyperfeldand shrubland, mostofwhichremains intheparkareas of vegetation oftheMalleeismainlysparselyvegetated broadacre cropping andsomegrazing.Thenatural largely flatandincreasingly arid,withlargeareas of riverine plainandtheMalleedunefieldswhichare –the thenorthisarea calledtheWimmera To significant fire risk. encroaching suburbanpopulation,butalsoposea Ranges provide highenvironmental amenityforthe eucalypt forests across theDandenongandYarra asset protection. To the theneareastofMelbourne, these areasforfire makesthemofconcern safetyand forests across thisregion, thegrowing populationin Lerderderg Gorge. Despitethefragmentednature of as MacedonRanges,Wombat StateForest and areas offorest insmallNationalandStateParkssuch mostly byrelatively lowelevationswithscattered areranges northwestofMelbourne characterised proportion ofVictoria’s high-valueagriculture. The extends totheMurrayRiver, supportingalarge North ofthecentralrangesisriverineplainwhich urban areasontheplainstosouth. ofMelbourne therangesbegintorise,with In centralVictoria were asillustratedinTable burnt), 2.1. hectares ofgrassland)and1977(103,000hectares fires occurredmore in1944(burning than1million districtandNorthWest.the western Significantgrass plantations across theplainsandundulatinghillsof Grass fires are arisktopasture, cropland areas and ffects ofindividual e beeninfluencedby INF.018.002.0115 INF.018.002.0116 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART North East Alpine Areas 2.15 The recent history of bushfires demonstrates the nature of disastrous fire in the Victorian environment. 2.11 It is in the North East of the State that the ranges A study in 1986 estimated that in the past 100 years,2 become rugged, mountainous alpine areas. The more than two thirds of Australian bushfire-related region is covered by extensive areas of normally cool, deaths and more than half of the significant bushfire- moist temperate forest such as Mountain Ash, as well related property losses occurred in Victoria. as drier sclerophyll forest at lower altitude and on drier slopes. Moist gullies are filled with tree ferns. 2.16 Particular fire seasons such as 1939 and 1983 tend to These worn, rounded mountains are high by be remembered for their severe impacts. Figures 2.1, Australian standards, reaching over 1,900 metres. 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the areas burnt during the There are many steep slopes making access very 1939, 1983 and 2002-2003 fires. difficult across much of the region. 2.17 The number of fires and the size of area burnt give 2.12 On the high plains, low alpine vegetation and Snow one perspective on the history of bushfires in Victoria Gums predominate across the middle of the highest but the impacts on life and assets provide another. ranges providing the environment for winter snow- Loss of life, property and other assets cannot be solely based recreation and, in summer, tourism and some predicted by the number and severity of fires. Some cattle grazing. But the chief characteristic of their relatively small fires have had a significant impact. terrain is forested mountain ridges interspersed with These fires, as well as large-scale fires, have long river valleys to the north and south, many of contributed significantly to fire-management which contain scattered, isolated farming arrangements. communities that are frequently exposed to high levels of fire risk. These valleys to the south gradually 2.18 Table 2.1 is a summary of significant fire events on all widen to become coastal plains across much of land across Victoria from 1851 through to 2003.3 It Gippsland, although at the easternmost end, the lists impacts on life and assets. forested ranges extend almost to the sea. 2.19 Additional historical information is provided at Appendix IV (Fires on Public Land - Historical Data) Gippsland and details the annual number of wildfires attended 2.13 The population of East Gippsland is relatively low and by public land managers between 1921 and 2003 mostly confined to coastal villages and towns around and the area burnt. a predominantly public estate of forested land. Small pockets of agriculture are interspersed within the steeper terrain. Farmland in central and west Gippsland provides an important source of agricultural income and supports a higher population in towns such as Warragul, Traralgon, Moe and Morwell. The mountain ranges in the east of the State provide much of the water for Melbourne via the Thomson Dam and water from the northern slopes feed Eildon and Dartmouth (to name but two water storages), and the Murray River.

Fire in the Victorian Environment

2.14 Fire has been a natural phenomenon within the Australian and Victorian landscape since time immemorial. However, the extent of fire appears to have increased with European settlement. (Chapter 12 discusses this in more detail.)

2 J. Hickman & M. Tarrant (1986) 'Australian Bushfires and their Real Cost', Fire Science, 4th Australian National Biennial Conference, 21–24 October, Perth, Institution of Fire Engineers, Perth. 3 While there is a lack of accurate information, particularly regarding fires during the nineteenth century, a significant fire event in 1851 reportedly

affected about a quarter of the State. The information has become more reliable during the twentieth century with better record keeping, PAGE especially for fires since 1939. 9 PAGE 10 Table 2.1:Significant Fire Events inVictoria Black Thursday 6February 1851 Date 19 February 1968 21 February–13 March 1965 17 January1965 14 January1962 5 February 1952 14 February 1944 14 January1944 22 December 1943 3–4 March 1942 (December 1938–January1939) Black Friday 13January1939 1932 1926 Early 1900s(esp.1905,1906,1912,1914) Red Tuesday 1February 1898 Thislistisnotdefinitivebutgives anideaofthemajorfire events,particularlyafter1939when thereliability ofinform 4 Benalla area Morwell, Yallourn Central &western districts Wangaratta (burning ona60mile front) Hamilton, SouthGippsland–Yarram Dromana, Yarra Glen, Warburton, Erica Warrandyte, Noojee,Omeo,Mansfield, and thetowns ofRubicon, Woods Point, Gippsland, theOtwayandGrampian ranges Large areas oftheNorthEast and Gippsland Many districts across Victoria, particularly Dandenong Ranges Noojee, Kinglake, Warburton, Erica, Gippsland, Grampians, OtwayRanges South Gippsland Heidelberg Ranges, Westernport, Dandenongdistricts, Wimmera, Portland, Gippsland,Plenty Dandenong Ranges,TheBasin,Upwey Gippsland Longwood Andrews, Hurstbridge, Warrandyte, Mitcham The Basin,Christmas Hills,Kinglake, St Location 4 9 people Many farms andhouses 60 people Varied (100,000hectares in1914) 260,000 hectares 2,000 buildings 12 people Victoria) Approx. five millionhectares (aquarter of Thousands ofcattle One millionsheep Approx. 12people 1,920 hectares 64 homesandotherbuildings 15,000 acres ofgrassland 300,000 hectares offorest More than4,000stock More than60homes/shops 6 houses 7 people (allfrom onefamily) 454 homes More than8people 100,000 hectares Several people Plant, works,opencutmineandbuildings grassland and160,000hectares offorest More thanonemillionhectares of Huge stock losses 500 homes 49 people Thousands ofacres ofgrass country 10 people More than20homes 2 farms 100 sheep 1 person 1.5–2 millionhectares 69 timbermills More than650homes/shops 71 people Losses andarea affected ation increases. INF.018.002.0117 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 11 CHAPTER 2 INF.018.002.0118 Losses and area affected and area Losses 1 abandoned house 181,800 hectares (indirectly) 1 person 41 houses 9,000 livestock 1.1 million hectares 50 houses 1,864 hectares 47 people than 27,000 stock More 2,000 homes/shops Over 210,000 hectares 3 people 182 homes 400 farms 46,000 stock 50,800 hectares 1 person 17 homes than 12,000 stock More forest) (mostly 10,000 hectares 3 people 41 houses 400 hectares 32,000 hectares tanker 1 CFA firefighters, 5 CFA 780 hectares of grassland 29,000 hectares 22 people 230 homes 21 schools/church/halls than 12,000 stock More 250,000 hectares 12,140 hectares 4 people than 100 houses/shops more 200,000 stock Approx. 103,000 hectares 2 people 1 house 6,500 stock 119,000 hectares 250,000 hectares , CSIRO and CFA, 1982; R. Murray and K. White, , CSIRO and CFA, . , AGPS, 1978; Reports of the 1939 and 1944 Royal Commissions; Bushfires in Australia Location Caledonia River area of the Alpine National area River Caledonia Forest State River Carey Park, Linton Dadswells Bridge Big Desert by lightning, started 80 fires Over Gippsland Victoria, North East Avoca/Maryborough, Little River, River, Little Avoca/Maryborough, Springfield, Melton Strathbogie Berringa Heathcote, Dandenong Ranges, Creswick, Gough's Bay Teddywaddy, Bairnsdale and the Big Desert Sunset country Cann River Mt Macedon East Cockatoo, Branxholme, Monivae, Otway Ranges, Mt Macedon, Trentham, Cudgee, Heights, Warburton, Belgrave Framlingham Upper Beaconsfield, 280 fires broke out affecting Lara, out affecting broke 280 fires Darraweit, Bulgana, Yea, Daylesford, Flat, Korongvale Kangaroo Mt Buffalo Creswick, Streatham, Tatyoon, Penshurst, Rokewood, Cressy, Werneth, Pura, Pura River Little Beeac, Mingay, Lismore, The fires of 12 February District of Victoria 1977 in the Western 17–19 December 2000 17–19 December 2002 17–31 December 2003 8 January–8 March 21 January 1997 31 1997–9 January 1998 December 1998 2 December 27 December 1990 27 December 1995 23 Feb Ash Wednesday 16 February 1983 16 February Ash Wednesday 14 January 1985 28 December 1980–6 January 1981 28 December 31 January 1983 1983 1 February 12 February 1977 12 February 15 January 1978 8 January 1969 1972 December Date Sources: CFA website; DPI/DSE website; R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, website; DPI/DSE website; R.H. Luke and A.G. McArthur, CFA Sources: Cheney and J. Barber, N.P. A.G. McArthur, State of Fire: A History of Volunteer Firefighting and the Country Fire Authority in Victoria, CFA, 1995 Firefighting and the Country CFA, Authority in Victoria, Fire State of Fire: A History of Volunteer PAGE 12 Figure 2.1:The1939Fires reasHgwy S/ABs tatVictoria PublicLand BassStrait Lakes Extentof1939Fires NSW/SA Freeways/Highways Major town INF.018.002.0119 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 13 CHAPTER 2 INF.018.002.0120 Major townExtent of 1982/1983 Fires Lakes Freeways/Highways Bass Strait Public Land NSW/SA Victoria Figure 2.2: The 1983 Fires 2.2: Figure PAGE 14 Figure 2.3:The2002-2003Fires reasHgwy S/ABs tatVictoria PublicLand BassStrait Lakes Extentof2002/2003Fires NSW/SA Freeways/Highways Major town INF.018.002.0121 INF.018.002.0122 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Exposure of People and Assets 2.24 The area of farmland and number of farms has to Bushfire Risk declined, especially since the early 1970s. At the same time, tourism has become a key growth industry in Population Density regional Victoria, particularly in areas of scenic quality. Visits to National Parks have increased between one 2.20 Victoria has the highest density of population in and six per cent per annum for the past 10 years.8 Australia with one quarter of the nation’s population Increased tourism has contributed to greater value occupying just three per cent of Australia’s total land being placed on the natural environment in many 5 area. The population of Victoria at 30 June 2001 was rural areas. 4.83 million, with approximately 1.30 million people living in rural and regional areas outside the Public Land Melbourne Statistical Division (broadly the greater 6 Melbourne area). 2.25 Approximately two thirds of the State’s land area is privately owned and the remaining third, some 7.7 2.21 Most of the people living in rural and regional Victoria million hectares is public land, principally parks and are exposed to bushfires since, apart from regional forests. Heightened community awareness of town centres, bushfires occur across all parts of the conservation issues has led to an increase in the area rural landscape putting lives, houses, farms, of National Parks at the expense of State Forests. The businesses and a range of other public assets at risk. area of protected parks in Victoria (National Parks and People living and working on the fringes of other protected parks and reserves) has progressively metropolitan Melbourne and regional towns are expanded from some four per cent of the State in the also at significant risk as demonstrated by the Ash early 1970s to approximately 16 per cent or 3.6 Wednesday fires in 1983, which resulted in 47 million hectares today.9 deaths. Table 2.1 includes major fires that have occurred on the Mornington Peninsula, the Western grasslands and across the Macedon, Dandenong Timber Production and Yarra Ranges. 2.26 The area of State Forest is 3.5 million hectares, of which just over one million is managed sustainably Agricultural Assets for timber production under the co-ordination of DSE. The remainder is in reserves for ecological and 2.22 Agricultural production currently occupies around recreational use. 56 per cent of the State’s land base. Of this, the major land use is broadacre dryland pasture and 2.27 Commercial State Forests supply timber that in broadacre cropping, approximately 95 per cent of 2001–2002 totalled 2,216,000 cubic metres (gross).10 7 agricultural land. The remainder consists of irrigated From this, 741,000 cubic metres (or approx 33 per pasture, horticulture and plantations. cent of total volume) of sawlogs was produced. Through recent policy developments (Our Forests 2.23 A range of high-value agricultural assets is therefore Our Future released in February 2002), a proposal exposed to fire risk, including stock, pasture, to reduce licensed sawlog volumes by approximately plantations and other crops. Some farmers made the 30 per cent Statewide has been agreed and value of these assets clear to the Inquiry when they implementation strategies are being developed. stated that protection of these agricultural assets was a higher priority than their houses. Similarly, plantations represent valuable assets that are very vulnerable to fire. While there have been changes in agricultural land use across Victoria over the years, particularly the change from grazing to private forestry, the impact of these changes on total fire risk is not clear.

5 Government of Victoria, Atlas of Victoria 1982, J. S. Duncan (ed), p82. 6 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Victorian Year Book, pp 7-8. 7 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Agricultural Census 2001.

8 Source: Victoria Research, Parks Victoria. PAGE 9 Department of Natural Resources and Environment – Submission to Linton Coronial Inquiry, Sept 2000 and Park Victoria – State of the Parks 2000.

10 This represents $39,38m and $25.566m respectively product charge invoiced, which is made up of the royalty, roading and silviculture charges. 15 Source: Forests Service. PAGE 16 2.31 2.30 2.29 2.28 population. declining smalltowns,andanageingrural around largemetropolitan andregional centres, areas, contributingtoaconcentrationofsettlement concern intermsoffireconcern risk. problems. Theinterfacealsoprovides asource of forest understories,andofpestplantanimal animals onprivatepastures andcrops, oflivestockon aboutthecross-boundaryconcerns impactsofnative of communitydebateformanyyears.There are of fires, weedsandferalanimals,hasbeenthesource between publicandprivateland,suchasthespread 6T. andTasmania’ Budge,‘Population declineinVictoria in P.W. Newton andM.Bell(eds) 16 5Department ofInfrastructure, 15 3Submission totheInquirybyCountryFire Authority, 13 2DepartmentofInfrastructure, 12 Auditor-General Victoria, 11 State. many ruralareas, particularlyinthewestof industry sector, precipitating populationlossacross changes thatresulted infewerjobstheprimary ofagriculturemodernisation from the1950ssaw second halfofthetwentiethcentury. The nineteenth century, thistrend hasreversed inthe the populationincreased significantlyduringthe changes haveoccurred across While ruralVictoria. Since European settlement,fundamentalpopulation Population Decrease inSomeFire RiskAreas Population andCulturalChange presenting athreat topublicland. noted thatfires dooriginateonprivateproperty, may posearisktoprivatelanditshouldalsobe fought andcontrolled more easily. Whilepublicland providing apointatwhichthefire islikelytobe point where accessiseasierandfuelloadschange, The boundarywithprivatelandissometimesthe vegetated, providing ready fuelforbushfires. lightning strikes,itismore likelytobeheavily This typeofcountryisnotonlymore prone to country thatgenerallyhasremained aspublicland. steeper, more inaccessibleandmarginalfarming valleys andplains,European settlementhascreated across theboundaryintoprivateproperty. Byclearing land, typicallyfrom lightningstrikes,andburning The recent fire seasonsawfires originatingonpublic property. boundaries betweenpubliclandandprivate There are approximately 60,000kilometres of Public LandandPrivateProperty 4T. andTasmania’ Budge, ‘PopulationdeclineinVictoria inP.W.Newton andM.Bell (eds) 14 published byAGPS, 1996pp193–4. published by AGPS,1996pp 193–4. 12 A cycleofdeclinebecamecumulativeinthese 11 Issues associatedwiththeinterface Fire PreventionandPreparedness Regional Matters– Atlas ofRegionalVictoria 2002 Regional Matters–AtlasofVictoria 2002 From theFoothillstoAlpineHeights 2003 , May2003. 2.33 2.32 2.35 2.34 Sydney fires in1994and2001-2002. in 1983,the1997DandenongRangesfires andthe trends continuedespitefires suchasAshWednesday near forest andcoastalheathland. risk ofbushfires, particularlythoselocatedinand population increases haveoccurred inareas athigh farm andrecreation zones.Thismeansthat the majorurbancentres andcoastal,historic,hobby 1991. increases ofaround 38percentbetween1976and rural retreat region, bothexperiencedpopulation commuting region,weekendand andtheMelbourne amenity. Forexample,theextendedMelbourne both regional townsandareas ofhighlandscape areas –in withincommutingdistanceofMelbourne There hasbeensignificantpopulationincrease in Population Increase inSomeFire RiskAreas during thelastdecade. volunteers, hasdeclinedaround 4.2percentyear the numberofCFA volunteers,particularlyrural crews andtheStateEmergencyService.Forexample, communities toparticipateinCFA andDSEsummer in theseruralareas hasbeenthereduced capacityof An importantimplicationofthedecreased population are exposedtohighbushfire risk. urban-ruralfringewhereMelbourne manyproperties and 1991,of122.5percent,wasexperiencedonthe An evengreater populationincrease between1976 protect themselvesandtheirproperty from fire. experience withfire andbeunaware ofhowto Some newerresidents intheseareas mayhaveno 25 percentoftheworkforce insomeareas. tourism-related servicesrepresenting more than throughout regional withemploymentin Victoria There hasalsobeenasignificantincrease intourism , p.27. , pp10-13. 14 Population Shift–Mobility andChangeinAustralia Second homesare generallyfoundinsomeof Population Shift–Mobilityand ChangeinAustralia , p.211. 13 16 These population 15 INF.018.002.0123 INF.018.002.0124 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Cultural Change: Changing Changes in Victorian Response Attitudes to Fire to the Threat of Unplanned Fire

2.36 The search for landscape amenity has been Changes to Legislative and Organisational paralleled by an increased interest in environmental Structures issues and conservation. This is shown by the increased membership of conservation and similar 2.39 The response of early Victorians to the threat of fires groups, including membership in rural areas. For was initially reactive and ad hoc. During the second example, the State Government’s Land for Wildlife half of the nineteenth century, fire brigades and program, in which landholders are supported to volunteer town and bush brigades slowly evolved provide habitat for native wildlife, has grown to over to help protect lives and assets. In 1890, the Fire 5,800 properties in Victoria since 1981. The Victorian Brigades Act19 established the separate responsibilities National Parks Association now has some 16,000 of the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board and Country members and supporters, around half located Fire Brigades Boards and ensured some consistency in outside of Melbourne.17 their funding. However, the country brigades remained relatively small, scattered and inadequately 2.37 A major change has also taken place in attitudes organised to meet the threat of any major bushfires about the place of fire in the Victorian landscape. In as their primary focus was townships and the (then) the early days of European settlement in Australia, fire outer metropolitan area. was an important tool for farmers and many others to assist with clearing and stimulating pasture 2.40 By 1914, a second fire brigade movement was growth. The widespread use of fire, as well as gaining momentum – the bush fire brigades, centred carelessness in its use, is clear from the Report of the on rural landowners. These brigades, the forerunner Royal Commission into the 1939 bushfires. Since to the Rural Brigades,20 were informal and had no then, however, attitudes to fire have slowly changed formal source of funding. In 1928, the Bush Fire so that where fire is used it is controlled and Brigades Association was formed to provide a voice. recognises safety issues. 2.41 In 1926, bushfires led to significant loss of life and 2.38 Nevertheless, reports following the 1939 and 1977 property in Victoria and subsequent efforts were major fires identified apathetic attitudes towards fire made to improve legislation and systems for fire except where danger was immediate.18 Increasing management. However, in 1939 the largest bushfires concern about the impacts and risks of prescribed in living memory occurred, resulting in 71 lives lost in burning – impacts on ecological values and health; one day and considerable loss of assets. risks to property and businesses such as tourism – has 2.42 The subsequent Stretton Royal Commission21 also led to apathy around bushfire prevention. In eloquently highlighted the need for Government to recent years, considerable effort has been put into address wildfire prevention and suppression needs on community education to increase awareness and all rural land in Victoria. The Government of the day preparedness for bushfires. This issue of public did not immediately act on the findings. awareness and preparedness is discussed further in Chapter 13.

17 Source: Victorian National Parks Association. 18 Stretton, L.E.B, Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Bushfires of January, 1939 and Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Occurrence of Bush and Grass Fires in Victoria, 1977. 19 The Fire Brigades Act 1890 established the Country Fire Brigades Board (CFBB) and the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board. The CFBB had extensive powers and responsibilities over volunteer fire brigades that were based more than 10 miles from Melbourne. Funding was provided in equal parts from the state of Victoria, from municipalities and from companies insuring against fire.

20 Bush Fire Brigades were the forerunner to the CFA Rural Brigades and were groups of landowners who banded together to replace the old PAGE informal arrangements. A formal organisation to support Bush Fire Brigades did not exist until 1928 when the Bush Fire Brigade Association was formed. Bush brigades relied chiefly on levies placed on landowners and donations from volunteers and the community. 17 21 Stretton, L.E.B, Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Bushfires of January, 1939. PAGE 18 2.45 2.44 2.43 operation on1January1945. model continuestoday. TheCFA commenced (now theMunicipalFire Prevention Officer). This Local Authoritiesandtheirdesignated‘Proper Officer’ prevention andplanning,theCFA wastoworkwith Board andtheBushFire Brigades.Inthearea offire replaced andsubsumedtheCountryFire Brigades totheCountryFireVictoria Authority(CFA), which Environment [DSE])andtheremainder ofrural Secretary oftheDepartmentSustainabilityand Commission (aresponsibility nowassumedbythe and suppression onpubliclandwenttotheForests arrangements. Responsibilityforwildfire prevention legislated forclarityintheorganisational 3Reportof theBushfire Review Committee onBushfire DisasterPreparedness Australia,Following the andResponseinVictoria, 23 Stretton, L.E.B,Reportofthe1944RoyalCommission. 22 Increased considerationofwildfire intheplanning • Increased investmentinresearch anddevelopment • Increased useandunderstandingoffuelreduction • Increased emphasisonresearch anddevelopment • in theareas of: and administration.Thesechangeshavebroadly been over thelastcentury, sodidthescience,technology structure forfire prevention andsuppression change Not onlydidthelegislativeandorganisational Administration Changes toScience,Technology and management onprivatelandandothersupportroles. staff and57,985volunteersinvolvedinfire 1,129 career (includingsupportandadministrative) firefighting continuestothisdayintheCFA, with However, onprivateland,thetraditionofvolunteer Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard. paid employees,permanentandcasual,ashasthe agencieshavealwaysreliedgovernment primarilyon In managingfires onpublicland,DSEandprevious second Stretton RoyalCommission Following furtherextensivefires in1944anda Fires 16February1983,April1984. schemes andtheBuildingCodes; and buildingdesign; fire onarangeofmaterials,buildingsandproducts into firefighting equipment,clothing,theeffect of detail inPartBofthisreport); intensity andassistinfire suppression (discussedin and otherfire mitigationstrategiestoreduce fire behaviour andthefactorsinfluencingthis; to developagreater understandingoffire into thescienceandecologyofbushfires inorder 22 the Government 2.47 2.46 2.51 2.50 2.49 2.48 the concert todelivereffective outcomesforVictoria. to oneagencyandthatallagenciesmustworkin recognised thatemergencyresponse isnotconfined Commissioner Millarin1984, and thereport oftheInquiryconductedbyPolice Following theAshWednesday fires of1983 five volunteerfirefighters in1998. atLinton,Victoria the AshWednesday fires in1983andthedeathsof important changesinfire managementarrangements: In more recent years,twofire eventshaveledto and LintonFires Changes followingAshWednesday impact onpeopleandproperty. are likelytobe,andtheextentwhichfires might in determininghowsuccessfulfire suppression efforts Weather atthetimeofunplannedfires canbecritical which fires suchasthoseof2002-2003,occur. Climate andweatherprovide thecontextwithin bushfires overcomingyears? us. Butcanweexpectanincrease inthenumberof As wehaveseen,unplannedfires willalwaysbewith Climate ChangeandIncreased Bushfire Risk suppression agencies. paramount intheprioritiesandprocedures offire this tragedywastoensure firefighter safetywas in thedeathsoffiveCFA firefighters. Theresponse to In 1998,arelatively smallfire nearLinton,resulted for bushfires, particularlyduringthe1980s. improve communityawareness andpreparedness progress incommunityeducationprograms to The AshWednesday fires alsoprompted considerable Gradualimprovements ininformationand • Increased emphasisontraininganddevelopment • efforts overtheyears. of whichhavesignificantlyimproved suppression equipment; andtheincreased useofaircraft –all technology, firefighting andcommunications communication technology, theuseofsatellite of allfirefighters, supervisorsandstrategists; Emergency ManagementAct1986 23 the Stateintroduced Ash Wednesday . ThisAct INF.018.002.0125 INF.018.002.0126 CHAPTER 2 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 2.52 Victoria experiences a climate conducive to the 2.58 To summarise here: Our exploratory investigations occurrence and spread of unplanned fires in nearly of the ways that global climate warming and cyclical every summer somewhere in the State. During phenomena such as El Niño drought contribute to fire periods of drought, such as those associated with El risk in Victoria reveal possible increases in fire risk as Niño events, evidence indicates there is an increased climate warms, and a higher likelihood of fire in risk of large fires. Additionally, climate change El Niño drought periods. throughout the present century is predicted to lead to increased temperatures and, with them, a heightened 2.59 It is therefore possible that a higher fire risk future risk of unplanned fire. for Australians will result from higher temperatures, changes in rainfall, and consequent altered ecosystem 2.53 As part of our Inquiry, we investigated whether dynamics (i.e. changed growing conditions for plants, Victoria must plan for an increased frequency of including altered competitive interactions, possible extreme fire weather days as the climate becomes increased biomass production and changed hotter. Specifically, we investigated whether there is fuel types). an increase in extreme fire weather during strong El Niño–Southern Oscillation events in eastern Australia. 2.60 This points to the importance of having systems in place to adjust progressively to changing 2.54 The Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology has circumstances. compiled summary statistics on Australia’s weather and climate and maintains an up-to-date analysis of short and long-term trends in key climate parameters, Recommendation especially temperature and rainfall. To assist analysis, 2.61 That DSE and CFA as part of their long the Bureau provided more detailed climate data, term planning, and in conjunction with the based on individual climate station records Melbourne Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology, consider and other selected locations in Victoria. ways in which evidence for climate change and 2.55 Long-term records for a number of climate stations in El Niño–Southern Oscillation cycle impacts on Victoria were used to estimate the daily 3 pm Forest the likelihood of unplanned fire, can be better Fire Danger Index and the Keetch-Byram Drought incorporated into preparedness and response Index, two measures of environmental conditions planning. widely accepted to be related to the probability of fire ignition and spread. These parameters were then Conclusion analysed in relation to time and to the Southern Oscillation Index to investigate the strength of 2.62 Land use has changed significantly over the last evidence for trends and cycles in the occurrence of 170 years of European settlement in Victoria and, extreme fire danger weather in Victoria. to a large degree, changing patterns of population destination has mirrored this. The interface between 2.56 We also examined the results of relevant public and private land was once an issue for the investigations into extreme fire weather conditions farmer only; this is no longer the case with increasing described in reports and working papers written by growth in both permanent and weekend Bureau of Meteorology staff. communities now at the direct interface with public land. 2.57 Specific findings of our investigation are outlined in detail in the paper ‘Climate, Weather and Unplanned 2.63 Last century, Victorians realised that unplanned fire Fires in Victoria’, attached as Appendix V to this would always be with us and they introduced a range report. of legislative and organisation responses to prevent and suppress fires. There is no doubt that Victorians are significantly more skilled in both these areas and have engaged on a continuous improvement strategy to better cope with our fire prone environment. Much of this report details the significant advances that have been made and opportunities for Victorian to advance further. PAGE 19 PAGE 20 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 Co-operative Arrangements Current Legislationand Chapter 3 • • • • • • September 2002. Department ofNaturalResources andEnvironment, the CountryFire Authority(CFA) andthethen the InquiryisCo-operativeAgreement between responsibilities. TheAgreement ofmostinterest to agencies onhowtheseimplementtheir of Understandingprovide detailfororganisationsand In addition,anumberofagreements andMemoranda • with protecting from Victoria fire. Theseinclude: A numberofotherActsimpactonagenciescharged • • Key legislationincludes: Victorian Legislation 2002–2003 fires. agencies inpreparing forandsuppressing the events. LaterChaptersassesstheeffectiveness of multi-agency preparation andresponse tobushfire This ChaptergivesthelegislativecontextforVictoria’s community. and communicationbetweenagenciesthe only succeedifthere isahighlevelofco-operation large numberofagenciesandorganisationscan Current arrangementsare complex;theyinvolvea those emergenciesonthecommunity. arrangements inplacetominimisetheimpactof in particular, fire. Italsodescribesco-operative relating tothemanagementofemergencies– legislation This ChapterdescribestheVictorian Overview • • • • National ParksAct1975 Catchment andLandProtectionAct1994 Alpine Resorts(Management)Act1997 Environment ProtectionAct1970 Transport Act1983 Flora andFaunaGuaranteeAct1988 Electricity Act1998 Metropolitan FireBrigadesAct1958 Emergency ManagementAct1986 Local GovernmentAct1989 Planning andEnvironmentAct1987 Forests Act1958 Country FireAuthorityAct1958 Country ; ; ; ; . ; ; and ; ; ; and ; ; . 3.8 3.7 3.11 3.10 3.9 Compensationarrangementsofregistered • ‘StateofDisaster’arrangements;and • Recoveryplanningandmanagement; • The utilise fire andemergencyservices. co-operation betweentheagenciestoeffectively (MFESB) andCFA andencouragefacilitate Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard can setandmonitorperformancestandards forthe planning, includingthefire services.TheOESC (OESC) abroad role inemergencyprevention Office oftheEmergencyServicesCommissioner The Emergency ManagementAct1986 predominantly withbushfires. Of these,itisthelattertwoagenciesthatdeal DepartmentofSustainabilityandEnvironment • CountryFire Authority;and • Metropolitan Fire andEmergencyServicesBoard; • Three agenciesrespond directly tofires inVictoria: The FireAgencies Sergeant), locatedwithineachmunicipality. Co-ordinators (usuallyanInspectororSenior sponsorship ofPoliceMunicipalEmergencyResponse their jurisdiction.Thistaskiscarriedoutunderthe to planforemergenciesthatmayoccurwithin including AlpineResortManagementBoards, and responsibilities placedonMunicipalCouncils, including fire. Ofparticularnoteare theobligations response planningandco-ordination foremergencies, specific responsibilities forthedevelopmentof Further tothesearrangements,theActoutlines arrangements forregistered emergencyworkers. Co-ordinator-in-Chief andPart6coverscompensation outlines thedeclaration,powersanddutiesof regional recovery committees.Part5oftheAct Co-ordinator andtheestablishmentofstate co-ordinating agencyforrecovery, aStateRecovery Recovery Plan.Thisincludestheappointmentofa Part 3AoftheActoutlinesStateEmergency emergency workers. (DSE). Emergency ManagementAct Emergency ManagementAct1986 also addresses: gives the INF.018.002.0127 INF.018.002.0128 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Metropolitan Fire and Emergency 3.17 Section 20 of the CFA Act states that the general Services Board duty of the CFA is ‘superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the prevention and suppression 3.12 Under section 7 of the Metropolitan Fire Brigades of fires and for the protection of life and property in Act 1958, MFESB has the function of suppressing case of fires…’.2 However, CFA does not have sole and preventing fire in the Metropolitan Fire District. responsibility for fire prevention in the country area This covers the Melbourne Central Business District of Victoria. It must work with the Municipal Councils through to Laverton in the west, Tullamarine and and public authorities to fulfil its fire prevention role.3 Somerton in the north, Croydon in the east and Both CFA and Local Government have a duty to Clayton and Mentone in the south. This is an area prevent fire. of approximately 1,100 square kilometres with a population of approximately 2.2 million.1 3.18 CFA fulfils its fire prevention role through a number of means. These include the Declaration of Fire 3.13 In the Metropolitan Fire District there are few Danger Periods4 within a municipality or part of a opportunities to engage in fighting bushfires. municipality, and Declarations of Total Fire Bans.5 However, there are some areas of protected public CFA also provides leadership within the fire land – for example, along the Merri Creek and the prevention planning process and provides training, Yarra – which DSE would normally have control of in advice and support to Municipal Fire Prevention respect of fire suppression. Following agreement Officers. CFA undertakes community education between the Chief Officers of the MFESB and DSE, programs to deliver appropriate fire safety and MFESB have assumed control for fire suppression in prevention messages to the community. These these areas. DSE and CFA assist MFESB as required if include intensive face-to-face activities. specific bushfire expertise or equipment is needed. Department of Sustainability and 3.14 While some small pockets of the Melbourne Environment Metropolitan Fire District contain public land and/or abut CFA areas (and could therefore be viewed as 3.19 DSE is responsible for fire prevention and suppression potential bushfire areas), CFA and DSE are the for Victoria’s 7.7 million hectares of public land agencies that deal mainly with bushfire. including forests, National Parks, and protected public lands. Section 62(1) of the Forests Act 1958 states Country Fire Authority that the Secretary’s duty is ‘to carry out proper and sufficient work for the prevention and suppression of 3.15 The CFA is established under section 6(1) of the fire in every State forest and national park and on all Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (CFA Act) and is protected public land…’.6 mandated to provide for the ‘more effective’ control and prevention and suppression of fires in the 3.20 Protected public land is defined in section 3 of the country area of Victoria. Forests Act 1958 and includes State Forests, National and State Parks, wilderness areas and Crown 3.16 The country area of Victoria is defined in the Reserves. This includes areas managed by an Alpine CFA Act to mean that part of Victoria outside the Resort Management Board. Metropolitan Fire District, not including forest, National Park, or protected public land. CFA is 3.21 DSE fire management planning operates at three therefore responsible for fire protection to all other distinct levels: parts of Victoria including outer metropolitan Melbourne and regional centres, rural areas and • Strategic fire plans; plantation forests. This equates to approximately • Fire operations plans; and 15 million hectares of land, approximately one • Individual burn plans. million homes and 2.6 million people.

1 Based on 2001 ABS data. 2 The powers given to the CFA to achieve its suppression and prevention roles are set out at ss20AA, s23, s28, s29, s30, s33 and a variety of ancillary provisions of the Country Fire Authority Act, 1958.

3 s43, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958; S8 and Schedule 1 of the Local Government Act 1989. PAGE 4 s4, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958.

5 s40, Country Fire Authority Act, 1958. 21 6 DSE’s powers to carry out its fire suppression and prevention roles are contained generally in ss63–69 of the Forests Act 1958. PAGE 22 3.26 3.25 3.24 3.23 3.22 of thestrategiessetoutinitsFire Protection Plans. systematic planningapproach totheimplementation unclear. has beentransferred totheCFA, makingdelineation some locationsaround theStatewhere thatpower both control andlightingoffires. Howeverthere are DepartmentofNaturalResources andEnvironment, 8 7 in thesuppression offire. of eachfire andensures theagenciesworktogether ensures there isaclearlineofauthorityinrespect to haveoverallcontrol ofresponse activities.This MFESB) mayappointanofficer ofonetheagencies the ChiefOfficers inrespect offire (includingthe Management Act1986 This arrangementisoutlinedinthe agency isdeemedthecontrol agencyforthefire. When thefire traversespublicandprivateland,one have responsibility oversuppression (seeFigure 3.1). or publicland,eitherCFA orDSErespectively will Depending onwhetherthefire islocatedonprivate CFA andDSESuppressing Fire Together Fire ManagementonPublicLand applying andpromoting the education programs, declaringprohibited periods, DSE undertakesitsfire responsibilities byrunning of anyNationalParkorStateForest. of fire hazards onprivatelandwithin1.5kilometres DSE hasthediscretionary powertodirect theremoval broader community. DSE alsoundertakesfurtherconsultationwiththe Park, DSEhasarepresentative onthisCommittee. adjacent tooradjoinsanypartofaforest orNational Prevention Committee.Where themunicipaldistrictis relevant CFA Group meetingsandtheMunicipalFire strategies forpublicandprivatelandisthrough Communication aboutrespective fire prevention detail inChapter14. the widercommunity. Theyare discussed inmore relevant and stakeholdersincludingParksVictoria developed through aconsultationprocess with plansforspecificlocations.Theseareburn development offire operationsplansandindividual which are developedforeachDSEdistrict,guidethe and priorityforfuelmanagementworks.Theseplans, zones thatprovide aguidetoappropriate treatments Strategic fire plansidentifyfivefuelmanagement 9 Forests Act1958 Local GovernmentAct 1989 ; s65. which provides thatanyof S8 andSchedule1confer thefunctionof“fire prevention and protection” onMunicipal Councils. Code ofPracticefor 8 and through its Emergency 7 This relates to Code ofPracticefor FireManagementonPublicLand,1995 3.28 3.27 3.31 3.30 3.29 arrangements inplace. extensive incidentcontrol andco-operative Fire PreventionandPreparedness detailed intheAuditor-General's May2003report most recently agreed toinSeptember2002and between thetwoagencies.Thisarrangement– with theaimofachievingseamlessco-ordination CFA were putinplacefollowingtheLintontragedy further co-operativearrangementsbetweenDSEand Liaisewithmedia. • Provide informationtoaffected communities • Overseeimplementationoftactics; • Co-ordinate therequests forandmanagement • Co-ordinate communication; • Determineandco-ordinate strategy; • incident control centre isestablishedto: Most importantlyforfire response, ajointly-staffed In additiontothe prevention role inthecountryarea ofVictoria. (and publicauthorities),haveasignificantprimaryfire In conjunctionwiththeCFA, MunicipalCouncils Municipal Councils agencies. requirements for theparticipationofmanythese Current legislationdoesnotprovide Victorian specific Theelectricityindustry, theOffice oftheChief • AlpineResortManagementBoards; and • The79MunicipalCouncils; • OtherpartsofDSE’s portfoliothrough theOffice • Office oftheEmergencyServices Commissioner; • MFESB,CFA andDSE; • of agenciesorbodies: Fire preparedness andprevention involvesamyriad in FireManagement Other AgenciesandOrganisations and thewidercommunity; of resources; some ofthemanyagenciesinvolved. andVicTrackAuthorities, VicRoads, –toname Electrical Inspector, theforest industry, Water Victoria; of Planning,theBuildingCommissionandParks Emergency ManagementAct1986 – setsoutthe INF.018.002.0129 9 , PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 23 CHAPTER 3 INF.018.002.0130 Major townLakes Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW/SA CategoryPublic land Reserves & other Conservation Parks forest State 4.23 million timber production for forest State (1.05 million) (ha) area Approximate million 7.70 3.50 million Source: DSE. Note 1: Total land base for Victoria is 22.83 million hectares. DSE. Note 1: Total Source: used is available and currently of State forest Note 2: 1.05 million hectares for timber production. Table 3.1: Public Land Types for which DSE has for 3.1: Public Land Types Table Management Responsibilities Fire Figure 3.1: Public and Private Land in Victoria Public and Private 3.1: Figure PAGE 24 3.36 3.35 3.34 3.33 3.32 0s62(2) 10 Flora andFaunaGuarantee. Framework andtheimplementation ofthe preparedness suchastheNativeVegetation measures thatimpactonfire prevention and may alsoneedtodealwithother environmental on theirplanningschememaps.Municipalcouncils councils haveWMOsandthisclassificationisnoted treatments tomitigatetheeffects offire. Twenty-six fire intensityishighenoughtowarrantspecial scheme. TheWMOidentifieslandwhere thepotential Management Overlay(WMO)totheplanning Wildfire Act 1987 Clause 15ofthe fire authorities. protection guidelinesandseektheadviceofrelevant affecting identifiedareas, haveregard tospecificfire schemes, considerfire hazards inplanningdecisions councils toidentifypriorityhazards inplanning guideline (thewildfire planningguide)thatrequires Office ofPlanningwithinDSE.There isanoverarching Planning PolicyFramework,administered bythe area. ThisplanningschemesitswithintheStatewide the use,developmentandprotection oflandforan administer andenforce aplanningschemetosetout Act 1987 Under Section14ofthe procedure hasnotbeeninvoked. responsibilities (ss45–46CFA Act).To date,this Authority isfailingtocarryoutitsfire prevention if itissatisfiedthataMunicipalCouncilorPublic a MunicipalCouncil’s fire responsibilities totheCFA the CFA canaskthe Governor-in-Council totransfer to fulfiltheirobligationsundertheCFA Act.However, Municipal Councilscannotbesanctionediftheyfail prevention infringementnotice. may alsoissueafire prevention noticeorafire Council's dutiesinrespect offire prevention, acouncil Prevention Officer (s96AoftheCFA Act).To enforce addition, allCouncilsmustappointaMunicipalFire Act) overseesthedevelopmentofthisplan.In be establishedaccording tosection54oftheCFA The MunicipalFire Prevention Committee(whichmust Municipal CouncilsmusthaveaFire Prevention Plan. statesall Further, section55AoftheCFA Act under itscare andmanagement’. it orunderitscontrol ormanagement;andanyroad the spread offires onandfrom –anylandvestedin occurrence offires on,andminimisethedangerof topreventall practicablesteps(includingburning) the every municipalcouncilandpublicauthoritytotake states‘itisthedutyof Section 43oftheCFA Act 1s33(1) 11 Forests Act1958 Country FireAuthorityAct1958 Country , allowsMunicipalCouncilstoapplya , MunicipalCouncilsare required todevelop, Planning andEnvironment . Planning andEnvironment . 3.38 3.37 3.41 3.40 3.39 of theAlpineBoard ofManagementArea. for managingfuelonpubliclanduptotheboundary undertaken. priortofireVictoria prevention worksbeing a statutoryobligationtoseekagreement withParks and suppression onallNationalParksandalsohas DSE hasstatutoryresponsibility forfire prevention and PortPhillipWesternportBays. the LowerYarra, andPattersonRivers, Maribyrnong responsibilities fortherecreational managementof alsohas parks andopenspacenetwork.ParksVictoria State andregionalmetropolitan parks,Melbourne's with responsibility forNationalParks,Wilderness, portfolio. ItisthelargestlandmanagerinVictoria isaStatutoryAuthoritywithintheDSE Parks Victoria Parks Victoria between DSEandCFA. prevention responsibilities followinganagreement except MountBaware underCFA’s fire and are therefore aDSEresponsibility, allresorts Although AlpineResortsare locatedonpublicland Alpine Resorts Ecologicalsites(forrare andthreatened species). • Culturalsitesrelating toAborigines, earlysettlers • Infrastructure (e.g.management buildings, • assets suchas: includessubstantial Land managedbyParksVictoria DSE toreview thePlans. Finally, anyaggrievedpartycanasktheSecretary, Branch, DSE,review themandresolve differences. andtheExecutiveDirector,Victoria Fire Management Before Fire Protection Plansare finalised,Parks plans anditsstrategicFire Protection Plans. consulted whenDSEauditsitsannualfire operations Operations PlansforeachDSEFire Districtandis in thedevelopmentofFire Protection PlansandFire mine sites,loggingtramtracksandtrails); (e.g. mountaincattlemanhuts)andindustry centres, walkingtrails); accommodation, informationandinterpretive 10 Parks Victoria isamajorstakeholder Parks Victoria 11 DSE stillretains responsibility INF.018.002.0131 INF.018.002.0132 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 3.42 Alpine areas are managed by Alpine Resort 3.47 MWC and DSE entered into an agreement in Management Boards. These Board are deemed December 1995 (shortly after the Melbourne to be a Municipal Councils for the purposes of the Metropolitan Board of Works was dismantled and Emergency Management Act 1986.12 As such, Boards became MWC) that recognises that DSE has the must prepare and maintain a Municipal Emergency primary legal responsibility for fire prevention and Management Plan (under section 20 of the suppression (under the Forests Act 1958) but Emergency Management Act 1986). Such plans are acknowledges MWC's role in this respect (under primarily for emergency prevention, response and section 321 of the National Parks Act 1975). That recovery. While they encompass fire prevention and agreement states MWC must be consulted about, suppression, the plans are cast at a management and agree with, the preparation of Fire Protection rather than operational level. Plans for its water catchment areas. MWC has its own standing fire suppression force of approximately 3.43 Despite this classification, Alpine areas do not have 50 full time staff, which is trained up to DSE to participate in Municipal Fire Prevention Committees standards and which, like DSE’s own force, is and are not required to prepare and maintain supplemented during each fire season. Municipal Fire Prevention Plans and have those plans audited by CFA every three years. They do not need 3.48 Interfacing with the Water Authorities and DSE to appoint a Municipal Fire Prevention Officer. are ten Catchment Management Authorities. Their general responsibilities (outlined in section 4 of the Water Authorities and Catchment Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994) are to Management Authorities maintain and enhance long-term land productivity while also conserving the environment. Catchment 3.44 Providing water is the province of five water Management Authorities aim to maintain and authorities (wholesalers), three metropolitan retailers enhance the quality of the State's land and water (licensees), 15 regional urban authorities, and one resources (and associated plant and animal life). irrigation trust. In the Melbourne metropolitan area They have no explicit statutory responsibility for there is one wholesaler (Melbourne Water) and three fire prevention. The Fire Protection Plans and Fire retailers. In the rest of Victoria there are four rural Operations Plans developed by DSE are required to water authorities, one water trust and 14 regional take into account the special characteristics of the urban water authorities. catchment areas.

3.45 Despite this number of entities, DSE and Parks Electricity Industry and Office of the Victoria are primarily responsible for fire prevention Chief Electrical Inspector and suppression in Victoria's water catchment areas. This is because, for the most part, Victoria's 3.49 The Office of the Chief Electrical Inspector (OCEI) significant reservoirs and catchment areas are has the statutory authority for ensuring that electrical located in National Parks or State Forests. companies minimise the risk of fire to the community. This authority is derived from Part 8 of the Electricity 3.46 Some water authorities (for example, Melbourne Safety Act 1998, which sets out the regime for Water Corporation [MWC] and Goulburn Murray electric line clearance in Victoria, and is backed by Water) also own freehold land on which balancing the Electric Line Clearance Regulations 1999, the storages are located. Because these are located in the Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation) Regulations country area of Victoria, CFA has fire prevention and 2003 and the Code of Practice for Electric Line suppression responsibility. The authorities work with Clearance. The regime contained in the Act, the CFA and the Municipal Fire Prevention Regulations and Code requires all electricity suppliers Committees to manage the fire risk on these to prepare a bushfire mitigation plan for the area properties. their supply covers.

12 s5 Alpine Resorts (Management) Act 1997. PAGE 25 PAGE 26 3.55 3.54 3.53 3.52 3.51 3.50 significant holdingsoveramore dispersedarea. as itdoesnotcaterforownerswhomighthave 4Amendments tothe 14 Seesections6.7to6.15of Auditor-General Victoria’s 13 controlled by15different plantationowners. There are now over25suchbrigadesinoperation, plantations. disproportionate burden forfire suppression in set uptoensure CFA localbrigadesdidnotcarrya State-owned plantationswere privatised.Theywere The forest brigadescameintobeingwhenVictoria's brigade. required toestablish,equipandstaff aforest industry plantation withina25kilometre radius,theymaybe plantation ownerhasmore than500hectares of Under amendmentstotheCFA Act,where a The Forest Industry those plansauditedbyanyofbodies. accordance withwiderfire prevention plans,norare that theCodeorBushfire MitigationPlansare in StateEmergencyService(VICSES)toensureVictoria required toconsultwiththeCFA, OESCorthe Practice forElectricLineClearance.OCEIare not recommendations onthepreparation oftheCode relevant stakeholdersprovide adviceand Consultative Committee.Representatives from all OCEI alsooverseestheElectricLineClearance for bushfire mitigationplans. OCEI prescribes thecontentandminimumstandards Electricity Safety(Bushfire Mitigation)Regulations, As of1July2003followingintroduction ofthenew mitigation plan. area andare notrequired toprepare abushfire have anyareas designatedasahazardous fire risk Of themainelectricitysuppliersonlyCitipowerdonot hazardous fire riskarea are auditedannuallybyOCEI. plans forthecompanieswithareas designatedasa Citipower andUnitedEnergy. Bushfire mitigation TXU, Powercor, AGLEnergy, CountryEnergy, company SPIPowerNetandthesixsupplycompanies: mitigation plan.Theseare themaintransmission with OCEI,mustprepare anannualbushfire There are sevenmaincompanieswho,inconjunction 6Pursuant tos11(1)ofthe 16 Specifically, sub-sections 16(1)(a)(b)and(e). 15 7Pursuanttos60 ofthe 17 14 This requirement isopentointerpretation, Country FireAuthorityAct,1958 Country Rail CorporationsAct 1996 Rail CorporationsAct 1996 . 13 . Fire PreventionandPreparedness (s23AA). 3.57 3.56 3.60 3.59 3.58 for roads inthe roads are derivedfrom theirgeneralresponsibilities broader MunicipalFire Prevention Plan. co-ordinate anyroad clearanceworkwithintheir fire prevention agencies,however, MunicipalCouncils ordinate itsroad maintenanceprogram withthemain under theCFA Act. Neitheragencyisrequired toco- with theirgeneralresponsibility forfire prevention the dutiesinrespectVicRoads’ ofroads are containedin private owner. perspective. Privateroads are theresponsibility ofthe safe from afire prevention andriskmanagement Councils are responsible forkeepingroads clearand other localruralroads. andMunicipal VicRoads roads). MunicipalCouncilsare responsible forall roads (suchasmajorarterials,forest roads andtourist areVicRoads responsible formaintainingalldeclared andCouncils Roads: VicRoads maintenance toanothercontractor. Both sub-lesseeshavesub-contractedrailline carrying outVicTrack’s statutoryfire responsibilities. sub-lessees havetheoperationalresponsibility for allowotheroperators tousethetrack.These in turn, railtracktotwomainlessees–who, leased Victoria's Department ofInfrastructure. They, havesub- inturn, head leasetothePublicTransport Divisionofthe VicTrack hasdelegatedthesefunctionsthrough a railway track. obstruction ordangerifitiswithin60metres ofa or remove anytree orwoodthatcouldbean owners andlandoccupiers,requiring themtofell VicTrack alsohasthepowertoserveanoticeon manage andmaintainrailwaysrail Act 1996 a bodycorporateestablishedbythe VicTrack RailTrack, isthetradingnameofVictorian VicTrack includes fire mitigationandprevention work. Although notexplicitlymentioningfire, thisfunction around railwaytracksbekeptclearandsafe. statutory functionandthemeanstorequire thatland Transport Act1983 for furtherdetail. . VicTrack hastheresponsibility toestablish, 17 In otherwords, VicTrack hasthe Local GovernmentAct1989 . 15 Councils’ roles inrespect of Rail Corporations infrastructure. coupled INF.018.002.0133 16 INF.018.002.0134 CHAPTER 3 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 3.61 If fire prevention works are not carried out, VicTrack Conclusion cannot be compelled to carry out works by Municipal Councils or the CFA as it is a public authority and not 3.66 As noted at the start of this Chapter, current subject to the serving of a fire prevention notice by a legislative arrangements are complex and involve Municipal Council.18 However, such a notice may be a large number of agencies and organisations. served on the lessees of railway track, because they Co-operation, communication and goodwill are are private companies. essential for such a complex system to work well.

3.62 The chain of command for fire prevention work 3.67 Chapter 5 notes the many submissions that praised on and around railway track is unclear and, as and criticised the effectiveness of co-operation and the Auditor-General's 2003 Report noted, many communication between agencies and the municipalities are themselves unclear as to who community. In Chapter 16 we assess how well our has responsibility for addressing fire prevention emergency management procedures work within concerns on leased lines. this legislative framework.

3.63 The Public Transport Division of the Department of Infrastructure has a co-ordinated Emergency/Incident Management Response Plan that includes bushfire. The Public Transport Division also holds bi-monthly co-ordination meetings with the rail bodies. The CFA, OESC, VICSES or any other body with fire management experience does not audit this plan.19

Building Commission

3.64 Under the Building Act 1993 and Building Regulation 1994, Councils can identify bushfire-prone areas and apply a WMO. WMO and bushfire-prone areas are now mapped using identical requirements. The effect of building a development in a bushfire prone area is that construction must be in accordance with the Building Code of Australia requirements.

3.65 The Building Code of Australia is generally reliant on the Australian Standard AS 3959 (the Standard) to provide specific requirements relating to construction in bushfire-prone areas. The Standard generally includes requirements for burning debris and ember protection, radiant heat and flame contact protection, controls on the combustibility of external materials, and the protection of openings, such as windows and doors. It is prescriptive in specifying construction requirements. The criteria for identifying the various risk categories in bushfire-prone areas is an aspect of the Standard more open to interpretation.

18 s41(1) Country Fire Authority Act 1958. 19 For further detail, see Auditor-General Victoria, Fire Prevention and Preparedness, 2003, 6.16–6.31. PAGE 27 PAGE 28 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 Victorian Fires The Storyofthe2002-2003 Chapter 4 the DSE follows, basedondetaileddailyrecords prepared by fire eventsfrom December2002toMarch 2003 fires –drought. Achronological narrativeofthekey Premier andCabinetwebsite. records canbe accessedontheDepartmentof Forexample,industryandthe public gavesignificantdonationstofirefighting agenciestohelp withfire suppression andrec 1 affected communities. positive andnegativeimpactsonfirefighters and engagement. We thentellanotherstory–oneof stories ofmulti-agencyco-operationandcommunity of humanresources andequipmentweoverlaythe country, threatened townshipsandtheco-ordination Onto thisstoryofdrought, dramaticweather, remote startbyhighlightinganimportantcontextfor the We of allinvolved. minimal loss–wasamajorachievementonthepart in aflexible,responsive andco-operativeway–with second, ittellsusthatsuppressing theseextreme fires multiple outbreaks andgeographicalspread. And fires were exceptionallysevere intermsoflength, Reference. First,itreminds usthatthe2002–2003 recommendations againstthethree Terms of important contextforourlateranalysesand of thestory2002-2003fires. Itservesasan achievements aswellthelosses,whichwere part This Chapteroutlinessomeofthesignificant broader fire story. were alsoaffected andthey, too,contributetothe communities –industry, themediaandpublic– their ownstoriesoffear, lossandtriumph.Victorian Thousands ofpeoplelivinginfire-affected areas have just tofightthefires, butinmanyothersupportroles. community members.Peopleworkedtogether–not personnel, includingagencyfirefighters and involving 3,000fires andmanythousandsof This wasawidespread, long-lasting,fire season 2002-2003 fire season. responses, successesandchallengesofVictoria’s justice tothemultipleandcomplexexperiences, There canbenosingle,definitivestorythatgives Overview 4 DSE website: Victorian Resources DSEwebsite:Victorian Online. 4 fires as‘formidable’. task ofpiecingtogetherarecord ofthe2002-2003 Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)describedthe CountryFire Authority, From the 3 The2003AlpineFires, DSE,July2003. 2 2 and theCountryFire Authority(CFA). 1 Not surprisingly, theDepartmentof Foothills totheAlpine Heights, 3 Both CFA’s AppendixF. SubmissiontoVictoria’s 2002-2003Bushfire Inquiry, 2003 4.7 4.6 4.12 4.11 4.10 4.9 4.8 restrictions andafurther196hadlowlevels. severe restrictions, 32onmoderatelysevere wereVictoria onwaterrestrictions; sevenwere on West regions. By6December, 235townsacross situation mostsevere intheNorthCentraland severity were inplaceacross withthe Victoria, By theendof2002,waterrestrictions ofvarying water storageslow. and springrainfallin2002keptstreamflows and time in2000and2001.However, thelackofwinter on average,betterinMay2002thanatthesame water supplyissues.Thestateofstorageswas, communities. Thedrought resulted inconsiderable in itssixthyearhadamajorimpactonrural In theperiodleadinguptofires, severe drought for theFires Drought –AKeyContext general counselling. for supportofvariouskindsincluding financialand Understandably, therecovery effort hasseen theneed Defendingtheirownandothers’property from fire • Maintainingbusinesses;and • anincome from Earning otherformsof • Handfeedingandwateringstock; • between priorities,including: source ofhardship. Communitieswere frequently torn doing ithard, thebushfires provided anadditional For manyinruralcommunitieswhohadalready been impact ofthebushfires. economic stress thatleftthemvulnerabletothe season, ruralcommunitiesfacedsignificantsocialand CFA volunteerstoprepare fortheforthcomingfire As theStateaskedcommunities,householdersand and otherwaterqualityproblems. and tourismcreated potentialforalgalblooms Lakes EildonandEppalockimpactedonrecreation Low waterlevelsinstreams, theHumeDamandin lower waterallocationstoirrigators. fruit trees, vinesandotherhorticulture. Itmeant impact onbreeding stock.)Thedrought threatened hadapotential stock tofindfeed.(This,inturn, increased costsforhandfeedingstockandmoving Poorpastures Victoria. meant particularly innorthern reduction infarmincomesandemployment, For thefarmsector, thedrought meantasignificant over alonganddifficult season. employment, sometimesinremote locations; overy. 4 INF.018.002.0135 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 29 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0136 TownFreeways/Highways Lakes NSW/SA Public Land Bass Strait Perimeter Fire Victoria Figure 4.1: Big Desert Fire Area Big Desert Fire 4.1: Figure PAGE 30 4.16 4.15 4.14 4.13 Forexample,theGenoafire, ignitedpriortothemain alpinefires, was classifiedascontainedandtheSale,Erica, Heyfield 6 Atthepeakoffire, over300firefighters, ninebombingaircraft and75vehicleswere deployed. 5 that followed. resources availabletofightthemultipleoutbreaks of resourcing did, however, impactonthelocal The fire wascontainedwithinafewdays.Thelevel supported bybulldozersandfirebombing aircraft. firefighters were allocatedtotheYambulla fire, main fires startedon8January, atotalof180DSE significant firefighting resources. Atthetime fire wasseenasposingamajorthreat andrequired area, NorthWest ofGenoainEastGippsland.The 8 January, lightningignitedafire intheYambulla Two daysbefore thelightningstrikesof7and Yambulla Fire –6to11January resources (Figure 4.1). predominantly publiclandandrequiring significant in20years,affectingin Victoria 181,400hectares of The BigDesertFire was,atthetimebiggestfire dense malleescrub. undulating sanddunecountryandareas of posed achallenge:accesswasdifficult inthe affected paddocks.Notjustweather, butterrain ontoprivateland,runningacrossburned drought- uncharacteristic southerlywinds,fingersoffire edgeofthepark,drivenby On thenorthern ParkandpartofWyperfeldNationalPark. Wilderness had merged,coveringlargeareas oftheBigDesert days,thetwooriginalfires thunderstorm. Within generated bythefire itself,causedalocalised intensity. Atmosphericconditionsintheregion, and erraticwindsfollowed,producing highfire North West. Severaldaysofveryhightemperatures ParkinVictoria’sin theBigDesertWilderness remote On 17December, alightningstormstartedtwofires The BigDesertFire –17to25December Outlook –wentonhighalert. significant riskfollowingtheBureau’s JulySeasonal agencies across theState–already aware ofthe leading uptothe1983AshWednesday fires. Fire Meteorology thatconditionswere similartothose receivedGovernment noticefrom theBureau of a warm,dryspringandtheongoingdrought, the in earlyJanuary. Atthebeginningofsummer, after by thetimeNorthEastandGippslandfires started reported inSeptember. Manyfires hadbeenattended The firstfires ofthe2002-2003fire seasonwere The 2002-2003FireSeason Thosefires inthe NorthEastwere grouped intocomplexes managedbytheOvensandCorryong IncidentManagementTeams. Corryon 7 Management Teams were closedoverthe week withmostfires under control inthearea. Feathertop/Harrietville area. The Razorback/MtCooper fire northofOmeo wasmanagedby theIncidentManagement Team atSwifts threatening tocross theborder from NSW. Ovens managedthe MtBuffalo fire andfivefires intheMtBeauty, MtBogong, andMt managed theCravensville fire andthePinnibar fire neartheNSW border. Thelatterwasmanaged asajointincidentwithNSW, w 5 4.18 4.17 4.22 4.21 4.20 4.19 East –continuedtoburn. fires –mostlyinsteep,inaccessibleforest intheNorth 14 Januaryasmallnumberoffires remained. These break through control lines. inexorable’. Despitetheirefforts, fires continuedto progress ofthe fires atthisstageas‘notragingbut hampered aerialsupport.Firefighters describedthe number andlocationofthefires aswellturbulence attack thefires andconstructcontrol lines.The Mt Feathertop.Handcrews andaircraft continuedto on theMtBuffalo plateau,MtArthur, Razorbackand challenges tofirefighters especiallyAnderson’s Peak Victoria andGippslandfiresVictoria (seeFigure 4.2). January 8isconsidered dayoneoftheNorthEast lightning overtheborder inNewSouthWales. regions andafurther42fires were ignitedby Park. Anothereightfires were reported inother mountainous, forested areas oftheAlpineNational North EastandGippsland.Manywere in lightning strikesthatignitedover80fires inVictoria’s dramatic, drythunderstormsbrought widespread Late onTuesday January7andearlythenextday, The FirstWeek –7to14January The NorthEastandGippslandfires season ahead. border)Victorian provided atasteoftheextreme fire four firesinKosciuskoNationalParknearthe burning The BigDesertfires andtheYambulla fire (aswellas Figure 4.3showsthefireson11January. burning the initialfires were containedorundercontrol. There were earlysuccesses.Bythesecondday, 40of are fullydiscussedinChapter17. weather conditions,compoundedthis.Theseissues country, inwhichtheignitionsstarted,aswell was difficult forthefirefighting agencies.Theremote detection ofthenumberandlocationsomanyfires The situationwasextremely complex.Accurate large numberoffires onbothprivateandpublicland. moved from otherareas. TheCFA alsoresponded toa effort onthefirstdaywithafurther265being Around 280DSEpersonnelwere involvedinthefire 7 These fires presented huge and Yarram Incident ith fires Creek. INF.018.002.0137 g 6 By PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 31 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0138 8-9 Jan Lightning StrikesMajor town Freeways/Highways NSW Lakes Public Land Bass Strait Victoria Figure 4.2: Lightning Strikes 7 and 8 January 2003 7 and 8 January Lightning Strikes 4.2: Figure PAGE 32 Figure 4.3:Fires Burning lc reasHgwy asSri Victoria NSW BassStrait PublicLand Freeways/Highways Lakes Fire Perimeter-11/1/2003 Place Day 4 11January2003 , INF.018.002.0139 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 33 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0140 apman, Holder reached Weston reached The Stanley fire 11 10 On 21 January, six fires started in the vicinity of six fires On 21 January, but the controlled Beechworth. Of these, four were two, known as the Stanley and Eldorado remaining rapidly with south-westerly winds gusting spread fires, very low humidity and per hour, up to 50 kilometres over 30 degrees. temperatures of Bright, Wandiligong, residents On 22 January, warned were that the Mt and Porepunkah Freeburgh was Fire was travelling in their direction. fire Buffalo of Harrietville and the town of within 500 metres Dartmouth was under threat. for the Ban was declared Fire a Total On 25 January, in the North whole of the State and temperatures that temperature in the 40s. (Melbourne’s East were – the second highest on record day was 44.5 degrees in threatened 1939.) Houses were after Black Friday, of Bright. CFA North West the Buckland Valley, of Victoria on the rest attended 237 incidents across some of which had the potential to become this day, large outbreaks. North East and Ban in the Fire Another day of Total The fire on 26 January. Gippsland was declared danger index was one of the highest of the fire and erratic. There behaviour was extreme period; fire at Mt Hotham and to property was continuing threat Dinner Plain; the township of Benambra was houses lost. A further six with three threatened, lost near Cobungra along with sheds houses were and stock. At this time, Harrietville and the Alpine resorts of Falls At this time, Harrietville and the Alpine resorts threatened Dinner Plain and Mt Hotham were Creek, private deployed to help protect were and crews lightning ignited a fire assets. Among other new fires, Gippsland in far-East in the National Park near Tubbut on 17 with New South Wales) (near the border placed further demand on DSE and This fire January. as ‘very described were a time when resources at CFA to whole time’. stretched threatened the outskirts of the Stanley township, threatened of pine four houses and a large area destroying contained by 27 January. were plantation. These fires 4.29 4.30 4.31 4.32 4.28 8 9 with the fires in the Kosciusko National Park (in with the fires and New South Wales); Mt Bogong and Razorback, all of around the fires steep mountain country. in remote, which were Creek at the same time as a tornado. Combined, they resulted in the tragic devastation to Canberra suburbs, including Duffy, Ch the same time as a tornado. in the tragic devastation to Canberra suburbs, including Duffy, at Creek Combined, they resulted burnt 160 000 hectares. and Kambah. Overall, the fires almost 70 per cent of the ACT – around 10 2003. January to March DSE Submission to Inquiry; Victorian Alpine Fires, 11 was established in Beechworth to manage these new fires. An Incident Management Team 8 A9 on nine days during this fortnight for either the North East or the State. ban was declared total fire pine plantations and generated a large, dry thunderstorm and tornadoes. The fire near Canberra destroyed fires On 18 January, there was a major expansion of the fires in Victoria. was a major expansion of the fires there the Razorback (in the Mitta were The largest fires On 18 valley) and Pinnibar (south of Corryong) fires. began to join and those fires and 19 of January, 4.4 very large complexes as shown in Figures create and 4.5. Specifically: • joined; The Pinnibar complex fires • south of Corryong joined The Mystery Lane fires • joined with The Mt Feathertop and Bald Hill fires January 14 saw a significant advance in all directions the Mt particularly toward of the Mt Feathertop fire, both New South from Hotham Alpine village. Fires on 17 the border and Victoria crossed Wales and 18 January. devastated Canberra, On January 18, the day fires The fourteen fires in North East Victoria were grouped in North East Victoria were The fourteen fires An into two complexes: Upper Murray and Ovens. with DSE and staffed Incident Management Team, managed each fire. personnel, CFA The area affected by the fires increased exponentially. increased by the fires affected The area burning than 27,000 hectares on 15 more From than to more increased area the affected January, on the 24 January and around 230,000 hectares by 2 February. 700,000 hectares impacted escalated dramatically as the fires The threat the North on private land and townships throughout East and Gippsland. The Fires Escalate – The Fires 14 January to 2 February and The weather deteriorated over the next fortnight intense and erratic. By behaviour was increasingly fire behaviour was at its most extreme. fire 30 January, The high volume Erickson aircrane, other aircraft and other resources were deployed early to Gippsland to resources were deployed early to Gippsland aircrane, other aircraft and other The high volume Erickson this level of resourcing, Despite private property. there due to the threat to assets and help contain the fire fire south of Sale – burnt and the Emu Track – the Mullungdung fire north of Yarram two Gippsland fires dollars. private plantations worth four million during the first three days, including around 8,000 hectares by 11 significant resources. However, was the largest in the first week, requiring The Mullungdung fire January both these fires were contained. 4.27 4.26 4.25 4.24 4.23 PAGE 34 Figure 4.4:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-18/1/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 11 , 18January2003 INF.018.002.0141 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 35 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0142 , 2003 19 January Day 12 Place Freeways/Highways Lakes Perimeter - 19/1/2003 Fire Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW Figure 4.5: Geographic Areas Affected by Fires by Fires Affected Areas Geographic 4.5: Figure PAGE 36 4.37 4.36 4.35 4.34 4.33 into actiontoprepareanddefendtheirlandassetsundereffective localCFA leadership.Thisincluded: fires revealalargesectionofunburntcountryaroundthetownship,illustratingcommunitywasgalvanised fires forapproximately40days,withthreehouses,grazinglandandstocklost.Yet mapsoftheareaburntby Benambra isinavalleysurroundedbytheAlpineNationalPark.Thetownexperiencedsignificantthreatfrom Organising supportforoperations. Establishing acommunityUHFoperationalnetwork;and Establishing amosteffective Divisionalcommandpostinthetown; fire orspottingactivity; Organising shiftsoflocalpeopletoactaslookoutsatstrategiclocations,dayandnight,reportany 3Thesecontinued tobeproblematic –forexample,on6Februaryspot fires inBenambraand Bindiareas800hectares burnt ofg 13 Forexample,on31January, newfires startednearCannRiver, Tubbut andBonang. 12 Thefire madeanumberofmajorrunsupto • TheBogongandPinnibarfires mergedand • fire seasonwithintenseanderraticfire behaviour: January 30wasprobably thesingleworstdayof Fire Behaviour January 30:IntenseandErratic by fire onthe27January2003. Figure 4.6showsthegeographicarea affected heightened alert. forecasted, anumberofcommunitieswenton deteriorated, withhottoveryconditions townships andprivateproperty. Asweather were focusedonassetprotection inandaround By lateJanuary, suppression efforts intheseareas surrounded byfire foraweek. Freeburgh, HarrietvilleandPorepunkah were ember attack.ThetownshipsofBright,Wandiligong, Swifts Creek; SwiftsCreek experiencedanintense The fire reached withinthree kilometres ofOmeoand thatsawfourhousesburnt. run intoBogongVillage totheedgeofDartmouthtownshipandafireburning complex required sustainedfirefighting withthefire in size.Extreme fire behaviourontheBogongWest Hotham toCanberra.TheMtBuffalo fire grew rapidly created acontinuousarea offire stretching from Mt The PinnibarandBogongcomplexesjoinedthis Wales border towards the SnowyRiver. South east ofMtHopealongtheVictorian-New Gelantipy andWulgulmerang, anotherfrom south near Benambrainasouth-easterlydirection into unprecedented. Oneofthelargestextendedfrom 40 to50kilometres inoneday, speedsthatwere Wales border toHarrietville. stretched over90kilometres from theNewSouth 4.40 4.39 4.38 Planningforrehabilitation offire areas. • Patrolling andmopupinsomeareas; and • Backburning; • Fightingspotfires; • Protecting assets; • Strengthening containmentlines–especially • This meantrenewed effort couldgoto: 31 January, Several newfires were ignitedbylightningon 1 Februaryto7March Reduced Fire Activity– 2 February. Figure 4.7showsthearea affected byfire on fire activityandreduced threat toassets. brought milderweatherwhichgenerallyreduced Fourhouseswere lostinandaround Omeobut • wassubjecttoafire TheMtHothamVillage • numberofcommunitieswere under A • Thefires causedoneormore thunderstormsin • satelliteimageshowsadramatic,intensearea A • around threatened communities; significant property damage. extensive andaggressive firefighting savedfurther within metres ofthebuildingsinvillage. spotting andemberattackwiththefire coming Harrietville. Creek, Cassilis,Bindi,MittaMitta,Eskdaleand considerable threat includingBenambra,Swifts east ofGelantipyintheSnowyRiverNationalPark. East Gippslandwithlightningstrikesoccurring Great AlpineRoad. deep intheDargoRivercatchmentnear of fire approximately tenkilometres wideandtwo 12 however, thefollowingthree weeks 13 razing land. INF.018.002.0143 INF.018.002.0144 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 4.41 Despite this, some areas of the fire continued to Firefighting Personnel create problems for Incident Controllers: 4.48 Fires of this scale and intensity involve very large • The south-west perimeter of the fire from numbers of people and equipment. Abbeyard to Dargo was in very rugged, steep and rocky terrain. A long and protracted campaign was 4.49 In early February, at the peak of the fires, around undertaken to establish control lines, with the fire 3,760 people were involved in the fire effort, continually breaking out for more than a month excluding local CFA brigades. This figure includes 160 before the area was secured. Defence Force staff, over 300 interstate firefighters, • The Tubbut and Deddick valleys experienced weeks 33 alpine firefighting specialists from New Zealand of threat from fires in the surrounding National and 35 personnel from the United States. Park. A long campaign was waged to secure control lines to stop impact on private 4.50 Apart from direct firefighting, staff worked in grazing land. command and control operations, planning operations and logistics, aircraft-related duties, base 4.42 Figure 4.8 shows the areas affected by fires on 9 camp support, media and community liaison, and February 2003. By 10 February, fire had burnt over liaison with police and other agencies. one million hectares of land. 4.51 DSE’s narrative of the North East and Gippsland Fires 21 February to 7 March provides a detailed, day-by-day account of staff and equipment deployed on the fire effort. In that report, 4.43 Rain in most areas across Gippsland helped to quieten DSE also describes an ‘all hands to the pump’ attitude fires. While lightning continued to ignite some fires in in agencies and across government throughout the this region, they were quickly controlled. By 1 March, suppression activities. The utility companies, especially at least 95 per cent of the fire edge was contained. power and telecommunications, also worked Crews and strike teams were rested or released. co-operatively and pro-actively to maintain and restore services. 4.44 On 26 February, storms and localised flash flooding washed a DSE vehicle into a stream in the upper Buckland Valley. Sadly, a DSE seasonal firefighter lost Keeping the Community Informed her life; the other two crew were rescued from the 4.52 The public’s need for information grew exponentially vehicle. During that same afternoon, a fixed-wing fire during the fire event. This need for information is bombing aircraft crashed south of Mt Buffalo, injuring likely to increase during future fire events and the the pilot. resourcing implications of this are discussed in Chapter 24. 4.45 On March 7, the Chief Fire Officer of DSE officially declared the fire contained 4.53 In addition to traditional media such as television, press and radio, a range of flexible and localised Agency Response to the Fires communication strategies kept communities informed and engaged: 4.46 Firefighters attended over 3,000 fires during the December to March period. The total personnel • Over 80 community meetings in the North East directly engaged on the North East and Gippsland and Gippsland to brief residents on the fire fires were 15,725.14 Maintaining effective firefighting situation and a further 172 in non-fire areas at the capacity over such a long period was an exceptional request of residents for information. Over time, achievement on the part of Victoria’s firefighting these meetings moved to recovery issues; agencies. • Specialist call centres set up in response to public demand;15 4.47 In total, over 35 agencies – both government and • Community newsletters updated and distributed non-government – were involved in the North East twice daily by individual Incident Management and Gippsland fires. In addition, DSE and CFA Teams to keep people informed; ‘recruited’ recently retired staff with specialised skills • CFA and DSE’s websites, which were updated in developing containment strategies, mentoring, and several times daily with fire information (the DSE managing the construction of containment lines. website had 106,000 ‘visits’ during the fire period);

14 Country Fire Authority, From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, CFA’s Submission to Victoria’s 2002-03 Bushfire Inquiry, 2003. 15 For example, due to public demand, an enhanced call centre was set up at World Vision headquarters on 24 January. Nine hundred and thirty eight calls were received in the first five and a half hours. On 25 January, 3,554 calls came in over a fourteen-hour period. An additional call

centre was set up in Traralgon to give specific information to east Gippsland residents. PAGE 37 PAGE 38 Figure 4.6:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-27/1/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 20 , 27January2003 INF.018.002.0145 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 39 CHAPTER 4 INF.018.002.0146 , 2 February 2003 , 2 February Day 26 Place Freeways/Highways Lakes Perimeter - 2/2/2003 Fire Bass Strait Public Land Victoria NSW Figure 4.7: Geographic Areas Affected by Fires by Fires Affected Areas Geographic 4.7: Figure PAGE 40 Figure 4.8:Geographic Areas Affected byFires reasHgwy ae ulcLn NSW Victoria PublicLand BassStrait Fire Perimeter-9/2/2003 Lakes Freeways/Highways Place Day 33 9February 2003 , INF.018.002.0147 INF.018.002.0148 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

More than half of the estimated 15,725 personnel engaged in the fires were CFA volunteers. 8,595 volunteers from 674 brigades fought a long, difficult campaign often giving up their normal businesses or employment. "Many of our CFA members are dairy farmers. Some had to pay for relief milkers to replace them while they went out to the fire fronts. Others relied on family members to maintain their businesses." Quote from Submission by John R. Cardwell, Captain, Mitta Rural Fire Brigade, Deputy Group Officer, Tallangatta Group. Submission no. 119.

• Information phone lines maintained by CFA, Impacts of the Fires Victoria Police and specific shires; • Media releases to alert residents of threat and 4.57 The 2002-2003 fires affected 1.12 million hectares in advise on appropriate actions and where to get North East Victoria and Gippsland and 181,400 more information; hectares in the Big Desert. Vast areas of forest were • Regional radio and TV stations used effectively burnt, some very intensely. The drought meant that to communicate fire information to rural mountain gullies and southerly slopes that in most communities; and other fires would remain unburnt, were dry enough •CFA ‘phone trees’, a system whereby messages to burn. This extensive impact is second only to that are communicated though the community by a caused by the 1939 fires which also had a substantial series of phone calls from person to person. effect on both people and environment.

4.58 Throughout the fire emergency, the safety of fire The Media’s Role crews and the wider community were afforded the highest priority. DSE is right to claim it is a significant 4.54 The media is a natural partner in emergency achievement that no lives were lost as a consequence situations, imparting information during the event. of what was, at times, extremely dangerous fire It acts as a source of information throughout recovery behaviour.16 and the critical community debrief phase. 4.59 While extensive hectares were burnt, there was 4.55 The media was a valuable partner over the summer minimal damage to structures compared to earlier fire of 2002–2003 and National, State and regional radio events and similar events elsewhere. Some 108,393 stations, print and electronic media, played important hectares of private land (including farms and 2,500 roles throughout the fires. DSE states that the media of plantations), 41 houses, over 213 other structures, generally, but regional radio in particular, assisted over 3,000 kilometres of fences and over 9,100 stock Incident Management Teams to get urgent were confirmed lost.17 information to communities across the fire area. This level of partnership is without precedent. 4.60 While this is clearly serious for those affected, the levels of loss were relatively low given the length of 4.56 In particular, ABC regional radio should be the fire campaign and its severity. This is testimony commended for services to Victorians during the to both the careful preparations by individuals and bushfires. ABC regional radio was a reliable source communities and to the skill of fire crews once the of information for Victorians throughout the entire fire front arrived. summer fire season, most notably in the response effort to the North East and Gippsland fires. Submissions and consultations noted that they provided reliable information.

16 For example, a CFA strike team in the Tambo/Bairnsdale area was in a near-miss situation when their truck became trapped in the fire at Cobungra in an intense ember attack. 17 Country Fire Authority, From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, CFA’s Submission to Victoria’s 2002-03 Bushfire Inquiry, 2003. Appendix G pp 1–3. PAGE 41 PAGE 42 4.64 4.63 4.62 4.61 trs: 7,000houseswithinfivekmofthefireperimeterand12,00010 1,000houseswithinthe perimeter ofthefires Source: CountryFire Authority, At risk: Protected: Lost: 41 houses 9Quotefrom PeterMalkinfrom aCD-ROMproduced bytheCFA: Bushfires 2003,aboutthe experience ofcommunitiesatMtHotham a 19 AlpineFires, DSE,Victorian JanuarytoMarch 2003,p.18 18 problems andreduced infrastructure andamenity. regional economichardship, continuedwaterquality communities are nolesssignificantastheyface their future livelihood.Thecontinuingimpactson significant financialimpactsandimplicationsfor For others,thoselosseswere veryreal, with their homes,property, stock,fencesandland. visibility. Inaddition,theylivedwiththefearoflosing state offire readiness withdecreased airqualityand spent weeksundergreat pressure astheylivedina overwhelming experience.Thoseinfire-affected areas Understandably, manyfoundthefires an the impactoffire onindividualsandcommunities. The Inquiryheard andread hundreds ofstoriesabout Impacts onCommunities fatigue, frustration,stress anddistress. camaraderie andco-operation,firefighters toldusof these observations.Keepinginmindthepositivesof The Inquiry’s consultationsandconversationssupport transpired. Othersexperiencedfear. bewilderment, shockanddisbeliefatwhathad who experienceddanger, there wasoftenasenseof suffered asthefire campaignprogressed. Forthose and aspiritofco-operationcountered this,morale staff wasfatigue.While,earlyinthefire, highmorale the psychologistsstatedthatmainissuefacing managers throughout thefires. Intheirreport toDSE, emotional supporttofirefighters andincident Incident Stress PeerSupportteamstoprovide setbacks anddifficulties. CFA deployedCritical support staff inwhatwasalongcampaignwithmany DSE employedpsychologiststhroughout thefires to Impacts onFirefighters Plain duringthefires. From theFoothillstoAlpineHeights 18 , CFA’s SubmissiontoVictoria’s 2002-03Bushfire Inquiry, 2003.AppendixG. 4.65 4.68 4.67 4.66 latest event.’ 1985 fires butnothingthenprepared meforthis bush fire experienceatHothamwasduringthe continually taketofireproof ourproperties. Mylast that weremain cognisantoftheprecautions wemust nature iscapableofdishingoutandwewillensure came awaywithrenewed respect forwhatmother ‘None ofuswere orare firefighters butwe fire. Apersonfrom MtHothamexpressed thiswell: communities oftheseriousandongoingriskposedby was arenewed andheightenedawareness among Second –andperhapsmore importantly–there community bondswere forgedthrough hardship. highlighted thepositiveimpactsoffires. First, However, manysubmissionstotheInquiryalso Government mustbea priority.Government relationships betweencommunities,agenciesand working togetherandrebuilding productive EffectiveGovernment. recovery musttherefore involve relationships betweencommunities,agenciesand As ournextChaptershows,thefires strained with environmental, financialandpsychologicalcosts. land, ourcommunitiesandfirefighters continues That fire storyisfarfrom over. Theimpactonour 2002-2003 fire story. achievements andlossesthatare partofthe This Chapterhasoutlinedthesignificant Conclusion education programs. informed choicesbecauseoftheCFA’s community individuals affected bythefires were abletomake Consultations showedthatmanycommunitiesand 19 nd Dinner INF.018.002.0149 INF.018.002.0150 CHAPTER 4 A SETTING THE SCENE PART

Health Impacts of Smoke during the 2002–2003 Bushfires The Department of Human Services (DHS) reported the following statistics in relation to the 2002 –2003 bushfires. DHS states there is no conclusive trend in relation to possible direct health impacts of the fires – for example, through acute or chronic smoke inhalation. Total State Hospital Admissions for January to March 2003 (compared to same period 2002) was 265,572 admissions (down five per cent from the previous year). Of these figures there were 6,148 respiratory- related admissions in the same period (up 2 per cent). DHS conducted a study of potential smoke impacts in the North East during these three months. The total admissions for the first three months of 2003 were 7,847 (7,977 for the same period in 2002). Of these, respiratory disease contributed 157 admissions; in 2002 this figure was 161. Source: Department of Human Services

The 2002-2003 Fire Season at a Glance • Over 3,000 fires burned from December to March. • Firefighters worked on the ground for over 70 days. • Over 1.12 million hectares were affected in Victoria’s North East and Gippsland. • Over 181,400 hectares were affected in the Big Desert. • Over 35 agencies were involved in fighting the fires and support roles, as well as interstate, New Zealand and US firefighters. • The total personnel directly engaged on the North East and Gippsland fires was 15,725. A peak of over 3,760 personnel were involved at any one time. • 8,500 people attended over 250 community briefings. • DSE’s website had 106,000 visits during the fire season. PAGE 43 PAGE 44 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 Consultation Submissions andCommunity Chapter 5 Greater consistencyfrom alllevelsof government • Bettercommunicationandplanningbetween • Betteruseoflocalknowledge; • to improve future efforts: decision-making. Theyidentifiedthree keystrategies complex combinationofcircumstances andpoor the fewfires thatgotawaydidsobecauseofa In broad terms,fire-affected assertedthat Victorians to PartEoftheReport. nature buthavebeenusedtoinformPartBthrough they were difficult tocodifyduetheirwide-ranging reference havenotbeenincludedinthisanalysisas The specificcommentsaddressing thethird termof of Reference) andthecommunityresponded tothis. recommendations forawayforward (thethird Term The Terms ofReference required theInquirytogive and recommendations inPartsB,CandD. important contextforourlateranalysis,discussion document areasTheseprovide ofparticularconcern. reader thebreadth, anddepth,ofissuesraisedto consultations. Instead,weaimtoconveythe on theviewscontainedinsubmissionsand Our summarymakesnocommentorjudgement Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissuesrelating tohow thefire was • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness, particularlythe • first twoTerms ofReference. Theseare: in thesubmissionsandconsultations,relevant tothe This Chapterdocumentsthefivekeythemesraised proposed; thuspresenting achallengefortheInquiry. the complexityofissuesraisedandsolutions markedly. Theconsultationsechoedthesubmissions, submissions commentsonissueswouldoftenvary individual critical tonotablypositive.Within submissions were diverse,rangingfrom thehighly 400 peopleasindividuals,oringroups. The individuals andorganisationsspokewithover The Inquiryreceived 273writtensubmissionsfrom Overview and private/publicurban/rural landinterface. on keypolicyissuessuchasfuel reduction burning, the agenciesandlocalcommunity; fought; issue offuelreduction onpublicland; 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.11 5.10 5.9 August 2003. the Inquirycontinuedtotakesubmissionsuntil While thedeadlineforsubmissionswas30May2003, papers andcountryinAprilMay2003. 1) weremetropolitan publishedintheMelbourne The Inquiry’s Terms ofReference (outlinedinChapter terms ofreference oranyaspectofthem’. factual informationorexpress anopiniononthe from personsororganisationswhowishtoprovide The Inquirycalledfor‘written,signedsubmissions Consultation Process The SubmissionandCommunity the fire efforts. appreciative ofthosewhofoughtinandsupported wereshowed thatmanyVictorians sincerely Having saidthis,ourcommunityconsultations informed ourthinkinginPartsBtoE. and theenvironment calmedandagainthishas issues mayhavegainedimportanceastimepassed did notfeature strongly inthesubmissions.These However, someissuesthatarose duringconsultations Meetfacetowiththosewhohadprepared a • Hearfrom thosewhowere unabletoparticipate • Revisitsomeoftherecurrent issuesraisedin • undertook acommunityconsultationprocess, to: In additiontowrittensubmissions,theInquiryalso varied markedly. submissions,commentsonvariousissues Within Terms ofReference. Somewere scientificallybased. specific; otherswere amore generalresponse tothe individual fire brigades.Somesubmissionswere highly the remainder fromauthoritiesand Government, commercial andprivateorganisationsorgroups, with neighbours. Aquarterofallsubmissionswere from experiences ortheoffamily, friendsand Terms ofReference; othersrelated personal individuals orhouseholdscommentingonthespecific Over halfofthe273submissionswere from thoroughly explored. couldbemoresubmission sothattheirconcerns in theformal,writtenprocesses; and written submissions; INF.018.002.0151 INF.018.002.0152 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 5.12 Throughout this Chapter the reader will note that 5.16 To assist with processing and analysing the negative comments outweigh the positive statements. submissions, issues have been grouped under broad This is to be expected when one seeks views from the themes that are derived from the terms of reference. community and specialist stakeholders’ on how to Once again, we make no comment on the validity improve the State’s planning, preparation and or otherwise of the opinions and views expressed response to the threat of bushfires. This process in submissions, but seek to assist the reader in was no exception. understanding the breadth of issues raised. Comments were evenly dispersed across each of 5.13 Finally, it was not possible for the Inquiry to Terms of Reference 1 and 2, with land management investigate in detail every anecdote and incident preparedness and response issues receiving the raised in submissions and consultations. Rather, the most attention from respondents. Inquiry focused on the broad themes and issues that emerged from the submissions and consultations 5.17 Table 5.1 summarises key thematic concerns against and this informed our research, investigations and the first two Terms of Reference. eventually our recommendations. There were however five exceptions. Five case studies relating to specific incidents and lessons that can be learnt from these events are detailed in Parts C & D.

Origin of Submissions

5.14 Figure 5.1 shows the geographic focus of the submissions. Where it was made clear in the submission, they have been grouped according to the fire area of principal interest:

• More than half of the submissions focused on, or came from residents of, the fire-affected areas of North East Victoria and Gippsland. • Remaining submissions covered Victoria-wide issues, specific fire events and issues outside the Terms of Reference. • Submissions from State agencies and business organisations covered a wide geographic area, as did the science and research-based submissions. • A large number of the Statewide submissions came from the Melbourne Metropolitan area. Key Themes

5.15 Figure 5.2 shows the level of comment in relation to the first two Terms of Reference. PAGE 45 PAGE 46 Figure 5.2:Percentage ofCommentsReceived byTerms ofReference 1and2byCategory Figure 5.1:Geographic Focus oftheSubmissions Source: Datacompiledfrom 273submissionsrecieved Bushfires bytheInquiryintoVictorian 2002/2003 Staffing &Training • • Equipment • Planning Agency Preparedness TOR 1 Communication • UseofLocalKnowledge • • Stratagies/Tactics Emergency&Incident • Response TOR 2 Source: Datacompiledfrom 273submissionsrecieved Bushfires bytheInquiryintoVictorian 2002/2003 Chart indicatingthenumberofcommentsmade(positiveandnegative)inrelationtoTerms ofReference(TOR) Management Systems North East Other Fire Areas <1% 28% 18% 35% 43% 10% 27% 29% 10% • Access Tracks Buffers &OtherReduction • FuelReductionBurning • Land Management/Preparedness TOR 1 Availability ofSkilledPeople • Shift/Managementvchange-over • Deployment&ManagementofResources • Management ofResources TOR 2 • Insurance • Economic Impacts RehabilitationofLand • Fences,Fodder&Water • Recovery Issues TOR 2 Statewide East Gippsland INF.018.002.0153 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 47 CHAPTER 5 INF.018.002.0154 urban/rural. - Land rehabilitation; - of public utilities; and Restoration - matters. recovery Other general - management; Plantation - and on public land; Grazing - and – private/public Land management at the interface 4. Management of resources - of resources; Allocation - people; of skilled Availability - Shift changes; - teams; Strike - and personnel; force Use of defence - at night. Firefighting issues 5. Recovery - Fences; - impacts; Economic Five key thematic concerns key Five 1. Land management/preparedness - burning; reduction/prescribed Fuel - tracks; Access 2. Agency preparedness - Planning; - Equipment; - and Training; - and Development. Research 3. Response issues - Strategy/tactics; - and experience; knowledge Utilising local - management arrangements; Emergency - and communication; Public information - and Risk aversion; - protection. Asset Term of reference Term TOR 2 TOR the 2002/2003 to of the response the effectiveness Assess management procedures, including emergency bushfires, and resource and co-ordination multi-agency response deployment. TOR 1 TOR the for of preparedness Examine the effectiveness reduction season, including hazard 2002/2003 bushfire and the mobilisation of resources. Table 5.1: Summary of Five Key Thematic Concerns; Terms of Reference 1 and 2. 1 of Reference Terms Thematic Concerns; Key Summary of Five 5.1: Table PAGE 48 5.24 5.23 5.22 5.21 5.20 5.19 5.18 undertaken variousfuelreduction activities. experiences ofindividualsand organisations thathave comments were constructiveandbasedonthe the role, historyandprocess ofthispractice. Overall, Comments represented awiderangeofviewsabout threat offire attracted considerablecomment. The issueoffuelreductiontoreduce burning the Fuel Reduction/Prescribed Burning management preparedness negative commentsmadeinrespect toland Figure 5.3givesasnapshotofthepositiveand attracted themostcomment. Of these,fuelreductionandaccesstracks burning Landmanagementattheinterface–private/public • Grazingonpublicland;and • Plantationmanagement; • Accesstracks; • Fuelreduction/prescribed burning; • issues: considerable commentandfocusedonthefollowing Land managementpreparedness attracted Land Management/Preparedness preparedness within twobroad themes; first Term ofReference, were grouped andanalysed Submissions addressing, eitherinpartorfull,the reduction andthemobilisationofresources. the 2002/2003bushfireseason,includinghazard ‘ Term ofReference1 respondents were developedintoabargraph. and negativecommentsforissuesidentifiedby For eachTerm ofReference, snapshotsofpositive Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissues; • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness; • thematic concerns: the firsttwoTerms ofReference, thesegroup intofive As stated,thisChapterdetailsthecommentsunder Examine theeffectivenessofpreparednessfor and urban/rural. and agency preparedness land management . ’ 5.27 5.26 5.25 5.30 5.29 5.28 prevent themfrom clearingnativevegetation. in placeundertheNativeVegetation Frameworkthat adjacent totheirown.Theyalsonotedtherestrictions undertaking fuelreductioninpublicland burning Private landownersraisedthepossibilityof Theconsequenthighfuelloadonpublicland. • Resourcing constraintsforfuelreduction; and • Therestrictive criteriaforperformingfuelreduction • perception oflackfuelreduction onpublic A • Submissions primarilyfocusedon: tomitigatetheeffectsburning ofunplannedfires. Bushfire Inquiriesadvocatedtherole offuelreduction acknowledged thatrecommendations from previous used onlyinparticularcircumstances. Submissions inappropriate orshouldbecarefully considered and benefits andpotential,thosewhofeltitwas strongly advocatedprescribednotingits burning, Opinion wasclearlydividedbetweenthosewho private land. and thattheseplansshouldcoverbothpublic partners inbroader MunicipalFire Prevention Plans community andkeyfire agenciesmustbeactive reduction strategies.Theyacknowledgedthatthe A numberofsubmissionssuggestedalternative Suggested Alternatives immediate suppression. come toviewallfires asbadandinneedof wasthatthewidercommunityhad Another concern and environmentalprograms burn wasinadequate. effectiveness orotherwiseofannualfuelreduction Others commentedthatdocumentationonthe this Code. hadnotmetminimumstandardsVictoria under Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)andParks Public LandandcontendedthattheDepartmentof 1995 CodeofPracticeforManagementFire on Some commentshighlightedtheexistenceof burning; land; INF.018.002.0155 INF.018.002.0156 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.3: Land Management/Preparedness

40

20

0

-20 Grazing

-40 Strategies Plantations Urban Rural Access Tracks Public Private

-60 Fuel Reduction Management of Other Reduction Clearance Buffers - Clearance Buffers - Clearance Buffers Prescribed Burning -80

-100

-120

-140

-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.31 Some suggested solutions included: • Older tracks were established on more appropriate gradients and in better fire control locations. This • Reintroduce fire wood collection from public land; made them more stable and, therefore, safer; • Increase slashing and/or controlled grazing along • New tracks created less stable creek crossings; roadsides; • New tracks had a greater potential to introduce • Modify the application of the Native Vegetation plant and soil disease; and Legislation; • Opening old tracks created less disruption to • Include more members of the community in actual natural resources than creating new tracks. reduction operations; and • Involve DSE ‘Project Firefighters’, local landowners 5.34 Currency in access track mapping was also raised, and CFA staff and volunteers in fuel reduction as was the importance of up-to-date fire suppression activities to increase their skills and knowledge. maps, particularly in National and State Parks. Submissions suggested that this would provide Some water authorities with responsibility for water additional opportunities for training, integrated fire harvesting noted they already conduct an active management experience and succession planning. program of access tracks maintenance for firefighting and other requirements. Access Tracks 5.35 Proposals in submissions included opening tracks 5.32 Many submissions were critical of the quality and prior to, and following, the summer fire season so number of access tracks on public land, in particular, that visitors could help park management keep tracks in State and National Parks. Many submissions called clear and report problems. Tracks could be closed off for a review of the maintenance and closure of after this period. access tracks.

5.33 Some submissions asserted that new access tracks were created during fire suppression activities in relatively close proximity to older, established access tracks that had been allowed to fall into disrepair. Respondents preferred to see older, established tracks re-opened because: PAGE 49 PAGE 50 5.42 5.41 5.40 5.39 5.38 5.37 5.36 agencies were forced tofightthefire onprivateland. on publiclandandtheperceived highfuelloads; Respondents saidthatbecause ofinadequatebuffers regimes shouldalsobeaddressed. land topublicandthatprivatemanagement submissions notedthatfire alsotravelledfrom private spread offire from publictoprivateland.Some land clearanceregimes were neededtoinhibitthe public/private landswere inadequateandappropriate The commonperception wasthatbuffers between at thepublic/privateandrural/urbaninterface. A rangeofissuesarose regarding landmanagement Land ManagementattheInterface supportthisposition,somesubmissionsnoted To Country. fuel loads,particularlyintheAlpineandHigh were supportiveofgrazingonpubliclandtoreduce The majorityofsubmissionscommentingonthisissue Grazing onPublicLand management standards. training andthedevelopmentofforestry forestry, includinguseoftheirownbrigadesand minimisation strategiesundertakenbycommercial Other submissionspositivelydiscussedthefire Thecreation ofappropriate buffers andaccess • Improved managementofground fuelsand • minimise thisrisk,forexample: pursuit ofpracticalmanagementsolutionsto risk. Mostsubmissionsonthistopicsuggestedthe isolated ruralcommunitieswere identifiedashigh particular, plantationsadjacenttourbanareas and the planning,designandlocationofplantations.In Submissions identifiedanumberofissuesregarding Plantation Management support theircase. reduction ingrazing,alsocitingscientificevidenceto alpine grazing.However, othersubmissionssoughta support ofgrazingandsuggesteda‘culturalvalue’in scientific findingsandphotographicevidencein of afire. ensure accesstocommunitiesintheevent tracks betweenplantationsandprivatelandto forests; and residue followingtheharvestofcommercial 5.44 5.43 5.48 5.47 5.46 5.45 Research andDevelopment. • Training; and • Equipment; • Planning; • four keyissueswere constant: When commentingonagencypreparedness, Agency Preparedness Developingauniformpolicyonbuffers between • Creating acleared trackonpubliclandadjoining • Developingindividual,co-operativeplanning • Creating buffers thatcouldrangefrom tenmetres • Suggestions included: Proposals prevention activities. conservation wasgivenhigher priority thanfire an influenceintheplanningprocesses. Theybelieved environmentalists had,intheirview, exertedtoogreat section ofthecommunity. Manywere aggrievedthat fire managementplanningmustinvolveawidercross- managed wasoftenraised.Respondentsassertedthat The questionofhowourNationalandStateParksare particularly thoseadjacenttopublicland. account fortheprioritiesofcommunity, impact wasthatDSEplanningdidnotadequately Municipal Councilsforconsultation.Theperceived they were presented tothecommunityand plans were anear-completed product bythetime There wasaperception thatDSEprescribed burning and thelevelofcommunityinputintosuchplans. Councils, therelationship betweentheagenciesplans prevention planningcompletedbyDSEandMunicipal comment. Commentsfocusedontheindividualfire The issueofplanningattractedconsiderable Planning comments madeaboutagencypreparedness. 5.4 givesasnapshotofthepositiveandnegative did offer somesuggestionsforbetterpractice.Figure The majorityofcommentswere notdetailedbut the urbanandruralinterface. could occur;and orothersuppressionwhich backburning efforts private landtoallowimproved access,andfrom arrangements forinterfaces; to twokilometres wide; INF.018.002.0157 INF.018.002.0158 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.4: Agency Preparedness

40

20

0

-20 R & D Training Planning

-40 Insurance Equipment

-60

-80

-100

-120

-140

-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.49 There was a perception that Local Government did Proposals not fully involve the appropriate stakeholders in 5.52 Respondents offered specific strategies to improve the developing Municipal Emergency Management Plans, planning process: Municipal Fire Prevention Plans, and local area and land management plans. This was seen to limit key • Adequate water storage should be planned and firefighting agency and community input. developed on public land, reducing reliance on private water storages when fighting fires on 5.50 However, comments acknowledged that the public land; Municipal Fire Prevention Plans were developed • Public infrastructure should be considered a primarily by CFA Brigades and Local Government and resource in both response and recovery phases; contended that DSE and the community were not • Planning should identify the priority order of assets actively involved. This was thought to result in lack of for protection – environmental, farming and understanding and ownership and, in some cases, community assets, as well as public and private failure to implement the plans. Similar comments assets; were made regarding the input to, and ownership of, • Planning should address school closures, impact on the Municipal Emergency Municipal Plans. Further to curriculum, bus services to schools and other this, some comments identified the importance of destinations; and using planning tools such as wildfire overlays and • Planning should address community infrastructure adopting relevant building codes in fire-prone areas. concerns and their management during and 5.51 Numerous comments identified the successes and following emergency events – for example, cultural benefits of adequate planning and involvement. heritage sites, power and roads;

5.53 Respondents also suggested that more use of photographic ‘before and after’ evidence would help communicate the importance of effective planning. PAGE 51 PAGE 52 5.60 5.59 5.58 5.57 5.56 5.55 5.54 when powerwaslost)also suggested. (such asportablegeneratorsto maintainoperations increase inqualityandquantityofbackupequipment food storageandtransportfacilities formeals.An Some commentshighlightedtheneedforimproved outside thefire area. and tracks–importantforthosedeployedfrom for betterqualitymapsandsignageaccessroads and fieldcommunicationsystems.Striketeamscalled A commonsuggestionwastostandardise general maps andappropriateness ofclothingforfirefighters. dealt withcommunicationsystems,thequalityof Other equipmentissuesraisedinthesubmissions vehicles were not. required tomeetsethygienestandards; firefighting firefighting vehicles:earth-movingequipmentwas disease) betweenearthmovingequipmentand requirements (tominimisethespread ofsoilandplant Respondents notedaninconsistencyinhygiene selection madeofearth-movingequipment. Further commentswere madeabouttheuseand appropriately fire andheatresistant. whether materialsusedonfire truckswere such asinclinometers.Othersubmissionsquestioned from outsideareas didnothaveappropriate devices promoted. Respondentsnotedthatsomevehicles North EastandGippslandwassupported tankers andslip-onunitsinthesteepterrainof terrain. Thesuitabilityofsmalltomedium-sized better matchbetweenfirefighting vehiclesand Comment alsofocusedontheperceived needfora Havinganappropriate aerialfire detectionstrategy. • Ensuringadequateairstripsandwatersupplies; • Gettingthemixofaircraft right; • earlier. Otherexpressedwere: concerns firefighting –inparticular, theneedto useaircraft Considerable commentfocusedontherole ofaerial circumstance. the rightmixofequipmenttoterrainand A keyissuewithoperationalequipmentwasensuring best toequipthefire servicesforthefuture. Comments were diverseaswere suggestionsonhow especially from thosewhopersonallyfoughtthefires. equipment wasakeyfeature ofsubmissions, Comment ontheadequacy, mixandqualityof Equipment and 5.62 5.61 5.65 5.64 5.63 decline. skills andexperienceoffirefighters wasonthe also aperception across submissionsthatknowledge, being abletoparticipateinthefire efforts. There was burdensome. Theynominatedthisasareason fornot volunteer firefighting wasconsidered too comments claimedthattrainingandaccreditation for appropriate trainingtominimiserisk.However, some service providers alsocommentedonthecasefor benefits oftraining.Various agenciesandutility Respondents were generallysupportiveofthe Training was alsoacknowledged. providing additionaltelephoneandmobilephones private four-wheel drivevehicles.Telstra’s assistancein machinery andtheversatilityofslip-onunitswith Comments were positiveregarding theuseofprivate flow from theappropriate mixofequipment. equipment use,notinginparticularthebenefitsthat The submissionsalsorelated positiveexperienceswith management. provide betterqualitytrainingforforest andfire applying research anddevelopmentoutcomesto fauna andwaterquality. Suggestionsalsoincluded wildfire managementandtheimpactoffires onflora, included improved methodsoffuelreduction and efforts. Areas identifiedforresearch anddevelopment from more substantive research anddevelopment Many submissionsnotedthebenefitsthatcouldflow Research andDevelopment Usefuelreductionasatoolforincreasing burning • Maintainand,insomespecificcases,increase • Increase trainingforCFA andDSEinregards to • Suggestions toimprove trainingincluded: Proposals should bemore trainingforthebroader community. A largenumberofsubmissionsrecommended there the trainingandskillleveloffirefighters. crews; and training forfirefighters, plantationstaff andmedia training formachineryoperators; firefighting, strategicplanning,response and INF.018.002.0159 INF.018.002.0160 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Term of Reference 2 • Unexplained changes in strategy by management during the campaign; ‘Assess the effectiveness of the response to • Poor deployment decisions; the 2002/2003 bushfires, including emergency • The lack of backburning as a fire suppression management procedures, cross agency response strategy; and co-ordination and resource deployment.’ • Occupational Health and Safety issues raised by the Linton Coronial Inquest; and 5.66 Submissions addressing, either in part or in full, • Mineral earth breaks as a firefighting tool on the second Term of Reference were grouped and private rather than public land. analysed into three broad themes; response, management of resources and recovery. Within each Unexplained Changes in Strategy by of these categories, a series of issues were regularly commented on. Response concerns attracted the Management most comment. 5.72 A perception shared by firefighters, fire ground managers and Incident Management Team members, was that changes were made to strategy during the Response course of the campaign, without explanation. In some 5.67 Land management preparedness and agency cases, this led to frustration and a lack of confidence preparedness were the two key themes we identified in decisions. in relation to the Inquiry’s first Term of Reference. Response issues, management of resources and Poor Development Decisions recovery issues are the three broad themes we 5.73 Respondents questioned some deployment strategies identified relevant to the Inquiry’s second Term of and tactics, specifically the level and quality of Reference. consultation between DSE and CFA. Some 5.68 In particular, response issues attracted considerable submissions also asserted that decisions were not comment around the following: being made at the fire front, limiting the input of local knowledge. This was seen to result in poor • Strategy/tactics; tactical and deployment decisions. • Utilising local knowledge and experience; • Emergency management arrangements; Weather Conditions • Public information and communication; • Risk aversion; and 5.74 A number of comments were made regarding • Asset protection. weather conditions as weather plays a significant part in determining fire suppression strategies. Comments 5.69 Figure 5.5 gives a snapshot of the positive and focused on two aspects; the weather conditions negative comments made about these issues. during the 2002-2003 fire season and a comparison of the 2002-2003 fire season weather patterns with Strategies and Tactics past extreme fire events. 5.75 Some submissions asserted that benign weather 5.70 Comments received were both supportive and critical of overall tactics and strategies employed by CFA and conditions were not taken advantage of to DSE but generally asserted that the agencies either aggressively suppress the fires. Other submissions collectively or individually did a good to exceptional noted that weather conditions were extreme, in part job in relation to fire suppression. from the unusual lack of rainfall over the period of the fire. 5.71 However, five key issues were consistently raised in regards to strategies and tactics. These were (in no 5.76 Opinion was divided when weather conditions were particular order): compared to other extreme fire events. Submissions supported the need to more effectively monitor and analyse weather conditions and factor this analysis into planning strategies and tactics. PAGE 53 PAGE 54 5.79 5.78 5.77 Figure 5.5:Response public land. constructed onprivatelandin preference to located wrongly, ofaninappropriate sizeand/or Perceptions were thatmineralearthbreaks were; breaks asatoolinfirefighting onpublic/privateland. Submissions alsocommentedonmineralearth Mineral EarthBreaksasaTool and reduced levelsofbackburning. in amore conservativeapproach tofire suppression on firefighter occupationalhealthandsafety, resulting recommendations andplacedtoostrong anemphasis that agencieshadover-reacted totheCoroner’s Linton Coronial Inquest.Thecommonperception was A numberofcommentsaddressed theimpactof Occupational HealthandSafetyIssues reaction tofindingsfrom theLintonCoronial Inquiry. commented thatthiscautiousapproach mightbea wasachievable.Somerespondentsand backburning when theybelievedweatherconditionswere benign support tacticsproposed byfire ground commanders was particularlysowhenIncidentControllers didnot asafireof backburning suppression strategy. This Dissatisfaction wasexpressed attheperceived lack Suppression Strategy Lack ofBackburningasaFire -160 -140 -120 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 20 40 0 Chart showingthenumberofpositiveandnegativecommentsextractedfrom273submissionsreceived Strategies/Tactics

Utilise Local Knowledge/Experience

Incident Management System AIMS/ICC

Public information/ Communications

Intitial Response 5.81 5.80 and fieldobservationseffectively atcriticaltimes. Management Teams didnotuselocalknowledge Teams. Particularly, somefeltthatIncident provided bylocalresidents toIncidentManagement knowledge andalackofconfidenceininformation of whattheyperceived asthepooruseoflocal A considerablenumberofrespondents were critical Utilising LocalKnowledgeandExperience Greater communityandotherkey stakeholder • and tacticsincluded: relatingFurther issuesandconcerns tostrategies Other Issues perception thatDSEprioritisedconservation A • Bettermanagementofaircraft deployment – • More timelydecisionmaking; • Bettermanagementoffire lines atshift • Integration of Agencies over privateproperty protection. are viewedasfavourable;and in particular, usingaircraft whenlocalconditions changeovers; protected; involvement inidentifyingpriorityassetstobe

Risk Aversion

Asset Protection

Asset Protection INF.018.002.0161 INF.018.002.0162 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 5.82 A large number of respondents identified times where 5.88 During the North East and Gippsland fires, DSE they believed local knowledge and experience were and CFA established Integrated Multi-agency not adequately applied: Co-ordination Centres to co-ordinate the work of Incident Management Teams at Incident Control • Instances were described where an Incident Centres and the deployment of resources across Management Team did not integrate local them. Some submissions raised concerns that these knowledge and experience when developing facilities were developed with minimal planning and firefighting strategy/tactics. consultation. There was also a perception that the • There was a perception that information was Integrated Multi-agency Co-ordination Centres treated differently, in some cases, when it was exerted influence over the Incident Management provided by an individual or group in the Teams operating in the ICCs’ choice of strategy community rather than sourced from local and tactics. DSE or CFA staff. • Some argued that local knowledge was not Municipal Emergency Co-ordination incorporated into strike teams from out of the area. Centres (MECCs) • There was a perception that the experience 5.89 Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centres were and knowledge of retired personnel was not activated in all affected Municipalities. While some consistently incorporated – in particular, their submissions noted that MECCs should have been in knowledge of terrain and fire behaviour. operation earlier, they generally felt the MECCs worked well, once established. Emergency Management Arrangements 5.90 Others commented that the roles and responsibilities 5.83 Many comments on Emergency Management noted of MECCs and Emergency Service Liaison Officers room for improvement. (located in MECCs) were unclear to key personnel, including those in Incident Control Centres. Many 5.84 Some submissions noted confused messages between suggested more training and practice in MECCs key agencies on issues such as road closures and would be beneficial. subsequent access, evacuation procedures and evacuation centres. Respondents claimed that, in Integration of Agencies some cases, established emergency management arrangements and other co-operative agreements 5.91 Respondents both praised and criticised the were not followed. integration of agencies. Specific suggestions were made to: 5.85 However, approximately twenty five per cent of all comments in this category were positive about • Improve the working relationship between emergency management arrangements and related responsible organisations; issues. These submissions noted the effective co- • Identify areas for improvement such as ordination between agencies, systems and plans. arrangements around road closures; and • Improve communication with the media. 5.86 A general feeling was that co-operation at the local level was successful, and respondents commended Initial Response the use of resources such as Red Cross, State Emergency Service, Rural Ambulance Victoria 5.92 Many respondents noted the importance of a quick and the Armed Forces. and appropriate first response. A common criticism in relation to initial response was that resources were Incident Control Centres not used early enough, particularly the use of aerial attack. Given the total resources available and a 5.87 Concerns were noted about the operation of the perception of benign weather, some felt the fires Incident Management Teams at Incident Control could have been put out much earlier. (We consider Centres, in particular lack of consistency in strategic the scientific evidence for this claim of benign directions and tactics between shifts and between weather in Chapter 6.) It was also claimed that, in changes of incident controllers. Comments suggested some cases, there was a lack of skill and experience some Incident Control Centres were too distant from in directing early response activities. the fire front and did not value or use local information and knowledge to full benefit. PAGE 55 PAGE 56 5.99 5.98 5.97 5.96 5.95 5.94 5.93 official assetssuchasvehicles,shedsandhouses. native vegetationreserves andagainstthemore especially around pasture, livestock,plantations, understand theirviewofprotection priorities, landowners feltfirefighters didnotshare oreven This pointwasnotedearlier. Forexample,some developed andagreed uponbefore thefire season. the protection ofpublicandprivateassetsshouldbe A numberofrespondents suggestedthatprioritiesfor Asset Protection of firefighting efforts. reduce thelikelihoodofaconservativeinterpretation considered ‘unsafe’toimprove firefighting safetyand submissions suggestedapriormappingofareas result oftheLintonCoronial recommendations. Some occupational, healthandsafetyconsiderationsasa increased fearoflitigationandunnecessaryfocuson As wenotedearlier, somesubmissionsassertedan negative impactoneffective suppression techniques. A generalsensewasthattheLintonInquesthada the LintonCoronial Inquiry. Many commentsaboutriskaversionreferred backto Risk Aversion the supportreceived from Telstra. role playedbytheABC,particularlyregional radioand of thepubliccommunicationprocess, particularlythe However, somesubmissionsidentifiedpositiveaspects to blackspots.) full radiocoverageinfarEastGippslanddue totheABC.(TheABCdidnothave alternative providing anaccurate,timelyandresponsible commercial newsservicesthatwere notseenas Some respondents questionedtheapproach of the fires –insomecases,more thanadaylate. information ontheprogress andmanagementof radio signalinsomeareas, andadelayinreceiving some poorinformationprocesses, includingpoor information andcommunication.Submissionsnoted Responses were mixedontheissueofpublic Public InformationandCommunication contained. example, atStanleywhere fires were quickly responded wellinparticularcircumstances –for Some submissionsnotedthatthefire agencies 5.102 5.101 5.100 5.107 5.106 5.105 5.104 5.103 Firefighting atnight. • UseofDefenceForce personnel; and • Striketeamsmanagement; • Shiftchanges; • Availability ofskilledpeople; • Allocationofresources; • Specifically, respondents commented on: management were common. the firefighting response, commentsonresource In additiontocommentsabouttheeffectiveness of Management ofResources limited losseswhencompared toprevious fire events. CFA andDSEinprotecting assetsregionally withthe feedback noting,inparticular, thegoodworkof Despite thesecriticisms,there wassomepositive need forrest. suggested greater importanceshouldbegiventothe not fitenoughforthetasksallocated. Respondents There was alsoaviewthatmanyfirefighters were onpubliclandwasseenasdisadvantaged. burning participation. Theapparent declineinprescribed training requirements were abarriertotheir advantage. Otherrespondents assertedthatincreased accreditation andcouldnotbeusedtofull volunteers hadnotcompletedand/ormaintained Further somesubmissionsnotedthatformer were notalwaysusedeffectively. Respondents claimedthosewhowere available of skilledandexperiencedpeopletofightthefires. Submissions consistentlystatedthere wasalack Availability ofSkilledPeople resources were limited. private unitsattachedtotheCFA, especiallywhen Submissions notedthevalueandimportanceof field operationsshort. Incident Control Centres were overstaffed leaving questioned. Onesubmissionassertedthat,attimes, overall adequacyofresource allocationwas resource managementwere successful,however, the A numberofsubmissionscommentedthataspects Resource Allocation resources. negative commentsmadeaboutthemanagementof Figure 5.6givesasnapshotofthepositiveand INF.018.002.0163 INF.018.002.0164 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.6: Management of Resources

40

20

0

-20 R & D Training Planning

-40 Insurance Equipment

-60

-80

-100

-120

-140

-160 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

5.108 Respondents felt this situation was due to increased Strike Teams training requirements and a decline in prescribed burning on public land that meant DSE personnel had 5.112 There was a perception that Strike Teams were less firefighting experience. sometimes poorly utilised and directed. Some respondents noted that strike teams (once in place) 5.109 Supportive comments noted the valuable roles played should have been allowed greater autonomy to make by counselling and therapeutic massage services for tactical decisions regarding how they would organise firefighters (although this was limited) and some to fight the fire. suggested this should be expanded. 5.113 Respondents reported that, in some cases, crews 5.110 The importance of the volunteers was highlighted remained out of firefighting when conditions were frequently, with some submissions mooting a skills seen as suitable for suppression activities. Others register as a valuable tool for the future to match noted that more flexibility was necessary, especially available skills to resource requirements. in regard to the ‘length of tour’ and daily hours.

Shift Changes Defence Force Personnel

5.111 Several submissions suggested shift structures were 5.114 Comments generally supported the use of Defence inflexible and proposed that changes and possibly Force personnel in diverse areas such as co-ordinating briefings should occur at the fire ground; that is ‘hot’ accommodation and meals, machinery, logistics changeovers, preferably in daylight for maximum and engineering. A number of respondents were advantage. Comments also suggested that set and dissatisfied that Defence Force personnel were regular shifts made shift changeover inflexible. not used on the fire line. PAGE 57 PAGE 58 5.120 5.119 5.118 5.117 5.116 5.115 inconsistent andcausedconfusionanger. in applyingthefencingassistancepolicywas Many commentedthattheGovernment’s approach due tobackburning. replacement costoffenceswhere theywere lost shouldpaythefull argued thattheGovernment inappropriately managed.Furthertothis,respondents costs ifthefire originatedonpubliclandandwas should beresponsible forhalfofthereplacement Specifically, respondents arguedthattheGovernment fences whentheyare adjacenttopublicland. has anobligationtoprivatelandownersreplace Comments principallyassertedthattheGovernment attention duringconsultations. submissions. Fencingwasalsothefocusofsignificant providing financialsupportwasasignificantissuein The restoration offencesandGovernment’s role in Fences negative commentsmadeaboutrecovery. Figure 5.7givesasnapshotofthepositiveand Otherrecovery matters. • Restorationofpublicutilities;and • Landrehabilitation; • Economicimpacts; • Fences; • major recovery issues: of recovery. Respondentsidentifiedthe following resources, submissionsalsofocusedonthequestion In additiontoresponse issuesandmanagementof Recovery Issues was alostopportunity. was notwellutilisedinsomecircumstances, and commented onnightfirefighting alsofeltthepractice Thosewho techniques, includingbackburning. potential tofightthefires atnightusingarangeof Most submissionsonthisissuefocusedthe FirefightingOvernight 5.122 5.121 5.124 5.123 opportunity torecover timberfromareas. burnt in fire-affected areas. Somesawaneconomic tourism andothernaturalresources-based industries would bealongprocess, especiallyforagriculture, Several submissionspointedouteconomicrecovery Costofrepairs inrestoring utilityservices. • Lossofnormalbusinessactivities,especiallywhen • Employersnotbeingcompensatedforemployee • Lossofwagestovolunteerswhenfightingthe • Cancellationofmajortourismevents; • Smokeimpactongrapecrops; • Lossofpasture andfodder; • Deathandinjuryoflivestock; • submissions are: the fires were diverse.Examplesoutlinedin Comments regarding theeconomicimpactof Economic Impact Probable impactonsoilstructure, characteristics • Impactonwaterqualityandquantity, especially • impacts duringrehabilitation: inconsistent. Theyidentifiedthefollowingpossible rehabilitation activitieswere tooslowand Respondents alsoexpressed theviewthat pest plantsfollowingthefire were alsoidentified. crossings. Thenewopportunitiestobettercontrol as accesstracks,mineralearthbreaks andcreek in regards tofire control activities privatelandsuch need foranagreement tobereached withagencies rehabilitation afterthefires. There wasaperceived Some constructivecommentswere maderegarding Land Rehabilitation related totheoutageofutilityservices;and hours lostwhenfirefighting; fires; the fire. and ecologyduetohighlevelsofheatduring during rainfallevents;and INF.018.002.0165 INF.018.002.0166 CHAPTER 5 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 5.7: Recovery

20

10

0

-10 Fences of Land Matters -20 of Utlilities Restoration Pest Control Rehabilitation

-30 Other Recovery Economic Impacts Vermin, Weeds and Weeds Vermin, -40

-50

-60

-70

-80 Chart showing the number of positive and negative comments extracted from the 273 submissions received

Restoration of Utility Service 5.129 There was a perception that recovery was more difficult due to public land managers not being ‘good 5.125 Some submissions noted undue delays in restoring neighbours’ as they had not prepared their selected services. However, other comments indicated boundaries to contain possible fires. that some utilities brought in additional skilled crews from other areas to assist in restoration. Centrelink

5.126 Some respondents recommended that utilities use 5.130 Further criticisms focused on the role of Federal fire-resistant materials in high-risk areas as flammable Government support – in particular, Centrelink. materials increased the likelihood of loss of utility Many commented that the support promised by services. Many asserted that mobile phone coverage politicians was difficult to access due to problems in should be improved. the availability of documentation to register. Many claimed Centrelink was not as responsive to the Other Recovery Issues needs of affected families as it should have been. The Importance of Preparation Water Replacement 5.127 The common message across submissions was that recovery appeared less traumatic when people had 5.131 Comments were made about the replacement policy planned and prepared for a fire or other for farm water used in fire suppression. A number of emergency event. farmers asserted that advice on cleaning out dams after the fires and early rainfall events was 5.128 Submissions noted the impact of the ongoing inconsistent and inappropriate. drought on pasture reserves, the decline in animal health and numbers, and the loss of pasture and livestock due to fire, on their ability for pasture to recover to meet their needs. PAGE 59 PAGE 60 5.136 5.135 5.134 5.133 5.132 exemplary underextreme circumstances. view ofrespondents thatfirefighting efforts were comments thanpositive,thiswasbalancedbythe exception. WhiletheInquiryreceived more negative to focusonnegativeeventsandthisInquirywasno In anycallforpublicsubmissions,commentsare likely comment. thosethemes,manyissuesreceived critical Within Recoveryissues. • Managementofresources; and • Responseissues; • Agencypreparedness; • Landmanagementpreparedness; • community consultations: Five keythemesdominatedthesubmissionsand Conclusion Thecontinuationofeducationforlocalchildren. • Earlierrepair andreopening ofroads andbridges; • Theneedformore counsellingresources; • perceived shortageofveterinaryservices A • Respondents totheInquiryalsoidentified: Other indentifiedissues on floraandfaunawouldbesignificantongoing. challenge. There wassomecommentthattheimpact erosion wasseenasafurtherongoingrecovery an ongoingissueforthenextfewyears.Minimising Comments alsoindicatedthatwaterqualitywouldbe on publicland,specificallyforfire suppression. Others saidthere neededtobemore waterreserves and available forlivestockassessment; INF.018.002.0167 INF.018.002.0168

Chapter 6 Weather Conditions Before and During the Fires of 2002-2003 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Overview Statewide Weather Conditions

6.1 Submissions to the Inquiry varied markedly in their 6.7 The Bureau of Meteorology (2003) reported that the interpretations of the weather conditions surrounding drought prevailing at the time of the 2002-2003 fires the fires in North East and North West Victoria in was one of the most severe in the nation’s history.2 2002-2003. Similar lead-up conditions were experienced prior to the 1939 and 1983 bushfire seasons in which large 6.2 The Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology (Bureau fires affected substantial areas of Victoria. However, of Meteorology 2003) regarded the conditions as the higher than average temperatures through similar to those characterising other years when large autumn, winter and spring of 2002 set this fire fires occurred in Victoria, including 1983 and 1939. year apart from any other. They reported that lead-up conditions of drought, combined with higher than average temperatures, 6.8 From as early as mid-July 2002 the Bureau had set the scene for high fire risk in the 2002-2003 fire early warning that conditions in the summer of season, with the risk of fire spread heightened by 2002-2003 would be conducive to major fire events. extremely dry fuel loads. The coincidence of many This was based on the predicted behaviour of the lightning ignitions and several to many days of Very El Niño–Southern Oscillation with forecasted continued High to Extreme fire weather1 was conducive to rapid drought and early drying of forest fuels. They advised fire spread with a reduced likelihood of successful that rainfall in the Victorian alpine region for the early suppression. remainder of 2002 was likely to be only 50–60 per cent of the average, and higher than average 6.3 As we saw in Chapter 5, submissions from a variety temperatures were also forecast. of other individuals and organisations disputed this assertion. They claimed weather was less severe than 6.9 Extremely dry spring and early summer conditions in the lead-up to and during the 1939 and 1983 fires, (20–40 per cent of normal rainfall) persisted through and that relatively benign weather conditions during January, with some areas by this time recording much of January and February should have been record or near-record low levels for rainfall for the conducive to successful fire suppression. October–January period. The Bureau of Meteorology’s submission notes that another unusual aspect of the 6.4 The Inquiry investigated the relevant evidence for 2002-2003 fire season was the long period without these varying assertions. Our expert analyses support rain after the start of the major fires in the North East the findings of the Bureau of Meteorology. and Gippsland. The lack of significant rain (defined as more than five millimetres in one day) between 2 6.5 This Chapter also considers a second point relating to January and 20 February 2003 – a period of nearly climate – the unusually low total areas burned per 50 days – allowed the fires to remain active. year by fire in Victoria from the mid-1980s to 2001. 6.10 As we noted in Chapter 4, there were heatwave 6.6 We examined the climate evidence in relation to this conditions in many parts of inland Victoria during issue and conclude that improved fire suppression by January 2003, with temperatures of 43–46oC the Department of Sustainability and Environment recorded for a number of locations on 25 January. (DSE) and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) is the most Evaporation over the April 2002–January 2003 period likely explanation of why so few fires in these years was the second highest on record at Hume Weir grew to large size, rather than either benign weather (after 1983). In combination with drought and or decreased fire due to prescribed burning. heatwave this may account for the substantial areas of tree death evident on north and west-facing slopes in Central and North East Victoria.3

6.11 Over the course of the 2002-2003 fire season, the Bureau of Meteorology issued 30 fire weather warnings (20 from October to December and a further 10 in January). This greatly exceeds the number of fire weather warning days reported for the previous three years (17, 19 and 14 respectively for 2000 to 2002).

1 Forest Fire Danger Index in the ranges 24–50 and 50–100, respectively. 2 The Bureau of Meteorology reports droughts on the basis of total rainfall received over a period relative to the proportion of years where rainfall was equal to or less than that total. Here we also report a drought index, the Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI). The KBDI requires more data

than the decile method of the Bureau of Meteorology and so does not cover as long a period at most stations. PAGE 3 At Corryong, for example, the KBDI had reached 160 by January. 61 PAGE 62 6.15 6.14 6.13 6.12 unplanned fires. weather inrelation toriskofignitionandspread of from thedailyclimaterecords andusedtodescribe Keetch-Byram Drought Index(KBDI)were calculated These indexes are described indetailChapter 7. 6 Climatedatawere airports(EssendonandTullamarine; investigatedforthefollowingstations andtime-periods:Melbourne 1951 5 Thesenumbers donotagree with highernumberscitedbyLong(unpubl.)whoinvestigatedextreme fire fors weatherinVictoria 4 temperature. 24 hourrainfall(to9am)andmaximum 3 pmtemperature andwindspeed,relative humidity, For eachstation,dailyinformationwasobtainedfor andGippsland,plusMelbourne. Victoria large fires of2002-2003:NorthWest andNorthEast weather conditionsinthethree areas affected bythe number oflocations.Ouranalysesfocusedon a largearea, weexaminedweatherrecords fora Since thefire covered complexinNorthEastVictoria Appendix VI. locations. Theaccompanyingfigures are in previously recorded fire weather extremes forthese conditions duringthefires of2003compare with the fire-affected areas. Inparticular, itidentifieshow weather conditionsforspecificlocationsinornear This sectionprovides ananalysisbytheInquiryof Affected Areas Weather ConditionsintheFire- 2003. (Forest Fire DangerIndexabove50)respectively in seven andfiveExtreme fire dangerweatherdays andCorryonghadnine, that Mildura,Melbourne location wouldbefewerthanthis,andwecalculate Of course,thenumberofsuchdaysforanysingle Itisthehighestnumberforasingleyearsince • Itisthethird highestannualtotalforMilduraafter • Corryonghasnothadmore thanonedayperyear • Corryong (1973–2003), MtHotham (1995–2003) andOmeo(1957–2003). (1939–2003), Nhill Walpeup (1998–2003),Benalla(1957–2003), Wangaratta (1956–66,1986–2003),Alburyairport (1983 Danger Index. from amountandtimeoflastrainfallgreater than2mm),anditisoftenlower 10,thusreducing the estimatedvalueofF usually closesttoitsmaximumvalueat 3pm,itisoccasionallyhigheratnoonor6pm.We usethetruevaluefordrought factor, and thecalculationofForest Fire DangerIndex forfourtimesofday:9am,noon,3pmand6pm.AlthoughForest Fire for theperiod1971to1999.Thehigher numbersdocumentedbyLongreflect theuseofanassumedmaximumvalue10fordr in 1951. suitable records airportsbegan forMelbourne respectively; and large fires intheGrampiansandBigDesertareas, 1983 and1958,whichwere yearsthatsawvery of Forest Fire DangerIndexcommencedin1973; in thisrangesincesuitablerecords forcalculation 4 oplacethesenumbersincontext: To 5 The Forest Fire DangerIndex(FFDI)and 6 6.16 6.17 Aboveaveragewindspeedscontributedtothe • Overthetwoweeksfrom 17–30 January, there • OnfivedaysinJanuary2003thefire dangerrating • Until22February, there wasnodailyrainfall • Only70millimetres ofrainfellinthefourmonths • Theprevious KBDIJanuarymaximumwaspassed • worst onrecord: At Corryong,thedrought of2002-2003wasthe The NorthEast AllbutsixdaysinFebruarywere alsoabovethe • 18Januaryalsosawrelative humidity equalthe • On18and26January, temperatures exceeded • Temperature andhumiditywere alsoextreme: per hour. January, 3pmwindspeedsexceeded30kilometres elevated FFDIs.Onsixdays,including17and18 (Figure 6.2). followed byonetotwodaysoflowerrating were fourcyclesofExtreme fire dangereach January. was passed,andithigheragainon18 17 Januarytheprevious record foranymonth(58) highest valuerecorded forthatmonth(45.6).On Very High.On7January theratingpassed was Extreme (FFDI>50)and,onfourdays,was the fires. greater than5millimetres withintheperiodof of averageforthatperiod. from October2002toJanuary2003,29percent climb through to20February(Figure 6.1). on 18January2003,andtheIndexcontinuedto per hourat3pm. speedon12Februaryreached 26kilometresWind temperatures andlowhumidity(10percent). February, inthemiddleofalongperiodhigh approached theExtreme levelagainon12 monthly average(30.4°C)andfire danger record lowof9percent. Corryong. 40°C, twoofjustninesuchdaysonrecord for index (calculated Danger Indexis orest Fire –2003), Mildura elected locations ought INF.018.002.0169 –2003), PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 63 CHAPTER 6 INF.018.002.0170 24 Jan 2003 February February Jan 2002 Rainfall (mm) 3pm Relative Humidity Fire Danger Index (FDI) Precipitation to 9am (mm) Precipitation to 9am 3pm wind speed (km/h) Jan 2001 Maximum Air Temperature (ºC) Maximum Air Temperature Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) Jan 2000 January January Jan 1999 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul 0 0 75 50 25 0 80 60 40 20 50 30 10 80 60 40 20 70 100 175 150 125 100 Figure 6.2: Daily Maximum Temperature, 3 pm Relative Humidity (%) and Wind Speed, Forest Fire Danger Index Fire Humidity (%) and Wind Speed, Forest 3 pm Relative Maximum Temperature, 6.2: Daily Figure 2003 January–February at Corryong, and Rainfall Figure 6.1: The Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) and Rainfall at Corryong, July 1998–July 2003 1998–July July at Corryong, (KBDI) and Rainfall Index Drought The Keetch-Byram 6.1: Figure PAGE 64 6.21 6.20 6.19 6.18 Drought indexvalues are loweratMt Hothamthanattheotherstations weexamined,largelybecauseofthelower temperatures 7 have hadhigherFFDIsthanreported here. period 20–25January)meanthat somedaysmay Missing datapoints(forexample, forwindoverthe Lowhumidity(9–17percent),hightemperatures • Temperatures exceeded30°Cmanytimesoverthe • ThehighestKBDIin2003was99on21February, • 1968, 1983and1998(Figure VI.3,AppendixVI): values forKBDIover95havebeenreached in1965, depth toseveralothersintheclimaterecord, where The drought atOmeoin2003wascomparable Gippsland Twenty millimetres ofrainfellattheend • ThehighestFFDIin2003,andtheon • pmwindspeedswere high(approximately 3 • Humidityreached itslowesteverrecorded valueof • givesomeindicationofclimateatthistime: To values recorded inprevious years,othersdidnot. prior toandduringthefires atMtHothamexceeded years). Whilesomeindicatorsoffire dangerweather The climaterecord atMtHothamisshort(eight The Alps Duringthedrought of2003,theKBDIexceeded • and Omeo’s 680mm. rainfall thatresult from its higherelevation.Forexample,average annualrainfallatMtHothamis1,179 mmcompared with Cor February (on14,17,26January, 7February). for sixotherdaysbetween13Januaryand12 hour) contributedtoVery Highfire dangerratings (27–34 degrees) andwinds(15–26kilometres per that day. contributed toaVery Highfire dangerratingon recorded on30 January. Thesetwofactors of thesummer(37kilometres perhour)wasalso VI.4, AppendixVI).Thehighest3pmwindspeed C.(Figure January, shortoftherecord of38.2° 2002-2003 fire season,peakingat35.5°Con30 while thehighesteverwas127inApril1968. month. January and42millimetres hadfallenearlierinthe 26.7°C). temperature recorded atMtHothamisjust and thetemperature peakedat23°C(thehighest low, thewindwas strong (39kilometres perhour), record, was22on21January, whenhumiditywas Appendix VI). 50 kph)on26,29and30January(Figure VI.2, January. 17 percenton12Januaryandagain21 peaking at39on20February. previous records (Figure VI.1,AppendixVI), 7 6.23 6.22 AllbutfivedaysofDecember2002recorded wind • Themaximumdailytemperature dropped below • For15daysduringDecember2002thefire danger • InWalpeup, thedrought wasextreme, withKBDI • North West toSouthWest. persisted duringthistimedespitewindshiftsfrom dry airandmoderatetohighwinds,conditionsthat vegetation andfuelsthere wasextremely hotand A prolonged andintensedrought ledtothedryingof Desert fires represented extreme conditionsforfire. The weatheratWalpeup duringtheperiodofBig 2002 were bothinthelowest10percentofrecords. region overtheperiodNovember2001toOctober since April2000.Rainfallandstreamflow forthe first significantrainfor34days,andthehighestfall 31 December, when30millimetres of rainfell–the until 26Decemberandthefires were declared outon the event.Significantareas continuedtobeburnt hectares ofthefinal181,400hectares reported for to 21December, coveringbythistime160,000 of17Decemberandspreadthe afternoon rapidlyup The BigDesertfires startedfrom lightningstrikeson The NorthWest per houron22December. 15 kilometres perhour, peakingat35kilometres speeds higherthantheDecember3pmaverageof the fires. on 16December, thedaybefore theoutbreak of ever recorded forWalpeup (sixpercent)occurred 11 days,itaveragedpercent.Thelowestvalue Walpeup averages30percentbut,during these 42.6°C. TheDecember3pmrelative humidityat maxima above40°C,peakingon21Decemberat period (24December),andfourdaysexperienced 30°C (theDecemberaverage)justonceinthis Extreme (Figure 6.4). 14 tothe24Decemberwere allVery Highor 18, 20and21December).The11daysfrom the and forfivedaysitwasExtreme (over50on2,16, rating wasVery High (FFDIover24butunder50) of theannualaverage. millimetres ofrainhadfallen,lessthan40percent months priorto16December2002just135 higher thanthisinFebruary1983.Inthe12 2002 (Figure 6.3),althoughKBDIwasslightly reaching 170ofamaximum200inDecember ryong’s 740mm and higher INF.018.002.0171 PART A SETTING THE SCENE PAGE 65 CHAPTER 6 INF.018.002.0172 January January Jan 2003 Jan 2002 Rainfall (mm) 3pm Relative Humidity 3pm wind speed (km/h) Fire Danger Index (FFDI) Precipitation to 9am (mm) Precipitation to 9am Jan 2001 Maximum Air Temperature (ºC) Maximum Air Temperature Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) Keetch-Byram Drought Jan 2000 December December Jan 1999 1357911131517192123252729312 1357911131517192123252729312 Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul 0 0 0 80 60 40 20 75 50 25 50 30 10 80 60 40 20 70 100 100 175 150 125 Figure 6.4: Daily Maximum Temperature, 3 pm Relative Humidity and Wind Speed, Forest Fire Danger Index Fire Humidity and Wind Speed, Forest 3 pm Relative Maximum Temperature, 6.4: Daily Figure 2002–January 2003. December at Walpeup, and Rainfall Figure 6.3: The Daily Keetch-Byram Drought Index (KBDI) and Rainfall Record for Walpeup, July 1998–July 2003 1998–July July Walpeup, for Record and Rainfall (KBDI) Index Drought Keetch-Byram The Daily 6.3: Figure PAGE 66 6.28 6.27 6.26 6.25 6.24 Mackeyetal.(2002)describetheoretical reasons forastatisticalrelationship betweennumber ofunplannedfires peryearan 8 unplanned fire. was notaccompaniedbylargeareas of data showed1998asayearofhighfire dangerthat the early1990s(Figure VI.5,AppendixVI).Again,the andverylow levelsoffireMelbourne, dangerthrough Omeo hadfewerhighfire dangeryearsthan similar toconditionsintheearly1990s. Conditions priortotheearly1980sfires were Ranges fire and1998oftheCaledoniafire. was theyearofmostrecent, seriousDandenong and 2001fire years.Althoughnotlargeinarea, 1997 expected muchlargerareasinthe1997,1998 burned fire dangerstatisticsandareawewouldhave burned, ofrelationshipBased onhistoricalpatterns between drought indexhasbeenhighthroughout thisperiod. four ofthesevenyearsfrom 1996to2003,andthe (Figure 6.5).Fire danger, onaverage,hasbeenhighin 1998 asinthebigfire yearsof1983and2003 the early1990s,butwasnearlyashighin1997and fireFor Melbourne, dangerwasbelowaverageduring long-term averageofabout120,000hectares. hectares ofpubliclandperyearcompared witha unplanned firesanaverageofjust26,500 burned between 1986and2002–from 1988to1998, in theearly1980swasfollowedbylow-area fire years byunplannedfiresThe largearea burned ofVictoria following discussion. Appendix VI)offer agraphicrepresentation ofthe Figures 6.5,6.6,and6.7below(andFigures VI.5-6, the 1983fires andthe2002-2003fires. Again, comparison canbemadebetweenconditionspriorto the mid-1970stopresent sothatsome This sectionexaminesthenature offire weatherfrom More successfulfire suppression. • Higherlevelsofprescribedthrough burning the • Benignweatherconditions; • following: may havebeenaconsequenceofoneormore ofthe The stringoflow-area fire yearsfrom 1986to2001 Burned Among Years ofHighandLowAreas Comparison ofWeather Conditions per year, andbetweenarea byunplannedfires burned peryearand and/or for theignitionandspread ofunplannedfires; 1980s. Thismayhaveprovided feweropportunities ∑ 6.30 6.29 6.33 6.32 6.31 FFDI 3 . unplanned fires. high FFDIyears,yetsawonlysmallareasby burned years. However, severalyearsinthelate1990swere there mayhavebeenalessenedriskoffire inthose two tofiveyearsindifferent partsoftheState,and that weatherwasmildintheearly1990sforfrom December 2002. despite highfire risk,untiltheBigDesertfire of (excepting the2000fire year)sawnolargefires, unplanned fires, thelate1990sthrough early2000s between highfire dangeryearsandareaby burned 1970s tomid-1980ssawastrong relationship sustained periodsofhighfire danger. Whilethelate (Figure 6.6).Bothoftheseperiodswere followedby danger inthemid1970sandagainearly1990s high withonlyafewyearscharacterisedbylowfire In theNorthWest region, fire dangerwasconsistently 1983 and1985. years incloseproximity shortlythereafter –1981, hand, largefires occurred inthree inpartsofVictoria accompanying largeunplannedfires. Ontheother and inBenalla19791980without danger weatheralsooccurred inCorryong1978 andOmeo.SeveralyearsofhighfireMelbourne unplanned fires. Thisissimilartorecords shownfor high in1998,withoutbeingaccompaniedbylarge show thatfire dangerwaslowintheearly1990sand Corryong andBenalla(Figure VI.6,AppendixVI), Data fortwolocationsintheNorthEastregion, successfully suppressed atanearlystage. they mighthavebeenexpected–orfires were didn’t occurinseveralyearsthelate1990swhen records, except thatignitionsleadingtolargefires distinguish thesetwoperiodsoftimeandtheirfire Taking along-termview, there maybelittleto latter period. total areainasingleyear(2003)the wasburned more than1.5millionhectares, whileaboutthesame that unplannedfires in1981,1983and1985burned from thelate1990stopresent (Figure 6.5),shows inthe early1980swiththeyears years forMelbourne Comparing theverysimilarstringoffire weather byunplannedfires.land burned days, are alsocharacterisedbylargeareas ofpublic and numbersofVery HighandExtreme fire danger sum ofdailyforest fire dangerindex,drought index, In general,yearscharacterisedbyhighvaluesforthe 8 Evidence suggests d sumofdailyFFDI INF.018.002.0173 INF.018.002.0174 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART 6.34 Examining the number rather than the area of unplanned fires per year on public land shows that there were more fires, as expected, in the high fire risk years of 1997, 1998 and 2001, but that they did not burn large areas (Figure 6.7). This suggests that successful fire suppression by DSE and CFA may have been the main cause of small-area years through the 1986–2002 period, rather than either a lower number of ignitions, or variations in the effectiveness of prescribed burning programs through time.9 Appendix IV, Fires on Public Land – Historical Data, provides data for the number of fires on public land and area burnt per annum for the period 1921 – 2003.

Figure 6.5: Indices of Fire Weather for Melbourne and Area Burned by Unplanned Fires Per Year Top Graph: • Annual Sum of Daily FFDI (Black Line), Annual Sum of Daily KBDI (Grey Line*) • Number of Extreme (Blue Histogram Bars) and Very High (Grey Histogram Bars) Forest Fire Danger Days Per Year Bottom Graph: Area Burned Per Year by Unplanned Fires in the Local DSE Fire Region (Grey Histogram Bars) and in Total for Victoria (Grey Plus Open Histogram Bars).

Melbourne 100 6000 80 FFDI ∑ 4000 60 40

KBDI/10, 2000 ∑ 20 Number of Days 0 0 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02

South West and Port Phillip

1.2

0.8

Area burnt (’000.000s ha) 0.4

0.0 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02

* Note: This value is expressed as ΣKBDI divided by 10 so that Y-axis values are scaled to allow comparison among all the variables graphed.

9 Appendix IV ‘Fires on Public Land – Historical Data’ documents the number of fires on public land 1921-2003 and the area burnt per annum. PAGE 67 PAGE 68 Figure 6.6:Indices ofFire Weather for Mildura (NorthWest Region)andArea BurnedbyUnplannedFires Per Year

Area burnt (’000.000s ha) ∑KBDI/10, ∑FFDI 2000 4000 6000 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 0 47 88 28 68 09 49 800 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 47 88 28 68 09 49 800 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 North West Mildura 02 02 20 40 60 80 0 100

Number of Days INF.018.002.0175 INF.018.002.0176 CHAPTER 6 A SETTING THE SCENE PART Figure 6.7: Annual Sum of Daily FFDI for Melbourne (black line), and Number of Fires Per Year on public land (green bars) in the State of Victoria, 1972–73 to 2002–03.

1200 3500

3000 1000

2500 800

2000 600 FFDI 1500 ∑ 400

Number of fires 1000

200 500

0 0 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Fire yearFire year

Conclusions Recommendations

6.35 The 2002-2003 fires in Victoria reflect the coincidence 6.38 That DSE institute additional routine data storage of two predisposing factors: El Niño drought and a and analysis to supplement current climate records long string of low fire-area years. Ultimately, high with at least daily 3 pm values for the Grassland lightning activity and extreme fire weather days led and Forest Fire Danger Index, and Keetch-Byram to the ignition and rapid spread of a number of large Drought Index, for selected high quality stations unplanned fires. Overall, the severity of weather in representing a cross-section of environments 2003 was of a similar level to that in 1983. throughout Victoria.

6.36 The long string of years (1988–2002) leading up 6.39 That DSE and CFA, recognising that the Bureau of to 2003 with low areas burned by unplanned fires Meteorology does not routinely store all variables included years of high fire danger weather (e.g. required to produce the calculations and indices 1997 and 1998) accompanied by a large number of necessary for research and planning into fire ignitions. Improved fire suppression by DSE and CFA, occurrence and behaviour, develop appropriate rather than either benign weather or decreased fire systems to ensure that such current and historical due to prescribed burning is the most likely information is readily available and accessible. explanation of why so few fires in these years grew to large size. References

6.37 Estimating fire weather parameters and storing that Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology submission to the Victorian information is important to the ongoing scientific Emergency Services Commissioner’s Inquiry into the 2002/03 bushfires. June 2003. investigation of relationships between climate and fire. It supports advances in our understanding of Long, M. unpublished report. how fires occur and behave and gives us the capacity Mackey, B., Lindenmayer, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, M.A. & Lindesay, J. to improve the managed use of fire. This last point 2002. Wildlife, Fire and Future Climates. CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. is taken up in Part B. PAGE 69 PAGE 70 INF.018.002.0177 INF.018.002.0178

Part B Term of Reference One: Fire and Public Land

Fuel Reduction Burn Horsham fire District April 2002 – DSE PAGE 72 DSE firefighter lightingfuelreduction-DSE burn Overview ofPartB chance oflosshumanlifeandproperty issmaller. is greater. Ifthechanceoffire control isgreater, thenthe is less,thenthechanceofcontrolling anyunplannedfire released inafire from theremnant fuelisless.Ifthisheat if theamountoffuelisless,thenpotentialheat The rationale,though,appearssimpleandpersuasive: complex. Prescribed inforests burning isbothcontroversial and a diverserangeofobjectives. necessary tocontinuouslyimprove landmanagementover belief thatclarificationanddiscussionofdifficult issuesis diverse areas andcomplextopics.We includetheminthe for understandingfire onpublicland.Thesechapterscover All sixChaptersfittogethertoprovide acrucialframework practicesoftheAboriginal Thetraditionalburning • Measures oftheeffectiveness ofprescribed burning • Constraintsonprescribedinforests burning • Fuelmanagementinthe‘Mallee’(Chapter9); • Fuelmanagementandgrazinginthe‘HighCountry’ • Background toprescribedinforests burning • Chapters 7through 12coversixareas: system andrecommendations forthefuture. scientific basisforchoicesmadeinthepast,ourpresent and,inalimitedsense,informsreadersconcerns ofthe demonstrates thecomplexityoffire andlandmanagement regarding approaches tolandandfire management.It Part Bexplainsandanalysessomekeytechnicalissues practices in Victoria (Chapter12). practices inVictoria people andtheirrelevancelandmanagement tomodern (Chapter 11);and (Chapter 10); (Chapter 8); (Chapter 7); INF.018.002.0179 INF.018.002.0180 OVERVIEW OF PARTOVERVIEW B B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART However, to quantify the argument we need to know In Chapter 10, the focus shifts back to the forested what forest ‘fuel’ is comprised of, how fuels change with landscapes of North East Victoria (including the northern time, how fires are measured and what the limits are to fire reaches of the Gippsland Region) and the use of fire there. control in forests and other vegetation types. Because fire This Chapter investigates the constraints on prescribed control is a function of weather and fuels (assuming a well- burning in forests, describes some key issues behind the equipped and efficient firefighting force) we must also scheduling of prescribed fires in forests and reviews data on define ‘fire weather’. prescribed fires in North East Victoria and Gippsland over the past decade. This Chapter includes new analyses In Chapter 7 we investigate these factors and establish undertaken for this report entitled ‘Prescribed Burning a knowledge base from which to discuss the positives Realities’. and negatives of this controversial practice. At the end of Chapter 7 we discuss tracks and their importance to Chapter 11 discusses how we can measure the firefighting and preparedness. Chapter 7 makes no effectiveness of prescribed burning. It deals with technical recommendation. matters that require a sound understanding of fire ecology and related management issues. Although the technical Chapters 8 and 9 are concerned with the vegetation types nature of this Chapter may cause difficulties for some dominated by, or associated with, shrubby eucalypts. In readers, it is important to examine these issues carefully Victoria these are found in contrasting environments – the as they are at the core of how we can adapt our land alpine and subalpine regions or ‘High Country’, and the management practices over time. semi-arid to arid landscapes of North West Victoria, or ‘Mallee’. Chapter 11 is based on the premise that if Victoria is to have an accountable, safe and effective system for the Chapter 8 discusses the issues of fuel management in modification of fuels, there must be some reliable way the High Country focusing, in particular, on the scientific of evaluating the costs and benefits of its programs. The evidence behind the claim that ‘grazing prevents blazing’. Inquiry suggests a number of measures that may assist Among other issues, we address whether or not cattle in dealing with this difficult issue. We go on to stress the grazing affects fire occurrence or behaviour in the importance of building a targeted and comprehensive mountains of North East Victoria. We conclude that there is system of data acquisition, storage, retrieval, analysis currently no scientific support for the view that ‘grazing and review to help in this process. prevents blazing’ in the High Country. Chapter 12 addresses the traditional burning practices Chapter 9 addresses fuel management issues in the of Aboriginal people and the prescribed burning debate Mallee, the locale of the Big Desert Wilderness Park fire in Victoria. The Inquiry concludes that we do not know in December 2002. The nature of fuel distribution and enough about traditional burning strategies and objectives accumulation in the Mallee has resulted in substantially in southern Australia to be able to implement an Aboriginal different approaches to prescribed burning from those in burning regime. Knowledge has been lost, or is the forested areas of the State. One relatively new strategy fragmentary. Any use of a ‘traditional Aboriginal burning is the chaining of strips of vegetation followed by burning regime’ within a park or State Forest in southern Australia the felled material once it has dried out. This system has would be an experiment in land management, rather than the potential to be a safer and more cost efficient way to a program based on a sound understanding of traditional construct buffers, but its effectiveness will need to be Aboriginal practice, and should be recognised as such. monitored. PAGE 73 INF.018.002.0181

Chapter 7 Background to Prescribed Burning in Forests

Overview 7.7 Minimising the adverse effects of fires is usually seen as reducing fire intensity (the rate of heat 7.1 'Prescribed burning' is the term applied to release), flame height and the chance of burning deliberately lighting fires for a variety of management embers or burning brands being produced and purposes. Its application is governed by a number setting fires downwind. Appropriate fuel modification of sometimes conflicting factors, depending on the aims to improve the conditions for firefighters in an particular purpose and the place of application. unplanned fire and to raise the chances of a fire These factors must be understood before any being put out, and assets protected. informed debate is possible on what has been and still is a controversial issue. 7.8 In Victoria, the most common management objectives for prescribed burning in forests are: 7.2 Twenty-seven percent of the comments in the written submissions to this Inquiry noted land management • Regeneration of forests following logging; as a matter of concern, with prescribed burning a • Fuel reduction to aid in the control of unplanned major theme. Such concerns can only be addressed fires; and when all stakeholders know and understand the • Species conservation. relevant details. This Chapter provides the background information to enable an understanding Who Does Prescribed Burning? of the complex prescribed burning debate. Where? 7.3 In Victoria the most common management objectives for prescribed burning in forests are regeneration of 7.9 One of the main ways to modify fuels in forests is to forests following logging, fuel reduction to aid in the burn them under mild weather, reducing fuel loads at control of unplanned fires, and species conservation. a time when not all fuel is likely to burn. This limits Fire crews attached to DSE carry out planned burning the risk of intense fire and reduces the risk of fire programs appropriate to the region and at intervals escape. and patterns specific to vegetation type. Five fuel 7.10 For example, a forester may burn post-logging debris management zones are currently recognised in (‘slash’ as ‘slash fires’, ‘regeneration burns’ or relation to management objectives. ‘silvicultural burns’) to clear land in preparation for 7.4 The topic and issues reviewed in this Chapter relate another crop. A manager of a Radiata Pine plantation to forest fire in general, and prescribed burning in will not usually burn the litter under the pines as the particular. They include forest types, fuel types and fire is likely to kill the crop but, when the pines have loads, fire behaviour, fire weather, the interval been harvested, the slash may be burned. Also, between burns, and the estimation of fire risk. plantation edges may be regularly burnt for fuel reduction. 7.5 We also consider tracks an important issue in firefighting preparedness. While it is easy to submit 7.11 Managers of eucalypt plantations may choose to that there should be more, or fewer, tracks we note prescribe burn them, as might those who manage it is not as easy to provide an adequate justification indigenous forests. National Park managers may for change. burn for ecological reasons related to flora and fauna management (Fire Ecology Working Group 1999) as well as fuel reduction. Also, burning may take place, Background across large areas, to reduce the load of forest litter (twigs, grass, small branches, bark). This is classical 7.6 The essence of a fuel modification program is to ‘prescribed burning’, conducted under prescribed minimise any adverse effects that unplanned fire weather and fuel conditions in a specified area might have on management objectives such as timber to safely achieve an explicit objective at a production, water quality, conserving biodiversity, particular time.1 promoting tourism and protecting cultural remains. It also promotes the main fire management objective, ‘the protection of human life and property’.

1 We use ‘prescribed burning’ as a term for reduction of litter in woody vegetation types by burning unless it is qualified as ‘slash’ ‘—for management fires set in logging debris for regeneration of tree crops, or ‘ecological burns’.Other terms for litter burning by managers are ‘fuel- reduction burning’, ‘control burning’, ‘planned burning’ and ‘hazard-reduction burning’. All burning involves fuel reduction so ‘fuel-reduction burning’ is a tautology but is very commonly used. ‘Hazard-reduction’ begs the question as to what the ‘hazard’ might be. 74 PAGE PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 75 CHAPTER 7 INF.018.002.0182 un with the actice. Forest Types productivity density, vary in stature, Victorian forests and fuel accumulation characteristics. At one end of of wetter the tall Ash forests the spectrum are locations and cooler aspects while at the dry end of Each such as ‘Box-Ironbark’. forests the spectrum are differently. must be treated type or part thereof forest Because this is the case and because management five Fuel Management DSE has created aims vary, Zones which we discuss later in this Chapter. and Loads Fuel Types to any plant tissue, dead or alive, that is Fuel refers shrubs, available to burn ‘Live fuels’ are during a fire. grasses, herbs and vines, and much of crowns, tree biodiversity may constitute fuel at the aboveground mostly comprised of the some stage. ‘Dead fuels’ are leaves, bark, branches and stems that accumulate at either ‘fine’ as considered and are floor, the forest or ‘coarse’. It is the fine, dead fuel component that is burns the main target of fuel reduction in forests. described in detail fuel types are forest The different in Box 7.1. The rationale, however, is persuasive. Prescribed The rationale, however, the burning, for whatever purpose, will reduce of fuel is less, If the amount amount of fuel present. the from in a fire released then the potential heat less, then the fuel is less. If this heat is remnant If is greater. fire any unplanned chance of controlling then the chance is greater, control the chance of fire is smaller. of loss of human life and property burning takes place in Most prescribed in forests products public land set aside for conservation, wood desirable nor and water catchment. While it is neither feasible to burn fuel all of rural Victoria to reduce especially of public substantial areas, are loads, there fuel land, that will be suitable for this form of burning the only management. Prescribed may be in such areas. means of fuel reduction cost-effective To rationale we must quantify the prescribed-burning how fuels know what constitutes ‘fuel’ in the forest, and what measured are change with time, how fires Because fire in forests. control the limits to fire are a is a function of weather and fuels (assuming control we fighting force) fire well-equipped and efficient weather’. must also define ‘fire 7.21 7.22 7.18 7.19 7.20 suggests immediately that the issue 3 prescribed burning is prescribed in forests 2 publication of McArthur.1962. controversial in terms of smoke production (health, in terms of smoke production controversial aesthetic and business implications), its perceived on biodiversity (the variety of native organisms effects genes to from species to microbes; tall tree from and its ecosystems), risks to lives and property, in mitigating unplanned fire. efficacy perceived is complex. It involves held values, limitations on the burns,implementation of prescribed incomplete and a lack scientific knowledge, incomplete records of unequivocal ways of evaluating burning programs. 3 beg of ‘burning in Australia to have officially burning’ the practice Prescribed has developed from off’ and may be considered 2 other forms of the pr burning’ from is sometimes used to qualify and distinguish ‘prescribed for litter reduction ‘Broad-area’ That the prescribed burningThat the prescribed debate has been with us for decades The extent of burning to Victorian forests appropriate controversial is not a new issue and is likely to remain for some time. In 1939 the practice of deliberately burning caused the Royal Commission to the forests that the amount of "strip and patch burning"remark carried out was "ridiculously inadequate" (Stretton of 1983, the fires 1939). After the Ash Wednesday Review Committee noted that the then Bushfire of mitigation and preparedness standards current Review Committee 1984, p. “too low” (Bushfire were 158). As we shall see, determining the value and burning extent of prescribed is not an appropriate easy task. Broad-area In any society there is a range of held values that In any society there for whom. determine what constitutes an asset and using program Any evaluation of a fuel-reduction burning will often prescribed (or any other technique) depend on the assessors own values. prescribed Most of the submissions that addressed burning prescribed burn that current considered inadequate to meet the asset were programs needs of Victorians. A smaller number of protection burning had comments took the view that prescribed of on the likelihood of ignition and spread little effect to ecological and was counter-productive fires, in objectives of species conservation, especially National Parks. The Prescribed Burning Debate Fire crews attached to the Department of crews Fire carry out (DSE) Sustainability and Environment to particular burning appropriate prescribed programs and at intervals and patterns specific to regions, vegetation type. 7.17 7.16 7.15 7.14 7.13 7.12 PAGE 76 7.26 7.25 7.24 7.23 Despite extendeddroughtanddryconditionssomelargefallenlogspersistthroughafireevent. consumption oflivefuelsmaybeless,butsmaller-diameter deadfuelscanstillbecompletelyremoved. fallen branches;andsomedead,standing,treeboles.Atnightwhenintensitiesareusuallylower, the living trees(sometimescalled‘candlebark’);thelitterandsmallplantsonforestfloor;somelargelogs fuel array:thecrownsoftreesandshrubs;anystringybarkor‘streamers’looseontrunks A majorfireburningattheendofalongdroughtunderextremeweatherconditionscanconsumeentire and deadbarkattachedto,orhangingfrom,trees. ‘Ladder fuels’ ‘Live fuels’ are leftinthefire-front’s waketosmoulderorflameinisolatedpockets. quickly (i.e.wetanddry)aremorereadilyignited.Theirignitioncreatesthefirefront.Thecoarsefuels Fine fuelsaredistinguishedfromcoarsebecausetheymorecontinuous,respondtotheatmosphere ‘Coarse fuels’ commonly inhigheraltitudeplantcommunitiesorswamps. ‘Peat orduff fuels’ bracken, whichareconsideredas’near-surface fuels‘(Cheneyetal.1992). fuel, largely‘litter’,consistsofleaves,twigs,woodyfruitsandbark.Addedtothismaybegrasses,herbs ‘Fine fuels’ Box 7.1FuelTypes Thelittermodelof 4 resume ofgrowth. normalseasonalpatterns replenish. Leavesandtwigswillbeshedascrowns eucalypts willbegintorecover andbarkbeginto Soon afterafire, tree crowns offire-tolerant crowns oftrees andshrubs. leaves andsmallbrancheswillbelostfrom fire-killed dead, standingshrubsandtrees. Later, twigs,dead the fuelarrayonforest floor. Thefire cancreate will break andaddtothecoarsefuelcomponentof During andshortlyafteramajorfire largetree limbs vegetation communities. to-year changesorthoseassociatedwithdifferent Authorities arewiththegross mainlyconcerned year- them tobeableafford repeated measurement. because thetimescaleofvariationistoofinefor Varying seasonalconditions are ignored byauthorities the year. amounts oflitterontheforest floorvarythroughout ofdecompositioncanalsovarysothatthe patterns increase butoccurmainlyasleaflitter. Seasonal severe drought lossesfrom thetree canopymay will beyearswhenaccessionsare lower. Duringa and twigsmaybehigherthanusual.Similarlythere particularly productive growth yearaccessionsofbark in summer, buttwigsfallallyearround. Aftera Australiatendtofallthegroundsouthern mainly The leavesandsmoothdetachingbarkofeucalyptsin ThecurvesofOlson(1963)are generallyapplicableinAustralia tothebuildupofeucalypt litterfuelsasafunctionoftim 5 pedanticview isthat“fuel hazard” issomewhat ofamisnomerbecause ’fuel’per seisnota’hazard’ unless:(i)itisignit A 6 1981). Thesehavethe formW=A/k[1–e constant andtistime inyears.A/k=W more slowly, graduallyapproaching themaximumfuelload. threatens specified assets. 4 have highermoisturecontentandgreaterresistancetoignition. are organicmaterialslessthan6mmindiameterontheforestfloor. Ineucalyptforeststhefine include standingdeadtrees,fallenbranchesandlogsinvariousstagesofdecomposition. are fuelscapableofcarryingfiretothetreecrowns.Theyincludetallshrubs,sub-canopytrees are greatlydecomposedorganicmatter, likeextremelyfinecompost,andarefoundmost Mercer etal.1995 specifically refers totwigandleaflitterseasonalannual variationinlitteraccumulation. max -kt where W ] where WisthefuelloadandAannual accessionofmaterialint/ha,kisthe decomposition max is thequasi-equilibrium fuelloadint/ha.Thesecurvesrise quickly soonafterfire, then 7.28 7.27 assessed. potential fordifferent fire behavioursthatmustbe loads, andatdifferent times,thereby creating forest typesreach quasi-equilibriumatdifferent fuel at itsmostcontinuousacross thesurface.Different (see Box7.3). by eachofitscomponents,such as‘elevatedfuel’ experts, ofthecontributionstofire behaviourmade of thefuelarrayandcategoricalassessment,by The Guide’s strength liesintheextentofits coverage Fuel Hazard Guide’(OFHG)(McCarthyetal.1999). For operationalpurposesDSEhasdevisedan‘Overall Overall FuelHazard Guide the sameamounteachyear, norforever (seeBox7.2). important tonotethatfuelsdonotaccumulateby quasi-equilibrium thanthelitter(Tolhurst 2003).Itis stringybarks maytakemanyyearslongertoreach The amountsofdead,outerbarkonthetrunks quasi-equilibrium The fuelloadingthenmaybesaidtohavereached a decomposed annuallywillbecomemore orlessequal. falling totheground andtheamountoflitterthatis will beactive.Eventuallytheannualamountoflitter At thesametimeorganismsthatdecomposelitter Litter willbegintobuildupontheforest flooragain. 5 condition andthelitterfuelwillbe e afterfire (e.g.Walker ed, and(ii) this INF.018.002.0183 6 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 77 CHAPTER 7 INF.018.002.0184 on level ground and kept there by and kept there (Tolhurst & (Tolhurst 15t/ha (Chatto 1996); below the threshold level 7t/ha 7 A fire-control strategist may argue that trying to A fire-control in fuel loads everywhere achieve such threshold on both mountainous terrain is inappropriate Some parts of the economic and practical grounds. ridge tops and certain landscape -such as windward bark types of vegetation that include species with of burning to the production types particularly prone important than others in brands-may be more by spotting. The fuels within the the fire spreading burning burning block may be suited to prescribed but those in an adjacent block or holding-private or safe burningpublic-may be such as to preclude in it, 1998). especially in spring (McCarthy & Tolhurst Rationale for Prescribed Burning fuels, fire With to forest introduction the brief behaviour above, we have in place weather and fire a technical all the information needed to provide by rationale for the importance of fuel reduction burning.prescribed by definition the When the fuel load is reduced, if the fuel is is reduced; potential intensity of the fire reduced Under the ’worst possible‘ weather conditions, a fire Under the ’worst possible‘ weather conditions, burning 8 t/ha in a fuel load of about an intensity near to that set as the upper will reach (Gill et al. 1987). This upper limit for control threshold over this intensity for fires is set by the general trend lofted burning These to produce brands or embers. and over fuel front downwind of the fire can set fires deployed (see Box 7.5). are firefighters where breaks repeated prescribed burning prescribed or other means, then repeated given is likely, within that area successful suppression adequate resources. 7.35 7.36 7.37 7.34 (Polglase & Attiwill 1992). 25 t/ha 7 These authors used 10 mm as the upper limit for fine fuels unlike the usual 6 mm in most studies. Under the worst possible weather and terrain intensity may conceivably conditions maximum fire of 100,000 kilowatts per metre the order reach 1990). The maximum intensity of forest (Gill & Moore is about 4000 kilowatts that can be controlled fires (Luke & McArthur 1978; McCarthy & per metre 1998). Tolhurst It is perhaps obvious that fires will spread fastest will spread It is perhaps obvious that fires uphill with the wind under dry and windy conditions. To with on rate of spread quantify the weather effect the wind, A.G. McArthur (1967) developed a "Forest Danger Index" (FFDI—see Box 7.4). Fire It is also important to know what the fire intensity It is also important to know what the fire limits to the range of are will be, because there intensity’, by ‘Fire intensities that can be controlled. definition, is equal to the fuel-load multiplied by the multiplied by the heat yield of the fire rate of spread in as a constant and measured of the fuel (regarded ‘kilojoules per kilogram’, kj/kg, as for food). ‘Fire of in kilowatts per metre intensity’ is expressed perimeter. fire Fires can spread uphill, downhill, with the wind or can spread Fires to the rate of spread behaviour’ refers against it. ‘Fire in the open. spreading of fires and other properties is important if we need an estimate of Rate of spread perimeter at a given time in the location of the fire fire to establish the most appropriate order strategy. suppression Fire Behaviour and Fire Weather Fire Behaviour and Fire Weather The OFHG also demonstrates the difficulties of The OFHG also demonstrates the difficulties variables quantifying fuel-array by noting the many Despite contributing to each fuel-array component. estimates of the OFHG offers this difficulty, ratings‘ ’equivalent fuel loads‘ for given ’hazard 7.1. as can be seen in Table Cheney 1999); Overall Fuel Hazard Guide Overall Fuel Hazard Box 7.2 Examples Of Quasi-Equilibrium Fine-Fuel Loads Box 7.2 Examples Of drier to wetter forests, are: forests, listed for fine-fuel loads in Victorian Some quasi-equilibrium • Grey Box (E. microcarpa), Ironbark (Eucalyptus sideroxylon) and Red • forests, and Narrowleaf-Peppermint (E. radiata) Mixed Messmate (E. obliqua) • Mountain Ash (E. regnans), 7.33 7.32 7.31 7.30 7.29 PAGE 78 7.42 7.41 7.40 7.39 7.38 be strongly affected. species, apparently relatively fewinnumber, can plant species),butitisknownthatcertain the effects offire seasonalityonthebiota(animaland peat fires couldeventuate.There islittleknownabout fires willnottakeplacewhenthesoilsare sodrythat complication, butweassumehere thatprescribed fires andtheirintensity. Peatorduff fires are a conservation candependontheseasonalityof The appropriate intervalsbetweenfires forspecies would besixto12years. altitude eucalyptforests whilethecycleforZone2 have totakeplaceonafoursixyearcycleinlower- considered would that,"inmanycases",burning For thestatedobjectivesofZone1,Tolhurst (2003) apply toanyZone. other environmental criteria,are involved.Thesecould determining intervalwhenplantoranimalspecies, discussed above.Complicationscanarisein Overall FuelHazard oracomponentthereof, as fuel accumulationcurve,eitherasaloading, 3. Thetimetoreach theselimitsisamatterofthe prescribed response burning are listedforFMZs1to (FMZs), thefuel-arraylimitsthatwouldtriggera In thedescriptionbelowofFuelManagementZones Intervals BetweenPrescribedFires canopy-nesting birds orleaf-feedinginsects). temporary lossofcanopyhabitat(forexample,for ground, toretain aestheticvalues,andtoavoid is toavoidhavingapulseofdeadleavesfallingthe brown becausetheyare heatkilled).Presumably this leave thecrowns ofthetrees withoutscorch (turning In forests, managersseektoremove thelitterbut 1986). this needsdefinitionaswellarationalbasis(Gill spelled out.Somemanagersaimfora‘mosaic’but the reasons forthepercentage haveneverbeen the Box7.6onFuelManagementZones),although percentage say80%(see ofthefinefueltobeburnt, intensity fire. Managersoftenaimforacertain canopies ofthetreesinahigh whichcanburn reduce thepotentialbarkfuelnorwillitremove the block.Prescribedwillnotgreatlyburning will remove allfuel,eventhefinedeadfrom a However, weshouldnotexpectthatprescribed fires 7.45 7.44 7.43 7.47 7.46 fire shouldbe3.3%. year bythecombinationofprescribed andunplanned this figure, theaverageproportionper oflandburnt considered idealforforests isabout30years.Using Working Group 2002).Generallytheaverageinterval vegetationtypes(Fireflora inallVictorian Ecology average intervalforthepersistenceofnativevascular limited) todeterminetheintervallimitsandasuitable expert opinionandallavailabledata(butthisis importance ofbetween-fire intervals.DSEhasused Understorey shrubsprovide otherexamplesofthe persistence mightbe. in acknowledgingwhatasuitableintervalforspecies’ regnans) for example,thoseofMountainAsh dependent animals.Ifthetrees are sensitiveasare, existence ofaplantspeciesorforthepersistence Fires canbetoorare ortoocommoneitherforthe persistence ofplantandanimalspecies(Gill1998). mayalsobeimportanttothe age sincelastburn The spatialarrangementofforest blocksofdifferent the fire regime: intensity, seasonalityandfire type. recognising theimportanceofothercomponents In thissection,wetalkonlyofintervalswhile Resources andEnvironment, 1998). andtheDepartmentofNatural Finance, Victoria, ecological requirements peryear(DeptTreasury and fromburning, whateversource, are inadequatefor recogniseDSE andParksVictoria thatcurrent levelsof unplanned fires averagedjust26,600ha. prior to30June1998,theannualfigure for hectares or3.1%peryear. However, inthedecade estate, thiswouldamountto240,000of7,700,000 (Morgan &Roche1998).ConsideringthewholeDSE similar amountwastreated byprescribed fires 120,000 hectares peryear, andduringthe1980sa Prior tothelate1980sunplannedfiresabout burned then thisfacthastobetakenintoaccount (Eucalyptus INF.018.002.0185 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 79 CHAPTER 7 8 INF.018.002.0186 If the maximum FFDI reached 9 is the critical fuel load on level ground and is the critical fuel load on level ground 0 ] where W ] where 0.0693S = W0/[e s , is given by: W s is measured as the depth of the litter layer; less than 25 mm depth corresponds to is measured as the depth of the litter 10 comprises shrub, heath, and suspended material; its influence on fire behaviour “depends on comprises shrub, heath, and suspended depends on the ‘amount of loose fibrous bark, particularly ‘stringybark’, the “amount of bark depends on the ‘amount of loose fibrous S is the slope in degrees. 9 with a limited run of data. New South Wales For Thredbo, 10 meters see: Noble et al (1980). For equations to McArthur’s 8 the critical fuel load on a slope, W Mathematically, The threshold figures given are useful as a guide but should not be taken as definitive. Fuel loads of 2 t/ha The threshold figures given are useful as a guide but should not be taken as may be such that the area cannot or more can form in the first year after a fire but the lack of fuel continuity be burnt under prescribed weather conditions anyway. Box 7.5 Threshold Fuel Loads Box 7.5 Threshold if we are going to be able to The ‘threshold fuel load’ gives us a guide to the maximum tolerable fuel load resources for firefighting are control fires under any circumstance at any place, assuming the best possible the fuel threshold will change with slope, because each increase of 10 degrees available. Theoretically, This reduces the intensity. doubles fire rate of spread and halves the threshold fuel load giving the same 10 degrees, then 20 degrees. threshold from 8 t/ha on level ground to 4 t/ha then 2 t/ha as a slope goes to these ‘worst conditions’ may Upper threshold fuel levels are set for expected worst possible conditions but be at an FFDI much less than 100 at higher altitudes (see Gill & Moore 1990). Box 7.4 Forest Fire Danger Index Fire Box 7.4 Forest is based on drought condition, air temperature, and relative humidity The Forest Fire Danger Index, or FFDI, height. and wind velocity in the open at 10 metres condition is given a maximum score of 100 while groupings of indices The perceived ‘worst possible’ weather weather forecasts-are named called ‘fire danger ratings’-familiar to anyone who follows summer and autumn High’ or ‘Extreme’. Rate of fire spread with the wind is given as either ‘Low’, ‘Moderate’, ‘High’, ‘Very doubling for every 10 degrees of upward slope. burnt off in any previous wildfire or fuel reduction burn, both at the base of the tree and up the bole” and in any previous wildfire or fuel reduction burnt off burning bark can “defeat control in wildfire or prescribed burn the “amount of long loose ‘ribbony’ bark”; distance spotting, and… acting as a link between ground and crown situations… by producing short and long fuels to produce crown fires.” ’Elevated fuel’ height, amount (weight), proportion of dead material, thickness the fuel continuity (horizontal and vertical), of the live foliage”. of the foliage and twigs, and flammability ’Surface Fine Fuel Hazard’ Box 7.3 Overall Fuel Hazard Guide Guide Hazard Box 7.3 Overall Fuel Fuel of the influences of) Bark Hazard + Elevated or OFH, is defined as “(the sum The ‘overall fuel hazard’, Fuel Hazard”. Hazard + Surface Fine alone. the fuel array than one based on fine-fuels a much more comprehensive guide to This, then, provides ‘Bark Hazard’ to 8–12 t/ha, and 35–50 mm depth corresponds to 12–20t/ha. <8t/ha, 25–35 mm depth corresponds fuel arrays in the forest. A photo guide is provided to help assess box for each an amount from the appropriate 7.1). Taking (Table Each component has five levels of ‘hazard’ by addition, and that amount used for estimating fire rate of component, the total OFH can be calculated behaviour guide. spread, or other properties, from a forest-fire Based on McCarthy et al. 1999 was 81, then the critical fine-fuel fuel load would be 9 t/ha; if 64, then 10; if 49, then 11- based on the was 81, then the critical fine-fuel fuel load would be 9 t/ha; if 64, then 10; if McArthur system. PAGE 80 7.51 7.50 7.49 7.48 Table 7.1:Equivalent Fuel Loads(t/ha)for given Hazard Ratings ulCmoetLwMdrt ihVr ihExtreme Very high High Moderate Low Fuel Component ufc ie 01 20 16 10 5 2 ElevatedSurface fine Bark 10 0026 Source: DSE,OFHG1999 management. 7.6) tofacilitateastrategicapproach tofuel 1Zoningappearstohaveoriginatedin1988–89whenfour zoneswere created withthesame maximumfuelloadsasthefirstthree 11 Natural Resources andEnvironment 1995) zones (Auditor-General’s Office 1992;Departmentof Accordingly, DSEhascreated fivefuel-management just built-assetprotection. less intensemeasures whileachievingotheraims,not a cost-effective riskmanagementplanmaydictate adjacent areas isgoingtobemaximalbutelsewhere density ofassetsisfound,effort infuelreduction in protect assetsofavarietytypes.Where ahigh particular aims.Fuelmanagementisdesignedto effects onmanagementplanning,according toits All thefactorsdescribedabovewillhavevarying DSE’s FuelManagementZones regime characteristicsonanimalsaswellplants. feedback ontheeffects offire intervalsandotherfire conservation estateseffectively itisimportanttohave This isnotnecessarilytrue.Ifweare tomanage then theanimalsandotherorganismswillbealso. Group (2002)isthatiftheplantspeciesare conserved purposes intheReportofFire EcologyWorking The assumptionaboutintervalsmadeforecological average intervalalsoneedstobeappropriate. provide more resilience thanregular intervals,butthe Some formofrandomisationintervalswould atregularparts ofamosaiccanbeburnt intervals. althoughitmaybeobviousthatthesame burning’ The formerideaisprobably behindcallsfor‘mosaic regular intervalsinthesameportionstimeaftertime. intervals andtimessincethelastfire, oritcanbeat (McCarthy etal.2001)togiveawidevarietyof intheother.pattern canberandomised Burning inonemaybeentirelyof burning different from the intwodifferentbe burnt regions, say, butthepattern The sameaveragepercentage ofthelandscapecan 5-part system. 057 0025 11 (see Box Hazard Rating 7.52 7.56 7.55 7.54 7.53 largest Zoneinbothareas. asset protection, whilethatofZone3parcels isthe relatively small,butparticularlyimportantintermsof Note thatthecollectivearea ofZone1parcels is Gippsland RegionsoftheDSEare listedinTable 7.2. The areas zonedinthesewaysfortheNorthEastand They maybecomesitesforunplanned ignitions. conditions forweedinvasionandestablishments. attract unauthoriseduseandprovide suitable Tracks cancreate adverseenvironmental effects, classes, ortrackedvehiclesonly. four-wheel drives,vehiclesofparticularweight gated. Tracks maybetrafficable bytwo-wheeland maintenance andrepair. Tracks canbealwaysopenor or becomepartofthetracknetworkrequiring created duringunplannedfires mayberehabilitated time ofthefire orreadied atsuchtimesonly. Tracks tracks canbemaintainedregularly, created atthe Tracks canbetemporaryorpermanent.Temporary have separateentrancesandexits. winding. Theymayincludewatercrossings, andmay clear, followridgesorcontours,bestraight steep gradients,berough orsmooth,vegetated (for trucksandothermachinery),haveshallowor or narrow, havepassingareas andturnaroundpoints Tracks havearangeofattributes.Theycanbewide areas offuelorforinitiatingprescribed fires. can takeplaceduringfirefighting,out forburning theyformtheedgeagainstwhichignition burning; unplanned fires; theydefineblocksforprescribed (Chapter 5).Tracks provide accessbyground crews to preparedness asshownbysubmissionstothisInquiry Tracks are animportantissueinbothfirefighting and Tracks of thepresent INF.018.002.0187 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 81 CHAPTER 7 INF.018.002.0188 . . (Code, p. 17) . . (Code, p.16) “provide[s] for the use of prescribed burning for the (Code, pp. 16-17) in “areas of vegetation in which there would be a high potential for (Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land – [or Code] p. 16) Fire Management on Public Land – (Code of Practice for (Code p. 17) ‘low’); Treat approximately 50% of the area in each prescribed-burning operation; Treat OFHG) on 50% of the area; Surface fine fuels should be at or below a depth of 25–35 mm (8-12 t/ha, see the surface fine fuels are Bark fuels should be less than ‘high’ (2 t/ha, see OFHG) on 50% of the area (unless and Elevated fuels should be ‘high’ (2 t/ha, see OFHG) or less on 50% of the area; OFH should be less than or equal to ‘high’ on 50% of the area. Treat up to 80% of the area; Treat in depth (8-12 t/ha, see OFHG); Surface fuels should be less than 25 mm surface fine fuels are ‘low’); Bark fuels should be ‘high’ or less (unless (2 t/ha, see OFHG); and Elevated fuels should be less than ‘high’ OFH should be ‘high’ or less. ‘Treat up to 90%’ of the burning block; up to 90%’ of the burning ‘Treat mm (4-8 t/ha, see OFHG); height of 15-25 Keep fuels at or below a litter-bed see OFHG) unless surface fine fuel is ‘low’. Bark fuels should be ‘high’ or less (2 t/ha, OFH should always be ‘moderate’ or ‘low’. Zone 5. Prescribed fire exclusion zone: fire Zone 5. Prescribed The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan sets aims for prescribed burning. In each operation: The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan sets aims for prescribed burning. In each Zone 4. Specific flora and fauna management zone: communities which have active management of specific flora and/or fauna, particularly for species and/or defined fuel or ecological critical fire regime requirements that are not adequately catered for by broadly management objectives” economic, ecological or cultural loss if they were subjected to prescribed burning” The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan sets aims for prescribed burning. In each operation: The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan sets mosaic zone fuel reduced Zone 3: Broad-area mosaic of areas of fuel reduction which will complement works in This Zone aims to ‘provide an irregular of wildfires’ Zones 1 and 2 in reducing the severity The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan describes the aims for prescribed burning. In each operation, The Gippsland Fire Protection Plan describes than a 10% chance of failure of first suppression attack if OFZ is less It has been predicted that there is less than moderate, even at a FFDI of 100. corridor zone Zone 2: Strategic fuel-reduced continuity to provide a substantial barrier to the spread width and These are ‘strategic corridors of sufficient and the potential for spot fire development’. They ‘provide areas of wildfire by reducing its speed, intensity safer and more effective’ which assist in making fire suppression Box 7.6 DSE Fuel Management Zones Box 7.6 DSE Fuel Management zone: Zone 1: Asset protection highly valued protection to human life, property and the highest level of strategic Here the aim is to “provide values” public land assets and PAGE 82 Fuel reduction burning. 7.58 7.57 the NorthEast Region(NER) Table 7.2:Areas (ha)ofFuel ManagementZones1to5(seeBox 7.6)for theGippslandRegion(GR)and einZn oe2Zn oe4Zn Total Zone5 Zone4 1,494,818 463,925 (31.0%) 2,576,835 494,630(19.2%) 142,126(9.5%) Zone3 468,593(18.2%) 660,169(44.2%) 1,115,830(43.3%) 205,202(13.7%) 408,437(15.9%) Zone2 23,396(1.6%) 89,345(3.5%) Zone1 NER GR Region Source: Datasupplied byDSE;areas fortheNorthEastRegionare from aDraftPlanandare approximate. 16,000 kilometres offire tracksare prepared. that eachyearpriortothefire seasonapproximately 2Auditor-General Victoria, 12 justification foranychange. or fewer, tracksbutnoteasytoprovide anadequate present. Itiseasytosaythatthere shouldbemore, firefighting resources andmethods,thefueltypes fire events,theextentandtypesofground andair much usethetrackswouldhaveoutsideofsevere and maintenance,thenature oftheterrain,how the overallaimsoflanduse,costestablishment operational sensebecauseanyanswerdependson the network)shouldbe,isnotanswerableinan What theoptimumdensity(orsizeof‘cells’within Tracks androads formanetworkofvariousdensities. and tracksacross theState. Industries manageover25,000kilometres ofroads on publicland.DSEandtheDepartmentofPrimary recreational useandfire managementpurposes operations, watercatchmentmanagement, Tracks androads are maintainedforforestry Fire PreventionandPreparedness 12 DSE advisedtheInquiry , May2003pp136. 7.60 7.59 7.62 7.61 ignition issuitable. (a higherdensityoftracks)whenonlyground-based suitable whenaerialignitionisused,smallerareas largerareasburning, (alowerdensityoftracks)being However, itmaybepossibletodosoforprescribed in relation tofirefighting alone. sets anappropriate densityforatracknetworkeven The Inquiryisunaware ofanyformanalysisthat burning. makenorecommendations here aboutprescribed We five Chapters. issue andwetakeupthediscussioninfollowing discussion ofthecontroversial prescribed burning This Chapterhassetthesceneforinformed Conclusion INF.018.002.0189 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 83 CHAPTER 7 142, INF.018.002.0190 . Forestry Pp. 101–27. . Victorian 5, 20l–3. Plant and Soil 10, 73–7. 44, 322–331 F. Muell. In Effectiveness of Firefighting First In Effectiveness of Firefighting , Research Report No. 45, Victorian , Research Synopsis of the Knowledge Used in Ecology Review of Budgetary Arrangements for Bushfire Prevention: Are We Doing Bushfire Prevention: Are We Department of Natural Resources and Department of Natural Resources Bushfire ’95 Presented Papers Fire and the Australian Biota. Gippsland Fire Protection Plan Australian Journal of Ecology Eucalyptus regnans Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into The Working Party Report. Working International Journal of Wildland Fire , Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne. , Institute of Public Affairs, . Government Printer, Melbourne. . Government Printer, 157–66. L.E.B. 1939. Stretton, Causes and Measures Taken to Prevent the Bush Fires of January to Prevent the 1939, and Causes and Measures Taken to Prevent Bush Taken to Protect Life and Property and The Measures to be of Future Bush and to Protect Life and Property in the Event Fires in Victoria Fires burning in Victoria: K.G. 2003. Prescribed Practice. Policy and Tolhurst, to a conference Paper presented Enough? 1999. N.P. K.G. & Cheney, Tolhurst, Prescribed Burning in Victoria. East Melbourne, Environment, Victoria. Special Report Protection, 1992, Fire Office, Victorian Auditor-Generals Melbourne. Number 16, Government Printer, and Finance & Department of Natural Victorian Department of Treasury 1998. and Environment Resources Fire Management. J. 1981. Fuel dynamics in Australian vegetation. In A.M. Gill, R.H. Walker, & I.R. Noble (eds) Groves Polglase, P.I. & Attiwill, P.M. 19992. Nitrogen and phosphorus cycling in 19992. Nitrogen & Attiwill, P.M. Polglase, P.I. to stand age of relation Australian Academy of Science, Canberra. Olson, J.S. 1963. Energy storage and the balance of producers and producers Olson, J.S. 1963. Energy storage and the balance of decomposers in ecological systems. McDonald, J. McI. 1999. East Melbourne and Environment, Department of Natural Resources flexible, non-deterministic, R.O. 1995. A G.N., Gill, A.M. & Weber, Mercer, litter accumulation model. In: Service, Fire & Tasmania Parks and Wildlife Service, Tasmania Tasmania, Hobart. Pages unnumbered. A seamless partnership in rural firefighting. Morgan, G. & Roche, T.1998. Authorities Council to the 1998 Australasian Fire Paper presented Hobart. Conference, meters & Gill, A.M. 1980. McArthur's fire-danger G.A.V. Noble, I.R., Bary, as equations. expressed McCarthy, G. J. & Tolhurst, K. G. 1998. & Tolhurst, G. J. McCarthy, of Natural Resources and Attack Operations by the Department Environment from 1991/92–1994/95 and Environment. Department of Natural Resources guide. 1999. Overall fuel hazard K.G. & Chatto, K. Tolhurst, G.J., McCarthy, and Environment edition. Victorian Department of Natural Resources Third Report 47. Management Research Fire interval fire 2001. Theoretical M.A., Gill, A.M. & Bradstock, R.A. McCarthy, distributions. Pp. . , State Forest Fire: , Commonwealth . Australian Australian Journal of Department of Natural A Prescribed Burning Guide for Western Australian Department of Western . Forests Commission of NSW, . Forests . CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. Bushfires in Australia Analysis of Disturbance by Fire on Public Interim Guidelines and Procedures for Fire Prevention and Preparedness B.24,1–12. Control Burning in Eucalypt Forests International Conference on Forest Fire Research, Department of Natural Resources and Environment & Parks and Environment Department of Natural Resources . Pp. 61–89. McGraw Hill, New York. . Pp. 61–89. McGraw Hill, New York. Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land 12, 299–306. Wildlife, Fire and Future Climates of Australia, Forestry and Timber Leaflet 80, Governmentof Australia, Forestry Bureau Printer, Canberra. Commonwealth behaviour in eucalypt forest. A.G. 1967. Fire McArthur, and Timber107. Leaflet No. Forestry Bureau McArthur, A.G. 1962. McArthur, Government Publishing Service, Canberra. J. M.A. & Lindesay, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, B., Lindenmayer, Mackey, 2002. Land in Victoria. Coimbra, Proceedings Management of Western Australian for the Fire Gill, A.M. 1986. Research and Conservation Reserves. State Forests References of Victoria. 2003. Auditor-General Victoria, East Melbourne. of south- intensities in eucalypt forests 1990. Fire P.H.R. Gill, A.M. & Moore, eastern Australia. Government Printer, Melbourne. Government Printer, and biodiversity in semi-arid regimes 2002. Fire Bradstock, R.A. & Cohn, J.S. Bradstock, J.E. Williamsmallee ecosystems. In R.A. & A.M.Gill (eds) Fire Regimes and Biodiversity of a Continent. Flammable Australia: The Cambridge, UK. 238–58. Cambridge University Press, and Disaster Preparedness Review Committee. 1984. On Bushfire Bushfire 16 Fires Response in Victoria, Australia, Following the Ash Wednesday February 1983. Davis (ed) fuels. In K.P. Byram, G.M. 1959. Combustion of forest Control and Use and fire to site characteristics levels in relation Chatto, K. 1996. Fuel hazard Victorian Natural Department of history – Chiltern Regional Park case study. Report No. 43. Research and Environment, Resources Gould, J.S. & Knight, I. 1992. N.P., Cheney, Regrowth Forests of Silvertop Ash Young Sydney. DNRE 1995. Government of Victoria, Melbourne. Group.1999. Ecology Working Fire Ecological Burning on Public Land in Victoria. & Parks Victoria. and Environment Resources 2002. Group. Ecology Working Fire Conservation and Land Management, Technical Report No. 12. Conservation and Land Management, Technical on regimes impact of fire effects: of fire Gill, A.M. 1998. An hierarchy and 14th Research Fire International on Forest landscapes. 3rd Conference Luso, Portugal, Proceedings, Meteorology and Forest on Fire Conference 1, 129–44. November 1998. Volume R.I. 1987. Bushfire & Forrester, P.H.R. Gill, A.M., Christian, K.R., Moore, burning. and fuel reduction hazard incidence, fire Ecology A. G. 1978 Luke, R. H. & McArthur, PAGE 84 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1 ‘High Country’ Fuel Managementinthe Chapter 8 in theHighCountry. support fortheviewthat‘grazingprevents blazing’ incidence orintensityoffires inHighPlainssystems. is whetherornotgrazingbycattlereduces the to commentonthewiderissue;whatispertinent Mosely 1988).Itisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy of cattleinNationalParks(Clark1992,Anon. part ofawider, longrunningissueaboutthegrazing High CountryhasbeenanissueinthisInquiry. Itis The extenttowhichgrazingmodifiesfuelinthe and 10,Gill&Moore 1990). relatively mildintheHighCountry(seeChapters6 short descriptionofclimate).Fire weatherisalso 1989fora generally mild(seeAshton&Williams Snow iscommoninwinter, whilesummersare because theystore andmoderatetheflowofwater. are animportantresource inwatercatchmentareas there are bogs,dominatedbySphagnummoss,which herbfields andheathlandsare tobefound.Also, air drainageathighaltitudewhere grasslands, orinareasmountains ofNorthEastVictoria ofcold The HighCountryislandabovethetree lineinthe High Country Burning andGrazinginthe concludethatthere iscurrently noscientific We unplanned fire. fuel modificationanditsplaceinpreparing for As inChapter7,ourbroad focushere ison region containsshrublandswithoutEucalyptusalso). of NorthWest or‘Mallee’(althoughthis Victoria, ‘High Country’,andthesemi-aridtoaridlandscapes environments –thealpineandsubalpineregions or theseareIn Victoria, tobefoundincontrasting dominated by, orassociatedwith,shrubbyeucalypts. understand more aboutthevegetationtypes ‘grazing prevents blazing’.To dothis,wemust This Chapterlooksatthesciencebehindclaimsthat presence ofcattleinAlpineNationalParks. the is partofthewiderculturalissueconcerning or behaviourinthemountainsofNorthEastVictoria Whether ornotcattlegrazingaffects fire occurrence Overview 8.8 8.7 8.11 8.10 8.9 autumn. areas are nowtheprimegrazinglandsinsummerand frequent allofthesecommunities,butnon-forested Gum andAlpineAsh(E.delegatensis).Cattlewill forests ofvariouseucalyptspeciesincludingSnow Lower inaltitudethesecommunitiesmergewith pauciflora) woodland,herbfield,grasslandandbogs. subalpine communitiesofSnowGum(Eucalyptus isolated plateauxandmountaintopscarrying consistsofanumber The HighCountryofVictoria Grazing History the samespot. season oftheirpresence andhowoftentheyrevisit on thetypesofanimal,theirstockingrates, The impactofanimalsinanygivenarea willdepend trampling, soildisturbance,urinatinganddefecating. an effect through whattheyeatorthrough vegetation intheshortandlongterm.Animalshave High Countrydependsonwhatcattledotothe Any effect ofgrazingontheproneness tofire ofthe High Plains. that grazingbecameheavilyconcentrated onthe was attheexpenseofgrasses tosuchanextent an understorey ofshrubs(Carr&Turner 1959).This repeated firingforimproved grazingled,ironically, to supportedanunderstoreyin Victoria ofgrass, but Woolybutt) inthevicinityofBogongHighPlains Originally, themountainforests ofAlpineAsh(or and recreationalist period.’ decline withtheascendancyofconservationist European pastoralistsandprospectors andrecent marked increase infire frequencies withthearrival of South Wales, showinga indicated‘ageneralpattern mainly intheAustralianCapitalTerritory andNew Studies ofgrowth ringsandfire scarsonSnowGum, off.’summer grazingwithitsassociatedburning was thebeginningofalongtraditionhighcountry the longhotsummersonsurrounding plains.This high mountainsummerpastures totidethemover 1820 ‘pastoralistswere …discoveringthevalueof bushfires.’ Inthehigheraltitudelandscapesaround green pickandtoreduce theriskofdestructive the forest visuallyopenandaccessible,toprovide a the heatofsummertoensurekeep a‘clean’burn theforestburnt asoftentheycouldandalwaysin was developedbytheearlypastoralists:‘Stockmen country. Banks(1989)notedthatastrong folklore Country isassociatedwiththatintheadjacentforest intheHigh The historyofgrazingandburning INF.018.002.0191 INF.018.002.0192 CHAPTER 8 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 8.12 Historically, the heaviest grazing of the High Country 8.17 Shrubs are most likely to burn when fire spreads in has been in times of drought such as in 1901, 1914, litter or dry grass near or underneath them. If the 1926 and 1939 (pre-1959 at least).1 Overgrazing grass is green, the fire will not spread. If the grass is occurred in some years (Holth 1980); horses, cattle only partially dead, any fire in it spreads more slowly and sheep were involved. These large vertebrate than if it consists of completely dead foliage. If the animals appear to have been a new evolutionary grass is grazed, the rate of spread of a fire may be up feature of the High Country, large native vertebrate to 20 per cent slower than in an ungrazed pasture; in herbivores being virtually absent from it previously. an eaten-out pasture a fire may still spread at about On these Plains the graziers apparently did not set 40 per cent of the ungrazed rate (Cheney & Sullivan landscape fires but in 1939 the Plains were 1997). This means that even if grasses are eaten ‘undoubtedly… swept by [unplanned] fire’ down, which is unlikely, they will carry fire if desiccated. Woody fuels will burn when the grass Modern Grazing Impacts is green but the reverse is unlikely.

8.13 Today, the High Country in Victoria is largely grazed 8.18 Grazing would have a negative effect on fires in the by cattle. Fifty-six licences to graze stock are presently High Country if it was intense enough to do any of held by ‘mountain cattlemen’ and paid for at about the following: $5 per head per year. Up to 8,000 stock travel to and • Alter the grass curing (‘proportion of dead matter’) from the mountains each year and graze there for significantly; about 16 weeks (Mountain Cattlemen’s Association). • Significantly reduce biomass (fuel load); 8.14 In a short study of the behaviour of free-ranging • Create large proportions of bare ground; or cattle on the Bogong High Plains, Van Rees and • Reduce shrub abundance. Hutson (1983) found that, for feeding, cattle 8.19 However, grazing animals are more likely to remove preferred grassland and heathland rather than open- the green material from a pasture leaving the brown heath, wet grassland or mossbed, but for resting they material if they can. On the other hand, if they graze overwhelmingly preferred grassland. They drank the pasture right down and it resprouts, then all the largely from mossbeds. new shoots will, of course, be green. 8.15 Carr and Turner (1959a) noted that cattle and sheep 8.20 Grazing animals will affect grassy biomass according do not eat the regrowth shoots of Snow Gum after to their stocking density and the seasonal availability fire but eat the flower heads of Snow Grasses (Poa of palatable herbs and flower stalks; they will mostly spp.) and a sedge called Ledge Grass (Carex hebes). ignore shrubs. After a small fire in 1984 at Mt Fainter Animals attempting to eat some varieties of Snow on the Bogong High Plains, it took more than 15 Grass early in the season actually pulled out parts of years to re-establish complete vegetation cover on the grass tussocks, which then died. At the peak of grazed sites and only 10 years on ungrazed sites. This the Snow Grass flowering there was little grazing of was because of differences in the rates of grass re- the grass or herb foliage. In poor seasons for the establishment; reduced cover allows erosion to occur flowering of the grasses, foliage was heavily grazed in and may lead to shrub invasion (Wahren et al. 1999). the experience of Carr and Turner (1959a). 8.21 In other words, free-range cattle grazing, associated 8.16 Our observations on the Bogong High Plains, after the with firing in forests in the past, appears to have 2003 fires, indicated that while the woody vegetation changed the fuel array in forests to one dominated (often copses of Snow Gums with heathy shrubs) was by shrubs rather than grass, a change likely to have burnt, the grass and herbs adjacent to it often were increased fire proneness and the chance of intense not. This is because litter fuels of Snow Gum fires. As a result, grazing has moved to the more woodland merely have to lose water by evaporation open higher-altitude country. There, cattle grazing has to become flammable – and can do so after only a changed the composition of the vegetation in some short time of desiccation. However, alpine grasses places by reducing the quantity of succulent herbage require seasonal periods of soil and atmospheric in the form of Snow Daisy (Celmisia sp.) and dryness for their leaves to die and become flammable. increasing the grass component (Carr & Turner 1959b).

1 This paragraph, unless otherwise noted, is based on the study by Carr, S.G.M. and Turner, J.S. (1959a). PAGE 85 PAGE 86 8.25 8.24 8.23 8.22 that ‘grazingpreventsblazing.’ Country shouldnotbebasedontheargument a decisionregardingcattlegrazingintheHigh That, accordingtoavailablescientificevidence, Recommendation to provide acommonwayforward. debate byallpartiesandstakeholdersinthisissue passionate. Giventhis,wecommendconstructive notes howeverthatopinionsare diverseand fires, isoutsidethescopeofInquiry. TheInquiry relates tothemitigationorotherwiseofunplanned the issuesofHighCountrygrazing,otherthanhowit cultural andheritagevalues.TheInquirybelievesthat withstronglong traditioninVictoria community, The InquirynotesthatHighCountrygrazinghasa that ‘grazingprevents blazing’intheHighCountry. There iscurrently noscientificsupportfortheview Conclusion that ‘grazingdoesnotprevent blazing’. fire-proneness ofeveneaten-outpastures, allsuggest from succulentherbstograssinsomeplaces,andthe to woodyunderstoreys intheforest, theshiftaway 1939 whengrazingwasheavy, theshiftfrom grassy The presence offires across theHighCountryin (ed.) Mosely, J.G.1988.HistoryofconservationtheAustralianAlps.InR.Good Cattlemen oftheBogongs Holth, T. 1980. of Science,Canberra. Australian AlpsNationalParksLiaisonCommittee&theAcademy Proceedings oftheFirstFennerConference ontheEnvironment. The Good, R.(ed.)1989. Coimbra, Proceedings Australia. eastern Gill, A.M.&Moore, P.H.R. 1990.Fire intensitiesineucalyptforests ofsouth alpine Clark, E.1992.Alpinegrazing,ataleoftwostates. CSIRO Publishing,Melbourne. Albury, NSW. Albury, Bushfire 1999,Proceedings. 425–30.CharlesSturtUniversity, alpineandsubalpinevegetation.AustralianBushfireVictorian Conference Wahren, C-H.A.,Pabst,W.A. R.J.1999.Post-fire regeneration &Williams, in Australia 12 the BogongHighPlains,Victoria. Van Rees,H.&Hutson,G.D.1983.Thebehaviouroffree-ranging cattleon Cheney, P. &Sullivan,A.1997. (ed.) Banks, J.G.1989.Ahistoryofforest fire intheAustralianAlps.InR.Good Significance oftheAustralianAlps region.vegetation intheVictorian InR.Good(ed.) R.J.1989.Dynamicsofthesub-alpine Ashton, D.H.andWilliams, and onward. alpineareaAnonymous 1992.CattlegrazingintheVictorian 1835–1991 References Fencing experimentsingrasslandC. Carr, S.G.M.&Turner, J.S.1959b.TheecologyoftheBogongHighPlainsII. Journal ofBotany The environmental factors andthegrasslandcommunities. Carr, S.G.M.&Turner, J.S.1959a.TheecologyoftheBogongHighPlainsI. The ScientificSignificanceoftheAustralianAlps. The ScientificSignificanceoftheAustralianAlps. 80, 2–3:129–55. : 176–7. Revue degeographiealpine Cattlemen oftheHighCountry. oftheMountain TheStory International ConferenceonForestFireResearch, 7:12–33. The ScientificSignificanceoftheAustralianAlps. B.24: 1–12. . Rigby, Melbourne. Grassfires. FuelWeather andFireBehaviour Proceedings oftheEcologicalSociety .143–68. Australian JournalofBotany 80, 2–3:481–509. The Scientific Revue degeographie 345–56. 65–80. Australian INF.018.002.0193 7: 34–63. . PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 87 CHAPTER 9 1 INF.018.002.0194 During 2 ussed 187,569 hectares were burnt. were In 187,569 hectares 3 Comparison of 2002–2003 to Earlier Fires Fires history The cultural baseline for contemporary fire which burntin the Mallee Region is the 1959 fire, of the Big Desert. two thirds approximately Mallee vegetation comprises shrubby eucalypts Mallee vegetation comprises tall in discrete or five metres usually up to about four a shallow litter bed and clumps underlain by or prickly hummock grasses associated with shrubs is common on stabilised (Spinifex). This vegetation in the North the geological past sand dunes from the climate is arid or semi- of the State where West (see Cheal arid with hot summers and cool winters & Parkes 1989 and Conn 1993 for descriptions). ability to The vegetation varies widely in terms of its Mallee eucalypts may occur with the highly carry fire. low flammable Spinifex grasses or with relatively of the Big flammability succulent shrubs. In the area of December 2002, the vegetation was of Desert fire shrublands. typical mallee mixed with non-succulent Fire and Fuel Management in the Mallee the 2003 season, 1985, the area burnt large at 87,306 1985, the area was relatively large In 1991, 1999 and 2001, relatively hectares. burnt were (all less than 50,000 areas aggregate to the small compared are but these areas hectares) burnt season. The area in 1981, at fire recent burnt exceeded the area in the 282,593 hectares, (Land Conservation Council 1987). fires recent 9.7 9.5 9.6

in Chapter 1. 1 1990. in Gill & Moore weather is briefly treated For a brief climatology based on Mildura see Maher 1973. Fire 2 and purpose is disc unless otherwise noted. The Tour to the area Inquiry Tour the DSE/CFA This paragraph uses information from What is Mallee? in December in the Mallee region The large fire 2002 was primarily in the Big Desert Wilderness Park. area the ‘Big Desert’ is part of a large Ecologically, of public land comprising Ngarkat (866,000 hectares) in South Conservation Park (208,000 hectares) Australia and the Big Desert Wilderness Park (142,000 (159,000 hectares) Big Desert State Forest hectares), in and Wyperfeld National Park (357,000 hectares) A few much & Thomas 1997). Victoria (Creswell could be added to this list. Not really smaller reserves a ‘desert’, the Big Desert is clothed in vegetation, typically mallee and heathlands. The nature of fuel distribution and accumulation in The nature types in the mallee and shrubland vegetation of other in substantially Victoria has resulted North West burning to prescribed from approaches different of the State. areas those in the forested and breaks attempts to establish buffers Various ‘link in the vegetation have been made, including chaining burns’. new strategy is the One relatively of strips of vegetation followed by burning the felled has the material once it has dried out. This system way cost efficient potential to be a safer and more and effectiveness but safety, to construct buffers, will need to be monitored. effects environmental Mallee is both a vegetation type and a district named Mallee is both a vegetation of The ‘Mallee’ is a large region after the vegetation. in the semi-arid and arid mainly shrubby vegetation may there fires of Victoria. Prescribed North West like consume all the foliage and litter and look unplanned fires. Overview 3 year ending June 30 of the stated year. to the fire This and similar shorthand refers

Conserving the Malleefowl Long periods without fire are advocated for the conservation of this species. given the slow litter The Malleefowl requires large amounts of litter to build its nest mound and, or more are estimated as optimal accumulation rates in this environment, fire-free intervals of up to 60 years for this purpose (Benshemesh 1990). available in vegetation no more On the other hand, the favoured food resources for the species may be most be likely to lead to local than 20–30 years old, while fires more frequent than every 10 years would extinction. to the times needed for the The long periods needed to reach maximum use of the habitat may be due breeding up of Malleefowl numbers rather than litter build-up. 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 Techniques and Approaches Techniques Fuel Management in the ‘Mallee’: ‘Mallee’: in the Management Fuel Chapter 9 Chapter PAGE 88 9.12 9.11 9.10 9.9 9.8 of carrying out the burning, addtotheproblems.of carryingouttheburning, Conservation issuesandthepractical considerations private land,usuallyincrops andpasture. problem ofwhattodowhere thepubliclandabuts to create suchasystemthere wouldalwaysbethe If itwere possibletoengendersufficient fire activity burning. may beoneoftheideasbehind‘mosaic’or‘patch’ created byotherfires intheprevious decade.This be created inwhichfires alwaysencountered abreak possible thatasystemofpatchesvegetationcould frequency washighenoughthenitistheoretically a break inthefuelfor, say, 10years.Iftheignition parts ofNgarkatConservationPark,fires canprovide In areas where grassyfuelsare rare, asinshrubby Limit Fire Spread Prescribed toInternally Burning place to(Bradstock&Cohn2002). the area. However, circumstances varywidelyfrom up to20yearsbefore anotherfire canspread through theseephemeralgrassyfuels,itmaybe fire. Without grassy fuelsmaygrow atanytimeafteraprevious patches andenablefires tospread more readily; these carry grassyfuelsthatjoinupthediscrete litter or shrubs.Inverywetyearstheheaviersoilsmay the swaleswiththeirheaviersoils,fuelmaybelitter clumps andshrubsare sometimescommon,whilein On thetopsofdunes,highlyflammableSpinifex discontinuous). other bybare ground (i.e.thesurfacefuelsare beneath themare oftensomewhatisolatedfrom each often separatefrom eachother, thelitterpatches forest types(seeChapter7).Becausetheplantsare generally lowincomparisonwithmoisteucalypt- typically reaching 5to15tonnesperhectare (t/ha)–is mallee plantsthemselves,thelitterfuelload– bases oftheplants.Infuel‘shadow’beneath the shrubbyeucalyptsmayaccumulatearound the In malleevegetation,thetwigs,leavesandbarkof protection ofthefamousMalleefowl while achievingconservationobjectives,suchas thereby avoidingdamagetoassetsonprivateland, difficulty ishowtocontainfire withinthesystem, Mallee ParksandStateForests. Themanagement There are anumberofaimsforthemanagement Fuel ManagementintheMallee (Leipoa ocellata) . 9.14 9.13 9.17 9.16 9.15 created. 30 kilometres longand2.5kilometres widewere the eveningtoputresultant fire out–stripsupto depending ongraduallymoderatingconditionsduring under windy, highfire dangerconditionsandthen ‘unbounded buffers’ –ignitinga50-metre edge discontinuous fuels.However, byprescribed burning since fire willnotspread againstthewindin isoftenineffectivebackburning inmalleevegetation prevented fire spread. Forsimilarreasons, because thefine-scalediscontinuityinfuels conditions (asisdoneinforests) wasunsatisfactory undermild by Billing(1981).Hefoundthatburning scale discontinuitytolimitfire spread were considered A numberofideasaimedatcreating suchcoarse- fire. break) wouldstem,orstop,theflowofanunplanned temporary barrier(i.e.abuffer stripratherthanafuel the spread offires forsomeyears.Ideally, this to graduallybuildupaftertreatment, wouldaffect strips across thelandscape,which,whileallowingfuel butrelatedAn alternate systemwouldbetocreate ‘Unbounded Buffers’ Prescribed toCreate Burning the fire does,however, varywithFFDI(Billing1981). and alldryfuelisconsumed.The rateofspread of vegetation alsoignite.Eitherway, acrown fire results patches. Whenthisoccursthecrowns ofthe sufficient forflamestospanthegapsbetweenfuel is because,forthefire tocarry, thewindsmustbe as afuel-managementtreatment orbylightning.This have thesameappearance,whethertheyare ignited Under somecircumstances, fires intheMalleecan Inquiry Tour). intervals are 20–30yearsand10–20(DSE/CFA 5–10 years.Forprescribed fires, therespective after while heaths(noneucalyptshrubs)canburn 10–15yearsafterthelastfiremallee fuelscanburn When theFFDIisin‘Very High’range(25–50), weather is100. value fortheIndexunderperceived worstpossible prescription putstheupperlimitat20(Table 9.1).The Forest Fire DangerIndex(FFDI)at20;thecurrent extend intofarmland.Billingsetalowerlimitfor was green andgrassyunlikelytoallowthefire to to create buffers becausethesurrounding country Spring, especiallyOctober, wasadvocatedasthetime INF.018.002.0195 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 89 CHAPTER 9 INF.018.002.0196 5 vegetation. 150 < ) that ‘mass short distance 9 expected in direction in direction 25, no change open (km/hr) < It is likely that most spotting will occur close to the It is likely that most spotting will occur close spotting with the chance of longer-distance front fire for being less – but still possible and significant Indeed, the Inquiry was informed firefighting. Inquiry Tour (DSE/CFA spotting (usually occurred) within 100 metres of the within 100 metres spotting (usually occurred) areas Any width advocated for treated head fire’. and needs to be assessed on the basis of probabilities costs, not certainties. Alternative Fuel Management Techniques of boundary is over 900 kilometres there Currently in the Mallee Region (DSE/CFA with private property adjacent to the and buffers The breaks Inquiry Tour). to be managed on a ‘twin- edge of private land were strip’ system, with a total width of 100 to 200 metres The ‘internal – the strips being burnt alternately. also ‘twin strips’ corridors’ within public land were but, in this case, each strip was to be approximately wide. one kilometre The implicit idea of internal corridors is that when a defined out, it will be confined to the area breaks fire is by them. While this idea has some merit, there about what sizes the blocks would be a difficulty and under what in a ‘wilderness (or elsewhere), area’ weather and fuel conditions the strategy would be effective. Plan also identifies Protection The Draft Mildura Fire techniques being used in the Mallee, suppression attack with and direct including aerial suppression in most of the is scarce Water heavy machinery. often depends on dry suppression Mallee, so fire rolling breaks, bare-earth techniques such as creating Inquiry Tour). or chaining (DSE/CFA heathy areas 9.22 9.23 9.24 8 C) (%)(mm) 10m height in the Index Drought o Temp. Temp. humidity Relative Wind at Keetch-Byram Zone 2 7 4 (max.) ( covers the Mallee Region of the Department 6 of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). of Sustainability and Environment 8 An account of the full system of Fuel Management Zones is given in Chapter 7. 9 Victoria following the path of the fires. the Inquiry toured As noted in the Introduction, 4 detail, see Chapter 7. 1967. For more Danger Index of McArthur, Fire ‘FDI’ or ‘FFDI’, is the Forest 5 gains and losses in a modelled soil profile. dryness based on moisture index is a value for soil The Keetch-Byram Drought 6 The Plan is due for renewal. 7not all of the Fuel Management Zones defined in Chapter 7 have been applied to In some DSE Regions, including the North West, Fuel Breaks, Buffers and ‘Spotting’ Buffers Fuel Breaks, in stopping is to be effective or buffer If a fuel break burning it must be wide enough to prevent a fire in a process brands passing over it to start other fires held in Mildura in called ‘spotting’. In a Workshop spotting up to 800 metres 1981, Rawson reported in Victorian mallee while Condon, front the fire from noted that spotting for southwest New South Wales, (written discussion up to 11 kilometres occurred following Rawson 1982). The difficulties in prescribed burning in prescribed mallee The difficulties was exemplified vegetation using unbounded buffers of April 2002. Flat Fire by the Waggon Essentially, these ‘link burns’ are unbounded buffers; these ‘link burns’ unbounded are Essentially, by (i) that have been fuel reduced linking areas for fires or (ii) prescribed unplanned fires ecological purposes. The 1991 Draft Mildura Fire Protection Plan (Edgar Protection The 1991 Draft Mildura Fire 1991) It advocates two Priority Burning Zones. Problems with Unbounded Buffers in with Unbounded Buffers Problems Burning Zones would ‘provide a strategic corridor of sufficient width a strategic corridor of sufficient would ‘provide a substantial barrier to the and continuity to provide intensity and fire reduce of unplanned fire, spread In Zone a base for suppression’. damage, and provide 4, burningto ‘link burns’, would be limited in part and conserve natural and cultural values’. to ‘protect Hummock grasslands DSE Source: VegetationMallee FFDI 20 12–28 25–60 Desert heaths 9.21 9.20 9.19 9.18 Table 9.1: Prescribed Burning Prescription Applicable to Mallee Areas Areas to Mallee Applicable Burning Prescription Prescribed 9.1: Table PAGE 90 9.28 9.27 9.26 9.25 misplaced inothervegetationtypesandStates. A relianceontheweathertostopfiresignitedaspartof afuelmanagementprogramhasalsobeen improve sufficiently toputoutthefirewasmisplaced. approximately 28,000hastretchingacrossmalleecountry for34km.Thus,adependenceontheweatherto despite crewsbeingintheareatodealwith‘hotspots’. The combinedfiresburnedanareaofpublicland a relativelysecureedge.Adayafterignitionwascomplete, threefiresbrokeoutfromthetreatedarea A strip150mwideand60kmlongwastobeburntusing aerialincendiariesfromahelicoptertotheeastof Buffers andtheWaggon FlatFire Information suppliedbyDSE 0Forfurtherdiscussionsee Gill 1990,pp.202–5. 10 forested areas oftheState. approaches toprescribedfrom burning thoseinthe North West results Victoria insubstantiallydifferent properties inmalleeandshrublandvegetationof The nature offueldistributionandaccumulation Conclusions rehabilitation problem (DSE/CFA InquiryTour). Also, dunedestabilisationcanposealocal the rehabilitation ofareas ifallowedtogounchecked. advantage ofnewlyopenedupareas andcanreduce four-wheel drivevehicles andmotorbikescantake movement ofvermincarnivorespecies.Recreational Open trackscanalsoactasapassageforthe established onfire accesstracksandcontrol lines. is preventing weedsfrom gettingintoandbecoming conservation reserve,ofDSEmanagers akeyconcern Given thatmostpubliclandintheMalleeis DSE Concern effectiveness andenvironmental effects. However, itneedstobemonitored for safety, safer andmore costefficient waytoconstructbuffers. suppression, thissystemhasthepotentialtobea As atreatment forpreparedness andforfire (DSE/CFA InquiryTour). inlateautumnorwinter bed thatcanbeburnt dries out,establishingamore-or-less continuousfuel Theflattened,chainedvegetation subsequently burnt. between twoverylarge,rubber-tyred tractors)and chained (flattenedbyaheavychaindraggedalong in which100to200metre-wide swathsofmalleeare The Inquirywasintroduced toarelatively newsystem Chaining 10 9.31 9.30 9.29 9.33 9.32 reviewed, evaluatedanddocumented. assisting suppressionoperationsbecontinually That thesuccessofcurrentbuffers intermsof and unsuccessfulburnsbedocumented. marking successful(‘withinexplicitprescription’) site weathersequencesandfuelconditions That if‘link’burnscontinuetobeused,thenon- Recommendations management aims. to besafe,effective andconsistentwithgeneral bufferburnt stripsmightreplaceiffound ‘linkburns’ mallee vegetation.We suggestthatchainedand the useofchainingtechniquetocreate buffers in buffer ingeneral,andrecent burning developmentsin theapparentburns’, chequered historyofunbounded The Inquirynotedtheopportunisticnature of‘link operations shouldbedefined. conditions forthesafeconductofburninginsuch That, asaresultofthismonitoring,weather Anyadverseenvironmentaleffects suchassoil • Theireffectiveness asabarriertounplanned • Theriskoffireescapesduringtheir • for: burning swathsofmalleebeexplicitlymonitored That thecreationofbuffers bychainingandthen mobilisation andlossofbiodiversity. and fire undervariousweatherandfuelconditions; establishment; INF.018.002.0197 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 91 CHAPTER 9 No. . Land INF.018.002.0198 Proceedings of the North West . [Pages not consecutively numbered] 63–4. National Parks Service, Victoria. Report on the Mallee Area Review Report on the Mallee Area Memoirs of the National Museum of Victoria Memoirs of the National Museum Fire Ecology in Semi-arid Lands. Proceedings of the Workshop held at Fire Ecology in Semi-arid Lands. Proceedings of the Workshop Rawson, R. 1982. Fire behaviour. In A. Heislers, P. Lynch and B. Walters Lynch In A. Heislers, P. behaviour. Rawson, R. 1982. Fire (eds) 24th–29th May 1981 Mildura, Victoria Conservation Council, Victoria. between Mildura and region 1973. Climate of the Murray Valley J.V. Maher, Renmark, South Australia. 34: 233–9. Commonwealth behaviour in eucalypt forest. A.G. 1967. Fire McArthur, and Timber Leaflet No. 107. Forestry Bureau Plan: A. 1995. Ecological burning Protection and the Mildura Fire Morrow, In G.J. Horner (ed.) Big Desert case study. Ecological Management Workshop. Land Conservation Council. 1987. Land Conservation Council. 79–158. Victorian Department of Terrestrial and Marine Protected Terrestrial The Mallee Lands. A Conservation The Mallee Lands: A Conservation 125–40. CSIRO, Melbourne. Mediterranean Landscapes in Australia. Mallee Flora of Victoria 1. Introduction. Flora of Victoria Desert Fire Fighting in the Victorian Mallee. Desert Fire Fighting in the Victorian (1997). Environment Australia, Canberra. (1997). Environment International Conference on Forest Fire Research, Draft Mildura Fire Protection Plan. 202–5. CSIRO Australia, Melbourne. 206–11. CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne.206–11. CSIRO Publishing, Proceedings B.24: 1–12. Proceedings Conn, B.J. 1993 Natural regions and vegetation of Victoria. In D.B. Conn, B.J. 1993 Natural regions Foreman & N.G. Walsh (eds) & N.G. Walsh Foreman Inkata Press, Melbourne.Inkata Press, I.D. & Thomas, G.M. (eds). 1997. Cresswell, Areas in Australia 2003. Inquiry Tour. DSE/CFA Edgar, T. 1991. T. Edgar, Coimbra, Gill, A.M. & Moore, P.H.R. 1990. Fire intensities in eucalypt forests of south- intensities in eucalypt forests 1990. Fire P.H.R. Gill, A.M. & Moore, eastern Australia. Conservation and Environment. Draft approved in 1992. Draft approved Conservation and Environment. conservation. management of mallee lands for species Gill, A.M. 1990. Fire Joss & G.K. Jones (eds) In J.C. Noble, P.J. Perspective. The lignotuber is the new growth coming from the base of the Mallee trees. coming from The lignotuber is the new growth References In to fire. of malleefowl with regard Benshemesh, J. 1990. Management Joss & G.K. Jones (eds) J.C. Noble, P.J. burning in the Big Desert. Forests reduction 1981. Hazard Billing, P. Branch Report No. 9. Research Commission of Victoria Fire semi-arid and biodiversity in regimes Bradstock, R.A. & Cohn, J.S. 2002. Fire mallee ecosystems. In R.A. Bradstock, J.E. Williams & A.M.Gill (eds) of a Continent. Flammable Australia: The Fire Regimes and Biodiversity Cambridge, UK. 238–58. Cambridge University Press, in Victoria.Cheal, D.C. & Parkes, D.M. 1989. Mallee vegetation In J.C. Noble & R.A. Bradstock (eds) Perspective. Ecosystems and their Management. PAGE 92 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 Burning inForests Constraints onPrescribed Chapter 10 five FuelManagementZones. Our recommendations includeareview oftheexisting to maximisetheopportunitiesthosedaysrepresent. and resources. Giventhis,everythingshouldbedone weather, socialimpacts,vegetationtypeandaspect, parts ofGippsland.Constraintsandinhibitorsinclude andnorthern in theNorthEastRegionofVictoria prescribed cantakeplaceineucalyptforests burning • Resourcing. Threat ofCensure orLitigation; and • • Biophysical Factors; • Smoke; • Ignition patterns; Weather andrelated factors; • Planningandapproval processes; • scheduling prescribed fires: This sectionoutlinesseveraldifficulties inherent in bushfire mitigation. be treated are alsoallrelevant inrelation topotential zones inwhichtheyoccur, andthesizesofblocksto areas approvedthefuelmanagement forburning, available tocarryitout.Thegeographicalspread of andtheresourcesof dayssuitableforburning Management Zonewillbeafunctionofthenumbers The areasbyprescription burnt ineachFuel Constraints onPrescribedBurning concludethatthere are fewdaysonwhich We prescribed burning. the numberofdaysitimpliesare availablefor envelope withinwhichprescribed fires canbelit,and practices. We includeananalysisoftheweather these data,andtheresource implicationsofthese per year, theareasanytrends burned, through timein on thenumbersandtypesofprescribed fires ignited Gippsland overthepastdecade.Ourreview focuses prescribed fires and intheNorthEastofVictoria of prescribed fires inforests andreview dataon describesomekeyissuesbehindthescheduling We of prescribed burning. totherealitiesThis Chapterturns andpracticalities Overview 10.7 10.6 10.11 10.10 10.9 10.8 the planareinanyoneyear. likelytobeburnt suitable. Thismeansthatnotallblocksidentifiedin area thathashadadifferent rainfall–mightbe another –forexample,atahigheraltitude,orinan prescription forprescribeditispossiblethat burning, within adistrictisfoundtobeoutsidetheweather circumstances. Forexample,ifaparticularblock allows choicestobemadeaccording to thanispossibleinanyoneyear available forburning the occurrence ofunplannedfire. Havingmore blocks duetoconstraintsonresources,burning weatherand identified are likelytobeavailableforprescribed In anyparticularyear, onlysomeoftheareas in PartC. The appropriateness ofthismodelisdiscussed established, are madeavailableforpubliccomment. are selectedthree yearsinadvanceand,once The areas inwhichprescribedisscheduled burning Planning andApproval Processes were: givenappropriatecompatible withburning, fuelload, prescriptions (orenvelope)thatCheneyconsidered not allowthefire tospread sufficiently. Theweather presents riskoffire escape,whilealowfuel loadmay the fine-fuelloadinforest. Ahighfuelload number ofdaysforprescribedwilldependon burning 60 to250kilowattspermetre. Thisimpliesthatthe should beconductedwithinthefire intensitylimitsof Cheney (1978)considered thatprescribed burning extent itislikelytomeetitsobjectives. or notprescribedwilltakeplaceandtowhat burning The weatherisamajorfactorindeterminingwhether Weather andRelatedFactors Interim ReportthatisatAppendixIII. of theprescriptions andapproval process inour process andwerecommended animmediatereview haveoccurredto burning becauseofthishierarchical There were suggestionstotheInquirythatrestrictions Head-office levelsmaybedeemednecessary. populations and/orassets),approval atRegionaland (for example,whenblocksare closetomajor may begiven.However, undersomecircumstances oftheproposedthenlocalapprovalmorning burn, of Meteorology. Iftheforecasts are suitableonthe location ofthefire mayberequested from theBureau scrutinised andspotforecasts fortheproposed (personnel andequipment)allocated.Forecasts are checked intheregional office andresources theprescriptionsClose tothetimeofburning are INF.018.002.0199 INF.018.002.0200 CHAPTER 10 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART • Air temperature between 10 and 20 degrees 10.15 For example, fire can be ignited using aerially applied Celsius; incendiary capsules or jellied petrol, or by drip torches • Relative humidity from 50 to 80 per cent; and at ground level. The pattern of application can be • Wind in the forest from two to five kilometres along ridges or along the lower parts of burning per hour. blocks or on a grid pattern, among many others. The fire behaviour that eventuates can be affected by the 10.12 Gill et al. (1987) analysed the relationship between density and time of day that ignition occurs. Variation fuel load and modelled days available for prescribed in ignition pattern may result in a five-fold variation burning based on Melbourne weather data, finding in fire intensity. Terrain and microclimate can be that number of days was not sensitive to fine-fuel important. Astute managers will vary all these factors, load above a certain level. From about 8 tonnes per sometimes during the conduct of the burn, to achieve hectare (t/ha) to about 15 t/ha, the average number suitable outcomes. Ignition can, therefore, change of days per year rose rapidly from very few to 14, the range of weather conditions suited to then dropped to about 10 when the fine-fuel load prescribed burning. was very high (40 t/ha). When the summer fire season was excluded because of risk of escape, this 10.16 Another way to achieve a high percentage of an area maximum dropped to 11 days per year on average.1 being burnt is to apply fire to the chosen area more If weekends were excluded on the grounds of work than once within a short return period (i.e. within one practices then the number would drop to about to two years). After the first fire, the aim is to burn eight. Numbers of days available varied widely the residual unburned fuel in the block. This can be from year to year. achieved without serious biodiversity consequences (which can be a problem when intervals are short) 10.13 In general, the number of days available for burning if the initially treated area does not carry a fire the in Victoria may be truncated in practice by deleting second time ignition is attempted. summer, spring and winter days, leaving only autumn. In summer there is the likelihood of fire escape 10.17 Suitable weather conditions for prescribed burning creating unplanned fires of high intensity. In spring are described in various ways, as Table 10.1 shows. there is the chance of a carryover of undetected Prescriptions used by others include those of smouldering materials to ignite unplanned fires in McArthur (1962), Cheney (1978) and Tolhurst (2003).3 summer, while windy days beyond the prescription may be too hard to predict following ‘good’ days for 10.18 Tolhurst found that an average of only 12 days per burning. In winter, the chance of smoke accumulating year were available for prescribed burning in the in valleys is high, and there may simply be too few Wombat State Forest, a mixed species eucalypt forest days above the minimum prescription to maintain a area about 80 kilometres north west of Melbourne. high level of staff and equipment readiness. Other Over the period analysed, from 1993 to 1999, the days, including holidays and weekends, may be number of days available varied from a low of only omitted for economic reasons.2 four in 1995 to a high of 20 in 1999. This was after eliminating days in summer, on weekends, and in Ignition Patterns November (since there is increased risk of re-ignition and escape of fires in the following summer months). 10.14 Tolhurst and Cheney (1999) point out the effects that The remaining days were mostly in March and April. ignition pattern may have on fire intensity and how These results are similar to those of Gill et al. (1987) the range of weather conditions suited to prescribed who used Melbourne weather data. burning may change, depending on choice of ignition.

1 These results are similar to those of a more recent study using a shorter weather record for a different station, Blakeville, and different criteria for days suited to prescribed burning (Tolhurst 2003). 2 In combination, this prescription of conditions for prescribed burning virtually precludes such burning for blocks with fuel loads beneath the

maximum fine-fuel load limit of 8 t/ha for Zone 1, assuming level ground (see Chapter 7). PAGE 3 Tolhurst’s criteria for burning were: FFDI<10; FFDI next day <15; maximum windspeed in the open <20km/hr; air temperature >14oC and <25oC;

relative humidity <70% and >35%; Fine Fuel Flammability Index (FFFI) between 6 and 10 (Williams & Dexter 1976); no rain on the day; 93 no rain >2 mm for the previous two days. PAGE 94 10.20 10.19 Table 10.1:Standard Prescribed BurnPrescriptions for Forest Litter Wiregrass (Tetrarrhena juncea) Wiregrass Regrowth, without forest (‘OpenForest’) Wiregrass Mature, without Wiregrass uncasFD mx Temp. ( 8 FFDI(max) Dry sclerophyll Burn class Source: DSE Mature forest with 35–70 18–27 Regrowth forest with 10 Dry sclerophyll forest Moisture content isexpressed as theamountofwaterinfuelapercentage ofitsoven-dry weight. 5 Thisisanindexofdrought. Itisthewaterdeficitof amodelsoilprofile holdingamaximumof200mmwater. Itiscalcul 4 prescribed fire? the negativeeffects are greater ifthere isno from unplannedfires inthesamearea?’ Perhaps prescribed fires equal,exceedorfallshortofthat question: ‘doestheamountofsmokeemittedfrom Adverse socialeffects engenderthefollowing programs.burning are importantsocialinhibitorsonprescribed neighbouring landuseactivity. Theseeffects resulting smokewillseriouslyimpactona to becancelledifthe alone maycauseaburn directionGrapegrower Association,2003).Wind was documented(AlpineValleys & Winemakers commercial wine-grapequalitynearharvesttime effect ofsmokefromfires thenortheastern on clothesline. InthecourseofthisInquiry, adeleterious and business–evenonwashinghangingthe people’s respiratory health,aesthetics,tourism, and communities.Theseincludeadverseeffects on Smoke hasvariousnegativeeffects onindividuals Smoke daily weatherandthe estimatedsoilwaterstoragepresent ontheprevious day. (on day2, 8 5 < 12) (or < < < 25 23 35–70 25 o C) Relative Wind at 1.5 m Keetch-Byram Fine Fuel Fine Keetch-Byram Wind at 1.5 m Relative C) % oet(mh)(%) forest (km/hr) (%) > > Humidity 59 45 10.22 10.21 < < < < 0 nteoe)ormore from 10m intheopen) egti h Dr height in the 5 10 10 10 < 0k/ra ithasfallen 30mm 20 km/hrat frequency andextentofprescribed fires. unplanned fires ofvariousintensitiesandthe actual relativities willdependonthechanceof same asthosefrom occasionalunplannedfires; the programburning overanextendedperiodwillbethe the amountsofsmokeemittedfrom aprescribed that ofhigh-intensityfires. Itistherefore possiblethat the frequency ofprescribed fires willbegreater than However, ifthefuel-reduction program issuccessful, at alowemissionrate. the amountsperunitarea willberelatively smalland that fuelisreduced regularly byprescribed burning, depends onthearea andthefuelloadbut,assuming amount ofsmokeemittedfrom prescribed fires are emitted,probably atahighemissionrate.The often from alargearea, andlargevolumesofsmoke high intensitythenlargequantitiesoffuelare burned, per unitoffuel(emissionrate).Iftheheadfire hasa andtheamountofsmoke the fuelquantitiesburned The amountofsmokeemittedfrom afire dependson < < < < < < summer max. 0srn theground •Finefuelabove 30 spring inautumn 80 9–16(surface) 50, or 50 0i pigtheground •Finefuelabove 30 inspring 80 inautumn ought Index < 2 f 9–16(surface) 120 if 4 • Finefuelatthe • Finefuelatthe • Whole depthof • Whole depthof Moisture Content ated onthebasisof litter surface, litter surface, fine-fuel litter, fine-fuel litter, 5 INF.018.002.0201 > > 13 13 > > > > 16 16 60 60 INF.018.002.0202 CHAPTER 10 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART Biophysical Factors Resourcing

10.23 The weather criteria for effective prescribed burning 10.28 The amount of burning that can take place in a year listed in Table 10.1 cannot take into account the is proportional to the number of available, well- effects of aspect in steep country where south resourced crews multiplied by the number of days eastern slopes, for example, are likely to be moister available. and cooler than others and therefore less fire prone. Moisture content will be higher on protected slopes Available Crews because they are likely to support taller, denser, forests that lessen the drying effects of wind and 10.29 The number of crews available and their resources to reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the fine fuel do the job is a budget matter not considered here. at ground level. Thus, wetter forests – often within However, the Inquiry noted reports suggesting that burning blocks with forest appropriate to burning – there has been a loss of staff with skills in fire are generally excluded from prescribed burning management due to DSE’s ‘downsizing’ and the ‘lack programs. Second, and of equal importance, if the of availability of experienced personnel in fire surface fuels in certain areas never reach the load behaviour to oversee the [ecological burning] levels that trigger prescribed fires there is no point in programs’ (Fire Ecology Working Group, 1999). The considering them for a prescribed burning program. Inquiry was informed that numbers of DSE staff had This may apply to some of the native conifer forests dropped from about 1500 to 2000 in the mid 1980s of the State, for example. to about 250 permanent field-based staff in 2003.

10.24 Taking into account these two exclusions based on Social Factors ‘broad forest types’, Tolhurst (2003) estimated that 21 per cent of public land would be removed from 10.30 Social factors also impact on resourcing. After a busy any prescribed burning program on these grounds. and tiring fire season in which officers often give up This reduces the land appropriate to prescribed the chance to spend time with their families because burning to about 6.2 million hectares. of actual fires or the threat of fire, the autumn period (encompassing Easter) would seem an obvious time 10.25 At a more detailed level, there may be issues that for scheduling vacations. This period is also a prime restrict the area suited to burning. These include the time for prescribed burning so there may be risk of fire escape associated with neighbouring shortages of experienced staff to conduct prescribed blocks (public or private) because of high fuel burns. Further, Project Fire Fighters, employed and accumulations or steep slopes, and the chances of trained for the summer fire season, have mostly arterial roads being closed because rocks and other completed their short-term employment contracts debris are released from the steep slopes above and are not available to assist with the autumn following the removal of stabilising vegetation. prescribed burning programs.

Threat of Censure or Litigation Budgets

10.31 10.26 It would be understandable if prescribed burning Whether or not current crews are available depends was entered into with a great deal of caution by field on the work practices and social factors mentioned staff given the protracted deliberations and critical above, but also on budget considerations. Without outcomes of the long-running Linton Coronial restrictions on public holidays and weekends, the Inquest, the deaths of New South Wales officers number of burning days could be expected to during prescribed burning at Ku-Ring-Gai Chase increase substantially. Presently, burns are only National Park in June 2000, public censure when scheduled on weekdays (Auditor-General 2003, prescribed burns escape (McDonald 1999, p. 58; p. 54; but see Figure 10.8 in this Chapter). McCarthy & Tolhurst 1998), the Victorian Auditor- General’s 2003 Report, and the present Inquiry.

10.27 Litigation potential is a further inhibitor to conducting burns. PAGE 95 PAGE 96 03 (1) 10.36 10.35 10.34 10.33 10.32 by theDataAnalyses andTrendsSummary ofPatterns Revealed management fires. 1991 to2003andincludesatotalof4,295 the Inquiryinrawform.Datacoversperiodfrom weremanagement RegionsofVictoria provided to Data fortheNorthEastandGippslandDSE through time. ‘prescribed fire’ forfuelreduction), andtrends type (ecological,regeneration or‘slash’,broad-area each year, thenumberandareabyzone ofburns days onwhichprescribed fires actuallytookplace This sectionexaminesDSEdataforthenumberof Analyses UndertakenforthisReport Prescribed BurningRealities: land estate. distribution ofareasacross burned thepublic trade-offs andthe betweenthecostofburning between publicandprivateland.Thus,there are in Zone1where fires areontheboundary burned In particular, fuelmanagementismore expensive $30–300. <$10–50;and • Zone 4: Zone3: • $30–300; • Zone $50–500; 2: • Zone 1: Management Zone: perhectarefor thecostsofburning according toFuel The Auditor-General (2003)quotedfigures from DSE isconducted. Management Zoneinwhichburning Budget isalsoimportantwithrespect totheFuel in annualarea logged). significantly (forexample,through areduction requirement for regenerationdecreased burns there were more crews andequipment,orifthe reduction. Suchalimitationcouldbeovercome if forfuel days) availabletocompleteplannedburns may limitthetime(andremaining suitableweather regeneration inloggingcoupesasapriority burns across broad areas. Therequirement toundertake andsodonotaddressburns fuelreduction issues North EastandGippslandRegionsare regeneration A verylargenumberoffires inmostdistrictsofthe 10.38 10.37 into theirdatabasesystem. does notincorporatefires oflessthanfourhectares One reason forthisisthat,practicalreasons, DSE andthesesourcesburns donotnecessarilymatch. Separate datasetsdescribenumbersandareas of prior to1991are incompleteandcouldnotbeused. werethe firstinstance)burns analysed.Dataforyears complete’ (lessthanthetargetarea hasbeenmetin areaplanned burn hasbeenmet)and‘partially (4) (3) (2) Data andAnalyses prescribed deliverymightbechanged. burning are pertinentindetermininghowthelevelof ‘weather envelope’describedintheprevious section, the These points,alongwiththoseconcerning Only datafor‘complete’(targetpercentage of might profitably bereviewed. fire daysfrom use.Thisisaresourcing issuethat windows oftimeavailableeliminatessomesuitable withinthenarrowSundays formanagementburns The inabilitytoregularly useSaturdays and occurs inautumn(mostlyMarch andApril). isnarrow:burning nearlyallmanagement The seasonalwindowoftimeformanagement Astrategicdiversionofresources toother • Areduction inresources availablefordelivery • This implieseither: than hasthatforregeneration burns. has declinedmore markedlythrough the1990s The numberandareaforfuelreduction ofburns fire (asnotedearlierinthisChapter). by areduction instaff employedtomanage and cutstobudgets–havebeenaccompanied plantation forestry andwatersupplysectors– The Inquiryunderstandsthatprivatisationofthe activities deemedtobemore important. staff numbersandbudget);and/or programsof burn (forexample,reduction in INF.018.002.0203 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 97 CHAPTER 10 INF.018.002.0204 Upper Murray Upper Murray Creek Creek Ecological Ecological Regeneration Regeneration Fuel reduction Fuel reduction Orbost Ovens Swifts Orbost Ovens Swifts Nowa Nowa Erica Heyfield Noojee Nowa Erica Heyfield Noojee Nowa River River Bendoc Cann Bendoc Cann dale dale Bairns- Bairns- 0 0 100 300 500 600 700 200 400

750 500 250

1500 1250

Number of fires of Number

Area burnt (km burnt Area ) 2 Figure 10.2: Aggregate area (km2; for Hectares Multiply by 100) of Prescribed Fires for Fuel Reduction, Fuel for Fires by 100) of Prescribed Multiply Hectares (km2; for area 10.2: Aggregate Figure and Gippsland Regions; the North East for DSE District Conducted by each Regeneration Purposes and Ecological 1991–2003 Figure 10.1: Numbers of Prescribed Fires Primarily for Fuel Reduction, Ecological and Regeneration Purposes by Purposes and Regeneration Reduction, Ecological Fuel for Primarily Fires of Prescribed Numbers 10.1: Figure 2003 and Gippsland Regions; 1991 to the North East for DSE District PAGE 98 1992–2003 Figure 10.3:Numbers ofPrescribed Fires Per Year, byPurpose, for theNorthEast andGippslandRegions; 10.39 7 foradefinitionanddiscussionoftheFMZs). management planningintheseregions (seeChapter Fuel ManagementZones(FMZs)nowusedforfire generally, sincetheyare definedinrelation tothefive fallwithintheambitofprescribedburns take precedencetypes.Ecological overotherburn the firstwinterafterloggingwhere-ever possibleand arethe followingspring.Theseburns donepriorto Alpine Ashtoensure recruitment ofthesespeciesin for current-year loggingcoupesofMountainand areecological purposes.Regenerationburns required formoreRegions ofVictoria thanfuelreduction and Fire ismanagedintheGippslandandNorthEast

Number of fires 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 1992 1991 1993 1992 1994 1993 1995 1994 1996 1995 1997 1996 10.40 1998 1997 fuel reduction. a smallernumberofmuchlargerareafor burns number ofverysmallarea regenerationand burns, total areaThisindicatesthatthere burned. are alarge reduction accountingformore thanninetypercentof small percentage andprescribed fires forfuel regeneration representing andecologicalburns onlya type (Figure 10.2)showsaverydifferent with pattern, regions. However, theareaby prescribed burned fire the distributionofnativetimberresources across the Variations inthenumberofregenerationreflect burns forthreeecological burns percent(Figure 10.1). fuel reduction accountfor33percentoffires and 63 percentofallplannedfires. Prescribed fires for most commonprescribed-fire type,representing ‘slash fires’ or‘regenerationare burns’ byfarthe For mostdistricts,especiallytheGippslandRegion, 1999 1998 2000 1999 Fuel reduction 2001 2000 Regeneration Ecological 2002 2001 2003 2002 INF.018.002.0205 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 99 CHAPTER 10 INF.018.002.0206 2000 2001 1999 2000 Ecological 5 Regeneration Fuel reduction exclusion 1998 1999 Ecological Regeneration Fuel reduction 1997 1998 4 ecological 1996 1997 3 broad mosaic 1995 1996 1994 1995 2 corridor strategic 1993 1994 1 asset 1992 1993 protetction 0

50

1991 1992 200 150 100 Number of fires of Number 0

750 500 250

1750 1500 1250 1000

Area burnt (km burnt Area ) 2 Figure 10.5: Number of Prescribed Fires by Type and Fuel Management Zone (FMZ) in the Management Zone (FMZ) and Fuel by Type Fires 10.5: Number of Prescribed Figure and Gippsland Regions; 2000–2002 North East Figure 10.4: Aggregate Area (km2) of Prescribed Fires Per Year, by Type, for the North East and the North East for by Type, Year, Per Fires of Prescribed (km2) Area Aggregate 10.4: Figure 1992–2003 Gippsland Regions; PAGE 100 (A) Fuel ManagementZoneand(B)BurnType. Dataare for theTwo-Year Period 2000–2002 Table 10.2:Average Area (ha)ofManagementFires intheNorthEast andGippslandRegionsby and GippslandRegions;2000–2002 Figure 10.6:Area ofPrescribed Fires byType andFuel ManagementZone(FMZ)intheNorthEast Ecuino rsrbdBrig1. 28.0 725.3 790.1 12.2 370.8 244.3 900.3 Regeneration Fuel Reduction Ecological Management Fire Type B. Not Allocated to aFmz 5 Exclusion ofPrescribed Burning 4 SpecificFlora &Fauna Management 3 Broad Acre Fuel-Reduced Mosaic 2 Strategic Fuel-Reduced Corridor 1 Asset Protection Fuel ManagementZone A.

Area burnt (km2) 100 200 300 400 0 protetction asset 1 strategic corridor 2 mosaic broad 3 ecological 4 Fuel reduction Regeneration Ecological exclusion 5 3827.9 676.9 14.0 23.8 NorthEast 702.3 67.3 Gippsland 139.6 NorthEast 272.4 Gippsland 270.5 INF.018.002.0207 INF.018.002.0208 CHAPTER 10 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 10.41 The number of burns per year for fuel-reduction 10.44 Burns for fuel reduction dominate in Zone 1 (asset peaked in the early to mid 1990s in the study area protection zone) and Zone 2 (strategic corridor zone), then declined slightly to the present (Figure 10.3). We with area burnt increasing from Zones 1 to 3 (Figure do not have an unassailable explanation for this, but 10.6). The mean size of burns for fuel reduction it probably reflects changed data collection and reflects the cost (risk and resource allocation) of management practices and so says nothing about burning in the different zones; fuel reduction burns trends prior to 1992. The area burned also declined in in Zone 1 average 244 hectares and cost most per a parallel fashion (Figure 10.4). Although the ways in hectare, while those in Zones 2 and 3 average about which ‘area’ has been reported over time may have 870 and 800 hectares respectively. Regeneration varied (Tolhurst 2003), the association of numbers burns are all small, averaging about 24 hectares and areas suggests that the decline has been real. (Table 10.2).

10.42 Since 2000-2001, prescribed-fire statistics have been 10.45 Given the total area of each Fuel Management Zone recorded in relation to the fuel management zones for the North East and Gippsland regions (Table 10.3), (FMZs). Sixty percent of fires were for regeneration the proportion of each FMZ burned for management and did not have FMZ recorded, and 69 per cent of purposes for the years 2001 and 2002 can be all fires (33 per cent of area burnt) did not have FMZ calculated. This shows that, over those two years the recorded. following percentages were burned for the purposes specified for those zones: 10.43 Although based on a smaller sample size than that used for other data, a clear pattern is apparent in the • FMZ 1: 2.9–3.2 remaining data, with by far the largest number of • FMZ 2: 1.7–2.8 fires and total area being in FMZ 3, the broadacre fuel • FMZ 3: 0.8–1.5 reduction zone (Figures 10.5 and 10.6). Many of the • FMZ 4: 0–0.2 fires in this, and other zones, and the only prescribed fires in FMZ 5 (fire exclusion zone), are regeneration burns.

Table 10.3: Areas (ha) of Public Land in Fuel Management Zones 1 to 5 for the Gippsland Region and the North East Region

Region Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Total Gippsland 89,345 (3.5%) 408, 437 (15.9%) 1,115,830 (43.3%) 468, 593 (18.2%) 494,630(19.2%) 2,576,835 North East 23,396 (1.6%) 205,202 (13.7%) 660,169(44.2%) 142,126(9.5%) 463,925 (31.0%) 1,494,818

Source: Data for Gippsland supplied by DSE; areas for the North East Region are from a Draft Plan and are approximate

Table 10.4: Annual Area (ha) of Management Burns by Fuel Management Zone (FMZ) for the Gippsland Region of DSE; 1994–2002

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Zone 1 12,610 5,781 5,150 12,202 8,942 2,550 3,625 4,326 1,052 Zone 2 35,258 45,078 18,428 37,918 8,062 17,066 17,242 15,887 7,989 Zone 3 40,873 33,624 4,085 35,812 6,837 20,975 25,276 21,259 9,377 Zone 4 3,375 250 750 1,662 380 6,382 2,734 1,388 98 Total 92,116 84,733 28,413 87,594 24,221 46,973 48,877 42,860 18,516

Source: DSE, Gippsland Region PAGE 101 PAGE 102 East andGippslandRegions;1991–2003 Figure 10.8:DaysoftheWeek whenPrescribed Fires (byType) were ConductedintheNorth Figure 10.7:NumberofPrescribed Fires Per MonthbyType intheNorthEast andGippslandRegions;1991–2003

Number of fires 1000 1250 1500 1750 250 500 750 0 Area burnt (km2) a e a p a u u u e c o Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan 200 400 600 800 0 o usWdTusSun Thurs Wed Tues Mon Fri Fuel reduction Regeneration Ecological Sat Fuel reduction Regeneration Ecological INF.018.002.0209 INF.018.002.0210 CHAPTER 10 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 10.46 Data supplied by DSE for prescribed fires in the 10.48 In their study of the effectiveness of fuel reduction Gippsland region over the nine years (1994 to 2002) burning in assisting with wildfire control, McCarthy shows that substantial variation in area burned per and Tolhurst (2001) reported an average fire interval year is a feature of the longer-term data (Table 10.4). of 5.8 years for vegetation in FMZ 1 and 11.5 years These data show that much larger areas were burned for FMZ 2 – values much lower than those from our annually in the early to mid-1990s than have data, but based on their own sample. subsequently been burned. In the years of highest areas burned, 1994 and 1997, about 13 per cent of 10.49 As we discussed earlier, the seasonal distribution of FMZ 1, and nine per cent of FMZ 2 were treated. management fires confirms that the bulk of fires are Over the whole period, the average area of Zone 1 conducted in the autumn, with little burning burned was eight per cent. undertaken at other times of the year (Figure 10.7). Most fires for fuel reduction take place on weekdays, 10.47 Data for the last few years of management burning with a minimum number on Sundays (Figure 10.8). (2000–2002), show that the average time lapsed before an area of FMZ 1 would be re-burned (if every part of the zone were burned before re-burning The Weather Envelope for commenced) is not less than 30 years (3.3 per cent of Prescribed Burning area burned per year), and is progressively longer for each of the other zones in turn. (Unplanned fires will 10.50 As we have seen, several authors have made also burn parts of the area and so reduce the average estimates for specific locations that calculate the time since fire for each zone to some extent). If data available days for prescribed burning – assuming the for Gippsland for the whole period from 1994 to weather is forecast perfectly. There were few days present is used, then a re-burn interval of about available as a rule. 12 years is estimated (8 per cent of area burned per year).

Figure 10.9: Estimated Number of Days Per Year Suitable for Burns for Fuel Reduction for Omeo (Gippsland Region) Breaks in the Graph Indicate Years of Missing Data

25

Omeo 20

15

10 Days per year

5

0 1952 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002

Year PAGE 103 PAGE 104 Melbourne Area for thePeriod 1952–2003 Figure 10.10:Estimated NumberofDaysPer Year Suitable for Burnsfor Fuel Reductioninthe 10.53 10.52 10.51 compatible withprescribed burning. Flammability Index)todefinefuelmoisture levels fine fuelmoisture content(viatheFineFuel a minimumDrought Factorof5isusedinplace TheKBDIwasnotusedforthe firsttwoyearsofrecords foreachlocation sinceestimateddailyvaluesforthisindex takeso 7 To ourknowledge, theseparametershavenotbeenusedinanalysesofthissortelsewhere. 6 performthisanalysis,wechoseaseriesofstations To load tothetargetlevel. wellenoughtoreduceit willnotburn thefuel is toogreat ariskthatthefire mightescape,orthat allowable range,thefire cannotbelitsincethere If anyofthelistparametersisoutside detailed inTable 10.1. weather records. Theseanalysesusetheprescription locations basedondaily forselectedVictorian burning the numberofdaysavailableperyearforprescribed constraints onprescribedweestimated burning, furtherinvestigatethenature ofweather To Dailyrainfallto9am. • speed;and Wind • • Relative humidity; • Temperature; possible, usingstandard 3pminformationfor: we analysedasmanyyearsofclimatedata comprehensiveness ofthemeteorological datavaried, in GippslandandtheNorthEast.Whileduration (see Chapter7formore details).

Days per year 10 15 20 25 0 5 9215 9716 9717 9718 9719 972002 1997 1992 1987 1982 1977 1972 1967 1962 1957 1952 1952 6 On advicefrom DrK.Tolhurst, Melbourne Year 10.55 10.54 10.56 specify theweatherenvelopeinrelation toburning. of thesevariablesandindicesare required inorder to area peryear. burned extent towhichweathermightinfluencetotal locations willprovide abroad overviewofthe case ofweatherlimitation,whileanalysesforother Data fortheGippslandRegioncanactasatest extensive unplannedfirespolicy. orchangeinburn impacts ofadverseweatherconditionsforburning, year shouldremain constantapartfrom thedirect equipment andoperatingbudget),areaper burned 10.4 above).Forastableresource level(personnel, subsequent year, from 1998inclusive (seeTable 1 and2intheGippslandRegionbutnotany early- andmid-1990swere relatively highforFMZs Areas prescribedinseveralyearsduringthe burnt (KBDI) calculation oftheKeetch-ByramDrought Index Each ofthesevariablesisnecessarytoallow between years(Figure 10.9). prescribed witharangeofoneto22days burns, average ofjust10daysperyearavailablefor Data forOmeofrom 1958topresent showsan 7 and theForest Fire DangerIndex(FFDI).All me timetostabilise INF.018.002.0211 PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 105 CHAPTER 10 INF.018.002.0212 Year Year Mt Hotham Wangaratta Albury Benalla Corryong 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1952 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002

5 0 5 0

35 30 25 20 15 10 25 20 15 10

Days per year per Days Days per year per Days Figure 10.12: Estimated Number of Days Per Year Suitable for Burns for Fuel Reduction for Mt Hotham, Reduction for Fuel Burns for for Suitable Year Number of Days Per 10.12: Estimated Figure and Albury, Respectively Wangaratta Figure 10.11: Estimated Number of Days Per Year Suitable for Burns for Fuel Reduction for Benalla and Corryong and Corryong Benalla Reduction for Fuel Burns for for Suitable Year Per Number of Days Estimated 10.11: Figure Data of Missing Years Indicate Benalla for Graph in the Breaks PAGE 106 10.59 10.58 10.57 Number ofYears ofClimate Data Analysed isshowninParentheses Below EachLocation. Locations inVictoria the Weather Prescriptions for BurnsSuitedtoFuel Reduction,andRangefor AllYears Analysed, for Selected Table 10.5:Estimated Average NumberofDaysPer SeasonandPer Fire Year (July–June) thatFall Within ipln moAeae1936034610.4 4.6 0.3 10.2 3.6 7.6 7.5 1.9 Annual 4.5 1.3 Spring Average 0.5 Winter 1.0 Autumn 1.4 Omeo 0.3 Summer Gippsland 1.2 Average Average Corryong Station Melbourne North East Melbourne Region each zone. of deliveringmanagementtargetsspecificto management zonesmaynotbepracticableinterms strategy,burning theInquiry notesthatDSE’s fivefuel In relation totheissueofresourcing anyprescribed Conclusions for fuelmanagersworkinginthemountains. available daysdeclineswithaltitude,asignificantfact Gum tops.Thedatasuggeststhatthenumberof because anyfire islikelytocausethedeathofSnow prescribed fires are notexpectedatsuchanaltitude Hotham) thenumberofdaysisextremely lowand In thecaseofhighaltitudesites(forexample,Mt 10.5 fordetails). prescriptions includingourmodification(seeTable undercurrent10 daysperyearsuitableforburning withanaverageofaroundshow asimilarpattern locations intheNorthEast(Figures 10.11and10.12) (FigureResults forMelbourne 10.10)andother 8yas ag – – 1–4 1–22 2.1 0 10.2 0–15 4–31 11.3 4–31 0.0 7.3 0–4 4–21 0 0–19 10.9 8.5 1–21 2–17 0.0 1.9 0–13 1–19 2–16 0–10 8.0 0–1 2.3 1–20 0–11 0.1 0–8 1–11 0–7 0–14 0.9 1.5 0–4 0–9 0–6 0.5 0–5 2.0 0–1 0–10 0.1 Range 1.2 0–9 0–2 0.2 Range 0–8 0–2 Average (45 years) Range Average 0.2 0–2 (8 years) Range Average 0–8 Mt Hotham (41 years) Range Benalla Average (20 years) Range Albury (17 years) Range Wangaratta (30 years) (52 years) 10.61 10.60 recommend theuseoffurtherfieldpeopletoassist. opportunities thosedaysrepresent. InChapter11we everything shouldbedonetomaximisethe days peryearsuitableforthepractice.Therefore, weather prescriptions, indicatethatthere are few available forprescribedusingavarietyof burning, All theanalysesconductedonnumberofdays effectively delivered. framework withinwhichmanagementcouldbemore inZones2to5ontheother,burning mightprovide a protection inZone1ontheonehand,andecological and 3(broad-scale fuelreduction). Afocusonasset previously identifiedforZones2(protection corridor) adequately coverthefuelreduction objectives vegetation typesforecologicalpurposesmay 4), whiletheincreased fire needsofmanyVictorian (currentwithin thecontextofecologicalburns Zone there isnoprescribed–couldbe‘managed’ burning Vegetation typesat present inZone5–which INF.018.002.0213 INF.018.002.0214 CHAPTER 10 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 10.62 Weather is not the only factor affecting the References appropriateness or otherwise of a decision to carry Auditor-General of Victoria. 2003. Fire Prevention and Preparedness. out prescribed burning. Terrain, fuel load and Government Printer, Melbourne. arrangement, and ignition pattern and density, are also important. These variables do not appear in the Alpine Valleys Winemakers & Grapegrower Association. 2003. Trials to extract smoke compounds from grape berries before harvest. prescriptions for burning seen for this Inquiry. The Unpublished Report. importance of these, and the ways in which these Cheney, N.P. 1978. Guidelines for fire management on forested watersheds variables may be used to advantage, need to be based on Australian experience. F.A.O. Conservation Guide 4. spelled out to make explicit to a wider audience when burning could safely take place, perhaps under Fire Ecology Working Group. 1999. Management of Fire for the Conservation of Biodiversity. Workshop Proceedings. Victorian Department a wider range of weather conditions than suggested of Natural Resources and Environment & Parks Victoria. by guidelines based solely on weather. Gill, A.M., Christian, K.R., Moore, P.H.R. & Forrester, R.I. 1987. Bushfire 10.63 Substantial numbers of days available for burning in incidence, fire hazard and fuel reduction burning. Australian Journal of Ecology 12: 299–306. spring are currently ignored because of the risk of long-smouldering materials later rekindling a fire McArthur, A.G. 1962. Control burning in eucalypt forests. Commonwealth under weather conditions conducive to outbreak and Forestry and Timber Bureau Leaflet 80. rapid spread. We respect this view and recognise that McCarthy, G.J. & Tolhurst, K.G. 1998. In Effectiveness of Firefighting our analyses are for days considered as if they existed Operations by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment from in isolation of subsequent and previous days. 1991/92–1994/95, Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment Research Report 45.

10.64 Substantial numbers of days available for burning in McCarthy, G.J. & Tolhurst, K.G. 2001. Effectiveness of broadscale fuel spring are currently ignored because of the risk of reduction burning in assisting with wildfire control in parks and forests in long-smouldering materials later rekindling a fire Victoria. Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Research Report 51. under weather conditions conducive to outbreak and rapid spread. We respect this view and recognise that McDonald, J. M. 1999. Gippsland Fire Protection Plan, Victorian Department our analyses are for days considered as if they existed of Natural Resources and Environment. in isolation of subsequent and previous days. Tolhurst, K.G. & Cheney, N.P. 1999. Synopsis of the Knowledge Used Nevertheless, potential may exist for some spring days in Prescribed Burning in Victoria. Department of Natural Resources and to be utilised for prescribed burning, especially in Environment, East Melbourne, Victoria. Zone 1, if appropriate safeguards can be established. Tolhurst, K.G. 2003. Prescribed burning in Victoria: Policy and Practice. Paper presented to a conference Bushfire Prevention: Are We Doing Enough? Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne.

Recommendations Williams, D.F. & Dexter, B.D. 1976. An index for fine fuel flammability. Forestry Technical Papers No. 24, Forests Commission of Victoria. 10.65 That a review of the fuel management zones be implemented with a view to reducing the number of zones so as to focus clearly on (i) asset protection (especially at the Public/Private land interface), and (ii) ecological burns.

10.66 That an explicit formulation of the interactions between terrain, fuel, ignition pattern, time of day and weather be created to better define those days suited to prescribed burning.

10.67 That evidence of the rekindling or otherwise of spring prescribed burns in forests be assembled and a model constructed and tested to see whether or not some days in spring could be used for prescribed burning in certain circumstances and places, especially in Zone 1. PAGE 107 PAGE 108 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 of PrescribedBurning Measuring theEffectiveness 11 Chapter SeeChapter7forafullerexplanation. 1 to continuouslychangingcircumstances. needed asindicatorsifmanagersare goingtoadjust are alsolikelytochange.Aseriesofmeasures willbe types offuelmodificationindifferent environments conditions change,themostappropriate levelsand As climates,landscapes,technologyandsocial measure fortheeffectiveness ofprescribed burning. unequivocal andimmediatechoiceofanappropriate There isnocurrent bodyofopinionthatallows overall objectives? any future levels,themostcost-efficient inachieving or helpindeterminingsuch?Are current levels,or appropriate levelofprescribedineachzone, burning be practicalandappropriate. Dotheyrepresent the effective inguidingmanagers,thosetargetsneedto andassessresultsburning againstthem.To be The current wayistoestablishtargetsforprescribed and benefitsofitsprograms. must besomereliable wayofevaluatingthecosts effective systemforthemodificationoffuels,there istohaveanaccountable,safeand If Victoria Introduction need,also,to considertheadequacyofthese We adjusted. tobeconstantly tool toenablethelevelofburning operations canbemeasured, managerswillhavea over time.Iftheeffectiveness ofprescribed burning core ofhowlandmanagementpracticescanadapt to examinetheseissuescarefully astheyare atthe difficulties forsomereaders. However, itisimportant management issues.Thistechnicalfocusmaycause a soundunderstandingoffire ecologyandrelated This Chapterdealswithtechnicalmattersthatrequire measure theeffectiveness ofprescribed burning? assist inansweringourtitlequestion:Howcanwe In Chapter11wesuggestthirteenmeasures thatmay Overview unplanned fires. stronger evaluationsoftheriskassociatedwith modification evolve,suchasystemwillenable retrieval, analysisandreview. Asprograms offuel comprehensive systemofdataacquisition,storage, various measures. Thisrequires atargetedand 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.12 11.11 11.10 fine-fuel loadonly, beingthenormalmethod. considered; thepotentialreduction usingthe conditions embracingallforest fuelsisrarely reduction inintensityundertheworstpossible of blocksthatmakeuptheregional picture. block’scale,orinrelation‘burning tothepatchwork prescribed canbeconsidered burning atapointscale, lags andvaryingeffectiveness. Theeffect of measurements, witharangeofcosts,varioustime For prescribedthere burning, are numerous possible the results reported. should bepractical,accurateandcomprehensive, and an appropriate measurement ormeasurements. These For asystemtobeseeneffective, there mustbe Prescribed Burning Measuring theEffectiveness of practices. to helpmanagersevaluatetheeffectiveness oftheir stimulate thesearch forthebestsuiteofmeasures others mayprove nottobeso.Theintentionis Some ofthemeasures advancedhere maybeuseful; a givenregion orzone. region orzone’s fuelload)canbemeasured in reduction duetoaprogram (forexample,average measured blocks.And, atpointsinindividualburning operation), orchangesinthefuelarray, canbe blockthatisactually fuel-reduceda burning inany load duetotreatment (forexample,anarea within no fire, plannedorunplanned.Reductionoffuel changes inthefuelarray–anarea compared with of procedures –suchasthereduction offuelload, or An indirect measure canbetonotetheeffectiveness of thedefinition‘intensity’ butthisappearstobea‘given’because burning, of potentialfire intensityfollowingprescribed A more immediatemeasure isthereduction very manyyears. of unplannedfires, aneffective assessmentrequires unplanned fires but,becauseoftheerraticnature human lifeandproperty orotherassetsfrom prescribed program burning intermsoflosses For example,wecanmeasure theoutcomesofa 1 . Infact,thepotential INF.018.002.0215 INF.018.002.0216 CHAPTER 11 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 11.13 Even more indirect are measures such as the areas Measure 2 of unplanned fires, because these are affected by The time-integrated amount of fuel above a threshold suppression operations as well as by fuel. In practice, level, in tonne-years. we might make assessments on as many measures as possible in the hope that they will all indicate a 11.18 Measure 1 only partly covers the consequences management change in the same direction. We of a fuel array being above a threshold. Fire intensity investigate a number of possible measures in the in forests is proportional to the fuel load squared next section. (implied in the McArthur system because rate of spread is proportional to fuel load), so small increases Effectiveness Measures in fuel load above the threshold can substantially increase the potential intensity. The ‘spotting’ Using Threshold Level potential of the fire is likely to be related to its intensity, among other things. 11.14 Because fuel accumulates at a point in a mathematical fashion, the curve of accumulation2 Mapping can be used as the basis for defining fuel condition and its consequences to fire behaviour, provided the 11.19 In practice, it is difficult to burn a particular target quasi-equilibrium load is greater than a management percentage of a designated burning block. Thus, the threshold. Two measures are described below. area burned needs to be mapped. It is sometimes assumed that the proportion burned represents the proportion of the fine fuel consumed. But the Measure 1 proportion of area burned and the proportion of fuel The time in years during which a fuel threshold consumed are rarely equal because not all the fuel is exceeded using given intervals between prescribed profile at any one point necessarily burns. Nor is the fires. (Gill & Bradstock 1994, pp. 703–12).3 fuel necessarily distributed evenly over the block.5

11.15 The idea here is that the threshold sets an upper level 11.20 Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) of acceptable fuel load. The length of time above this mapping is patchy in scope and accuracy. Some is the length of time during which control is perceived prescribed burn areas remain unmapped, some are to be compromised. mapped as blocks rather than the area burned within them; some are mapped for part of a large treated 11.16 If it can be assumed that burning within a block area then extrapolated (using a simple model) to the is spatially random – an assumption that is unlikely remainder of the treated area. to hold in mountain country – then the fuel accumulation figures can take burn incompleteness 11.21 The more sophisticated method would be to map the into account. If the assumption of randomness does extent of fire accurately and also take point measures not hold, then detailed fire and fuel mapping is of fuel-array changes. necessary for an accurate estimate of fuel-array condition at any time.

11.17 An alternative measure is the length of time the fuel array is above a certain level of ‘Overall Fuel Hazard’4 such as ‘moderate’.

2 These have the form W = A/k[1 – e-kt] where W is the fuel load and A is the annual accession of material in t/ha, k is the decomposition constant

and t is time in years. A/k = Wmax where Wmax is the quasi-equilibrium fuel load in t/ha. These curves rise quickly at first after fire, then more slowly, gradually approaching the maximum fuel load. (See Chapter 7)

3 The measure was the fraction of time the fuel load was in the desired range, F, and given as: ln(Wmax/(Wmax-Wc)) divided by ln(Wmax/(Wmax-Wb))

where Wmax is the quasi-equilibrium fuel load, Wc is the desired threshold for fuel load, and Wb is the fuel load at time of burning. A yearly time step in values of W is assumed. PAGE 4 See Chapter 7 for an account of Overall Fuel Hazard.

5 For example, an estimate from NSW forests was that ‘burning generally reduces the fine fuel weight by up to 75 per cent over 30 to 60 per cent 109 of the gross area being treated’ (Moore & Shields 1994). PAGE 110 11.25 11.24 11.23 11.22 generally are uncertain. treated area. Hazard, thelowerchancesofafire jumpinga readily reached byflames.ThelowertheOverallFuel materials are suspendedintrees andshrubsthatare produced ifbarkisshaggyandothersuitable brands andembersare muchmore likelytobe However, theresults of Project Vesta inWesternAustralia(Project Vesta website)are promising. 7 Basedoninferences byA.M.Gillfrom theCanberrafires of2003. 6 fire cantravelaround anarea, avoidingitaltogether. This canbemappedandmeasured. Anunplanned below athresholdforfirespread. The proportionofthelandscapewithfuelquantity Measure 5 of hundred metres, 1978, p.102)andfire-igniting embersuptoacouple travel upto30kilometres ormore (Luke&McArthur area stoppingsuchafire.brandsmay Whileburning Measure 4measures theeffectiveness ofatreated materialandtherebyburning continuetospread. been prescribedcouldjumpitvialofted burnt An unplannedfire encounteringanarea thathas (the smallerthenumberbetter). the upwindsideofZone,orblock,toitswidth The ratiooftheestimateddistancespottingfrom Measure 4 certain conditions. unplanned fire cantravelthrough suchareas under is, ameasure ofresidual risk.Thisisimportantasan provides anindicationoftheareasthat leftunburnt, escaped firesItalso andwithincompleteburns). weather, fuelandotherconditionsassociatedwith improve prescriptions burning (i.e.dataonthe can beusedalongwithweathermeasurements to well asthatwithinit,tobequantified.Suchdata beyondthetreatedinadvertently burned block,as wereburnt mapped.Thismeasure enablesanyarea These couldbedrawnforZones1to4ifareas Histograms oftheproportionsblocksburned. Measure 3 6 the detailsofrelationships 7 What isclearthatburning 11.26 11.29 11.28 11.27 unplanned fire. and otherconditionsatthetimeof theareaburned (prescribed orunplanned),weather depend onfuelage,thenature ofthefire thatlast unplanned fires. Interpretation ofthismeasure will Thissituationwillnotberepeatedunburned. inall of recent fuelreduction wasidentifiedasremaining thefireGippsland fires. perimeter, Within noarea This happenedinthe2002–2003NorthEastand independent ofthetimeelapsedsincetreatment. Unplanned fire cangothrough atreated area unplanned fire. The proportionofareasgivenfuelagesburntby Measure 6 Other Ways ofMeasuringEffectiveness a particularFFDIwiththewind. probability ofslowinganunplannedfireat burning They were abletoquantifytheeffects ofOFHonthe Hazard (OFH). Fire DangerIndex(FFDI)andtheOverallFuel authors examinedtheirresults inrelation toForest in thestudyhadafinalarea of6,500hectares. The occurred intheyears1991to1998.Thelargestfire this probability usinginformationfrom 114fires that McCarthy andTolhurst (2001).Theauthorsestimated studyby This wasinvestigatedinauniqueVictorian spread atall. spread. Insomecases,thisslow-downwillbetono probability thatthefire willhaveaslowerrateof other words, withlessfuelthere isagreater but ataslowerratebecauseofthetreatment. In An unplannedfire maytravelthrough atreated area wind). burn slowingaheadfire(afireburningwiththe The estimatedprobabilityofapreviousfuelreduction Measure 7 INF.018.002.0217 INF.018.002.0218 CHAPTER 11 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART Measure 8 Measuring Relationships Between Varying Factors Comparing the severity of fires in the Fuel Management Zones. Measure 9 11.30 ‘Severity’ is a measure of the effect of a fire on the The ratio of annual area burned to Σ(3pmFFDI 3). vegetation. An unplanned fire may spread through a treated area but have a lower severity than in a 11.33 This would provide a damped measure of change. similar area that was not treated. DSE have mapped If prescribed burning was having an effect, the total the severity of the 2002–2003 fires in North East area burnt by unplanned fire per year in Victoria Victoria using satellite imagery. should decline with time. However, a decline could also be the result of improved firefighting capability. 11.31 Their categories were: If the area burnt was related in some suitable way to the extent of prescribed burning then a case for its 1. Forest with crown burnt (i.e. defoliated); effectiveness could be made. However, because the 2. Forest with severe crown scorch (brown foliage); area burned in unplanned fires per year is widely 3. Forest with moderate crown scorch; variable it is not easy to assess whether or not there 4. Forest with light crown scorch; and has been a decline. It might take two decades or 5. Treeless, burnt. more to see if there was a trend. 11.32 Given that there is more prescribed burning in Zone 1 11.34 If the area burned by unplanned fires was, in fact, followed by Zone 2, then the others (see Chapter 7), related to the weather, a large part of the variation we might expect that severity in Zone 1 would be less per year might be removed, thereby establishing a than that in Zone 2, and so on. This measure would better basis for comparison. A study done for Central have to be interpreted in relation to slope, forest type Victoria (Mackey et al. 2002) showed that the areas and fire weather, because not all fires will have the burnt per year were related to the sum of the cube extreme effects of the 2002–2003 fires. of daily 3 pm FFDI8 except for the remarkable 1983 season. The exception is important, as this was the Extreme year within the available record.

The Results of Quantifying the Effects of Overall Fuel Hazard (OFH) on Probability of Slowing a Fire While the mathematics are quite complex, the result is easy to grasp. In short, the probability of slowing a fire under an FFDI of 100 (i.e. the upper limit of Extreme fire weather rating) is close to nil if the OFH is between ‘high’ and ‘extreme’. It is only a 50:50 chance even if OFH is ‘low’. The situation at an FFDI of 25 (i.e. upper level of High fire weather rating) is quite different: while the chance of slowing a fire burning with the wind at OFHs of ‘extreme’ and ‘very high’ remains small, there is a better than even chance that areas with an OFH of ‘high’ will slow the fire and a 75 per cent chance or better that the fire will be slowed in areas with ‘moderate’ or ‘low’ OFH. The implication of these results is that if the fuel array, measured as OFH, is put into a lower category as the result of prescribed burning, then there will be an increased chance of slowing a fire and an increased chance of putting it out. However, as we have seen, control is not guaranteed just by slowing the fire down as the fire may continue to have an intensity above the threshold for control. It should be noted also that if the perimeter is not spreading with the wind or uphill then the chances of a slowing down leading to perimeter control are increased. The result remains: with less fuel there is a greater probability that the fire will have a slower rate of spread. In some cases, this slow-down will be to no spread at all.

8 That is, Σ(3pmFFDI3). PAGE 111 INF.018.002.0219

11.35 A number of possible reasons explain why such years Measure 11 might be outliers. For example, in those extreme years The ‘number of fires exceeding 400 hectares’ (rather there may be days in which it might be inappropriate than the proportion of fires over 400 hectares). to assume that the numbers of fires per day was related to FFDI. Furthermore, if two individual fires 11.39 The frequency distribution of burned areas can be burn on two successive days the total area they burn simplified into two classes. For example, the Victorian will be smaller than if the one fire burnt for the same Department of Treasury and Finance and the (then) period spreading over two days, so the inherent Department of Natural Resources and Environment assumptions of equality –fire duration the same - (1998) have used 400 hectares as the division from year to year might be violated. Thus, in a year between larger and smaller fires. In the four decades when fires burn for days, weeks or even months to 1998, the percentage of fires larger than 400 (as in 2002–2003) we would expect the relationship hectares fell dramatically. If we were to use this Σ 3 between area burnt per year and (3pmFFDI ) measure exclusively then we would need to be to be different. sure that it wasn’t an artefact of reportage. If, for example, small fires were under-reported in the 11.36 Our preliminary analyses show there is a weak past, then rectifying this deficiency would quantitative linear relationship between areas burnt automatically lead to a lesser proportion of by unplanned fires for Victoria as a whole and the fires exceeding 400 hectares. weather index Σ(3pmFFDI3) for Melbourne. The year-to-year results would have to be interpreted in 11.40 It is likely that fires greater than 400 hectares relation to the suppression forces available as well as have been better reported than small ones, so this the area of prescribed burning in different Zones. proposed measure might be an improvement.

Measure 10 Measure 12 The nature of the relationship between the Reduce the frequency distribution of the areas of logarithms of unplanned-fire area and their log- unplanned fires to the average area per fire and use transformed frequencies. this figure as an effectiveness measure. 11.37 It seems reasonable to suggest that if a prescribed 11.41 Tolhurst (2003) pointed out there has been a decrease burning program were effective then the areas of in average area from about 200 hectares for the single unplanned fires would be gradually reduced period 1940 to 1990 down to about 50 hectares for over time. At least, there might be many small fires the last decade (not including the 2002–2003 fires). readily extinguished and occasional large ones that Comments on the use of the numbers of fires would defied control in the early stages. If so, the shape of have to be considered as for Measure 11. the frequency distribution – the numbers of fires in different area classes – would have changed from the linear log-log graphs reported by Rawson and Rees Measure 13 (1982) for Victorian public land to a curvilinear one. Monitor the annual number of fires per unit of FFDI as a measure of reportage and/or effectiveness. 11.38 Of course, there are other influences on fire size like fragmentation of vegetation types, effectiveness 11.42 As noted above, measures that include numbers of of suppression and changes in fuel types. Issues fires per year are sensitive to the comprehensiveness related to the quality of the data in terms of of reportage, which may not have been consistent comprehensiveness, accuracy and precision will over the years. also be affected by the data source. 11.43 The numbers of fires on public land in Victoria reported by DSE (and its predecessors) increased from 1950 to peak about a decade later, dropped to a low in the early 1970s then rose rapidly to current relatively high levels (Morgan & Roche 1998) of about 630 fires per year (Department of Treasury and Finance 2002). The ‘number of fires’ in the data is the number attended by DSE staff. 112 PAGE INF.018.002.0220 CHAPTER 11 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART 11.44 The figures could reflect actual changes in the 11.49 Although it is obvious that some fires have adverse numbers of fires in the landscape, or there could have effects (and ‘letting Nature take its course’ is unwise been changes over time in the numbers of fires in some circumstances, at least) the idea behind the actually detected and attended within or outside the Wilderness concept may be that if all fires were area of jurisdiction, and changes in the numbers of allowed to burn they would be self-limiting. Even those actually reaching the database. It is impossible so, this would imply that boundaries are unimportant. to assess this. The Inquiry concludes that the idea of letting Nature take its own course is untenable as a practical 11.45 The Country Fire Authority estimated there were concept. about 3,500 unplanned fires per year for all land tenures in Victoria between 1992 and 2002 (Auditor- Comparison with Perceived ‘Ideal’ Regions General 2003). The Inquiry found that the number of fires per year in Victoria is related to the Melbourne 11.50 Unfavourable comparison of south eastern Australian Σ(3pmFFDI) for that year. practices with those in other areas like south western Australia is not uncommon (McCaw et al. 2003, Philosophical and Comparative pp.171–87), and appeared in some of the submissions to the Inquiry. Approaches to Determining Effectiveness 11.51 The claim is that southwestern Australian forests are treated with the ‘ideal’ prescribed burning regime and Philosophical Guidelines that this should be adopted more widely. Areas being annually prescribed burnt have been falling steadily 11.46 The current fire management system is one of in southwestern Australian forests, but in 1995–6 managing pro-actively, selecting objectives and about seven per cent per year was being burnt (Gill seeking to achieve them. & Moore 1997). This proportion of prescribed burnt land is much greater than in Victoria, but the context, 11.47 Two popular but alternative views of fire history and biota (animal and plant species) management are based on ideas of Aboriginal are different. management and the concept of Wilderness. The first claims that if we burned the landscape in the same 11.52 To be meaningful, comparisons should be made way, as did the Aboriginal people then we would not in terms of land-use objectives, social context, have present-day problems with unplanned fires and fire weather, forest productivity, floral and faunal the conservation of native flora and fauna. Given the characteristics, rates of fuel accumulation, slopes weight of this or related views in popular, of terrain, lengths of roads and tracks in various management and anthropological writings – and in recognised categories (access), prescribed-burning submissions to this Inquiry – we review it in detail in days and the availability of firefighting resources. Chapter 12.

11.48 Second, a particular concept of Wilderness asks: ‘If The Importance of Quantitative Data nature is allowed to take its own course, surely it will 11.53 By definition, landscape management is a look after itself?’ This view implies that burning by geographically based enterprise. For effective Aboriginal people had no effect and that no asset of management, especially fire management, an any sort would be adversely affected by fires left to underpinning of appropriate, accurate and precise run. More recent views of the Wilderness concept data is essential, even central. Indeed, maps and seek to debunk the idea that Wilderness existed other information previously presented and used in without an effect of humankind (Langton 1998). the form of hard-copy Management Plans are often the basis of public land management. Now there is the opportunity to use computer-driven Geographical Information Systems and to regularly update plans as analyses and information come to hand. PAGE 113 PAGE 114 11.59 11.58 11.57 11.56 11.55 11.54 area each yearforeachregion. recorded totalnumberoffires andtheircollective could thenbeexpressed asaproportion ofthe number andcollectivearea ofunentered fire maps computer maps(shapefiles)foromissions.The fire reports and estimatedareas offires against extent ofthebacklogcouldbecheckedbycomparing unplanned fires isincomplete.DSEsuggestthatthe electronically bothregionally andcentrally. Dataon prepared accurately inthefieldandstored Maps ofprescribedparticularly, burns, needtobe need foragenciestoupdatetheirmaps. In thecourseofthisInquiry, webecameaware ofthe Additional Data Updating MapsandArchiving to suchavaluableasset. as current staff andresearchers, willhaveready access information sothatgenerationsofemployees,aswell organise, analyse,retrieve anddisplayaccurate It isachallengeappropriately togather, filter, store, may betrackedinreal time. vegetation recovery, andsoon.Vehicles andaircraft rare species,weatherdataandsystems, infrastructure locations,animalhabitat,locationsof fuel curing,fire footprints(where fires havebeen), information onfire locations,relative fire intensities, positioning systems,atvariousscales.Theseprovide radar, lidar, automaticweatherstationsandglobal sensors suchasscanners,stilldigitalcameras,video, from satellites,aircraft andtheground usingvarious potential avalancheofusefuldatacanbeobtained A relatively newproblem forfire managersisthata currently theonlyfires mappedare onpublicland. A Statewidecoverageoffire mapsisneededbut • Creating ecological-burning prescriptions. Assessingtheeffectiveness • Conductingfire threat analyses; • Generatingstandards offire cover; • Providing informationfor • • Estimating greenhouse-gas Measuringfire riskandfire regimes; emissions; • for: Fire maps,totakebutonetypeofdata,are necessary of prescribedand burning; state-of-the-environment reports; 11.60 11.64 11.63 11.62 11.61 Conclusions Skilledoperatorsforprescribed(Locations burning. • Operationalequipment(numbersandtypes • • Fires; • Fuels; Track network details; • Fire weatherindices; • example, thefollowinginformationcouldbearchived: benefited theInquiry, iftheyhadbeenavailable.For There are manysortsofdatathatwouldhave (Auditor-General 2003,p.49). fires. Thus: ‘prescribedisnotapanacea’ burning themselves. Theymayescapeto becomeunplanned unplanned fires buttheyalsoposeariskin Prescribed fires mayreduce thepotentialriskfrom programburning andthisishard toquantify. There willalwaysbearesidual riskinanyprescribed p.50). Thishappenedduringthe2002–2003fires. land inextreme weather(Auditor-General 2003, unplanned fireacross maystillburn recently treated environmental orbiophysicalreasons. Thus, prescribed fires are contemplatedforeconomic, when extreme weatherconditionsoccur, evenbefore re-accumulate, theycouldsupportunplannedfire necessary timedimensiontobeconsidered. Asfuels However, becausefuelsre-accumulate there isa Residual Risk life andproperty are reduced. of fire control are improved andtherefore therisksto themitigationofunplannedfires, thechances With purposes. that canonlybeconsidered beneficialforprotection fire intensity. Italsochangesfuelarrangementinways fuel quantitiesso,bydefinition,itreduces potential Prescribedbyitsverynatureburning. burning reduces doing thisinpublic,forested landscapesisprescribed the effects ofunplannedfires. Themaintechniquefor A primepurposeoffuelmodificationistomitigate Benefits ofPrescribed Burning also needtobeknown.) at shortnotice;theskillsofthesepeople pilots, etc.mayneedtobeknown of equipment,firefighters, caterers, mechanics, of vehicles);and INF.018.002.0221 INF.018.002.0222 CHAPTER 11 B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PART Prescribed Burning: Should we be Doing 11.70 Given the emphasis in expert submissions to the More or Less? Inquiry on the effectiveness of prescribed burning in forested south-western Australia for asset protection, 11.65 The extent to which prescribed burning should be a detailed investigation of fire behaviour and practised is a vexed and long-term problem. Few, if management there might usefully contribute to the any, people will commit themselves to an optimal development of prescribed fire policy in Victoria. figure for the amount of prescribed burning needed in Victoria. Assessing this is a major and primary task for fire managers. It is a difficult task, not least Recommendations because of the long time lags for feedback on the 11.71 That DSE: impact of prescribed burning on unplanned fires and their effects. Also, area, by itself, is not the only • Provide further training and/or field staff consideration. for the routine acquisition and reporting of geographic data (maps of fire extent for 11.66 The large area affected by the summer 2002–2003 prescribed and unplanned fires) and fuel-array fires, the calls for increased ecological burning across data (quantity, type, condition and arrangement large areas of the State, the evidence of Tolhurst on before and after fire as in the Overall Fuel rotation times for Zones 1 and 2, and the apparent Hazard Guide). decline in area subject to prescribed burning per year • Routinely and explicitly report on measures of suggest that the trend, at least, should be for more the effectiveness of the prescribed burning prescribed burning rather than less. For strategic program. reasons, any change in the level of prescribed burning • Measure the total area subject to prescribed will take time to implement, especially in light of the burning treatment in each Fire Management extensive areas recently burnt by unplanned fire. Zone each year along with the average proportion of that area successfully burned. Better Systems; Greater Learning • Develop an explicit, routine system of evaluation, analysis and reporting of the effects 11.67 DSE have a growing and valuable database that of prescribed burning in relation to needs to be augmented and filled out if the dream of environmental outcomes such as conservation a quantitative understanding of the effectiveness of of flora and fauna and water quality. prescribed burning and other fuel modifications is to • Train more crews, use Project Firefighters more be attained. Only with a targeted and comprehensive extensively (and CFA members or MFESB system of data acquisition, storage, retrieval, analysis firefighters where appropriate), to undertake and review will progress be made in evaluating the prescribed burning. risk associated with unplanned fires as programs of fuel modification evolve. 11.72 That DSE undertake a formal study of the level of prescribed burning in south western Australia 11.68 Evaluating the effectiveness of prescribed burning for its possible application in Victoria by comparing even for a perceived single factor like the protection respective fuel arrays, terrain, weather, ground of built assets is extremely difficult. Because of the access, staff, prescribed burning days, areas difficulty, we need systems that store knowledge so conducive to prescribed burning and fire lessons can be readily learned. response systems. 11.69 Such a system would have a number of parts, some 11.73 That DSE and CFA map all unplanned fires greater of which we mention in our recommendations below. than four hectares on public and private land in Basically, it would consider weather, fuel arrays, order to further develop an understanding of the terrain and ignition patterns in each burning block risk to rural Victoria from unplanned fires. that created particular areas and patterns of fuel-array changes. Information arising from this program could provide a clear appreciation of the fuel arrays left in deliberately mapped unburnt remnants and the implications of this for the spread of unplanned fire. Eventually, an empirical picture could be drawn of what conditions gave ideal results. PAGE 115 INF.018.002.0223

References

Auditor-General of Victoria. 2003. Fire Prevention and Preparedness. Government Printer, Melbourne.

Department of Treasury and Finance. 2002. The Cyclical Nature of Fire Season Severity and its Impact on the Price of Fire Management Services on Victoria’s Public Land. Joint Natural Resources and Environment & Department of Treasury and Finance Working Group Report.

Department of Treasure and Finance & Department of Natural Resources and Environment. 1998. Review of Budgetary Arrangements for Fire Management. Working Party Report. Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance & Department of Natural Resources and Environment.

Fire Ecology Working Group. 2002. Analysis of Disturbance by Fire on Public Land in Victoria. Department of Natural Resources and Environment & Parks Victoria, East Melbourne.

Gill, A.M. 1977. Management of fire-prone vegetation for plant species conservation in Australia. Search (Syd.) 8: 20–6.

Gill, A.M. & Bradstock, R.A. 1994. The prescribed burning debate in temperate Australian forests: towards a resolution. Proceedings of the 2nd International Forest Fire Research Conference, Coimbra, Portugal.

Gill, A.M. & Moore, P.H.R. 1997. Contemporary fire regimes in the forests of southwestern Australia. Contract Report to Environment Australia.

Langton, M. 1998. Burning Questions: Emerging Environmental Issues for Indigenous Peoples in Northern Australia. Northern Territory University, Darwin.

Luke, R.H. & McArthur, A.G. (1978). Bushfires in Australia. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Mackey, B., Lindenmayer, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, M.A. & Lindesay, J. 2002. Wildlife, Fire and Future Climates. CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne.

McCarthy, G.J. & Tolhurst, K.G. 2001. Effectiveness of broadscale fuel reduction burning in assisting with wildfire control in parks and forests in Victoria. Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Research Report 51.

McCaw, L., Cheney, P. & Sneeuwjagt, R. 2003. Development of a scientific understanding of fire behaviour and use in south-west Western Australia. In I. Abbott & N. Burrows (eds) Fire in ecosystems of south-west Western Australia: impacts and management. 171–88. Backhuys, Leiden.

Moore, P.F. & Shields, B. 1994. The basis of fuel management on State Forest in NSW. Proceedings of the Linnean Society of New South Wales 116: 115–26.

Morgan, G. & Roche, T. 1998. A seamless partnership in rural firefighting. Paper presented to the 1998 Australasian Fire Authorities Council Conference, Hobart.

Project Vesta web site:www.bbm.csiro.au/Vesta.

Rawson, R. & Rees, B. 1982. A summary of forest fire statistics 1972/73–1980/81. Victorian Department of Conservation and Environment Research Report No.12.

Tolhurst, K.G. 2003. Prescribed burning in Victoria: Policy and Practice. Paper presented to a conference ‘Bushfire Prevention: Are We Doing Enough?’ Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne. 116 PAGE PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 117 CHAPTER 12 INF.018.002.0224 as a new land-use regime was established, as a new land-use regime followed by some sort of equilibrium which maintained a system with desired – a managed landscape; and properties The arrival of Europeans late in the 18th century was The arrival of Europeans accompanied by a sudden and massive impact on the which has been on-going. Australian environment, of this impact is well known and is not The nature discussion is Relevant to the present here. reviewed and their of unplanned fires that the occurrence is now impacts on people and the environment, that requires viewed as a serious problem a large extent, this is a management intervention. To settlement patternsconsequence of post-European and land uses, with associated high asset values and fragmentation of the landscape into a mosaic of private and public lands with very different management goals and requirements. in significant loss of property resulting Large fires and/or human life have punctuated the last one years in Victoria, 1939, 1983 most notably hundred fuel to reduce and 2003. The managed use of fire (and other vegetation loads in our public land forests types) since the 1950s has been the major strategy employed by Government to mitigate the risk of into private lands. Despite spreading unplanned fire burning’ large unplanned this ‘prescribed program, in 1983 and 2003 have cast doubt over its fires effectiveness. Arrival of People and Their Arrival of People Possible Impacts people in Australia, evidence for the arrival of Direct based on radiocarbon dating of human remains, around indicates colonisation of the continent by (ybp) (Allen 1994), while present 40,000 years before occupation sites in thermoluminescence dates from suggest possible arrival by the Northern Territory evidence, 60,000 ybp (Roberts et al. 1993). Indirect for changes in records based on pollen and charcoal has been of fire, occurrence vegetation and increased anywhere variously argued to suggest colonisation 40,000 to 140,000 ybp. from Notwithstanding the debate concerning the over date of first arrival, argument has also arisen was whether Aboriginal occupation of Australia accompanied by: 1. change in vegetation; Little or no human-induced 2. alteration An early phase of landscape 3. 1998). Continuous change (Bowman 12.8 12.9 12.6 12.7 this philosophy we apply

would need to know the details of past fire regimes would need to know the details of past fire attempt to for each management unit, so we could them. recreate The Inquiry concludes that we do not know enough about traditional burning strategies and objectives in southern Australia to be able to implement an Aboriginal burning Knowledge has been lost, regime. Any use of a ‘traditional Aboriginal or is fragmentary. in burning within a park or State Forest regime’ southern Australia would be an experiment in land and should management rather than a re-creation as such. be recognised To philosophy not only this is a highly attractive many, but also for its implicit directly, for what it promises to social message. However, and summarise the key In this Chapter we review be concluded to find what might reasonably literature to fire approaches and future to present in relation management. A particular line of reasoning suggests that if we A particular line of reasoning burnedsame way as the the landscape in the period – Aboriginal people did in the pre-European burning pre-historic a congruence of prescribed with – then we would not have the problems regimes fire and with we have today with unplanned fires conservation of native flora and fauna. Overview southern Australia, and Historical accounts from central and northern Australia, evidence from direct as a fire support the argument that Aborigines used that land management tool. Evidence also suggests of Australia may not have been subjected some areas because of low human population to managed fire not were Other areas availability. size and resource burnedsignificance or because due to their cultural to burn. difficult they were

12.5 12.4 12.3 12.2

12.1 Burning Debate in Victoria Burning Aboriginal People and the Prescribed People and Aboriginal Traditional Burning Practices of Practices Burning Traditional Chapter 12 Chapter INF.018.002.0225

12.10 Some critics argue that there has been insufficient Descriptive Sources of Information prescribed burning to provide an effective barrier to the spread of unplanned fires - noting that current 12.13 Any supporting evidence for a pre-European, high- targets have rarely been met over the past decade frequency, low-intensity burning regime is otherwise (e.g. see Chapter 10 for evidence from the Gippsland based largely on the written accounts of early DSE Region). One suggested remedy is an increase in European explorers and settlers (and their prescribed burning to meet current (or revised- interpretation), ecological observations and studies by increased) asset protection and/or ecological targets ethnographers/anthropologists who have viewed established by the Department of Sustainability and Aboriginal practices in central and northern Australia Environment (DSE) and Parks Victoria. Others suggest in the post-European period. the institution of an ‘Aboriginal burning regime’ that would see a patchwork of frequent, low-intensity fires 12.14 There are many such accounts throughout southern across all public lands to manage fuel loads (Tolhurst and eastern Australia and Tasmania for the period th 2003). from first European contact through to the mid-19 century. Similar accounts are recorded for central and th Possible Evidence for Earlier Fire Regimes northern Australia into the 20 century, reflecting the survival of traditional Aboriginal practices in these 12.11 Ward et al. (2001) reported on a new grasstree areas until more recently (Gill 2000). These accounts (Xanthorrhoea preissii) fire history record, based on regularly describe Aboriginal people’s frequent visible colour banding of leaf bases on the stems of burning of vegetation, including forest understoreys, these plants. They propose that fire intervals in the to maintain open areas of vegetation for ease of sclerophyll (Eucalyptus) forests and shrublands of travel, to produce new growth of plants for human south western Australia, for the period from 1750 consumption (or for consumption by animals used by to as recently as 1940, were much shorter than at people), and to drive animals for hunting purposes present, and averaged only three to five years. They (see reviews by Hallam [1975], Nicholson [1981], argue that this represents the pre-European burning Bowman [1998] and Abbott [2003], among others). regime practised by the Aboriginal inhabitants. After 12.15 For cultural reasons, some areas were not burned. 1940, they report less frequent fire, with intervals Other areas were not regularly occupied by people between fires similar to those based on field and may not have been managed using fire. In such observations and documentary records over the past places, naturally ignited fires would be the norm. It is 30 to 40 years (i.e. fire intervals of 10 to 15 years). unknown whether explicit objectives included a 12.12 These findings have added a direct source of evidence reduced likelihood of large unplanned fires, although previously lacking in relation to the Aboriginal this is possible, since such fires could adversely affect burning debate. If the grasstree record is valid, then the distribution of food resources for some time, the structure and composition of Australian plant could damage sites of cultural significance, and communities where such fire regimes occurred may would be a threat to human life. have been markedly different in the recent past from 12.16 A number of early accounts describing the Australian that observed today. However, it is unclear how many bush note the open nature of forest and woodland fire-killed woody plants could have survived such a understoreys and the ease with which parties were fire regime. Currently, the grasstree record is based on able to move through the countryside in the early only a small number of records and does not yet exploration and settlement periods. See, for example, provide any evidence concerning the scale of burning the journals of Major Mitchell (1839) in Victoria, and that may have occurred in these vegetation types. of James Drummond (summarised by Ericson 1969) in south western Australia, and reviews by Hallam (1975), Bowman (1998) and Abbott (2003). This has been ascribed to Aboriginal burning in most cases, with frequent, understorey (low intensity) fire regime precluding the development of a dense shrub layer. 118 PAGE PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 119 CHAPTER 12 INF.018.002.0226 woodlands prior (E. pauciflora) infrequent fire (one to two large fires per century) (one to two large fires fire infrequent in Snow Gum settlement, followed by a sudden to European after the of fire in the frequency increase settlers and their of European introduction livestock to the alpine and subalpine areas of south eastern Australia. We small, yet were can conclude that many fires large – but can say little about absolute some were in open, grassy areas can guess that fires sizes. We (every few years), while likely to be frequent were heavily wooded and were many other areas less frequently. experienced fire Intervals Scientific Investigations into Fire of evidence based on scientific Most sources suggest regimes fire investigations of historical forest much longer intervals between stem-damaging fires period than surmised above. in the pre-European • evidence, Banks (1988) reports Using tree-ring In southern Australia the alienation of Aboriginal their traditional lands means that from groups and any mostly lost of this knowledge are repositories would largely be speculative regime reconstructed The historical observation (Benson & Redpath 1997). of Aboriginal burning in southern Australia record season since dates specific evidence on fire provides of in many cases. A review recorded are of fires in south western for Aboriginal fires historical records settlement and during early European Australia before lit in (74 per cent) were shows that most fires in the and nearly all (86 per cent) occurred summer, hot hottest four months of the year under typically and windy conditions (Abbott 2003). and their return interval Data for the size of fires size is Fire is less amenable to quantitative analysis. historical accounts; many to ascertain from difficult to multiple ignitions being observed, or sources refer of small indicative of smoke visible, on the same day, the individual size (Abbott 2003), and some note length of burned traversed on approximate areas than one particular journeys. less from These range also are large fires Very to many tens of kilometres. as early as Vlamingh (Western Sources recorded. extensive fires Australia, 1697) describe apparently sea (Abbott 2003), while Gill (2000) visible from in central Australia historical accounts of fires reports to rapid being lit in hot, windy conditions conducive and ultimately covering tens of thousands spread, fire of hectares. 12.23 12.24 12.21 12.22 ) grassy Eucalyptus tricarpa/sideroxylon E. camaldulensis woodlands. Problems of Reconstructing the Past Gill and Catling (2002) conclude that reconstructing or for particular areas frequencies mean fire such as many historical records, vegetation types from of those described above, is fraught with difficulty and has met with little success. That is, we cannot of traditional Aboriginal burningestablish the nature existing using data derived from regimes historical records. This suggests that frequent Aboriginal burning may This suggests that frequent of some parts of the landscape have been a feature characterised by shrubby but not others. Forest regimes may have experienced fire understoreys today. in such areas regimes similar to the fire Central Victoria, an area massively disturbed by Central Victoria, an area mining and timber harvesting since the 1850s, hills – appears to have been characterised by forested ( Box-Ironbark probably – often with a dense, shrubby complex) forest (Howitt 1855), interspersed with grassy understorey 1848). plains (Mitchell 1839, Howitt 1855, Westgarth to The latter vegetation was most likely related Redgum ( present-day Evidence is also available for the presence of dense for the presence Evidence is also available and for the development vegetation in some places, the absence of Aboriginal of open vegetation in increased burning. Gell et al. (1993) report for a grassiness in the absence of fire understorey site in East Gippsland, followed by the forest burningdevelopment of shrubbiness when prescribed et al. (1994) Wahren to the area. was introduced shrub to grass and herb document changes from and grazing in dominance in the absence of fire the alpine grassland-shrubland vegetation on Bogong High Plains. Conflicting Evidence 12.20 12.19 12.18 12.17 INF.018.002.0227

• Similarly, Burrows et al. (1995) report a mean fire 12.28 Keith et al. (2002) review fire regimes in Australian interval of about 80 years for tree-scarring fires in heathlands and report similar times for fire recurrence open forests of south western Australia in the pre- based on fuel accumulation rates, suggesting average European period. minimum fire return intervals of five to eight years for • Mackey et al. (2002) identify a stand-killing fire dry heaths. These sources of evidence do not support interval of 75–150 years for Mountain Ash (E. the notion that fires could recur in these vegetation regnans) forests of central Victoria based on stand types at intervals of three to five years, consistently age structures. over a period of hundreds of years. However, also • In temperate woodlands of south western relevant to the present debate is the suggestion by Australia, Hobbs (2002) argues that the available Bradstock (1990) that changes to fire regime may evidence supports the notion of a change from have a feedback effect, altering species composition less frequent (40–50 years) to more frequent (six to and stand flammability properties such that a new eight years) fire following European settlement. fire regime is established.

12.25 Bowman (1998) warns that the dendrochronological (tree-ring) record for fire does not necessarily register Fire and Change in the low intensity fires that fail to damage the cambium Australian Biota layer of forest trees, and so may have missed Aboriginal burning of the understorey. While true, 12.29 The evolution of Australian species, and their this argument would also indicate that frequent adaptation to fire regimes, has occurred over a period understorey burning – if it was occurring – failed to much longer than that represented by the presence of preclude tree-scarring, possibly high intensity, fires people on the continent. The debate about the extent from recurring at the intervals indicated by the tree- to which Aboriginal fire regimes may represent a ring records. suitable strategy for modern fire management in Australia must also take into account this long-term 12.26 Further to this last point, for example, the age relationship. Kershaw et al. (1993, 2002) interpret structure of present day stands of Mountain and increased abundance of charcoal particles in deep-sea Alpine Ash in south eastern Australia reflects a pre- cores off the coast of north Queensland as indicative European history of stand-killing, high- intensity fires. of the regional presence of fire in Australia since at Such fires are important for recruitment of the species least 1.4 million ybp. Singh and Geissler (1985) report and for the provision of tree-hollow nesting sites for the occurrence of fire back to 800,000 ybp at Lake birds and small marsupials (Lindenmayer & George in south eastern Australia, increasing Possingham 1995). Small patch burning is likely to especially after 140,000 ybp. have proven difficult on moist south-facing slopes and valleys in mountainous areas of south eastern 12.30 These authors, and others, argue that fire has Australia – as it is today. Such areas are only likely to increased as a factor driving evolution and adaptation be available to burn under extreme weather of the Australian biota (plant and animal species) conditions, and then bushfires will quickly spread since the Late Tertiary–Early Quaternary periods, through areas even if they were burned only a few accompanying increased aridity and the onset of the years earlier (McCarthy & Tolhurst 2001). glacial–interglacial cycles of the last two million years.

12.27 In drier vegetation assemblages of southern Australia 12.31 Even since the arrival of the first people in Australia, such as mallee, slow fuel accumulation rates may evidence suggests continuous change in the people- preclude the recurrence of fire within seven to ten environment relationship. At the time of Aboriginal years or more of previous fire (Cheal et al. 1979; arrival, Australia supported a diverse megafauna of Noble 1984). However, rapid accumulation of marsupial species with body weights greater than ephemeral grasses or Spinifex (Triodia scariosa in 40 kilograms, including Diprotodons, giant kangaroos Victoria) cover, following above-average rainfall years and giant wombats. Between 30,000 and 10,000 might allow occasional fires at shorter intervals in ybp, and at least 10,000 years after people arrived semi-arid and arid Australia (Bradstock & Cohn 2002). in Australia, most of these species became extinct. Prehistorians and palaeo-environmentalists variously attribute these extinctions to: 120 PAGE PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 121 CHAPTER 12 INF.018.002.0228 Further, the massive number of plant and animal the massive number of plant and Further, that has accompanied European introductions settlement of Australia means that few if any in the way to fire ecosystems will necessarily respond past. For that they may have in the pre-European may favour the survival and example, such regimes expansion of invasive animals and plants, such as has also been Small patch size of fires blackberry. in higher rates of insect and mammal found to result granivory and herbivory than occur for large fire sizes, so that species composition and abundance (Cowling may also be affected relationships & Lamont 1987). Nor was traditional burning subject to the same constraints as modern burning prescribed programs. no private land assets (fences, houses, were There larger that grew by fires threatened livestock, crops) few or no constraints in were than planned. There such as those faced to safety and resourcing, relation by our management agencies today (see Chapter 10). Problems for Modern Fire Problems for Modern Management we must ask to modern management fire In relation between the cultural might be conflicts whether there burning exploitation goals of Aboriginal and resource in and the species conservation goals of management (Langton 1998). parks and reserves Aboriginal burning – it had objectives was purposeful that included the optimisation of food resources of plant growth hunting or direct (either through to of dense understorey and removal products) in the of fires facilitate easy travel. The role populations conservation/management of species and Other cultural of plants and animals is unclear. species of significance practices designed to preserve important and these may have may have been more was managed. While many intersected with how fire known by and are, animal and plant species were, assigned significance, it is not clear that name and are or all species (for example, those with no resource As valued and managed equally. totem value) were philosophies of species conservation with current the management, strategies that seek to ensure adequately survival of key species might or might not lacking. other species for which data are protect 12.37 12.38 12.35 12.36 cycles on the distribution of suitable vegetation, cycles on the distribution and reproduction, climate for growth appropriate or and available water); Dodson 1992; Bowman 1998). Change has continued in the last 5,000 years at no less rapid a pace. McGlone et al. (1992) provide weather events evidence for the onset of extreme associated with the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) in both Australia and New Zealand around as a in fire this time, and note a possible increase Head (1989) and Lourandos (1983) report result. and intensification of changes in technology, Aboriginal occupation and land-use in south eastern to the continent Australia. The dingo was introduced mainland from and the thylacine disappeared from Australia (Gollan 1984). The koala disappeared south western Australia within the last 500–1,000 gradual years (Flood 1983). These events all represent shaping the changes in the Australian environment, of plant and animal communities, the people- nature and – and the place of fires relationship environment on them. their effect In north eastern Australia, rainforest decreased in In north eastern decreased Australia, rainforest by 38,000 ybp and was replaced around extent from (Eucalyptus-dominated) vegetation. From sclerophyll and rainfall 7,000 ybp, as temperature around and forest sclerophyll re-invaded rainforest increased, of the of habitat, regardless these lost areas reclaimed of humans as an additional ignition source presence (Kershaw 1986). Flannery (1994) argues that the loss of these animals Flannery (1994) argues that the loss of these of plant communities may have changed the nature rates of live and dead plant biomass and increased and the frequency accumulation, so increasing Horton (2000) considers that intensity of fires. and the maintenance of grassy fire frequent but would landscapes would favour large herbivores, shrubby ground disadvantage small ones that require shelter and cover and log hollows for refuge, Since it was the small species that survived breeding. Horton believes that Aboriginal burning better, in a landscape in which cannot have resulted common than shrubbiness in grassiness was more Such frequent and woodland understoreys. forest of burning the recruitment might also have limited for long-term parent species sufficient tree replacement. • hypothesis); over-kill People (the Pleistocene •(the impacts of glacial-interglacial Climate change • A 1967; combination of the two (Martin & Wright 12.34 12.33 12.32 INF.018.002.0229

Conclusions References Abbott, I. 2003. Aboriginal fire regimes in south western Australia: evidence 12.39 The purpose of the foregoing survey is not to from historical documents. In I. Abbott. & N. Burrows (eds) Fire in discredit or promote the ‘stewardship’ of Aboriginal ecosystems of south west Western Australia: impacts and management. people over the land during their period of their 119–46. Backhuys. Leiden. unique tenure, but to provide a balanced position Allen, J. 1994. Radiocarbon determinations, luminescence dating and from which we may reasonably conclude how best Australian archaeology. Antiquity 68: 339–49. to advance management of the species and habitats Banks, J.C.G. 1988. A history of forest fire in the Australian Alps. In R. Good that remain in our care. This is especially complex (ed.) The scientific significance of the Australian Alps. 265-80. Australian given that it is desirable to meet the multiple Academy of Science, Canberra.

objectives of competing interest groups in Benson, J.S. & Redpath, P.A. 1997. The nature of pre-European native our society. vegetation in south eastern Australia: a critique of Ryan, D.G., Ryan, J.R., Starr, B.J. (1995) ‘The Australian landscape – observations of explorers and 12.40 No recommendations are made to accompany early settlers’. Cunninghamia 5: 285–328.

this Chapter, but the Inquiry offers the following Bowman, D.M.J.S. 1998. Tansley Review No. 101. The impact of Aboriginal conclusion based on this survey of the relevant landscape burning on the Australian biota. New Phytologist 140: 385–410. literature. Bradstock, R.A. 1990. Relationships between fire regimes, plant species and fuels in mallee communities. In G.N. Harrington, A.D. Wilson & M.D. Young 12.41 The view of the Inquiry is that we do not know (eds) Management of Australia’s Rangelands. 218–25. CSIRO. Melbourne. enough about traditional burning strategies and objectives in southern Australia to be able to Bradstock, R.A. & Cohn, J.S. 2002. Fire regimes and biodiversity in semi-arid mallee ecosystems. In R.A. Bradstock, J.E. Williams & A.M. Gill (eds) implement an Aboriginal fire management regime. Flammable Australia: The fire regimes and biodiversity of a continent. Knowledge has been lost due to the alienation of 238–58. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. tribes from their land, or is fragmentary. While it Bradstock, R.A., Williams, J.E. & Gill, A.M. 2002. (eds) Flammable Australia: would be advantageous to have Aboriginal The fire regimes and biodiversity of a continent. Cambridge University Press, knowledge added to the decision-making process – Cambridge, UK. as is now done for Kakadu and Uluru-Kata Tjuta Burrows, N.D., Ward, B. & Robinson, A.D. 1995. Jarrah forest fire history National Parks in the Northern Territory (Langton from stem analysis and anthropological evidence. Australian Forestry 58: 2000) – any use of a ‘traditional Aboriginal burning 7–16. regime’ within a park or State Forest in southern Cheal, P.D., Day, J.C. & Meredith, C.W. 1979. Fire in the national parks of Australia would be an experiment in land north western Victoria. Report by National Parks and Wildlife Service, management, rather than a re-creation of Aboriginal Melbourne. fire regimes, and should be recognised as such. Cowling, R.M. & Lamont, B.B. 1987. Post-fire recruitment of four co- occurring Banksia species. Journal of Applied Ecology 24: 645–58.

Dodson, J.R. et al. 1992. Dynamics of environment and people in the forested crescents of temperate Australia. In J. Dodson (ed.) The Naïve Lands. 115–59. Longman. Melbourne.

Ericson, R. 1969. The Drummonds of Hawthornden. Lamb. Perth.

Flannery, T. 1994. The Future Eaters: An Ecological History of The Australasian Lands and People. Reed. Sydney.

Flood, J. 1983. Archaeology of the Dreamtime. Collins. Sydney.

Gell, P.A., Stuart, I.M. & Smith, D.J. 1993. The response of vegetation to changing fire regimes and human activity in east Gippsland, Victoria, Australia. The Holocene 3: 150–60.

Gill, A.M. & Catling, P.C. 2002. Fire regimes and biodiversity of forested landscapes of southern Australia. In R.A. Bradstock, J.E. Williams & A.M. Gill (eds) Flammable Australia: The Fire Regimes And Biodiversity Of A Continent. 351–72. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 122 PAGE PART B TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: FIRE AND PUBLIC LAND PAGE 123 CHAPTER 12 INF.018.002.0230 435–62. El Niño: Philosophical 150: 323–9. Management of Yale University Press. Yale B 311: 379–447. 37: 58–9. CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. Fire and the Australian Biota. Pleistocene Extinctions. . In G.N. Harrington et al. (eds). Forest Ecology and Management . 223–40. CSIRO. Melbourne. 42: 607–39. Australian Archaeology Mallee Aust. J. Bot. Wildlife, Fire and Future Climates. Ward, D.J., Lamont, B.B. & Burrows, C.L. 2001. Grasstrees reveal contrasting reveal C.L. 2001. Grasstrees D.J., Lamont, B.B. & Burrows, Ward, settlement of and after European before in eucalypt forest regimes fire southwestern Australia. Transactions of the Royal Society of London Transactions Burning K. 2003. Prescribed in Victoria: Policy and Practice. Paper Tolhurst, we doing enough?’ Conference, are Prevention: to ‘Bushfire presented Melbourne. Institute of Public Affairs, & Williams, vegetation R.J. 1994. Long-term C.H-A., Papst, W.A. Wahren, to cattle grazing in sub-alpine grassland and heathland change in relation 1945 to from on the Bogong High Plains: an analysis of vegetation records 1994. Singh, G. & Geissler, E.A. 1985. Late Cainozoic history of vegetation, fire, E.A. 1985. Late Cainozoic Singh, G. & Geissler, Wales. lake levels and climate, at Lake George, New South Australia’s Rangelands Australia’s dating of Deaf Adder Roberts, R.G., Jones, R. & Smith, M.A. 1993. Optical and indicates human occupation between 53,000 Gorge, Northern Territory 60,000 years ago. Mackey, B., Lindenmayer, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, M.A. & Lindesay, J. M.A. & Lindesay, D.B., Gill, A.M., McCarthy, B., Lindenmayer, Mackey, 2002. H. 1967. & Wright, Martin, P. New Haven. fuel of broadscale K.G. 2001. Effectiveness Tolhurst, G.J. & McCarthy, in in parks and forests burning control reduction in assisting with wildfire and Report No. 51. Department of Natural Resources Victoria. Research East Melbourne.Environment. 1992. El Niño/Southern & Markgraf, V. A.P. McGlone, M.S., Kershaw, American Oscillation climatic variability in Australasian and South Markgraf (eds) Diaz, & V. In H.F. records. palaeoenvironmental Oscillation. Historical and Palaeoclimatic Aspects of the Southern Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Expeditions into the Interior of Eastern 1839. Three Australia: Mitchell T.L. Felix and of Region of Australia with Descriptions of the Recently Explored Boone. London. & W. T. Colony of New South Wales. the Present In and the Australian Aborigine – an Enigma. 1981. Fire Nicholson, P.H. & I.R. Noble (eds) A.M. Gill, R.H. Groves 55–76. AAC. Canberra. Noble, J.C. 1984. 133: Flammable Fire: the Flammable 305–326. . 3-25. Cambridge Archaeology in 20: 37–46. Australian Institute of . Australian National The risk of extinction: Ranking Allen & Unwin. Sydney. Centre for Indigenous Natural and Centre Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, Green, Longman, Brown, Australian Geographer 401–28. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 401–28. Cambridge University Press, Flammable Australia: The fire regimes and 3–32. National Academies Forum. Proceedings of the 3–32. National Academies Forum. Proceedings Burning questions: Emerging environmental issues for Vertebrate zoogeography and Evolution in Australia. Vertebrate Fire and Hearth: a study of Aboriginal usage and The Pure State Of Nature. Land, Labour and Gold: Or Two Years in Victoria with Visits in Victoria Years Land, Labour and Gold: Or Two Proceedings of the Ocean Drilling Program, Scientific Results 18: 81–94. 322: 47–9. Gill, A.M. 2000. Fire pulses in the heart of Australia. Fire regimes and fire regimes heart of Australia. Fire pulses in the Gill, A.M. 2000. Fire Australia. August Report to Environment management in central Australia. 2000. dingo: in the shadow of man. In M. Archer Gollan, K. 1984. The Australian & G. Clayton (eds) Hesperian Press. Perth. Hesperian Press. Hallam, S.J. 1975. European usurpation in south western Australia. Aboriginal Studies. Canberra. vegetation: an Aboriginal impacts on Australian Head, L. 1989. Prehistoric assessment of the evidence. in Australian temperate and their effects regimes Hobbs, R. 2002. Fire woodlands. In R.A. Bradstock, J.E. Williams & A.M. Gill (eds). Australia: The fire regimes and biodiversity of a continent. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press, Horton, D. 2000. Howitt W. 1855. Howitt W. Diemens Land. to Sydney and Van London. management and Keith, D.A., Williams, J.C.Z. 2002. Fire J. & Woinarski, R.A. Bradstock, and principles. In biodiversity conservation: key approaches J.E. Williams & A.M. Gill. biodiversity of a continent. Australia: The fire regimes and biodiversity of a continent Cambridge, UK. University Press, McKenzie, G.M. & McMinn, A. 1993. A Quaternary A.P. Kershaw, vegetation history of northeastern pollen analysis of ODP Queensland from site 820. 107–14. Langton, M. 1998. Darwin. University. Management, Northern Cultural Resources Territory of each family: Aboriginal at the centre Langton, M. 2000. The fire ancient fire and the challenges for reproducing regimes traditional fire of northern areas Australia. In management in the protected Australian experience National Academies. Canberra. 1999 seminar. 1995. D.B. & Possingham, H.P. Lindenmayer, Possum management options for Leadbeater’s Canberra. Conservation Agency. University & Australian Nature Lourandos, H. 1983. Intensification: a Late Pleistocene-Holocene south western sequence from Victoria. archaeological Oceania Kershaw, A.P., Clark, J.S., Gill, A.M. & D’Costa, D.M. 2002. A history of fire A.P., Kershaw, in Australia. In R.A. Bradstock, J.E. Williams & A.M. Gill (eds) indigenous peoples in Northern Australia. UK. north 1986. The last two glacial-interglacial cycles from A.P. Kershaw, eastern and Aboriginal burning. Australia: implications for climate change Nature PAGE 124 INF.018.002.0231 INF.018.002.0232

Part C Term of Reference One: Community and Agency Preparedness

Eldorado Fire North East Victoria January 2003 – DSE PAGE 126 Fire damageinEastGippslandFebruary2003-CFA Overview ofPartC INF.018.002.0233 INF.018.002.0234 OVERVIEW OF PARTOVERVIEW C C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART This Part addresses the Inquiry’s first Term of Reference by No one could have anticipated the scale and duration of examining community and agency bushfire prevention and the fires in the North East and Gippsland, although there preparedness. was evidence of growing concern in some communities about the management of public land and the build up The recent Auditor-General’s Report, Fire Prevention of fuel in forests, caused in part by six consecutive years and Preparedness, May 2003, has already covered much of of drought. Lessons have been learnt and areas for this topic. However, at the time of its release, the post-fire change identified. evaluation undertaken by the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) and the Country Fire Authority The Inquiry concludes that the specialist fire and (CFA) was not yet complete. emergency services and Local Government undertook an appropriate risk assessment and adequately prepared We have reviewed the Auditor-General’s analysis for the 2002–2003 fire season within the parameters and recommendations and note where we believe of climatic conditions, current legislation, polices and the recommendations are critical. We also note where procedures. Public land management issues are discussed recommendations require further extrapolation based on in Part B of this report. In Chapters 14 and 15, we make the submissions, consultation and analysis undertaken specific recommendations for legislative and policy change by the Inquiry since the release of the earlier report. to tighten and enhance future planning and preparation, moving to a more holistic, integrated model for fire The following four Chapters include findings and prevention planning and management. recommendations relating to: In Chapter 13 we observe that community preparation, • Individuals and their communities; was not uniform in application and diligence. In some • Municipal fire prevention and preparedness planning; communities, significant warning of the impending fires • The fire agencies; and saw a level of, and commitment to, land clearing and • The State’s Emergency Management framework. tidying up of which Local Government and the fire agencies could only dream in the normal pre-fire season. Some businesses appeared to have inadequate insurance cover for income and payroll, while others were under-insured in respect to assets. In other cases, individuals, communities and businesses demonstrated a very sound and appropriate approach to preparation and risk management. PAGE 127 PAGE 128 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.2 13.1 Public Awareness andPreparedness Chapter 13 ‘life, injuryandevendeathofoccupants’. property, andcanmeanthedifference between difference between losingorsavingbuildingsand General’s Reportstresses, preparation canmeanthe self helpandawareness initiatives.AstheAuditor- appropriate, tobecomeinvolvedincommunity of theirindividualhouseholdsand,where thorough preparation, tocarefully plantheresponse make recommendations toimprove themfurther. community educationandengagementprograms and behaviour inrelation tobushfire. We alsoreview four (CFA) thatassesscommunityknowledgeand by theAuditor-General andtheCountryFire Authority In thisChapterweconsiderrecent surveysconducted our discussionandanalysisinthisChapter. developing safetystrategies.Thisprincipleunderpins services; itcanandshouldbeanactiveparticipantin The communityneednotbeapassiverecipient of Overview for protecting theirownproperty andaccountabilities. heightened fire riskandtheirindividualresponsibilities ascertain whetherthecommunityunderstood 2002–2003 bushfire season,theInquiryneededto In assessingthecommunity’s preparedness forthe property’ on emergencyservicestoprotect theirlivesand 2002–2003, thecommunity‘cannotrely solely of alargebushfire suchasthatexperiencedin and Preparedness The Auditor-General’s 2003Report, Heightened FireRiskfor2002–2003 Community Understandingof a soundpreparedness measure. an appropriate levelofinsurancecoverageas conclude withrecommendations toencourage Warning SignalandRadioCodesofPractice.We communications alerts:theStandard Emergency to maximisethepotentialoftwovaluable This Chapteralsomakesrecommendations investigatehowwellresidents understand We making thisdecision. information toguidecommunitymembersin decisions to‘stayorgo’.We recommend improved fire conditionsandhowthisimpactsonappropriate 2 Auditor-General Victoria, 1 3 Fire Preventionand Preparedness Fire Preventionand Preparedness 1 . Communitiesneedtobeableundertake , isunequivocal:intheevent Fire PreventionandPreparedness , pp.75–77 , p.75 Fire Prevention , May2003p.69. 13.8 13.7 13.12 13.11 13.10 13.9 families andtheirproperty intheeventofafire. an informeddecisiontoprotect themselves,their whether theseindividualswere inapositiontomake themselves years. However, justoverhalftherespondents saw have beenafeature inthisStateoverthelastsix given thepersistentdrytodrought conditionsthat the 2002–2003bushfires. overlapped thesubsequentarea affected by bushfires. Bychance,partofthesurveyarea community knowledgeofandpreparedness for in thepast.Thesurvey’s aimwastoexamine Ranges, bothfrequently affected byunplannedfires fire-prone areas –GippslandandtheDandenong effectively raiseawareness offire risk. meetings. Thissuggeststhatcommunitymeetings probable thanthosewhohadnotattendedany significantly more likely’tobelievethatafire was Fireguard orothercommunitymeetingwere that people‘whohadattendedaCFA Community property was‘likely’or‘verylikely’from thatbushfire. of thosesurveyedfeltthatdamagetothehouseand ‘very likely’inthenextfiveyears.Further, 51percent the prospect ofbushfire intheirarea was‘likely’or approximately 79percentofrespondents thought In termsofknowledgefire, thesurveyfoundthat November 2002).Thesurvey households earlyinthefire season(from 15to24 General’s Office conductedasurveyof800 Independently ofthefire agencies,theAuditor- Survey ofRiskAwareness Results ofAuditor-General’s 2002 These issuesare explored laterinthisChapter. into appropriate actionatalocallevel. processes are needed totranslatethisinformation consistent andpractical.Inaddition,suitable What iscriticalthattheinformationprovided is Emergency ServicesBoard andLocalGovernment. of sources includingtheCFA, Metropolitan Fire and residents, thisinformationcancomefrom arange in areas prone tobushfire. Forbothexistingandnew factor inpreparedness forthosewhochoosetolive Access toappropriate informationisacrucial summarise:residents sawbushfire asahighrisk, To Importantly, theAuditor-General’s Report at risk.ThequestionfortheInquirywas 2 was conductedintwo 3 noted INF.018.002.0235 INF.018.002.0236 CHAPTER 13 C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART

‘Within minutes the smoke cloud was upon us, building intensity, a swirling mass of white/brown/red/black towering above. The wind picked up, all the trees were being sucked down towards the valley below us as birds struggled to fly out against it. The noise built from a distant roar until it sounded like a jet taking off at our side’. Howman’s Gap Alpine Centre Submission

Understanding Bushfire Options: 13.17 The Auditor-General’s Report viewed the CFA The Decision to Stay or Go? approach as too prescriptive and recommended that it reconsider its advice on the 10 am departure on all 13.13 In 2001, the Australasian Fire Authorities Council4 high fire danger days. Timing should be based on published a position paper on community safety and local risk assessment and be built into local evacuation under threat from bushfire. They made community education and awareness programs. the case against large-scale evacuation in favour The Inquiry supports this view. of well-prepared and able-bodied residents being encouraged to stay and protect their property. The Decision to Stay or Go If residents decide to stay, it is essential that they be fully informed of the risks. 13.18 Awareness is growing, albeit slowly, that residents who stay and safeguard their property following the 13.14 The Auditor-General’s survey5 found that a majority passing of the fire front, have a much better chance of respondents selected the following options when of survival than those who leave at the last minute. asked what they would do if a bushfire occurred in This message is reaching more people since the Ash the area and they were at home: Wednesday fires of 1983 that saw the loss of life and property through people leaving at an inappropriate • Stay to defend the residence throughout the fire; time8. The well-prepared and maintained home has • Do as much as possible to protect the house but been shown to be a safer option than escaping either leave if fire threatens; on foot or in a car at the height of the fire. • Stay, but leave when advised by emergency services; or 13.19 However, the survey conducted by the Auditor- • Leave as soon as they were aware of fire in the General demonstrated9 that significant numbers of area. people hold ‘incorrect beliefs and knowledge that may lead them to make household survival plans that 13.15 Even though over half said they would stay initially, could place them in danger’10. This was particularly so only 27 per cent would remain on site to defend the in relation to the protection afforded by houses under residence throughout the fire. The option to stay and attack by bushfire and the time a house would take defend the property is supported by CSIRO research to burn. The survey showed that slightly more than into the Ash Wednesday fires in 1983 and the fires half of the respondents falsely believed that houses around Sydney in 1994. The CSIRO concludes there is are destroyed in the time it takes a fire front to pass a relative ten-fold increase in household survival if the through an area. ‘stay and defend’ option (following the passing of a fire front) is put in place, when compared with 13.20 Further, residents in fire-prone areas are not aware leaving the property unoccupied6. of the conditions that they will face as a result of a decision to leave at an inappropriate time. Such 13.16 Further in the Auditor-General’s survey, only four per conditions include a rapidly moving fire front, wind cent answered that they would leave home at the and fire noise, flying materials, radiant heat, smoke announcement of a day of high fire danger. CFA’s and soot affecting visibility, and the effect of advice7 has been that residents should leave by 10 am smoke and soot on car filters. on days of high fire danger. A significant number of respondents appear to be intending to adopt an approach somewhere between the CFA preferred positions of ‘stay’ or ‘go early’.

4 Australian Fire Authorities Council, 2001, Position Paper on Community Safety and Evacuation During Bushfires. 5 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 78. 6 G.C. Ramsay, N.A. McArthur and V. P. Dowling CSIRO (1996). Building in a fire–prone environment: research on building survival in two major bushfires. Proceedings of the Linnaeus Society of New South Wales – Sydney 1995. This referred to surveys following fires in the Otways Ranges in 1983 and in NSW in 1994. 7 CFA: the current advice is that timing for departure should be based on an assessment of local conditions and risk. PAGE 8 N. Krusel and S. Petris, A Study of Civilian Deaths in the 1983 Ash Wednesday Bushfires Victoria Australia, CFA Occasional Paper No. 1.

9 We assume, here, that the sample used was representative. 129 10 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p.81. PAGE 130 13.26 13.25 13.24 13.23 13.22 13.21 to evacuate. direct apersonwithfinancialinterest inaproperty evacuated. There to isnolegalauthorityinVictoria right tostaywiththeirproperties andnotbeforcibly unique legislativeprovision allowingresidents the properties. been savedifhomeownershadstayedwiththeir many ofthehousesdestroyed intheACTcouldhave their property. Furthermore, initialanalysissuggests the advicegivenbyfire servicetostayandprotect evacuation directions giventoresidents bypolice,and (ACT) bushfires followingapparent confusioninthe 11 evacuate, where dotheygo? However, ifthehouseholdmakesdecisionto McLeod Report This legislativeprovision hasbeensupportedbythe The Auditor-General’s Report Evacuate: To Where? during thepassageoffirefront. emotional impactslikelytobeexperienced inappropriate times,andtheconditions the likelyconsequencesofleavinghomeat incorporate abetterunderstandingofboth supporting thedecisiontostayorgo, That CFA furtherdevelopstheinformation Recommendation fire years. bushfire, inreadiness forthenextandsubsequent to areas thathavenotbeenrecently affected by make adifference. Keymessagescouldbedelivered This isawaytoeducatepeoplethatstayingcan Demonstrationsofhowtoprepare theproperty • Practicalskillsdevelopment(perhapsthrough • Survivalstories; • media, forexample: positive storiesusingelectronic andprinted bushfire events.There isalsoaneedtohighlight those whohavehadearlier, personalexperienceof though thatunderstandingmayprove traumaticto what theywillencounterasthefire front passeseven All residents require agreater understandingof 2McLeod 2003, 12 Fire PreventionandPreparedness and thefamilyforfire. lifestyle programs); and Inquiry into the Operational response to the January 2003 BushfiresintheACT intotheOperationalresponse to theJanuary Inquiry 12 into theAustralianCapitalTerritory 11 , p.82. highlighted Victoria's 13.29 13.28 13.27 13.33 13.32 13.31 13.30 seek advice,financialassistanceetc. Victoria. Thisisacriticalaspectofcommunitysafety.Victoria. approach totheprovision ofpublicfire refuges for is currently workingtodevelopacomprehensive emergency serviceagenciesandLocalGovernment) A Fire RefugeSteeringCommittee(comprisedof meals; and shelter foralongerperiodoftime,sleepoverandget building)whereor othergovernment peoplecanseek front passes; refuges fire groups suggeststhere issomeconfusionbetween Consultation withMunicipalCouncilsandcommunity approaching, where togobecomesacrucialdecision. who havechosentoevacuatewhenthefire is centre orawayfrom thefire area. However, forthose own arrangementstogoeitheranevacuation in mostcases,willhavethetimetosafelymaketheir early intheday(asrecommended byCFA) andwho, This isnotanissueforthosewhochoosetoleave communities thinkaboutrefuge issues. will besomeinterimproducts availabletohelp in timeforthecomingfire season,butexpectsthere The Inquirynotesthatthisworkwillnotbefinalised to communitybushfire safety. complementary elementinasystemicapproach undermine thatstrategy, andmustbeseenasa CFA wasdeveloped.Anyfire refuge policymustnot and defendorgoearly’strategyadvocatedbythe Ash Wednesday Fires; wellbefore thecurrent ‘stay The Fire Refugeconceptoriginatedafterthe1983 potential users. public refuges carryadutyofcare tousersand that theowners/operatorsofpremises designatedas be universallyprovided. Thisisreinforced bythefact choices tobeimplementedlocallyandnotnecessarily public fire refuges beseenaspartofasuite from placetoplace.Itistherefore appropriate that on individualandgroup behaviour, whichcanvary The risktolifefrom bushfire iscriticallydependent refuges inparticularareas. decision-making intheactualimplementationof community consultationprocess toenablelocal and operaterefuges, andisformulatingamodel The Committeeisdevelopingguidelinestoestablish eoeycentres recovery , thatis,aplacetostaywhilethefire , pp.187–92. evacuation centres where someonewould (often aschool,hall INF.018.002.0237 INF.018.002.0238 CHAPTER 13 C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART

East Gippsland Shire Council noted that the threat of fires in the North East of Victoria moving into Gippsland saw a significant increased effort within communities to clean up properties and remove flammable material. This Shire, along with many others, significantly increased the opening hours of the local tips. They noted that the amount of green waste disposal was extraordinary.

CFA Community Education and CFA’s May 2003 Survey of Fire-Affected Information Program Communities

13.34 Access to appropriate information is a crucial factor 13.39 In May 2003, CFA commissioned a survey of the in preparedness for those who choose to live in areas community in the fire-affected areas of North East prone to bushfire. The CFA believe their target Victoria and East Gippsland14. The 602 telephone audience equates to 2.6 million, which incorporates interviews, conducted by an independent consultant, the outer Melbourne areas and approximately one were part of CFA’s normal community safety post- million dwellings13. incident analysis process.

13.35 Over the summer of 2002–2003, the CFA continued 13.40 The survey sought responses to the experience to provide extensive community information and of households, pre-, during- and post-fire. The education campaigns to better equip families in preliminary results indicate that 75.6 per cent of protecting themselves, their homes and their property. households judged themselves to be either ‘well prepared’ or ‘very well prepared’ to deal with a 13.36 These campaigns comprised three key elements: bushfire before this summer. This figure climbed to 96.3 per cent by the time the fire was a threat to • A summer publicity campaign to raise general their property. Inquiry consultations in those same awareness of bushfire risk within the community; areas illustrated that from the time of initial threat to • Interactive Bushfire Blitz community meetings; and exposure to the fire front, there was a massive scaling • The Community Fireguard program, which up of local and regional preventative activities. continued to facilitate the formation of groups in high-risk areas, and to maintain current group 13.41 The Auditor-General’s Report15 refers to the activity. considerable research program undertaken by the CFA over the last decade to better understand 13.37 Specifically, the CFA: community behaviour during a wildfire. That research has led to a shift away from media-based campaigns • Conducted over 1,500 meetings around the with generic safety messages to interactive, State, including both fire-affected and other areas. participative community-based programs. These Typically, between 11,000 and 16,000 Victorians programs aim to provide specific information to meet participate annually in the CFA summer program, local needs, emphasising the need for households to which provides preparedness information tailored undertake ‘necessary preparedness activities’ well to the local area and conditions; before the outbreak of fire in their local area. • Provided approximately 138,000 information brochures to community members (i.e. available 2001–2002 fire season estimate); and • Released radio, television and print media community service messages, prior to and during the fire season.

13.38 The finding of this Inquiry is that appropriate information is available in the public domain. But how much reaches that target audience of well over two million people?

13 Submission to the Inquiry by the CFA: From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, June 2003 p. 22. 14 From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, pp. 257–8. 15 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 70. PAGE 131 PAGE 132 13.45 13.44 13.43 13.42 properties undertakeprevention activities’ public landrequires thatresidents inadjoining reinforce themessagethat‘Prevention offires on has increased. Theeducativeprocess needsto weekenders inareas nexttolandmanagedbyDSE are notclearcut,andthenumberofhomes distinctions betweenpublicandprivatelandfires direct implicationsthaneverbefore giventhat its developmentandimplementation.Thishasmore 16 access toinformationleadssafebehaviour. performance reviews toassesstheextentwhich agencies shouldundertakerigorous summerprogram It isthefindingofInquirythatfire suppression advice onpreparedness forthecomingsummer. information linesforthecommunitytoaccessspecific interviews withfire serviceexperts,talkbackand full dayprogram onABCRegionalRadiothatincludes recent years,thecampaignhasbeenlaunchedwitha andregionalheadquarters inMelbourne centres. In literature distributedbybothCFA BrigadesandCFA preparedness messages.Itissupportedwithprinted advertising promoting keyfire safetyand the production andbroadcast oftelevisionandradio This campaignisruneverysummerandincludes Summer PublicityCampaign Communityengagementthrough CFA Brigades. • CommunityFireguard; and • Bushfire BlitzProgram; • SummerPublicityCampaign; • (each ofwhichisdiscussedbelow): engagement appearstohavefourdistinctprograms The focusofcurrent communityeducationand Four CurrentPrograms draft formfrom 1995 education andinformationprogram stillremains in By wayofcomparison,thestrategicplanforDSE’s DSE CommunityEducationProgram 17 Fire PreventionandPreparedness Fire Preventionand Preparedness 16 , andisyettogainfundingfor , pp.72-74. , p.73. 17 . 13.48 13.47 13.46 13.52 13.51 13.50 13.49 if theyare available. activity-based interest groups suchasLandcare, The CFA attempts to useestablishedcommunityand personal safetyandunderstandingbushfire behaviour. devising practicalinterventions,informingabout All haveasimilarfocus:identifyinglocalhazards, Communitymeetings(foralargergroup). • Street walkmeetings;or • Streetmeetings; corner • Bushfire Blitzmaytaketheformof: the dangersofbushfires. their homesandproperties assafepossiblefrom awareness program toassisthomeownersinmaking component ofanextensivecommunityeducationand This initiative,whichcommencedin1997,isamajor Bushfire BlitzProgram and terminologywouldenhanceoutcomes. However, theInquirynotesthatclarityoflanguage be justifiablyproud oftheirachievements. and individualsiscommendabletheCFA should agencies, notablyCFA, inworkingwithcommunities The findingoftheInquiryisthatworkfire Plan Workbook the CFA, maintaining itusingapublicationavailablefrom voluntary, withthehouseholderdevelopingand available onfile.Infact,theplanpreparation is plan whichtheymistakenlybelievedwouldbe directly totheirlocalCouncils,seekingacopyof in theirarea –sawsomemembersofthepublicgoing get householdersandtheirfamiliesprepared forfire now Instructions, suchas‘ announcements duringthe2002–2003fire campaign. by thefire agencies,particularlyinpublic ‘Bushfire Blitz’terminologyusedinpublicinformation many membersofthepublicmisunderstood the Inquiry. However, theconsultationsshowedthat Overall, thisschemeisconsidered verypositivelyby ’ –usedfrequently inpubliccommunicationto Living in the Bush – Bushfire Survival Living intheBush–BushfireSurvival . activate yourpersonalfireplan INF.018.002.0239 INF.018.002.0240 CHAPTER 13 C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART

‘When the lightning strikes occurred on 8 January 2003, final fire preparations were put in place for a possible bush fire. Verandahs were cleared, extinguishers were placed into roof cavities and large sprinklers operated continuously, wetting the grass and into the forest, the woodpile and the gas tanks. The CFA were pleased with the preparations. Comments such as ‘three quarters of the work has already been done’ were common from the firefighters on site. We believe that it was not a matter of luck that our facility and ongoing business remain strong and intact. It was because we planned, took advice from responsible agencies and acted on our bushfire plan when the need arrived’. Howman’s Gap Alpine Centre submission

Recommendations 13.59 The CFA describes the CFG in these terms:

13.53 That the three fire agencies (CFA, DSE and ‘Community Fireguard is intended to provide residents MFESB) develop and implement a joint Statewide of high-risk areas with an understanding of the risk of fire awareness education and information unplanned fires and to support them in developing program aimed at encouraging a higher degree strategies appropriate for their situation. The program of personal and household self-reliance. seeks to empower people in local areas to take responsibility for being effectively prepared. Once 13.54 That CFA should remain the lead agency in groups are established and have undertaken several delivering the community education and program meetings, the level of CFA participation in information program to rural Victoria. the group usually reduces as the group develops greater confidence and self-reliance. CFG groups 13.55 That CFA and MFESB: are able to develop a wide range of local initiatives and actions’20. • Conduct an annual survey of households to test the level of awareness and acceptance 13.60 Components of the CFG program for group of fire knowledge among Victorians; and participants, include: • Regularly measure whether access to information leads to safe behaviours. • Personal fire safety planning and asset protection; • Understanding fire in a rural landscape, and the 13.56 That the Co-ordinator-in-Chief of Emergency potential impacts on personal safety and property, Management directs that all emergency as well as how to safely defend against it; management agencies review, by June 2004, • Understanding the roles of fire and emergency terminology and language in current services personnel; communication and public education material • Awareness of potential impacts of fires on utilities to ensure it is clear, easily understood and (reticulated water, power and telephone services); consistent, particularly with regard to fire. • Development of bushfire action plans for the participants; and 13.57 That CFA and MFESB encourage householders • Development of effective fire information to review their fire safety plan annually. networks.

Community Fireguard (CFG) 13.61 CFA are of the view that the ‘fundamentals of the CFG have proved effective and should be 13.58 This initiative, which commenced in 1993, has maintained21.’ However, in response to a specific seen the development of up to 1,000 Community question from the Inquiry on the future direction 18 Fireguard groups across the State . The Auditor- of CFG groups, the CFA noted ‘there needs to be General’s report indicates over 330 Community greater definition of the parameters of the program 19 Fireguard groups are currently active across Victoria . and what it can and cannot provide’.

18 From the Foothills to the Alpine Heights, p. 253. 19 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 71. 20 Extract from ‘Questions for the CFA Arising from Public Submissions, Public Consultations and Research’, 2003. PAGE 21 ‘Questions for the CFA Arising from Public Submissions, Public Consultations and Research’, 2003. 133 PAGE 134 13.67 13.66 13.65 13.64 13.63 13.62 3McLeod, p.236. 23 2McLeod2003, 22 management ofstriketeamsis discussedinPartD. beyond whatisintendedbyCFG activities.The second acasewhere thelandholderclearlywent clearly linkedtoCFA activitiesarisingoutofCFG,the extinguishing spotfires are operationalroles, thefirst Developing andimplementingtelephonetrees and heard ofcaseswhere theMunicipalEmergency We transport. illness, orthosewhodidnothaveaccesstoprivate with additionalneedsduetoage,disabilityand landowners andthosepeopleintheircommunities telephone trees, checkingtheproperties ofabsentee the NorthEastandGippslandfires, activatingtheir community informationdisseminationtasksduring Certainly, manyoftheCFGgroups hadtakenon the CFA andthecommunity. therefore highlightedanemergingexposure forboth during thefires intheNorthEastandGippslandhave intended role forthesegroups. CFGoperations The InquiryunderstandsthatthiswasnotCFA’s engaged infire suppression beyondtheirownland. of theircommunitiesduringthefires, becoming groups appeartohavebecomemore activeinsupport were raisedindiscussionswiththeInquiry. Some The role, responsibilities andaccountabilitiesofCFG any actionstheCFGgroup mighttake. accompanying control (includingqualitycontrol) over their liabilityforaformalBrigade–butwithoutthe financial andlegalliabilityforCFGgroups –similarto place theCFA inthepositionofassumingsome them. TheInquirywasadvisedthattodosowould facilities toCFGgroups, nordoesitassistinaccessing protective clothing,equipmentorcommunication The InquirynotesthattheCFA doesnotprovide property isdonebytheirchoiceandatownrisk. the participantsinrelation tofires outsidetheirown suppression inafire event,andanyactiontakenby CFG groups havenoresponse oroperationalstatusin orders). outside thearea whowere awaitingoperational (while beingobservedbyaCFA striketeamfrom extinguish spotfires single-handedlyinthelocalarea CFG co-ordinator usedadaptedfarmequipmentto from theirownland.Itwasreported thatafemale individuals undertookfire suppression activitiesaway also evidentthat,insomecases,thesegroups and/or developing andimplementingtelephonetrees. Itis Co-ordination Centres taskedtheCFGwith Inquiry into the Operational response to the January 2003Bushfiresinthe ACT intotheOperational responsetotheJanuary Inquiry 13.70 13.69 13.68 13.74 13.73 13.72 13.71 structures thatmaybethreatened bylargebushfires.’ services willbeabletoattendallresidences or orcommunitycanguaranteethatfiregovernment experience inbuilt-upareas) meanthatno and spread (whichfarexceedsthenormalfire bushfires canpresent aseriousthreat: ‘theirintensity household self-reliance.’ about achievingahigherdegree ofpersonaland including advisingthecommunityhowbesttogo committed ‘todoingallthattheycantohelp, The report recommended thatauthoritiesbe to the2003ACTbushfires The McLeodReportintotheoperationalresponse agencies tobepresent atallfires, particularlybushfires. acknowledgement thatitisnotalwayspossibleforfire need toconsiderthisnewdevelopmentcarefully inthe local communitiestofacilitatefire awareness butmay The InquirybelievesthattheCFA hasworkedwellwith erecommend thatthe CFA workwithcommunities We assistance isunavailableordelayed. required toengage infire suppression because However, CFGisnotanoptionforcommunities programs availabletoassistandeducateVictorians. model. CFGhasavaluableplaceinthesuiteof CFA needstoreview andfurtherdeveloptheCFG if theyfaceasimilarscenariointhefuture. more shouldbedonetoempowerthesecommunities situations andtheresultant actionsanddecisions, While theInquiryunderstandswhatledtothese among manycommunitymembers. protect themselves.Thiscausedconsiderableanxiety protective clothing,noequipmentandwere leftto communities were givenalittleknowledge,no of thesecommunitieshadaCFG.Ineffect, these to assistintheeventoffires reaching them.Some neither DSEcrews norCFA Brigadeswouldbeavailable communities thatthere wasahighlikelihoodthat agencies informedanumberofsmallandisolated The Inquirywasadvisedthatthefire suppression isolated communitiesisrequired. to thespecialsituationandneeds ofremote or trained initsuseisneeded.Amore flexibleapproach others, assistanceingettingequipment andbecoming creating aformalBrigademaybetheanswer. In andlocalcommunities. Insomecases, Government a suiteofsolutionsare required tobeplacedbefore communities are required toundertake.Proposals for those tasksthat,bydefaultordesign,some to developmore flexiblesolutionsthatfullyrecognise , p.174. 23 22 noted thespeedatwhich INF.018.002.0241 INF.018.002.0242 CHAPTER 13 C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART Recommendations 13.83 The Inquiry received a number of submissions relating to the operation of Brigades falling into a number of 13.75 That CFA, in conjunction with isolated small categories: communities, develop and promote a suite of appropriate fire readiness and fire management • Communications equipment; strategies to meet their needs. • Maps; • Access tracks; 13.76 That CFA reports to the Minister for Police and • Water sources; Emergency Services on recommended solutions • Equipment types; and implementation strategies for isolated small • Management of crews; communities by June 2004. • Issues relating to AIIMS-ICS; • Incorporation of local knowledge into the 13.77 That CFA clarifies and restates the roles and development of strategy and the implementation function of existing Community Fireguard of tactics; and Groups (including their relationship to the • Perceived differences in the culture and work Municipal Fire Prevention Plan) to members, practices of paid DSE crews and volunteers. co-ordinators, Incident Controllers and Municipal Emergency Resource Officers, prior to the 13.84 These issues are addressed in detail in Part D of this 2003–2004 fire season. report.

13.78 That Community Fireguard Group co-ordinators’ Outstanding Issues names are supplied to their local municipality for the 2003–2004 fire season, and are updated 13.85 It is clear that CFA offers a broad base of educative annually for use in information exchange should programs and enabling processes in relation to a Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centre or community preparedness for bushfire. The MFESB’s Incident Control Centre be established. work complements this in the area where regional and metropolitan media overlaps. More should be 13.79 That CFA provides technical advice to Community done to ensure each agency remains on message and Fireguard Groups in the selection and purchase that the message is consistent. of appropriate equipment and protective clothing for use on their own land. 13.86 It also remains unclear to the Inquiry what is the actual ‘trigger’ for households, neighbours or 13.80 That CFA, recognising the value of the communities to move from ‘awareness’ to a Community Fireguard Group program, undertake heightened level of involvement and active a review by June 2004 to identify opportunities participation in community-wide fire prevention to further develop the program to ensure its planning and suppression. Research on this would continuing appropriateness in preparing inform the further development and refinement communities for fire into the future. information programs.

CFA Brigades 13.87 The last issue to be explored is whether there is sufficient connection between the two ends of the 13.81 CFA Brigades are another way in which communities CFA community empowerment program. At one end, prepare for, and engage in, bushfire events. The the information exchange of a Bushfire Blitz program history and role of CFA Brigades is well covered in naturally extends into the community self-help Chapter 2 and in the Auditor-General’s Report. CFA process that is Community Fireguard. At the other Brigades have a proud history and a deservedly high end is involvement in, or the formation of, a new CFA reputation. The efforts of the Brigades and volunteers Brigade. There appears little middle ground between in the fire season of 2002–2003 have been widely the self-help process at one end and the fully acknowledged. committed response structure, which is sanctioned and protected, at the end. The Inquiry believes this 13.82 As a member of a Brigade, community members have warrants attention. access to the full range of information relating to preparedness for bushfire and a depth of understanding of how to apply this knowledge. PAGE 135 PAGE 136 13.89 13.88 Omeo after1939fire -CFA decision atthetime. the current signal,inconformitywithanational a different tone, SEWSwasre-launched in1998with in1992using Originallylaunched inVictoria warning. States ofAustraliaasacyclone media inthenorthern signal –thesameasisusedby SEWS isawarning To alertthecommunityatlarge,viaapublic • To alertradio/televisionlisteners/viewersthatan • designed: The Standard EmergencyWarning Signal(SEWS)is Standard EmergencyWarning Signal Systems Public Awareness Communication broadcast. emergency announcementisabouttobe address system,thatanimportantofficial and emergency thathasthepotentialtoaffect them; anactualorimminent made concerning official emergencyannouncementisabouttobe 13.92 13.91 13.90 awareness ofitspurposeinthebroader community. as partofexercises tobuildunderstandingand should alsobegiventooccasionallyplayingthesignal the medianeedstobere-established. Consideration linguistic diversity).Further, anawareness program for additional needs(eghearingimpaired, culturaland and bemore inclusiveofthoseinthecommunitywith developed. Protocols foruseneedtobemodernised dated andamore contemporarymessageneedstobe The accompanyinginstructionstoSEWSneedbe Policeduringemergencies. by Victoria locate theircopyofthesignal,whenaskedtoplayit some cases,mediastationshavebeenunableto suggested thatthecurrent systembereviewed. In and somesectionsoftheelectronic media,have DSE, CFA, Emergency ResponseCo-ordinators were issued. occasions inGippslandwherethisformat warnings the SEWSwasusedsparingly. There were two andGippslandfires,During theNorthEastVictorian INF.018.002.0243 INF.018.002.0244 CHAPTER 13 C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PART

Omeo after 2003 fire - CFA

Recommendation 13.96 We also noted that some rural radio stations have skeleton staff as they relay feed from another station 13.93 That the Co-ordinator-in-Chief of Emergency – generally in a capital city that may be in another Management directs the Media subcommittee State. These stations are less able to respond to local of the State Emergency Response Committee emergency issues. The Inquiry believes that this issue to review the use of the Standard Emergency should be considered in our recommended review of Warning Signal and its accompanying message. the Codes of Practice.

Radio Codes of Practice Recommendation 13.94 The Inquiry notes that the Community Broadcasting 13.97 That Victoria include an agenda item for Codes of Practice document (2002) does not deal both the National Emergency Management with the issue of reporting emergency situations Committee and the National Meeting of specifically. Emergency Services Ministers recommending 13.95 Part of this Code deals with news and current affairs, that the Australian Communications Authority the intention being to promote accuracy and fairness. review both the Commercial Radio Codes However, the Commercial Radio Codes of Practice of Practice and Guidelines, and Community and Guidelines document (2001) specifically aims ‘to Broadcasting Codes of Practice, to ensure they ensure that licensees have procedures in place to provide necessary guidance and obligations on enable timely and accurate broadcast of emergency radio stations during emergencies and in relation information.’ Views were expressed in some parts of to emergency warnings. the broadcasting industry that more guidance would assist in emergency situations, especially given concerns about the language used in the SEWS. PAGE 137 PAGE 138 13.102 13.101 13.100 13.99 13.98 Fran &JohnJames not knowwhatthehellIwasinfor…whendragonroarsyouhadbloodywellbetterlisten.’ breathe…even thoughIfeelthatperformedwellduringthefires,itwasbasicallyduetofactdid The windwasroaring,thefiretheresparksandsmokeeverywheremakingitimpossibleto ‘…it washorrificthewindblewfirehorizontallyacrosspaddock,itseemedtoigniteallatonce. of increased personalrisk. staying andfightingthefire bringswithittheissue maintenance ofapproved equipment,etc.Further, in verifyingstandards ofwork,continuing found there are ‘hurdles’ tothisapproach, particularly Attempts todealwiththisissueinthepasthave doors. deadlocks fittedtoallexternal households inhighriskburglaryareas tohave industry provides suchincentivestoinduce properties from fire. Forexample,theinsurance in placeadditionalmeasures toprotect their provide incentivesforthoseproperty ownerswhoput property ownersinbushfire-prone areas, nordoesit to provide anyadditionalobligationsonthose Current insuranceindustrypracticedoesnotappear cashflow (forexample,underdrought). wearing considerablerisk–usuallyattimesofpoorest always remain under-insured orwillself-insure, the familycar. Asaresult, somehouseholderswill insuringahouse,contentsand for urbanVictorians property, thesecostsgowellbeyondthenormalcover machinery shedsandequipment.Onatypical Those needsincludefences,yards, andassociated to adequatelyinsure allstructuralandbusinessneeds. required from annualcashflow, foraruralproperty and businessespointtothehighleveloffixedcost Submissions andanecdotaladvicefrom landholders encouraged. is asoundpreparedness measure andshouldbe landscape. Anappropriate levelofinsurancecoverage option forprotecting assetsandlivinginarural through bushfires. Insuranceremains anecessary maintaining insurancecoverageagainstlosses However, thisshouldbeseenasanadjunctto adequately prepared todoso. their homesandproperty from fire, iftheyare forhouseholderstostayanddefend rural Victoria There isagrowing willingnessinouterurbanand Insurance asaPreparednessMeasure 13.104 13.103 13.108 13.107 13.106 13.105 anti-theft homesecurity. on theirproperties,similartoincentivesfor who takeappropriateself-protectionmeasures such asareductioninpremiumsforthose industry toexploreoptionsforincentives That Governmentworkwiththeinsurance a partofthehouseholder’s annualchecklist. cover, andensurethatinsurancebecomes packages, encourageappropriateinsurance That CFA, intheireducationandinformation Recommendations within theCommunityFireguard group program. may needtocarefully considernewdevelopments with localcommunitiestofacilitatefire awareness but The InquirybelievesthattheCFA hasworkedwell Bushfire Blitzprogram. difference, and clarifyingthelanguageusedin efforts toeducatepeoplethatstayingcanmakea through thesummerpublicitycampaign;re-focusing we havesuggestedincreasing positivesurvivalstories communication andeducation.Amongotherthings, we concludethatthere isscopeforimproved While manyeffective programs are inplace, safety strategies. community tobeanactiveparticipantindeveloping existing informationandprocesses encouragethe Our focusinthisChapterhasbeenonwhether to bushfire. in preparing thosewhochoosetoliveinareas prone Access toappropriate informationisacrucialfactor Conclusion INF.018.002.0245 PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 139 CHAPTER 14 . INF.018.002.0246 4 were that: were 2 . The Fire Protection plans Protection . The Fire 3 management responsibilities do not actively do not management responsibilities nor can they participate in the planning process, be compelled to undertake works that would in the plan; measures complement the proposed of the municipality and land under the control council within municipalities; and (DSE) is a participant in the planning Environment concerns is limited scope to resolve there process, to the interface between public and relating private land. locations/management objectives. •other agencies with public land The utilities and • private land within the The plan only addresses • Even though the Department of Sustainability and Fire planning for public land is completed at three levels: planning for public land is completed at three Fire • level; a regional Plans at Protection Fire • District; and Plans for each DSE Fire Operations Fire • Individual burning plans for specific and strategic in nature Plans are Protection The Fire meant to… ‘apply for 10 years, with the provision are after five years’. It is intended that… for revision objectives protection ‘Each plan must define the fire and indicate the strategies to be adopted within the planning area...’ of DSE Operations Plans under the control The Fire burnslist all fuel reduction and major works to be season commences. the fire performed before in each Region signs these off…‘ Fire The Manager, the first or before by 30 September each year, spring burning operation, whichever is sooner’ These plans, which may cover a number of then distributed for public municipalities, are with Municipal comment and a consultation process Committees is undertaken. Prevention Fire The most significant concern raised with the Inquiry to these plans was the manner in which in relation a completed plan consultation is pursued. At present, to the community and the Municipal Fire is presented Committee for comments and feedback. Prevention of these plans is such that they the nature However, any where as a finished product perceived are feedback will be noted but not necessarily acted on. The principal concerns in relation to the preparation The principal concerns in relation with both the Inquiry and in the of these plans, raised Report Auditor-General’s Land Plans for Public Protection Fire inform the Fire Operations Plans. inform the Fire 14.9 14.10 14.11 14.12 14.13 14.8 , State Government of Victoria, Melbourne. . 1 , Government Printer, May 2003, p. 64. , Government Printer, . . implementation Fire Prevention and Preparedness Country Fire Authority Act 1958 Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land Country Fire Authority Act 1958

4 1999. Operations Plans June 1-Fire Management Instruction S.P. DSE Fire 2 Victoria, Auditor-General 3 DNRE 1995. 1 Section 55A Existing plans are subject to audit under the Existing plans are of the provisions The Inquiry is satisfied that the audits of Municipal Plans had been completed in Prevention Fire of the legislation prior with the provisions accordance It is worth noting that there to the 2002–2003 fires. of the under consideration in the Office proposals are Emergency Services Commissioner and the Country to amend the current Authority (CFA) Fire arrangements for audit of these plans to apply scrutiny to their actual greater The plan may include proposals for burningThe plan may include proposals or for within the and hazards clearing firebreaks advice to other as well as provide municipality, authorities for the clearance of hazards responsible land under their control. from Municipal Fire Prevention Plans (‘the plan’) address Prevention Municipal Fire and mitigation works on the planning for prevention of the private land and land under the control and Officer Prevention The Municipal Fire municipality. Committee are Prevention the Municipal Fire it for developing the plan and presenting responsible to Council for adoption. Municipal Fire Prevention Plan Chapter 14 describes this new process and outlines the Chapter 14 describes this new process more consistency, many benefits it will bring: greater better co-operation, effective co-ordination, effective and implementation of response and concurrent duplication of effort. activities and reduced recovery Fire does not respect boundaries, nor does it respect boundaries, nor does it does not respect Fire is no logic, There organisational arrangements. different in planning separately across therefore, arrangements. tenure in Part As we saw in Chapter 3 and as later Chapters plans cover the a number of different C show, in Victoria. This and mitigation of fire prevention to Chapter notes a number of concerns relating a new, existing arrangements and proposes – the Municipal Fire consolidated planning process Management Plan. Overview Plans must be audited at least every three years to Plans must be audited at least every three of the Act and assess compliance with the provisions Authority Regulations 1992. the Country Fire

14.7 14.6 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.1 An Holistic Approach An Holistic Planning for Fire – Fire for Planning Chapter 14 Chapter INF.018.002.0247

14.14 While the Code of Practice for Fire Management on Water Companies Public Land 1995 provides that both the Fire 14.19 Fire impacts have the capacity to immediately Protection Plan and the Fire Operations Plans are to alter the quality of water from a catchment and, be developed by DSE in consultation with the depending on the extent and nature of the dominant community, the Inquiry believes the community does vegetation, to have a prolonged adverse impact on not value the process and, as such, the community the water harvest over many years. However, consultation process needs reconsideration. provided the appropriate prevention and suppression 14.15 Information presented to the Inquiry indicates that measures are put in place, these impacts can be proposals for works on public land where it interfaces minimised – as can the associated costs to improve with private land are not developed in consultation medium-term water quality. with landowners or local fire brigades. Consequently, 14.20 There is a range of Water Authorities across the any sense of community ownership of the plans is State; Chapter 3 provides their details and context. minimal. Melbourne Water, as the largest water authority within the State, liaises at all levels with the statutory Fire Prevention and Mitigation Plans fire authorities including DSE and the Country Fire for Utilities Authority (CFA), and is represented on appropriate Regional and Municipal Fire Prevention Committees in 14.16 Land tenure provides no boundary to the spread areas where their assets are located. Melbourne of fire. Since the decision in the 1990s to privatise, Water also carries out bushfire prevention works, corporatise and ‘regionalise’ a number of utilities utilising a mobile and well-equipped field workforce in this State, responsibility for the prevention trained and accredited to DSE standards, and is first and suppression of fire has transferred from the responder to many unplanned fire events. Government sector to the private investor or has been devolved to regional authorities. It has been 14.21 Melbourne Water informed the Inquiry of a range of suggested in submissions that over this time, mitigation strategies that the company has put in there has been a decline in the aggregate staff place, including seasonal or project firefighters. The and equipment available for fire prevention and fire company advises that it is developing more formal suppression works. arrangements with DSE Fire Management Branch through the establishment of a Memorandum of 14.17 The utilities involved in this process are: Understanding covering fire suppression activities in • Water distribution; their catchments. • Electricity generation, transmission and 14.22 In the Inquiry’s opinion, Melbourne Water appears distribution; and well placed for the coming fire season. Because of the • Rail transport. importance of Victoria's water catchment areas, the 14.18 Each of these, described in detail in Chapter 3, have Inquiry believes that Government should be assured developed their own approach to meeting bushfire that adequate fire mitigation and fire suppression prevention and preparedness responsibilities. Here, planning is in place for all the State’s water we review the preparations for the 2002–2003 fire catchments, but especially the Melbourne season by these utilities, before turning to three catchments. further industry players: 14.23 An extreme fire in the catchments would have severe • Roads authorities; impacts on water yield well into the future and could, • Plantations; and in a worst-case scenario, require development of • Alpine Resort Management Boards. alternative water storage. Therefore, in accordance with recommendation six in the Inquiry’s Interim Report,5 further review of fire prevention and preparedness arrangements for Victoria’s – and, particularly, Melbourne’s – water catchments is warranted.

5 See Appendix III. 140 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 141 CHAPTER 14 INF.018.002.0248 Code of . that deals with result on roadsides; result to adjoining public and private land; roadsides that may occur on, or pass fire public from and roadsides; through, passed through. Roads Authorities levels of In Chapter 3, we noted the three (i.e. government infrastructure involved with road in co- Federal, State and Local). Each needs to work which operation with the Municipal Council through passes. their designated road in the broader Factors that need to be considered are: planning and mitigation process • that may Managing the potential intensity of fire • from of fire and spread Restricting the propagation • of the travelling for adequate protection Providing • has safe for travel after a fire are Ensuring roads called a document VicRoads has produced Practice for Roadside Management levels of GovernmentAll three – even owners of input to provide – should be required private roads planning process. prevention into the municipal fire Sub-lessees for rail operators in VictoriaSub-lessees for rail operators the have out VicTrack's for carrying operational responsibility to Chapter 3 for (refer responsibilities statutory fire they in turnsub- have However, further explanation). is no Again, there contracted rail line maintenance. is subject to any audit or indication that this work monitoring process. prevention cannot serve a fire Councils, at present, such a notice may be However, notice on VicTrack. for fire served on the lessees. The chain of command railway tracks is work on and around prevention confusing, with many municipalities presently unclear as to which body is responsible remaining on leased rail lines. prevention for fire input to provide All rail operators should be required planning prevention municipal fire into their relevant process. a document that deals has produced and CFA fire, called the on roadsides with planning for fire Roadside Fire Management Guidelines 14.33 14.34 14.35 14.36 14.30 14.31 14.32 The Public Transport Division, which oversees rail The Public Transport in this State, has a co- transport and infrastructure Emergency/Incident Management Response ordinated The Inquiry could find Plan, which includes bushfire. no evidence that this plan undergoes any audit by an management experience. organisation with fire The Inquiry is of the view that these operators should input into the Municipal Fire to provide be required which, through in areas planning process Prevention or in which, their assets exist. Operators Rail Transport This plan sets out the work to be completed over the This plan sets out the work to be completed risks associated wildfire next 12 months to ensure minimised. These assets are field with the company’s and an OCEI audit before plans have been approved, season found that the companies’ the 2002–2003 fire OCEI advised the Inquiry that appropriate. plans were the available for public viewing from all plans are network operators. Power Transmission and Distribution Power Transmission Companies the responsibility function remains prevention The fire (see of transmission and distribution companies a Chapter 3), with each power company submitting of the Chief Mitigation Plan to the Office Bushfire Electrical Inspector (OCEI), covering their Under the Electricity and processes. responsibilities 1999, Safety (Electric Line Clearance) Regulations vegetation appropriate each company must ensure under and adjacent to management and control, power lines. The Inquiry is of the view that these agencies have a The Inquiry is of the view that these agencies and mitigation planning, prevention in fire critical role and be required in this process must be represented input. to provide That the Premier requests that the Minister for Water That the Premier requests prevention planning and fire critically review the fire catchments. water Victoria’s response strategies for that, since privatisation, has advised the Inquiry CFA the State have been Authorities across Water in the Municipal to take an active role reluctant Planning process. Prevention Fire Recommendation 6 from the Interim Report Recommendation 14.29 14.28 14.27 14.26 14.25 14.24 INF.018.002.0249

Plantations 14.41 The Inquiry supports the findings of the Auditor- General9 in recommending that ‘the CFA adopt a firm 14.37 Commonwealth and State policy is to encourage the line in encouraging companies at risk to form industry development of the plantation industry. Accordingly, brigades as provided for under legislation.’ in recent years there has been increased investment and rapid expansion of eucalyptus plantations for the 14.42 The Auditor-General notes that it is not clear how short rotation pulpwood production, particularly in well the formation of these Brigades adequately the south west of the State. With this growth, and protects the forest industry. There is also confusion the more moderate expansion of radiata pine, the within the Brigades as to how they fit within the CFA private plantation estate is now approximately command structure and to whom they owe their first 360,000 hectares6 Statewide. As a result of this shift duty of loyalty when fighting fire. to an industry driven by external investment, there will have to be an increased reliance on the private 14.43 However, submissions to and discussions with the sector in regional fire prevention, mitigation and Inquiry suggest that Forest Industry Brigades played a suppression. very active role in the 2002–2003 bushfires and should be accorded more of the protection afforded 14.38 Chapter 3 provided some background on the to regular CFA Brigades. The Inquiry also noted that plantation sector in this State. While not at the scale Forest Industry Brigades responded well to calls for of previous bushfire events in Victoria’s past, the loss assistance from the CFA and operated for significant of approximately 2,500 hectares of plantations in the periods fighting fire on non-plantation land. Victorian fires over 2002–2003 will have a significant impact on the plantation owners, wood production 14.44 It has been recognised that the CFA Act needs to be industries and the local communities they support. amended – specifically, section 93B, where it is not In the plantation sector, the returns are typically lawful for Forest Industry Brigades to act outside the obtained 25 years, or longer, from the initial planting. Country Area of Victoria. This means that Forest Therefore, plantation companies take the threat of Industry Brigades are not authorised to act in areas fire very seriously, and insure against this eventuality. managed by DSE or across State borders. This However, within the community and, to some degree omission in the Act is of particular concern as many within the volunteer fire services, plantations are still industry players manage land that adjoins public land not regarded as assets despite the employment they managed by DSE, or crosses the New South Wales or create and the long-term prospect of a significant South Australian borders. This part of the Act directly return to the regional economy at harvest. conflicts with the spirit of mutual assistance and co- operation that has built up over time. 14.39 The Inquiry supports the findings of the Auditor- General7 in recommending that ‘State and local 14.45 The need for a review of the Forest Industry Brigade government and the CFA improve the standard of legislation after a suitable period of operation and municipal fire prevention planning and ensure its settling has already been recognised and the forest consistent implementation in forest plantations.’ industry, CFA and Government are currently working through this review. Forest Industry Brigades

14.40 In Victoria, there are now over 25 Forest Industry Recommendations Brigades established by 15 different plantation owners8. There is some industry discussion as to 14.46 That, following the review of Forest Industry whether the current criteria for establishing an Brigades, the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 Industry Brigade is appropriate, especially as it does be amended to ensure that the Forest Industry not cater for owners who might have significant Brigades, which are acting in an approved manner, holdings over a more dispersed area. (Currently, a have the same powers and rights as other Brigades company may be required to establish, equip and when attending fires on public land or interstate. staff a Forest Industry Brigade if a plantation owner 14.47 That the CFA should not be given the power to has more than 500 hectares within a 25-kilometre direct Forest Industry Brigades to engage in fire radius. Over 10,000 hectares, a Forest Industry prevention and suppression activities off their Brigade must be formed.) land and that decision should remain the responsibility of the plantation company.

6 AFFA (2003) National Plantation Inventory – Australia (annual update). 7 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 12. 8 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 99. 9 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 12. 142 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 143 CHAPTER 14 INF.018.002.0250 Emergency k of researching in recommending 13 and therefore prepare and therefore for fire prevention and protection; and in planning development applications. The Inquiry therefore gives qualified support to the The Inquiry therefore findings of the Auditor-General Recommendations and the Plantation Industry jointly That CFA develop and agree on Fire Prevention Guidelines for Plantations by June 2004, to be then promoted and distributed by the Industry. That Municipal Councils: • Ensure consistent approaches to planning • Consider existing rights of neighbours Alpine Resort Management Boards to considered are Alpine Resort Management Boards be Municipalities for the purpose of the Management Act 1986 within Emergency Management Plans for the area unlike Municipal Councils their boundaries. However, Prevention Fire to produce not required they are Plans. In discussions with the Inquiry, the plantations Inquiry, In discussions with the while they had been proactive industry suggested that guidelines to alleviate planning in developing design Municipal Councils had allowed issues, in some cases example, housing) development (for ‘inappropriate’ are plantations and forest where next to, or in, areas land use. This was done without a predominant risk. adequate consideration of the fire that the is needed to ensure A consistent approach existing rights of landholders, such as forestry taken into consideration. Equity must companies are new when Municipal Councils approve be considered to in proximity subdivisions and land rezoning plantations. To of instances both are there sum up, it would seem on long-established development encroaching too plantations and of plantations being approved areas. close to residential that ‘the CFA formally endorse State Fire Prevention formally endorse State Fire that ‘the CFA guidance Design Guidelines for Plantations to provide to key stakeholders’. 14.56 14.57 14.58 14.59 14.53 14.54 14.55 but 10 to develop… 12 , p. 11. , p. 12. , p. 12 in recommending that ‘the DSE, the CFA in recommending 11 modification of machinery exhaust temperatures; all equipment working in plantations; and high. factors are access when local fire-risk Fire Prevention and Preparedness Fire Prevention and Preparedness issues. related the full spectrum of bushfire Fire Prevention and Preparedness and the plantation industry initiate work with the Centre Co-operative Research Bushfire 11 12 An organisation established by the Federal Government, range of industry stakeholders, charged with the tas involving a broad 13 10 The Inquiry supports the findings of the Auditor- General The CFA have progressed towards developing good developing towards have progressed The CFA design guidelines for plantations during 2002 Historically, available data indicates that the majority available data indicates that the Historically, in significant plantation losses have resulting of fires estate, and the 2002–2003 started outside the forest have followed this trend. fires The land management practices of adjoining on a landholders can have a significant impact is a need to there assets and, accordingly, plantation’s policies in place for all protection have consistent fire classes of rural land use, including: • design guidelines; Establishing property • such as Developing ignition management protocols • for equipment/resources Specifying minimum fire • on public Implementing work bans and restriction All rural land managers have responsibility to ensure have responsibility All rural land managers supported by suppression, and responsive effective In planning and land management. appropriate involve planning and plantations, these practices and available maintenance of access tracks, firebreaks on their and the management of fuel loads water, estate. Planning for Plantations standards to minimise the wildfire risk in commercial to minimise the wildfire standards plantations.’ forest the forest industry has protested at their release industry has protested the forest based on a single land use because the guidelines are industry believe category (plantations only). The forest view that, in this may heighten the general public’s risk, or fire a greater situations, plantations are fire argue that They strongly dangerous. more inherently as part of a these guidelines should only be released package of guidelines for all other rural broader and grazing), industries (for example, cropping to fire ensuring a consistent approach thereby on all rural land. The Inquiry supports prevention this view. 14.52 14.51 14.50 14.49 14.48 INF.018.002.0251

14.60 In order to fill this gap, the Alpine Resort A New Approach to Municipal Management Boards have addressed the general Planning issues of fire prevention in their Emergency Management Plans. The DSE Strategic Fire Protection 14.64 The Inquiry proposes a consolidated planning process Plans address land up to the boundaries of the at municipal level so that, at a minimum, the issues resorts, however, there is limited interaction between currently dealt with by the Municipal Fire Prevention the two organisations to ensure the work done across Plan, the Strategic Fire Protection Plans for Public the two land tenures is consistent. Land and the planning undertaken by utilities and other Government departments are brought together 14.61 It is clear to the Inquiry that the treatment of land to produce a single and consolidated Municipal Fire under the control of the Alpine Resort Management Management Plan. Boards should be no different to any other land tenure. Accordingly, there is a need to prepare 14.65 The development of agency-specific preparedness and comprehensive fire prevention plans for Alpine response planning should remain the responsibility of Resorts and such planning should be integrated those agencies, but should be informed by the and consistent with the planning undertaken outcomes of the municipal fire management planning for the surrounding land tenure. process.

14.62 The recommendations relating to the development 14.66 Figure 14.1 maps the consolidation of fire of Municipal Fire Management Plans should therefore management planning arrangements. Part E, The Way apply equally to Alpine Resort Management Boards. Forward, takes this approach further by exploring the concept of an ‘all hazards–all agency’ comprehensive Concerns Relating to the Existing approach to emergency management in Victoria. We make further recommendations in Part E in respect to Planning Arrangements planning and legislation.

14.63 The Inquiry is of the view that the current planning arrangements, particularly at municipal level, have Model of Fire Cover a number of inherent weaknesses: 14.67 The Model of Fire Cover, currently being developed • They demand a significant commitment of within the Office of the Emergency Services resources from all agencies involved, particularly Commissioner (OESC), will be a critical tool in the municipalities, and result in duplication of developing the proposed Municipal Fire Management effort and information; Plan, and in implementing the outcomes of that • The legislation that requires fire prevention planning (see Figure 14.1). The Model of Fire Cover is planning is fragmented (in some cases, duplicated a tool that will be applied across the whole of the by other, related legislation), diverse, incomplete State, including public land, to provide both valid and and does not compel all responsible agencies to consistent quantitative measures of risk. work co-operatively within the process; and 14.68 The Model identifies the risk environments that exist • Planning treats public and private land separately based on statistical evidence collated from a range of and does not adequately address the planning data sources. The recommended Municipal Fire needs of the interface between them. Even though Management Committee and individual agencies can consultation with interested parties is envisaged then build on this model through their enhanced and encouraged, there is insufficient integration knowledge of the local area and their understanding between the different plans, and consultation and of what assets are of importance to that community. input from other stakeholders is inadequate. The model is designed to identify the drivers of risk, allowing mitigation strategies to be targeted appropriately to achieve community-agreed outcomes. 144 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 145 CHAPTER 14 INF.018.002.0252 Scale Other Including Wildfire Overlay industries Timber and Plantations, Refer Chapter 3 Management Tourism, Large Manufacturing DSE Planning Protection Strategic Fire other approval and industry subdivisions, Municipal Fire local planning will inform the development s Management Plan scheme including input Planning Prevention Committee - Includes CFA Municipal Fire response likely to be faced by the communities; communities. response and DSE for those arrangements the specific fire he Municipal Fire provide input to Outcomes From the Planning Process DOI T Other treatment strategies the municipality and for use in both response and recovery activities. for all agencies for both public and private land Management Plan will developed by CFA and for communities within Planning: Vic Roads Government Departments One Municipal Fire Management Planning Document One Municipal Fire Management Planning Document Establishing an agreed hierarchy of community asset values; Establishing an agreed hierarchy of community that consolidates all fire prevention and mitigation planning that consolidates all fire prevention and mitigation Determining the appropriate mitigation strategies for the fire threat Determining the appropriate mitigation strategies and asset hierarchy; and Identifying common information and processes and asset hierarchy; and Identifying common Determining the response priorities based on the agreed mitigation strategies Determining the response priorities based on Water Cover Utilities Planning Including Electricity, Authorities Model of Fire Figure 14.1: Consolidation of Fire Management Planning Arrangements Management Consolidation of Fire 14.1: Figure PAGE 146 14.73 14.72 14.71 14.70 14.69 this view. developing thisnextstage.TheInquirysupports recommends thatDSEbemore activelyinvolvedin 14 reserves, andculturalorrecreational sites. assets suchasspecificecologicalhabitats,forest transmission lines),or‘natural’environmental interpretation centre; askilodge;electricity informationand including plantations;aParksVictoria communications tower;ruralhousingandbusinesses, associated services(forexample,aradio may be‘built’assetsintermsofinfrastructure and specific prevention andsuppression activities.These and/or theirbusiness,thatwillinformown important forthemselves,theirkeystakeholders to provide adviceaboutwhichassetstheyconsider Each landmanagerwithinanarea needstobeable activity istoolate. identifying assetsat,orduring,thesuppression protecting communityassets.TheInquirybelievesthat agencies didnotconsultwiththecommunityon fire managementstrategies,thefire suppression Many submissionswere criticalthat,aspartoftheir of CommunityAssets Establishing anAgreedInventory Thechangingnature offarming andlanduse–for • Theurban-ruralinterface,recognising thatmany • In particular, thiswillfocuson: Mitigation Strategies Determining theAppropriate at thislevelofplanningare asfollows. As figure 14.1indicates,outcomestobeachieved Planning Process Key Outcomesfrom theProposed Auditor-General's Report to bedevelopedwillthewildfire component.The undergoing independentvalidation.Thenextstage Model, structuralfires, iscompleteandtheModel Development workonthefirststageof Fire PreventionandPreparedness example, plantations,aquaculture, horticulture. seeking amore ‘green’ environment; and/or new subdivisionsare particularlytargetedtothose 14 supports thisworkand , p.37 14.75 14.74 14.77 14.76 representatives ofthatcommunity. astheelected level betweenthelevelsofgovernment of opinionandprioritymustbemanagedatthelocal available duetoprevailing fire conditions.Difference during theactualsuppression alloptionsmaynotbe on where theirprioritiesliewhilerecognising that agreement withinthecommunitybefore afire event There shouldbe,wherever possibleandappropriate, from aneighbouringmunicipality. either originatingwithinthemunicipalityorcrossing development ofjointstrategyintheeventafire preparedness arrangementsandhelpinthe for protection. Thiswillguideprevention and and, where possible,offer someviewoftheirpriority develop alistofimportantassetsinthecommunity Management Authorities,shouldworktogetherto agencies, bywayofexampleCatchment Plan, themanydifferent groups, organisationsand In order todevelopaMunicipalFire Management citizens club,etc). through availablesources (egdistrictnurse,elderly the collectorofsuchinformation;rathercollator planning. Councilsdonothavetoseetheirrole as of peoplewithadditionalneedsmustbefactored into communities, anearlyrecognition oftherequirements due tothecontinuallychangingcircumstances of While nosuchsystemcanbecurrent onadailybasis, people ‘atrisk’intheeventofanemergencyarising. difficulty inkeepingaccurateandupdatedrecords for Consultations withMunicipalCouncilsindicatedthe Recovery Activities Processes forUseinBothResponseand Identifying CommonInformationand those choices. Fire ManagementPlansbeusedtoinform This modelproposes that,where possible,Municipal decisions willberequired onstrategyandoptions. resources andtheprevailing fire conditions.Attimes, considering desired outcomesagainstavailable Fire suppression strategiesare developedafter and AssetHierarchy on theAgreedMitigationStrategies Determining ResponsePrioritiesbased INF.018.002.0253 PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 147 CHAPTER 14 15 INF.018.002.0254 16 Audit Arrangements Audit arrangements should be a fundamental as is planning. Therefore, component of effective the case, the new planning arrangements currently audit and transparent should include effective that consider the format and content of the processes plans. The audit should, over time, be extended to implementation. consider effective that recommended has already The Auditor-General of the Emergency Services Commissioner, ‘the Office the Public Transport in consultation with the CFA, Division, and the OCEI, establish systems to improve and the trends on wildfire performance reporting outcomes for industry.’ Options for management of an expanded audit limited. With are brief, which an expanded processes and utilities, responsibility includes public lands, roads for the audit function may have to be reconsidered. that this new The Inquiry does not recommend alone. function necessarily be performed by the CFA DSE, OESC and that CFA, The Inquiry recommends Local Government audit develop an appropriate model for endorsement by Government. Management of the New Planning Management of Arrangements for emergencies planning Within a municipality, a critical function. is in particular, and fire generally, to demonstrate is ample evidence in the past There due that some Municipal Councils have not given in the weight to these obligations. This is evidenced low- practice of some municipalities appointing of Municipal Fire to the roles ranking officers also discusses The Auditor-General Officer. Prevention this issue, noting the need for ‘skills in strategic skills’. planning, risk assessment and management can be prevention Community safety and fire the task of municipal planning where compromised priority within council. is not given sufficient In implementing the arrangements proposed the Inquiry believes Municipal in this Chapter, senior officer Councils must appoint an appropriately to oversee working at a strategic level within council this critical function. 14.84 14.85 14.86 14.87 14.82 14.83 Information , p. 65. , p. 11. . Further, at the outset of an at the outset . Further, Fire Prevention and Preparedness Fire Prevention and Preparedness preparedness, response and recovery elements of and recovery response preparedness, co-ordination effective more planning and ensure the interface between public and private across land. and for response agencies that have responsibility the use of during emergencies through recovery common information and data systems. activities by and recovery of both response and those ensuring that emergency responders, working are and recovery, involved in co-ordination with common information and systems; and arrangements duplication that exists in the current several committees operate at municipal where bits of the same level, managing different emergency. 16 15 Involvement in the New Planning Arrangements with responsibilities groups All agencies and interest and obligations for land management and fire level planning at municipal and regional prevention should continue, or commence, their involvement. and effective appropriate This will be critical to ensure a municipality. management across planning for fire in place to develop and implement this The structure that all agencies and planning must ensure interests, organisations having appropriate contribute to the planning process In view of these key outcomes, the benefits of a In view of these key outcomes, the benefits considerable. are consolidated planning process The plan: • consistency between the greater Should provide • Will better co-operation between encourage • implementation concurrent and effective Promote • it will eliminate much of the Most importantly, The provision of this information should be without The provision fear of action under the privacy legislation. Benefits of the New Municipal Fire Management Plan The finding of the Inquiry is that Municipal Councils The finding of the Inquiry networks to develop the most should work with local community who of those within their accurate picture emergency situation. This must may be at risk in an of the be done under the principles Privacy Act 2000 seek any any community briefing should emergency, updates on changed circumstances. 14.81 14.80 14.79 14.78 INF.018.002.0255

Case Study: Tallangatta Valley – Late January 2003 In late January the continual spread of the fires in North East Victoria showed that containing the fires within heavily forested areas was proving difficult. This was due to the dry condition of the fuel and the intensity of the fire behaviour causing regular spotting across control lines. The Mt Beauty IMTs strategic response included the construction of mineral-earth control lines along the bottom of the Tallangatta Valley adjacent to the road as a fall back tactic if the fire could not be stopped on forested public land. A 10 metre wide mineral earth-break on private property parallel to the road was commenced. As a consequently, fencing, stockyards, gardens, pasture and other farm infrastructure would have been damaged as the bulldozers progressed through the valley. The strategy was adopted without reference to the landowners of the affected properties. Tension arose when landowners objected to this strategy and at one point a number of community members acting in concert diverted the construction from private property to the roadside of the fence. The Inquiry questioned DSE on the events and was advised that during construction, landowners were approached and, where they objected to the placement of the line on their property the line was constructed on the adjacent road reserve. This was not the view of the landowners directly affected. The failure to consult landowners during the development of this strategy and the assertive manner in which fire ground commanders executed the strategy created great angst within the community. Many landowners actively opposed the implementation of the strategy and attempted to convince the Mt Beauty IMT to change its decision on the placement of the control line. Any opportunity to develop and partnership between the IMT and the community they were responsible for protecting was compromised. Lessons Learnt Strategy developed in isolation from the community and without input from any key stakeholder is likely to be compromised. The likely strategic response to a fire must be established between the agencies and the community before the fire starts. Strategies should be based on an agreed understanding of the values placed on private and community assets and how they will be protected during fire suppression activity. This is best achieved through an holistic planning process that identifies those values well before the fire starts. On this occasion, any possibility of developing a co-operative partnership was lost due to the failure to communicate with and give consideration to the views of the community.

Boundary Issues 14.89 Many of the current fire prevention and mitigation plans have an historical basis, with the boundaries 14.88 With any attempt to bring together all appropriate developed on a range of different and variable criteria interests in the one municipal fire management (for example, DSE Fire Regions, CFA Area Boundaries). planning process, difficulties will arise including the However, CFA Area Boundaries mesh in well with the degree to which municipal, departmental and other Local Government area boundaries. Other agencies’ boundaries are aligned. Goodwill must be organisations with an interest in fire management are exercised here, and organisations may have to put represented in a range of municipalities (for example, community interest before agency processes and VicRoads, railways, power companies). protocols. 14.90 We therefore believe that the municipal boundary is the most appropriate, both practically and legislatively, on which to base fire management planning. 148 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 149 CHAPTER 14 INF.018.002.0256 The Inquiry is of the view that this planning process The Inquiry is of the view that this planning to encompass the full spectrum of can be broadened with emergency management planning over time benefits accruing in terms of enhanced even greater and reduced better co-ordination community safety, duplication of effort. Conclusion for the development of policy direction Broad and mitigation prevention of fire planning at all levels is no agencies. There with the response rests currently agencies consistency across to ensure formal structure Government. or to gain endorsement from We that the State would benefit from believe operating as a subcommittee of establishing a group the Victoria Emergency Management Council tasked is a policy framework, developed with ensuring there agencies, within which the by the responsible and necessary planning can take place effectively at all levels. efficiently would, for example, consider the ‘Fire Such a group and Priorities’ developed by DSE and CFA Control them for endorsement by the Victoria recommend as providing Emergency Management Council as well new policy a forum in which agencies can promote initiatives. 14.100 14.97 14.98 14.99 1958 be Country Fire Authority Act and Emergency Management Council. Plan and the requirement for a Fire Prevention Committee with a Municipal Fire Management Plan, and Municipal Fire Management Committee; and an involvement in fire management for both private and public land within the municipality. That the Government identifies an appropriate or bodies, to undertake the audit of the body, Municipal Fire Management Plans. That the Municipal Fire Management Plan amendment includes appropriate provisions for the audit of the plans including: • Content; • Process of development and implementation; • Compliance reporting to the Victoria That the new Municipal Fire Management Plan That the new Municipal Fire Management the is informed by the policy directions of Emergency subcommittee of the Victoria Management Council. amended to: • Replace the current Municipal Fire Prevention • Bring together all stakeholders with Emergency Management That the Victoria 2004, Council establish a subcommittee by June to ensure an all-agency and appropriate and industries policy framework is developed fire agreed in respect to the planning for prevention, mitigation and suppression. That Government review legislation for utilities That Government review State to ensure their operating within the fire preparedness and involvement in regional mitigation planning. That the Recommendations 14.96 14.95 14.94 14.93 14.92 14.91 PAGE 150 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.2 15.1 Agency Preparedness Chapter 15 Chapter. the agencies.Theseagreements are elaboratedinthis interstate agenciesandintegratedplanningbetween CFA–DSE Co-operativeAgreement, agreements with Recommendations were madeinrelation tothe Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE). Fire Authority(CFA) andtheDepartmentof aspects ofthepreparedness activitiesoftheCountry Auditor-General Victoria, 1 agencies priortothefire season. range ofissues,placingadditional pressures onfire required tomaintainalevelofpreparedness across a scares over thefollowingmonths.Agencieswere Services) astheyfollowedupmany‘whitepowder’ Board [MFESB],CFA andDepartmentofHuman police, theMetropolitan Fire andEmergencyServices the emergencymanagementagencies(particularly anthrax placedconsiderableadditionalworkloadon on theirriskmanagement.Further, thethreat of places andevents,workingwithcriticalindustries capability, improving securityarrangementsforpublic Agencies havebeenheavilycommittedtoupgrading response byemergencymanagementagencies. capability andscenarioplanningforpotential Australia. Thishasledtoaconsiderablereview of aboutterrorismcontinued tobegeneralconcern in incidents andtheBaliterrorist attacks,there has the UnitedStates,subsequent'whitepowder' Following the11September2001terrorist attacksin Management Issues Terrorism andOtherEmergency Prior tothe2002–2003FireSeason External InfluencesonFireAgencies implementation oforganisationalchange. with verylittlerespite from incidentresponse andthe activity forallagencies,particularlythefire services, inquiries. Thepicture thatemergesisoneofintense planning for, andresponding to,othereventsand 2002–2003 summertookplaceinacontextof the emergencyservicesinleadupto alsoacknowledge thatplanningundertakenby We already made. depth andaddsweighttotherecommendations Inquiry addresses someoftheseissuesingreater supports thoserecommendations. InthisChapter, the The InquiryconcurswiththeAuditor-General and The Auditor-General’s recent report, Overview Fire PreventionandPreparedness 1 addresses many , Government Printer 2003. , Government 15.7 15.6 15.10 15.9 15.8 ContinueddevelopmentoftheCo-operative • ReviewofsystemsgenerallywithinDSEandCFA; • Continuousimprovement systems withinthe • Requirement forcompulsoryminimum skillsfor • ContinuedintegrationoftheCFA group structure • implemented inDSEandCFA, including: fire management,anumberofchangeswere ensure firefighter safetyremained paramountin To well assafetyarrangementsforallfirefighters. of theagreements inplacebetweenCFA andDSE,as These incidentswere pivotalinprompting thereview public andthedeathsoffiveCFA volunteersrespectively. resulted inthedeathsofthree membersofthegeneral and the1998fire nearLinton(southwestofBallarat) Significant fires intheDandenongRanges1997 Linton andtheFire Agencies all concerned. Significant workisrequired toensure protection for respect topaymentsmadeinrelation toan injury. required torecompense theWorkCover Authorityin direction ofanotherentity(Department)maybe an officer whoisreleased tofightfires underthe result inthattheDepartmentalSecretary employing arrangements relating toworkerscompensationmay The Inquirynotedthatthecomplexlegislative in placeforthenextfire season. commenced toensure appropriate arrangementsare be anissuefor2002–2003.Discussionshavealready access thesestaff. Fortunately, thisdidnotprove to Department. Noformalagreements were inplaceto of thefrontline firefighters were nowinanother on firefighting arrangementsforpublicland,asmany during thefire season,couldhavehadamajorimpact These significantchanges,occurringastheydid Communities. (DPI) andVictorian Sustainability andEnvironment, PrimaryIndustries Environment dividingtoformtheDepartmentsof with theformerDepartmentofNaturalResources and Departments, changes toanumberofgovernment December 2002sawmachinery-of-government Departments Restructuring ofGovernment effective co-ordination oftheagencies. Agreement betweenCFA andDSEtoensure and Incident Control System; firefighters; with theIncidentControl System; INF.018.002.0257 PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 151 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0258 Water Authorities cannot be compelled under current Water the water arrangements and legislation to provide of rapid replenishment or volume to ensure pressure and the community vehicles. Volunteers firefighting have been very vocal about this issue. have In some parts of the State, local arrangements Authorities to guarantee been negotiated with Water This includes adequate water supply for firefighting. placement of hydrants and large-volume, static water tanks connected to pipelines and part-funded by the Access Road Subsidy Scheme. (Municipalities are Fire to fund the hydrants; a matched funding required scheme of one dollar for every two dollars applies in under the Fire the case of static water tanks provided Access Roads Scheme.) needed for the contingency Other options are water for firefighting. planning necessary to ensure safety being a In keeping with the concept of fire partnership between State and Local Government and communities, public land managers, Catchment Authorities, fire Management Authorities/Water should work agencies and community groups together to develop and implement environmentally water supply for sound local solutions to ensure firefighting. Impact of the Drought on Water Impact of the Drought for Firefighting Availability with six years of 2002–2003, together The fires with the have highlighted problems of drought, water supplies for firefighting availability of adequate purposes. Irrigation channels and dams have traditionally easy and ubiquitous access to water for provided pipelines are in rural Victoria; however, firefighting open irrigation channels, particularly in the replacing and Western Victoria. Specific North West stage in arrangements must be made at the planning pipelines. later access to water from to ensure order Even so, pipelines often do not permit rapid tankers because of their of CFA replenishment variable and limited flow rates and pressures. the from Estimates suggest fill times could increase eight minutes to, time of approximately current perhaps, 40 minutes. 15.19 15.20 15.21 15.17 15.18 With and its impact on the drought the continuing and the largely rural-based workforce, volunteer, the across for fire heightened level of preparedness strained, even prior to severely were State, resources in the North East and Gippsland. the fires By the time the North East and Gippsland fires the former Department commenced in early January, (now DSE and and Environment of Natural Resources DPI) and Parks Victoriahad attended over 470 fires 13,733 reported season. CFA for the 2002–2003 fire season the commencement of the fire from responses that CFA until that time. It should be remembered in emergencies, including road role have a broader and specialist incidents, house and structural fires, rescue. Deployment of Firefighters to Interstate Deployment of Firefighters and to the United States an issue for of fatigue remains The cumulative effect the end of 2001 From resources. Victorian firefighting fire until the commencement of the 2002–2003 continuing calls on the expertise were season, there illustrated agencies. Those deployments are of the fire assistance with firefighting 15.1. They include in Table and a deployment to assist with in New South Wales in the United States. fires forest severe That DSE commences discussion with the That DSE commences discussion with Authority in respect to WorkCover Victorian being released employer liability for those staff fire to, and directed, by another agency in prevention and suppression activities. That DSE investigates whether such agreements should exist with other government Departments officers and agencies, particularly those with who may be involved in located in rural Victoria in the fire response and support operations future, based on their expertise and experience. That DSE and the Department of Primary That DSE and the Department an agreement by the Industries formalise documenting the policies, 2003-2004 fire season arrangements relating procedures and financial to the availability of Department of Primary to be trained and released Industries staff for fire prevention and suppression activities on public land. Recommendations 15.16 15.15 15.14 15.13 15.12 15.11 INF.018.002.0259

Table 15.1: Fire Agency Commitments 2001–2002 Outside Victoria

Location CFA commitments DSE commitments Total

Sydney Dec. 2001– Jan. 2002 2,593 personnel, 122 appliances 803 personnel 3,396 Northern NSW Oct.—Nov. 2002 453 personnel, 26 appliances 146 personnel 599 Sydney Dec. 2002 320 personnel, 16 appliances 9 personnel 329 USA Aug.–Sept. 2002 13 personnel 13

Source: Personnel and equipment figures supplied from CFA and DSE records 2003

15.22 An example of this is the proposal by community Country Fire Authority groups at Stanley in the North East, to use a small parcel of public land, currently an old mining site of Regional Operations Management Plans little apparent environmental value, to establish a 15.27 The Operations Manager in each CFA Region is small dam to provide water for firefighting. The group responsible for the preparation of a Regional has suggested the dam can be filled from a spring Operations Management Plan. This plan addresses without interfering with the water catchment. the specific operational arrangements within each region and the way in which resources are applied to the response to, and management of, fires and Recommendations other emergencies. This planning is undertaken in consultation with senior volunteer and career 15.23 That Government in the development of its statewide water policy includes appropriate personnel within the Region and in accordance with consideration of access to water for firefighting. a structure approved by the Chief Officer, CFA.

15.24 That communities, public land managers, Wildfire Response Plans Water Authorities and Catchment Management 15.28 An important component of preparedness and Authorities jointly identify and implement response planning for CFA is the preparation of local and environmentally sound solutions Wildfire Response Plans. These are prepared for to improve the availability of water for specific and generic risks within each region and firefighting through the Municipal Fire include specific response arrangements for wildfire. Management Planning process. These plans are also prepared in consultation with 15.25 That the fire agencies develop contingency plans senior Brigade members from the area addressed in in relation to access to water for firefighting, the plan, and the relevant DSE Fire Management including where appropriate, the use of static, Officer. large volume water tanks. Department of Sustainability Joint Planning and Environment 15.29 Each DSE Region is responsible for preparing a 15.26 The major component of joint planning for response Readiness and Response Plan. These plans address the to and management of fire is the Co-operative specific detail relating to the readiness and response Agreement between CFA and DSE. There is a arrangements for all DSE personnel within the Fire Memorandum of Understanding between CFA and Region along with the co-operative arrangements in MFESB, which is currently under review, and a draft place with DPI and Parks Victoria. Memorandum of Understanding between DSE and MFESB. 15.30 The plans are distributed to key stakeholders including the relevant CFA Regional Operations Managers. Six Readiness and Response plans2 were in place by November 2002 – five Regional and one Statewide. 152

PAGE 2 Source: DSE Fire Management, 3 Sept. 2003. PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 153 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0260 currently 8 is qualified to gency and normally mplexity which is , p. 157. During the public consultation, the Inquiry became During the public consultation, the Inquiry to personnel management of issues related aware The Inquiry within some Incident Management Teams. working believes that to develop improved personnel should arrangements within those Teams, to their abilities in managing be assessed with respect people to best outcomes, not only on their experience and knowledge in dealing with fires. Recommendation review selection and training That DSE and CFA programs for Incident Controllers and Incident members to ensure that they Management Team include all necessary competencies in recognition that technical skills are only one component of the required attributes. DSE provided advice that 1,194 personnel DSE provided of Incident Management Training Members Team have ongoing training and Both DSE and CFA in incident management for programs refresher roles. personnel endorsed for incident management incident to provide also training programs are There as future management skills for personnel identified members. Incident Management Team Team The opportunities for Incident Management to train and exercise DSE and CFA members from were together appear to be limited. Joint exercises personnel in late held at Benalla for DSE and CFA meetings November 2002. A number of other joint the State between DSE and CFA and briefings across held prior to the summer. incident managers were is no evidence of formalised exercise there However, that Incident Management Team to ensure programs and members have an opportunity to work together rapport. develop improved have accreditation in a range of fire roles, such as: roles, in a range of fire have accreditation officers planning or operations incident controllers, and firefighters. Fire Prevention and Preparedness 15.39 15.40 15.36 15.37 15.38 that 5 examined the members are identified members are , pp. 107– 9. 3 4 . 6 personnel trained in Minimum 7 expected to be controlled within 24 hours, and involving resources from outside the local area. An Incident Controller Level 3 An Incident Controller outside the local area. from within 24 hours, and involving resources expected to be controlled involved, normally multi-a a range of locations are from resources 3 incident (a large or complex incident where a Type control Auditor-General taken from expected to exceed 24 hours). Definitions are Fire Prevention and Preparedness recruitment and management of DSE’s Project DSE’s and management of recruitment of recruitment and the CFA’s program Firefighter to The findings in relation volunteer firefighters. the need stressed program Firefighter Project DSE’s Project focus to ensure the program to broaden available not only for fire were Firefighters activities but for mitigation/prevention suppression burning.activities, such as the conduct of prescribed detail later in This issue is discussed in more this Chapter. 7 30 June 2003. CFA, Source: 8 Management, 3 Sept. 2003. DSE Fire Source: 4 and in Part D. discussed later in this Chapter are and Incident Controllers Incident Management Teams 5 Management, 3 Sept. 2003. DSE Fire Source: 6 incident of medium size or co 2 incident (a developing/developed a Type Level 2 is qualified to control An Incident Controller 3 CFA has pursued a major training initiative over the CFA years focusing on the establishment of past three This project for all firefighters. minimum skills profiles in 21,673 has resulted Training of Firefighters Training have implemented extensive Both DSE and CFA personnel. DSE for firefighting training programs for all training program undertakes a comprehensive on the commencement of their Firefighters Project employment. The Inquiry is satisfied that DSE and CFA had The Inquiry is satisfied that DSE and CFA there undertaken the necessary planning to ensure to fires available to respond resources sufficient were season. that may occur in the 2002–2003 fire Incident Management Team Recruitment and Management of Personnel Recruitment and report The Auditor-General’s Agency Resources by each agency in accordance with the Co-operative by each agency in accordance DSE and Officer, Each year the Chief Fire Agreement. endorse personnel for functional CFA Chief Officer, The within Incident Management Teams. roles within to undertake a role endorsement of an officer is based on formal an Incident Management Team qualifications in incident management and experience. By way of example, DSE report 13 per cent of their personnel hold level 2 or 3 role in a fire accreditation Skills – Wildfire. 15.35 15.34 15.33 15.32 15.31 INF.018.002.0261

Sustaining Long-term Firefighting Agreements and Memoranda and Incident Management Capacity – of Understanding Succession Planning The Co-operative Agreement Between 15.41 Submissions to the Inquiry, and comments made CFA and DSE – September 2002 during consultations with agency personnel and the 11 public, highlighted a concern regarding the age and 15.46 The Auditor-General’s report made a number of declining number of experienced Incident observations and recommendations in relation to this Management Team members, particularly, Agreement. The Inquiry supports these findings and experienced fire ground supervisors. wishes to specifically address the establishment of broader objectives for fire suppression activities. 15.42 Of most concern is the ability of Incident Management Teams to sustain an operation 15.47 As part of this agreement, DSE and CFA established a as large as the North East and Gippsland fires number of broad priorities for their response to and given the number of personnel endorsed to manage management of fires. These were ‘the protection of large complex fires. These concerns apply equally firefighters, the public, essential community assets and the environment, control of fires in the shortest to DSE and CFA. The Auditor-General9 addressed this issue in detail. practicable time and the provision of the best possible fire service to the people of Victoria.’12 15.43 The Auditor-General’s concerns were borne out by experience in the 2002–2003 summer. Submissions 2002–2003 Bushfires: Fire Control Priorities received by the Inquiry, and observations made by a 15.48 Early in the response to the fires started by lightning number of DSE and CFA personnel in discussions with in North East Victoria, the Chief Fire Officer, DSE and Inquiry members, indicated the need to develop a the Chief Officer, CFA met and confirmed these longer-term resource management strategy to ensure priorities and communicated them again to members the future availability of: of both agencies. For the purposes of this report, are • Trained and experienced fireground supervisors; referred to as the ‘Fire Control Priorities’. • Personnel experienced in conducting backburning 15.49 Those priorities were: operations; and • Fully-qualified personnel to undertake senior roles • Firefighter safety; in Incident Management Teams. • Community and asset protection; • Aggressive first attack on new outbreaks to 15.44 This is of particular concern for DSE in light of the extinguish fires; recent organisational changes and the prospect of • Ecological and environmental value protection; and further restructuring in the near future. • Fire containment and control. 15.45 The Inquiry strongly supports the findings and 15.50 An overriding concern was the need to maintain recommendations made by the Auditor-General10. sustainable resourcing for the whole of the fire In particular, those relating to succession planning season. are critical for DSE’s immediate and longer-term firefighting capability. The Inquiry believes that good 15.51 The Inquiry notes, however, that these priorities were firefighters and incident controllers are developed not clearly communicated to the public prior to the and not recruited. summer fire season, nor during the response to the fires. This may have caused concern and some confusion for communities when decisions regarding broader strategy were being made. During public consultation, it became increasingly clear to the Inquiry that communities have high expectations of the fire services in relation to information about what the fire is doing, what action the fire services are taking, and why they are pursuing a particular strategy.

9 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, pp. 110–114. 10 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 114. 11 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, pp. 34–7. 12 Co-operative Agreement between CFA and DNRE – September 2002. 154 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 155 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0262 vides a structure for fire ground supervisors of ground for fire 15 about 1:5; an Incident Management Team; and the agencies. • for each position within Functional responsibility • Management plans as an integral part of control; • within retained resources Command of firefighting The system can be applied to the management of any The system can be applied to the management structure incident with an Incident Management Team the principal functions of control, designed around operations, planning and logistics. Within these broad a number of tasks that must be are functions there and the number of personnel within the addressed appointed to carry out Incident Management Team expands and contracts depending on the these roles needs and complexity of the incident. appoints the Incident The Incident Controller consultation with in each fire for Management Team agency managers. The Incident Management relevant a plan to manage for preparing is responsible Team the incident and implementing that plan. In doing so, they liaise with support agencies, the community and to co-ordinators the police emergency response of control achieve (i) the set objectives for effective community safety the incident and (ii) the broader priorities set in local and State emergency management plans. Incident Control System of AIIMS is the Incident The central component principles of: System (ICS), based on the Control • Management by objectives; • A single Incident Controller; • A span of control into System was introduced The Incident Control ‘Large Fire DSE in the late 1980s in the form of the in the early Organisation’ arrangements, and into CFA fires 1990s. Its underpinning principles for managing a number of seen to address and emergencies were with incident management existing problems to major fires, identified during the response in 1982–1983. The particularly those that occurred System has been applied to the Incident Control since that time. management of fires 15.59 15.60 15.57 15.58 between CFA and between CFA 13 (AIIMS). AIIMS is a concept developed to 14 for the delegation of functions. Be developed annually by CFA and DSE; Be developed annually by CFA Management Council; and CFA; agreement between the DSE and the Municipal Fire Management Plans. support the manager who is responsible for taking support the manager who is responsible an emergency situation. action to resolve 13 September 2002. and DNRE – between CFA Co-operative Agreement 14 Authorities Council. in Emergency Management, Australasian Fire AIIMS Teamwork 15 by one person, and pro or individuals controlled to the number of groups is a management concept that relates Span of control The Co-operative Agreement Incident Management Arrangements – AIIMS-ICS of incident management The effectiveness is a critical issue suppression arrangements for fire the system used by the Accordingly, for the Inquiry. The way in which that agencies is described below. system was applied is discussed further in Part D. Recommendation That Statewide Fire Control Priorities: • • Emergency Be endorsed by the Victoria • Be incorporated into the co-operative • Inform the Fire Control Priorities in the In addition to this Agreement, DSE Regions and CFA In addition to this Agreement, to local Co-operative Agreements prepare staff Area specific detail on joint response more provide complement the arrangements. These agreements by the two agencies and content of plans produced the State-level Co-operative Agreement. The State-level priorities should be clear and The State-level priorities need to Agreement statements within the prominent the local level. Prior to each be communicated at communicated be effectively they need to summer, as well as to Government the community, from to pre- service members. Agency and local fire regional Management incident planning and Municipal Fire to the Fire Plans should be developed with reference Priorities, along with the identification of local Control risks and community priorities. DSE states, as its first governing operational principle, operations will be conducted suppression that all fire set with the principles and procedures in accordance to out in the AIIMS Manual. This is a reference Incident Management the Australian Inter-service Systems 15.56 15.55 15.54 15.53 15.52 INF.018.002.0263

Figure 15.1: Incident Management Team Structure for a Large or Complex Incident

INCIDENT CONTROLLER I/C Other Agency Liaison Officers

PLANNING OFFICER OPERATIONS OFFICER LOGISTICS OFFICER (P/O) (OPS/O) (L/O)

Situation Supply Division Air Operations Facilities Resources Commanders Manager Ground Support Sector Management Support Aircraft Air Attack Comm's Commanders Officer Supervisor Medical Information Strike Team Leaders Airbase Catering Task Force Leaders Manager Technical Specialists Finance Crew Leaders

Crew Source: CFA-DSE Co-operative Agreement 2001–02

15.61 For small incidents, the Incident Management Team ‘We found that the Incident Control System was may operate from a Control Point16 in the field. For well entrenched in the DSE and underpinned all key larger or more complex incidents, a pre-planned static aspects of its fire management activities such as Incident Control Centre may be established to operational planning and fire line operations. There accommodate members of the team that require is a strong commitment to Incident Control System more equipment and facilities to undertake their role training and implementation. However, we found effectively. DSE and CFA have identified a number of that within the CFA the situation is more problematic. facilities throughout Victoria that have been pre- There is a clear organisational commitment to ICS planned as Incident Control Centres. These facilities at a central and regional level and the ICS structure have been equipped with communications and other is adopted for larger fires. However, the ICS has not facilities to support the operations of an Incident been fully adopted at group level and may not be Management Team when required. adopted during rapid development stages of smaller fires where significant risk to personal safety 15.62 During the response to the fires that occurred in may exist’. 2002–2003, Incident Management Teams were formed for all fires. Written submissions and 15.64 The Inquiry is of the view that the Auditor-General’s consultations with agency representatives and the concerns are valid. There were instances where, public, show that the Incident Control System was, for a number of reasons, CFA personnel did not generally, an effective method of managing these operate within the structures established by the fires. Incident Management Teams for supervision of the fire ground. The specific challenges relating to the Concerns About the Incident Control System application of the Incident Control System are addressed in Part D. 15.63 In the Auditor-General’s Report17, the following observations were made in relation to the Incident Control System:

16 Control Point – management from a short-term communications position – may be an emergency vehicle for a localised incident. 17 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 41. 156 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 157 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0264 firefighters and indemnities. firefighters The Inquiry is of the view that one of these a useful model for further offers agreements Co-ordination development. The Southern Fire Border Association is a forum of Government services fire and land management agencies and the private forest Victoria and the operating in the South West industry, has worked South East of South Australia. This group fire effective together for many years to ensure in arrangements are and joint response prevention both plantation assets and place to protect communities in this area. nor would have no weight in law, These agreements it be expected that they should. What is expected is and co-ordination to bushfire an holistic approach management in South Eastern Australia. To overarching achieve this holistic approach, must be in place to provide principles and processes service managers. guidance for fire appropriate This enables mutual aid and joint operational management strategies. arrangements to develop fire disputes that may to resolve It also guides processes strategy for any given to appropriate arise in relation areas. impacting on border fire The remaining agreements in place are ad hoc in place are agreements The remaining service by local fire arrangements developed to specific geographic managers that relate These documents provide along the border. areas agencies guidelines for the comprehensive involved and cover: • burns; Notification of prescribed • Notification of fires; • Initial attack arrangements; • Incident management arrangements; • Communications procedures; • Management of aircraft; • and Cost recovery; • Legal arrangements covering compensation for to makes any reference Only one of these agreements of the development of joint strategy for management might be by which agreement or the process fires management strategies. Both on specific fire reached have indicated to the Inquiry that the DSE and CFA and arrangements need to be reviewed current service managers to updated. The work of local fire operational planning and response establish effective is there arrangements is acknowledged, however, scope for significant improvement. 15.73 15.74 15.75 15.71 15.72 However, only one agreement has been established only one agreement However, by senior agency at State level and signed off This is a Memorandum of representatives. Victoria and the Country Understanding between CFA was Service in South Australia. This agreement Fire finalised in December 1999 and deals with key the two agencies along the issues affecting response length of the Victoria South Australia border. – A number of forums have been established with both New South borders covering Victoria’s and South Australia. Each of these has Wales documents detailing joint response produced arrangements. These documents have been reviewed between reviews periodically with the most recent 1999 and 2002. Senior agency personnel from Victoria, New South Senior agency personnel from to discuss and South Australia meet regularly Wales impacting arrangements for the management of fire focused on These discussions are on State borders. in mutual aid arrangements are ensuring effective together place and that the agencies can operate safely and efficiently. That CFA continues to work with its Brigades to That CFA with the complete the integration of AIIMS-ICS by the Group Structure for full implementation 2004-2005 fire season. and Liaison Interstate Agreements This issue was addressed in the Inquiry’s Interim in the Inquiry’s This issue was addressed Report, included as Appendix III. Our 2), which has (recommendation recommendation been accepted by the Government, is extrapolated a timeframe. to provide here Recommendation The Inquiry is of the view that CFA should establish a view that CFA The Inquiry is of the that clearly explains Brigade Groups model for Fire to, and response during the planning for, their role and out a process and incidents. Plans that set fires the necessary changes within timetable to implement communicated to all should be developed and CFA key stakeholders. 15.70 15.69 15.68 15.67 15.66 15.65 INF.018.002.0265

‘The co-ordination of fire detection and suppression within the South Australian/Victorian southern border is achieved through the Southern Border Fire Co-ordination Association, a body formed by representatives of organisations with fire suppression responsibilities and capabilities, and organisations statutory support responsibilities in the area. This need was recognised following the 1979 Caroline fire.’ Guidelines for Co-operation Between Victorian and South Australian Organisations on Fire Suppression in the Southern Border Area.

Recommendations 15.79 In 1998, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) and the then Department of Natural Resources 15.76 That the Victorian fire agencies negotiate with (DNRE) reviewed the Department’s fire management their counterparts in New South Wales and South performance (revisited in 2002). Among other things, Australia to put in place agreements for mutual the 1998 report analysed the Department’s aid and the development of cross border strategy performance from the late 1940s. Notwithstanding for the management of fires burning in the this recent summer, DTF concluded that while the vicinity of, or across, State borders, and these numbers of wildfires occurring on public land had agreements are reviewed annually. increased over the period, the area burnt and the percentage of fires that exceed 400 hectares in size 15.77 That any local level agreements developed had fallen dramatically – as had total fire to address geographically specific risks or management expenditure in real terms. issues must be consistent with State-level arrangements. 15.80 A separate, but similar analysis conducted by economists in the then DNRE’s Performance and Evaluation Division in 1997 concluded that ‘for every Information Management $1 of funding allocated to fire management, Victoria Costs benefits by $22 in saving assets’.

15.78 The DSE budget allocated to fuel reduction burning 15.81 DSE recognises the difficulty of establishing in 2001–2002 was about $2 million, or approximately assessment tools in relation to fire; they have, over 4 per cent of the total Fire Management Budget time, considered and started a range of projects. ($48.5 million). The Auditor-General’s report18 Recognising that this is a broader issue than just commented that the budget allocation did not reflect DSE’s own fire management, the Department19 have the full cost of resources committed to fuel reduction suggested that the recently established Bushfire burning program with other non-Fire Management Co-operative Research Centre develop this vital piece staff having their salaries charged against their normal of work further for all jurisdictions. duties. Prescribed burning is an important task and, with the establishment of DSE and DPI from the 15.82 More recently, DSE has engaged an external former DNRE, non-DSE agencies will need to be contractor to further develop its risk management able to invoice for costs. approach to fire management. Preliminary work suggests that while DSE has not previously succeeded in analysing the balance of investment between preparedness and suppression, there is only a low risk that the current balance is seriously in error. Models to assess the appropriate resource balance between the various elements of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery – based on quantitative measures – are required.

18 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 55. 19 DSE responses to Inquiry questions, 20 August 2003, p. 13. 158 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 159 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0266 ’s public land, in recommending that DSE… ‘fully costs in recommending 22 fuel reduction burningfuel reduction activities within its internal funding allocates appropriate budgeting process, employed from levels and allocates the cost of staff other business units; and, in consultation with the and Finance, considers revised Department of Treasury flexibility greater funding arrangements that introduce levels of funding to reflect to allow for differing factors such as seasonal variations.’ The Inquiry supports the findings of the Auditor- General However the Inquiry concludes that theses in themselves not sufficient are recommendations and makes further recommendations. Recommendations That Government supports the immediate development of financial models to analyse and determine the appropriate level of investment in fire management planning, preparedness and suppression on public land. 15.85 15.86 15.87 and represents 21 , p. 7. . This level of budget coverage has 20 Working Group Report March 2002, page i. Report March Group Working Fire Prevention and Preparedness 21 ibid., p. 4. 22 20 management services on Victoria severity and its impact on the price of fire season of fire nature The cyclical DNRE and DTF, Further, in light of the phase-down in the State Further, 30 per cent sawlog licences by approximately Forest will be to in Chapter 2, there statewide, referred burningimpacts on the amount of regeneration on an annual basis. Many of these areas required outcomes forestry managed for commercial previously conservation focus, therefore to a broader will revert fuel management practices. The differing requiring in to the overall will need to be factored net result by DSE Fire burningfuel reduction budget required Management. DSE believes that its current ‘base’ allocation DSE believes that its current Management of $48.5 million for its overall Fire management fire to provide is sufficient program season of ‘below average’ severity. services for a fire DSE have been working with DTF to However, annual budget ‘representative’ develop a more severity indicators to meet the needs based around the seasons and reduce of 80 per cent of the fire Advance to cover the costs need to seek a Treasurer’s in a given year been estimated to be $68.2 million, delivering fire management services for a fire season management services for a fire delivering fire described by DSE as at the middle range for ‘significant’ severity. Case Study: Deddick Valley and Tubbut – Early February 2003 – Early February and Tubbut Valley Case Study: Deddick to the Due in early February. Delicknora and Tubbut around on the Deddick Valley Fire began to impact of for the Delicknora Sector the strain on available resources, responsibility fires and extent of the Victorian were managing the fires the IMT at Jindabyne. Jindabyne IMT was delegated to Valley the fire in the Deddick included at Orbost and Jindabyne IMTs control strategy agreed between the The fire in southern NSW. area, including control lines on private land. control lines and backburning in the Delicknora in This resulted there was greater likelihood of success for this strategy. Private land had lower fuel loads and and fences. the burning of private forest, pasture focused on the works undertaken by NSW National Parks and Wildlife The concerns raised by the community Advice that the burning was going to be undertaken was not firefighters to implement this strategy. firefighters operating in Communication with Victorian community. thoroughly communicated to the local community members did attempt to determine what was adjoining sectors was not complete. When information. happening they were given conflicting to develop the agreed strategies were ad hoc, the Inquiry is satisfied Even though the arrangements in place that the Orbost IMT were appropriate The Inquiry notes however, that the strategic fire control decisions efforts the and timely information to these communities. Additionally, failed to adequately provide accurate under their control, on strategy and structures put in place to to brief firefighters and fire ground managers implement these strategies, were insufficient. Lessons Learnt with of local knowledge and the need to communicate effectively The principle of recognising the value agreements that are developed with interstate agencies. The process communities should be addressed in the communication of strategy applied to fires burning across state for development, implementation and agreements. borders must be documented in these 15.84 15.83 INF.018.002.0267

Since the 1940s, unplanned fires on public land have increased but areas burnt have decreased. During this time ‘real’ expenditure has declined. For every $1 spent on fire management, Victoria benefits by $22 in saved assets. Source: DTF-DNRE Working Party Report 1998

15.88 That the financial models incorporate changes 15.94 Submissions to the Inquiry from a range of sources in public land use, particularly ‘Our Forests Our pointed to continuing problems with information Future’, and the subsequent changes in fire about, and access to, suitable well-signposted and management priorities. well-maintained tracks on public land. The database for that information is reviewed annually but, with 15.89 That the financial arrangements incorporate the assessment being based on variable knowledge full cost recovery for prescribed burning to be and experience, these assessments remain subjective, undertaken over a number of weekends utilising making data comparisons problematic. Project Firefighters, CFA volunteers and MFESB members. 15.95 To better understand the road access network, the Auditor-General26 examined the results of a 2002 15.90 That Government reviews the funding for DSE desktop assessment of the condition of those roads for the 2004-2005 fire season to ensure that related to forest and fire management. The finding appropriate resources are available for fire was that approximately 80 per cent of aggregate prevention planning and preparedness. fire management and forest management roads were rated as in good or fair condition. The Auditor- Roads and Access Tracks General’s subsequent regional visits to the Dandenong Ranges and Gippsland showed that 15.91 DSE and Parks Victoria are responsible for managing the condition of some roads described as in poor over 25,000 kilometres23 of roads and tracks in their condition could reduce the ability of fire agencies various jurisdictions on public land across the State. to respond promptly. These are maintained for forestry operations, water 15.96 Load limits were another concern: where some catchment management, recreational use and fire bridges have a load-limit of 5 tonnes, the weight management purposes. Each year, prior to the fire of some firefighting equipment may reach up to season, approximately 16,000 kilometres24 of fire 50 tonnes. track network is prepared as part of the pre-fire season preparedness. 15.97 Public road network details are listed in DSE’s Fire Protection Plans for each fire district, including the 15.92 Ready ground access for personnel with machinery, component maintained specifically for fire protection. equipment and materials is an essential component The Operational Plans list all fuel reduction burns and in a rapid and safe response to bushfires and major works to be performed before the fire season to minimise their spread. DSE aims to control commences. Major works could include road 75 per cent of all bushfires at less than five hectares upgrades or other infrastructure (for example, a new in size.25 This response target is designed to provide fire tower), but would not include blading-off roads due regard to the land management objectives on, and culvert maintenance. and environmental values in, the public land estate and the economic impacts of fire.

15.93 Achieving this ready access requires maintaining a strategic network of roads and tracks (including bridges), and the construction of additional roads and tracks where necessary to complement the network. Accurate and readily available information is required on the location, condition and accessibility of that fire access network.

23 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 136. 24 DSE Fire Management supplied this estimate. 25 DSE draft responses to Inquiry questions, August 2003. 26 Fire Prevention and Preparedness, p. 139. 160 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 161 CHAPTER 15 INF.018.002.0268 Recommendations and That DSE assesses the environmental monetary cost of establishment and 100km, rehabilitation of temporary tracks, per constructed during firefighting operations, of a and compare this with the recurrent costs program of maintaining existing tracks. as above, That DSE includes the costs of tracks, in the development of financial models to analyse and determine the appropriate level of investment in fire management planning, preparedness and suppression on public land. That DSE undertake community consultation on policies relating to roads and access tracks on public land, particularly in respect to fire management. Aircraft is discussed and response preparedness Aircraft The Inquiry in Chapter 22 Part D of this report. commissioned an independent consultant report Fighting Resources’ entitled ‘A Report on Aerial Fire by Capt. Nick Le- was prepared The report by AVISE. by Dr Bob and reviewed Ray-Meyer AM, ATPL, ATPL. Dannatt DBA, MBA, F Dip. Com Eng., AAvPA, is in Appendix VII. The full report The Inquiry is of the view that an analysis needs to The Inquiry is of the the financial and environmental be completed of both and tracks during new roads impacts of developing to maintaining and as compared firefighting would be an the existing network. This improving management of fire input into any modelling on and suppression planning, preparedness public land. concerned the the Inquiry remains about Finally, in respect high level of anxiety within the community and track access. Submissions to public land road questioned the Government's commitment to continuing access to National Parks and other has wilderness The Inquiry areas. and conservation formed the view that the Government should issue undertake community consultation on the and access tracks on public land. of roads 15.105 15.106 15.107 15.108 15.103 15.104 , p. 140. in recommending that: in recommending 28 believe there is no evidence that the state of believe there between DSE business entities; information needs; 27 - clarifying system management responsibilities - external identifying and addressing stakeholder - systematic inspection processes; introducing - and safety audit processes; implementing regular infrastructure management strategy’. infrastructure changes to, and the condition of, the fire access changes to, and the condition of, the fire network on public land; systems governing access network by: the fire Fire Prevention and Preparedness • and agreed DSE develop an appropriate • information on appropriate regular, ‘DSE provide • upgrade of existing DSE enhance the proposed the road and track network contributed significantly the road event. However, major fire to the scale of this year’s signage was the lack of, or poor condition of, road seen as a notable ‘debrief’ issue and has been consideration. identified as a matter requiring 27 debrief. to Inquiry questions, 20 August 2003. This is based on the joint CFA–DSE DSE responses 28 The Inquiry supports the findings of the Auditor- General DSE is involved in a project (ROADS) over the next DSE is involved in a project the two years, commencing in late 2002, to review and track management systems. strategic road DSE If the fire agencies are adversely impacted by these agencies are If the fire and track network within the changes to the road management public land estate, other forms of fire the capability may have to be employed to assist is that a bushfire to ensure firefighters on-ground – for example, the use of suppressed effectively and better and rappel aircraft specialised firefighting dependence on access A reduced detection measures. costs and the subsequent impact on prevention roads in the will need to be balanced against an increase cost of suppression. As stated earlier in Chapter 2, some public land use As stated earlier in Chapter and to National Parks State Forests has changed from It is argued in other conservation purposes. in the ‘effective’ has resulted submissions that this and tracks on public of a number of roads closure a decline in road due to traffic land to conventional progressively maintenance, making some roads This drive summer use only. suitable for four-wheel of a deliberate does not appear to be the result on the pressures are there Further, change in policy. other land and track network from existing road animal management issues, such as weed and pest four-wheel of recreational invasion and the provision drive access. 15.102 15.101 15.100 15.99 15.98 INF.018.002.0269

Conclusion

15.109 It is the finding of the Inquiry that CFA and DSE were appropriately prepared for the 2003-2004 fire season. CFA and DSE are recognised as leading firefighting agencies throughout Australia and overseas. The findings in Chapter 6 and tables in Appendix IV support this view noting that while the number of fires on public land have increased over time the area burnt has declined. The partnership between DSE and CFA has proved effective.

15.110 Further, the emergency services have also had to prepare for and deal with a range of other demands on their resources including the outworking of the Linton Coronial Inquest and terrorism threats. Despite the best will and intention, these activities will impact Regeneration of ecalypt forest four months after the fire. to some degree on preparation for fire management in this State.

15.111 In the face of changes in government administrative arrangements, an array of agreements between agencies and difficulties in boundary and border co- operative agreements; goodwill and personalities have promoted sound co-operation between the various fire agencies but these remain complex and incomplete. The Inquiry remains concerned that these arrangements are not viable in the longer term and recommendations have been made in respect to these issues.

15.112 The Inquiry commends the high level of acceptance of AIIMS-ICS as the incident management system in place within Victoria for dealing with unplanned fires and encourages the speedy adoption of ICS across the CFA.

15.113 Finally, costs associated with fuel reduction burning need to be better determined and more flexible arrangement put in place to meet regional fuel management schedules on public land. 162 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 163 CHAPTER 16 was INF.018.002.0270 defines the Emergency . Emergency Management Act 1986 The Act is unique in Australia in that it appoints the as the Minister for Police and Emergency Services of Emergency Management. Co-ordinator-in-Chief the Governmentis fully This ensures of the day involved in the development of emergency management policy and practice. The Act also for the appointment of Victoria Police as provides of emergency response. co-ordinator of organisations participating in The operational roles spelled out in specific emergency management are For example, the operational legislation or charter. services and Municipal Councils are of the fire roles set out in other Acts. State Emergency Recovery Plan The State Emergency Recovery Plan was formalised in 1987 to develop specific arrangements for planning aspects of emergencies. and managing the recovery In 1994, the and recognised, amended, the Recovery Plan officially with the word ‘disaster’ formally replaced the word the term recently, ‘emergency’ in most usages. More the term DISPLAN has replaced ‘emergency response’ in day-to-day usage. In June 1985, the then Minister for Police and In June 1985, the then a working party be that Emergency Services directed management disaster on Victoria’s formed to report to reported of which were arrangements, the findings The findings of the same year. the Minister in October led to the development of of the working party emergency management current Victoria’s arrangements and the passage of the Management Act 1986 The Emergency Management Act 1986 assigns State's emergency management structure, special and provides and responsibilities, roles for the integrated management of provisions Act is: emergencies. The principal objective of the and recovery] response that [prevention, ‘… to ensure which facilitates organised within a structure are operational co-ordination planning, preparedness, and community participation’ (section 4A). 16.8 16.9 16.10 16.11 16.6 16.7 State Disasters .

Act 1983 Emergency Management Act 1986 of Victoria's disaster A number of reviews conducted as a management arrangements were bushfires Ash Wednesday of the catastrophic result in February 1983. They concluded that that occurred was not well managed nor co-ordinated the response to adopt a and, in November 1983, Cabinet agreed set of disaster management arrangements provisional embodied in the which were Victoria State Disaster Plan The document that forms the basis of today's the Victoriaemergency management arrangements is DISPLAN. State Disaster Plan (VSDP), also known as in the 1960s to resolve The VSDP was first prepared the State's human and co-ordinating problems of 1962. during the significant fires material resources DISPLAN, which did not have legislative Apart from backing, the only other arrangements in place for managing significant emergencies involved the fire Commission of Victoria, and services, the then Forests held by responsibilities some specific disaster-related some State Government departments and statutory authorities. The Development of Victoria's Emergency Management Arrangements At the end of the Chapter we turn to the important that report We issue of continuous improvement. emergency arrangements have been well Victoria’s However, robust. years and are tested in recent and we also note that emergency management to emergency services must continue to evolve stay ahead of local and global changes. This Chapter begins with an overview of Victoria’s This Chapter begins and emergency response emergency management, arrangements. emergency recovery We of meeting review on the Inquiry’s then report emergency documentation and minutes for relevant fire management bodies, prior to the 2002–2003 season. Overview

16.5 16.4 16.3 16.2 16.1 Preparedness Emergency Services Services Emergency Chapter 16 Chapter INF.018.002.0271

Fire Disaster Control Unit Role of the Minister

16.12 Another outcome of the Ash Wednesday bushfires 16.15 The Minister to whom the Emergency Management was the establishment in 1983 of the Fire Disaster Act 1986 is allocated (the Minister for Police and Control Unit in the Department of the Premier and Emergency Services) is the Co-ordinator-in-Chief of Cabinet. The Unit later transferred to the Ministry for Emergency Management. Police and Emergency Services and became the Office of the Co-ordinator-in-Chief of Disaster Control. The 16.16 The role of the Co-ordinator-in-Chief is to: title changed over the years and in June 2000 became the Office of the Emergency Services (a) Ensure that adequate emergency management Commissioner (OESC), when the position of measures are taken by government agencies; and Commissioner was created in the Act. (b) Co-ordinate the activities of government agencies carrying out their statutory functions, powers, duties and responsibilities in taking such measures. Review of Emergency Management Arrangements Victoria Emergency Management 16.13 Victoria’s emergency management arrangements are Council constantly tested both operationally and in redefining relationships between the agencies. When tested they 16.17 The Victoria Emergency Management Council advises are also reviewed to ensure they can better deal with the Co-ordinator-in-Chief on matters including the significant emergencies, thereby fostering a culture of co-ordination of Government and non-government continuous improvement. Such emergencies have agencies responsible for prevention, response and included the 1993 Northern Victorian floods, 1997 recovery. Council membership consists of nominees bushfires, Longford explosion and subsequent gas of Government ministers and of non-government crisis in September 1998, planning for the Year 2000 agencies. The Act does not specify which agencies transition, September 11 terrorist attacks in the should be represented on the council. The Emergency United States in 2001 and the extensive 'white Services Commissioner is the Council's Executive powder' hoaxes that followed in Australia. More Officer with OESC providing the Council’s secretariat recently, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and functions. subsequent changes in the global security environment have tested Victoria’s emergency management arrangements. The Emergency Management Arrangements 16.14 Victoria’s approach continues to develop, in the spirit of that captured by Arnold Howitt1 of the John F 16.18 The arrangements are built on the nationally accepted Kennedy Business School at Harvard University, who ‘all hazards, comprehensive and integrated’ model of wrote after the September 11 terrorist attacks that: emergency management. All hazards means that a wide range of types of emergencies are managed ‘… well developed emergency management within the arrangements, comprehensive means that arrangements should include among other attributes, the management streams of prevention, response and an all hazards and multi agency approach, considered recovery are focal points, and integrated means that emergency contingency planning, an appropriate all agencies make their specialist contributions. incident management system to allow for the direction and co-ordination of workers from different 16.19 The emergency management arrangements establish organisations during a disaster, interoperable the basis for organisations to relate and work communications systems and regular and repeated together to achieve the outcome desired – that is, a training exercises and simulations’. safer community. In addition to emergency services organisations, all government Departments and all Municipal Councils, there are specific roles assigned to particular organisations such as the Red Cross to carry out the integrative and co-ordinative aspects of emergency management.

1 A. Howitt, ‘New York’s Preparedness Should Inspire Other Cities to Act’ The Boston Globe (17 September 2001). 164 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 165 CHAPTER 16 of INF.018.002.0272 of restoration of productive of restoration of restoration and reconstruction of restoration Physical aspects of damaged community infrastructure and private of damaged community infrastructure housing; Economic aspect activity and local employment; Social, financial and psychological aspects personal, family and community functioning. Recovery management is specifically concerned with the: • a range of organisations provide As with response, these are services in Victoria. Principally, recovery Municipal Councils and the Department of Human network. DHS has its regional Services (DHS) through been appointed under the Act as the co-ordinating is appointed and a senior officer agency for recovery, The State as the State Recovery Co-ordinator. Emergency Recovery Plan is the guiding document management. for recovery Depending on the chosen event, exercises will include event, exercises Depending on the chosen or of the Municipal, Divisional one or more rehearsing an emergency; the State and State level aspects of and/or the interstate Commonwealth arrangements; between agencies/States. arrangements developed The Victorian arrangements have been compared and on many occasions to those in other States of the September of Australia. As a result Territories to attacks, they have also been compared 11 terrorist those in the United States, England, Northern Ireland and parts of Asia. In all cases, the Victorian in their arrangements have been found to be robust constitution and seamless in their application. Emergency Recovery Arrangements Recovery is assisting persons and communities and by emergencies to achieve a proper affected level of functioning. Recovery takes place effective for some during, immediately following and, often, considerable time after an emergency. • • 16.27 16.28 16.24 16.25 16.26 control agency Victoria's organisations and emergency service under those other organisations with responsibilities the emergency management arrangements come together in the multi-agency setting at various times the arrangements. the year to exercise throughout both the crisis and around revolve Exercises and, at consequence elements of response and a minimum; focus on command, control co-ordination. Multi-Agency Exercises The State level is responsible for obtaining resource The State level is responsible and/or the other States, Territories support from Defence Commonwealth when needed (for example, local Exceptions to this principle are Forces). arrangements for mutual aid or cross-border assistance, and Commonwealth operational support in the vicinity of military bases, which can be arranged at the local level. The response arrangements have been developed to The response day to day act as a natural extension of the agencies’ agencies practices on any occasion when two or more the level of This happens from working together. are to the most rescues, local incidents such as road The major Statewide flood or bushfire. The Response function is concernedThe Response function with combating and immediate rescue emergencies, and providing the Response involves services to those affected. relief with Victoriaemergency services, Police personnel of role taking the specific emergency management activities that response Police ensure Co-ordinators. managed and resourced. are and for each type of emergency is pre-determined, structure. other agencies work within a management is no formal activation of the arrangements or There to an event. declaration of an emergency in response Municipal to Divisional and, Escalation from according State-level, occurs automatically ultimately, levels to to need and the capacity of each of these the event. resource Emergency Response Arrangements Emergency Response 16.23 16.22 16.21 16.20 INF.018.002.0273

Emergency Management Preparation 16.33 The fire services collectively recognised the for the 2002–2003 Fire Season significance of the Bureau of Meteorology’s report and advised of the arrangements underway within State Emergency Response Planning and between organisations to prepare for the Committee forthcoming season2. They expressed concern about the possible length of the fire season and the 16.29 The State Emergency Response Planning Committee management of firefighter fatigue. It was noted that held its annual pre fire season meeting on 31 October all other States were in a similar situation and this 2002. Discussions covered the coming fire season could affect the availability of interstate firefighters. including:

• Weather; Continuous Improvement • Fire risk forecast; • Fire agency preparations; and 16.34 The finding of the Inquiry is that Victoria has learnt • Progress of the Fire Refuges working party. from careful review and analysis of fire events such This working party is looking into standards as the Ash Wednesday Fires of 1983, the Dandenong for fire refuges, and the development of a pilot Ranges Fires in 1997, and the deaths of firefighters at community consultation and decision-making Linton. Similarly, Victoria's emergency management process. arrangements have evolved to include learning from other emergency events such as the 1993 floods, the State Emergency Recovery Planning Longford Gas Crisis, recent terrorist attacks in the United States and Bali, and the 'white powder' Committee incidents of 2001. 16.30 The State Emergency Recovery Planning Committee 16.35 The Arthur’s Seat chairlift emergency in January 2003 held its pre fire season meeting on 19 December provided an opportunity to further evaluate the 2002. Among other items, agencies reported on pre- State's ‘all hazards – all agencies’ approach. With the planning for the fire season, and community support CFA as the lead agency, 200 staff from 10 different issues related to the prolonged drought. organisations were fully involved, including police and emergency services, ambulance, hospitals, Local Victoria Emergency Management Council Government and non- government organisations.

16.31 The Victoria Emergency Management Council held 16.36 More formal inter-agency multi-disciplinary teams its annual pre fire season meeting on 20 November include the Urban Search and Rescue Team, which 2002, at which time the approaching fire season and have personnel from fire services, Victoria State continuing drought were discussed. The Bureau of Emergency Service (VICSES) and the ambulance Meteorology and key agencies with response and service. They undertake rescues from collapsed recovery obligations in bushfire emergencies provided structures. The complex flood warning arrangements readiness updates and discussed possible issues for some flood-prone rural communities involve relating to the upcoming season. Municipal Councils, Bureau of Meteorology, VICSES, local media, community groups and organisations, 16.32 The Bureau of Meteorology also provided information and private industry. on anticipated weather patterns, expected rainfall and ongoing concerns with the El Niño. The key points of discussion revolved around the 55 per cent likelihood of the summer being warmer on average than would normally be expected, and that rainfall was expected to continue to be below average levels into mid- 2003. Both these key points culminated in the Bureau of Meteorology giving advice that there was a strong likelihood that this would lead to a dangerous fire season in 2002–2003.

2 As noted previously, the three major fire services are Country Fire Authority (CFA), the then Department of Natural Resources and Environment (now the Department of Sustainability and Environment [DSE]and Department of Primary Industries and the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board [MFESB]). 166 PAGE PART C TERM OF REFERENCE ONE: COMMUNITY AND AGENCY PREPAREDNESS PAGE 167 CHAPTER 16 INF.018.002.0274 Emergency management, and emergency services Emergency management, to stay ahead of these must continue to evolve changes. to makes recommendations Part E of this report Victoria's emergency management further strengthen made not are arrangements. The recommendations to, and recovery a finding that the response from was flawed or mismanaged, but as the fires from means of further developing systemic arrangements and public safety in particular, fire that will improve safety in general. 16.41 16.42 However, no emergency management arrangements However, Victoria perfect and the risk environment are continues to change. The community’s confronts all governmentexpectations of service from agencies the emergency services – is also – particularly from changing. Having carried out a detailed and intensive review Having carried out a detailed and intensive review of 2002–2003, the Inquiry concludes that of the fires Victoria's arrangements are emergency management focus and sound, have a continuous improvement favourably with internationalcompare best practice. Conclusion documentation and minutes The Inquiry has reviewed Emergency Management bodies for the relevant within Victoria. The Inquiry believes that these clearly focused on the agencies were indicate that the fire a season, had created coming 2002–2003 fire and had fully heightened level of public awareness, informed Government, as all the other as well both emergency agencies of their preparations, separate within and outside of the State. Further, consultations and discussions with emergency the period of this review agencies throughout and indicated their general sense of awareness season. during the last fire preparedness Since 1983, fire response has seen significant response Since 1983, fire In 1983, in integrated operations. improvement Board and Emergency Services Fire the Metropolitan marginally involved in response (MFESB) was, at best, By 1997, MFESB bushfires. to the widespread successfully were under MFESB command, taskforces, in the Dandenong Ranges deployed to assist the CFA MFESB During the 2002–2003 bushfires, Fires. stepped up to resource appliances and firefighters to enable the outer urban area stations in fire CFA strike teams in the to be deployed as resources CFA played key North East and Gippsland. MFESB officers and in Incident Management Teams roles worked trained MFESB firefighters appropriately – ground command on the fire under CFA demonstrating a high level of trust and co-operation between the services. 16.40 16.39 16.38 16.37 PAGE 168 INF.018.002.0275 INF.018.002.0276

Part D Term of Reference Two: Response and Recovery

Fire Line North East Victoria January 2003 – DSE PAGE 170 Overview ofPartD Briefing ofDSEandCFA Crew atSwiftsCreek February2003-CFA. been impactedbytheemergencyevent. adds tothestress experiencedbycommunitieswhohave ensure theworkofrecovery agenciesalleviatesratherthan a casemanagementapproach torecovery. Thisshould also makesrecommendations inrelation totheneedfor after theresponse activitieshaveconcluded.TheInquiry that musttakeplaceinparalleltoresponse ratherthan from thefires. Inparticular, westress thatrecovery isatask 24 weaddress anumberofissuesrelating tothe Part Ddoesnotonlydealwithresponse issues;inChapter if thoseneedswere met. communication needsduringthefires andask Unit and,inChapter23,lookatthecommunity’s attention totheaircraft operationsandtheStateAircraft paid crewsour andvolunteers.InChapter22weturn the fire response andtherole ofthoseatthefire line,both deployed. We alsofocusoncommunityinvolvementduring resources were mobilisedandhoweffectively theywere emergency managementsystemandaddress howwell co-ordination. We assesstheeffectiveness oftheState's Chapters 18to21focusoninteragencyco-operationand lightning strikesof7and8January2003(Chapter17). to theinitialfire emergency, inparticular, themultiple In PartD,weanalysehowwellthefire agenciesresponded management offire hasbeen conclusivelydemonstrated. should, beanactivepartnerinthepreparation forand work withthecommunity. Thatthecommunitycan,and alsomaderecommendations forbetterwaysto We private andpublicland. to fire managementplanning thatwouldincludeboth In PartCwemaderecommendations foranewapproach recovery INF.018.002.0277 INF.018.002.0278 OVERVIEW TO PARTOVERVIEW D D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Strategies and Tactics The initial finding of the Inquiry was that some Incident Management Teams may have applied the incident control Most importantly, in Part D we analyse the effectiveness system and its attendant procedures and systems too rigidly, of the firefighting strategies and tactics employed during or inflexibly. In effect, this limited tactical decision-making the 2002–2003 fires. In Chapter 19 we look closely at the by sector commanders and strike-team leaders. Tensions Incident Control System and how it was applied, asking: between the fire ground and the Incident Management did the right people make the right decisions at the right Teams resulted. Suggestions, recommendations and tactical time? Because our analysis assumes an understanding of proposals from the fire ground were in some cases refused the relationship between strategy development and outright. In other situations, processes were too slow for tactical firefighting some background here is warranted. suggestions to be approved.

A key principle of the Incident Control System is that the Opportunities to safely attack sectors of the fire Incident Management Team develop the overall strategy were missed. for the fire, or fires, utilising available intelligence derived from technological and human sources. Those on the fire On many occasions we were told that the ground develop the firefighting tactics to meet the recommendations of the Linton Coronial Inquiry about strategic objectives for the fire. firefighter safety caused firefighting management to be risk averse. This explanation was put forward to explain some This accords with command and control systems employed of the anger, annoyance and criticism of fire management. by the military where command sets the strategic targets or The Inquiry does not support this view. The Linton tasks, and expects front line leaders to develop the tactics recommendations do not preclude an aggressive attack to achieve them. This approach builds on the very logical on fires when it is safe to do so. The likely explanation is view that, providing they are appropriately trained and more complex. equipped, those at the frontline are most likely to be aware of terrain, weather, enemy location, condition and number The priority given to firefighter safety is appropriate and of resources etc., and are therefore best placed to make apparent to all. While we acknowledge that there may the correct tactical decision. be some sensitivity and, perhaps, some overreaction to the Coroner’s recommendations, this is not the only issue We believe the same logic should apply to incident control to consider. The location of Incident Control Centres, the systems for emergency management in general, and experience of some Incident Controllers, the application firefighting in particular. of AIIMS–ICS and other factors, all contributed to the level of criticism of fire management. Communication systems and two-way communication protocols are obviously critical components of a successful incident control system. Firefighter safety must, of course, remain a critical priority in the development of both strategy and tactics.

In our Interim Report (attached as Appendix III), we provided some preliminary views on these questions and suggested that local knowledge was not sufficiently utilised in the decision-making processes of some Incident Management Teams. PAGE 171 PAGE 172 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.4 17.3 17.2 17.1 Chapter 17 Initial ResponsetotheFires they becameestablished. of thelightningstrikefires of7and8Januarybefore resource levelsnecessarytosuccessfullyextinguishall fire seasonriskassessmentwouldhavejustifiedthe support theview, thatitismostunlikelyanypre It hasbeensuggested,andtheInquiryisinclinedto then toattackthemore remote fires. may haveposedathreat to,communityassets–and focus initialresponse onthosefires closeto,orwhich strategy immediatelyafterthelightningstrikeswasto The Inquirywasadvisedthatthefire management and managedthefires. discussions heldwiththefirefighters whofought were undertaken,andextensivebriefings conditions. Detailedinspectiontoursofthefire areas moisture content,andthedocumentedweather access thefires. We assessedthefuelloadsand considered thenature oftheterrainandabilityto ignitions overthefirsttendaysoffires. We The Inquiryanalysedthenumberandlocationof why thefires ‘gotaway’. allegations were offered asexplanationsof employed conservativefirefighting strategies.These claims thatDSEandtheCountryFire Authority(CFA) Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE).Andthere were fires were simplyignored bytheDepartmentof There were allegationsthatanumberofreported was initiated. have permittedamore aggressive initialattackthan first tendaysfollowingthethunderstormshould It wassuggestedthatweatherconditionsforthe they were small. fires were notextinguishedinthefirstfewdays,while received from membersofthepublicaskedwhy Many ofthewrittenandverbalsubmissionswe severe fire weatherdevelopedonFriday17January January 2003couldhavebeenextinguishedbefore of whetherthefires started by lightningon7and8 A criticalissuefortheInquirywasquestion Overview 1 Part A, Chapter 4, The Story of the 2002-2003 Victorian Fire, PartA, Chapter4,TheStoryofthe2002-2003 Victorian Provides asynopsisofthemajor fires duringthe2002-2003fire 1 1 . 17.9 17.8 17.13 17.12 17.11 17.10 fires asquicklypossible. by DSEandCFA inthefirsttendaystocontain resources available,allreasonable efforts were made prevailing weatherconditions andthesuppression strikes, thefuelloadavailabletosupportfire, the location andaccessibilityoffires causedbylightning The Inquiryhasconcludedthat,giventhenumber, More firefighters withremote-area skillsand • Qualifiedrappelcrews; and • Heavyequipment; • Anincreased numberofappropriate aircraft • resources, including: dosowouldhaverequired veryconsiderable To such asrappel. based firefighters, skilledinremote-area techniques, personnel deployedincludedanumberofGippsland- along witheightbulldozersandfouraircraft. The Industry (DPI)personnelwere deployedtothisfire andDepartmentofPrimary DSE, ParksVictoria both publicandprivateland.Onehundred andeighty to spread significantlyandtoimpactonlargeareas of started afire atYambulla. Thisfire hadthepotential in theCoopracambraNationalParknorthofGenoa A lightningstrikeon6Januaryinfar-East Gippsland Fires Already Burning These issuesare outlinedinmore detailbelow. CFA’s taskextremely difficult. attack. Incombination,thesefactorsmadeDSEand extinguish oreffectively containthefires duringinitial impacted ontheabilityoffire servicesto Inquiry hasbeenadvisedthatmanyotherfactors 15. Inadditiontotheissuesidentifiedthere, the 2002–2003 summerhasbeendiscussedinChapter The contextinwhichthefire servicesprepared forthe Factors Affecting InitialAttack would havemade,oncethefires started. establish whatdifference approaches thosealternative different approaches, itissimplynotpossibleto and there are areas where theInquiryrecommends strategies orprioritiesshouldhavebeenestablished, While there were suggestionsthatalternative initial attack. experience tosuccessfullycontainfires through on standby; season. INF.018.002.0279 INF.018.002.0280 CHAPTER 17 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART

‘If you had wanted to light three fires in the Ovens Fire District that would have caused the most grief, the locations you would choose would be where the Anderson’s Peak, Mount Feathertop and Mount Arthur fires started.’ Senior, experienced fire manager, North East Victoria

17.14 This fire was eventually controlled on 11 January and 17.21 In addition to these fires, on 8 January the CFA staff were released to other fires. attended a further 83 fires started by lightning and other causes, and 78 other incidents across the State. New Fires that Started on 7 and 8 January This had a significant impact on the availability of CFA firefighting crews, particularly in North East Victoria 17.15 The dry thunderstorms that crossed the State on 7 and Gippsland. and 8 January caused a huge number of lightning strikes, starting fires throughout North Central 17.22 DSE and CFA policy is to attack new fires as soon as Victoria, North East Victoria, Gippsland, the Australian they are detected. Accordingly, those fires that began Capital Territory (ACT) and New South Wales (see earlier in the day were the first to have resources Chapter 4). deployed to them. As new outbreaks were detected, fire managers were faced with a number of complex 17.16 The fires in the ACT eventually burnt into Canberra. and difficult decisions. They needed to set priorities for the allocation of firefighting resources and needed 17.17 The Inquiry was advised that the fires that started on to redirect resources already deployed to existing fires. 7 January in North Central Victoria around Bendigo were detected and extinguished quickly by DSE and 17.23 DSE began moving firefighters from the west of the CFA crews. Many fires that started on 7 and 8 state to North East Victoria and Gippsland as the day January in North East Victoria were also discovered progressed. The Inquiry was told that the distance very quickly and, by 10 am on 8 January, 14 fires had travelled by these crews is one explanation for the been detected. As the day progressed and the storm time it took to deploy additional personnel to the continued to move east, new fires were started. By newly-detected fires. midnight on 8 January, more than 80 fires caused by lightning had been detected on public land. Number of Fires Contained on 8 and

17.18 Records indicate that a large number of fires were 9 January reported over a comparatively short period of time 17.24 Of the more than 80 fires in North East Victoria but, because of cloud obscuring some areas of the ignited by lighting on 8 January, 40 were either Alps and the remote nature of some of the country contained or under control by late afternoon on affected by thunderstorms and lightning, not all fires 9 January. were detected on the first day. Similarly, it was not possible to confirm the location of all the reported 17.25 Table 17.1 summarises the resources deployed to the fires. fires on 9 January by DSE, Parks Victoria and DPI.

17.19 A number of additional fires were detected on Thursday 9 January.

17.20 Figure 17.1 shows the distribution of the lightning strikes detected after the passage of the thunderstorms through eastern Victoria. This map gives some indication of the number, distribution and location of the early fires, and suggests the scale of the task confronting the fire services. PAGE 173 PAGE 174 Figure 17.1:Total LightningStrikes –Eastern Victoria. ao on S ulcLn Victoria BassStrait PublicLand Lakes NSW Freeways/Highways Major towns Jan 8-9Lightningstrikes INF.018.002.0281 INF.018.002.0282 CHAPTER 17 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Table 17.1: Number and Location of Fires and Firefighters Deployed, 9 January 2003

Incident Management Team Number of Fires DSE, ParksVic., DPI

Cann River - Yambulla Fire 1 fire 87 Firefighters Mansfield 4 fires 30 Firefighters Ovens 18 fires 203 Firefighters Tallangatta/Corryong 30 fires 106 Firefighters Heyfield 11 fires 81 Firefighters Erica 5 fires 24 Firefighters Yarram 2 fires 99 Firefighters Swifts Creek 5 fires 24 Firefighters Total 76 fires 654 Firefighters

Number of Fires Attended by CFA Availability of Appropriately Skilled Crews

17.26 In submissions to the Inquiry and during public 17.32 A number of the fires that started on 7 and 8 January consultations, a number of people suggested that were burning in very steep and rough terrain. DSE more CFA resources could have been deployed to advise that firefighting in this environment is the fires in the critical first few days. dangerous and demanding. Personnel undertaking this type of firefighting must be very fit and 17.27 Information provided to the Inquiry shows that CFA appropriately trained and equipped. The personnel resources were heavily committed to fire suppression who supervise these operations must have on 8 January, responding to both the lightning strikes appropriate experience and understanding of fire and other fires and emergencies elsewhere across behaviour in these conditions. the State. 17.33 Given that these personnel are often the first to be 17.28 The most critical resource required for fires started deployed, many crews, including rappel crews, were by lightning is skilled and experienced remote-area engaged in fighting the Yambulla fire in East firefighters. CFA advice indicates that only a small Gippsland on 8 January. The deployment of all four number of volunteer firefighters have those skills. specialist DSE rappel crews at the start of the fires is described below. 17.29 Table 17.2 provides an indication of the CFA commitment to the fire suppression effort on 17.34 The Number 1 North East Rappel Crew was deployed Thursday 9 January. In addition to attending fires to the Anderson’s Peak fire (Mt Buffalo) during the and other incidents on private land, CFA deployed morning of 8 January and remained overnight. Direct considerable resources to assist DSE on public land. attack was unsuccessful and this crew was then redeployed to cut a helipad to ferry in further crews. Number of Fires Contained by Saturday 11 January 17.35 North East Rappel Crew 2 was deployed to the Catherine River fire, south-east of Mt Buffalo during 17.30 Analysis of records indicates that by Saturday 11 the morning of 8 January and remained overnight. January, three days after the thunderstorms had The rappel crew contained the fire overnight but it moved through Victoria, only 17 of the more than subsequently crossed control lines several times 80 fires that had resulted from lightning strikes were during the following days. It was finally contained still ‘going’. In addition, the fire in far-East Gippsland and declared safe on 16 January. at Yambulla had been contained.

17.31 The Inquiry is satisfied that this analysis shows a concerted effort on the part of the firefighting agencies to contain the fires. Those fires that were not contained are discussed in more detail below. PAGE 175 PAGE 176 17.38 17.37 17.36 Table 17.2:CFA Deployment toFires, byLocation, 9January2003 wfsCekFot erOe Support Support Support Support Support Rules Rd–northofErica Control 115otherincidentsattended including55fires Frosts –nearOmeo Role Tom’s Cap–southofTraralgon CFA Support MtBulldog–northofHeyfield Mt.Mittamatite –northofCorryong Other Incidents Swifts Creek Erica Fillinos–lower slopes ofMtBuffalo Yarram Heyfield Corryong Fire Ovens Incident ManagementTeam Where CFA isthe‘support’,DSEcontrol agencyandviceversa.CFA isthecontrol agencywhenthefire isprincipallyo 2 fire wascontainedto50hectares on11January. contain asignificantescapefrom afire line.This of 10 Januaryto Heyfield, intheearlymorning deployed totheLazarininCreek fire, northof The crewactivities duringthatafternoon. was rappel helicopterswere committedtohigher-priority of9 January,completed bytheafternoon butall transported toHeyfieldre-equip. Thistaskwas from Yambulla on8January, thecrew was the crew unavailableforrappelwork.Whenreleased Rappel Crew 2ontheeveningof7January, making belonging toGippsland equipment andharnesses An escapedfire from theYambulla Fire destroyed overrun whenweatherconditionsdeteriorated. was initiallycontainedbyindirect attack,butwas 9 January. Direct attackwasunsuccessful.Thisfire to theCavalierSpurfireof earlyonthemorning fixed-wing aircraft totheUpperMurrayanddeployed Gippsland RappelCrew 1wastransportedby for bothcrews tobereleased from Gippsland. evident, theDSEStateFire Co-ordinator arranged became lightning activityinNorthEastVictoria of8January.the morning Whenthescaleof on theYambulla Fire, north-westofGenoa,during Gippsland RappelCrews 1and2were bothworking Hover ExitCrews are involvedinthedirect transferofspecialistfire personnelandequipmentfrom ahoveringhelicopterto 3 used whenground vegetationorterrainprevents ahelicopterfrom conductingafullskidlanding. DSE whenthefire isprincipallyonpublicland. CFA records forthenumber offirefighters ateach fire were notavailable. et’ d–suho rrlo Support Support Support Support Support Support Control Old Rosedale Rd–southofTraralgon Betty’s Rd–southofTraralgon Little Tower Rd–southofTraralgon Support Control Emu Track (Holey PlainsState Park) Support Elliot Ridge–nearCorryong Sandy Creek –Ovens Valley Mountain Creek –north-east ofMtBeauty Glue Pot –KiewaValley Bill HickTrack –south-west ofDederang Bakers Gully –southofBright 17.41 17.40 17.39 access by‘HoverExit’. crews asnofires couldbeidentifiedassuitablefor 9 January. Thesecrews were deployedasground and deployedtovariousfires intheNorthEaston of8January Horsham/Halls Gapontheafternoon engaged inaerialfire attack. on prioritiesforthefire attack.Otheraircraft were considered necessarytoenableaninformeddecision and report onthestatusoffires. Thiswas reconnaissance taskstoassistfire managerstolocate decision todeploysomeoftheavailableaircraft to thereIn NorthEastVictoria, wasaconscious operations attheYambulla fire inEastGippsland. earlier, aircraft were already committedtofirefighting all thefires thatwarrantedairsupport.Asindicated dispersion itwasnotpossibletodeployaircraft to Given thenumberoffires andtheirgeographic response wasbeyondtheState’s supplycapacity. Demand foraircraft resources duringtheinitialfire Availability ofAppropriate Aircraft Hover ExitCrews 3 1 and2were bothdispatchedfrom 2 the ground. Theyare n privatelandand INF.018.002.0283 INF.018.002.0284 CHAPTER 17 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 17.42 Later on 8 January, localised extreme weather had an 17.48 It is impossible to quantify how much difference the impact on aircraft operations and availability when proposed additional resources in the AFAC model wind speeds grounded the aircraft operating from the would have made to the fire situation had they been Mt Beauty airstrip. available when the dry storm swept across South East Australia in January 2003. What can be said is that 17.43 After reviewing available records, the Inquiry has aerial resources play a crucial role in holding fires in concluded that, despite the significant demands for the early stages until on-ground firefighters are aircraft on 8 January, there were some aircraft not available for direct attack, or in direct attack on small used to best effect. A small number of aircraft were fires in remote and difficult terrain. There is also not deployed to aerial fire attack when it may have substantial research evidence from recent fires been possible to do so. The Inquiry has been unable supporting the effectiveness of heavy water bombers to conclusively determine why this occurred. in firefighting at the urban-rural interface. However, the explanation may be that those managing the response to the fires were more 17.49 After the May 2003 national meeting of Ministers focused on the task of identifying the location and with responsibility for emergency services, a potential of the new fires. communiqué was released calling on the Federal Government to support an appropriate national aerial 17.44 Some have argued that had these aircraft been firefighting strategy as a matter of urgency. deployed to support ground crews in initial fire attack, the spread of some fires may have been 17.50 Chapter 22 provides further discussion in relation to limited. This cannot be conclusively established. aircraft operations throughout the 2002–2003 summer. 17.45 Based on the information available to the Inquiry, and based on the issues discussed in Part B relating to fire intensity and fuel loads, we are of the view that the Recommendation small number of aircraft not immediately deployed to firefighting did not compromise the overall outcome. 17.51 That an appropriately resourced, national aerial firefighting strategy is urgently required, and that National Aerial Firefighting Strategy the Victorian Government make representations to the Commonwealth to support the Australasian 17.46 During the fires in New South Wales in 2001–2002, Fire Authorities Council recommendations. the Commonwealth Government offered to facilitate the establishment of a National Aerial Firefighting Need to Maintain a Statewide Reserve Strategy to better share and co-ordinate resources. for New Outbreaks The Commonwealth Minister for Regional Services, Territories and Local Government asked the 17.52 As discussed in Part A, most of Victoria was assessed Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC) to as being at high to extreme bushfire risk during the develop a suitable resource assessment and summer of 2002–2003. The fire services have an management strategy. obligation to all Victorian communities to provide and maintain an appropriate level of fire cover and 17.47 This strategy was submitted to the Commonwealth response capability, Statewide. For this reason, it was Minister in August 2002, but was not approved not possible to deploy all resources in the immediate before the 2002–2003 fire season. While some and near vicinity of a fire, until back-up or ancillary additional resources were made available, mainly to services were put in place that were capable of New South Wales, they fell well short of the resources protecting threatened or affected areas in the event proposed by AFAC. Victoria, New South Wales and of additional outbreaks. the Commonwealth jointly funded further aerial resources during the fires in January 2003. Arranging additional resources during a fire season is slow, cannot be guaranteed, is considerably more expensive than arranging them at other times, and resources are sometimes unavailable. PAGE 177 PAGE 178 17.58 17.57 17.56 17.55 17.54 17.53 forward rateofspread andspottingactivity. immediately impactonprivateproperty. equipment allocatedwere those withthepotentialto the fires thathadthegreatest numberofcrews and private assetswere givenhighest priority. Obviously, presented animmediatedanger tocommunityand rappel crew reported extreme fuelhazard Alpine Ashisa‘nofire’ vegetation type.Thismeansfuelreduction isnotpossibleasameansof managingfuelloads burning 5 SeeChapter 15,PartC. 4 continued tospread. number ofattemptsatdirect attack,thefire fire hadincreased insizeto100hectares. Despitea the didnotameliorateand, bymorning, overnight attempt atdirect attackonthefire. Theconditions if conditionseased.Thiswouldallowforanother helipad toallowaircraft toferryinadditionalcrew abandoned direct attackandbeganbuildinga Because ofthisfire behaviour, therappelcrew lightning inAlpineAshfuels the MtBuffalo plateau.Thefire originatedfrom This fire startedinaruggedandinaccessiblepartof Anderson’s PeakFire DSE haveprovided thefollowingdetailsofthesefires. andGippslandfires.become theNorthEastVictorian ten days.Thesefires eventuallyspread andjoinedto on 7and8Januarywere notcontainedinthefirst A numberoffires thatstartedfrom lightningstrikes The FiresthatWere Not Contained Thefires intheBuffalo RiverValley, southwestof • TheCavalierSpurfire, northwestofHarrietville; • TheCravensvillefire intheTallangatta Valley; • TheMountMittamatitefire, northofCorryong; • TheEmutrackfire intheHoleyPlainsStatePark, • TheTom’s Capfire intheMullungdung State • Fires thatstartedon8January inthiscategorywere: Control Priorities response tothefires on8January, theagreed Fire In determiningwhere todeploy resources intheinitial Assets ImmediatelyThreatened Priorities toProtect Communitiesand Overall FuelHazard Guide, DepartmentofNaturalResources andEnvironment, May1999.DiscussedinChapter7. 6 Myrtleford. and west oftheLongford townshipnearSale; Forest, southeastofTraralgon; 4 were activatedandfires that 5 and thefirstarriving 6 , rapid 17.60 17.59 17.62 17.61 of control linesratherthandirect attack. became significantandtheyreverted toconstruction reported atanearbyfire. Theriskstofirefighters covered 10hectares bynightfallwithstrong winds steep slope.Despiteinitialdirect attack,thefire had and barkfuels.Thefirefiercely wasburning ona first arrivingcrews ashavinghighlevelsofelevated This fire startedinAlpineAshforest describedbythe Mt FeathertopFire control lines. resultedwinds intheafternoon fire escaping attempted againon9January, however, stronger communities andprivateassets.Direct attackwas and were posingamore immediatethreat to crews were redeployed tootherfires thathadstarted joined andcovered approximately 100hectares. The However, thethree bylateafternoon fires hadalready undertaken soonafterthefires were reported. of8January.late onthemorning Direct attackwas Three fires incloseproximity startedonMtArthur Mt ArthurFires arrived afterdark. The timetakentogetcrews onscenemeantthey difficult accessthrough veryruggedandrocky terrain. Razorback fire wasinaremote area oftheforest with an immediatethreat toprivateproperty. The started earlierintheday, manyofwhich were posing crews were already committed tothefires thathad inmixed-speciesforest.burning Atthistime,available This fire wasreported lateon8Januaryandwas Razorback Fire higher. other fires where theprobability ofsuccesswas fire. Themajorityofthecrews were redeployed to these circumstances theywere unabletocontainthe experiencing intenseanderraticfire behaviour. In fire wasnow150hectares insizeandtheywere ground. By3pmthatday, crews reported thatthe aerial resources supportingthefirefighters onthe Direct attackwasattemptedagainon9Januarywith . INF.018.002.0285 INF.018.002.0286 CHAPTER 17 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 17.63 The first arriving crew walked into the fire during the 17.68 We have not found any incident or events that night to undertake reconnaissance. By the time they indicate systemic failures on the part of the agencies arrived, the fire was already in excess of 10 hectares. responding to the fires. Neither could we conclude Efforts were made to contain both the Razorback fire that any incident or event significantly impacted on and another nearby fire using ground crews and large the end result. bulldozers. However, the fire jumped control lines on 11 January and continued to spread, despite a 17.69 However, there has been criticism in some areas and number of further efforts to contain it. opportunities for improvement are certainly available.

17.70 In retrospect, there may have been some opportunity Pinnibar Fire Complex for a different approach to the deployment of aircraft in the early stages – although, using aerial resources 17.64 A number of lightning strikes in the Mt Pinnibar area to fight the fire was balanced against the need to started fires in Alpine Ash and mixed-species forest gather intelligence on the number and location of with extreme fuel loads. Direct attack had begun by lightning strikes. In any emergency, the initial mid-afternoon on 8 January with the fire covering response occurs in an environment where the Incident approximately 10 hectares by 7 pm that night. Controller and agency Co-ordinators are still Additional fires were reported in the area just before gathering the necessary information to understand nightfall on 8 January in very remote and inaccessible the complete situation confronting them. In this country. situation, it is understandable if intelligence gathering 17.65 Direct attack with fire bombing aircraft was is given some priority. undertaken early on 9 January. The nearest airbase to these fires was 50 minutes flying time for fixed-wing fire bombers, and the delay between loads appears to have limited the effectiveness of this strategy.

Conclusion

17.66 Records show that, in the past, large numbers of fires have been caused by dry storm events. However, the fires of 7 and 8 January may well have been unprecedented – at least in terms of the number of lightning strikes causing fires.

17.67 The Inquiry finds that, given the context of the drought, prevailing weather conditions, and the forest fuel load available to support fire, the initial response to the fires resulting from the dry thunderstorms that swept across south eastern Australia on the 7 and 8 January was, overall, professional and timely. Resources were generally deployed with speed and precision and the outcomes of this are evident. Within the first few days, most of the more than 80 fires were extinguished or under control. PAGE 179 PAGE 180 Chapter 18 18.6 18.5 18.4 18.3 18.2 18.1 Arrangements inAction The State’s EmergencyManagement These questionsare explored below. improvement identifiedthrough thisexperience? service tothecommunity?Were opportunitiesfor appropriate methodforagenciestoprovide their 2002–2003 fires. Were thesearrangementsan an effective managementframeworkduringthe emergency managementarrangementsprovided The InquiryhasassessedwhetherVictoria’s and consistentapproach. operational managementsystemsprovide aseamless agencies mustensure theirincidentcontrol and community. Inaddition,bothresponse andrecovery focus ontheconsequencesofanemergency The Inquirybelievesthatagenciesmustensure aclear the EmergencyManagementManualVictoria. be complementaryto,theprovisions oftheActand must bestructured sotheycanoperatewithin,and including incidentcommandandcontrol systems, agencysystemsandstructures,arrangements. Internal framework forVictoria’s emergencymanagement clearly intendedtoprovide themulti-agency The responsible agenciesoperate. the emergencyserviceorganisationsandother These arrangementsprovide theframeworkinwhich emergency. adequate resources are availabletomanagethe And theyidentifyarrangementsthatwillensure response to,andrecovery from, agivenemergency. effective co-ordination ofallagenciesinvolvedinthe them. Theyalsoidentifyarrangementstoensure outline theplanningarrangementsfordealingwith agencies fordifferent typesofemergenciesand management arrangementsidentifythecontrol As describedinPartC,Victoria’s emergency Overview Emergency ManagementAct1986 (the Act)is 18.8 18.7 18.11 18.10 18.9 the processing ofrequests forresources. communities and,insomesituations,duplicated information betweenthesefacilitiesandtheir Co-ordination Centres restricted theflowof Incident Control Centres andMunicipalEmergency MECCs. Thelackofeffective liaisonbetweenthe DSE didnotprovide aliaison officer foranyofthe Fire Authority(CFA). Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)andtheCountry limited supportprovided by the Departmentof the effectiveness ofthesecentres wasreduced bythe ordination Centres (MECCs).TheInquirybelievesthat Gippsland establishedMunicipalEmergencyCo- municipalities ofAlpine,Indigo,Towong andEast During theNorthEastandGippslandfires, the Municipal EmergencyCo-ordination and supportconcurrent response andrecovery. management planningandstructures encourage level shouldreflect thistoensure thatemergency sequentially. Theplanningundertakenat municipal that shouldbeimplementedinparallel,ratherthan the viewthatresponse andrecovery are processes as itissafeandpracticabletodoso.TheInquiryof that manyrecovery tasksneedtobeinitiatedassoon to themanagementofrecovery. Itisalsoapparent Management Teams andMECCstaff isfundamental Much oftheinformationgathered byIncident legislated role. limiting theresponsibilities ofcouncilstoplaytheir buildings wouldremove someofthepressure without suggested thatsitingtheMECCawayfrom council difficulty ofstaffing andmaintainingMECCs.They A numberofcouncilsexpressedatthe concern commendtheworkdonebymunicipalitiesin We capability. ensuring councilsmaintainedtheirobligationsand support ofcommunityvolunteerswascriticalto and maintainingtheco-ordination centres. The Municipal Councilshadtobeinnovativeinstaffing a challenge.Inorder tomeetalltheirobligations, staffing ofMECCsoversuchaprotracted periodwas their ownoperationalcapabilities.Inparticular, the establishing andoperatingMECCswhilemaintaining INF.018.002.0287 INF.018.002.0288 CHAPTER 18 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Recommendations 18.17 DSE and CFA’s position is that it is preferable for well- prepared and able-bodied people to take refuge in a 18.12 That Incident Control Centres and Municipal well-prepared home, and to defend that home during Emergency Co-ordination Centres be collocated, the passage of the fire. People who believe they are wherever practicable. not adequately prepared, or who feel they would not cope with the trauma of a bushfire, are encouraged 18.13 That DSE and CFA ensure that: to leave early when they become aware that a fire may impact on them. • When a Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centre is established in response to a fire, an 18.18 The Inquiry supports the position of DSE and CFA on appropriately experienced, trained and briefed this issue and notes that other States and Territories officer of the control agency is appointed as have adopted this approach. The Victorian approach liaison between the Municipal Emergency was also endorsed in the findings of the McLeod Co-ordination Centre and the Incident Report1 into the Australian Capital Territory Control Centre; and (ACT) fires. • There are appropriate training regimes in place to provide officers with the skills necessary to 18.19 The Inquiry was made aware of a small number of perform the role of Emergency Services Liaison instances where, apparently on their own initiative, Officer in the Municipal Emergency Victoria Police members encouraged some residents Co-ordination Centre. in fire-affected communities to evacuate, without any recommendation from the Incident Controller. These 18.14 That DSE and CFA work in co-operation with the actions caused unnecessary concern and confusion Municipal Emergency Response Co-ordinators to among residents and, in one case, was contrary to develop and conduct joint exercises that practise the fire safety plan established by the residents and the skills and test procedures for operations of endorsed by CFA prior to the fire. the Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centre, Municipal Recovery Centre and Incident 18.20 In Victoria these were isolated events. However, Control Centres. media coverage of the ACT experience and the different legislation applying to evacuation in other States could lead to further confusion. The issue is Evacuation of sufficient importance to warrant some refresher training for police members. 18.15 Section 4.6 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria explains the process to be followed for evacuation during emergencies. Under Victorian Recommendation legislation, a person with a financial interest in a property cannot be forced to evacuate that property. 18.21 That Victoria Police ensure all police members The control agency for the emergency has understand the Victorian legislation in relation to responsibility for recommending that evacuation evacuation, and that any decision to recommend should occur where the magnitude of the event evacuation remains with the Incident Controller. warrants it. Victoria Police then carry out the evacuation process in consultation with the control agency. Divisional Emergency Co-ordination

18.16 Both DSE and CFA have agreed that individuals 18.22 The Victorian emergency management arrangements must make their own decision to 'stay or go' based provide for the development of Divisional Emergency on plans they have developed for their property and Response Plans and the establishment, when their own personal safety. Analysis following fatal appropriate, of Divisional Emergency Co-ordination bushfires indicates that, for well-prepared individuals, Centres. These are the responsibility of the Victoria fleeing at the last minute as fire approaches can be Police Divisional Emergency Response Co-ordinator. more dangerous than staying to protect the property. A number of issues arise from the arrangements (We discuss this in the context of community put in place to manage the 2002–2003 fires. preparedness in Chapter 13.)

1 R. McLeod, Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires in the ACT, 2003 PAGE 181 PAGE 182 18.27 18.26 18.25 18.24 18.23 .WhiletheIMACCswere judgedaseffective by 1. of comment: Three issuesrelating totheIMACCsare worthy Fire Co-ordination Centres. Emergency Co-ordination Centres andDSERegional Centres isnormallyundertakenatCFA Regional overseeing broader strategyfortheIncidentControl such facilities.Thetaskofco-ordinating resources and This wasthefirsttimeDSEandCFA hadestablished Provide strategicreporting toStatearrangements. • MonitorIncidentManagementTeams; and • Co-ordinate IncidentActionPlans; • Provide strategicincidentmodellingand • Provide strategicresource co-ordination between • Provide astrategicoverviewofallfacetsthe • area ofinterest) wasto: The statedrole ofeachIMACC(withinitsgeographic problems identifiedduringthebushfires. The IMACCswere establishedtoresolve co-ordination ordination Centres (IMACCs)atBenallaandTraralgon. CFA establishedtwoIntegratedMulti-AgencyCo- their agencies'resources ataregional level,DSEand In order toestablishappropriate jointco-ordination of Centres Integrated Multi-AgencyCo-ordination Co-ordinators atWangaratta andBairnsdale. particularly thepoliceDivisionalEmergencyResponse established communicationandliaisonprotocols, to theefforts ofsenioragency personnelwho overcome. Credit forthisisdueinnosmallpart were relatively fewdifficulties thatwere not responses tomajoremergencies inthepast,there and praise.Whenconsidered inthecontextof andGippsland,deserveacknowledgement Victoria co-ordination oftheresponse, bothinNorthEast Having saidthat,theefforts toestablisheffective co-ordination. a gapinDSEandCFA’s planningforregional very needtoestablishsuchcentres demonstrates the combatingagencies,Inquirybelieves predictions; incidents; incident; 18.28 18.32 18.31 18.30 18.29 planning exists. the Inquiryisofviewthatacleargapincurrent co-ordination centres across theState.Giventhis, promotes thedevelopmentofpermanentstrategic required. CFA’s submissiontotheInquiryalso DSE andCFA’s assessment isthatsuchcentres were Centres basedinmetropolitan Melbourne. separate StateEmergencyCo-ordination/Operations Emergency ServicesBoard (MFESB),allmaintain Service (VICSES)andtheMetropolitan Fire and Currently, DSE,CFA, StateEmergency theVictorian Emergency Response State LevelCo-ordinationof management arrangements. changes beformalisedintheemergency Emergency ResponsePlansandthatany co-ordination arrangementsandDivisional the relationshipbetweenfireserviceregional That Victoria Police,CFA andDSEreview emergency managementarrangements. Co-ordination Centres,bereflectedintheVictorian as thecontinueduseofIntegratedMulti-Agency arrangements bereviewedandanychanges,such That existingDSEandCFA regionalco-ordination Recommendations of DivisionalEmergencyCo-ordination. needs ofallresponse agenciesandtherequirements Consequently, anynewstructures shouldincludethe of existingemergencymanagementarrangements. functions mustbeundertakenwithconsideration However, anydevelopmentofsuchfacilitiesor .TheIMACCsdidnotformeffective relationships 3. Anunintendedconsequenceofthesecentres 2. resources forfire suppression activities. times, confusionintheaccountabilitiesforlocating in delaysinformationbecomingavailableand,at Emergency Co-ordination Centres andthisresulted and communicationlinkswiththeMunicipal accommodate, butwere unfamiliar with. and othersupportingagencieshadto were anewstructure thatthePoliceCo-ordinator emergency managementarrangements:IMACCs existence created confusion within thewider operational structures. More importantly, their was adegree ofconfusionwithin DSEandCFA INF.018.002.0289 INF.018.002.0290 CHAPTER 18 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 18.33 Large fire events managed by multi-agency 18.40 The extent and duration of the 2002–2003 fires Incident Management Teams may be co-ordinated placed a huge burden on the agencies responsible for at a regional level by an Integrated Multi-agency managing these events. In particular, sustaining the Co-ordination Centre, but managed separately staffing in Incident Control Centres, IMACCs and the at the State level. State Emergency Operations Centres proved a huge challenge. Assistance was sought (and received) 18.34 The need to staff and operate the State-level centres, through the Victorian emergency management and to establish effective co-ordination between arrangements to source personnel from Victorian them, placed a significant burden on the combating government departments who could assist at all levels agencies during their response to the North East of emergency management. This whole-of- Victoria and Gippsland fires. Effective communication government approach to resourcing the management relied on a complex process of briefings, of major emergencies was a significant factor in teleconferences and liaison. sustaining the effort for the duration of the fires.

18.35 The Inquiry is of the view that the separation of 18.41 The Victorian Government has already identified this key personnel at the State level does not provide problem and directed that a review of emergency for effective co-ordination of joint agency response. operations centres be undertaken with a view to Furthermore, the duplication of resources to sustain exploring opportunities to rationalise and reduce these separate centres cannot be justified. duplication.

18.36 Maintaining separate facilities means the opportunity is lost for personnel from the various services to work Recommendations together on a day-to-day basis and to take part in planning activities, joint training and exercises. Yet 18.42 That a single state-of-the-art all hazards State when an emergency arises, these personnel are Emergency Operations Centre be established for expected to operate together for extended periods, Victoria. This could, if necessary, be implemented often under stressful circumstances. Maintaining in stages, initially incorporating DSE, CFA, MFESB separate State-level operational facilities to manage and the State Aircraft Unit. resource deployment, strategy development and communication with key stakeholders, creates a 18.43 That the options of collocating the State number of problems. Emergency Response Co-ordination Centre with the new State Emergency Operations Centre be 18.37 First, the information technology systems employed explored. by the agencies are different. This can restrict the ability of officers to access and share available data, 18.44 That the State Emergency Operations Centre and can hide any discrepancies in information. Given develop and maintain strong and close links with that this information is the basis of joint decision- the State Emergency Response Co-ordination making by the agencies, it can affect the quality of Centre if collocation is not possible. decisions taken.

18.38 Second, the ability to inform key stakeholders, Co-operation Between Agencies especially the community and Government, on the 18.45 The relationship between DSE and CFA, and their status of an emergency becomes complex due to the ability to integrate their planning and firefighting need to ensure consistency of message across two or operations, has been the subject of scrutiny over more response agencies. The accuracy and timeliness many years and has attracted attention in numerous of information flow is at risk. reports. Provisions under section 16 of the Emergency Management Act 1986 specifically address this issue. 18.39 Finally, there is limited ability for key personnel in the decision-making process to resolve issues face- to-face. Agencies currently rely on teleconferencing or meetings (which require travel). This is inefficient and inhibits the effective process of communication and decision-making given that decisions often have critical timelines imposed by numerous external factors. PAGE 183 PAGE 184 18.50 18.49 18.48 18.47 18.46 Victoria’s emergencyresponse agencies. will promote more effective co-operationbetween that canbetakenatbothStateandlocallevelwhich There are, however, anumberofspecificinitiatives for developingandmaintainingtheserelationships. management arrangementsprovide thefoundation emergency Management PlanningandtheVictorian the developmentofholisticMunicipalFire between DSEandCFA, theIncidentControl System, ongoing priority. TheCo-operativeAgreement between emergencymanagementagenciesisan and maintenanceofeffective workingrelationships These submissionshighlightthatthedevelopment management ofthefire intheDeddickValley. applied; andinfar-eastern inrelation Victoria, tothe there were disputesinrelation tothestrategies of thefire intheMullungdungStateForest, where expressed inSouthGippslandaboutthemanagement agencies wasineffective.were Concerns also occasions where communicationbetweenthetwo Desert fire inDecemberhighlightedanumberof by personnelinvolvedintheresponse totheBig was noteffective. Inparticular, informationprovided working relationship betweenDSEandCFA personnel However, there were someinstanceswhere the Control Centres andonthefire line. Multi-Agency Co-ordination Centres, Incident praised theeffective operationsatIntegrated consultations; indiscussionswithDSEandCFA – testimonials –insubmissionsandduringpublic improvement onpastexperiences. Numerous in particularDSEandCFA, were asignificant all agenciesdeployedinresponse tothefires, that, overall,theworkingrelationships between The evidenceputbefore the Inquiryindicates effective jointoperationsbetween DSEandCFA. Agreement asafundamental requirement for The Inquiryviewsthedevelopmentofsuchan Co-operative Agreement is a response tothisneed. The preparation andannual review oftheDSE–CFA ongoing relationship between thetwokeyagencies. There isaclearneedtomaintain astrong 18.52 18.51 18.55 18.54 18.53 agencies. arrangements betweenemergencyresponse agreements thatdescribejointoperational amended torequirethedevelopmentof That the Recommendations Management Team members. firefighters, fire ground supervisorsandIncident develop understanding,trustandconfidenceamong prescribed onpublicland.Thiswillfurther burns MFESB firefighters, shouldbe invitedtotakepartin CFA personnel(paidandvolunteer)and,perhaps, involved. TheInquirybelievesthat,where practicable, different agenciesoperateshouldbeapriorityforall the capabilities,principlesandsystemsunderwhich all fire agencies.Improving theunderstandingof between agencypersonnelandthevolunteersof There isaneedtofurtherdevelop relationships Management Teams. for anumberoftoursdutyandservedinIncident were alsodeployedasmembersofCFA striketeams Appropriately trainedMFESBfirefighters andofficers andGippsland. Victoria to undertakelong-termdeploymentsinNorthEast extended periodtoallowCFA officers andfirefighters foran stations intheoutersuburbsofMelbourne firefighters andvehiclessteppedupintoCFA fire MetropolitanMelbourne Fire District.MFESB deployment everofMFESBfirefighters outsidethe The fires of2002–2003sawthemostsignificant Emergency ServiceBoardPersonnel Deployment ofMetropolitanFireand should trainandexercisetogether. likely tobedeployedtogethermanagefire, Team membersfromDSE,CFA andMFESBwhoare That, whereverpossible,IncidentManagement Emergency ManagementAct1986 INF.018.002.0291 be INF.018.002.0292 CHAPTER 18 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 18.56 This level of co-operation had a number of important Recommendation outcomes: 18.61 That VICSES, with the support of the CFA, • Continuity in the provision of fire and emergency includes basic fire safety training as one of the response capability for the whole of the State; competencies for the VICSES Volunteers. • Development of skills among MFESB officers and firefighters; • Improvements in understanding between Conclusion firefighters from MFESB and CFA in relation to their roles; and 18.62 The fires of the North East and Gippsland were a • Strengthening of the bonds between the significant test for Victoria’s emergency management emergency services. arrangements, and involved: • Mobilising a significant response capability Recommendation together with the support agencies necessary to manage the emergency; 18.57 That the MFESB continue to give priority to • Maintaining this capability over an unprecedented appropriate bushfire training for its firefighters. period of time; and • Maintaining an appropriate level of resources to respond to any other fire or emergency situation Deployment of Victoria State occurring concurrently in the State. Emergency Service Personnel 18.63 As is the case with any comprehensive post-event 18.58 VICSES volunteers were also extensively involved in review, opportunities to further strengthen the the response to the fires, undertaking a number of existing arrangements have been identified. The traditional roles such as tree clearing, provision of Inquiry concludes that Victoria’s emergency support to Victoria Police and municipal co- management arrangements are robust and provided ordination. VICSES also undertook a number of new the appropriate framework to co-ordinate the roles including support on the fire ground, various management of the 2002–2003 bushfires. roles within Incident Management Teams, and support to logistics and staging area operations. 18.64 Recommendations are made in Part E for further There were some initial difficulties in relation to these systemic improvements to these arrangements. deployments in that insufficient VICSES volunteers had received training in bushfire safety prior to the 2002–2003 fires. CFA Training Officers provided the necessary training for approximately 100 VICSES personnel who were to be deployed, however, this placed a heavy burden on the trainers as the instruction was provided at the height of the fires.

18.59 VICSES support and involvement could have been much more extensive if more volunteers had received appropriate training prior to the fires.

18.60 There were also times when VICSES volunteers were mobilised to North East Victoria or Gippsland, then waited for significant periods of time before being deployed or tasked. While it is hard to be too critical, more attention needs to be given to ensuring that where volunteers are called and leave their employment to participate in an emergency, they are appropriately tasked as soon as possible and not required to wait for long periods at staging areas. PAGE 185 PAGE 186 Chapter 19 19.4 19.3 19.2 19.1 System Work? Did theIncidentControl strike teamstoIncidentManagementTeams. regional staff andassistedinthesupplyofcrews and Traralgon. TheIMACCcollocatedCFA andDSE afterwards, asimilarfacilitywasestablishedat established attheDSEoffice inBenalla.Shortly Multi-Agency Co-ordination Centre (IMACC)was As wediscussedinChapter18,anIntegrated evident. fire managementandco-ordination alsobecame The needforaregion-wide, longer-term strategyfor between thetwoagenciesmightbeoverwhelmed. apparent thattheusualco-ordination arrangements During theearlydaysoffire operationitbecame created majorlogisticsandco-ordination problems. organisations. Thegeographicspread ofthefires also Gippsland fires created significantchallengesforboth Country Fire Authority(CFA) to theNorthEastand of SustainabilityandEnvironment (DSE)andthe The numberofresources deployedbytheDepartment Regional EmergencyCo-ordination Theeffective transferofcontrol from oneIncident • ThelocationofIncidentControl Centres; and • QualificationsforIncidentManagementTeam • Theappointmentofdeputiestokeyroles in • Regionalemergencyco-ordination; • challenges relating to: In particular, Chapter19focusesonissuesand application oftheIncidentControl SysteminVictoria. Interim Report(AppendixIII)toimprove the Chapter wereinforce recommendations madeinour organisations tobeeffectively managed.Inthis emergencies involvingmanyagenciesand A strong incidentmanagement systemallows Overview Control Centre toanother. members; Incident ManagementTeams; 19.6 19.5 19.8 19.7 Liaisonbetweenthecontrolagencyand • Efficient managementofinformationflow • Effective strategicmanagementofresources; • Effective monitoringofIncidentManagement • level inordertoensurethereis: document proceduresandstructuresatregional with otherresponseagencies,toestablishand Emergency ResponseCo-ordinators,inconsultation be amendedtorequirePoliceDivisional That theemergencymanagementarrangements Recommendation policy andorganisationalrestructuring ‘ontherun’. and aninevitableconsequenceofimplementing elsewhere. Thiswasbotha failure tocommunicate impression thatthefires were beingmanaged Controllers –leftfirefighters withtheerroneous combined withtheinexperienceofsomeIncident deployment ofout-of-area crews andstriketeams– Centres andtheirrole inco-ordinating thesupplyand suppression across anumberofIncidentControl role inbroad strategicdevelopmentforfire who hadultimatecontrol of thefires. TheIMACCs’ confusion inthemindsofmanyCFA Brigadesasto As wealsonotedinChapter18,theIMACCscreated appointed asdeputiestothesefourkeypositions. Personnel from thesupportingagencyare then when thefire ispredominantly onprivateland. predominantly onpublicland;theyare madebyCFA The appointmentsare madebyDSEwhenthefire is Operations Officer andLogisticsOfficer. within theteam:IncidentController, PlanningOfficer, from thecontrol agencytothefourkeypositions DSE andCFA havetraditionallyappointedofficers When establishingjointIncidentManagementTeams, Teams Structure ofIncidentManagement co-ordinators. divisional andmunicipalemergencyresponse the agenciesandcommunity; within andbetweenagencies, Teams; INF.018.002.0293 INF.018.002.0294 CHAPTER 19 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 19.9 This arrangement has often been difficult to achieve 19.15 The Inquiry acknowledges this principle and agrees due to the number of qualified and endorsed that the purpose of the Incident Control System is personnel available. Nor does it always lead to the to ensure effective and efficient management of a most effective use of available resources. This is specific incident. Accordingly, knowledge of the especially so in long campaigns, given that most Incident Control System is only one skill set required Incident Management Teams operate 24 hours a day by members of an Incident Management Team. In for the duration of the fire. order to ensure that all aspects of response to the incident are addressed, these officers – particularly 19.10 The Inquiry heard suggestions that this practice may the Incident Controller – must also have a sound have limited the number of experienced fire ground understanding of the Victorian emergency supervisors available to work in the field because arrangements and the relevant Municipal Fire experienced personnel had been deployed to an Management Plan (as outlined in Part C). Incident Control Centre. 19.16 There is an increasing expectation that the media 19.11 Submissions, including those from DSE and CFA, will provide real-time, accurate and authoritative suggest that providing a deputy from the supporting information to enable threatened and fire-affected agency is not viable in longer campaigns. This is communities to adopt safe behaviours. This will based on their experience during the fires of put an increasing pressure on Incident Controllers 2002–2003. to provide information to the media. The Inquiry understands that CFA provides media training 19.12 The Inquiry believes that a commitment by the to all level 2 and level 3 incident controllers. agencies to greater integration in planning, training DSE has no formal media policy, or training. and co-ordination at regional and State level would make this practice obsolete. Recommendations

Recommendation 19.17 That the person appointed by DSE or CFA as Incident Controller for any incident should have 19.13 That the practice of appointing Deputy Planning formal qualifications and accreditation in the Officer, Deputy Operations Officer and Deputy Incident Control System, be fully aware of the Logistics Officer in an Incident Management Team Victorian emergency management arrangements be abandoned. This recommendation and have access to local fire prevention and acknowledges the benefits of retaining a Deputy response planning, including the Municipal Fire Incident Controller from the support agency (in Management Plan. accordance with section 4.2.6 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria), to ensure that the 19.18 That CFA and DSE provide media training to all command structure of that agency is preserved. Level 2 and Level 3 Incident Controllers.

Qualifications for Incident Incident Control Centres Management Team Members 19.19 The location of Incident Control Centres (AIIMS–ICS)1 19.14 In comments to the Inquiry about the links between – in particular, their distance from the fire front – was the Victorian emergency management arrangements a frequent criticism in submissions to the Inquiry and and incident management, DSE noted that: during the Inquiry’s tour of fire-affected areas. DSE and CFA, in consultation with Emergency ‘AIIMS – ICS does not, and is not intended to, Management Co-ordinators, pre-plan the location of address overall co-ordination across multiple incidents Incident Control Centres across the State. A decision – it is a system from ‘Incident Controller down.’ on their placement has often been a compromise between the need to be close to the fire and the need for adequate infrastructure.

1 Australasian Inter-agency Incident Management System. This is a nationally adopted structure to formalise a co-ordinated approach by all agencies involved in the management of an emergency. It is described in more detail in Chapter 15. PAGE 187 PAGE 188 19.23 19.22 19.21 19.20 La Trobe University, that byWednesday 22ndtheAdministration buildingwastotallytakenoverbytheseoperations.” of SustainabilityandEnvironmentParksVictoria (alreadyonsiteastenants)werequicklyexpandedso of theStateEmergencyServiceandCountryFireAuthority. OtheragenciesincludingtheDepartment “By 4pm[21January]theAdministrationbuildinghadbeentakenoverbyLogisticsandResourceunits Opportunities forcollocationwithMunicipal • Existingpublic infrastructurethatmayprovide • locations, DSEandCFA givedueconsideration to: That inthereviewofIncidentControlCentre Recommendations other resources. in theprovision oftechnology, supportstaff and collocate thesetwofacilities.Thisoffers advantages some instances,there maybeopportunitiesto and MunicipalEmergencyCo-ordination Centres. In and co-operationbetweenIncidentControl Centres opportunities existtoenhancetheinformationflow development offuture IncidentControl Centres, In additiontousingexistinginfrastructure forthe emergencies. computing infrastructure tothatneededduring facilities havesimilartelecommunicationsand Beechworth –already existacross theState.These similar totheLaTrobe Universitycampusat training/exercising. Qualityfacilitiesindailyuse– they mayonlybeusedoccasionally, evenfor emergency servicesisnoteconomicallyviablegiven emergencies. To buildcentres specificallyforthe infrastructure askeyoperationscentres during Clearly, there are significantbenefitsinusingexisting of firefighters. Management Team, stagingarea andwelfare needs readily accommodatedexpansionoftheIncident Stanley withsignificantsurgecapacity. Thisfacility of agenciesmanagingthefires atEldoradoand Incident Control Centre wasabletomeettheneeds established withintheUniversity’s facilities.This University enabledaneffective centre tobe an agreement betweenDSE, CFA andLaTrobe location ofIncidentControl Centres. AtBeechworth, existing publicinfrastructure whendeterminingthe The Inquirysawopportunitiestomakegreater useof Emergency Co-ordinationCentres. suitable facilities;and Buildings &GroundsNewsletter , May2003. 19.25 19.24 19.28 19.27 19.26 affecting theOvensValley. Control Centre atOvenstofocussolelyonthefires the fires affecting thatarea andtoallowtheIncident established atMtBeautytomore effectively manage On 18January, anewIncidentControl Centre was Incident ControlCentretoAnother Transferring ControlfromOne close tothefirearea. safe andpracticable,thoseCentresarelocated Incident ControlCentrestoensurethat,wherever That DSEandCFA reviewtheirjointplanningfor this betterinfuture. confusion andwehaveidentifiedaneedtodo suppression. Itdid,however, causeunnecessary or anyother, hadadetrimentalimpacton fire There isnoevidencethatthischangeincontrol, about detailsofthechangesproved inadequate. inform fire ground supervisorsandthecommunity processes followed.Thecommunicationstrategyto are abouttherigourofprocedures concerns and Incident Control Centre atMtBeauty, however, there decision madebyDSEandCFA toestablishthe Following investigation,theInquirysupports commanders andthecommunity. confusion amongfirefighters, fire ground to theMtBeautyIncidentControl Centre created management from theOvensIncidentControl Centre another is,andwas,complex.Thechangeinfire complex offires from oneIncidentControl Centre to The process oftransferringcontrol ofafire or INF.018.002.0295 INF.018.002.0296 CHAPTER 19 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART

“First, we must improve the way that we direct and co-ordinate the diverse agencies and professional groups that come together from many locales and levels of government in a crisis. Within hours of the crisis in New York City, as in Oklahoma City 6 1/2 years ago, multiple fire crews, police officers, ambulances, and rescue workers converged, not only from all over the city, but from neighbouring jurisdictions on Long Island, and in New Jersey and Connecticut. Such teams, which have never worked together and have no common operational method, must be productively co-ordinated. Otherwise they may be doomed to ineffectiveness or however inadvertently to endanger one another’s lives. The “incident management system”, developed initially for the fire service in California to deal with this problem, needs to be made standard practice” Source Howitt, A. ‘New York’s Preparedness Should Inspire Other Cities to Act’ The Boston Globe, 17 September 2001.

Recommendation 19.34 A final relevant point is that since the 11 September terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States has 19.29 That DSE and CFA develop an agreed process for mandated that the response and emergency the effective transfer of control from one Incident management plans of all agencies must include Control Centre to another, including processes for an appropriate multi-agency incident management communicating this change to fire ground system. This supports the Inquiry’s view that the supervisors and local communities. approach to incident management in Victoria is consistent with worlds best practice. Conclusion

19.30 An incident management system is essential to allow for the effective management of large or multiple fires, and multi-agency events. The Inquiry notes that the effectiveness of any system is determined by the training provided for its users.

19.31 The Inquiry’s Interim Report (Appendix III) made recommendations to better utilise local knowledge in the Incident Control System, and to integrate the CFA group structure with the Incident Control System.

19.32 The Inquiry’s views have not changed and further recommendations about the application and refinement of the Incident Control System have been made here.

19.33 We found AIIMS–ICS, endorsed and introduced by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council members in the early 1990s, to be a sound incident control system and strongly support its continued use. A coroner’s report following the Linton bushfire2, discussed AIIMS–ICS at length and noted evidence that the system had not been completely accepted and adopted across the State. This mitigates against an incident being managed in the seamless and integrated way envisaged. CFA and its volunteer groups must work together to finalise the integration of AIIMS–ICS as a matter of urgency.

2 State Coroner’s Office, 2002, p. 596 - 656. PAGE 189 PAGE 190 Chapter 20 20.5 20.4 20.3 20.2 20.1 of FireControlStrategies Development andImplementation Fire containmentandcontrol. • Ecologicalandenvironmental valueprotection; and • Aggressive firstattackonnewoutbreaks to • Communityandassetprotection; • Firefighter safety; • The prioritieswere confirmedas: and IncidentControl Centres. Integrated Multi-AgencyCo-ordination Centres from theStateEmergencyCo-ordination Centres, throughout thecampaignbypersonnelworking These prioritieswere appliedbytheagencies Priorities’ discussedinChapter15,PartC. Officer, CFA metandreaffirmed the‘Fire Control and Gippsland,theChiefFire Officer, DSEandChief Early intheresponse tothefires intheNorthEast Priorities toIncidentActionPlanning Application oftheFireControl tactics occurred. implementation offire suppression strategyand where difficulties inthedevelopmentandsuccessful However, theInquiryidentifiedanumberofsituations compared tothescaleoffires. assets anddamagetoproperty waslimitedwhen to thefire andnosignificantinjuries.Lossofprivate safely aspossible,withnolossoflifedirectly related the objectiveofcontainingfire aseffectively and appropriate insuppressing thefires. Theyachieved (DSE) andtheCountryFire Authority (CFA) were the DepartmentofSustainabilityandEnvironment view that,overall,thestrategiesandtacticsappliedby On theevidenceavailable,Inquiryhasformed Team Leaders. Commanders, SectorCommandersandStrike Operations SectionincludestheDivision tactics rests withtheOperations Section.The The taskofimplementingthestrategyandselecting Section, inconsultationwiththeOperationsOfficer. Incident ManagementTeam, inparticularthePlanning Development ofstrategyistheresponsibility ofthe Overview extinguish fires; 20.9 20.8 20.7 20.6 20.10 season communityeducationandawareness material. the Inquirybelievestheyshouldbeincludedinpre fire priorities willchangesignificantlyfrom yeartoyear, While wedonotenvisagethatthesefire control CFA andDSE. criticism ofthefirefighting strategies employedby or consultation–andthisledtoconfusion,anger modified –apparently without appropriate approval In atleastoneregion, these prioritieswere during andimmediatelyfollowingthefires. contributed tocommunityangerinsomeareas community. Thismayhavedirectly orindirectly managing thefires, butless understoodbythe believes theseprioritieswere wellknowntothose However, aswenotedinChapter15,theInquiry and directly contributedtothe positivefire outcomes. The Inquirybelievestheseprioritieswere appropriate On13February, afire ignitedonthesideof • OnTuesday 21January, newfires broke outnear • For example: principles ledtosuccessfulfire outcomes. was abletoidentifymanyinstanceswhere these In analysingtherecord ofthefire events,theInquiry contain thisfire. forotherfires,Bairnsdale were abletoquickly Firefighting resources, includingreserves heldat and commercial properties includingahospital. grassland andplantationsthreatened private This firethrough burnt nearly1,000hectares of Princes Freeway betweenMorwellandTraralgon. behaviour, thesefires were successfullycontained. new outbreaks. Despitesevere anderraticfire from reserves andothergoingfires tocontainthe fire outbreaks, resources were promptly redeployed asset protection andaggressive firstattackonnew accordance withtheprinciplesofcommunityand Beechworth, StanleyandMyrtleford townships.In posed significantthreat toprivateassetsandthe Beechworth atEldoradoandStanley. Thesefires INF.018.002.0297 INF.018.002.0298 CHAPTER 20 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART

Case Study: Yalmy Road In the first weeks of February the IMT at Orbost developed a control line along the south east boundary of the Snowy River National Park, using Yalmy Road. The strategy was to contain the fire at Yalmy Road if other control lines to the north proved ineffective, thereby protecting forest, parks and communities to the south. There has been extensive public and professional debate in relation to the appropriateness of the location and width of this line. In the end the break was not required as the fire was controlled to the north. It has been alleged that trees from the Snowy River National Park, pushed over by bulldozers during the construction of the control line, were subsequently milled in contravention of Government policy. The Inquiry formally wrote to the Secretary DSE, seeking advice. In response the Secretary has informed the Inquiry that: “On 21 February 2003 the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) initiated an investigation into the tree removal along the Yalmy Fire Control Line within the Snowy River National Park and the adjacent State forest. The investigation was launched following concerns raised about the works that were undertaken to prepare the Yalmy Control Line for backburning operations. These concerns related to the extent of tree removal, in particular the National Park, an assessment as to whether the works were excessive, consistent with prescriptions and achieved their prevention objectives. The investigation report is currently in draft form. The Department has sought legal advice in relation to aspects of the report, and in relation to the possible offences. The report is currently receiving further consideration.” Given the public significance of this issue, the Inquiry believes that Government must urgently resolve this issue in a transparent and public manner. Lessons Learnt The apparent inappropriate application of the fire control strategies by the Incident Management Team at Orbost may have been avoided if the agreed fire control priorities had been applied in a more considered way. Secondly, clear structures must be in place to supervise IMTs to ensure adherence to the fire control priorities and all other policy guidelines.

20.11 State-level Fire Control Priorities must be applied in a Aggressiveness of Firefighting local context. These priorities should be an integral part of municipal and agency planning and assist in the joint Criticisms of DSE and CFA’s Strategies development of contingency plans for fire suppression and Tactics strategies in all communities. This planning, described in Chapter 14, should then be a key input into the 20.14 Many submissions to the Inquiry were highly critical development of Incident Action Plans for specific of the strategies and tactics employed by DSE and incidents by Incident Management Teams. CFA in the management of the fires. These criticisms were made both by fire-affected communities and local CFA volunteers. (Chapter 17 discusses some of Recommendations these concerns in relation to the initial response to the bushfires.) 20.12 That CFA and DSE include agreed Fire Control Priorities in community awareness and education 20.15 The issues raised in these submissions were material provided to the community before each surprisingly consistent across all fires examined by fire season. the Inquiry, and fall into a number of areas:

20.13 That the fire agencies ensure Incident Action Plans developed by Incident Management Teams are consistent with, and built on, the agreed Fire Control Priorities. PAGE 191 PAGE 192 20.18 20.17 20.16 IncidentControl Centres beingestablished • Failure toadequatelyuselocalknowledge • interacting factorsandeventsincluding: the community. Thelikelyexplanationis oneof raisedbybothfirefightersfor theconcerns and The Inquirybelievesnoonefactorisresponsible The Inquiry’s View DSE andCFA. operational debriefprocesses undertakenby and decision-makingwasalsohighlightedinthe The needtoincludefront linepersonnelinplanning Theavailabilityofexperiencedfire ground • Theavailabilityoffirefighting resources, both • Thepriorityoffirefighter safety; • Thenumberofdaysveryhightoextreme • Thedrynessofthefuelandnumber • backburning: in evaluatingstrategyoptions,particularly indicated thatthefollowingfactorswere considered The InquiryputtheseissuestoDSEandCFA. They DSE andCFA’s ResponsestoCriticisms thatmanyresources Concerns were notdeployed • perceived failure earlyinthecampaigntodeploy A • Staff atIncidentControl Centres restricting the • perceived reluctance toundertakebackburning A • perceived reluctance toundertakedirect attack A • the fire front; (in somecases),aconsiderable distancefrom (discussed indetailbelow); operations. supervisors toundertakebackburning geographic spread ofthefire; and personnel andequipment,duetothesize fire danger; numbers ofspotfires; thatescapedorproducedbackburns large undertaken. effective fire suppression couldhavebeen to thefire linebutwere heldinreserve when aircraft forfire bombingactivities;and tactics thatfire ground supervisorscouldemploy; in litigation; general, andforfearfires would escape,resulting as amethodofconsolidatingcontrol lines–in recommendations; following theLintonCoronial Inquiry on firesoverfirefighter duetoconcerns safety 20.19 20.24 20.23 20.22 20.21 20.20 receiving approval aftertheopportunityhadpassed. prevented from undertakingtheoperation,or operationsandeitherbeing attack orbackburning approval from IncidentControl Centres fordirect fire Commanders andStrikeTeam Leadersreport seeking opportunities were lost.Division Commanders,Sector sectors ofsomefires. Anumber ofthese opportunities tosafelyandmore aggressively attack weather conditionsandfire behaviour provided The Inquiryhasconcludedthere were dayswhenlocal later inthisChapter. Wealso havealleviatedtheseconcerns. discussthis into thedevelopmentofstrategyandtacticswould Finally, more effective integrationoflocalknowledge selected strategiesandtactics. included aclearexplanationofthereasons for to fire ground managersduringthecampaignhad may havebeenaddressed ifthebriefingsprovided raised byfirefightersSecond, manyoftheconcerns Inquiry andmustbemaintained. This focusonfirefighter safetyissupportedbythe fire behaviourandfirefighter safety. programs stress theimportanceofunderstanding by bothDSEandCFA sincelate1999.These addition toenhancedtrainingprograms implemented following theLintoninquest.Theseinitiativesare in changes recommended Coroner bytheVictorian Project’. Thisproject implementsanumberof in thepast18months–‘SaferFire Fighting First, DSEandCFA haveundertakenamajorinitiative incident managers. and thewiderinfluencesaffecting DSEandCFA in thecontextofimportancefirefighter safety The Inquirybelievestheseissuesmustbeconsidered AIIMS–ICSbeingappliedtooprescriptively or • InexperienceonthepartofsomeIncident • failure onthepartofIncidentManagement A • Control Centres. inflexibly bysomestaff operating from Incident Controllers; and communities; selected strategiestobothfirefighters andaffected Teams tocommunicatethereasons behind INF.018.002.0299 INF.018.002.0300 CHAPTER 20 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 20.25 The Inquiry concludes there were some opportunities • Forecasts for significant changes in weather; where weather conditions, local fire behaviour and • Fire moving from one vegetation type to another; available resources could have justified a decision to and undertake a more aggressive or direct attack safely on • Changes in threatened topography and assets, as the fires during the campaign. While we can the fire progresses. speculate on the difference this decision might have made to property damage and losses, it is not 20.32 Some of these reasons are valid, however, others possible to objectively, or conclusively, assess the (such as vegetation, topography and weather impact it might have had on the total area burnt by forecasts) should be included in the strategic planning the fires. Nor is it possible to assess whether it would process at the Incident Control Centre. have reduced the impact of the fires on private 20.33 All should be part of comprehensive two-way property. communication between those responsible for firefighting strategy and those responsible for tactical Recommendations firefighting.

20.26 That DSE and CFA continue to stress firefighter 20.34 The Inquiry believes that implementing the safety as their highest priority for incident recommendations under the earlier section of this managers and fire ground supervisors. Chapter, ‘Aggressiveness of Firefighting Strategies’, will address some of these concerns. However, it is 20.27 That DSE and CFA ensure that agreed strategy and apparent that different Incident Controllers addressed tactics, and their rationale, be communicated to strategy development in significantly different ways. personnel involved in the fire fight and be For example, there were clearly instances where included in briefings for fire line personnel. strategy changes occurred when Incident Management Team shifts changed, or at the 20.28 That personnel assigned the roles of Division changeover following an Incident Management Commander, Sector Commander and Strike Team Team’s tour of duty. Leader on the fire ground are actively encouraged to provide input into the selection of strategies 20.35 This suggests a need to change the way in which and tactics. Incident Management Teams are monitored and guided. The Inquiry heard that the Integrated Multi- 20.29 That personnel assigned the roles of Division Agency Co-ordination Centres were responsible for Commander, Sector Commander and Strike Team overseeing the Incident Management Teams. Prior to Leader be given flexibility to alter tactics to take their establishment, this role was undertaken at CFA advantage of changed conditions on the fire Regional Emergency Co-ordination Centres and DSE ground. Regional Fire Co-ordination Centres.

20.36 A State-level Strategic Plan was prepared for Consistency of Strategy management of the fires. This plan was reviewed regularly and communicated to the Incident 20.30 A consistent theme in written submissions and during public consultation was the number of unexplained Management Teams via the Integrated Multi-agency changes in fire management strategy as the campaign Co-ordination Centres. DSE and CFA indicated this progressed. Firefighters, fire ground managers and plan gave direction to the Incident Management Incident Management Team members all expressed Teams in their development of Incident Action Plans. some frustration in relation to this issue. 20.37 In their submission, CFA suggest the appointment of one Incident Controller for the duration of an 20.31 DSE and CFA were asked to comment on this criticism and suggested a number of factors that influenced incident. DSE does not support this view and has how strategies were determined. They noted that concerns in relation to the fatigue and welfare of the these factors change over time depending on such officers involved. The Inquiry believes the issue of things as: consistency in strategy must be addressed.

• Rapidly changing fire behaviour; • Changes in fire development; • Actual changes in weather; PAGE 193 PAGE 194 20.42 20.41 20.40 20.39 20.38 Appendix III,p.10. 1 ContinuestoworkwithitsBrigadescomplete • Modifiesitsoperationalprocedurestoallowfor • Modifiesitsoperationalprocedurestoensure • the CFA: That, inpreparationforthecomingfireseason, Recommendation 2fromInterimReport report (AppendixIII) the recommendations madeintheInquiry'sinterim before thenextfire season.Accordingly, itwasoneof significance thatcould,andshould,beaddressed The Inquiryconsidered thistobeanissueof the fires. wasexpressedThis concern before, duringandafter during publicconsultations,andinthemedia. fires raisedinsubmissions, wasamajorconcern firefighting personnelintothemanagementof The useoflocalknowledgeandintegration Use ofLocalKnowledge changes. can bemaintainedatshiftandtourofduty ensure thatamoreconsistentstrategicapproach That CFA andDSEjointlydevelopproceduresto Fire ManagementPlan. ‘Fire ControlPriorities’,andtherelevantMunicipal response shouldreflecttheendorsedStatewide That the‘IncidentObjectives’establishedforany organisational planning. communities, andareincorporatedintobroader firefighters, firegroundsupervisorsandaffected strategies, theseareeffectively communicatedto implement significantchangestoobjectivesand That whenIncidentManagementTeams Recommendations structure. the integrationofAIIMS–ICSwithgroup more flexiblemanagementofstriketeams;and management; incorporated intotacticalandstrategicfire that localknowledgeisflexiblyandappropriately 1 . Ourrecommendations were: 20.44 20.43 20.46 20.45 local personnelfrom bothDSEandCFA. Creek andBeechworthallhadsignificantinputfrom Incident ManagementTeams atCorryong,Swifts where localknowledgewas usedveryeffectively. integrated intotheIncidentManagementTeams and instances where localfirefighting personnelwere Like allissuesraisedwiththeInquiry, there were incorporated intodecisionmaking. strategies andthatadvicefromthefiregroundis expertise inthedevelopmentoffiresuppression members whocanprovidelocalknowledgeand or appropriatelyexperiencedandqualifiedcommunity have fullaccesstothoseDepartmental,ParksVictoria Incident ControllersandManagementTeams That DSEreviewsprocedurestoensurethatall Recommendation 3fromInterimReport possible toovercome theseobstacles. communication strategiesare inplace,itshouldbe insurmountable. Iftheappropriate andnecessary This isacommunicationissueandnot recommended bylocalpersonnel. valid reasons fornotpursuingastrategy whole ofthefire and,consequently, mayhavevery has aresponsibility tomaintaintheoverviewof operating elsewhere. TheIncidentManagementTeam ground maycompromise thesafetyoffirefighters ataparticular pointonthefireundertake abackburn example, thesuggestionbylocalpersonnelto broader issuesimpactingonthefirefight. For limited understandinglocalpeoplemayhaveof Management Teams toutiliselocalknowledgeisthe A keyfactorinfluencingthewillingnessofIncident Theneedtomanagefatigueamongseniorfire • Thesmallernumberofpeoplelivinginsome • Thewillingnessoflocalpersonneltoundertake • Theneedforlocalvolunteerstoundertake • Thedurationofthefires andthetimethat • personnel forthisrole. Theseincluded: the IncidentManagementTeams, toaccesslocal Many factorsinfluencedtheabilityofDSE,CFA, and Team members. ground supervisorsandIncidentManagement regional areas; and roles inIncidentManagementTeams; protection oftheirownproperties; firefighting operations; volunteer personnelwere abletodevote INF.018.002.0301 INF.018.002.0302 CHAPTER 20 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART

Case Study: Tom Groggin – Mid January 2003 On 17 January 2003, the Pinnibar fire was burning to the north west of Tom Groggin. Tom Groggin Station is located in Victoria on the border between Victoria and NSW at the headwaters of the Murray River. A fire control strategy was agreed between the IMTs at Corryong in Victoria and Jindabyne in NSW. The broad strategy was to halt the southerly spread of the fire by containing it north of Tom Groggin in Victoria and the Alpine Way in NSW through the construction of control lines and backburning. The weather on 17 January was severe and fire behaviour was intense and erratic. There were major runs of the fire on this day which overran most of the control lines to the south. During the day firefighters from NSW commenced a backburn in NSW immediately north east of Tom Groggin Station, which burnt vigorously up slope from the ignition point. It appears the fire subsequently burnt back into Victoria in the northern end of the Station, burning out grazing land. The tactics employed by backburning under severe weather conditions to contain the fire were questioned by the manager of Tom Groggin station and local firefighters but these concerns were not heeded. While strategy was agreed between the NSW and Victorian IMTs, there are reservations about the tactics employed to implement the strategy, and their timing. Communication between the IMT at Corryong and Tom Groggin Station was undertaken on a regular basis. The family at Tom Groggin were actively engaged in fire suppression on and off their lease for an extended time and protected community assets in NSW. They were a partner in the suppression works as their equipment was used to undertake the construction of fire control lines in conjunction with equipment deployed by the IMT at Corryong. However Tom Groggin Station was left as a passive recipient of decisions Lessons Learnt This Case Study underlines the importance of effective communication and the establishment of partnerships between all personnel involved in responding to a fire. In determining what tactics to use, Incident Management Team members and fire ground commanders need to heed the advice provided by local fire agency personnel and landowners to ensure that the tactics applied are effective and will deliver the desired outcomes. In this case those at Tom Groggin were informally part of the fire control structure because of their isolation as well as being the community. Open and frank discussions on tactics across borders must also occur and it is clear that while strategies at the IMTs were agreed, tactical implementation was not agreed or discussed with the other ‘fire ground commander’ on the spot and therefore local knowledge was ignored.

20.47 There is still a need to address those instances where • Gaps in information used to make both tactical local knowledge could and should have been used and strategic decisions; and more effectively, namely: • Failure, on some occasions, to take advantage of opportunities for fire containment brought about • The failure of some Incident Management Team by lulls in the weather and fire behaviour. personnel, deployed from outside the fire area, to seek or utilise advice from local DSE and CFA 20.49 In recommending that local knowledge be better officers; and utilised, the Inquiry recognises that local staff and • The difficulty in ensuring that local officers were volunteers will also have to adjust. Instead of staffing integrated into the Incident Management Team. the local fire appliance, local staff and volunteers may need to blend with strike teams from other areas who 20.48 These situations had detrimental effects in specific need local knowledge. They may need to be areas, including: positioned in Incident Control Centres, not at the fire front. • Alienation of local personnel; • Frustration and isolation of local communities; 20.50 Accordingly, the Inquiry restates the concerns • Loss of confidence in the Incident Management discussed in the Interim Report and stresses the Teams at community level; importance of the recommendations made there. PAGE 195 PAGE 196 20.54 20.53 20.52 20.51 methods arepursuedtogreatesteffect. and processingfireinformationtoensureall That DSEandCFA reviewmethods ofgathering Recommendation to ensure itsaccuracy. importance ofbeingabletovalidateinformation sources ofintelligence.Theyalsonotedthe striking theappropriate balanceamongthevarious gathered. CFA’s response indicatedacommitmentto impacted ontheeffective useofsomeintelligence information withintheIncidentControl Centres that did acknowledgethere were gapsintheflowof gathering informationfrom allpossiblesources. They this issue,DSEindicatedtheyplaceimportanceon In theirresponse toaquestionputbytheInquiryon is addressed inChapter19. where IncidentControl Centres shouldbelocated a lackofconfidenceinsuchinformation.Theissue of informationaboutfire locationandbehaviour, and ground supervisors.Itcanalsoresult inthefiltering personally brief,andgaindirect feedbackfrom, fire ability ofIncidentManagementTeam membersto this problem. Inparticular, thispracticelimitsthe Centres somedistancefrom thefire contributedto It hasbeensuggestedthatlocatingIncidentControl line ormembersofthecommunity. and behaviourprovided bypersonnel onthefire reluctant toacceptinformation aboutfire location Management Teams were, insomeinstances, submissions madetotheInquirythatindicateIncident scanning capability. Thesecommentscontrastwith infraredsmoke loggingandthelackofairborne line the lackofaircraft reconnaissance capabilitydueto At thetimeofresponse, the reasons oftengivenwere understanding ofthefire’s locationandbehaviour. Teams founditdifficult todevelopanaccurate On anumberofoccasions,IncidentManagement Information Gathering 20.56 20.55 20.59 20.58 20.57 managing theborder fires. regular teleconferences todiscussstrategyfor Jindabyne. IncidentControllers alsotookpartin Wales RuralFire ServiceIncidentControl Centre at Officer wasappointedtoworkoutoftheNewSouth New SouthWales Liaison aVictorian andVictoria, strategy betweentheIncidentManagementTeams in maintaineffective liaisonandconsistencyof To strategy forfire containment. managing resources andestablishingeffective presents anumberofco-ordination problems for of fire impactingacross Stateborders iscommonand andSouthAustralia.Theincidence between Victoria National Parkaffected asmall sectionoftheborder and NewSouthWales. Thefire intheBigDesert on over120kilometres ofborder betweenVictoria The NorthEastandGippslandfires directly impacted Development Cross BorderLiaisonandStrategy poor qualityphotocopies. provided tofire ground supervisorsandcrews were reading difficult. Insomeinstances,theonlymaps in excessofwhatwasrequired, andmademap indicated thatthedetailonthesemapswasoftenfar of personnelwhoprovided submissionstotheInquiry Geographic InformationSystems.However, anumber significantly inrecent yearswiththedevelopmentof available tofire ground managershasimproved quality ofdocumentationprovided. Mappingmade nature ofbriefingsprovided tothemandthevarying and CFA expressedtotheInquiryabout concerns Firefighters andfire linesupervisorsfrom bothDSE Briefings were madeinPartC,Chapter15. Recommendations inrelation tointerstateliaison resulted inunplannedoutcomes. Jindabyne), whileconsistentwithagreed strategies, (at thedirection oftheIncidentManagementTeam at New SouthWales tacticaloperationsandtheirtiming effective. Itwassubmittedthere were occasionswhen SouthWalesVictorian–New border wasnotalways Incident ManagementTeams traversingthe ordination andimplementationofstrategybetween Submissions madetotheInquirysuggestthatco- INF.018.002.0303 INF.018.002.0304 CHAPTER 20 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 20.60 The operational debriefing process conducted by • The Wulgulmerang and Suggan Buggan areas on DSE and CFA identified a concern among some 30 January where fire intensity and the danger of firefighters that, on occasion, briefings for DSE and falling trees over the only access route presented CFA personnel were conducted separately. There were a risk to firefighter safety. also occasions when the information provided during briefings was inconsistent. The Inquiry is of the view 20.66 While the Inquiry supports the primary focus on that to enable effective joint operations, joint the safety of firefighters at all times, there is a need briefings of all responding agencies are critical. to ensure a clear process for making and, where appropriate, documenting and communicating such a determination. Recommendations

20.61 That DSE and CFA review the standards and Recommendation protocols for documentation, including mapping, provided to fire line managers as part of their 20.67 That DSE and CFA ensure that: briefing notes, to ensure these are concise and • A clear process is established for determining appropriate. whether a specific location is, or is no longer, 20.62 That operational briefings in multi-agency fires a ‘no go zone’ or an area into which it is too should, wherever possible, be joint briefings of all dangerous to deploy resources, and that agencies involved. affected communities are advised as soon as possible of the determination, the reasons for such determination and what actions they ‘No Go Zones’ should take as a result; and • Where the Incident Management Team, Division 20.63 In Chapter 14 we commented on the need for holistic Commander, Sector Commander and/or Strike planning for fire and emergencies. As part of that Team Leader identify an area as a ‘no go zone’ planning we recommended that DSE and CFA work or an area into which it is too dangerous to with communities to identify areas where the safety deploy resources, the reasons for that of firefighters may be compromised during severe designation are recorded by the Incident fire behaviour. Management Team in the incident log.

20.64 During the fire campaign there were a number of occasions when Incident Management Teams and fire Use of Bulldozers line supervisors determined that some areas were unsafe for firefighters to enter or remain, due to the 20.68 In their submissions to the Inquiry, a number of nature of the fuel loads, problems with access and landowners and community members questioned the egress or the intensity of fire behaviour at the time. use of bulldozers for construction of fire control lines. These determinations were in addition to areas in In particular, the environmental impact of this work in existing pre-incident plans already identified by DSE sensitive soil and vegetation types on both private and CFA regional personnel as too dangerous for the and public land was cause for concern, along with deployment of firefighting personnel during severe the difficulty of rehabilitating the affected areas after fire behaviour. the fire.

20.65 Examples put forward by CFA and DSE include: 20.69 Conversely, concerns were also expressed about the apparent reluctance to deploy bulldozers in sensitive • The upper reaches of the Buckland River Valley areas because of the potential damage to the where access and egress for firefighters was of environment. A number of fire ground supervisors concern due to both the density of the forest and expressed some frustration at the restrictions they felt the nature of the access road; Incident Management Teams had imposed on their • The Anglers Rest area on 26 January where the fire use of bulldozers. intensity was so great that firefighters could not safely negotiate the road into the area; and PAGE 197 PAGE 198 20.76 20.75 20.74 20.73 20.72 20.71 20.70 to activelyparticipateintactical decision-making. communicate disempowersthose onthefire ground open toquestion(andtheywere). Suchfailure to planned outcomesthentactical decisionsare more front lineisnotfullyinformedofthestrategyandits intermediate control andsupervisorypositions.Ifthe communicated tothoseontheground andthosein the strategicdecisionstakenwere noteffectively More importantly, however, theInquiryfoundthat to more aggressively attackthefire. ground and,assuch,opportunitieswere missed responsive tothechangingconditionsonfire to implementthestrategieswere bothflexibleand The Inquiryislesssatisfiedthatthetacticsdeveloped foundthatthehigh-levelandlocal-level We tactical response. strategy andtheexecutionofstrategiesthrough The Inquiryreviewed boththedevelopmentof Conclusion consequential rehabilitationworks. agreed standardarenotre-engagedforthe that contractorswhohavenotperformedtoan are routinelycompletedpostfireseason,toensure That qualitycontrolorperformanceassessments supervised. effectively, appropriatelyandareadequately fire suppressionoperationstoensuretheyareused the managementandapplicationofbulldozersin That DSEandCFA workco-operativelytoreview Recommendations Incident ManagementTeams isrequired. this matter, theInquirybelievesthatclarificationfor been missed.Giventhecleardivergenceofviewson mineral earthbreaks tocontain thefires mayhave that opportunitiestodeploybulldozersbuild bulldozer operators.There is alsoevidencetosuggest supervision orlackofexperienceonthepartsome control lineswere constructeddemonstratedalackof appropriate tactic.Inaddition, thewayinwhich decision todeploybulldozerswasnotthemost conclude there were anumberofcaseswhere the The Inquirywasprovided with sufficient evidenceto and havebeen. some instanceswhere thesecouldbequestioned fires were overallsoundandappropriate. There are strategies developedtocontrol andsuppress the INF.018.002.0305 PART D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PAGE 199 CHAPTER 20 INF.018.002.0306 d that the inology used did not due to the intensity of the fire. Other vehicles, due to the intensity of the fire. Other * The directive issued by the IMT at Orbost indicated that crews should take refuge at an anchor point, however DSE have indicate at an anchor point, however DSE should take refuge issued by the IMT at Orbost indicated that crews The directive is Safety Zone. The Inquiry is of the view that the term took refuge the crews term to describe the locations where appropriate the outcome. affect * Case Study: Gelantipy and Wulgulmerang – 30 January 2003 and Wulgulmerang Case Study: Gelantipy district on 24 January. Wulgulmerang in the Gelantipy, conducted a briefing for the community DSE and CFA during the to impact on the district at some time acknowledged that the fire was likely At that time it was by both assets were developed and implemented for the protection of homes and other following weeks. Plans DSE and residents. Command Point at Karoonda Park, Gelantipy on 28 January. The IMT at Orbost established a Divisional Fire and Rescue Service allocated to and Queensland vehicles from CFA Resourcing was minimal; 16 fire fighting of local DSE slip-ons and bulldozers also working in the area. the Division on 29 January and a number experts Fire behaviour 29 January for Thursday 30 January. on Wednesday Fire Ban was declared A Total and Gelantipy late in the day the fire could impact on Wulgulmerang predicted that, as a worst-case scenario; on Sunday 2 February. of 30 January but more likely 3 days later about the fire behaviour experienced the previous night and early that Early morning 30 January information was available from the IMT at Swifts Creek and was passed on to the morning in the area east of Benambra was not forwarded to the Divisional Command Point at Gelantipy. IMT at Orbost. It appears this intelligence an increase in fire intensity on the morning of who observed officer Local residents and a Parks Victoria Divisional Command Point. What weight was given to this information 30 January provided this advice to the Point is unclear. by the personnel at the Divisional Command area, firefighters were deployed from impacting on the Wulgulmerang When it became apparent that fire was back to Wulgulmerang. the Divisional staging area at Gelantipy where high winds were bringing down trees and other debris, and spot They travelled through forested areas around them. Some of the firefighting vehicles arrived at fires were being ignited and burning fiercely safety zone but had to take refuge at a Wulgulmerang including a number from Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, were caught on the road by falling trees. Action including a number from Queensland their escape to safe ground. This event had a assisted officer by local landowners and a Parks Victoria particular those who had not had any exposure to extreme bushfire significant impact on the firefighters, in clearly traumatised by their experience. and were behaviour, resources in the the IMT at Orbost had issued a directive to all Due to the extreme weather and fire behaviour, Following the passage of the fire, Gelantipy Division to go to a safety zone and remain until otherwise advised. team leader was unable to gain local residents approached the firefighters seeking their assistance. The strike from the Orbost IMT. approval to move from the safety zone to undertake firefighting operations within the fire services, The Inquiry has formed the view that there was systemic communication failure staff Secondly, Point at Gelantipy. particularly at and between the IMT at Orbost and the Divisional Command nor did they have the at Divisional Command Point at Gelantipy did not receive the support they needed Such a finding regarding resources or information to deal with the circumstances that confronted them. that they were completely support could be made in respect to the Orbost IMT however it is also clear overwhelmed with the task at hand and had become cautious. the actual conditions observed by the strike team leader on the fire ground after the passage of the fire Finally, It is the finding of the Inquiry front was not given due weight by the IMT and the Division Command Point. on 30 January, Wulgulmerang that the severity of the weather and the intensity of the fire that burnt through severe of any that occurred which has subsequently been shown by fire intensity mapping to be the most incident managers and the community. overwhelmed the firefighters, throughout the summer, Lessons Learnt in an accurate and timely manner Lessons from this case study include the importance of passing on information appears a factor here. and that such information must be processed immediately and acted upon. Fatigue local knowledge was not fully incorporated into decision making either prior to or after the firestorm. Secondly, advice of those on the fire ground. The IMT at Orbost was too cautious after the event and failed to act on the but strategy and the guiding principles for managing a fire rest with the senior members of the IMT, Finally, commanders. This did not determining the tactics to implement those strategies must be left to fire ground happen on this occasion. PAGE 200 Chapter 21 21.5 21.4 21.3 21.2 21.1 Other ResponseIssues system whichisstillundertrial. been supplementedinrecent yearsbyabarcoding commanders tomanageresources. Thissystemhas currently inusebyCFA andalsousedbyfield Control Centres. Apaper-based ‘Tcard’ systemis computerbasedinformationsystem developedbyCFA tosupportmanagement of emergenciesatRegionalandStatelevel. A 1 the forces undertheircontrol. maintain anoverviewofthelocationandtasking when itbecamedifficult forincidentmanagersto The Inquirywastoldofoccasionsduringthefires Incident ManagementSystem State andregional levelresource tracking.The backup. CFA alsohaveacomputer-based systemfor occasions, amanual,card-based systemisusedas DSE useacomputer-based system(IRIS);on Management Team. resources oncetheyare allocatedtoanIncident different systemsfortrackingthedeploymentof at Stateandincidentlevel.DSECFA have need forimproved resource trackingcapability, both incident managersandfirefighters, highlightedthe Submissions from DSEandCFA, andinputfrom Resources Keeping Track ofFirefighting CommunicationsfacilitiesusedbyDSEandCFA • Thesystemstotrackvehiclesandpersonnelwhen • Theeffective deploymentoffirefighting personnel • In particular, itlooksat: through submissionsandduring publicconsultation. response tothefires thatwere raisedwiththeInquiry relatingThis Chapternotesanumberofconcerns to Authority (CFA) tomanagetheresponse tofire. Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)andCountryFire many systemsdevelopedbytheDepartmentof capability includingfirefighting equipmentandthe summer testedallaspectsoftheState’s response The fires thatoccurred duringthe2002–2003 Overview during firefighting operations. they havebeendeployedtoafire; and firefighting vehicles; and equipment,includingprivately-owned 1 is notusedatIncident 21.7 21.6 21.10 21.9 21.8 management. to supportthematvariouslevelsofoperational basis, theyrequire labour-intensive manualsystems some resource trackingcapabilityonaStatewide While DSEandCFA computer-based systemsprovide Management Team. becomes theresponsibility of theIncident controller, trackingtheprecise locationandtasking an incidentandunderthecontrol ofanincident However, oncetheseresources are deployedto within thegreatermetropolitan Melbourne area. StateEmergencyService(VICSES)resourcesVictorian Services Board (MFESB),CFA, Ambulance,Policeand deployment ofMetropolitan Fire andEmergency sophisticated computer-based systemforthe alsomaintainsa Communications Victoria are inplaceforresource tracking.Emergency At Statelevel,anumberofdifferent systems teams couldbeimproved. firefighting crew, andthemanagementofstrike particular, themanagementofshiftchanges for provided fortheInquirytoconcludethat,in firefighting resources. Sufficient evidencewas aboutthemanagement ofsome raised concerns contribution andsacrifice,anumberofsubmissions wouldacknowledgetheir While mostVictorians erratic andunpredictable fire behaviour. and terraintheywere oftenconfronted byvery frequently undertakeninthemostdifficult ofweather threatened oraffected byfire. Theirworkwas worked hard toprotect communitieswhowere 2002–2003 summer, were extremely dedicated.They volunteer –whowere deployedduringthe The firefighters andsupportagencies–bothpaid Resources intheField Management ofFirefighting resource trackingduringmajorfiresandincidents. operatively toestablishacommonsystemfor That DSE,CFA, MFESBandVICSESworkco- Recommendation INF.018.002.0307 INF.018.002.0308 CHAPTER 21 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Shift Changes Management of Privately-Owned Firefighting Resources 21.11 On a number of occasions the change of shift took up to three hours to complete. This process included 21.15 Within the farming communities of regional Victoria, the feeding of crews, briefings, and travel time from unplanned fire is a fact of life. Many farmers and staging areas to the fire line. The reasons for any residents have a strong connection with the land and particular delay in changing shift varied significantly. an appropriate respect for, and understanding of, the However, the key issue that emerged was how well fire threat. As part of their response, many property prepared the responsible Incident Management Team owners have purchased or developed their own was. More attention to this aspect of resource firefighting capability to protect their properties. This management is required. equipment may include purpose-built firefighting tankers, decommissioned CFA tankers, or trailer- Strike Team Protocols mounted tankers. When threatened by fire, community members support their friends and 21.12 The protocols for management of strike teams, neighbours, often using privately-owned firefighting specifically within CFA, require clarification. The equipment. Inquiry heard numerous accounts of strike team leaders maintaining very rigid control over the 21.16 The fires of 2002–2003 were no exception and there resources under their control. On some occasions this were many occasions when privately-owned was to the point where crews were not permitted to firefighting equipment was deployed in support of operate out of the strike team leader’s sight. We DSE and CFA resources. On some occasions, privately- discussed this issue earlier in Part D, and note that it owned equipment was the first to arrive at the fire is already being addressed by the CFA. However, it is and, due to the heavy commitment of DSE and CFA clear that CFA strike team leaders need to be briefed resources, fought the fire for some time before DSE more thoroughly on their role. They must also be or CFA crews arrived. flexible in how they manage the resources they are responsible for, while recognising the need for 21.17 A number of challenges are posed by the presence firefighter safety. of this type of firefighting equipment at fires. Most important is the safety of those people operating the 21.13 Additionally, Incident Controllers should also consider equipment. Other challenges include the the need, in some situations, for deployment of appropriateness of privately owned firefighting individual resources to effectively implement their equipment for the task, and the ability of the incident strategies, rather than strike teams. They should and fire ground managers to communicate with the source these accordingly. people involved and integrate them into the broader strategy for safely controlling the fire.

Recommendation 21.18 Residents of regional communities will always work co-operatively to support each other in times of crisis. 21.14 That DSE and CFA review the management of Accordingly, the Inquiry understands that privately- personnel deployed ensuring that: owned firefighting equipment will always be part of • Shift changeovers of fire line personnel and the response to fires in Victoria. It is vital that all fire line supervisors are conducted in such a involved are able to operate in as safe an way that the fire line is not left inappropriately environment as possible, and in a co-ordinated unattended; manner. • Management protocols for Strike Teams are made more flexible; and • Strike Team Leaders and Task Force Leaders undertake refresher training in the management of resources under their control. PAGE 201 PAGE 202 21.23 21.22 21.21 21.20 21.19 Auditor-General Victoria, 2 system’s positiveperformance. of firefighters whospoketotheInquirynoted to haveovercome manypastproblems. Anumber Incident CommunicationsChannelsystemappears Centres wasproblematic. Inmostcases,theDSE Divisional CommandPointsorIncidentControl communication betweenthefire ground and a numberofremote mountainvalleyswhere radio terrain inwhichthefires wereThere burning. were widespread asmighthavebeenexpected,giventhe needs offirefighters,were theseconcerns notas radio communicationnetworksdidnotmeetallthe While theInquirywasmadeaware ofinstanceswhere Incident Control Centre. fire ground, andbetweenthefire ground andthe particularly communicationbetweenresources onthe identified communicationasasignificantproblem, Previous Inquiriesintobushfire eventshaveinvariably Communications Facilities ‘slip-on’ typeequipment. given tothenumberanddistributionofsmaller in service.Inparticular, considerationshouldbe review themixoffirefightingappliancescurrently That CFA, havingregardtoterrain,continue Recommendation of thistypevehicleintheCFA fleet. submissions alsosupportedanincrease inthenumber firefighting inremote andruggedterrain.Severalof of equipmentisparticularlyappropriate for units tosupplementtheirestablishedfleet.Thistype order foranumberofadditionalslip-onfirefighting However, duringthefire campaign,DSEplacedan reliably andwasgenerallysuitable tothetask. equipment operatedbyDSEandCFA functioned Based onsubmissionstotheInquiry, thefirefighting Firefighting Vehicles integrated intothefireresponse. privately ownedfirefightingequipmentshouldbe communicate clearguidelinesonhowandwhen with stakeholders,CFA andDSEdevelop That, asamatterofurgencyandinconsultation Recommendation Fire PreventionandPreparedness , Government Printer,, Government May2003. 21.26 21.25 21.24 21.29 21.28 21.27 response fortheforthcomingfire season. recommendation toDSEandCFA forimmediate recommendation andcommendsthe The InquirysupportstheAuditor-General’s weredebriefs, indicatedthattheseconcerns valid. Comments madeduringDSEandCFA’s operational 2003 report significant contributingfactortothisproblem. Inhis discipline onthepartoffirefighters appearstobea with competingmessages.Inconsistentradio systems havethepotentialtobecomeoverloaded Firefighters arethat openchannelradio concerned firefighters. the fires wasraisedbyanumber ofindividualsand Frequency (UHF)andCitizen Band(CB)radiosduring Similarly, thevalueandeffectiveness ofUltraHigh on thepartofagencies. an issuethatrequires ongoingstudyandnegotiation confused andfrustrated.TheInquirybelievesthisis agencies andmultiplejurisdictionscanbecome endeavouring toco-ordinate resources from multiple frequencies andprotocols. Fire ground supervisors continues tobeproblematic withanarrayofsystems, Radio communicationbetweeninterstateagencies determine anappropriate technicalsolution. possible fortheInquiry, inthetimeavailable, to issue andputproposalsItwasnot toGovernment. marginal ornon-existent.CFA haveinvestigatedthis where radioreception from fixedtransmittersis identified anumberof‘blackspots’across theState support effective incidentmanagement.Theyhave current viabilityoftheexistingradiosystemsto CFA aboutthe haveraisedanumberofconcerns improvement onprevious arrangements. shorter durationincidents,itisasignificant interim measure andnotonethatcanbeusedin the fire ground. AlthoughthisisseenbyCFA asan radio repeaters toaddress gapsinradiocoverageon CFA were alsoabletodeploya numberofportable Radio Infrastructure for on-the-ground communications training’. pre-season, hands-onrefresher traininginradiouse ‘the DSEandtheCFA introduce arequirement for 2 , theAuditor-General recommended that INF.018.002.0309 INF.018.002.0310 CHAPTER 21 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 21.30 The Inquiry wishes to acknowledge the number of positive comments received from both the public and the firefighting agencies on Telstra’s performance during the fire response. On a number of occasions, emergency service personnel offered unsolicited praise for the efforts of Telstra staff in providing the necessary telecommunications infrastructure and surge capacity to enable a co-ordinated response.

Recommendations

21.31 That DSE and CFA work with the Bureau of Emergency Services Telecommunications to ensure that rural communication issues are appropriately addressed in the Statewide Integrated Public Safety and Communications Strategy, and that priorities and business cases are agreed for Helitack - Medium Helicopter fitted with belly tank for water and foam drops. critical issues.

21.32 That CFA develop protocols to integrate Ultra High Frequency and Citizen Band radios into their communication structures. PAGE 203 PAGE 204 Chapter 22 22.5 22.4 22.3 22.2 22.1 and theStateAircraftUnit Aircraft Operations efficient toolinmanysituations’. fire suppression isindeedasafe,effective and Australasian Fire Authorities Council,2002, 1 This Chaptersummarisesthereport findings. report isatAppendixVII. DBA, MBA,FDip.ComEng.,AAvPA, ATPL. Thefull Meyer AM,ATPL, andreviewed byDrBobDannatt Resources document –‘ ‘AVISE’, toreport onthissubject.Theresulting The Inquirycommissionedanindependentconsultant, effectiveness ofthisresource. Accordingly, itisimportanttodeterminethe State toanaerialfirefighting capabilityissignificant. acknowledge thatthefinancialcommitmentby The Inquiryagrees withtheseviews.We also Aerialsuppression mustbeintegratedwithother • Optimumreturnscomefrom rapidattackon • Aerialsuppression isnotalwaysappropriate for • following qualifications. However, thatendorsementissubjecttothe Strategy Authorities Council’s NationalAerialFireFighting in whichthefireIn isburning. including weatherconditions,visibilityandtheterrain bear inmindthelimitationsaffecting theiroperation complement ground attack. However, itiscriticalto replace on-ground firefighters but,rather, resources usedtosuppress bushfires. Theydonot Aircraft are animportantelementofthemix Overview in isolation. fire operationsandisgenerallyineffective ifused degree ofeffectiveness insuppressing thefire. the timetakentocarryoutfirstdrop andthe for this,andthere isadirect correlation between incipient fires. Aircraft needtobereadily available need tobemanaged. reasons ofeffectiveness andsafety. Expectations 1 , thefire agenciesacknowledge that,‘aerial ’ –wasprepared byCaptainNickLe-Ray- A ReportonAerialFireFighting Australasian Fire National AerialFirefightingStrategy 22.8 22.7 22.6 22.10 22.9 Operationalprocedures foruseofaircraft in • Provision ofspecialisedaircraft resources for • categories: The IFAR arrangementscanbebroadly splitintotwo signed bybothparties. Firefighting Aircraft Resource (IFAR) agreement, This initiativewasformalisedintheIntegrated aircraft operations’. maximise safety, effectiveness andefficiency of duplication ofresources andeffort withanaimto operations betweenthetwoagencies…toavoid systems formanagementandsupportofallaircraft ‘as farasispracticable,standardise procedures and Authority (CFA) reached agreement thattheywould: and Environment (NRE),and theCountryFire In 1989,theformerDepartmentofNaturalResources Resource Integrated FirefightingAircraft State FleetAircraft shouldbeconsidered synonymous. for thepurposeofthisreport, thetermsIFAR and as aconsequenceofthenamechanges.Accordingly, the IFAR agreement were notsubjecttorenegotiation Aircraft’. Ongoingaircraft contractsestablishedunder new agreement introduced theterm‘StateFleet the substanceremained essentiallyunchanged,the DSE supersededtheprevious agreements. Although a revised Co-operativeAgreement betweenCFA and Department ofSustainabilityandEnvironment (DSE), In October2002,subsequenttoDNREbecomingthe signed byNREandCFA inSeptember2002. reconfirmed intheCo-operativeAgreement jointly establishment ofaStateAircraft Unit.Thiswas significant advancefrom thisprocess wasthe ‘Safe ForestFireFighting’ On 1August2000,theCFA andDNREPositionPaper , Melbourne. operations isenhanced. procedures are standardised andsafetyof firefighting activities,withaviewtoensuringthat administration andsupportarrangements; firefighting alongwiththeassociatedoperational was jointlysigned.Themost INF.018.002.0311 INF.018.002.0312 CHAPTER 22 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Assessment of Aircraft Requirements Review of the 2002–2003 Aircraft for the 2002–2003 Fire Season Type/Mix Assessment

22.11 The Chief Fire Officer, DSE and the Chief Officer, 22.17 Our attempts to determine the validity of this CFA are jointly responsible for determining the assessment of aircraft requirements were hampered, resources to be provided in the coming fire season. to a large extent, by the paucity of collated, By September 2002, as in previous years, the State qualitative information. Information from previous fire Aircraft Unit was consulting with specialists from seasons on the effectiveness of the ‘base fleet’ would NRE/DSE and CFA to determine what, if any, changes have helped in this regard. (We discuss the lack of were required to the total aircraft numbers and types this information later in this Chapter.) for the 2002–2003 fire season. 22.18 Nevertheless, two documents were located and 22.12 The number and mix of aircraft (base load resources provide a useful basis for, at least, a subjective to meet Victoria’s ‘normal’ fire situation) contracted assessment. They are ‘Model of Fire Cover for Fire for the 2001–2002 season2, were: Suppression3’ and a draft report from the Forest Science Centre4. These are discussed further in • Six light helicopters; Appendix VII. • Five medium helicopters; • Ten fixed-wing bombers; and Identification and Use of Other Firefighting • Three other specialist aircraft Aircraft Resources - One linescan fixed-wing aircraft - One light fixed-wing aeroplane 22.19 State Aircraft Unit management advised the Inquiry - One Erickson S64 crane heavy helicopter. that they would consider the introduction of additional aircraft types when assessing the 22.13 Specialist advice indicated a higher risk of bushfire appropriate size and mix of aircraft resources. for the 2002–2003 season. Based on that advice, the State Aircraft Unit considered that if the 2001–2002 22.20 For example, having participated in the March 1996 fleet was supplemented by one medium helicopter, evaluation of the CL415 ‘scooper’ specialist and one light helicopter, it should be adequate to firefighting amphibian, they were well aware of its meet the ‘normal fire situation’. The respective Chief capabilities. Its addition to the 2002–2003 fleet was Fire Officer DSE, and the Chief Officer CFA, approved not considered either necessary or viable for a this fleet. number of reasons including:

22.14 The proposed aircraft mix provided core capability for: • Load factor compared to the S64; • Reconnaissance and control (the light helicopters • Availability of ‘refill’ sources given the prevailing and linescan aeroplanes); low capacities of suitable water sites (large • Rappelling and movement of ground personnel reservoirs, lakes); and directly into or from fire areas; and • Contractual difficulties including costs vis-à-vis • Fire bombing. other comparable types such as the S64.

22.15 Based on previous State Aircraft Unit experience, this 22.21 In accordance with its assigned operating principles, constituted an affordable and flexible rapid response, the State Aircraft Unit did not consider the use of and effective capability. helicopter or fixed-wing operators who had not demonstrated a level of operational competency to 22.16 The State Aircraft Unit acknowledged there is always State Aircraft Unit standards. The State Aircraft Unit a risk of higher peak demand on some occasions. The contends that mixing unknown operational normal ‘staged’ movement of fire seasons across the performance competencies can be detrimental to country is from north to south. There was an overall safety and counter productive. They also expectation that additional medium and high-capacity indicated that the use of light helicopters to carry aircraft, including the S64 cranes being contracted by small capacity buckets is generally ineffective – both New South Wales, could be available to meet such an from a suppression and cost basis. event. This view was in accord with the Australasian Fire Authority Council’s proposed National Aerial Firefighting Strategy.

2 We have not included aircraft contracted solely for transport of personnel to, from and within fire regions. 3 DNRE, September 2000. 4 Draft Research Report No 52 – The Effectiveness of Aircraft Operations in Fire Management, July 2003. PAGE 205 PAGE 206 22.24 22.23 22.22 BusinessProtocols. • Operational Protocols; and • Standards; • Parties, theStateAircraft Unitwastoestablish: Additionally, inconsultationandagreement withthe There willbeacommitmenttocontinuous • RelevantdataandinformationheldbyCFA and • Allaircraft resources willbeeffectively, efficiently • Commonstandards andmodesofaircraft • Aircraft andresources willbeshared; • Safetyistheparamountconsiderationinall • important, severalare keytothisreview: under whichtheUnitwouldoperate.Whileallare CFA (‘theParties’)specifiedthegeneralprinciples In establishingtheStateAircraft Unit,NRE/DSEand General andOperatingPrinciples of theState(IFAR) Aircraft State AircraftUnitandManagement Thelocationofexistingnominatedoperational • Despitethelackofeithersignificantqualitativeor • subjectiveassessmentofaircraft requirements A • review ofthefire dangerforthe2002–2003 A • pilots andcontractors),weconcludethat: (including ground personnel, airattacksupervisors, discussions withaerialfirefighting participants Based ondocumentationavailabletothereview and Findings performance improvement. and NRE/DSE willbefreely availableandexchanged; and professionally managed; operation willapply; operations; post fire seasondata. not beenperiodicallyreviewed usingquantitative bases satisfiesbasicstrategicrequirements buthas obligations); and assessed threat, budgetconstraintsandcontractual 2003–2003 fire seasonwasreasonable (giventhe of aircraft agreed byDSEandtheCFA forthe 2001–2002 aircraft fleet,the numbersandmix objective assessmentoftheeffectiveness ofthe to meettheassessedthreat was conducted; fire seasonwasconducted; 22.27 22.26 22.25 22.30 22.29 22.28 agency. and useoftheassetisassumedbyrequesting asset tobedispatched.Oncedispatched,thecontrol It hasnorole indeterminingthenumberortypeof The StateAirDeskactssolelyasthedispatchagency. available tothejointagencies. aircraft assetsandcompetent operationalstaff are that ofa‘serviceprovider’. That is,itensures that management ofjointaircraft operationsisessentially Our review establishedthat State Aircraft Unit Management These are publishedintheAir OperationsManual. standards aswellgeneral operatingprocedures. and unequivocalpersonnel,equipmentaircraft the StateAircraft Unithasestablished asetofclear Using thefundamentalsdevelopedbyitspredecessor, esuggestthatthesecommentshaveprobably We claimed tobeunbalanced. Inessence,integration was raised thisconcern. personnel. FormalsubmissionstotheInquiryalso and CFA, theUnitfavoursDSEactivitiesand that, ratherthanbeingajointunitservingbothDSE firefighting foranumberofyears,expressed theview its role. Severalpersonsactivelyinvolvedin theStateAircraftconcerning Unit’s managementof disquiet, bordering ondiscontentinsomeinstances, The review wasconfronted withanelementof Integration: ServingbothDSEandCFA? final authorityonflightsafety. the aircraft pilotforadviceastheaircraft pilotisthe turbulence. Eventhen,theStateAircraft Unitrelies on inadequate in-flightvisibilityorunacceptablelevelsof can bedeniedonflightsafetygrounds, suchas command and/orcontrol role. However, dispatch State Co-ordinators, itdoesnothaveadirect advice ontheuseofaviationassetstorespective While theStateAircraft Unitispermittedtooffer offered. bias simplybecauselittle,ifany, explanationwas ‘callout’ ofanotherAAS–were opentoclaimsof already whobecameavailableafterthe airborne Desk staff involved–suchastheuseofanAAS actions thatare seeminglyrationaltotheStateAir Aircraft UnitandtheStateAirDesk.Moreover, resulted from therapidestablishmentofState INF.018.002.0313 INF.018.002.0314 CHAPTER 22 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 22.31 A ‘snapshot’ examination of air desk logs established Findings no instances to support claims of bias. Moreover, the State Aircraft Desk’s activities are co-ordinated by the 22.36 The independent consultant fount that: State Aircraft Co-ordinator with the respective DSE or CFA State Co-ordinators. In the event that there are • The conduct of aerial firefighting in Victoria is any conflicting requests: generally well structured – and has no peer in Australia. • Solely within DSE or CFA, the CFA State Co- • State Aircraft Unit business protocols are generally ordinator determines CFA priorities and DSE State soundly based, especially contractual Co-ordinator determines DSE priorities; and arrangements. However, fleet assessment and mix • Inter-agency, the DSE and CFA State Co-ordinators should be based on quantitative and objective confer and determine the priority. In the event that data. Further, a compliance audit program of all they cannot agree, the matter is referred to the contractors should be considered. Chief Fire Officer, DSE and the Chief Officer, CFA • Establishment of the State Aircraft Unit has for determination. resulted in some integration issues. Primarily, these are communication rather than cultural problems. 22.32 Since the activities of the State Air Desk are While maintaining overall competency standards, supervised by both agencies internally and externally, there must be some acknowledgment that CFA the opportunities for officers to exercise any bias – relies substantially on volunteer support. Training even if so inclined – appear limited. We therefore programs and opportunities as well as conclude that the complaints probably reflect poor communication of change must be mindful of this communication of the new functions and their modus at all times. operandi. • Timely and useful collated operational reporting is incomplete and, in some instances, not available. Operational Reporting Further, there was no apparent concern at its absence. 22.33 The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) and agency procedures require that reports be furnished for various activities. Despite Deployment of Aircraft During excellent departmental IT systems, there is a paucity Operations of readily available aircraft operational data that is collated, qualitative and objective. Aggregate Flying Hours 22.37 Data made available to this review shows that some 22.34 The purpose of a constructive reporting system should 3,335 flying hours were used in support of the North be to (at least): East and Gippsland fires. Excluding training, aircraft • Record the events that have occurred and, plans deployed by the State Aircraft Unit flew just over and decisions taken; 5,000 hours on fire operations during the 2002–2003 • Provide a basis to assess effectiveness; and season. Of this total, some 3,300 hours were used in • Provide a basis for future action. the Alpine fires.

22.35 We found that Incident Management Team reporting 22.38 In the period 8 to 18 January nearly 900 hours were seldom recorded aircraft activity and/or intentions. flown. Of this total, fire bombing was conducted for Further, reports from Aerial Attack specialists and nearly 500 hours. Aircraft Operations Managers varied from complete 22.39 By way of comparison, the aggregate totals for the and informative to incomplete and/or lacking in any 2000–2001 and 2001–2002 fire seasons were useful operational information. In some instances fire- approximately 1,250 hours and 750 hours scene reports could not initially be located; they had respectively. The previous flying hour peak, of some either not been submitted or had been misplaced. 2,750 flying hours, occurred in 1997–98. Therefore, State Aircraft Desk operating procedures are the aggregate 2002–2003 flying hours represents discussed in more detail in Appendix VII. almost a 500 per cent increase over the prevailing annual average. PAGE 207 PAGE 208 22.44 22.43 22.42 22.41 22.40 the arrivalofasupplementaryS64aircrane. The fleetwasfurtherreinforced lateinJanuarywith the StateAircraft Unit’s ‘callwhenneeded’provisions. Additional aircraft alsobecameavailablethrough suppression. fire outbreaks before initiatingconcentrated that, initially, thefocuswastoestablishextentof 19 hourstosome70‘bombing’.Thissuggests some 22hours.By10January, reconnaissance was reconnaissance wasflownwhile‘bombing’only considerably. On8January, some12hoursof flight hourstoactual‘bombing’varied East andGippslandfires, theratioofreconnaissance varied. Forexample,inthefirstfewdaysofNorth While aircraft availabilitywashigh,actualusage for ‘callwhenneeded’aircraft. of sufficient resources giventhepre-season planning reserve requirement didnotaffect overallavailability and replaced byavailableaircraft. Thisstrategic These aircraft were,deployedtootherareas inturn, Marsh asprotection forMelbourne. medium helicopter(HT334)waskeptatBacchus of furtheroutbreaks inthefar-West region, anda bomber atHorshamwaskeptinreserve intheevent were heldasstrategicreserve. Forexample,thefire On daysofTotal Fire Ban,somefirefighting aircraft for this. No records havebeenlocatedtoindicatethereason and twooffivemediumhelicopterswere available. records showthatonlyfiveofsixlighthelicopters deployment totheAlpinefires area. On8January, State Aircraft Unit/IFAR aircraft fleetwasavailablefor that –withtheexceptionof8Januaryentire throughout thecampaign.Data tohandindicates aircraft wasgenerallyavailable fordeployment The fullcomplementofStateAircraft Unit/IFAR Aircraft Availability 22.46 22.45 22.49 22.48 22.47 already deployed. not submittedbecauseallknownassetswere for additionalaircraft mayhavebeenwithheldor there issomeanecdotalinformationthatrequests because ofalackaircraft availability. However, that requests foraircraft assistancewere rejected locatednodocumentationorreports indicating We some‘smokedin’daysdidoccur.of allconcerned, fronts were stillthwartedand,despitethebestefforts outbreaks. However, operationsonparticularfire to bedeployedotherareas intheeventofnew ‘smoked in’)andensured aircraft were available avoided unnecessarygroundings (knownasbeing redeployment ofaircraftin thecampaign.Timely in valleyareas) were restricted bysmokequiteearly from theBenambraandCorryong bases(bothlocated inversions preventing smoke dispersion.Operations meteorological conditions– low-leveltemperature occasions, thiswasexacerbatedbytheprevailing widespread, in-flightvisibility wasreduced. Onsome As thesmokepallintensifiedandbecamemore Onelightfixed-wing–reconnaissance. • Five lighthelicopters–reconnaissance andAir • Fourfixed-wingbombers; • Two BK117helicopters–fire bombing; • OnemediumB412helicopter–fire bombing; • ‘Call whenneeded’aircraft included: of 50days;theaveragewas30days. use variedfrom asshortsevendaystoamaximum 13 Januaryandthelaston24February. The periodof accident. Thefirst‘callwhenneeded’wasinitiatedon required followingthelossofafire bomberinan availability. Areplacement fire bomberwasalso protection activitysometimesexceededaircraft because thenumberofon-goingfires andasset were required duringthefire season.Thiswas Aircraft additionaltotheStateAircraft Unit/IFAR fleet Fleet Aircraft Use ofNon-StateAircraft Unit/IFAR procedures are required. fleet, dispatchofaircraft and/orredeployment determine what,ifany, changestothesizeof outstripped supplysothatpost-seasonanalysiscan needs torecord instanceswhere demandhas and shouldbediscouraged.Thereporting system If thisisthecase,practicecounter-productive Attack Supervisor(ASS);and INF.018.002.0315 INF.018.002.0316 CHAPTER 22 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 22.50 Through contract consultations and provisions, 22.55 Having said that, State Air Desk records reveal that IFAR contractors are aware of the ‘call when needed’ the time interval between requests for air support and requirement and keep the State Aircraft Unit the issue of dispatch orders was within the intended informed of their capacity to meet a request. This guideline parameters. The Inquiry was able to generally ensures that ‘call when needed’ requests establish an assessment that suggests the overall can be actioned without undue contractual effectiveness should have been satisfactory by using negotiations and delay; response time is therefore a comparison of: optimum. The use of IFAR contractors also ensures that only known competent assets are used. • Aircraft type flying hour data – extracted from This ensures overall safety and effectiveness Flight Operations Return records; standards are not compromised. • Broadly-assigned role data – for example, fire bombing; 22.51 In early January, an additional S64 Erickson Crane • The number of aircraft available for delivery of heavy helicopter was requested. This followed the suppressant; and inability of New South Wales to release one of its two • The number of aircraft used for AAS tasks. S64s due to ongoing fires. The aircraft (Helitack 144) was arranged through the State Aircraft Unit contract 22.56 However, in reviewing aircraft operations we were system and arrived at Avalon airport on 28 January able to establish a very rough assessment that (accompanied by an additional S64 requested by suggests overall effectiveness should have been New South Wales agencies). It entered service on satisfactory. In making this assessment, we were 29 January. mindful that the highest priority in bushfire operations is firefighter safety. Given the widespread Effectiveness of Aircraft Deployment intensity of some fires, the fact that no on-ground firefighters were lost as a direct result of fighting the 22.52 Performance indicators for effectiveness of aircraft fires would suggest that aircraft support was operations can be varied. For example, primary effective. performance indicators might include response time, 22.57 Despite the lack of documentation, some reporting success of fire suppression or success in protecting did show that aircraft materially assisted in the assets. Whatever the type of indicator used, the protection of assets. For example, two teams (fire measure of effectiveness must also reflect the bombers and the S64 Crane) carried out a joint air intended objective – for example, suppression, attack at Buckland Gap. A fire bomber en route back fire protection, or containment. to Wangaratta reported a spot fire along the road 22.53 Readily available records indicate that few AAS collect that was endangering two houses. While the S64 or collate effectiveness data such as number of loads continued to attack Buckland Gap, two fire bombers delivered, and accuracy and overall success in and an AAS diverted to the spot fire and effectively achieving the Incident Controller’s objective. Similarly, stopped the fire spread, which arriving ground forces while the Incident Controller’s strategy can be then suppressed. gleaned from the Incident Action Plan (for example, 22.58 The Inquiry contends that a measure of aircraft this might be firefighter and asset protection), we effectiveness should be available as one of the were unable to locate complementary documentation parameters to determine, among other things, as to exactly how the aircraft were committed to future numbers and the appropriate mix of aircraft. achieve these strategies. No other reporting system Consideration should be given to introducing an was found to provide usable data to measure or appropriate system of performance indicators assess aircraft effectiveness. and complementary data reporting. 22.54 Accordingly, our review was unable to readily establish an assessment of aircraft effectiveness during the 2002–2003 fire season, based on normal parameters. PAGE 209 PAGE 210 22.59 Theestablishmentofanextendedairtransport • Whileonefire bomberwasdestroyed inaflying • Nodocumentationreports were locatedshowing • Specifictraininginthematchingofpreferred • There isnostructured performanceassessment • AnadditionalS64cranewasobtainedlateinthe • Aircraft numbersandaircraft mixwere increased • Instancesmayhaveoccurred where demand • Aircraft availabilitythroughout thefire seasonwas • Theaggregate flyinghoursflowninthe • The independentconsultantfoundthat: Findings effectiveness ofthefirefighting force. service contributedmeaningfullytotheoverall expended andtheoperationalconditions; excellent giventhehighnumberofflyinghours accident, theoveralllevelofflightsafetywas to lackofavailableaircraft; a request foraircraft assistancewasdenieddue strategy needstobeextended; aircraft/load capabilitytofire characteristicsand/or suitability; assessing aircraft effectiveness andaircraft documentation prevented theInquiryfrom system. Thislackofdatafrom suitablecollated S64 wouldnothappen; expected release ofaNewSouthWales-contracted fire seasonafteritbecameapparent thatthe from existingIFAR contractors; through the‘callwhenneed’provisions available regardless ofknownorassumedunavailability; to encouragepersonnellodgerequests – not submitted.Procedures needtobedeveloped exceeded availabilityandarequest forserviceswas fatigue; unscheduled maintenance,pilotunavailabilityor satisfactory withnoevidenceofuntoward levelsof a factoroffive; by afactoroftwo,andtheaverageaggregate by 2002–2003 fire seasonsurpass theprevious peak 22.63 22.62 22.61 22.60 22.66 22.65 22.64 agency andSAUpersonnel. Aircraft Fleetcontractorsbeconductedjointlyby That asystematicperformanceauditofState Training andAccreditationprograms. Aircraft Fleetcompositionandtheadequacyof analysed andusedfortheassessmentofState effectiveness ofaerialfirefighting becollated, That aftereachfireseason,measuresofthe are recorded. outstrips thesupplyofStateFleetAircraftavailable That instanceswheredemandforairsupport effectiveness ofaircraftin firefightingoperations. of performancemeasuresforreportingthe That thejointagenciesintroduceasystem Recommendations procedures. Aircraft Unit’s roles,responsibilities,practicesand communication anddiscussioninregardtoState That moreemphasisshouldbegivento firefighting capabilitytraining. Incident Controllersshouldincludeaircraft That trainingandcompetencyprogramsfor Authority totheStateAircraftUnit. compliance auditpreparedforCivilAviation Safety a copyoftheirannualindependentregulatory That aviationcontractorsberequiredtosubmit INF.018.002.0317 INF.018.002.0318 CHAPTER 22 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Conclusion

22.67 This Chapter draws some positive conclusions about Victoria’s aerial firefighting capacity and performance during the 2002–2003 fires: the numbers and mix of aircraft were reasonable given the assessed threat, budget constraints and contractual obligations; aircraft availability was satisfactory with no evidence of untoward levels of unscheduled maintenance, pilot unavailability or fatigue; the overall level of flight safety was excellent given the high number of flying hours expended and the operational conditions.

22.68 However, the Inquiry’s commissioned review found no structured performance assessment system in place within the State Aircraft Unit. Data is not being kept or collated that would allow a more objective assessment of aircraft effectiveness and suitability around clear performance indicators. We conclude, then, that there is significant room to improve the assessments, audits, and record keeping and reporting around aerial firefighting performance. PAGE 211 PAGE 212 Chapter 23 23.6 23.5 23.4 23.3 23.2 23.1 with theCommunity Communication in Chapter13. time thefire wasathreat totheirproperty, asdetailed were ‘wellprepared’ or‘verywellprepared’ bythe in May2003,96.3percentofrespondents feltthey CFA, NorthEastandGippsland Fires 2003,Community SafetyPost-IncidentAnalysis. 1 these communicationsuccesses. This Chapterdescribeshowwecanbuildfurtheron information wasalsonoted. systemstolinkusers tootheruseful Internet-based that shouldbefurtherdeveloped.Thescopefor efforts tocontainthem,wasasignificantadvance community abouttheprogress ofthefires andtheir asameansofinformingthewider Internet The InquiryfoundthattheDSEandCFA’s useofthe were abletoquestionthemdirectly. members oftheIncidentManagementTeam and the fires. Communitymemberswere briefedbysenior communities thatcouldbeaffected bythepassageof to provide accurateandtimelyinformationto Incident ManagementTeams wasaneffective way Setting upCommunityInformationUnitswithin In surveyscommissionedbytheCFA communication approaches adoptedbytheagencies.) expected. (Chapter4inPartAliststhewide-ranging a lowerleveloflossthanmightotherwisehavebeen community preparedness. Thiscontributedgreatly to outlets allresulted inaheightened levelof Broadcasting Corporation’s radioandothermedia call centres andthesupport oftheAustralian Community meetings,communitytelephonetrees, informing themoftheprogress ofthefires. how toprepare forthepassageoffire, aswell Importantly, theagenciesadvisedcommunitieson standard inemergencyresponse inVictoria. of the2002–2003summerfires establishedanew Fire Authority(CFA) tokeepthecommunityinformed Sustainability andEnvironment (DSE)andtheCountry In general,theefforts ofthe Departmentof Overview 1 and conducted 23.9 23.8 23.7 23.12 23.11 23.10 Communities Dispersedproperties. • Marginalornonexistentradioandtelevision • Theremoteness ofsomecommunitieswhere • Thepotentialforthefire situationtochange • These difficulties include: all affected communitiesduringemergencies. establish andmaintaineffective communicationwith These criticismsdemonstratehowhard itisto were doingtocontainit. location ofthefire andwhat thefire agencies information wasneeded,particularlyaboutthe personal experiences;respondents suggestedmore public meetings.Thesecommentswere basedon comments insubmissionstotheInquiryandduring number ofcommunitymembersmadecritical Despite agenerallypositiveassessment,small Communication with The Challenge:Maintaining language. those whodonotspeakEnglishastheirprimary special needs,inparticular, thehearingimpaired and It isalsoimportanttoconsiderthosewhohave Equity Considerations communication strategiesandnetworks. to emergenciesbutmaynothaveaccesscurrent who are willingtobecomepartnersintheresponse additional informationneedsofcommunitymembers CFA inparticular, butalsoDSE,needtoaddress the awareness policiesandprocedures. improve communityinformationand the fires havehighlightedopportunitiestofurther Not surprisingly, thescale,locationanddurationof affected byfire or, forthatmatter, otheremergencies. arrangements tocommunicatewithcommunities The fires of2002–2003significantlytestedcurrent reception; and access isdifficult; rapidly; All Fire-Affected INF.018.002.0319 INF.018.002.0320 CHAPTER 23 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 23.13 In correspondence to the Inquiry, the Australian 23.20 We also recommend that community information Communications Authority (ACA) raised this issue in models developed by the CFA should be able to be relation to the hearing impaired and described the used by other emergency response agencies, experience of a deaf person during the Canberra especially the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency bushfires. ACA asked that we consider this issue Services Board and the Victoria State Emergency in our final recommendations. Service.

23.14 ACA made a number of suggestions that would make emergency communication more accessible and Recommendations equitable. These include: 23.21 That in relation to the provision of information • Using captioning or crawler messages on television to communities affected by fires and other material; emergencies, DSE and CFA ensure that: • Setting up outbound text messages on the telephone typewriter available in most emergency • Incident Management Teams understand communications centres; and that one of their primary responsibilities, in • Publicising the 1300 or 1800 general hotline. co-operation with the Municipal Emergency Response Co-ordinator, is to keep the 23.15 They also proposed that a list of people be community informed as to where the fire is established who wish to pre-register to receive and its likely path, what is being done to messages containing emergency information via the combat the fire and any preparations the telephone typewriter system. community should undertake; • Community Information Units are effectively 23.16 These ideas are supported by the Inquiry, and are in integrated into the Incident Management accord with moves in Victoria to further improve Teams; and emergency warning systems for all community • They continue to develop a joint Internet-based members. communications tool to provide information and advice to both affected and broader Lead-in Times and Advice to Communities communities during fires.

23.17 Another critical issue is the lead-time between 23.22 That the model of community engagement emergency response agencies becoming aware of the developed by DSE and CFA and applied during the location of a fire and the arrival of the fire front 2002–2003 fires is further developed and refined, within a particular community. Because of the particularly in regard to short-duration, rapidly protracted nature of the North East and Gippsland escalating incidents. fires there were often a number of days between the development of a threat to a community and the 23.23 That relevant Government agencies including arrival of the fire. Emergency Communications Victoria, the Bureau of Emergency Services Telecommunications and the 23.18 This is most often not the case. Historically, in many Victoria Police Media Unit, evaluate the proposals (if not most) of the fire emergencies that impact on put forward by the Australian Communications communities in Victoria, there is very little lead-time Authority with respect to the hearing impaired. between ignition and the impact on a community. This means that DSE and CFA must ensure their models of community advice and warning Radio Coverage in Rural Victoria accommodate both long lead-time and 23.24 Radio reception remains limited in some parts of short-duration, rapidly escalating incidents. the North East and Gippsland, particularly in the steeper valley communities. Further, atmospheric 23.19 Having community information units effectively integrated into Incident Management Teams is also conditions can also cause changes in the strength critical to ensuring communication is effective of the signal. This situation may also occur in during a more protracted fire event. other areas of the State. PAGE 213 PAGE 214 23.27 23.26 23.25 broadcast messagesare consistent. to exchangerelevant information.Thiswillensure meeting withNewSouthWales, bothpartiesagreed Inquiry thatduringarecent cross-border liaison joint informationforbroadcast. CFA advisedthe authorities shouldworkmore effectively todevelop of theemergency. Inthesesituations,relevant gain aconsistentandaccuratepicture ofthestate a needtoensure thatcommunitiesintheselocations weather), basedontheoriginofsignal.There is conflicting information(forexample,aboutfire and coverage ofseveralradiostations,maygain Communities atStateborders, orwithinthe Mixed MessagesAcrosstheBorder with informationthatwasoneorseveraldaysold. be problematic. Somecommunitieswere provided place, butimmediacyandcurrency ofinformationcan papers, newsletters,andfacsimiles–alsohavetheir timely andaccurateadvice.Otherformsofmedia– directly orthrough feederstations,trustittoprovide that haveaccesstothepublicbroadcaster, either source oflocalandup-to-dateinformation.Those rural community, itremains aprincipalandready While radioisonlyoneformofmediaforthebroader necessary toprotect livesand property. about theprogress ofthefires andtheactions gave ahumanfaceandvoicetocriticalmessages agencies (andwithIncidentControllers inparticular), effective andconstructiverelationships withkey to threatened communities. Theirefforts tobuild provided accurate,credible andtimelyinformation found thattheAustralianBroadcasting Corporation both thefire agenciesandthe community. TheInquiry fires received consistentlypositivecommentfrom Corporation, particularlyRegionalRadio,duringthe The role playedbytheAustralian Broadcasting 23.28 23.32 23.31 23.30 23.29 Australian BroadcastingCorporation considering evacuationtomakeinformeddecisions. behaviour ofafire alsoallows householderswhoare community. Accuratelydefiningthelocationand and behaviourofafire reduces angstwithinthe andeffects.patterns Accuratelydefiningthelocation and tracks;theymaybelocalfire andwindbehaviour, advice. Thesereference pointsmaybeaccessroads reference pointstogivespecificinformationand therefore uselocalknowledgeandkeylandscape and onacommunity. Effective communicationshould real orperceived, willincrease thelevelofstress in The heightenedfearofimpendingimpact,whether Announcements Local AccuracyforEmergency information. improve coverageforbroadcastingemergency black spots,andexploreopportunitiestofurther Broadcasting CorporationLocalRadiotoidentify That CFA andDSEworkwithAustralian this arrangement. and theemergencyserviceagenciestoimplement work withtheAustralianBroadcastingCorporation That theVictoria PoliceMediaUnitco-ordinate the wholeofState. given itistheonlyradiostationthatcancover as theofficial emergencyradiostationforVictoria, Australian BroadcastingCorporationLocalRadio That considerationbegiventoformalising Recommendations extend coverage. reception problems, anddevelopoptionsto with theemergencyagenciestoidentifyareas with Corporation hasindicatedtheyare prepared towork cannot receive asignal.TheAustralianBroadcasting are stillsome‘blackspots’where communities provider withstatewidecoverage.However, there Corporation, through itsnetwork,istheonlyradio The InquirynotesthattheAustralianBroadcasting INF.018.002.0321 INF.018.002.0322 CHAPTER 23 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 23.33 That opportunities be explored to use community radio to complement other methods of communication with isolated communities.

23.34 That Interstate Agreements prepared by the fire agencies be reviewed to include protocols for the joint release of consistent and appropriate information relating to fires burning across State borders.

Conclusion

23.35 Community expectations have changed significantly, both in terms of the service communities expect from Government, and in terms of the information they demand from Government during emergencies.

23.36 Experience in Victoria during the Longford Gas Crisis and in New York following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, highlights the importance – and value – of providing authoritative, realistic and accurate information to threatened or affected communities. This information can assist a well- prepared community to adopt the safe behaviours necessary to survive an emergency such as bushfire.

23.37 The Inquiry commends agency efforts to keep the community regularly and accurately informed throughout the 2002–2003 fires and notes that further improvements and innovations are likely to follow. PAGE 215 PAGE 216 Chapter 24 24.6 24.5 24.4 24.3 24.2 24.1 Environmental Recovery Social, Businessand and sacrificesofbothcommunities andfirefighters. that report, theTaskforce recognised the efforts 28 Februaryandthefinalreport inApril2003.In the Taskforce. An interimreport wasreleased on arrangements. TheHon.JohnBrumby, MP, chaired and topromptly putinplacearangeofrecovery assess theimpactoffires thatwere stillraging the MinisterialTaskforce onBushfire Recovery to PremierIn January2003,theVictorian established Bushfire Recovery The MinisterialTaskforce on result ofapproved fire suppression activity. rehabilitation ofdamagetoprivateproperty asa between publicandprivateland,the restoration andreplacement ofboundaryfencing made specificrecommendations inrespect to recoveryand comments concerning toGovernment The Inquiry’s InterimReport(AppendixIII)passedon of thisexpenditure. werebusinesses inruralVictoria thedirect beneficiary purchase ofsuppliesandservices.Manysmall economythroughVictorian additionalwagesandthe suppression activitiesinjected$117millionintothe some positivestonote.Whilstthere were losses,fire for improved policiesandcommunication,there are While wemakeanumberofrecommendations here they accessrelief andsupport. recovery toaddress thefrustrationofcommunitiesas also suggestacasemanagementapproach to equitable andconsistentmodelsoffinancialrelief. We discusses theimportanceofhavingpredictable, during andfollowingthe2002–2003bushfires and Chapter 24provides anoverviewofrecovery efforts and recovery can,andshould, beintegrated. not apost-eventprocess but aparallelone.Response This Chapterispremised on theviewthatrecovery is that is,thankfully, infrequent. They hadthenfacedbushfires ofascaleandduration forestry policy, andsixconsecutiveyearsofdrought. affected changesto bytheruraleconomic downturn, 400 people.Manyofthosecommunitieshadbeen visited fire-affected communitiesandspokewithover passed. Thiswasillustratedinstarktermsaswe Community recovery continues longafterthefire has Overview 24.9 24.8 24.7 24.13 24.12 24.11 24.10 the for establishingandmaintainingthePlanand,under Department ofHumanServices(DHS)isresponsible Recovery Planasthebasisforitswork.The procedures andprocesses intheStateEmergency The MinisterialTaskforce usedtheinfrastructure, interim Februaryreport. initiatives including$13.9millioncommittedinthe In total$76millionhasbeenallocatedtothese industry andthewidercommunity. environmental restoration; andassistancetofarmers, specific initiativesfocusedonwater, landand The Taskforce report alsoannouncedarangeof it tootherMunicipal Councils. of aregister oftrainedvolunteersandrecommends during thefire event.TheInquirysupportstheidea of extraadministrativeandsupport taskstheyfaced volunteers alsohelpedCouncil withthemultitude trained volunteerstoassistthe community. Those Council establishedandmaintainedaregister of emergency andcommunitysupport.TheAlpineShire became afocusforvolunteerswantingtoassistwith The MunicipalEmergencyCo-ordination Centres as providing valuableassistance. the recovery centres received praiseandwere seen Municipal EmergencyCo-ordination Centres. Overall, own operationalresponsibilities andrunningthe engaged insuppression activities,managingtheir was available,giventhatmunicipalitieswere alsofully assistance. Forsomecommunitiesonlyonelocation community andmanyprovided a'one-stop-shop'for Recovery centres were establishedtoassistthe to reach thoseinremote areas. progress ofthefire whileotherssetup‘faxtrees’ Some MunicipalCouncilsalsoprovided mapsofthe information andadvice,assistedinrecovery. centres were setup.Theseprovided up-to-date communities. Telephone informationlinesorcall effective communicationprocesses fortheir Municipal Councilsresponded swiftlytoestablish Municipal Councils timely andeffective. following overviewshows,action–overallwas effective andspeedyrecovery process. Asthe ofalllevelswereGovernments committedtoan Overview oftheRecoveryProcess for EmergencyRecovery. officer ofDHSisappointedastheStateCo-ordinator Emergency ManagementAct1986 , asenior INF.018.002.0323 INF.018.002.0324 CHAPTER 24 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART

Due to the heat of the fires that burnt through Alpine Ash forests in North East Victoria, the seed banks on the trees and in the soil were destroyed. The fires created a small time frame when seed could be spread in ideal soil and climatic conditions. This meant the Department of Sustainability and Environment collected some 1,580 kilograms of seed and have sown this over 1,600 hectares. Plans for the next two years include the collection of another 1,800 kilograms of seed to be sown over 2,000 hectares. DSE Forest Management

Assistance to Farmers The Importance of Roads

24.14 The Department of Primary Industries (DPI) received 24.17 Both Municipal Councils and VicRoads appear to have significant praise for the speed with which they reopened and repaired roads with efficiency. However, contacted farmers whose stock were distressed, there were complaints that this work should have injured or dead as a result of the fires. Led by senior been completed sooner. The Inquiry recognises the veterinarian officers, the Department’s Agriculture inherent tension between safety and access, Recovery Officers and other professionals speedily particularly for the transport of critical supplies such assisted with remedial advice and helped to identify as fodder. However, we note that the ability to access stock suitable for sale to the abattoirs. They also the municipality early in the recovery process provides assisted with stock disposal. Such tasks need to be a critical foundation for effective recovery. done with speed and sensitivity. The Inquiry noted that, in some areas of the State, farmers did not Centrelink: Access and Eligibility Issues appear fully conversant with this service and acted on uninformed advice – which they later regretted. 24.18 In some cases, road closures affected people’s eligibility for Centrelink support. 24.15 The Inquiry recommends that DPI promote an awareness campaign for the farming community in 24.19 For example, the access road to Falls Creek closed for relation to this service. some days during the peak of the fire. This affected electricity and other communications. The local Rehabilitation of Public Land and community were fully engaged in the firefighting Water Catchment effort. When the road was reopened and individuals went to register for income support, they were 24.16 The Department of Sustainability and Environment unable to seek recompense for the full period immediately commenced rehabilitation works because they had been unable to access the following the passage of the fire. These works appropriate Centrelink office and forms. included actions to stabilise land, restore mineral 24.20 The Inquiry believes the Commonwealth Government earth breaks, protect catchments to minimise effects should review eligibility criteria and registration on water quality and, revegetate where necessary, processes for those without employment who are for example, reseeding of Alpine Ash forest areas. engaged in an emergency response and unable to A priority was to ensure the roads were open as soon access the appropriate Centrelink office. The Inquiry as possible and were protected from landslip. Such also asks that eligibility criteria be communicated to works commenced when the organisation was still communities at community briefings. heavily committed to fire suppression. PAGE 217 PAGE 218 24.25 24.24 24.23 24.22 24.21 in thesesituations. monies fromtoassistwithsupport Government Municipal Councilsshouldbeinreceipt ofuntied payments. TheInquiryformedtheviewthat income. Manywere ineligiblefordisasterrelief and indirect hardship through thelossofasecond programs. Forexample,manyfamiliessuffered direct relief supportforitemsthatdon’t fallwithinexisting Many individualsandfamiliesneedemergency withDHSand discussedtheseconcerns We in response activities. people havealsolostincomeduetotheirinvolvement support groups. Asaconsequencesomeofthese Cross, CountryWomen’s Associationandother Fire Authority, StateEmergencyService,Red Victorian Many ofthesepeopleare volunteersfortheCountry for manyruralfamilieswere affected. secondary incomes(andsometimesprimaryincomes) The fires drove touristsawaywiththeresult that farmers, smallbusinessesandtourismoperators. deep indrought, placingadditionalstress onmany The NorthEastandGippslandfiresacross burnt land Financial Support Community Developmentand tourism). decline inlocalamenitythatseverely affected bushfire onlocalindustries (including ageneral were leftwithoutincomedue totheeffects of engaged incasualandevenpermanentemployment the NorthEastandGippslandfires, manyofthose fully understandsthereason forthis.However, during registration mustbecompleted inperson.TheInquiry paid from thedateofregistration, andthat other communitymembers.Centrelink claimsare only frequent amongvolunteerfirefighters concern and Eligibility forCentrelink payments wasanarea of aware oftheseissues. demand. TheInquiryisconfidentthatDHSfully need exists.Financialcounsellorswere alsoinhigh available foraslongademonstrablecommunity Councils forcommunitydevelopmentofficers be recommended thatthefundingavailabletoMunicipal 24.26 24.30 24.29 24.28 24.27 Recovery from MajorEmergencies The RoleofMinisterialTaskforces in of communitysupport. shouldnotbeviewedastheonlysourceGovernment associations andlobbygroups. TheInquirynotesthat have raisedthismatterwithanumberofprofessional through arangeoforganisations andproviders. We support, adviceandguidancecouldbesourced can bepurchased orbrokered. Servicesoffering officers haveflexiblefunding sothatspecialistservices therefore suggestthatcommunitydevelopment We from aboutprivacy. alocalperson,dueto concerns others were reluctant toaskforhelporseeksupport did notinitiallyrecognise their ownneeds,while one, easilydisturbed.Manyofthoserequiring support seeking supportandthoseproviding itisafragile It wasevidentthattherelationship betweenthose farmers areawareoftheservices provided. service availableduringemergencies toensureall within thecommunity, theagriculturalrecovery That DPIactivelypromoteas widely aspossible incidents. the responseto,andrecoveryfrom,emergency available toprovideassistanceandsupportduring develop registersofvolunteerswillingand That MunicipalEmergencyResourceOfficers Recommendations emergency events. community needsinextreme orlarge-scale wouldensurein turn, amore timelyresponse to any necessaryarrangementstobeputinplace.This, ThiswouldallowforpreplanningGovernment. and one oftheco-ordination optionsopento gained byformallyrecognising theirestablishmentas clearly established,andthere are efficiencies tobe support setup.ThevalueofsuchTaskforces hasbeen necessary administrativeprocesses andadministrative terms ofreference needtobeagreed toandthe case-by-case basisandthisconsumesvaluabletime: However, eachTaskforce hasbeenestablishedona of recovery work. functioning. Itisalsoarecognition ofthescale assisting communitiestoreturnnormal emergencies. Thisrecognises theimportanceof economic recovery followinganumberofmajor established tooverseesocial,infrastructure and In recent years,MinisterialTaskforces havebeen INF.018.002.0325 INF.018.002.0326 CHAPTER 24 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 24.31 That VicRoads and Municipal Councils review Planning for Programs and Entitlements procedures and processes to ensure that the identification and delivery of remedial works on 24.38 If recovery efforts are to be timely and appropriate State and Council roads following emergency they need to be delivered as soon as practicable after events are as efficient as possible. the passage of the fire front. This was the intent of the Ministerial Taskforce on Bushfire Recovery. In 24.32 That the Victorian Government recommend hindsight, time was lost establishing programs and to the Commonwealth Government that it reviews entitlements rather than delivering them. Those eligibility for those without employment who may providing support, information and awareness or may not be engaged in an emergency response, programs first had to be trained in a set of new rules. and are unable to access the appropriate This took time and caused frustration within infrastructure to register for financial assistance. communities.

24.33 That Government funding for Community 24.39 Even so, the Inquiry is of the view that the Ministerial Development Officers engaged in community Taskforce acted as a focal point for Government and support and rebuilding incorporates flexible agencies, galvanising Departments into action and resources to enable the purchase of services from response, and providing a focus for information a range of providers to ensure choice for those sharing and problem solving. The Taskforce requiring support. successfully linked Government and the community.

24.34 That the Emergency Management Act 1986 be amended to include a provision that, on the Planning for Infrastructure recommendation of the Minister for Police and 24.40 Effective recovery requires supporting infrastructure – Emergency Services as Co-ordinator-in-Chief of a point that may not be widely understood. Emergency Management, or of another Minister, the Premier establish a Ministerial Task Force to 24.41 For example, additional infrastructure is established oversee recovery in situations of extreme natural for suppression activities but is soon removed once disaster or other emergency events. the emergency response has concluded. A clear example is Telstra’s excellent work in supporting agencies and the community with additional capacity Response and Recovery: and services and the speedy restoration of Two Sides of the Same Coin telecommunications services. However, once the emergency had passed, the additional capacity was 24.35 While the Inquiry heard many positive comments removed at the very time many people were returning about recovery efforts, there were also criticisms. to their communities and seeking to rebuild their Many community members and agency lives. Communication is as critical at this point as it representatives expressed concern at delays in was the day before. This example is not intended as initiating and delivering recovery support. In part, a criticism of Telstra but shows how response and this could be due to the protracted nature of the recovery are parallel events. fire which meant that response and fire suppression activities continued for a number of weeks, diverting 24.42 All agencies need to ensure they have contingency resources and attention. planning in place for adequate surge capacity for recovery operations. This applies both to Municipal 24.36 Nevertheless, the Inquiry believes it is important for Councils, utilities such as electricity supply recovery to commence when the fire event (or any companies, and DHS. other emergency) commences. Recovery is not a post- event process but a parallel one; response and recovery can, and should, be integrated.

24.37 This ability to respond quickly to the recovery needs of communities relies on comprehensive preplanning and an ability to commence work while an emergency response is still underway. PAGE 219 PAGE 220 24.48 24.47 24.46 24.45 24.44 24.43 Emergency ManagementPlans. strategies, areincludedintheMunicipal associated publiceducationandinformation recovery activities,andthatsuchplans, of theneedtodevelopcontingencyplansfor providers andLocalGovernmentsbemadeaware That allDepartments,statutoryauthorities,utility of theMunicipalEmergencyCo-ordinationCentres. and deliveryisanintegralpartoftheoperations same timeasresponseandthatrecoveryplanning That recoveryisrecognisedascommencingatthe Recommendations be available. needed toprogress recovery activitieswillalready how tomakecontact,andmuchoftheinformation community knowswhere thefacilityislocatedand arrangement. Theinfrastructure isinplace,the recovery phaseappearstobethemostlogical Centre beyondtheresponse phaseandintothe Operating theMunicipalEmergencyCo-ordination accurate andtimelyinformation. Control Centre are essentialtoensure theflowof Close linksbetweenthisfacilityandtheIncident to, theMunicipalEmergencyCo-ordination Centre. involved inrecovery shouldbelocatedin,oradjacent integrated response andrecovery activities,personnel In order toimplementeffective concurrent and commendthismodeltoallthoseinvolvedin We thus mitigatingtheimpactoffire onthecommunity. prompt recovery effort afterthepassageoffire, bushfire. Measures were putinplacethatalloweda agencies toprepare forthepossibleconsequencesof outcomes wasaconcertedeffort onthepartofthose the firesattime.Oneofbriefing burning emphasise thepotentialimpactoncommunitiesof and utilitiesatLakesEntranceon24Januaryto Co-ordinator convenedabriefing forlandmanagers this pointwell.TheDivisionalEmergencyResponse The efforts oflandmanagers inGippslandillustrate Effective recovery planningcreates positiveimpacts. Effective RecoveryPlanning:PositiveModels emergency response andrecovery. 24.50 24.49 24.53 24.52 24.51 ehavearguedthateffective recovery isbuilton We Equitable, Consistent Relief andRecovery–Predictable, of Victoria, suchasCentrelink payments. including mattersthatarenottheresponsibility processes establishedtoassistindividuals– reinforced andcommunitiesareinformedofthe emergency events,toensurerecoveryissuesare in communitybriefingspriortoandduring That allagenciesengagedinrecoveryparticipate treatment shouldbeobviousandbroadly acceptable. similar assistance apparent thatpeoplewith assistance isfairlyprovided. Thatis,itmustbe in different events,itmustbe that whenassistanceisprovided todifferent people Grants adhere totheprincipleofequity. Thismeans assistance schemessuchasthePersonalHardship financial It ishighlydesirablethatGovernment The maximumgrantsavailabletotalsome$22,800. income test,takinghouseholdsizeintoconsideration. the levelofneed.Eligibilityisestablishedthrough an earthquake. Thesizeofgrantisassessedinterms a naturaldisastersuchasbushfire, flood,stormor whose principaldwellingisrendered uninhabitableby The largestfinancialgrantsare forthosehouseholds Financial Assistance-Equity State expenditure threshold of$200,000isexceeded. of thecostapproved assistancemeasures, oncea Commonwealth reimburses theState50percent Arrangements. Underthesearrangements,the of theCommonwealth’s NaturalDisasterRelief affected bynaturaldisasterswithintheframework assistance tohouseholdsandsmallbusinesses provides Government financial The Victorian frequently quotedexampleisfencing. provided afterfires inprevious years.Themost islessthanthat communities byGovernment believe thecurrent financialassistanceprovided to some sectionsofthecommunitybecausepeople any emergencyevent.Significanttensionsexistwithin guidelines forentitlementsmustbeinplacepriorto immediate response. To facilitatethis,well-publicised . Thereasons foranydifferences in similar needsreceive apparent that the INF.018.002.0327 INF.018.002.0328 CHAPTER 24 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART Fire Damage Benambra February 2003 – CFA

24.54 Post-emergency financial assistance occupies a 24.57 To achieve substantial equity in Government post- sensitive and difficult space. It is administered as part emergency financial assistance we would need to of the social welfare system and must operate compare a number of factors: consistently with those principles. However, it is also part of emergency management and often provided • Assistance available to householders, small when a local community is undergoing a very public businesses and non-profit organisations; crisis. At these times, the wider community and • Type of emergencies (bushfire, flood, storm or Government want to be seen to be doing something earthquake); urgently to restore that community’s normal • Other events of the same type; and functioning. The Government’s package of assistance • Previous policy and practice for assistance. must be seen as comprehensive, whether or not 24.58 Achieving substantial equity in these situations may public appeal moneys are being distributed to well be unattainable. affected communities and individuals.

24.55 In addition, the policies governing such assistance are Insurance and Income Thresholds-Dilemma not always the same in relation to the personal and economic impacts of a natural disaster. For people 24.59 An obvious equity issue arises for those people whose whose home and livelihood are affected by the application for a Personal Hardship Grant is rejected natural disaster – for example, farmers or tourist because they are insured or have an income above operators – the nature of Government financial the test thresholds. These people, who have been support for damage to their home will differ from the prudent, may well complain of discrimination when nature of support given to their business. those who fail to insure, for whatever reason, do receive Government assistance. However, if the 24.56 Assistance to businesses affected by natural disasters Government made significant grants available to is strongly influenced by the view that those losses those who are already insured, Government would be are not a special category; business owners should accused of providing a disincentive to insure – and protect their income source thorough prudent risk accused of wasting taxpayers’ money. management, such as insurance or other financial products that smooth out income fluctuations. While 24.60 The income test applied by the State is intended to low-interest loans are usually offered after natural ensure that grants are targeted to those people most disasters to businesses with reasonable prospects of in need, that is, those who may not be able to afford recovery, cash grants are not normally provided. insurance among all their competing household expenditure needs. PAGE 221 PAGE 222 24.64 24.63 24.62 24.61 applied policyframework. developed withinaknownandconsistently Having saidthat,theseplansandactionsare best preparation combinedwithappropriate insurance. isplanningand inaction. ThebeststrategyforVictoria individuals transfertheirrisktotheStatethrough appropriate levelofrisk;weare notproposing that is apartnerinallsucheventsandmustacceptan business andlandowners.Ultimately, the community not, replace prudentriskmanagementbyindividuals, emergency events.Thispolicycannot,andshould for assistancetothecommunityarisingfrom that aclearandconsistentpolicybedeveloped personal hardship grants,theInquiryrecommends While there are clearpolicypositionsinrelation to Clarity ofPolicy assistance. for Government personal situationrenders themtechnicallyineligible fall outsidestandard assistanceguidelinesorwhose tothosewhoseneeds or supportedbyGovernments) money from publicappeals(where theyare initiated One waytoredress equityissuesistotarget that istheCommonwealth’s preferred position. would inevitablypoliticisethegrantprocess. However, it canleadtodelaysinassistancebeingprovided, and consideration ofeachevent.Thisisinequitableinthat crash. Thecurrent approach results inanadhoc damage, suchasachemicalincidentoraircraft for otheremergenciesthatmightinflictsimilar Relief Arrangements.Grantswouldnotbeavailable to A furtherissueisthateligibilityforgrantstied households insimilarways. emergency eventwhichhasaffected severalormore resources are stretched orexhaustedbecauseofan to assist,and(ii)thesituationwhere community community isunaffected and hasavailableresources individual householdatatimewhentherest ofthe really isadifference between(i)theneedsofan losses. Thepointtoexplore here iswhetherthere greater amountsforwhatappear tobeequivalent bushfire, flood,stormorearthquake canreceive far houses are damagedordestroyed asaresult ofa non-natural causationseethatotherpeoplewhose the EmergencyGrantfollowingasinglehousefire of Claims ofinequitycanalsoarisewhenrecipients of natural events defined undertheNaturalDisaster all 24.66 24.65 24.69 24.68 24.67 public landatthepublic/privateinterface. imperative forappropriate landmanagementon circumstances andneeds.Itshouldalsoprovide an with theaboveprinciplesandlinkedlocal appropriate bylocalmanagers, appliedinaccordance guidelines thatcanbeflexiblymanagedwhere The frameworkshouldincludegeneralpolicy Itshouldbe 2. Itshouldnotreplace prudentriskmanagement 1. following twoprinciples: holds forallcircumstances in accordance withthe fencing policy, todevelopapolicyframeworkthat financial assistanceandrelief measures, including shouldreviewThe InquiryconsidersthatGovernment the hopethatanentitlementmayflow. personal detailstoeachandeveryagencyin were required to‘telltheir story’andgivetheir and makinggoodotherdamagetotheirproperty – watering stock,rebuilding fences,disposingofstock and communities–busyhandfeeding People engagedinrebuilding theirlives,businesses amount ofpaperworkandthenumberforms. community membersbecamefrustratedatthe affected bythefires, theInquirywastoldthatmany intentioned andactedinthebestinterests ofthose While theserepresentatives were undoubtedlywell- in accessingrelief entitlements. households toprovide supportandtoassistpeople and communityorganisationsvisitedfarms Representatives fromnon-government Government, to Recovery A CaseManagementApproach natural disasters. to recoverfromemergencies,including equitable policydesignedtoassistthecommunity communicate apredictable,consistentand and financialassistancepolicy, anddevelop That Governmentreviewtheemergencyrelief Recommendation emergencies andoverdifferent years. when appliedtodifferent areas, different (insurance) byprivatelandholders;and predictable , equitable , and consistent INF.018.002.0329 INF.018.002.0330 CHAPTER 24 D TERM OF REFERENCE TWO: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PART 24.70 Unfortunately, co-ordination and information 24.78 That the State Emergency Recovery Committee sharing between organisations appears to have been explore opportunities to establish a 'one-stop- minimal. The current approach is time consuming and shop' approach wherever practicable following frustrating for both individuals and the community – emergencies, including a single telephone number and it is no guarantee that people will not slip to connect a person to all agencies involved through the cracks. in the recovery process.

24.71 The Inquiry therefore believes there should be a case management approach to recovery. Fencing and Rehabilitation: Private Land Damage Following 24.72 This should be co-ordinated through the established recovery processes to ensure that personal details are Fire Suppression Works captured by one organisation, and then shared with 24.79 These issues were addressed in the Interim Report other appropriate agencies when they need to (Appendix III) and Government has accepted the interact with individuals and households. This should following recommendations. also provide a more efficient way of assessing eligibility if additional entitlements become available through the efforts of charities and fundraising. Recommendation 4 from Interim Report That Government initiate a review of the fencing 24.73 The Inquiry was also told that it was frustrating to policy for boundary and internal fences damaged ring Government for advice or assistance, and be as a result of a fire. passed from person to person or from department to department. It appears that, in some cases, people gave up in frustration. Quite conceivably, they may Recommendation 5 from Interim Report have missed out on entitlements. That Government develop a consistent policy for the rehabilitation/restoration of private assets damaged or 24.74 The Inquiry believes contacting Government can and consumed in authorised fire suppression activity. should be done more efficiently to provide the service the community is entitled to expect. We propose a 'one-stop-shop' approach that would operate in Conclusion concert with our recommended case management approach. 24.80 Recovery efforts have been, and continue to be, wide-ranging. This Chapter has looked at some of 24.75 A community awareness campaign should accompany those efforts and the issues they raise, including these processes. Formal consent may be required community development, welfare and financial from individuals to ensure their information can be support, the rebuilding of infrastructure such as shared and that privacy concerns are managed. roads, and the impact on farmers and communities.

24.81 A particular concern is the depth of physical Recommendations and mental exhaustion evident in many of the communities we visited. This is reflected in both 24.76 That DHS, in conjunction with Local Government, personal and community wellbeing. Government departments and the non- government sector, modify recovery planning at 24.82 The Inquiry believes that recovery will be a long and all levels to include a case management approach slow process that will continue in fits and starts as supported by an appropriate information system new hurdles emerge. Government must continue to be activated at the time of an emergency. to work in partnership with volunteers, farmers and other small business operators to meet that 24.77 That the Privacy Commissioner be asked for advice ongoing challenge. in the development of this model. PAGE 223 PAGE 224 INF.018.002.0331