Objectivity, Language, and Communication
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Objectivity, Language, and Communication Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Eric Kevin Carter, M. A. Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Stewart Shapiro, Advisor David Sanson Kevin Scharp Copyright by Eric Kevin Carter 2011 Abstract HIS DISSERTATION IS a study of objectivity, language, and communication. T While most of us take for granted that scientific discourse is objective, when it comes to other discourses, our inclinations are different. For example, we take for granted that humor discourse is not objective. While these attitudes about ob- jectivity are commonplace, they raise questions about the factors that influence ob- jectivity. The primary thesis that I defend is that a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity is influenced by how a speaker uses that discourse, especially what a speaker takes for granted about the information that everyone in a conversation shares. When we talk to one another, we take for granted that there is a question that everyone is discussing. However, when a speaker uses an objective discourse in a conversation, someone in a disagreement over the question under discussion must be inattentive, biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. We take other things for granted in a conversation too, especially about the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. A speaker who uses an objective discourse takes for granted that the discussion serves only to coordinate either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. While conversational requirements are a mark of objective discourse, conver- sational latitude is a mark of non-objective discourse. Objectivity requires that a speaker take for granted that the discussion addresses a question that does not al- ii low for cognitively faultless disagreement. Objectivity also requires that a speaker take for granted that the conversation only serves to influence either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. However, given that we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, things are different. When a speaker uses a discourse that is not objec- tive, a speaker might take for granted that there is a question is under discussion that gives rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. In addition, a speaker might take for granted that conversation serves to coordinate attitudes other than either knowledge or belief. For example, when a speaker uses a discourse that is not ob- jective, a speaker might take for granted that conversation functions to coordinate desires, hopes, or even feelings. iii Dedication To my family, especially my parents, Rick and Sandy Carter iv Acknowledgments AM EXTREMELY grateful to my advisor, Stewart Shapiro. I benefited in count- I less ways from his wisdom, enthusiasm, and generosity. I cannot thank him enough. I am also deeply indebted to both my current and my former disserta- tion committee members, including Ben Caplan, David Sanson, Kevin Scharp, and William W. Taschek. I learned from each of them, and I appreciate their guidance, support, and commitment. Along with my advisor and committee, I owe a spe- cial thanks to Michael P. Lynch, Craige Roberts, and Crispin Wright. Not only did their research deeply influence my dissertation project, but I appreciate their collegiality and involvement. I value both Michael’s support and his feedback on my work. Craige and Crispin attended multiple talks, and they met with me on several occasions to discuss my work. I am fortunate to be surrounded by a large group of helpful and supportive colleagues, and, as a result, there are many people that deserve credit for help- ful feedback on my research. In particular, I thank Louise Antony, Andrew Arlig, William Bauer, David Blanks, Steven Brown, John Carroll, Julian Cole, Kevin Con- nor, Justin D’Arms, Philip Ebert, Douglas Edwards, Salvatore Florio, Timothy Fuller, Johannes Hafner, Carol Hay, Dai Heide, Ole Hjortland, Torfinn Huvenes, Gabrielle M. Johnson, Nicholaos J. Jones, Alison Duncan Kerr, Owen King, Robert Kraut, Dustin Locke, Michael Martin, William Melanson, David Merli, Sebastiana v Moruzzi, Michael Miller, Cathleen Müller, Robby Newman, Nikolaj Jang Peder- son, Michael Pendlebury, Graham Priest, Diana Raffman, Patrick Reeder, Marcus Rossberg, Robert Rupert, Timothy Schroeder, Anders J. Schoubye, Lisa Shabel, Joshua Smith, Martin Smith, Declan Smithies, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Chiara Tabet, Neil Tennant, Brad Tuggle, Daniel Wilkenfield, Lucian Zagan, and Elia Zardini. Over the past several years, I have given talks based on chapters of my disser- tation at different venues, including the Alabama Philosophical Society, the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews, the German So- ciety for Linguistics, the Florida Philosophical Association, the North Carolina Philosophical Society, North Carolina State University, The Ohio State University’s Internal Graduate Colloquium, the Society for Exact Philosophy, and the Tampa Workshop on Syntax, Semantics, and Phonology. I thank the organizers of these events for supporting my research, and I thank the audience members for their helpful feedback. I was awarded a research grant from the College of Arts and Humanities at The Ohio State University in 2010, and I am grateful for their support, especially since the grant made it possible for me to attend the Subjective Meaning Workshop – Alternatives to Relativism. My family has always supported my educational pursuits, including my grad- uate career at The Ohio State University. I am especially thankful for my parents, Rick and Sandy, my older brother and his wife, Todd and Kari, their two chil- dren, Anna and Gracie, and lastly, my younger brother and his wife, Blayne and Sarah, and their two children, Paige and Landon. I appreciate their love and de- votion. Along with my immediate family, I also acknowledge my extended fam- ily, especially my grandparents, Virgil and Helen Carter, as well as Ken and Bon- nie Morgan. My grandparents showed a constant interest in my education, and I vi thank them for their involvement. In addition to my family, I thank several oth- ers for their friendship, encouragement, and humor, including Ike Blake, Joanna Blake, Lesley Cline, Thomas Evans, Greg Goudy, Michael Martin, William Melan- son, Robby Newman, Joshua Smith, Brad Tuggle, and Ann Wells. vii Vita 2011 . Ph. D., Philosophy, The Ohio State University 2002 . M. A., Philosophy, Texas Tech University 2000 . B. F. A., Visual Arts, Auburn University 1995 . Austin High School Field of Study Major Field: Philosophy viii Contents Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . v Vita . viii Contents . ix 1 Objectivity, Language, and Communication . 1 1.1 Introduction . 1 1.2 Discursive Objectivity . 5 Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Influence . 6 Truth Talk: Inflation, Substance, and Pluralism . 8 The Deflationist-Inflationist Contrast . 9 The Insubstantial-Substantial Contrast . 10 1.3 Against Semantic Discursivism . 11 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault . 14 Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness . 15 1.4 Beyond Semantic Discursivism . 17 ix Acceptability, Dynamics, and Linguistic Communication . 18 Questions, Attitudes, and Objectivity . 20 Speaker Discursivism . 21 How Objectivity Influences Communication . 22 1.5 Conclusion . 24 I Discursive Objectivity . 26 2 Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Influence . 27 2.1 Introduction . 28 2.2 Frege, Objectivity, and Truth in the Scientific Sense . 30 Mathematical and Scientific Objectivity . 31 Truth in the Scientific Sense . 33 2.3 Dummett, Bivalence and Recognition-Independent Truth . 36 Bivalence . 37 Recognition-Independent Truth . 38 2.4 Williams, Substantial Truth, and Deflationism . 40 Substantial Truth and Deflationism . 42 2.5 Tarski’s T-Schema . 45 2.6 Conclusion . 50 3 Truth Talk: Inflation, Substance, and Pluralism . 51 3.1 Introduction . 52 Substantial Truth . 53 3.2 Deflationary Truth . 56 Classical Deflationism . 57 Another Alternative . 58 x Inferential Deflationism . 60 Alethic Inferences . 61 Disquotational Schema . 63 3.3 Inflationary Truth . 66 Inflationary Truth . 67 Motivating Inflationary Truth . 69 Compositionality Considerations . 70 Choice Negation and Inflated Truth . 72 3.4 Insubstantial Truth . 78 Alethic Minimalism . 80 Alethic Pluralism . 83 Insubstantial Truth . 85 3.5 Substantial Truth . 87 Is ’Substance’ a Univocal Notion? . 89 What We Can Know . 90 Cognitive Fault . 92 3.6 Semantic Discursivism . 96 3.7 Conclusion . 98 II Against Semantic Discursivism . 100 4 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault . 101 4.1 Introduction . 101 4.2 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault . 102 A Subjective Use of ’For Me’ . 103 4.3 Disagreement, Cognitive Fault, and Cognitive Command . 106 Cognitive Command . 108 xi The Challenge of Scientific Disagreement . 109 Cognitive Immodesty . 109 4.4 Quotidian Disagreement and Cognitive Fault . 112 Modal Idioms . 112 Circumstantiality . 113 Gradation . 114 Modality and Quotidian Disagreement . 115 Are Cognitively Immodest Disagreements Still Problematic? . 117 4.5 Cognitive Modesty and Cognitive Fault Talk . 118 Cognitive Fault Talk in Context . 120 Cognitive Standards . 121 Explanatory Faults . 123 Is Cognitive Modesty Problematic? . 125 4.6 Conclusion . 127 5 Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness . 129 5.1 Introduction . 129 5.2 Judge-Dependence and Compositional Semantics . 130 Judge-Dependent Truth . 131 Standard Approaches . 133 Compositional Semantics . 134 Vague Sentences . 135 5.3 Subjective Attitude.