November 2019

Monthly Forecast

1 Overview Overview 2 In Hindsight: Missing Monthly Assessments of Council Presidencies The UK has the presidency in November. It has Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed 3 Status Updates since chosen to hold an open debate on reconcilia- will brief Council members on her recent visit to our October Forecast tion which appears to be a follow-up to an open the Horn of Africa focused on women, peace and 5 Syria debate held during its last presidency in August security. A representative from the AU is also 2018, on mediation, in which reconciliation fea- expected to brief. 7 Libya tured in the discussion. Other Africa issues include: 8 Bosnia and There will be the regular briefings and consul- • Central African Republic, renewal of MINUS- Herzegovina tations on the Syria political and humanitarian CA’s mandate; 9 UN Peacekeeping situation. The OPCW will brief the Council in a • Democratic Republic of the Congo, consulta- 11 Somalia private meeting on the use of chemical weapons tions on the strategic review of MONUSCO; 12 DPRK (North Korea) in the country. • Sahel, a briefing on the Joint Force of the Other meetings on the Middle East include: Group of Five for the Sahel; and 14 Sudan/South Sudan • Iraq, briefing and consultations on UNITAD; • Sudan/South Sudan, the renewal of UNISFA 15 Central African • Israel/Palestine, the monthly briefing and in Abyei. Republic consultations; On Europe, the Council will hold its semi- 16 Reconciliation • Lebanon, consultations on resolution 1701; annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina and 17 Group of Five for the • Libya, briefing on the ICC by the Prosecutor will need to renew the authorisation of the EU-led Sahel and briefing and consultations on UNSMIL; multinational stabilisation force. There will also 19 Lebanon and be consultations on UNFICYP in Cyprus. 20 Yemen • Yemen, the monthly briefing, followed by con- Regarding the Democratic People’s Republic sultations, on implementation of resolutions of Korea (DPRK), the chair of the 1718 DPRK 22 Cyprus 2451 and 2452. Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Christoph 23 Iraq Several meetings on Somalia are expected. The Heusgen (Germany), will brief in consultations. Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution on the The sixth annual briefing with heads ofpolice Somalia sanctions regime, addressing the partial components of peacekeeping operations will be lifting of the arms embargo on Somali security held in early November. forces, the authorisation for maritime interdiction The 15 current Council members and the to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports and incoming five (Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and charcoal exports, and humanitarian exemptions the Grenadines, Tunisia, and Vietnam) will par- to the sanctions regime, all of which expire on 15 ticipate in the annual “Hitting the Ground Run- November. It is also expected to adopt a resolu- ning” workshop organised by Finland. tion renewing the mandate of the 751 Somalia Several Arria-formula meetings are anticipat- Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts, which ed, including on radicalisation in prisons, children expires on 15 December. A briefing, followed by and armed conflict and reintegration, environ- consultations, on UNSOM is anticipated. ment and security, and human rights defenders.

30 October 2019 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org.

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Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Missing Monthly Assessments of Council Presidencies

In 1997, Security Council members came up of Equitable Representation on and Increase decade or so, these formulations have disap- with the idea of producing monthly assess- in the Membership of the Security Council peared almost completely from the cover note, ments of their own Council presidencies as and also requested that the assessment be cir- reflecting a seeming shift in practice towards one means of introducing a more analytical culated as both a Council and an Assembly greater consultation among Council mem- component into the Council’s annual report document. This seemed to signal that some bers on draft assessments. to the General Assembly. With two excep- members saw the assessment as a transpar- The monthly assessments continued to be tions (in 1999 and 2014), all presidencies ency tool, affording the general membership issued by all but one presidency through May produced their respective assessments from a window into the Council’s functioning. 2015. Starting in 2016, published assessments July 1997 until May 2015. More recently, In the absence of any guidance on their dropped significantly. Only three assessments fewer than half of the Council members have format, the assessments differed in length, were published for that year, followed by five submitted monthly assessments, and most level of detail and analytical content. All tend- for 2017 and six for 2018, with only one at with considerable delay, in one case of more ed, however, to contain useful information press time for 2019. The time lapse between than two years. Meanwhile, the weak analyti- about aspects of Council work missing from the end of a presidency and the publication cal content of the Council’s annual report has official Council documents, such as Arria- of the assessment also increased consider- remained among the chief concerns voiced formula meetings or the horizon-scanning ably, ranging from two months to in some by UN member states. (See In Hindsight, briefings provided in consultations by the cases a year or more. Early on, assessments March 2019 Forecast.) Secretariat from 2010 through 2013. had come out quite quickly, sometimes dur- A note by the president from 1997, out- In the following two years, more assess- ing the month following the presidency and lining a new structure for the annual report, ments were issued as separate documents almost never taking more than a few months. specified that it would include, as an adden- (though with the exception of Canada’s for The diminished number of assessments dum, “brief assessments on the work of the April 2000, no longer as General Assembly may have to do with a heightened divisive- Security Council, which representatives who documents), and by 2001 all but one were ness within the Council overall having con- have completed their functions as President circulated as free-standing documents. They tributed to a more contentious consultative of the Security Council may wish to prepare, were usually sent to the president of the Secu- process. This would explain the long time under their own responsibility and following rity Council, accompanied by a cover letter lapses between a presidency and the publica- consultations with members of the Council stating that while the author had consulted tion of the respective assessment. It appears for the month during which they presided and other Council members, the assessment that, on some occasions, members have cho- which should not be considered as represent- should not be considered as representing the sen not to publish, rather than compromising ing the views of the Council” (S/1997/451). views of the Council. the text. In some recent cases, elected mem- As this language makes clear, monthly A note by the president of the Council bers may not even have been aware that they assessments were never mandatory. But issued on 22 May 2002 introduced several were expected to produce an assessment. In starting with Sweden’s July 1997 presiden- changes to the structure of the annual report. at least one case, the drafter, having received cy, all presidencies prepared their assess- Some changes aimed at reducing its volume, comments from other members, decided to ments, which were published as an appen- which by then had reached almost 600 pages. take on board only some of them and in the dix to the annual report. Some members did For one, the report would no longer repro- cover letter returned to the disclaimer lan- more: Costa Rica issued the assessment of duce the monthly assessments in full, but guage, stating that while other Council mem- its December 1997 presidency as a separate would simply list the assessments “issued bers had been consulted on the assessment, it document as well. In a letter to the Secretary- by the individual monthly Presidencies of should not be considered as representing the General, the country’s Permanent Represen- the Council on its work” (S/2002/199). Also views of the Council. tative asked that the assessment be circulated in 2002, the Council began the practice of During the discussion of the Security as a document of both the General Assembly assigning responsibility to the July presiden- Council’s 2018 annual report by the General and the Security Council, citing the note that cy for drafting an introductory essay for the Assembly on 10 and 12 September, several had established the practice and also under- annual report with some analytical content. speakers noted with concern the decrease lining that “this document has not been Following the 2002 switch to listing mere- in the number of assessments issued and agreed by Council members”. Canada fol- ly the document symbols in the annual report, highlighted their usefulness as a comple- lowed suit with the assessment of its Febru- the individual assessments still included a ment to the introduction to the report. They ary 1999 presidency. The cover letter referred note stating that while Council members expressed the hope that assessments would to the General Assembly’s discussions in the had been consulted, the document repre- again be produced by all members, and in a Open-ended Working Group on the Question sented the views of the presidency. In the past timelier fashion.

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Status Update since our October Forecast

Counter-Terrorism business” on 3 October to discuss the politi- South Sudan On 1 October, the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic cal unrest in Haiti. At that meeting, Special On 8 October, the Security Council adopted State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh) Representative of the Secretary-General a presidential statement (S/PRST/2019/11) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee met to and head of MINUJUSTH Helen La Lime on the implementation of the Revitalized discuss a recent visit to Syria by the Monitor- briefed on Haiti’s political and economic Agreement on the Resolution of the Con- ing Team assisting it. On 11 October, the com- challenges. On 15 October the Council held flict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) of 12 Sep- mittee met with the Monitoring Team for a a debate on MINUJUSTH and heard a brief- tember 2018 (S/PV.8634). The statement quarterly briefing and a report on its recent ing from Under-Secretary-General for Peace welcomes initial progress implementing the country visit to the DRC. On 23 October, the Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix (S/PV.8641). R-ARCSS and calls on the parties to expe- Counter-Terrorism Committee met to discuss Norway also briefed in its capacity as presi- dite the process of implementing transitional recent country visits to the Maldives, the Phil- dent of ECOSOC about the work of the Ad security arrangements and to continue con- ippines and Ghana by the Counter-Terrorism Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti. The delega- sultation on the issue of the number and Executive Directorate. tions of the EU and Haiti also participated. boundaries of states. The next day, 16 October, MINUJUSTH Youth, Peace and Security transitioned to the UN Integrated Office in Children and Armed Conflict On 2 October, the Council held a debate Haiti (BINUH). La Lime was appointed as The Working Group on Children and Armed under the agenda item “Peace and Security head of BINUH on October 14. Conflict met on 8 October and 15 October in Africa” with the focus on “Mobilising the to discuss its conclusions on the Secretary- Youth towards Silencing the Guns by 2020” Sudan (Darfur) General’s report on children and armed con- (S/PV.8629). The briefers were the Special On 3 October, Ambassador Joanna Wronecka flict in Yemen (S/2019/453). It held a formal Adviser on Africa to the Secretary-General, (Poland), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions meeting on 14 October for a video teleconfer- Bience Gawanas; the AU Special Envoy on Committee, provided the quarterly briefing to ence discussion with the Sudan Country Task Youth, Aya Chebbi; Hafsa Ahmed, co-founder Council members on the committee’s work (S/ Force on Monitoring and Reporting ahead of and chairperson of the organisation Naweza PV.8632). On 17 October, the Council was the renewal of UNAMID (Darfur). in Kenya; and Victor Ochen, a youth activist briefed on the special report of the Chairper- from Uganda. At press time, the adoption of a son of the AU Commission and the Secre- DPRK (North Korea) presidential statement by the end of October tary-General on UNAMID (S/2019/816) by On 9 October, Council members discussed was possible. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Opera- the 2 October submarine-launched ballis- tions Jean-Pierre Lacroix (S/PV.8643). He told tic missile test conducted by DPRK under Afghanistan the Council that the Sudanese government has “any other business”. France, Germany and On 2 October, Council members issued a requested more time to formulate its needs for the UK requested the meeting, citing seri- press statement on the 28 September presi- a possible follow-on mechanism to UNAMID ous concern over the missile test. These dential elections (SC/13969). On 21 October, and recommended that for an initial period of members, together with Belgium, Germa- Council members issued a press statement six months, which coincides with the anticipat- ny, Poland, and incoming Council member condemning in the strongest terms a terror- ed duration of peace talks, UNAMID would Estonia, made a joint statement at the media ist attack on 18 October in the Haska Mena retain the same ceiling of uniformed person- stakeout afterwards condemning the DPRK’s district in Nangarhar Province (SC/13992). nel. At press time, the Council was expected provocative actions. Stressing that the missile The attack resulted in the death of at least 60 to adopt a resolution extending UNAMID’s test constitutes a violation of Security Coun- people and almost 60 injured. mandate until 31 October 2020. cil resolutions, these members called on the DPRK to abandon the development of weap- Great Lakes Region Mali ons of mass destruction. On 3 October, Special Envoy of the Secretary- On 8 October, the Council received a brief- General for the Great Lakes Region Huang ing (S/PV.8636) via video teleconference Democratic Republic of the Congo Xia briefed the Council on developments in from Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the Secretary- On 9 October, the Council held a briefing on the Great Lakes Region (S/PV.8630) and the General’s Special Representative and head of MONUSCO (S/PV.8638). Leila Zerrougui, Secretary-General’s report on the implemen- MINUSMA, who presented the Secretary- Special Representative and head of MONUS- tation of the Peace, Security and Coopera- General’s latest report on Mali (S/2019/782). CO, briefed. A DRC representative also took tion Framework for the DRC and the Region Ambassador José Singer (Dominican Repub- part in the meeting. Afterwards Council (S/2019/783), followed by consultations. On lic), as chair of the Mali 2374 Sanctions Com- members met in consultations. Following the 8 October, Council members issued a press mittee, briefed on the work of the committee. meeting, Council members released a press statement on developments in the region, Consultations followed the public session. The statement on 14 October (SC/13985). In the particularly on the DRC (SC/13978). next day, Council members issued a press statement, members welcomed the new coali- statement on the implementation of the Agree- tion government as well as President Félix Haiti ment on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and Tshisekedi’s commitment to national unity, Council members met under “any other the overall security situation (SC/13981). rule of law, and fighting against corruption.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Status Updates since our October Forecast

Council members also called for increased UNISFA’s support to the Joint Border Verifi- commemoration of the twentieth anniversary state presence in the eastern DRC in order cation and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)”. to consolidate peace and address continued until 15 November (S/PV.8640). On 24 Octo- The briefers were UN Secretary-General insecurity. The statement furthermore reit- ber, the Council was briefed (S/PV.8644) on António Guterres; UN Women Executive erated Council members’ overall concern the Secretary-General’s most recent report Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka; the AU about the humanitarian situation, including (S/2019/817) by Under-Secretary-General Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security the ongoing Ebola outbreak. for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix Bineta Diop; Lina Ekomo, a former foreign and the Special Envoy for the Horn of Afri- minister of the Central African Republic on Colombia ca, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (the latter via behalf of FEMWISE (the Network of African On 10 October the Council received a brief- video teleconference). Lacroix referred to Women in Conflict Prevention and Media- ing on Colombia from the Secretary-Gener- the “unprecedented opportunity” to resolve tion); and Alaa Salah, a civil society activist al’s Special Representative and head of the the border related issues between Sudan and and community leader from Sudan. Resolu- UN Verification Mission in Colombia, Car- South Sudan, adding that the two countries tion 2492 was adopted unanimously. los Ruiz Massieu, on the Secretary-General’s need to resume direct talks immediately to 90-day report on Colombia (S/2019/780) resolve the final status of Abyei. Council Visiting Mission and the most recent developments (S/ From 18 to 23 October, a Security Coun- PV.8639). The briefing was followed by con- Western Sahara cil visiting mission went to South Sudan sultations. On 15 October, Council mem- On 16 October, Council members met in and Ethiopia, via Kenya. Members travelled bers issued a press statement, reiterating consultations to discuss MINURSO before to South Sudan on 20 October, to push for their unanimous support for the peace pro- its mandate’s expiry on 31 October. Spe- implementation of the Revitalized Agreement cess in Colombia while deploring a recent cial Representative Colin Stewart discussed on the Resolution of the Conflict in South announcement by a group of former fighters the fragile peace and ongoing humanitarian Sudan, in particular, the formation of a transi- that they would return to armed activity. The challenges in the region. At press time, the tional government of national unity by the 12 statement expressed concerns about the kill- Council was expected to adopt a resolution November deadline of the pre-transition phase ings of community and social leaders as well on 30 October renewing MINURSO’s man- of the peace accord. Members met with repre- as candidates running in the 27 October local date for 12 months. sentatives of UN Mission in South Sudan and and departmental elections. In the statement, UN Country Team, and civil society organ- members reaffirmed their commitment to UNDOF (Golan Heights) isations. They also met with President Salva working closely with Colombia in achieving On 16 October, Council members were Kiir, before a public meeting with the other progress in the implementation of the peace briefed in consultations by Under-Secretary- signatory parties and stakeholders to the peace agreement (S/13988). General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean- agreement, including opposition leader Riek Pierre Lacroix on the latest 90-day report by Machar. The mission co-leads, South Africa Guinea-Bissau the Secretary-General on UNDOF. and the US, held a press conference at the On 10 October, Council members held con- mission’s conclusion. In Addis Ababa, Ethio- sultations on Guinea-Bissau ahead of next Israel/Palestine pia, Council members held their 4th annual month’s 24 November presidential election. On 28 October, the Council held its quarterly informal meeting with AU Peace and Secu- Special Representative and head of UNIOG- open debate on Israel/Palestine. Special Coor- rity Council on 21 October, and 13th annual BIS Rosine Sori-Coulibaly briefed via video- dinator for the Middle East Peace Process joint consultative meeting with the PSC on 22 teleconference. On 16 October, Council Nickolay Mladenov opened his statement by October. The informal meeting focused on the members issued a press statement, reiterat- saying that there had been no progress towards AU’s “Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020” ing “the imperative need for the presidential the realisation of a two-state solution. He said initiative, and the modalities for joint field mis- election to be held on 24 November 2019” that while there were severe humanitarian sions of the two Councils. For the consultative (SC/13989). At press time, Council members problems, the core of the crisis is political and meeting, the Councils discussed South Sudan, were expected to meet on 30 October to dis- there must be a political solution. The Minister the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic cuss Guinea-Bissau under “any other busi- of International Relations and Cooperation of and under “any other business”, Guinea-Bis- ness” following President José Mário Vaz’s South Africa, Naledi Pandor, presided over the sau. Members also received briefings at the dismissal of the government on 28 October. open debate (S/PV.8648). UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) from Special From 27 to 30 October, the Chair of the 2048 Representative and head of the UNOAU Han- Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Anatolio Women, Peace and Security na Tetteh, and the Special Envoy for the Horn Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea), led a com- On 29 October, the Council held its annual of Africa, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga. At AU mittee visiting mission to Guinea-Bissau. open debate on women, peace and securi- headquarters, Council members met with AU ty, under the theme “Towards the success- Commissioner Moussa Faki. They also met Sudan/South Sudan ful implementation of the women, peace and with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. On 15 October, the Council unanimous- security agenda: moving from commitments ly adopted resolution 2492 extending to accomplishments in preparation for the

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Status Updates since our October Forecast

Burundi President of the International Court of Justice Tetteh, and AU Peace and Security Commis- At press time, the Secretary-General’s Spe- Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf in a private meeting. sioner Smaïl Chergui (both via VTC). cial Envoy Michel Kafando and Ambassa- dor Jürg Lauber (Switzerland), the chair of Cooperation between the UN and Kosovo the Burundi configuration of the PBC, were Regional Organisations At press time, the Council was expecting to expected to brief the Council on 30 October On 30 October, the Council considered hold on 31 October its third and final regular on the Secretary-General’s report on Burun- the Secretary-General’s annual report briefing on Kosovo for the year. Special Rep- di (S/2019/837). (S/2019/759) on the UN-AU partnership on resentative and head of UNMIK Zahir Tanin issues of peace and security in Africa (S/PV. was expected to brief the Council on the lat- International Court of Justice 8650). At press time, the expected briefers est Secretary-General’s report (S/2019/797) At press time, the Council was expecting to were Special Representative to the AU and and recent developments. receive on 31 October the annual briefing by head of the UN Office to the AU Hanna

Syria

Expected Council Action State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria. apparently detracted from the ability of Kurd- In November, the Security Council is expect- Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 24 ish forces to guard the thousands of Islamic ed to hold its monthly meetings on the politi- September, Erdoğan called for the establish- State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters cal process, the humanitarian situation, and ment of a “safe zone” inside Syria 30 kilome- under their watch. On 13 October, Kurd- the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Regard- tres wide and 480 kilometres long in which ish officials claimed that hundreds of ISIL ing the meeting on the use of chemical weap- to resettle one to two million Syrian refugees. prisoners escaped from Ain Issa, a detention ons, the Director-General of the Organisa- The security and political impacts of the camp in north-eastern Syria, following shell- tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons incursion have been significant. Following ing by Turkish forces near the camp. (OPCW), Fernando Arias, is expected to several days of fighting, US Vice President The security environment remained uncer- brief the Council in a private meeting. Mike Pence met with Erdoğan in Ankara on tain and fluid at the time of writing. On 25 The current authorisation for cross-border 17 October, agreeing on a 120-hour pause in October, media outlets reported that skirmish- humanitarian assistance expires on 10 Janu- the fighting to allow Kurdish troops to with- es had resumed between Turkish forces and ary 2020. draw from a border zone approximately 20 Kurdish fighters, and US Secretary of Defence miles (32 kilometres) wide in order to pave Mark Esper said that some US troops would Key Recent Developments the way for a more permanent ceasefire. For remain in eastern Syria to prevent oil facilities On 9 October, Turkey initiated a military its part, the US—whose troops moved out of from falling into ISIL’s hands. offensive against Kurdish militias in north- north-eastern Syria and into Iraq—agreed to The conflict in north-eastern Syria has had eastern Syria, which it called “Operation withdraw sanctions it had imposed on Turkey grave humanitarian consequences. OCHA Peace Spring”. The operation—which has in response to the incursion. has estimated that by 24 October, nearly employed aerial bombardments, artillery fire, Subsequently, under an agreement 180,000 civilians had been displaced by the and ground forces—took place on the heels reached by Russian President Vladimir Putin fighting that began on 9 October. On 29 of a phone call between US President Donald and Erdoğan in Sochi on 22 October, Russia October, the Syrian Observatory for Human Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdoğan and Syria agreed to patrol part of the border Rights estimated that 130 civilians had died on 6 October, in which Trump indicated that area and oversee the withdrawal of Kurdish in north-eastern Syria as a result of fighting US troops would be withdrawn immediately forces 30 kilometres from the border over since Turkey initiated its military operation. from the border area inside Syria. a period of 150 hours. Following this time On 26 October, the leader of ISIL, Abu In a letter to the Security Council on 9 period (that is, beginning the evening of 29 Bakr al-Baghdadi, died near Barisha, Syria, October, Turkey cited article 51 of the UN October), Russia and Turkey were expect- during a raid conducted by US special forces. Charter, on self-defence, as a reason for its ed to patrol sections of the border east and Council members have engaged closely on intervention, saying that the operation was west of where the Turkish military operation Syria in recent weeks. On 30 September, Spe- intended to ensure the security of its bor- was conducted and 10 kilometres into Syria, cial Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen briefed der and to fight terrorism. Turkey considers with the exception of Qamishli city. Turkey the Security Council on the political situation Kurdish forces in Syria to be terrorists, and announced that its military campaign had in the country. This came one week after Sec- it maintained in its letter that the operation ended on 22 October. retary-General António Guterres announced would counter Kurdish forces and the Islamic Turkey’s “Operation Peace Spring” on 23 September that the Syrian government

UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2019/12 (8 October 2019) welcomed the Secretary-General’s announcement of the formation of the Constitutional Committee. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8645 (24 October 2019) was a meeting on the political and humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8628 (30 September 2019) was a meeting on the political situation in Syria.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Syria

and the Syrian Negotiations Commission concern about the risk of dispersion of ter- the statement said. In a press briefing on 15 Octo- had agreed to form “a credible, balanced rorists belonging to UN-designated groups, ber, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner and inclusive Constitutional Committee that including ISIL, and about the risk of a further for Human Rights noted that “since the Turkish military offensive began on 9 October, we have will be facilitated by the UN in Geneva”. At deterioration of the humanitarian situation verified a number of civilian casualties each day the meeting, Pedersen announced his inten- in Syria. as a result of airstrikes, ground-based strikes and tion “to convene 150 Syrian men and women The monthly humanitarian meeting on sniper fire”. for the launch of a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned, Syria was held on 24 October with Assis- credible, balanced and inclusive Constitu- tant Secretary-General Mueller, Khiari, tional Committee” on 30 October, facilitated and Agnès Marcaillou, the Director of the Women, Peace and Security by the United Nations in Geneva. At press UN Mine Action Service, briefing. Mueller In his 30 September briefing to the Council, Ped- ersen announced in relation to the Constitutional time, the meeting was still scheduled to take emphasised the importance of protecting Committee “that nearly half the civil society list place on this date. civilians and civilian infrastructure, the need are women, and that we have around 30 percent On 8 October, the Council adopted a for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, women in the overall 150”. He argued that “any presidential statement welcoming the Secre- and the need for an end to hostilities in Syria. viable, sustainable peace process needs to have tary-General’s 23 September announcement She said that it was critical that cross-bor- women of all political persuasions at the table, since they represent over half its population and of the agreement to form the constitutional der humanitarian assistance be reauthorised since, throughout the course of the conflict, they committee. The statement reaffirmed that by the Council for another year. Khiari also have taken on an ever more prominent role in their there is no military solution to the Syrian expressed concern about the humanitarian communities”. conflict, which can only be resolved through impact of the military operation in north- the full implementation of resolution 2254. eastern Syria, while reporting that there had Council members discussed north-east- been an increase in air strikes in Idlib since Key Issues and Options ern Syria during “any other business” on 10 12 October. He noted the possibility that local A key issue is how the Council can sup- October at the request of the five European populations could face political retribution, port the work of Special Envoy Pedersen in members of the Council (Belgium, France, detention, and conscription when Syrian facilitating the Constitutional Committee. Germany, Poland, and the UK). Assistant authorities regain control of the north-east. Members may emphasise the importance of Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia Khiari added that the issue of foreign nation- confidence-building measures as a means of and the Pacific Mohamed Khaled Khiari and als in Syria (most likely a reference to foreign energising the political process. For example, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitar- terrorist fighters) had to be addressed, calling in next month’s meetings, they could high- ian Affairs Ursula Mueller briefed, apparently on all member states to take “all measures light that large-scale releases of detainees noting that Turkey’s incursion was not a lim- necessary to ensure that their nationals are and abductees and information about miss- ited action and expressing concerns about repatriated for the purposes of prosecution, ing persons could be important steps in this its impact on the humanitarian, security and rehabilitation, and/or reintegration as appro- regard, as some have already begun to do. political situation in Syria. Members criti- priate and in line with international law and Another key issue for the Council is how cised the fighting to varying degrees, rang- standards”. Marcaillou stressed that mine to address the humanitarian and security ing from condemnation of Turkey’s action action was critical to improving humanitar- impacts of the recent conflict in north-east- and calls for it to exercise restraint, to calling ian access in Syria. ern Syria. Humanitarian access to this area on all parties to exercise restraint. The US and the rise in displacement are important proposed press elements—an informal prod- Human Rights-Related Developments considerations, as are plans to guard the ISIL uct that requires unanimity and is generally On 27 September, the Human Rights Council fighters who had been detained by Kurdish adopted a resolution on human rights in Syria by issued immediately after a closed meeting to forces that have now retreated from the bor- a vote of 27 in favour, six against and 13 absten- provide information to the press – that would tions (A/HRC/42/L.22). The resolution deplored der areas. Members could seek further infor- apparently have expressed concern about the fact that the conflict in Syria continues in mation from OCHA on how humanitarian the humanitarian and security impact of its ninth year with its devastating impact on the access can be maintained and enhanced in the fighting. Members were unable to agree, civilian population. It reaffirmed that there can north-eastern Syria, especially given that con- only be a political solution to the conflict in Syria however, and at the stakeout, Ambassador trol of this area has changed hands. and demanded that all parties work towards a Vassily Nebenzia (Russia) said that a product genuine political transition based on the 2012 In the future, the Council will also need “should take into account other aspects of the Geneva communiqué and Security Council reso- to consider how to approach the potential Syrian crisis, not just the Turkish operation”. lution 2254. On 10 October, the Commission of repatriation of Syrian refugees now in Tur- On 16 October, Council members again Inquiry on Syria released a statement noting “with key to north-eastern Syria. A reaffirmation grave concern the military offensive and aerial discussed the situation in Syria under “any of the importance of the voluntary, safe and campaign being launched in northeast Syria on other business”, also at the request of the five 9 October”. Hundreds of thousands of civilians dignified return of refugees in accordance European members. Under-Secretary-Gen- may be affected by any operations along the with international law, possibly in a Council eral for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock border and “any new military campaign may lead outcome, could be considered. and Khiari briefed. In the press elements fol- to insecurity and chaos, risking circumstances Addressing the humanitarian situation in lowing the meeting, members expressed deep under which a resurgence of ISIL could occur”, north-western Syria is another ongoing issue

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Syria facing the Council. Given that a significant maximum restraint from the parties, it framed dignified manner; that civilians and civilian amount of aid comes across the Turkish bor- the operation as a result of coalition forces infrastructure are not targeted in the conflict; der with north-western Syria, members could having supported the Kurds in north-eastern and that there is accountability for the crimes begin discussing the reauthorising of cross- Syria at the expense of Arab groups, which being committed. As reflected in statements border humanitarian assistance, which has Ambassador Nebenzia referred to as “demo- during the 24 October briefing, several mem- traditionally occurred in December. graphic engineering” at the press stakeout on bers are also emphasising the critical impor- 10 October. All members are keenly aware of tance of re-authorising cross-border humani- Council Dynamics the importance of ISIL not regaining a foot- tarian assistance. Many Council members were highly criti- hold in north-eastern Syria. Several Council Belgium, Germany, and Kuwait are the cal of Turkey’s military operation in north- members share a variety of other concerns: penholders on Syria humanitarian issues. eastern Syria. Russia’s position varied from that any repatriation of refugees into north- that of other members. While also calling for eastern Syria is done in a voluntary, safe and

Libya

Expected Council Action consultations under “any other business” use of drones, as reported by DiCarlo. The In November, the Council is expected to to discuss the AU proposal for a joint AU- conflict is fuelled by support from other gov- receive briefings by the Special Representa- UN special envoy for Libya. This idea had ernments, including military support chan- tive and head of the UN Support Mission in featured in a communiqué issued after the nelled to both the GNA and the LNA in vio- Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé, and the last AU PSC ministerial meeting on Libya lation of the UN arms embargo. chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, on 8 October, supporting an 8 July decision On 6 September, UNSMIL condemned Jürgen Schulz, the Deputy Permanent Rep- by the AU High Level Committee on Libya an attack “conducted by General Haftar’s resentative of Germany. Additionally, ICC that such a joint envoy be appointed. During forces” that targeted the Equestrian Club Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda will deliver her the consultations, Under-Secretary-General in Tripoli, injuring children. An UNSMIL semi-annual briefing on recent developments for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rose- assessment mission confirmed the civilian concerning cases in Libya. mary DiCarlo briefed on the situation in Lib- nature of the targeted site, on which four The mandate of UNSMIL expires on 15 ya. The African members proposed elements bombs were dropped. September 2020, and the mandate of the to the press, and later a press statement, that Haftar’s offensive halted a UN-supported Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya would, among other things, have taken note political process and caused indefinite post- Sanctions Committee expires on 15 Febru- of the proposal, which was not agreeable to ponement of the National Conference, which ary 2020. all members. had been scheduled for 14-16 April. The aim Libya’s capital, Tripoli, continues to be the of the National Conference was for Libyans Key Recent Developments scene of fighting that started on 4 April when to agree on the holding of parliamentary and On 22 October, Council members held their General Khalifa Haftar, head of the eastern- presidential elections and a constitutional annual joint consultative meeting with the AU based militia known as the Libyan National referendum. Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Addis Army (LNA), launched an offensive towards In August, Salamé proposed three steps Ababa. This was the first time since 2011 that Tripoli and against the internationally rec- for an end to the conflict: a humanitarian Libya was on the agenda. It is also proving a ognised and UN-backed Government of truce during Eid al-Adha, including confi- difficult issue in the negotiations on the joint National Accord (GNA) based there. Lib- dence-building measures between the par- communiqué that is issued following these ya does not have professional security forc- ties; a high-level conference of “concerned annual meetings. The situation has been a es, and the GNA currently relies on armed countries”; and a “Libyan meeting of lead- source of tension between the Council and groups for its security. After initial military ing and influential personalities from all over PSC in the past, with the PSC frequently feel- gains by the LNA around Tripoli, the front the country”. The GNA agreed to the truce, ing sidelined in efforts to address the crisis. lines have remained mostly static since mid- as did the LNA, which had initially rejected On 16 October, the three African mem- April, with continuing air strikes and indis- it and then limited the truce on their part to bers of the Council (Côte d’Ivoire, Equa- criminate artillery shelling of densely popu- the suburbs of Tripoli and for only a few days. torial Guinea and South Africa) requested lated civilian areas as well as an increase in the More recently, and in support of Salamé’s

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2491 (3 October 2019) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisa- tions, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking.S/RES/2486 (12 September 2019) extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 15 September 2020. S/RES/2473 (10 June 2019) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. S/RES/2441 (5 November 2018) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee as well as the measures related to the illicit export of crude oil from Libya until 20 February 2020; it was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8631 (3 October 2019) was the adoption of resolution 2491. S/PV.8523 (8 May 2019) was the semi-annual briefing by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on recent developments concerning cases in Libya.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Libya

second step, a series of meetings on Libya Libya”, which must include the closure of migrant An ongoing issue is the military escala- were held in Berlin in October, convened by detention centres. tion, which threatens to deepen long-stand- Germany and co-led with UNSMIL; attend- ing political and economic divisions between ees included Egypt, France, Germany, Ita- Women, Peace and Security different parts of Libya. Individual Council ly, Russia, Turkey, the UK, the United Arab In his latest annual report on women, peace members could use their influence to put and security, the Secretary-General writes that Emirates, the US, the AU, the Arab League pressure on the parties and countries to the UN “received reports of intimidation, includ- and the EU. ing social media attacks, against women activ- adhere to the arms embargo. In the longer The number of internally displaced people ists and lawmakers in Libya and others living term, a Council visiting mission to Libya or stands at 301,407, according to 18 October abroad”. He names as “a stark example” the 17 a full-fledged visit by the Libya Sanctions estimates by UNHCR. Of those, 128,000 July forced disappearance of Seham Sergiwa, a Committee could be considered. member of the House of Representatives. During have been displaced since the attack on Trip- a 4 September Council meeting on Libya, Marwa oli in early April. Mohamed, Head of Advocacy and Outreach of Council and Wider Dynamics At press time, the UN’s 2019 humanitar- Lawyers for Justice in Libya, referred to Sergiwa’s Libya remains a divisive issue within the ian response plan for Libya of $201.6 million case as well, pointing out that she had “expressed Council. Council resolutions and presidential was funded at 45.8 percent, with $109.3 mil- political views critical of the offensive of the LNA statements routinely call upon UN member on Tripoli”. Speaking on the situation in general, lion outstanding. states to cease support for parallel institu- Mohamed said that “since 2014, women human rights defenders have been routinely subjected tions in Libya, but some countries, including Sanctions-Related Developments to gender-based violence and threats, including permanent members of the Council, fail to The Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya physical assault, abductions, sexual violence, respect these calls and also continue to sup- Sanctions Committee continues to brief the com- as well as gender-related slurs and smear cam- port Haftar militarily. Militias affiliated with mittee on an ad-hoc basis on the numerous viola- paigns”. Together with a lack of accountability, the GNA also receive military support from tions of the UN arms embargo. this had “effectively forced women out of public life”. abroad. Reportedly, Turkey and Qatar sup- port the GNA militarily while Egypt, Saudi Human Rights-Related Developments Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provide During its 42nd session, the Human Rights Key Issues and Options military support to the LNA. Political sup- Council received an oral update on Libya on 25 Council members are following closely the port for Haftar comes from France, Russia, September from Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kate Gilmore, who highlighted the progress made by Salamé in his proposed and the US. level of civilian casualties in Tripoli and beyond, three steps. In case of significant progress at Libya also continues to be a difficult issue adding that since April, at least 46 attacks have the political level, the Council may consider in the relationship between the Council and been directed against health workers and health endorsing any advances. Bearing in mind the the AU. facilities. Gilmore also noted that serious human complexities of the situation in Libya, the The UK is the penholder on Libya, shar- rights violations are widespread in Libya, including summary executions, abductions, enforced disap- Council could add a request for more fre- ing the pen with Germany on the sanctions pearances, torture and ill-treatment, and gender- quent written reporting by the Secretary- file. Schulz, Germany’s Deputy Permanent based violence, including conflict-related sexual General so all members can stay more closely Representative, chairs the 1970 Libya Sanc- violence. She also called for “a dignified, human informed of developments. tions Committee. rights-based solution for migrants stranded in

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments Serbs. NATO ministers agreed in Decem- In November, the Council will hold its semi- More than a year has passed since gener- ber 2018 to start implementing BiH’s long- annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina al elections took place on 7 October 2018. stalled Membership Action Plan, a key step (BiH) and to renew the authorisation of However, the new national-level BiH Council for BiH’s accession to NATO. (The Mem- the EU-led multinational stabilisation force of Ministers has not yet been formed. Gov- bership Action Plan is a NATO programme (EUFOR ALTHEA). High Representative ernments have also not been formed in the of advice, assistance and practical support Valentin Inzko is expected to brief on the lat- Federation of BiH (FBiH)—the predomi- tailored to the individual needs of countries est report of the Office of the High Represen- nantly Bosniak and Croat regional entity— wishing to join the Alliance. Although it does tative (OHR), due by 29 October. and in two of the Federation’s ten cantons. not guarantee future membership, it effec- The current authorisation for EUFOR The deadlock reflects continued divisions tively puts countries on track to joining the ALTHEA expires on 6 November. and tensions among Bosniaks, Croats and Alliance.) However, BiH has not accepted

UN DOCUMENTS ON BIH Security Council Resolution S/RES/2443 (6 November 2018) renewed the authorisation of EUFOR ALTHEA for a further period of 12 months, until 6 November 2019. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8522 (8 May 2019) was the semi-annual debate. Security Council Letters S/2019/364 (1 May 2019) was the High Representative’s report, covering the period from 16 October 2018 to 15 April 2019. S/2018/974 (30 October 2018) was the High Representative’s report, covering the period from 22 April 2018 to 15 October 2018.

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Bosnia and Herzegovina this offer, as Bosnian Serb leaders oppose He emphasised the continuation of divisive challenging BiH’s sovereignty and territorial NATO membership. and destabilising rhetoric, the need to cre- integrity. Russia, however, tends to be more In September, the largest Bosniak party, the ate governments at the local, state and fed- supportive of the positions of the RS leader- Party of Democratic Action (SDA), adopted eral levels and the importance of keeping the ship and is critical of the High Representative, a declaration expressing the intention to cen- country moving forward along the path to contending that his reporting is not objective. tralise the country’s governance by creating a integration with the European Union. Milo- At the debate in May, where all 15 Coun- republic with three levels of authority: state, rad Dodik, then-Chair of Bosnia and Her- cil members made statements, Russia said regional and local. This was strongly opposed zegovina’s Tripartite Presidency, continued the report of the OHR “was far from impar- by Bosnian Croats and Serbs. An 18 Septem- to speak out against the country’s statehood tial” and called for more time to consider the ber statement by Inzko deplored “the fact that and to threaten secession by the RS. (The report ahead of the debate. SDA has decided to formulate its vision about position of Chair rotates every eight months As in previous years, the decision on 6 the future of BiH based on a concept which around the three members of the Presidency, November 2018 to reauthorise EUFOR is clearly not acceptable for some”. The state- with each of them serving as Chair twice dur- ALTHEA for one year was not controver- ment emphasised that the BiH Constitution ing a presidential term.) Inzko stressed that sial, as all members in the Coordination and guarantees the “sovereignty, territorial integ- BiH “still requires the attention and unified Drafting Group and the Council support rity, and political independence of BiH” con- approach of the international community”. the continuation of the EU-led international sisting of two autonomous entities, the FBiH force. The BiH Coordination and Drafting and Republika Srpska (RS). The statement Key Issues and Options Group prepares the first draft of Council said that “any change to the internal organi- Ethnic divisions among Bosniaks, Croats and products on BiH. For 2019, it comprises Bel- zation of BiH must be adopted in accordance Serbs continue to create political gridlock gium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, with the procedures set forth in the Constitu- and a dysfunctional state, hampering socio- the UK and the US. tion, which requires a comprehensive process economic reforms—including BiH’s EU inte- However, during negotiations last year, of consensus-building and agreement across gration—and fostering disregard of judicial Russia broke silence and objected to three the entire political spectrum”. decisions. Linked to this is the stalled prog- paragraphs in the renewal resolution that On 14 October, the EU Council adopt- ress on fulfilling the criteria and objectives expressed support for the OHR; apprecia- ed conclusions on BiH that called on the for closing OHR. Regarding BiH’s failure to tion of the High Representative, personnel of country to proceed with government for- form a government, one of the main areas of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, the Organiza- mation and start work without any further disagreement reportedly remains whether the tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe delay. It also welcomed the continued pres- country’s NATO Membership Action Plan and the EU; and the importance of progress ence of EUFOR ALTHEA and said that it should be activated due to the opposition of towards Euro-Atlantic integration. looked forward to the next strategic review Bosnian Serb leaders. A further issue, flagged These three paragraphs had been included in 2021 as a basis for discussion with mem- by the High Representative last year, is pres- in resolution 2183 adopted on 11 November ber states on EUFOR’s tasks and options sure on BiH from migrants who are increas- 2014, on which Russia abstained, and have for the future of the operation. From 7 to 11 ingly seeking to pass through the country. not been included in resolutions adopted October, EUFOR ALTHEA held its annual subsequently, on which Russia has voted in Quick Response test exercise of the opera- Council Dynamics favour. To achieve consensus on the renewal tion’s capability to rapidly reinforce its troops Council members largely share concerns in 2018, the three references were removed at in BiH with part of its reserve forces, which over BiH’s divisive ethnic politics and the Russia’s request. Resolution 2443 was adopt- are held at high readiness in partner nations. urgent need for parties to take the necessary ed unanimously. (For more details see our The Council held its previous semi-annu- steps following general elections in Octo- What’s In Blue story of 5 November 2018.) al debate on BiH on 8 May. Inzko briefed ber 2018. Most members are also critical of and presented the latest report of the OHR. the RS leaders’ rhetoric, which they view as

UN Peacekeeping

Expected Council Action and UN Police Adviser Luís Carrilho are Stabilization Operation in the Democrat- In November, the Council will hold its annual expected to brief. The heads of police com- ic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); briefing with the heads of UN police com- ponents of three UN peacekeeping opera- Mary Gahonzire, the police commissioner ponents. Under-Secretary-General for UN tions will also brief: Awale Abdounasir, the of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix police commissioner of the UN Organization (UNISFA); and Issoufou Yacouba, the police

UN DOCUMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2447 (13 December 2018) focused on enhancing support to police, justice and corrections in peacekeep- ing operations and special political missions. S/RES/2382 (6 November 2017) stressed the important contribution UN policing can provide in peacekeeping and special political missions throughout the conflict cycle across the entire peace continuum. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/1183 (31 December 2018) was the Secretary-General’s report on UN policing. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8393 (6 November 2018) was the annual briefing on the role of UN policing in peacekeeping operations.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 9 UN Peacekeeping commissioner of the UN Multidimension- by the end of 2018, focused on “strengthen- Key Issues and Options al Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali ing the operational and policy coherence of A key issue that may be addressed in the (MINUSMA). Abdounasir is expected to UN policing across the UN system”, among meeting is the role of UN policing in the speak about MONUSCO’s efforts to address other issues. context of the Declaration of Shared Com- serious and organised crime, while Gahonzire The report, which was published on 31 mitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, will discuss UNISFA’s efforts to support December 2018, made several observations launched by Secretary-General António community protection committees in Abyei to help enhance the effectiveness of UN Guterres in August 2018 and currently and Yacouba will address efforts to build gov- policing. Among other things, the report: endorsed by 152 member states and four ernance in “ungoverned spaces” in Mali. • called on mission heads to include the regional organisations. This could include, heads of police components as part of for example, focus on how UN policing can Key Recent Developments their senior management teams; most effectively advance political solutions Briefings with the heads of police compo- • observed that member state support is to conflict, protect civilians, and strengthen nents of UN peacekeeping operations have needed for the UN to achieve the Secre- peacekeeping’s impact on sustaining peace. been held in the Council annually since tary-General’s strategy for gender parity The briefings with the heads of police 2014 when this meeting was initiated by for uniformed personnel by 2028; components have traditionally included then-Council member Australia. The most • urged police-contributing countries to interaction between briefers and Council recent of these, held on 6 November 2018, strengthen efforts to evaluate and train members. Members may pose questions featured a briefing from Assistant Secre- their police personnel and hold them directly to the heads of the police compo- tary-General for Rule of Law and Secu- accountable for criminal acts; nents, an otherwise rare practice in Council rity Institutions Alexandre Zouev and the • observed that the UN Police Unit can public briefings. heads of police components of three UN contribute to “horizon scanning and ear- An additional issue for Council members peacekeeping operations: Unaisi Bolato- ly warning processes and briefings to the is the fact that the Secretary-General’s 31 lu-Vuniwaqa of the UN Mission in South Security Council by analysing the state December 2018 report on UN policing has Sudan (UNMISS), Serge Therriault of of policing and other law enforcement yet to be formally discussed by the Council, the UN Mission for Justice Support in institutions and by recommending swift although it has been informally discussed Haiti (MINUJUSTH), and Abdounasir of responses to emerging problems”; and among police advisors from UN mem- MONUSCO. Tuesday Reitano, the depu- • encouraged the consideration of options ber state missions. Council members may ty director of the Global Initiative against for establishing a police advisory com- choose to raise themes highlighted in the Transnational Organized Crime, also par- mittee to “strengthen information report during their interventions. ticipated in the meeting. exchange and triangular cooperation” Zouev introduced the themes addressed among police-contributing countries, Council Dynamics by the police commissioners. Vuniwaqa the Secretariat and the Security Council. There is general agreement among Council discussed UNMISS’ efforts to protect civil- On 13 December 2018, the Coun- members about the importance of UN police ians through gender-responsive policing, cil adopted resolution 2447, which was in helping to maintain public order, protect Abdounasir briefed on efforts by MONUS- spearheaded by the Netherlands and Côte civilians, and assist host states in building CO to prevent and address organised crime, d’Ivoire and underscored the importance of their law enforcement capacities. Members and Therriault briefed on MINUJUSTH’s integrating UN support for police, justice also emphasise the importance of deploying efforts to strengthen the rule of law through and corrections institutions in the mandates UN police with the requisite linguistic skills police reform. Reitano discussed trends in of UN peace operations. and training, including with regard to sexual organised crime and highlighted gaps in the and gender-based violence, and the need to UN’s efforts to address this challenge. Women, Peace and Security increase the number of women in UN police Resolution 2382, adopted on 6 Novem- In his latest annual report on women, peace contingents. While some members tend to and security, the Secretary-General writes that ber 2017 at that year’s annual police com- emphasise the role of UN policing across “figures among uniformed personnel remain low” missioners’ briefing, stressed the important and that as of December 2018, women repre- the peace continuum (encompassing conflict role of UN policing with respect to the pro- sented 12.8 per cent of police personnel. He fur- prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, and tection of civilians, capacity-building, and ther states that twelve sexual and gender-based peacebuilding), others underscore that pro- the development efforts of host-state police violence advisers were placed in police compo- longed deployments risk inhibiting the ability nents of UN missions in Abyei, the Central Afri- services. It further called on the Secretary- of host countries to develop their own polic- can Republic, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of General to provide a report on UN policing the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Mali and South Sudan. ing capacities.

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Somalia

Expected Council Action The security situation, along with droughts heavy arms out of the country. He also rec- In November, the Council is expected to and other climate-related issues, continue to ommended that the arms embargo be stream- adopt a resolution on the Somalia sanctions be a driver of displacement. According to lined and updated to reflect current coun- regime, addressing the partial lifting of the OCHA’s 13 September assessment of human- ter-insurgency efforts, including enhanced arms embargo on Somali security forces, itarian assistance in Somalia, submitted to oversight over commercial explosives used the authorisation for maritime interdic- the Somalia Sanctions Committee, 270,000 by Al-Shabaab to manufacture improvised tion to enforce the embargo on illicit arms people were displaced between January and explosive devices. imports and charcoal exports, and humani- August 2019. The volatile security situation The charcoal ban, according to the coordi- tarian exemptions to the sanctions regime, hampers the ability of humanitarian workers nator, has not affected Al-Shabaab’s income all of which expire on 15 November. The to provide assistance. In some districts, par- in a critical way, as the group is not depen- mandate review of the Somalia Panel of ticularly in southern and central regions of dent on charcoal exports alone. In this con- Experts, which expires on 15 December, is Somalia, humanitarian access remains limited, text, the Committee also discussed how also due in November. due in part to insecurity along main supply charcoal smugglers also smuggle other com- Finally, there will be a briefing, followed routes. According to OCHA, in the absence modities and arms. As Al-Shabaab has other by consultations, on the UN Assistance Mis- of humanitarian assistance, up to 2.1 million sources of revenue and is still profiting from sion in Somalia (UNSOM). people across Somalia will face severe hunger charcoal domestically, the Panel of Experts The mandate of UNSOM expires on 31 by December 2019. That would bring the total suggested assessing the impact and utility of March 2020. The mandate authorising the number of Somalis expected to be food inse- the charcoal ban. Finally, the coordinator rec- AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expires cure to 6.3 million by year’s end. In light of this ommended that the Council utilise targeted on 31 May 2020. situation, OCHA has recommended that the sanctions on violators of the sanctions regime, Council extend the humanitarian exemption financiers of terrorism, violators of interna- Key Recent Developments to the assets freeze imposed by the committee tional humanitarian law and political spoilers. The armed group Al-Shabaab remains active on individuals and entities. Several Council members expressed sup- and dangerous, carrying out attacks targeting The 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee port for the Panel of Experts’ work and not- civilians, government facilities and person- met with a representative of the UN Office ed that it was unacceptable that Somalia has nel, security forces, and international part- on Drugs and Crime on 3 October. One of not cooperated with the panel during the last ners. On 30 September, the group attacked the issues discussed was the ban on charcoal year, most notably by not allowing the panel Baledogle, a military airbase located in Lower exports (discussed further below). The repre- to visit Somalia. Shabelle region, about 60 miles from Mog- sentative explained that Somali charcoal is in Special Representative and head of adishu, currently used by the US to train high demand because of its quality, particu- UNSOM James Swan last briefed the Somali commandos. The attack was repelled larly in the Gulf states. Council on 21 August. He highlighted the and no injuries were reported. An Italian mili- The Chair of the committee, Ambassa- dire humanitarian situation in Somalia tary convoy, a contingent of the EU training dor Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium), and stressed that the security situation also mission in Somalia, was attacked in Moga- briefed the Council on 25 October on the remains a serious concern, mainly due to Al- dishu on the same day, also without casual- committee’s recent activities. He emphasised Shabaab terrorist attacks. At the same time, ties. In response, the US stated that its forces the conclusions of OCHA’s 13 September he noted that Somali security forces, work- carried out two airstrikes and engaged in an humanitarian assessment, and also spoke ing with AMISOM and international part- exchange of fire with militants, killing ten, in about the 15 October briefing by the coor- ners, are making progress in recovering and unspecified locations in the country. dinator of the Panel of Experts assisting the stabilising areas near Mogadishu previously Several Kenyan police officers were committee, on the panel’s soon-to-be-pub- held by Al-Shabaab. reportedly killed on 12 October when their lished final report. The coordinator highlight- On Djibouti and Eritrea, the Secretary- vehicle hit a roadside bomb near Garissa on ed that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat General informed the Council in a short letter the Kenyan side of the Somali border. On to peace and security in the region and to vio- on 5 August that no significant progress has 13 October, at least three mortar shells were late international humanitarian law. The coor- been made in resolving the dispute between fired at Mogadishu’s international airport dinator told the Committee that the panel had the two states; this was his latest update as compound, where several embassies and confirmed that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing requested in resolution 2444, which lifted UNSOM headquarters are located, injuring homemade explosives while benefiting eco- sanctions on Eritrea. He noted that Djibouti at least seven people. Over 40 Al-Shabaab nomically from a system of parallel taxation insists on resolving its border dispute with militants were killed in operations conducted on virtually all trade in southern Somalia. Eritrea through binding international arbitra- by the Somali military in Kismayo and Hiran, On the arms embargo, the coordinator tion, and remains concerned about the fate of on 7 and 19 October, respectively. assessed that it has been successful in keeping its soldiers who are missing as a result of the

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2472 (31 May 2019) renewed the authorisation of AMISOM until 31 May 2020 and authorised reductions to achieve a maximum level of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel by 28 February 2020. S/RES/2461 (27 March 2019) renewed the mandate of UNSOM until 31 March 2020. S/RES/2444 (14 November 2018) lifted sanctions on Eritrea and extended various elements of the Somalia sanctions regime until 15 November 2019. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/661 (15 August 2019) was the most recent report on Somalia and UNSOM. Security Council Letter S/2019/627 (2 August 2019) was from the Secretary-General on developments towards the normalisation of relations between Djibouti and Eritrea. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8647 (25 October 2019) was a briefing by the Chair of the Somalia Committee, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium). S/PV.8601 (21 August 2019) was the briefing by Special Representative and head of UNSOM James Swan on the latest UNSOM report. Security Council Press Statement SC/13883 (15 July 2019) condemned the terrorist attack in Kismayo on 12 July 2019. Sanctions Committee Document S/2019/799 (7 October 2019) contained the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Somalia border clashes between Djibouti and Eritrea Key Issues and Options at press time, there does not seem to be much from 10 to 12 June 2008. It further main- The key immediate issue for the Council in disagreement over the renewal. tains that the unresolved issues with Eritrea November is renewing the various sanctions Somalia continues to be of the view that constitute a threat to Djibouti itself and to measures and corresponding exemptions. the arms embargo should be amended to international peace and security. Eritrea, for The Council may take the opportunity to allow it to import heavy weapons without its part, maintains that the dispute should be streamline sanctions language found in sev- authorisation from the sanctions commit- resolved within a wider regional framework. eral resolutions into one comprehensive text. tee. However, as the situation on the ground The Council may use the opportunity to is not improving and given Somalia’s recent Human Rights-Related Developments reiterate previous calls for Somalia and oth- lack of engagement and cooperation with the During its 42nd session, the Human Rights Council er member states to meet their obligations committee and its Panel of Experts, several (HRC) held an interactive dialogue on 25 Septem- in implementing the sanctions regime, par- Council members seem content to renew the ber with the independent expert on human rights in Somalia, Bahame Nyanduga, and considered his ticularly with respect to the arms embargo measures as they are. report (A/HRC/42/62). The report concluded that and charcoal ban, and impose or threaten to The Council may choose to consolidate while terror attacks, insecurity, human rights viola- impose sanctions on individuals involved in sanctions language into a single new text, as tions, poverty and intercommunal conflicts persist, the illicit trade in charcoal. well as consider suggestions for adding new the country’s transition to a democratic state is Regarding the Djibouti-Eritrea situation, elements to the regime. Such attempts may advancing. On 27 September, the HRC adopted without a vote a resolution renewing the mandate the Council could issue a press statement in prove difficult, however, as this exercise may of the independent expert for one year (A/HRC/ light of the lack of progress, encouraging the lead to wider discussions about previously RES/42/33). The resolution also called on the Fed- two sides to settle their dispute in accordance agreed language, which other Council mem- eral Government of Somalia to take action in 22 with one of the methods enumerated in Arti- bers will want to avoid. specific areas, including making urgent progress cle 33 of the UN Charter. The UK is the penholder on Somalia and towards settling outstanding constitutional issues; expediting the establishment of a national human the US is the penholder on piracy. Ambas- rights commission; promoting the protection Council and Wider Dynamics sador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Bel- of all internally displaced persons; and ensuring While negotiations over the renewal of sanc- gium) is the Chair of the Somalia Sanctions safe, timely, sustained and unhindered access for tions and exemptions had yet to commence Committee. humanitarian organisations.

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action the missile test and declared it successful. to abandon the development of weapons of In November, the chair of the 1718 Demo- According to information provided by the mass destruction. The DPRK also conduct- cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Defense, the ed short-range missile tests in August and Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Chris- projectile reached an altitude of 565 miles September. Council members met twice in toph Heusgen (Germany), is expected to while covering a distance of 280 miles. Japan August under “any other business” following brief Council members in consultations on said that one part of the missile fell in the each of the tests that month. the 90-day report about the committee’s work. waters of its exclusive economic zone. On the diplomatic front, there has been The mandate of the Panel of Experts One week later, Council members dis- only limited engagement between the US expires on 24 April 2020. cussed the incident under “any other and the DPRK and no meaningful prog- business”. France, Germany and the UK ress since the collapse of the February US- Key Recent Developments requested the meeting, citing serious con- DPRK summit in Hanoi. In June, US Presi- In recent months, the DPRK has conduct- cern over the missile test. These members, dent Donald Trump and DPRK leader Kim ed multiple ballistic missile tests and further together with Belgium, Germany, Poland, Jong-un met briefly in the demilitarised zone jeopardised diplomatic efforts on the denu- and incoming Council member Estonia, (DMZ) between the two Koreas, and agreed clearisation of the Korean Peninsula. In the made a joint statement at the media stakeout to continue negotiations on denuclearization. latest tests, the DPRK fired a submarine- condemning the DPRK’s actions as provoc- In September, the DPRK indicated its will- launched ballistic missile on 2 October from ative. Stressing that the missile test consti- ingness to engage in wide-ranging talks but the waters off the eastern coast of the coun- tutes a violation of Security Council resolu- stressed that the US needs to approach such try. The DPRK’s state-run media confirmed tions, these members called on the DPRK talks with new ideas and proposals.

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2464 (10 April 2019) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee until 24 April 2020. S/RES/2397 (22 December 2017) tightened sanctions on the DPRK. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2017/16 (29 August 2017) condemned the launch of a missile over the territory of Japan and urged the DPRK to comply with previous Council resolutions and presidential statements. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8507 (10 April 2019) was the adoption of a resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee until 24 April 2020. S/PV.8363 (27 September 2018) was a ministerial-level meeting on efforts to denuclearise the DPRK.S/PV.8362 (26 September 2018) was a high-level meeting on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Sanctions Committee Document S/2019/691 (30 August 2019) was a midterm report of the Panel of Experts.

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 DPRK (North Korea)

On 5 October, the US and the DPRK implementation of sanctions measures and the such meeting was held in 2018, an option negotiating teams met in Sweden in the first need for the Council to address the new meth- would be for the Council to hold a meeting official working-level meeting of the two ods the DPRK uses to evade sanctions. on the human rights situation in the DPRK sides since the February summit in Hanoi. before the end of 2019. In statements issued afterwards, both sides Human Rights-Related Developments offered varying perceptions of the encounter. During its 42nd session, the Human Rights Council Dynamics Council adopted without a vote the outcome The DPRK said it ended the talks because The Council remains divided on the role of of the universal periodic review for the DPRK the US failed to make any concessions. The (A/HRC/42/10) on 20 September (A/HRC/ sanctions in addressing the nuclear threat US presented a more positive view of the DEC/42/108). Recommendations for the coun- posed by the DPRK. The US continues meeting and signalled its intention to con- try in the report of the Working Group on the to emphasize the importance of sustain- tinue the talks in the upcoming weeks. In Universal Periodic Review included cooperat- ing the policy of maximum pressure on the ing with OHCHR and allowing access to special a statement issued a day later, the DPRK DPRK until it takes concrete steps towards procedure mandate holders, allowing direct and Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it would unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance denuclearization. The EU members of the not engage in further negotiations unless the providers, abolishing the death penalty, and tak- Council have generally been supportive of US changed its approach and abandoned ing concrete measures to improve conditions of this approach. On the other hand, Russia its hostile policy towards the DPRK. The detention. and China have suggested on several occa- DPRK has also accused the US of using the sions that they would be open to consider- negotiations for domestic political purposes. Key Issues and Options ing some sort of sanctions relief, arguing that No details were released formally about Since 2006, the Council has adopted a series some sanctions relief should accompany any the specifics of the negotiations in Sweden. of resolutions, imposing and gradually esca- potential positive developments on the dip- According to some media reports, the US lating sanctions on the DPRK. Nevertheless, lomatic front. Russia has also emphasized offered temporary sanctions relief on some the country has not significantly changed its that the Council should address the impact sectors of the economy in exchange for veri- behaviour: it has continued to test ballistic of sanctions on the humanitarian situation fiable denuclearisation. missiles and to violate the sanctions regime. in the DPRK. After initial discussions in the 1718 DPRK While diplomatic efforts over the past two Over the past several months, Germany, Sanctions Committee, the midterm report years have resulted in the easing of some ten- France, and the UK have taken the initiative of the Panel of Experts was published on 30 sions on the Korean Peninsula, the latest series in drawing the Council’s attention to the bal- August. The report described the DPRK’s of ballistic missile tests by the DPRK and the listic missile tests conducted by the DPRK, continued violations of the sanctions imposed lack of progress on the diplomatic front pres- initiating three meetings (two in August and by the Council. The panel acknowledged that ent a serious concern for the Council. one in October) under “any other business” diplomatic efforts on denuclearisation had An issue for the Council is finding the right to address the issue of ballistic tests. The US generally contributed to an easing of tensions balance between applying pressure through administration has downplayed recent missile on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK has, sanctions and simultaneously encouraging tests and has focused mostly on the sanctions however, continued to improve its nuclear the diplomatic track. An option is to explore pressure and diplomatic efforts. and ballistic missile capabilities in violation ways to modify the sanctions on the DPRK Although cautious in their optimism, of Council resolutions. Some of the areas in to encourage further engagement on the dip- Council members are unanimous in their which sanctions evasions were most prominent lomatic front. support for the US-DPRK and inter-Korean include illicit ship-to-ship transfers, the prolif- Some Council members are concerned diplomatic efforts. Council members are con- eration of weapons, and increasingly sophisti- about the impact of sanctions on the human- cerned about the recent escalation of missile cated cyber-attacks. The panel noted that the itarian situation in the DPRK. The Coun- tests by the DPRK and its potential to further DPRK actors have engaged in cyber-attacks cil could seek more regular interaction with derail the diplomatic efforts. Some members on financial institutions and infrastructure. OCHA to obtain detailed information for its have shown interest in a new approach to The country also engaged in illegal transfer consideration of humanitarian exemptions. the Council’s relationship with the DPRK— of crypto-currencies and money laundering. Another option would be to consider having including responding to positive develop- The panel has stressed that the DPRK’s use the Panel of Experts assisting the sanctions ments through Council outcomes and oth- of cyber-attacks provides an opportunity for committee add an expert on humanitarian er means of showing support for a serious sanctions evasion involving minimal resourc- issues who could analyse the impact of sanc- dialogue about the denuclearisation of the es while offering low-risk, high-reward oppor- tions on the civilian population. Korean peninsula—but there has been little tunities. According to some estimates, the The ongoing dire human rights situation movement in this direction. DPRK has managed to generate around $2 in the DPRK remains an issue. Every Decem- The US is the penholder on the DPRK, billion using cyber-attacks, which represents ber from 2014 through 2017, the Council and Germany chairs the 1718 DPRK Sanc- a significant portion of the DPRK’s revenue held a briefing with the High Commissioner tions Committee. stream. This illustrates the importance of full for Human Rights on this topic. Although no

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Sudan/South Sudan

Expected Council Action remained the practice until the one month Key Issues and Options In November, the Council expects to renew technical rollover resolution was adopted in A key issue for the Council to consider ahead the mandate of the UN Interim Security October. (For more details, see our What’s In of UNISFA’s mandate renewal is the over- Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Council is Blue story of 14 November 2017.) all appropriateness of the mission’s current also expected to extend the mission’s sup- The JBVMM remains at initial operating mandate in relation to the situation on the port for the Joint Border Verification and capability, according to a 20 September let- ground and what modifications, if any, to Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), estab- ter from the Secretary-General, with only two make to the mandate and force structure. lished in 2011 to conduct monitoring and of the four sector headquarters in operation Council members may want to consid- verification activities along the Sudan-South and three out of four team sites established er the two possible options proposed in the Sudan border. within the SDBZ. Despite the absence of Secretary-General’s report. The first option The mandate of UNISFA and the mis- significant progress in meeting the border- includes the repatriation of 295 troops to com- sion’s support to the JBVMM expire on 15 related benchmarks contained in resolution plete the force reduction set out in resolution November. 2465 and the lack of technical assets, the 2445, which did not take place as planned by JBVMM “remains an essential tool to moni- May, followed by a further reduction of 295 Key Recent Developments tor the situation along the border between troops in accordance with resolution 2469, The overall security situation in Abyei, the dis- the Sudan and South Sudan”, the letter says. bringing the authorised ceiling to 3,550. The puted territory along the Sudan/South Sudan UNISFA’s mandate was extended until second option includes postponing the further border, remains fragile. According to the Sec- 15 November in resolution 2469, adopted on reduction of the 295 troops, requested in reso- retary-General’s most recent report, cover- 14 May. The resolution reduced the autho- lution 2469, until the end of the dry season— ing 16 April to 15 October, intercommunal rised troop ceiling from 4,140 to 3,550 and that is, beyond May 2020—and strengthening tensions continued, along with an increase increased the authorised police ceiling from the mission’s civilian capacities, based on the in criminality and the sporadic presence of 345 to 640 police personnel. The resolution conflict and criminal trends over the past six armed elements in Abyei, including in the Safe also requested, for the first time, that the months as well as the positive political develop- Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ). On the Secretary-General appoint a civilian Deputy ments between Sudan and South Sudan. Both political situation, the report noted that while Head of Mission for UNISFA “to further approaches include an extension of the mis- both Sudan and South Sudan are undergoing facilitate liaison between and engagement sion’s support to the JBVMM for six months. internal transitions, there has been continued with the parties in a manner consistent with The report recommends the second approach. rapprochement between the two countries. the Agreement on Temporary Arrange- The difficulty of obtaining visas for mem- However, it is too soon to assess the effects of ments for the Administration and Security bers of UNISFA’s police component has been this on the situation in Abyei, the report said. of the Abyei Area, including agreement to an ongoing problem. On 25 September, the In Abyei, the two countries have not made any establish the Abyei Police Service”. Such an strength of the mission’s police component significant progress on the issues of border appointment has not yet been made because stood at thirty-four officers against an autho- demarcation, the establishment of joint insti- of opposition from Sudan in particular. (For rised total of 640 police personnel. According tutions, or the final resolution of Abyei’s status. more details, see our What’s In Blue story to the Secretary-General’s report, this is attrib- On 15 October, the Council unanimous- of 13 May.) utable to the non-issuance of visas to police ly adopted resolution 2492, extending the The Council was last briefed on the issue personnel by Sudan. In this context, members mission’s support to the JBVMM until 15 on 24 October by Under-Secretary-Gener- will most likely be eager to hear if the political November. The aim of the resolution was al for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix transformations in Sudan have had an impact to consolidate what have been two separate and the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, on improving this process. Council decisions: on the renewal of UNIS- Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (the latter via video Another issue is what steps the Council FA’s mandate, and on the mission’s support teleconference from Addis Ababa). Lacroix should take to encourage greater progress in to the JBVMM. Resolution 2386 adopted on referred to the “unprecedented opportunity” the political process to resolve the final status 15 November 2017 had decided to separate to resolve the borderrelated issues between of Abyei. Council members may also reflect the Council’s decision on mandate renewal Sudan and South Sudan, adding that follow- on how best to support Onanga-Anyanga, from its decision on the JBVMM, by extend- ing recent positive developments in bilateral whose mandate includes carrying out good ing the mandate by six months and its sup- relations, the two countries need to resume offices and, in cooperation with regional and port to the JBVMM by five months. Dur- direct talks immediately to resolve the final subregional organisations, to enhance subre- ing negotiations for that resolution, the US status of Abyei. Onanga-Anyanga also gional capacities for conflict prevention and proposed suspending the mission’s support referred to the improved relations between mediation. to the JBVMM, which was opposed by sev- the two countries, adding that the list of eral Council members, resulting in the com- pending issues remains extensive with most Council Dynamics promise of separating the two decisions as a of the commitments agreed to in 2012 not As in previous years, the Council’s focus on means of putting pressure on the parties. This yet implemented. the situation in Abyei remains limited, largely

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2492 (15 October 2019) extended UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM until 15 November 2019. S/RES/2469 (14 May 2019) extended UNISFA’s mandate until 15 November 2019. Secretary General’s Report S/2019/817 (15 October 2019) was on the situation in Abyei. Security Council Letters S/2019/768 (20 September 2019) was from the Secretary-General on the JBVMM. S/2018/955 (24 October 2018) was from the Secretary-General setting out the mandate of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8644 (24 October 2019) was a briefing on Sudan/South Sudan.

14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Sudan/South Sudan overshadowed by its ongoing engagement on of Abyei. The US has also pressed for a viable In statements at the 24 October brief- South Sudan and Sudan (Darfur). However, exit strategy for the mission. When it circu- ing, several Council members expressed the upcoming expiration of UNISFA’s man- lated the draft of what became resolution their support for UNISFA, as well as for the date and its support for the JBVMM present 2492 in October, the US apparently again JBVMM, and called on Sudan and South opportunities for Council members to direct expressed the need for UNISFA to be more Sudan to make progress in resolving the final attention to the issue. effective and efficient while recognising that status of Abyei. Some members, including the Negotiations around troop and police the mission’s support for the JBVMM should Dominican Republic, Germany, Peru, Poland, levels have been particularly contentious in be retained. and the US emphasised the need to imple- the past. The US has consistently pushed for During negotiations in May on resolution ment the previously agreed increase in the further troop reductions. It has repeatedly 2469, the three African members, supported mission’s police personnel and for the neces- asserted that UNISFA is persisting longer by China and some other members, called sary visas to be issued to allow this. The US than intended for an interim force, and that for a rollover of the mission’s mandate, given and France highlighted the need to appoint Sudan and South Sudan are taking advan- the evolving internal political situations in a civilian Deputy Head of Mission. tage of the relative stability that UNISFA pro- Sudan and South Sudan. However, the US The US is the penholder on Abyei. vides to delay attempts to resolve the status and some other members opposed a rollover.

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action The report noted that while the agreement to deliver assistance. Between January and In November, the Council is expected to has offered many civilians a reprieve from September, three humanitarian workers were renew the mandate of the UN Multidimen- violence, the overall levels of violence remain killed and 34 were injured in the country. sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in worrisome, with women and children among The Secretary-General recommended in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the most affected. his report that MINUSCA’s mandate to pro- which expires on 15 November. In recent incidents, from 27 to 30 Sep- vide political, technical and operational sup- tember, clashes between armed elements in port for the peace process, implementation of Key Recent Developments the southern Kouango area claimed 14 lives the agreement, and extension of state author- The Political Peace Agreement in the Cen- and uprooted around 2,000 people from ity be reinforced “without caveats that could tral African Republic (CAR) was signed by their homes. Unidentified armed men killed preclude MINUSCA from seeking resources the CAR government and 14 armed groups 12 people in a village outside the town of commensurate to its tasks”. in Bangui on 6 February, following negotia- Bambari in the centre of the country on 10 From 5 to 7 October, the UN Under-Sec- tions in Khartoum that began on 24 January October. Against the backdrop of continu- retary-General for Peace Operations, Jean- under the auspices of the AU. A new cabinet, ing security concerns and lack of significant Pierre Lacroix; the AU Commissioner for in which all 14 armed groups are represented, progress in the deployment of CAR secu- Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui; and the was formed on 22 March. rity forces and expansion of state authority, managing director for Africa in the European This is the latest of several peace agree- MINUSCA continues to be the primary pro- External Action Service, Koen Vervaeke, vis- ments that have been signed between the vider of security in the country. The Secre- ited the CAR to take stock of the implemen- government and armed groups in the CAR tary-General thus recommended in his report tation of the peace agreement. They met with since the current crisis began in 2013, and that MINUSCA’s authorised troop strength government officials, political parties and it remains to be seen whether it will be fully be maintained. civil society. They called on all signatories to implemented. According to the Secretary- According to his report, the number of the agreement to respect their commitments General’s 15 October MINUSCA report, people requiring humanitarian assistance has and immediately end violence and promote military confrontations between CAR securi- decreased from 2.9 million to 2.6 million, but dialogue. They stressed that those violating ty forces and MINUSCA have subsided, and a fifth of the population remains displaced, the agreement should be sanctioned and human rights violations linked to the conflict with 581,000 internally displaced people and that MINUSCA should use its agile posture have decreased. However, armed groups have over 605,000 refugees registered in neigh- to safeguard the integrity of the agreement. been fighting each other and violating the bouring countries at 31 August. Meanwhile, They also encouraged the adoption of draft agreement through violence against civilians, the CAR continues to be one of the most laws essential to holding peaceful, inclusive illegal taxation, and obstructing the deploy- dangerous places for humanitarian workers, and credible elections. ment of state institutions and security forces. according to OCHA, decreasing their ability Also in the report, the Secretary-General

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE CAR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2488 (12 September 2019) amended the CAR sanctions regime for CAR security forces. S/RES/2454 (31 January 2019) renewed the CAR sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the CAR Sanctions Committee. S/RES/2446 (15 November 2018) extended the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 December. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/822 (15 October 2019) was on MINUSCA. Security Council Letter S/2019/145 (14 February 2019) was the Secretary-General’s letter containing the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8646 (25 October 2019) was a brief- ing on the latest MINUSCA report.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Central African Republic

stressed the importance of holding presiden- September on technical assistance and capacity- workers might also help to curb violence. tial, legislative and local elections scheduled building in the field of human rights in the CAR Furthermore, targeting actors who enable the for 2020 and 2021 on time to consolidate (A/HRC/RES/42/36). The resolution strongly economic activities of armed groups and the condemned killings; acts of torture and inhuman peace and ensure stability. He welcomed the and degrading treatment; sexual violence; abduc- flow of arms might further pressure them to promulgation of the electoral code into law tions; arbitrary arrests and deprivation of liberty; adhere to the agreement. on 20 August while noting with concern that extortion and looting; the recruitment and use of preparations for voter registration, due to children; the occupation of schools and attacks Council and Wider Dynamics begin in January 2020, were already behind on them, on the sick and injured, medical per- All Council members share the hope that the sonnel, health centres and medical vehicles as schedule. He further stressed that, given the well as the denial of humanitarian assistance. It peace agreement will improve the situation limited capacity of the CAR and the coun- renewed, for one year, the mandate of the inde- and restore peace and security in the CAR, try’s security challenges, MINUSCA’s strong pendent expert on human rights in the CAR. It and they agree that without MINUSCA’s support is essential throughout the electoral also decided to organise, at its 43rd session in presence there would be a serious security process. Accordingly, the Secretary-General March 2020, a high-level interactive dialogue to vacuum in the country. Some Council mem- assess the evolution of the human rights situa- recommended that the Council authorise tion on the ground, placing special emphasis on bers also see MINUSCA as a vital element MINUSCA to provide operational, logisti- preventing the recruitment and use of children in in helping to keep rebel groups committed cal and security support for the elections and the armed conflict. to the political process. Despite this politi- coordination of other international support cal achievement, Council members seem to as well as the necessary resources to perform share the view that the security situation has these tasks. Key Issues and Options not changed significantly and that, accord- The Special Representative for the CAR The immediate task for the Council is renew- ingly, MINUSCA’s mandate should not be and head of MINUSCA Mankeur Ndiaye ing MINUSCA’s mandate in November. Pro- altered dramatically. last briefed the Council on 25 October. AU tection of civilians will remain a priority, but Several Council members see the mandate Commissioner for Peace and Security Smaïl in light of the peace agreement, the Council renewal as an opportunity for the Council Chergui and the EU External Action Service’s will need to update language on MINUSCA’s to emphasise MINUSCA’s role in support- Director for Integrated Approach for Security support for the political processes in the CAR. ing the wider political process. Particularly, in and Peace, Stefano Tomat, also briefed, both It may choose to elaborate on MINUSCA’s light of the limited capacity of the CAR to via videoteleconfrence. Ndaye stressed that political mandate, including in support of the conduct timely elections without MINUSCA at the time of adopting MINUSCA’s current agreement and local reconciliation initiatives. and the negative impact on security and sta- mandate, the extent of the logistical and tech- The Council may also give MINUSCA bility that might follow if elections are not nical means required for the implementation responsibility for providing good offices held, some Council members are in favour of the peace agreement, could not be foreseen. and advising the CAR on electoral prepra- of authorising MINUSCA to provide techni- Therefore, he said, it is essential that MINUS- tions. In addition, the Council may authorise cal and logistical support for the scheduled CA be provided with a mandate and adequate MINUSCA to provide technical and logisti- legislative and presidential elections in 2020- resources to support the implementation of cal support to the electoral process. 2021. While this expansion of MINUSCA’s the peace agreement. Additionally, he asked More generally, monitoring the implemen- mandate will not necessarily prove controver- the Council to mandate MINUSCA to pro- tation of the peace agreement remains a pri- sial among Council members, some may be vide the necessary technical, logistical, security ority as violence continues and rebel groups hesitant to add tasks that may require enlarg- and operational support for the conduct of the show half-hearted commitment. A credible ing MINUSCA’s budget. elections within constitutional deadlines. threat of targeted sanctions against spoilers France is the penholder on the CAR, and might provide an incentive for armed groups Ambassador Bernard Tanoh-Boutchoué Human Rights-Related Developments to truly commit to the process, and sanctions (Côte d’Ivoire) chairs the 2127 CAR Sanc- During its 42nd session, the Human Rights Coun- against those responsible for attacks against tions Committee. cil adopted a resolution without a vote on 27 civilians, MINUSCA and humanitarian

Reconciliation

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments 2018, on “Maintenance of international In November, the Council is expected to hold This open debate seems to stem from an peace and security: Mediation and the peace- an open debate on reconciliation. At press open debate held by the UK during its last ful resolution of conflicts”. While it focused time, no formal outcome was anticipated. presidency of the Security Council, in August on the role of mediation, reconciliation was a

UN DOCUMENTS ON RECONCILIATION Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2004/2 (26 January 2004) was a presidential statement adopted after an open debate on “post-conflict reconciliation: role of the UN”.Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8334 (29 August 2018) was the open debate on “Maintenance of international peace and security: Mediation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts” held at the initiative of the UK.S/PV.4903 and Resumption 1 (26 January 2004) was the open debate on “post-conflict reconciliation: role of the UN” held at the initiative of Chile.

16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Reconciliation part of the discussion, with several speakers excerpts from a letter from Archbishop Des- and reconciliation commissions or other rec- raising the topic. mond Tutu. Thirty-seven member states onciliation efforts to brief. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin participated in the open debate. At the end Another option would be for the Council Welby, was invited to participate as a member of the meeting, the Council adopted a presi- to adopt a presidential statement on recon- of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advi- dential statement that reaffirmed the vital ciliation processes. The UK could also choose sory Board on Mediation. In his statement, importance of the UN’s role in post-conflict to produce a chair’s summary that would Welby said that mediation is only effective national reconciliation and underscored the reflect the themes of the open debate. in the context of reconciliation. He defined experience and expertise in the UN system reconciliation as “the process of transforming and among member states with respect to Council and Wider Dynamics violent conflict into non-violent coexistence such reconciliation. The Council rarely addresses reconciliation as where communities have come to terms with Throughout the years, various resolutions a thematic issue. The topic has, however, been history and are learning to disagree well”. and presidential statements have stressed the part of discussions on post-conflict situations, Other briefers included Secretary-General importance of reconciliation as part of a com- such as South Sudan or the former Yugoslav António Guterres and Mossarat Qadeem, co- prehensive approach to conflict prevention republics. Additionally, several Council mem- founder of the PAIMAN Alumni Trust, which and sustaining peace. bers have their own historical reconciliation works to prevent violent extremism in Paki- At press time, Council members were experiences from which they can draw, such stan. Several speakers talked about how medi- negotiating a draft presidential statement on as Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and the UK. ation efforts are complemented by national conflict prevention that could be adopted In the open debate on mediation last August, reconciliation and post-conflict development. before the end of October. members spoke about how reconciliation is Additionally, some speakers stressed that the needed for inclusive societies. Members also parties themselves must recognise their own Key Issues and Options talked about the importance of confidence- interest in reconciling and take ownership A key issue for the Council is to learn more building in local reconciliation. Many praised over any reconciliation process. about how various elements of reconcilia- the Secretary-General’s increased focus on The last Council meeting focused spe- tion—for example, truth and reconciliation using mediation to shore up preventive diplo- cifically on reconciliation took place more commissions and national dialogues—have macy. The UK focused on UN peacekeeping than fifteen years ago, during an open debate worked in different settings and with what missions’ effective facilitation role of media- on 26 January 2004, organised by Chile. impact. Colombia, whose peace process has tion efforts. Equatorial Guinea, speaking on The meeting was focused on “post-conflict an important reconciliation component and behalf of the three elected African Council national reconciliation: role of the UN” and whose implementation the Council has been members, emphasised the unique role regional was seen as a continuation of the ministerial- following closely, will most likely be on many organisations can play and called for contin- level meeting on the rule of law on 24 Sep- members’ minds. Participants may also use ued UN support to regional efforts, especially tember 2003, spearheaded by the UK, which the debate as an opportunity to discuss how those of the African Union. Ethiopia, Equato- included discussion of the need to balance to support national and local reconciliation rial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Peru, Poland, and national reconciliation and justice, and the strategies in other countries emerging from the UK made specific mention of the need to Council’s role in fostering reconciliation. conflict; whether and how to support recon- include women in conflict resolution at all lev- The January 2004 meeting had three brief- ciliation processes as part of exit strategies for els. France and Peru worried about how the ers: Tuliameni Kalomoh, Assistant Secretary- peace operations; and how the Council can increasing complexity of conflicts could pose a General for Political Affairs; Mark Malloch engage with other parts of the UN system, challenge to mediation efforts. China stressed Brown, Administrator of the United Nations including the Peacebuilding Commission and the need for those involved in post-conflict res- Development Programme; and Carolyn UN Country Teams, to support such processes. olution to recognise national sovereignty and McAskie, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordi- One option for the Council is to invite a to avoid imposing unilateral solutions. nator of OCHA. Additionally, Chile shared civil society representative involved in truth

Group of Five for the Sahel

Expected Council Action decided to establish in February 2017 to com- receive every six months in resolution 2391. In November, the Council expects a brief- bat terrorist and criminal groups in the region. ing on the Joint Force of the Group of Five Prior to the briefing, members expect the Key Recent Developments for the Sahel (FC-G5S), which Burkina Faso, Secretary-General’s report on the activities of Over the past year, the security situation in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (G5 Sahel) the FC-G5S, which the Council requested to the Sahel deteriorated further, as terrorist

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE G5 SAHEL Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2480 (28 June 2019) renewed the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2020, which included expanding MINUSMA’s provision of “life-support consumables” to benefit all G5 Sahel joint force contingents.S/RES/2391 (8 December 2017) outlined ways in which MINUSMA should support the G5 Sahel joint force. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8526 (16 May 2019) was a briefing on the G5 Sahel joint force. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/782 (1 October 2019) was the latest report on MINUSMA.Security Council Press Statement SC/133811 (16 May 2019) was on the G5 Sahel joint force and Burkina Faso.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Group of Five for the Sahel groups continue to destabilise much of Mali initiatives to address structural causes of the counter-terrorism, is a related issue. Comple- and Burkina Faso, fuel inter-communal vio- Sahel’s instability. The following day, the menting security measures through address- lence, and increasingly threaten coastal West Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) held a ing structural problems that contribute to African states. high-level meeting on the situation in Burkina regional instability through the UN’s Sahel Attacks in central Mali on 30 September Faso with Burkinabe President Roch Kaboré. Strategy and the G5 Sahel Priority Invest- and 1 October against a Malian battalion of In a press release, the PBC said that it stood ment Programme is a further important issue. the FC-G5S in Boulkessi and a Malian army ready to advocate for support to the govern- Problems in common facing Sahelian coun- base in Mondoro killed twenty-five soldiers ment’s priority economic development and tries include poor governance, poverty, lack of and left around sixty missing. It was one of emergency programmes and other peace- opportunities for young people, and climate the deadliest strikes against Malian forces building efforts in the country. change that has disrupted many livelihoods. since 2012. In Burkina Faso, the number of Earlier this year, when the Council adopt- A continuing option before the Council, internally displaced people increased by near- ed resolution 2480 on 28 June renewing and advocated by the Secretary-General, is ly 70 percent in just a three-week period due the mandate of the UN Multidimensional to establish a dedicated UN support office, to violence and insecurity, to total 486,0000 Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali funded through assessed contributions and people by 11 October, according to the Office (MINUSMA) for one year, it expanded independent of MINUSMA, to deliver a of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. MINUSMA’s provision of “life-support con- support package for the FC-G5S across its Burkina Faso’s military sustained its greatest sumables” to benefit all contingents of the entire area of operations. Council members losses ever in a single incident when 24 sol- FC-G5S rather than just those operating on could continue to provide bilateral support diers were killed on 19 August in Koutougou, Malian territory, on the condition that the to strengthen the military capacities of G5 near the Malian border. The Islamic State joint force or other partners deliver this assis- Sahel countries, both to the joint force and claimed that its affiliate the Islamic State tance and that units receiving such assistance national militaries. in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splin- strictly comply with the UN human rights ter group of Nigerian terrorist group Boko due diligence policy. Council and Wider Dynamics Haram, carried out the attack. While there may be growing doubts among In light of the worsening insecurity, on 25 Key Issues and Options countries over the viability of the FC-G5S August, at the heads of state summit in Biar- Despite efforts by regional countries and to stem the current deterioration, so far in ritz of the Group of Seven (G7)—Canada, external partners over recent years, the ter- public forums member states have contin- France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and rorism threat and inter-communal violence ued to call for support to the regional force. the US—the G7 adopted the Biarritz decla- have been worsening in the Sahel, expanding Over the past two years, the Council has been ration for a G7 and Africa partnership and from Mali to parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. divided over whether the UN should provide the Sahel partnership action plan. The ini- There are now heightened concerns about financial support to the FC-G5S. Resolution tiative calls for extended military coopera- terrorist groups spreading to coastal West 2391 in December 2017 established some tion to fight terrorism in the Sahel, enhanced African countries. Regarding the FC-G5S, multilateral support for the FC-G5S and efforts to strengthen governance, in particular persistent challenges for its effectiveness, as this was enhanced by resolution 2480. But for the rule of law, and to promote inclusive, discussed at the Council’s last briefing on 16 most members—including France, which has sustainable economic growth in the region. May, include training and equipment short- championed the joint force—would wish to The 15 countries of the Economic Com- ages, unclear sustainability of financing, the see further support provided through the UN. munity of West African States (ECOWAS) absence of fortified and secure operational The US, though, has objected to proposals decided to enhance their engagement and bases and limited basic infrastructure. Infor- that could incur UN assessed contributions. cooperation to respond to the terrorism threat mation sharing and coordination between the Internal discussions within the AU that have emanating from the Sahel. At a 14 September force and G5 Sahel member states remain postponed pursuit of a Council resolution on ECOWAS summit on terrorism held in Oua- challenging, as does the need to clarify and financing for AU peace support operations, gadougou, West African leaders directed the develop the force’s strategic concept of opera- and growing concerns about the FC-G5S, ECOWAS Commission to finalise an eight tions. Apparently, there is increased question- together make it unlikely that there will be a point Priority Action Plan for 2020-2024 to ing among member states about whether the new push to authorise a UN support package combat terrorism in the region, to be adopted G5 Sahel joint force can become an effective this year. G5 Sahel member Niger will join at ECOWAS’ next summit, on 21 December way to combat terrorism in the region—sig- the Council in two months, replacing Côte in Abuja. ECOWAS countries further com- nalled, for example, by ECOWAS’ intention d’Ivoire, and could potentially be a strong mitted to mobilising $1 billion towards their to become more involved. Forthcoming FC- proponent of the FC-G5S from within the enhanced counter-terrorism activities. G5S operations may be an important test to Council. On 25 September, a high-level event was counter some of these growing doubts. On Burkina Faso, Council members, convened on Mali and the Sahel in New York Promoting and ensuring that the FC- including France, have advocated greater during General Assembly high-level week, at G5S complies with international human PBC involvement to support an enhanced which states reiterated their support to the rights and humanitarian law, which is neces- UN country team mobilisation to help pre- joint force, and stressed the need to support sary for UN support and critical for effective vent further deterioration. Council members’

18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Group of Five for the Sahel

16 May press statement, issued following its same time, some members have wondered France is the penholder on the G5 Sahel last briefing on the FC-G5S, encouraged the whether the PBC is itself the right forum to joint force. PBC’s engagement on Burkina Faso. At the address the worsening situation.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action would impose a tax on phone calls using Voice and economic reforms, security challenges, In November, the Council expects to receive over Internet Protocol technology and calls and Syrian refugees. During her last day in the Secretary-General’s report on the imple- using the Internet instead of analogue phone Lebanon, DiCarlo visited the UNIFIL area mentation of resolution 1701, which called lines with applications such as WhatsApp. of operations in southern Lebanon and met for a cessation of hostilities between the This announcement prompted thousands of with the head of mission and force command- Shi’a militant group Hezbollah and Israel in demonstrators to turn out in Beirut and other er, Major General Stefano Del Col. 2006. Briefings in consultations are expect- cities throughout the country. Facing public ed from Ján Kubiš, UN Special Coordina- pressure, the government reversed its deci- Key Issues and Options tor for Lebanon, and a representative of the sion later the same day. The demonstrations The situation in UNIFIL’s area of opera- Department of Peace Operations. continued, however, and the participants’ tions has remained relatively calm despite a The mandate of the UN Interim Force numbers grew over the next several days. On very volatile regional security environment. in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August 21 October, the government approved the The Council’s primary concern is the lack of 2020. budget for next year, including reducing the implementation of resolution 1701, including salaries of government officials and elimi- a permanent ceasefire and disarmament of all Key Recent Developments nating unnecessary government bodies and armed groups in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has come under agencies. The budget did not include any new One of the central issues for the Council growing domestic pressure to root out cor- taxes. These measures did not appease the is the significant amount of weaponry held by ruption and improve the economic situa- demonstrators, who, at press time, continued Hezbollah and other non-state actors. This tion. Among the most pressing issues facing to protest, and called for Hariri’s government inhibits the government’s ability to exercise the Lebanese economy are mounting public to resign. On 29 October, Hariri announced full authority over its territory, poses a threat debt and persistently low levels of economic his resignation. to Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability, and growth. In addition, Lebanon continues to Another issue facing Lebanon is a short- contravenes its obligations under resolutions carry the burden of hosting over one million age of foreign currency reserves, particularly 1559 and 1701. A related issue is Hezbollah’s Syrian refugees. US dollars. This has had especially nega- involvement in the Syrian civil war and the In addressing the economic situation, the tive consequences for companies in the fuel movement of arms from Syria to Hezbollah. Lebanese government led by Prime Minis- sector. Domestic gas sales are conducted The Council is likely to continue to mon- ter Saad Hariri has sought to initiate a series in Lebanese pounds, while international itor the political situation in Lebanon closely, of reforms and austerity measures, includ- importers and suppliers sell oil to gas stations especially given recent instances of public ing public-sector spending cuts and tax almost exclusively in US dollars. This situa- unrest in the country. An issue for the Coun- hikes. Given the high public debt, the Leba- tion prompted gas station owners to go on a cil is how to address the growing political nese government is in dire need of financial countrywide strike in September and again instability and its potentially negative con- assistance. The release of some $11 billion in October. sequences for the overall security situation in loans and grants pledged by international During her broader visit to the Middle in Lebanon. donors in 2018 is conditioned on Lebanon’s East, Under-Secretary-General for Political Lebanon’s burden in hosting over one implementing necessary structural reforms. and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo million refugees from Syria is also of deep From the outset, the government’s attempts travelled to Lebanon from 9 to 11 October. concern, and in that regard, the Council to implement austerity measures drew strong In meetings with senior government offi- could request a briefing by UNHCR on how criticism from the general population. The cials, including President Michel Aoun and member states can help enhance services first major demonstrations took place at the Prime Minister Hariri, DiCarlo reiterated for refugees. end of September when thousands gathered the UN’s support for the extension of state in Beirut to voice their concerns about the authority over the whole Lebanese territo- Council Dynamics government’s handling of the economy. ry. Other issues high on the agenda during The Council is united in its support for Leb- On 18 October, the government said it DiCarlo’s visit were the economic situation anon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and

UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2485 (29 August 2019) renewed UNIFIL’s mandate for another year and asked the Secretary-General to conduct UNIFIL’s assessment by 1 June 2020. S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) expanded UNIFIL by 15,000 troops and expanded its mandate. S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory, and free and fair presidential elections. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2019/574 (17 July 2019) was on the implementation of resolution 1701. S/2019/343 (25 April 2019) was on the implementation of resolution 1559. Security Council Press Statement SC/13696 (8 February 2019) welcomed the formation of the new unity government in Lebanon

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Lebanon

security. The Council has also continued to weapons in southern Lebanon. The US (the penholder) and Russia—have empha- emphasise that the Lebanese Armed Forces entered the latest mandate renewal negotia- sised that no changes should be made to the should play a critical role in addressing secu- tions advocating a significant reduction of mission’s mandate. These members are cau- rity challenges in the country. the troop ceiling and a comprehensive stra- tious about such changes because of their Council members’ positions differ, howev- tegic review of the mission. These proposals potential impact on the fragile calm that has er, on the security dynamics in the region and encountered strong opposition from most been maintained in southern Lebanon for the role of the mission. Over the past several Council members. The US has argued that over a decade. The mandate renewal resolu- years, these differences have been especially the mission’s role should be reconsidered, tion, however, calls for an assessment of the evident during negotiations on UNIFIL’s given that UNIFIL is unable to fulfil part mission to be conducted by the Secretariat mandate renewals. The US has taken the view of its mandate because it lacks access to its and in this context to take into consider- that the mission should play a more active area of operations. On the political front, the ation the troop ceiling and the civilian com- role in confronting the threats the US consid- US has raised concerns about Hezbollah’s ponent of UNIFIL. ers most serious in this context—those posed growing role in the new Lebanese govern- France is the penholder on Lebanon. by Iran, Hezbollah, and the proliferation of ment. Other members—including France

Yemen

Expected Council Action had been placed on hold until the Stockholm imports that were creating a severe fuel In November, the Council will receive its Agreement’s implementation. (The Stock- shortage in the north. monthly briefing on Yemen from Special holm Agreement included a deal to demili- Griffiths briefed via the Council via VTC Envoy Martin Griffiths. Under-Secretary- tarise the port city of Hodeidah, a prisoner from Riyadh. He said that there were signs General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Low- exchange, and a statement of understanding of hope for Yemen, citing a reduction of vio- cock and General Abhijit Guha, the chair of to de-escalate fighting in the city of Taiz). But lence in the north, and a decrease in the the Redeployment Coordination Committee the fighting in the south and rising regional number of airstrikes since October. Griffiths (RCC) and head of the UN Mission to Sup- tensions have created new urgency to restart also welcomed the Houthis’ recent release of port the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), a political process. In a communiqué from 290 detainees, which he hoped could lead to are also likely to brief. the 26 September ministerial-level meeting the parties resuming discussions for further The mandate of UNMHA expires on 15 in New York of the P5, Germany, Kuwait prisoner releases in line with the Stockholm January 2020. and Sweden with Griffiths, the countries of Agreement. During consultations, Guha this newly formed ‘small group’ on Yemen briefed members by VTC for the first time Key Recent Developments affirmed that the lack of the Stockholm since his appointment in September as the There has been growing momentum for Agreement’s full implementation “should UNMHA head and RCC chair. restarting a political process and negotia- not prevent the parties from participating in At the end of the public part of the meeting, tions on a comprehensive settlement to end the Special Envoy’s process toward a broader Yemen’s permanent representative Abdullah the Yemen war. On 20 September, the Houthi political settlement to end the conflict”. Ali Fadhel al-Saadi addressed the Council. rebel group announced that it would cease On 17 October, the Council held its Despite Council members’ calls in the cham- attacks against Saudi Arabia. Saudi Ara- monthly briefing on Yemen. Lowcock briefed ber to advance political talks in parallel with bia, which has led the coalition in support first on the humanitarian crisis. He said that implementing the Stockholm Agreement, al- of the Yemeni government for the past 4.5 disbursements of $700 million by Saudi Ara- Saadi asserted that “all political consultations years, has signalled an openness towards a bia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the comprehensive dispute settlement de-escalation. Yemen’s south has also expe- over the past month—part of the $1.5 bil- hinge on the implementation the Stockholm rienced greater calm since the beginning of lion they pledged in February—combined Agreement...as those who failed to observe the fighting in August between the govern- with new contributions by other govern- previous agreements will never comply with ment and southern separatists, who, by late ments, had relieved the financial strain on them this time”. October, were close to formalising a power- relief efforts, allowing programmes that had On 24 October, it was announced that sharing agreement after two months of Saudi- been suspended to restart. Humanitarian an agreement had been reached in Riyadh mediated talks. restrictions remained particularly challeng- between the Yemeni government and the After the Stockholm Agreement brokered ing in the Houthi-controlled north, however. Southern Transitional Council (STC), which in December 2018, further negotiations Lowcock also highlighted the humanitarian had seized control of Yemen’s interim capi- between the government and the Houthis impact of government regulations on fuel tal Aden in August. (The STC is supported

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2481 (15 July 2019) renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 15 January 2020. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2019/9 (29 August 2019) was on developments in southern Yemen and efforts to resume comprehensive political negotiations. Secretary-General’s Letter S/2019/823 (14 October 2019) was a review of UNMHA. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8642 (17 October 2019) was a briefing on Yemen. Human Rights Council Document A/HRC/42/17 (9 August 2019) was a report of the Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen

20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Yemen

by the UAE, despite the UAE being a coali- establish the facts and circumstances surround- STC, brokered by Saudi Arabia, through a tion member.) At press time, the parties ing the alleged violations and abuses and, where presidential statement. A Council product still had not formally signed the agreement. possible, to identify those responsible; to make could further reiterate messages from the 26 recommendations on improving respect for inter- According to the deal, negotiated in Jeddah national human rights law; and to engage with September communiqué of the ‘small group’: and Riyadh, the STC will become part of a Yemeni authorities and other stakeholders to that the lack of full implementation of the new 24-member government that should be promote accountability for violations and abuses. Stockholm Agreement should not prevent the formed within thirty days of the signing, with On 27 September, the HRC adopted a resolution parties’ participation in an inclusive political 12 ministries allocated each to the STC and on technical assistance and capacity-building for process toward a broader political settlement, Yemen, without a vote (A/HRC/RES/42/31). supporters of the internationally recognised Before the Council’s 17 October meeting on and calling on the Yemeni parties to resume President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Saudi Yemen, some Council members’ plan to have the negotiations without delay on the security forces, which had been deploying for several Chair of the GEE brief on its latest report caused and political arrangements necessary to end weeks to Aden amid reports of a pending deal, strong pushback from certain Council members, the conflict. have reportedly replaced Emirati forces in the as well as from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The initiative was scuttled, and instead, an informal city. The agreement would postpone the issue meeting was held the following day (18 October) Council Dynamics of southern independence until the war with at the UK mission, where the GEE briefed Council Council members appear united in want- the Houthis has been resolved. members on the report that details possible war ing the parties to restart a political process In accordance with resolution 2481, the crimes committed by the parties to the conflict. concurrently with efforts to implement the Secretary-General submitted a review of Stockholm Agreement. Even coalition mem- UNMHA in a 14 October letter to Council Key Issues and Options ber Kuwait, which has often underscored the members. The review found that the mission’s A key issue is restarting negotiations for a need to implement the Stockholm accord to presence continues to have a tangible calming broader solution to the conflict, while at the return to talks, appears now to favour moving and moderating effect and that UNMHA’s same time advancing implementation of the forward with both processes at once, having objectives remain achievable and appropriate Stockholm agreement. The apparent agree- supported the 26 September communiqué for the situation on the ground. According to ment between the Yemeni government and of the small group. At the Council briefing in the review, the mission has achieved an initial the STC would be an important step towards October, Kuwait offered to host future nego- operating capacity with 55 personnel, includ- resuming a political process. At press time, tiations, a role it played previously when it ing 35 military and police monitors and 20 its signing was expected soon; despite the hosted talks for three months in 2016. civilian staff. 24 October announcement of agreement, Differences in members’ positions On 22 October, UNMHA announced the parties have been seeking to clarify the emerged in the context of the cancelled brief- the establishment of four joint observation sequencing of different steps in the deal. A ing by the GEE chair last month. During the posts along the Hodeidah city frontlines. The related issue is how to make peace talks more preparation of the Council’s October pro- observation posts, manned by teams of UN, inclusive of other sectors of Yemeni society, gramme of work, Peru suggested including government and Houthi monitors, are part of beyond the government and the Houthis. the GEE chair as a briefer during the month- the ceasefire enhancement and de-escalation Regarding the Stockholm Agreement, imple- ly Yemen meeting. Only in the week before mechanism activated on 10 September. menting its main component—the demili- the briefing on Yemen did some members tarisation of Hodeidah—requires a political begin objecting to the GEE’s participation, Human Rights-Related Developments agreement on local forces to take over secu- arguing that the timing could undermine On 26 September, the Human Rights Council rity in vacated areas, and on port revenues the momentum to restart a political process. (HRC) adopted a resolution on the human rights and governance arrangements, according to While some countries supported Peru, the situation in Yemen by a vote of 22 in favour, 12 against and 11 abstentions (A/HRC/RES/42/2). the UNMHA review. GEE chair’s participation was cancelled as The resolution condemns the ongoing violations The humanitarian crisis—currently the a procedural vote was unlikely to pass, with and abuses of international human rights law and largest in the world, with 24 million people even some members that have supported the violations of international humanitarian law in requiring assistance—remains severe. In its GEE’s mandate in the Human Rights Coun- Yemen, including those involving the widespread monthly updates, OCHA usually briefs on a cil preferring to postpone its briefing at the recruitment and use of children by parties to the armed conflict, sexual and gender-based vio- number of key priorities to mitigate the situ- Security Council. lence, arbitrary arrests and detention, denial of ation, which the Council has acknowledged The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Peru humanitarian access and attacks on civilians and in several products: the protection of civil- chairs the Yemen 2140 Sanctions Commit- civilian objects, including medical facilities and ians, humanitarian access, a fully funded aid tee. Following the appointment of perma- missions and their personnel, as well as schools, operation, support for Yemen’s struggling nent representative Gustavo Meza-Cuadra as and emphasizes the importance of accountability. It renewed the mandate of the Group of Interna- economy and the need for a political solution. Peru’s foreign minister, Deputy Permanent tional and Regional Eminent Experts (GEE) for The Council may seek to welcome the Representative Luis Ugarelli has temporarily one year. The resolution contained new language power-sharing agreement once formally assumed the committee chairmanship. on the GEE’s mandate to include the following: to signed between the government and the

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Cyprus

Expected Council Action the internationally recognised Republic So far, Lute has kept a low profile and has In November, the Secretary-General is due of Cyprus, focused primarily on the status not released any substantive details about to present to the Council the report on his of Varosha. The Republic of Cyprus has her discussions. good offices in Cyprus as requested by reso- claimed that threats by Turkey and Turkish lution 2483. Council members are expected Cypriot authorities to change the status of Key Issues and Options to receive a briefing from a representative of Varosha run contrary to Council resolutions The absence of a meaningful political process the Department of Political and Peacebuild- on Cyprus. remains the central issue for the Council. In ing Affairs. Varosha, which is a beach resort suburb addressing this, the Council could consider The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping of the city of Famagusta, is on the Turkish playing a more proactive role in stimulating Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) expires on 31 Cypriot side of the buffer zone, a demilita- that process. In light of the enduring stale- January 2020. rised area separating Turkish Cypriots in the mate, the Council could consider changing north from Greek Cypriots in the south. The the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force Key Recent Developments residents, who were predominantly Greek in Cyprus, including seeking options for Tensions between the Republic of Cyprus Cypriots, fled Varosha in 1974 after Turkish downsizing and a possible exit strategy. and Turkey intensified over the long-standing military forces intervened on the island fol- Developments surrounding the political issue of hydrocarbon resources off the coast lowing a coup d’état by Greek officers of the process have generally played an important of Cyprus. Over the past few months, Tur- Cyprus National Guard. Since then, Varosha role in guiding Council discussions during key has deployed several vessels in the area has remained unpopulated and closed to the mandate renewal negotiations. Although and has started hydrocarbon exploration and public. It is under the control of the Turk- Lute has been engaged in talks with the par- drilling activities. The Republic of Cyprus ish military. In resolutions 550 and 789 the ties, the Council has not received detailed claims that Turkey’s activities within its Council has called for the transfer of Varo- information about their progress. Given the exclusive economic zone constitute a breach sha’s administration to the UN force. sensitivities involved, the Council could con- of international law. Turkey says its explora- After the 9 October meeting, the Coun- sider requesting a closed meeting with Lute tion activities are conducted in the area of its cil adopted a press statement that recalled about the prospects for the political process. continental shelf and are therefore legitimate. the importance of the status of Varosha as The Council will continue to monitor the Besides, Turkey has maintained that it would described in previous Council resolutions rising tensions off the coast of Cyprus. This protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots and and “reiterated that no actions should be car- issue has the potential to damage prospects that they are also entitled to receive benefits ried out in relation to Varosha that are not in for the political process as well as the security from the hydrocarbon resources. accordance with those resolutions”. situation on the island. On several occasions between June and While there was some limited activity on July, the EU condemned Turkey’s explora- the political front, the unification talks have Council Dynamics tion and drilling, calling the activities ille- remained at an impasse since July 2017. On Cyprus remains an issue of low intensity on gitimate. In early October, tensions rose fur- 9 August, Special Representative Elizabeth the Council’s agenda. Among members with ther when Turkey deployed one of its drilling Spehar hosted a meeting between Greek a special interest in Cyprus that follow the ships in one of the areas where the Repub- Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and Turk- issue closely are France, Russia, and the UK. lic of Cyprus has already given exploration ish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinçi. In a joint The latter is also one of the guarantor pow- rights to international oil companies. During statement issued after the meeting, the two ers under the 1960 treaty guaranteeing the the 14 October meeting of the EU Council, leaders expressed their readiness to hold a independence, territorial integrity, and secu- agreement was reached to sanction those joint meeting with the Secretary-General rity of Cyprus. involved in illegal drilling activities off the and also agreed to continue their engage- The 2011 discovery of hydrocarbon coast of Cyprus. The EU Council asked the ment with Jane Holl Lute, a senior UN offi- resources off the coast of Cyprus has brought EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs cial appointed by the Secretary-General to increased attention to the island during the and Security Policy and the EU Commission conduct consultations, on finalising the terms past several years. The US has become more to present proposals to this end. At press time, of reference for the negotiations. engaged in finding a political solution to the there were no specific details about possible The Secretary-General has emphasised Cyprus problem, given the island’s location individuals or entities that will be sanctioned. that before resuming negotiations the sides and strategic importance in the fight against On 9 October, Council members were should agree on the terms of reference to terrorism in the Middle East as well as grow- briefed in consultations on the situation represent a starting point for a negotiated ing overall concerns about security in the in Cyprus by Assistant Secretary-General solution. Lute has engaged in a series of sep- eastern Mediterranean region. Oscar for Peacebuilding Support Fernan- arate discussions with the Cypriot leaders on Council members are united in their sup- dez-Taranco. The meeting, requested by finding agreement on the terms of reference. port for a negotiated solution to the Cyprus

UN DOCUMENTS ON CYPRUS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2483 (25 July 2019) extended the mandate of UNFICYP in its current configuration until 31 January 2020.S/RES/789 (25 November 1992) endorsed the Secretary-General’s set of ideas for Cyprus reunited as a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single, indivisible sovereignty. S/RES/550 (11 May 1984) called on all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus and condemned all secessionist actions. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2019/562 (10 July 2019) was on UNFICYP. S/2019/322 (16 April 2019) was on the Secretary-General’s good offices. Security Council Press Statement SC/13980 (9 October 2019) reiterated the importance of the status of Varosha as set out in previous Security Council resolutions.

22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 Cyprus issue. Members seem to diverge, however, way, maintaining that the process must be the mission and timed benchmarks for an exit on the conditions and timeframe for reuni- Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned to achieve strategy tied to the political process. Some fication talks. With the protracted impasse in lasting results. members are still wary of initiating drastic those talks, some members appear to share The US has emphasised that peacekeep- changes to the mission’s mandate and size. the view that this process cannot be open- ing missions must support political processes In the absence of progress, the US position is ended and that the Council could apply and that the Council should reconsider the likely to gain more support from other mem- pressure on the parties to revive the negotia- mandates of missions where the political pro- bers who have so far been cautious about this tions. On the other hand, Russia has strongly cess is absent. Given the lack of progress on issue. Russia is likely to oppose any changes opposed any attempt to exert pressure on the political front in Cyprus, the US has sup- to the status quo. both sides and affect negotiations in any ported a comprehensive strategic review of The UK is the penholder on Cyprus.

Iraq

Expected Council Action efforts to hold the Islamic State in Iraq and resolution 2379, the Special Adviser’s first In November, the Council is expected to the Levant (ISIL) accountable for crimes report was published on 16 November 2018. receive a briefing from Karim Asad Ahmad it committed in the country “by collecting, The resolution further set a 180-day report- Khan, the Special Adviser and head of the preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of ing cycle for subsequent reports and asked UN Investigative Team to Promote Account- acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes the Special Adviser to present these reports to ability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ against humanity and genocide”. Addition- the Council. Khan’s first briefing took place ISIL (UNITAD). His third report to the ally, UNITAD is responsible for promoting on 4 December 2018, followed by a second Council is due in November. The Secretary- accountability globally for atrocity crimes briefing on 15 July. During the Council’s General’s reports on the UN Assistance Mis- committed by ISIL in order to counter ISIL 28-29 June visiting mission to Kuwait and sion in Iraq (UNAMI) and on the issue of narratives that have led people to join the ter- Iraq, members met with the Special Adviser missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals rorist group. and his team. In a 30 June press statement on and missing Kuwaiti property, including the According to resolution 2379, UNITAD the trip, Council members underscored their national archives, are also due in November. is to be “impartial, independent, and cred- support for UNITAD. UNITAD’s mandate expires on 21 Sep- ible”, operating within its terms of reference, UNITAD’s implementation strategy tember 2020. UNAMI’s mandate expires on the UN Charter, UN best practices and entails three initial areas for investigation, 31 May 2020. relevant international law, including inter- with monthly benchmarks for progress. Those national human rights law. The investiga- areas are: attacks committed by ISIL against Key Recent Developments tive team has an assessed budget of around the Yazidi community in the Sinjar district in On 20 September, the Council unanimously $19.5 million for 2019; additionally, it relies August 2014; crimes committed by ISIL in adopted resolution 2490, renewing the man- on voluntary contributions made to the Mosul between 2014 and 2016; and the mass date of UNITAD until 21 September 2020, trust fund established by resolution 2379 as killing of unarmed Iraqi air force cadets from as requested by the Iraqi government. The well as in-kind contributions, including the Tikrit Air Academy (also known as “Camp resolution further requested the Special provision of expert personnel. UNITAD’s Speicher”) in June 2014. UNITAD’s investi- Adviser and head of UNITAD “to continue overall staff stands at around 100 members. gations are focusing on those ISIL members to submit and present reports to the Council Support for the work of UNITAD is part of who bear the greatest responsibility among on the team’s activities, every 180 days”. UNAMI’s mandate. the leadership as well as regional and mid- UNITAD was set up through resolu- On 31 May 2018, the Secretary-General level commanders. If extra-budgetary fund- tion 2379 of 21 September 2017 for an ini- announced the appointment of Karim Asad ing increases, UNITAD expects to add more tial period of two years, following a request Ahmad Khan as Special Adviser and head areas for investigation. by the Iraqi government. The Council had of UNITAD. The investigative team formal- Resolution 2379 refers to the possibility of asked the Secretary-General to establish an ly began its work on 20 August 2018, and evidence collected by the investigative team investigative team to support Iraqi domestic in line with the 90-day deadline set out in complementing “investigations carried out by

UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2490 (20 September 2019) extended the mandate of UNITAD until 21 September 2020. S/RES/2379 (21 September 2017) established an investigative team to collect, store and preserve evidence of international crimes committed by ISIL in Iraq. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8624 (20 September 2019) was the adoption of resolution 2490, extending the mandate of UNITAD until 21 September 2020. S/PV.8573 (15 July 2019) was the second briefing by the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD. S/PV.8412 (4 December 2018) was the first briefing by the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD.S/PV.8052 (21 September 2017) was the adoption of resolu- tion 2379. Security Council Letters S/2019/760 (19 September 2019) transmitted a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, requesting the extension of UNITAD’s mandate until 21 September 2020. S/2019/407 (17 May 2019) was from the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD, transmitting the second report on the activities of UNITAD. S/2018/1031 (15 November 2018) was from the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD, transmitting the first report on the activities of UNITAD.S/2018/773 (15 August 2018) was from the Secretary-General, notifying the Council of his appointment of Karim Asad Ahmad Khan as Special Adviser and head of the investigative team earlier that year and that the investigative team was to begin its work on 20 August 2018. S/2018/118 (9 February 2018) was a letter from the Secretary-General, conveying the terms of reference for the investigative team.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 23 Iraq Security Council Report Staff Karin Landgren Executive Director authorities in third countries at their request”. Council and Wider Dynamics Joanna Weschler UNITAD is currently supporting cases in Council members are generally supportive Deputy Executive Director Finland, France, and Germany. of UNITAD, and the negotiations on UNI- Shamala Kandiah Thompson The international crimes UNITAD is TAD’s mandate renewal were reportedly Deputy Executive Director mandated to investigate are not yet incorpo- uncontentious. The Iraqi government also Paul Romita Senior Policy Analyst rated into Iraq’s domestic legal system and appears supportive, as shown by its request to are prosecuted as terrorist crimes. Iraq is cur- extend UNITAD’s mandate. Some members Victor Casanova Abos Policy Analyst rently working on legislation establishing a continue to be concerned about the possibil- Teale Harold tribunal for the prosecution of ISIL for inter- ity that evidence shared by UNITAD might Policy Analyst national crimes. be used in criminal proceedings in which Lindiwe Knutson capital punishment could be imposed. Other Policy Analyst Issues and Options members stress that this matter falls under Vladimir Sesar After extending its mandate for another year Iraq’s sovereignty, a viewpoint shared by Iraq. Policy Analyst in September, the Council will keep monitor- Another issue frequently raised by members Eran Sthoeger ing UNITAD’s activities closely. An option is how and where to prosecute foreign terror- Policy Analyst for Council members would be to hold con- ist fighters currently in Iraq. Vanessa Tiede sultations following Khan’s briefing in order The UK is the penholder on UNITAD. Policy Analyst to have a more interactive and frank discus- Benjamin Villanti sion with him. Policy Analyst Robbin VanNewkirk Website Manager

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