Objectivity, Language, and Communication

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Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Eric Kevin Carter, M. A. Graduate Program in Philosophy

The Ohio State University 2011

Dissertation Committee: Stewart Shapiro, Advisor David Sanson Kevin Scharp Copyright by Eric Kevin Carter 2011 Abstract

HIS DISSERTATION IS a study of objectivity, language, and communication. T While most of us take for granted that scientific discourse is objective, when it comes to other discourses, our inclinations are different. For example, we take for granted that humor discourse is not objective. While these attitudes about objectivity are commonplace, they raise questions about the factors that influence objectivity. The primary thesis that I defend is that a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity is influenced by how a speaker uses that discourse, especially what a speaker takes for granted about the information that everyone in a conversation shares. When we talk to one another, we take for granted that there is a question that everyone is discussing. However, when a speaker uses an objective discourse in a conversation, someone in a disagreement over the question under discussion must be inattentive, biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. We take other things for granted in a conversation too, especially about the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. A speaker who uses an objective discourse takes for granted that the discussion serves only to coordinate either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. While conversational requirements are a mark of objective discourse, conversational latitude is a mark of non-objective discourse. Objectivity requires that a speaker take for granted that the discussion addresses a question that does not al-

ii low for cognitively faultless disagreement. Objectivity also requires that a speaker take for granted that the conversation only serves to inﬂuence either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. However, given that we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, things are different. When a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that there is a question is under discussion that gives rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. In addition, a speaker might take for granted that conversation serves to coordinate attitudes other than either knowledge or belief. For example, when a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that conversation functions to coordinate desires, hopes, or even feelings.

iii Dedication

To my family, especially my parents, Rick and Sandy Carter

iv Acknowledgments

AM EXTREMELY grateful to my advisor, Stewart Shapiro. I benefited in count- I less ways from his wisdom, enthusiasm, and generosity. I cannot thank him enough. I am also deeply indebted to both my current and my former dissertation committee members, including Ben Caplan, David Sanson, Kevin Scharp, and William W. Taschek. I learned from each of them, and I appreciate their guidance, support, and commitment. Along with my advisor and committee, I owe a special thanks to Michael P. Lynch, Craige Roberts, and Crispin Wright. Not only did their research deeply influence my dissertation project, but I appreciate their collegiality and involvement. I value both Michael’s support and his feedback on my work. Craige and Crispin attended multiple talks, and they met with me on several occasions to discuss my work. I am fortunate to be surrounded by a large group of helpful and supportive colleagues, and, as a result, there are many people that deserve credit for helpful feedback on my research. In particular, I thank Louise Antony, Andrew Arlig, William Bauer, David Blanks, Steven Brown, John Carroll, Julian Cole, Kevin Con- nor, Justin D’Arms, Philip Ebert, Douglas Edwards, Salvatore Florio, Timothy Fuller, Johannes Hafner, Carol Hay, Dai Heide, Ole Hjortland, Torfinn Huvenes, Gabrielle M. Johnson, Nicholaos J. Jones, Alison Duncan Kerr, Owen King, Robert Kraut, Dustin Locke, Michael Martin, William Melanson, David Merli, Sebastiana

v Moruzzi, Michael Miller, Cathleen Müller, Robby Newman, Nikolaj Jang Peder- son, Michael Pendlebury, Graham Priest, Diana Raffman, Patrick Reeder, Marcus Rossberg, Robert Rupert, Timothy Schroeder, Anders J. Schoubye, Lisa Shabel, Joshua Smith, Martin Smith, Declan Smithies, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Chiara Tabet, Neil Tennant, Brad Tuggle, Daniel Wilkenﬁeld, Lucian Zagan, and Elia Zardini. Over the past several years, I have given talks based on chapters of my dissertation at different venues, including the Alabama Philosophical Society, the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews, the German So- ciety for Linguistics, the Florida Philosophical Association, the North Carolina Philosophical Society, North Carolina State University, The Ohio State University’s Internal Graduate Colloquium, the Society for Exact Philosophy, and the Tampa Workshop on Syntax, Semantics, and Phonology. I thank the organizers of these events for supporting my research, and I thank the audience members for their helpful feedback. I was awarded a research grant from the College of Arts and Humanities at The Ohio State University in 2010, and I am grateful for their support, especially since the grant made it possible for me to attend the Subjective Meaning Workshop – Alternatives to Relativism. My family has always supported my educational pursuits, including my graduate career at The Ohio State University. I am especially thankful for my parents, Rick and Sandy, my older brother and his wife, Todd and Kari, their two children, Anna and Gracie, and lastly, my younger brother and his wife, Blayne and Sarah, and their two children, Paige and Landon. I appreciate their love and de- votion. Along with my immediate family, I also acknowledge my extended family, especially my grandparents, Virgil and Helen Carter, as well as Ken and Bon- nie Morgan. My grandparents showed a constant interest in my education, and I

vi thank them for their involvement. In addition to my family, I thank several others for their friendship, encouragement, and humor, including Ike Blake, Joanna Blake, Lesley Cline, Thomas Evans, Greg Goudy, Michael Martin, William Melan- son, Robby Newman, Joshua Smith, Brad Tuggle, and Ann Wells.

vii Vita

2011 ...... Ph. D., Philosophy, The Ohio State University 2002 ...... M. A., Philosophy, Texas Tech University 2000 ...... B. F. A., Visual Arts, Auburn University 1995 ...... Austin High School

Field of Study

Major Field: Philosophy

viii Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... iv

Acknowledgments ...... v

Vita ...... viii

Contents ...... ix

1 Objectivity, Language, and Communication ...... 1

1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 Discursive Objectivity ...... 5 Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Influence ...... 6 Truth Talk: Inflation, Substance, and Pluralism ...... 8 The Deflationist-Inflationist Contrast ...... 9 The Insubstantial-Substantial Contrast ...... 10 1.3 Against Semantic Discursivism ...... 11 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault ...... 14 Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness ...... 15 1.4 Beyond Semantic Discursivism ...... 17

ix Acceptability, Dynamics, and Linguistic Communication ...... 18 Questions, Attitudes, and Objectivity ...... 20 Speaker Discursivism ...... 21 How Objectivity Inﬂuences Communication ...... 22 1.5 Conclusion ...... 24

I Discursive Objectivity ...... 26

2 Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Inﬂuence ...... 27

2.1 Introduction ...... 28 2.2 Frege, Objectivity, and Truth in the Scientific Sense ...... 30 Mathematical and Scientific Objectivity ...... 31 Truth in the Scientific Sense ...... 33 2.3 Dummett, Bivalence and Recognition-Independent Truth ...... 36 Bivalence ...... 37 Recognition-Independent Truth ...... 38 2.4 Williams, Substantial Truth, and Deflationism ...... 40 Substantial Truth and Deflationism ...... 42 2.5 Tarski’s T-Schema ...... 45 2.6 Conclusion ...... 50

3 Truth Talk: Inﬂation, Substance, and Pluralism ...... 51

3.1 Introduction ...... 52 Substantial Truth ...... 53 3.2 Deﬂationary Truth ...... 56 Classical Deﬂationism ...... 57 Another Alternative ...... 58

x Inferential Deflationism ...... 60 Alethic Inferences ...... 61 Disquotational Schema ...... 63 3.3 Inflationary Truth ...... 66 Inflationary Truth ...... 67 Motivating Inflationary Truth ...... 69 Compositionality Considerations ...... 70 Choice Negation and Inflated Truth ...... 72 3.4 Insubstantial Truth ...... 78 Alethic Minimalism ...... 80 Alethic Pluralism ...... 83 Insubstantial Truth ...... 85 3.5 Substantial Truth ...... 87 Is ’Substance’ a Univocal Notion? ...... 89 What We Can Know ...... 90 Cognitive Fault ...... 92 3.6 Semantic Discursivism ...... 96 3.7 Conclusion ...... 98

II Against Semantic Discursivism ...... 100

4 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault ...... 101

4.1 Introduction ...... 101 4.2 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault ...... 102 A Subjective Use of ’For Me’ ...... 103 4.3 Disagreement, Cognitive Fault, and Cognitive Command ...... 106 Cognitive Command ...... 108

xi The Challenge of Scientiﬁc Disagreement ...... 109 Cognitive Immodesty ...... 109 4.4 Quotidian Disagreement and Cognitive Fault ...... 112 Modal Idioms ...... 112 Circumstantiality ...... 113 Gradation ...... 114 Modality and Quotidian Disagreement ...... 115 Are Cognitively Immodest Disagreements Still Problematic? . . . . . 117 4.5 Cognitive Modesty and Cognitive Fault Talk ...... 118 Cognitive Fault Talk in Context ...... 120 Cognitive Standards ...... 121 Explanatory Faults ...... 123 Is Cognitive Modesty Problematic? ...... 125 4.6 Conclusion ...... 127

5 Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness ...... 129

5.1 Introduction ...... 129 5.2 Judge-Dependence and Compositional Semantics ...... 130 Judge-Dependent Truth ...... 131 Standard Approaches ...... 133 Compositional Semantics ...... 134 Vague Sentences ...... 135 5.3 Subjective Attitude Ascriptions ...... 136 The Verb ’Find’ ...... 137 To-Charlie Sentences ...... 138 Judge-Shifting Semantics ...... 139 Compositionality Considerations ...... 141

xii Compositionality Constraint ...... 141 Fact-Finding Ascriptions v. Subjective Ascriptions ...... 142 Is Vagueness Judge-Dependent? ...... 144 Big-Bowl Sentences ...... 144 Should We Care about Acceptability Judgments? ...... 146 Hammer-Ugly Sentences ...... 147 5.4 Judge-Dependence, Judge-Shifting, and Shapiro Semantics ...... 148 Partial Interpretations, Frames, and Sharpenings ...... 149 Partial Interpretations ...... 149 Frames ...... 150 Sharpenings ...... 150 5.5 Judge-Shifting in a Shapiro-Style Semantics ...... 151 Communal Consensus ...... 151 Judge-Shifting Semantics ...... 153 Sharpenings Revisited ...... 153 Frames Revisited ...... 153 Technical Digression ...... 155 5.6 Conclusion ...... 156

III Beyond Semantic Discursivism ...... 157

6 Acceptability, Dynamics, and Linguistic Communication ...... 158

6.1 Introduction ...... 158 Against Semantic Discursivism ...... 160 Substance and Discursive Objectivity ...... 160 Substance and Compositional Semantics ...... 162 Beyond Semantic Discursivism ...... 166

xiii Methodological Deﬂationism ...... 166 An Alternative to Semantic Discursivism ...... 168 6.2 Linguistic Communication ...... 170 Conversational Acceptability ...... 171 Conversational Dynamics ...... 174 6.3 Information Structure ...... 176 Communication and Scorekeeping ...... 177 Conversational Scorekeeping ...... 178 Conversational Acceptability ...... 179 Conversational Dynamics ...... 180 An Information Structure Approach ...... 181 Common Ground ...... 183 Questions Under Discussion ...... 186 Information Structure ...... 188 6.4 Pragmatic Presupposition ...... 189 6.5 Assertion and Inquiry ...... 192 6.6 Conclusion ...... 194

7 Questions, Attitudes, and Objectivity ...... 195

7.1 Introduction ...... 195 Semantic Discursivism ...... 197 Beyond Semantic Discursivism ...... 198 Speaker Discursivism ...... 199 7.2 Speaker Discursivism ...... 202 Cognitive Question ...... 203 What is a Question Under Discussion? ...... 203 What is a Strictly Cognitive Question? ...... 206

xiv Discussing Judge-Dependent Questions ...... 209 Classical Inquiry ...... 213 What is a Classical Inquiry? ...... 214 Subjective Inquiry ...... 216 7.3 How Objectivity Influences Communication ...... 218 Communication with Objective Discourse ...... 219 How Objectivity Influences Acceptability ...... 220 How Objectivity Influences Dynamics ...... 224 Subjectivity in Communication ...... 226 How Subjectivity Influences Acceptability ...... 227 7.4 Conclusion ...... 231

Bibliography ...... 233

xv Chapter One

Objectivity, Language, and Communication

What supremely confuses the issue is the failure to distinguish between the task of elucidating the nature of a certain type of communication (the empirically informative) from the problem of the actual functioning of the word “true” within a framework of that type of communication.

Peter F. Strawson, “Truth”

1.1 Introduction

HIS DISSERTATION IS a study of objectivity, language, and communication. I T concentrate on questions about how objectivity is reflected in the language that we use, or what I call discursive objectivity. For instance, while most of us are inclined to say that scientific discourse is objective, our inclinations are different, at least when it comes to matters of taste. These different inclinations raise puzzling questions about the linguistic factors that influence discursive objectivity. What

1 linguistic factors make scientific discourse objective? Is there a germane difference between scientific discourse and talk about matters of taste? Of course, questions akin to these animate philosophical discussions about discursive objectivity with respect to other discourses, too. Is mathematical discourse objective? What about ethical or aesthetic discourse? The primary thesis that I defend is that a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity turns on how a speaker uses that discourse in a conversation, especially what that speaker takes for granted about the information that everyone in that conversation shares. In particular, I recommend that we conceive discursive objectivity in terms of two requirements on the speaker’s attitude toward shared information. The first requirement concerns the fact that when we talk to each other in a conversation, we take for granted that there is an issue that everyone is discussing. When a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, the speaker cannot take for granted that just any question is under discussion. After all, in a disagreement over an objective issue, someone must be biased, confused, inattentive, or otherwise cognitively at fault. The approach that I defend highlights this connection between discursive objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault. While how we should interpret the modal idiom is something that I consider in more detail below—i. e., the relevant sense of necessity in which someone must be cognitively at fault—the upshot is that discursive objectivity requires not only that a speaker take for granted that there is a question under discussion, but also that it is question that cannot give rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. The second requirement concerns the fact that when a speaker engages in a conversation, he takes for granted that the conversation serves to coordinate everyone’s attitude toward an issue that is under discussion. When a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, the speaker cannot take for

2 granted that the conversation serves to coordinate just any attitudes. The approach that I defend highlights a connection between discursive objectivity, epistemic attitudes, and doxastic attitudes. When a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, that speaker takes for granted that the only attitudes that conversation aims to coordinate are knowledge and belief. In other words, a speaker takes for granted that the conversation strictly influences only either what everyone knows or what everyone believes. On the approach to discursive objectivity that I defend, our inclination to say that scientific discourse is objective partially stems from the fact that when we talk about scientific issues, the questions that we take for granted are under discussion cannot give rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. In other words, when we talk about a scientific question, if there is a disagreement over that question’s answer, someone must be prejudiced, irrational, or otherwise cognitively at fault. Our inclination also stems from the fact that we take for granted that a conversation about a scientific question only serves to coordinate either what we know or what we believe. When we address a scientific issue, we take for granted that the conversation does not function to coordinate desires, hopes, or feelings about that issue. When it comes to a language that is not objective, a speaker in a conversation has more latitude. When a discourse is not objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, that speaker might take for granted that what is under discussion is a question that allows for cognitively faultless disagreement. A speaker might even take for granted that the conversation coordinates attitudes other than knowledge or belief. For instance, a speaker might accept that it serves to coordinate everyone’s desires, feelings, or hopes. The approach to discursive objectivity that I defend exploits this conversational latitude to account for our inclinations to

3 say that some discourses are not objective. For instance, when we talk about matters of taste, a speaker might take for granted a question is under discussion that might give rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. Alternatively, in a conversation about matters of taste, a speaker might take for granted that the conversation serves to coordinate attitudes other than either knowledge or belief. For instance, when it comes to matters of taste, we often accept that conversation influences not merely what everyone knows or believes about an issue that is under discussion, but also how they feel about it. Unlike the speaker-oriented approach to discursive objectivity that I defend, the standard approach originates in Gottlob Frege’s conception of mathematical and scientific objectivity. The approach that Frege inspired highlights not what speakers take for granted about a conversation and the information that everyone in it shares, but sentences, their semantic contents, and their truth conditions. On this view, when a discourse is objective, there is more to truth talk’s semantic content than we might capture with equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” As I discuss below, there is little or no consensus about exactly what more there is to truth talk’s content, but I emphasize several marks of discursive objectivity that stem from Frege’s conception of scientific and mathematical truth. When we are dealing with an objective discourse, we might be mistaken. In addition, there are truths that we never consider, or at least there might be some. When we are dealing with an objective discourse, we also discover truths—we do not invent them. Moreover, in an objective discourse, either a claim is true, or it is false. The picture of objectivity that Frege inspired highlights either these or similar factors about truth talk, and it draws on them to account for a language’s status with respect to objectivity.

4 1.2 Discursive Objectivity

I survey several historical and contemporary perspectives on discursive objectivity below in Part I. The discussion is devoted to issues not only about truth talk’s semantic content, but also the putative explanatory connection between that content and discursive objectivity. As I show in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this al- leged connection is closely aligned—not only in historical but also contemporary perspectives—with the idea there is substance to truth talk’s content. While the substance of truth talk’s content is integral to almost every account of discursive objectivity that Frege influenced, the notion is quite tricky to articulate, and, as a result, there is little or no agreement about how we should understand it. I consider what principles motivate the idea of substance, and I defend an account that is based on these principles. As a prelude to the discussion below in Part I, we may think about a substantial account of truth talk’s content in terms of how it conflicts with a dogma of classical deflationism, namely, that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” completely account for the expression ‘true’ and its semantic content. As I note above, equivalencies akin to these and the linguistic practices that underwrite them do not completely capture truth talk’s content, at least if truth talk is substantial in the intended sense. While there is more to say about truth talk’s additional content, the orthodox semantic approach to discursive objectivity exploits that lacunae for explanatory gain. In preliminary terms, we may say that semantic discursivism is a view that a discourse’s objectivity is due not only to that discourse’s semantic content, but also the substantial truth conditions that are associated with that content. In short, when truth conditions are substantial, the associated discourse is objective, and

5 the discourse’s substantial truth conditions account for its status with respect to objectivity. The above account of semantic discursivism is the backdrop for not only a critique that I develop and defend in Part II, but also an alternative that I sketch in Part III. However, before I turn to either the arguments that I defend against semantic discursivism or the alternative picture that I articulate below, I say more about both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Inﬂuence

In Chapter 2, I describe a familiar approach to discursive objectivity that emerged in the nineteen sixties, and I show how Gottlob Frege’s views about mathematical and scientific objectivity influenced this approach. According to ‘Kreisel’s dictum’, mathematical realism is an issue about not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical discourse (see Georg Kreisel (1958, 138n1)). I use Kreisel’s dictum to illustrate a view that is implicit in many influential discussions in the nineteen sixties and subsequent decades, namely, that a subject- matter’s objectivity arises from the language that we use to talk about it. Our familiarity with the implicit picture of discursive objectivity above is likely due to Michael Dummett. This is due not only to his seminal article “Truth” ((1959) 1978), but also the wide ranging responses to his subsequent research program. As I show in Chapter 2, Dummett often draws attention to two linguistic factors that contribute to objectivity, namely, semantic content and truth conditions (e. g., see Dummett (1978) and (1993)). On Dummett’s view, when we are dealing with an objective subject-matter, we can make semantic generalizations about the associated discourse that are closely aligned with strictly classical reasoning, including classical semantic principles akin to bivalence (i. e., the principle that either a claim

6 is true, or it is false). Given that a discourse is objective, Dummett also thinks that we can also make generalizations about truth, knowability, and the connections between them. When a discourse is objective, either some truths are unknowable, or they might be unknowable. While Dummett’s work is perhaps more well-known, I discuss other researchers in the nineteen sixties that address discursive objectivity too, including Bernard Williams (1966) in his seminal article “Consistency and Realism.” While Williams does not explicitly draw attention to semantic principles akin to bivalence or knowability, there is broad agreement between Dummett and Williams. On Williams’ view, when we are dealing with an objective subject-matter, the target discourse’s semantic content is associated with truth conditions that are somehow substantial. Williams’ insight is that a substantial conception of truth talk is incompatible with the classical deflationist dogma that I mention above, namely, that we can completely account for truth talk’s content in terms of equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” When truth talk is substantial, truth talk’s content is not completely captured by these equivalencies. Dummett’s focus on knowability and semantic principles akin to bivalence provide us with a sense in which truth talk is associated with a semantic content that extends beyond what a classical deflationist sanctions. As such, it furnishes one sense in which truth talk is substantial. As I mention above, a main theme of Chapter 2 is Frege’s influence on the picture of discursive objectivity that emerges in the nineteen sixties. Frege worries about mathematical and scientific objectivity. Like Dummett and Williams, when Frege seeks to account for mathematical and scientific objectivity, he turns to the the languages that we use to talk about these subject-matters. While Frege focuses

7 on what he calls truth in the scientific sense (see Frege ((1906) 1979, 186)), I recommend that we see Frege’s notion of scientific truth as a prototype for subsequent substantial conceptions of truth talk, including Dummett’s and Williams’ conceptions. As I show in Chapter 2, there are four features that are integral to Frege’s scientific notion of truth talk. A person who accepts a mathematical or scientific truth might be mistaken. There are (or might be) some scientific and mathematical truths that we do not assert, believe, or even contemplate. In addition, the fact that we assert, believe, or otherwise accept a scientific or mathematical truth does not make it true, at least in some cases. Lastly, Frege insists that when we accept a mathematical or scientific claim, either it is true, or it is false.

Truth Talk: Inﬂation, Substance, and Pluralism

While I focus in Chapter 2 on the historical backdrop of the semantic discursivist project, I turn to foundational questions about semantic discursivism in Chapter 3, especially how we should properly formulate a semantic discursivist approach. Given the controversial and vexing notion that is the centerpiece of the semantic discursivist project—namely, substantial truth—this is a difficult task. As I recommend below in Chapter 3, we can understand the idea that truth talk is substantial in terms of two requirements on truth talk’s content. I allude to the first requirement in the preliminary description above, namely, that a deflationist’s resources do not completely capture the content of truth talk that is substantial. In short, an account of truth talk is not substantial unless truth talk is inflated. Since I recommend that Frege’s scientific notion of truth is a prototype for substantial truth, the second requirement addresses the connection between an inflated conception of truth and Frege’s scientific notion. The requirement is that an account of truth talk is not substantial unless it displays most or all of the marks of Frege’s scientific no-

8 tion of truth. However, considerations about compositionality play a crucial role, since it is a discourse’s compositional semantic role that conﬁrms whether truth talk displays these marks with respect to that discourse.

The Deﬂationist-Inﬂationist Contrast

A classical deflationist claims that when we seek to account for truth talk’s semantic content, we need only look to equivalencies similar to those that I mention above, namely, either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” Since the semantic discursivists in the nineteen sixties contrast substantial truth talk’s content with the classical deflationist approach, it is classical deflationism that I address below in Chapter 2. However, I introduce an inferential alternative to classical deflationism in Chapter 3. Setting worries about semantic paradox aside, we accept as correct an inference from the sentence “snow is white” to “‘snow is white’ is true.” Similarly, we accept as correct the converse inference, namely, the inference from “‘snow is white’ is true” to “snow is white.” Since these inferential practices underwrite a classical deflationist’s equivalencies, I recommend that we adopt an inferential alternative to the classical deflationist approach below in Chapter 3. After I outline inferential deflationism and compare it to classical deflationism, I explore inflationist alternatives below in Chapter 3, where an inflationist claims that there is more to truth talk’s semantic content than a deflationist of whatever stripe admits. Since an inflationist allows (or might allow) that either an inferential deflationist’s inference rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies at least partially account for truth talk’s content, the inflationist agrees with the deflationist up to a point. However, an inflationist takes issue with the deflationist’s claim that these rules or equivalencies completely account for truth talk’s content. As I

9 argue below in Chapter 3, compositionality considerations are an important motivation for the inflationist approach to truth talk’s semantic content. When an inflationist claims that truth talk’s content is inflated with respect to a discourse, the inflationist often draws attention to a discourse’s compositional semantic role. In order to motivate an inflationist approach to truth talk’s content, the inflationist draws attention to what a compositional semantic theory shows us about truth talk’s semantic content.

The Insubstantial-Substantial Contrast

While every substantial conception of truth talk is inflationist in the above sense, some inflationist conceptions of truth talk do not qualify as substantial. As a result, we cannot identify substantial truth simply as inflationist truth. Before I discuss what other factors are integral to substantial truth, let us consider an illustration that is due to Crispin Wright (1992). Wright’s (1992) approach to truth talk is partially based on an epistemic idealization regarding a sentence’s assertibility conditions—what Wright calls superassertibility. In preliminary terms, let us say that when a sentence is superassertible, not only is it epistemically justified, but no matter how the circumstances improves epistemically, that sentence remains epistemically justified. Wright (1992) claims that we can account for truth talk’s content in terms of superassertibility, at least with respect to a range of discourses (e. g., humor discourse). If Wright’s claim is correct, truth talk’s content goes beyond an inferential deflationist’s rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies. After all, a superassertibility account of truth talk’s content requires that there is a conceptual connection between truth and ideal epistemic justification, even though a deflationist account does not license such a connection. So, if a superassertibility account of truth talk is correct for a range of discourses, truth talk is also inflated

10 with respect to those discourses. Yet since there is little or no inclination to think that a superassertibility account gives rise to substantial truth, at least if substantial truth is intended to explain discursive objectivity, there must be some other factor that is integral to substantial truth. In other words, a superassertibility account of truth talk is missing some feature that is required for substantial truth. In order to account for what else is required to turn an inﬂationist approach to truth talk into a substantial conception, I treat Frege’s conception of truth in the sci- entiﬁc sense as a prototype, and I draw attention to some conceptual connections between human attitudes and truth. For example, when we accept a substantial truth, we not only risk error, but also cognitive fault, especially when there is disagreement. While I discuss this connection further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the basic idea is that when truth talk’s content is substantial, it is conceptually impossible that no one in the disagreement is biased, inattentive, or otherwise cognitively at fault. In contrast, when we accept an insubstantial truth, we do not face the same risk. When there is disagreement, while someone might be cognitively at fault, it is equally possible that no one is at fault. Another example that I discuss below in Chapter 5 is the explanatory connection between truth and our attitudes toward it. When we accept a substantial truth, the fact that we accept it does not make it true. While our attitudes do not explain what is true in the substantial sense, matters are different when it comes to insubstantial truth. When we accept a truth that is insubstantial, the fact that we accept it makes it true, at least in some cases.

1.3 Against Semantic Discursivism

Given the account of semantic discursivism that I articulate below in Part I, I explore some worries about semantic discursivism’s success in Part II. As I suggest

11 above, truth talk’s substance plays a crucial role in a semantic discursivist conception of discursive objectivity. For a semantic discursivist, when we seek to explain a discourse’s status with respect to discursive objectivity, we look to the truth conditions associated with that discourse’s semantic content, in particular, we look to see whether those truth conditions are substantial or insubstantial. In addition, a semantic discursivist draws attention to compositionality considerations to confirm whether truth talk is substantial or insubstantial with respect to that discourse. When truth talk is substantial with respect to a discourse, that discourse’s compositional semantic role shows that truth talk is substantial. Similarly, when truth talk is insubstantial, this fact is reflected in the discourse’s compositional semantic role. These claims are the focus of the case against semantic discursivism that I defend below in Part II. There are two primary worries about semantic discursivism that I address in Part II. Since a semantic discursivist assigns an important explanatory role to truth talk’s substance, we should expect that the truth conditions of every objective discourse are substantial. However, I show that some facets of discursive objectivity are compatible with the assumption that truth talk’s content is deflated. In particular, I call attention to a widely recognized facet of discursive objectivity in Chap- ter 4, namely, the impossibility of cognitively faultless disagreement. From a semantic discursivist’s perspective, cognitively faultless disagreement is impossible with respect to a discourse only if that discourse’s truth conditions are substantial. However, I show that we can account for the fact that cognitively faultless disagreement is impossible, even if we assume that there is nothing more to truth talk’s content than what a deflationist sanctions. For example, we might grant that cognitively faultless disagreement is impossible with respect to a discourse, even though equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is

12 white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” completely account for truth talk’s content. Along with my worries about the explanatory role of truth talk’s substance, I raise a worry about the extent to which compositionality considerations support a semantic discursivist’s claims about truth talk’s substance. For a semantic discursivist, there is no strong motivation for either the thesis that truth talk is substantial or the thesis that it is insubstantial unless the target discourse’s compositional semantic role establishes such a thesis. As a case study, I explore an approach to truth talk’s content that is widely recognized as insubstantial, namely, judge-dependent truth. The truth-value of a judge-dependent sentence varies systematically with respect to germane facts about human attitudes, and, at least in some cases, those attitudes account for that sentence’s truth value. Yet semantic discursivists have a discouraging record with regard to establishing that compositionality considerations support their claims about judge-dependent truth. Indeed, I show that there are even some cases where considerations about a discourse’s compositional semantic role are not merely inconclusive, but that the discourse’s compositional semantic role disconﬁrms the semantic discursivist’s claims about judge-dependent truth. The problems that I raise in Part II for semantic discursivism set the stage for the alternative that I sketch below in Part III. While semantic approaches to discursive objectivity that Frege inﬂuenced put semantic factors about substantial truth conditions into the spotlight, the alternative that I defend highlights pragmatic factors about the conversations in which a speaker uses the discourses in question. In particular, I call attention to both the questions that are at issue in a conversation, and the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. However, before I

13 say more about the alternative that I defend in Part III, I discuss the case against semantic discursivism that I develop in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Disagreement and Cognitive Fault

The focal point of Chapter 4 is the semantic discursivist’s explanatory commitments with respect to substantial truth. As I discuss in Chapter 3, a semantic discursivist finds it difficult—and perhaps impossible—to account for discursive objectivity without explanatory recourse to a substantial conception of truth. I raise a worry about this commitment in Chapter 4, especially in the context of the notion of discursive objectivity that is closely aligned with our expectations about strictly cognitive content, disagreement, and cognitive fault. When we disagree over a content that is strictly cognitive, we expect that someone must be biased, inattentive, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. When we disagree about an issue that is not strictly cognitive, we grant that someone might be cognitively at fault, but there is little inclination to say that someone must be cognitively at fault. While Williams (1966) explicitly addresses how discursive objectivity is associated with the impossibility of cognitively faultless disagreement, the association is perhaps implicit in Frege’s attention to error in his account of mathematical and scientific objectivity. Even so, the most widely discussed account of the connection between discursive objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault is due Crispin Wright (1992). As I discuss below in Chapter 3, Wright appeals to a notion of substantial truth that is not only associated with our intuitions about strictly cognitive content, but also underwrites conceptually necessary connections between disagreement and cognitive fault. As I show in Chapter 4, it is difficult to square Wright’s account with the fact that there are conceptually possible scenarios where no one in a disagreement is cognitively at fault. After all, science is a paradigm of

14 discursive objectivity, and there are conceptually possible scientiﬁc disagreements where no one is cognitively at fault. In Chapter 4, I defend an alternative approach to the expectation that someone in a disagreement over a strictly cognitive content must be cognitively at fault. I recommend a resolution that is based on the modal idiom, cognitive fault talk, and their interpretation. I claim that the modal idiom expresses necessity relative to everyday or commonplace disagreements, and cognitive fault talk is subject to several contextual restrictions, including contextually supplied standards of cognitive fault. Given that the conceptual possibility of cognitively faultless disagreement is consistent with my account of strictly cognitive content, my view has an advantage over Wright’s (1992) approach. In addition, my approach is important to the case that I make against semantic discursivism. My approach to strictly cognitive content allows us to consistently claim that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” give rise to truth talk’s content, even when we are dealing with discourses whose semantic content is strictly cognitive. An upshot is that there are some scenarios where we can account for discursive objectivity even without explanatory recourse to substantial truth.

Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness

While a semantic discursivist’s commitment to the explanatory role of truth talk’s substance is the critical target of Chapter 4, I concentrate on the commitment to a compositional account of inﬂationist truth conditions in Chapter 5. As I discuss below in Chapter 3, the motivation for attributing either substantial or insubstantial truth is the compositional semantic role of the target discourse, since compositionality considerations are essentially what conﬁrm that the semantic discursivist’s

15 claim that truth talk’s content goes beyond the content that a deflationist sanctions. In other words, there is no strong motivation for attributing inflated truth conditions to a target discourse, whether those truth conditions are substantial or insubstantial truth, unless it is incompatible with the target discourse’s compositional semantic role that its truth conditions are given by, say, equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” As I show below in Chapter 5, it is difficult to find a neat-and-tidy connection between the discourses to which the semantic discursivist attributes inflated truth conditions—whether substantial or insubstantial truth—and the compositional semantic role associated with that discourse. Given this situation, compositionality considerations do not conclusively support a semantic discursivists claims about inflated truth. The conclusion that I draw below in Chapter 5 is based on a case study of judge- dependent truth, where judge-dependent truth is conceived as a form of inflated but insubstantial truth. When a term is judge-dependent, its extension systematically varies with respect to germane facts about human attitudes, and perhaps other semantic factors about it vary systematically with our attitudes, too. Taste terms akin to ‘boring’ are often treated as judge-dependent. Along with matters of taste, I draw attention to a view that Diana Raffman (1994) and Stewart Shapiro (2006) defend, namely, that vague sentences have judge-dependent truth conditions. I defend a view roughly that there is no strong motivation to adopt a judge- dependent account of truth with respect to a given discourse unless sentences in that discourses are acceptable under attitude ascriptions akin to ‘He finds it boring’. While studies of attitude verbs akin to ‘find’ confirm that taste terms are judge-dependent, they also show that some clauses that contain a vague term are unacceptable under ascriptions akin to ‘find’. This case study illustrates an ob-

16 servation that I mention above, namely, that there are cases where a discourse’s compositional semantic role do not support a semantic discursivist’s claims about inﬂated truth conditions.

1.4 Beyond Semantic Discursivism

While I devote the discussion to semantic discursivism, both in Part I and Part II, I shift attention to an alternative to semantic discursivism in Part III. As I suggest above, when a semantic discursivist seeks to account for discursive objectivity, he calls attention to semantic factors about truth talk’s content. The semantic discursivist claims that truth talk’s content is substantial with respect to an objective discourse. Yet when we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, the semantic discursivist claims that truth talk’s content is insubstantial. Unlike semantic discursivism, the approach that I defend does not focus on semantic factors about substantial and insubstantial truth. I defend an approach to discursive objectivity that is consistent with a position that Hartry Field ((1994) 2001) calls methodological deflationism, namely, the view that we should adopt deflationism as a working hypothesis about truth talk’s semantic content. For instance, we might take as our working hypothesis that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” completely account for the semantic content of the expression ‘true’. Given Field’s methodological deflationism, the working assumption is that truth talk’s content is not inflated, and this working assumption even applies to discourses that are objective. It follows that we can no longer appeal to semantic factors regarding truth talk’s substance to account for differences between discourses with respect to discursive objectivity.

17 As I suggest above, I defend an alternative to semantic discursivism that highlights pragmatic factors about linguistic communication. In particular, I recommend that we conceive discursive objectivity in terms of how a speaker uses a discourse in conversation, especially what that speaker takes for granted as shared information. Since the alternative to semantic discursivism that I defend draws attention to pragmatic factors about linguistic communication, I survey some key issues about linguistic communication in Chapter 6. After I outline the approach to linguistic communication that I favor, I articulate an account of discursive objectivity in Chapter 7.

Acceptability, Dynamics, and Linguistic Communication

I survey in Chapter 6 the approach to linguistic communication, namely, Craige Roberts’ information structure approach (e. g., see both Roberts (1996) and (2002a)). According to an information structure approach to linguistic communication, a speaker associates a conversation with a body of shared information. An information structure approach highlights our attitudes toward conversation to account for our judgments about linguistic communication. In particular, when someone makes a speech act in a conversation, competent speakers make judgments not only about whether that speech act is felicitous or acceptable with respect to that conversation, but also how either it changes subsequent conversation, or would change subsequent conversation if everyone accepted it. According to an information structure approach, a key factor that inﬂuences a speakers judgments about both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics is the body of shared information that the speaker associates with a conversation. Since I defend a conception of discursive objectivity that highlights pragmatic facts about

18 how a speaker uses a discourse in conversation, the information structure approach serves as a theoretical backdrop for the discussion in Chapter 7. An advantage of Roberts’ information structure approach is how it synthesizes other inﬂuential approaches to linguistic communication, including Paul Grice (1989b), David Lewis ((1979) 1983), and Robert Stalnaker ((1978) 1999). Roberts (1996) claims that a facet of the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation is what Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) calls the common ground. Among other items, a conversation’s common ground includes common belief. When a belief is common in a conversation, not only does everyone believe it, but everyone believes that everyone believes it, too. For instance, if it is a common belief in a conversation that Barack Obama is the forty-fourth president, everyone believes it, everyone believes that everyone believes it, and so on. Stalnaker (2002) also calls attention to a wide array of other attitudes that also contribute to the common ground, including common knowledge, common assumptions, and common pretenses. Given Stalnaker’s ((1978) 1999) inﬂuential work, it is widely agreed that common belief is a factor that accounts for competent judgments not only with regard to conversational acceptability, but also conversational dynamics. For instance, if we are in a conversation where it is commonly believed that Obama is the forty- fourth president, competent speakers judge that it is unacceptable to assert this fact about Obama. After all, when a speaker asserts something that goes unchallenged in conversation, then it is added to the stock of common beliefs in that conversation (at least temporarily). As such, assertions serve to coordinate common belief, and there is no point in asserting something that is already a common belief. A conversation’s common ground thus partially accounts for conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics.

19 While Roberts’ (1996) information structure approach draws on Stalnaker’s notion of the common ground, she also highlights how conversations are organized around questions that are the target of a common inquiry. Just as some beliefs have a common ground status in a conversation, so too some questions have a common ground status. Roberts’ (1996) attention to the common ground status of questions that are the target of a common inquiry is familiar from Paul Grice’s (1989b) emphasis on the cooperative and purposive nature of linguistic communication. On an information structure approach, the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation includes not merely the conversation’s common ground, but also the questions that are under discussion. Just as a speaker’s attitudes about the common ground inﬂuences his judgments about linguistic communication, including judgments about conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics, so too a speaker’s attitudes about the questions that are under discussion inﬂuences his judgments. For example, Roberts (1996) claims that competent speakers judge as unacceptable assertions that are irrelevant to answering the question under discussion. Similarly, when a speaker raises a question that goes unchallenged in conversation, the conversation shifts, and that question becomes the target of common inquiry (at least temporarily).

Questions, Attitudes, and Objectivity

After I survey an information structure approach to linguistic communication below in Chapter 6, I draw on that approach to articulate an alternative to semantic discursivism in Chapter 7. As I conceive discursive objectivity, a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity turns on how a speaker uses that discourse in conversation, especially that speaker’s attitudes toward a conversation’s information structure. The objectivity of a discourse places strict requirements on a speaker’s

20 pragmatic presuppositions, both about the questions that are under discussion and about the attitudes that a discussion serves to coordinate. After I discuss this speaker-oriented picture of discursive objectivity, I address how objectivity inﬂu- ences communication. Since a speaker’s presuppositions about a conversation’s information structure shapes his judgments about conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics, the alternative that I defend implies that communication varies according to whether a speaker uses an objective discourse.

Speaker Discursivism

While a semantic discursivist draws attention to semantic and truth-conditional factors about a discourse, the view that I defends highlights what we take for granted about a conversation’s information structure. Given that the alternative to semantic discursivism that I defend highlights speakers and their attitudes, I call the alternative speaker discursivism. As a prelude to the discussion below in Chapter 7, we may think about the approach in terms of two requirements on what a speaker takes for granted about a conversation’s information structure.

Cognitive Question The ﬁrst requirement draws on the account of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions that I defend below in Chapter 4, though it applies that account to questions. When a question is strictly cognitive, in the relevant sense, someone in an everyday or commonplace disagreement over that question’s answer must be irrational, confused, prejudiced, or otherwise cognitively at fault. The requirement is that if a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, there is a strictly cognitive question from that discourse, and that speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion in that conversation. As I point out above, since the account of strictly cognitive content that I defend is consistent with a deﬂationist approach to truth talk’s semantic

21 content, this requirement does not bring with it the difﬁculties associated with a substantial conception of truth talk’s content.

Classical Inquiry When an inquiry over a question is either epistemic or doxastic, the conversation serves to coordinate either what everyone knows or what everyone believes about that question’s answer. Yet subjective inquiries are different, since conversation serves to coordinate how everyone feels about an issue. The second requirement concerns what a speaker takes for granted about the attitudes that an inquiry serves to coordinate, and if a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, the speaker pragmatically presupposes that the inquiry over the question under discussion is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. For instance, when a speaker uses an objective discourse, he does not accept that the inquiry over a question functions to coordinate subjective attitudes about the issue. When an inquiry over a question is strictly either epistemic or doxastic, I call it a classical inquiry. Discursive objectivity thus demands that a speaker pragmatically presuppose that an inquiry over a question is classical.

How Objectivity Inﬂuences Communication

A speaker’s judgments about communication are shaped by his attitudes about a conversation’s information structure, as I argue below in Chapter 6. From a speaker discursivist perspective, discursive objectivity places requirements on what a speaker takes for granted about what is under discussion and what attitudes that discussion serves to coordinate. There is more latitude for a speaker who uses a discourse that is not objective. Given the tight connection between a speakers attitudes about a conversation’s information structure and his judgments about communication, a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity shapes how a speaker judges conversation. As we move from discourses that are objective to discourses

22 that are not, there are corresponding changes in our judgments regarding acceptability, as well as our judgments about conversational dynamics. One issue about discursive objectivity and conversational acceptability that I consider concerns a notion that I introduce in Chapter 5, namely, judge-dependence. When an assertion’s semantic content and truth conditions are judge-dependent, it might be unsettled with respect to the attitude-independent world. In addition, given that it is left unsettled by the attitude-independent world, our attitudes influence (or might influence) whether it is true. An issue about conversational acceptability arises give the interaction between the cognitive question requirement and judge-dependent assertions. A speaker who uses an objective discourse pragmatically presupposes that a cognitive question is under discussion. Since cognitive questions have cognitive questions, that speaker judges as unacceptable assertions that are not cognitive. Since some judge-dependent assertions are not cognitive, it follows that the speaker judges them as conversationally unacceptable. Another issue about discursive objectivity and conversational acceptability that I consider concerns subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘Jones finds Smith boring’. A speaker who uses an objective discourse pragmatically presupposes that an inquiry over a question under discussion only serves to coordinate either our epistemic or doxastic attitudes. This requirement that discursive objectivity places on a speaker’s attitudes toward a conversation makes assertions that report a person’s subjective attitudes unacceptable unless they are otherwise evidentially relevant to the question under discussion. After all, if a speaker pragmatically presupposes that there is a question under discussion, but the discussion is only serves to coordinate either what everyone knows or believes about that question’s answer, then a person who asserts something about how he finds an issue is addressing some-

23 thing irrelevant. As a result, a speaker who uses an objective discourse judges some subjective attitude ascriptions as unacceptable.

1.5 Conclusion

The remarks above serve as a preliminary introduction to this dissertation’s themes, including the positive account of discursive objectivity that I defend. I concentrate below in Part I on not only the historical backdrop for the semantic discursivist project, but also the foundational issues about how we should understand a semantic approach to discursive objectivity. I show below in Chapter 2 that Frege’s account of mathematical and scientific objectivity, especially Frege’s appeal to a scientific notion of truth, is a model for subsequent philosophical work on semantic discursivism, including Dummett’s and Williams’ research in the nineteen sixties. Given this historical backdrop, I shift attention below in Chapter 3 to how we should understand a semantic approach to discursive objectivity, especially given more recent semantic discursivist approaches, including Wright’s (1992) position. Before I turn to consider the semantic discursivist project, let me briefly mention a contrast between discursive and metaphysical conceptions of objectivity. Discursive approaches to objectivity originate in the idea that objectivity is a fact about the language that we use to talk about a subject-matter. Yet from a metaphysical perspective, the issue that underlies and unifies debates about objectivity and realism is metaphysical. For instance, it is a disagreement either over whether facts (or states of affairs) exist, or over whether they depend on germane facts about us—and perhaps, creatures like us.1 While some argue that these alternatives are competing conceptions of objectivity, others treat them as conceptually orthogonal. 1For further discussion about metaphysical conceptions of objectivity and realism, see Michael Devitt (e.g., in Devitt (1984) and (1991)) and Theodore Sider (forthcoming).

24 Since this dissertation concerns how we should understand discursive objectivity, I set aside for future research questions not only about metaphysical objectivity, but also the connections between these notions of objectivity.

25 Part I

Discursive Objectivity

26 Chapter Two

Objectivity, Language, and Frege’s Inﬂuence

Incidentally, it should be noted that Wittgenstein argues against a notion of mathematical object (presumably: substance), but, at least in places ... not against the objectivity of mathematics, especially through his recognition of formal facts ... .

—Georg Kriesel, “Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics”

The consequent question, if all this is accepted, is: what, in that case, are such debates about?

—Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity

27 2.1 Introduction

E MIGHT FIND the attention among philosophers given to questions about W objectivity unremarkable. Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact—and, perhaps, a startling fact—that, at least over the past few hundred years, the most widely discussed contributions to the philosophy of objectivity and realism stem from investigations regarding language, linguistic meaning, and truth. In order to settle the pervasive questions that we raise about objectivity, we ﬁnd prominent philosophers who counsel us to look not to the extra-linguistic world and the denizens therein, but to language itself. Consider an infamous slogan that Michael Dummett (1978, xxviii) and other philosophers attribute to Georg Kreisel. According to ‘Kreisel’s dictum’, as far as mathematical realism goes, the problem is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical discourse. This dictum is due to Kreisel’s (1958, 138n1) remark about an argumentative strategy from Ludwig Wittgenstein.

... it should be noted that Wittgenstein argues against a notion of mathematical object (presumably: substance), but, at least in places ... not against the objectivity of mathematics, especially through his recognition of formal facts ... .

As far as the dictum goes, the advice is that, when we seek answers to questions about mathematical objectivity, we should look not to numbers or their existence, but to the language of mathematics. Another illustration is Crispin Wright’s ((1988) 2003, 37, my emphasis in italics) remark, “What may a region of discourse lack ... which may inspire doubts about its factuality? ... The answer is, in one unhelpful word, ‘objectivity’.” In accordance with Kreisel’s dictum, Wright’s words suggest that objectivity (or ‘factuality’) is reﬂected in the language or discourse that we use to talk about a subject-matter.

28 Kreisel’s dictum and Wright’s remark illustrate what I call a discursive perspective on objectivity. In preliminary terms, the discursive perspective is that, when a subject-matter is objective, what accounts for that subject-matter’s objectivity is the language that we use to talk about that subject-matter—or at least facts about that language. As such, we may conceive objectivity, realism, factuality, and kindred notions in terms of the linguistic factors that give rise to them. Of course, this characterization is intentionally vague, and as such, it leaves unsettled many issues. Perhaps most notably, it leaves open what linguistic factors account for whether a subject-matter is objective. However, since different philosophers in the discursive camp take different stands on this question, it is useful to keep matters open at the outset. (While I briefly address these issues below in Section 2.4, I discuss them in Chapter 3 in greater detail.) While the primary focus of this chapter are the discursive perspectives that are familiar from the nineteen sixties, especially the views of Michael Dummett and Bernard Williams, the main theme is the extent to which Frege’s writings on mathematical and scientific objectivity influenced these view-points. Frege insists that both mathematics and science are objective. However, as I show below in Section 2.2, Frege does not account for mathematical and scientific objectivity by calling attention to the objects of mathematics and science. Instead, he focuses on the language of mathematics and science, that language’s semantic content, and the truth conditions associated with that content. On Frege’s view, the truth conditions of sentences in mathematical and scientific languages are integral to their objectivity, especially what Frege calls “truth in the scientific sense” (see Frege ((1906) 1979, 186)).1 1As Thomas G. Ricketts (1986, 65) notes, the above interpretation of Frege contrasts with an interpretation according to which Frege is metaphysical realist. See Ricketts (1986) for further discussion of the contrast.

29 Almost everything that was written about objectivity and realism in the nineteen sixties are variations on a basic picture that originates in Frege’s writing. In subsequent sections, I compare Frege, Dummett, and Williams. While there are similarities between Frege and Dummett with respect to the semantic principles that underwrite realism and objectivity, I discuss below in Section 2.3 how Dum- mett’s conception of truth differs from Frege’s conception. For Dummett, when a subject-matter is objective, even our best opinions about that subject-matter might be unjustified. Williams’ picture of objectivity is continuous with both Frege’s and Dummett’s, but as I discuss below in Section 2.4, he emphasizes how the the notion of truth that is operative in the discursive perspectives that Frege influence—what Williams (1966, 18) calls substantial truth—is incompatible with a central tenet of a classical deflationist approach to truth. Classical deflationism is a view about the semantic content of truth talk, and the primary thesis that a classical deflationist defends is that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” completely capture the content of the expression ‘true’.

2.2 Frege, Objectivity, and Truth in the Scientiﬁc

Sense

The discursive perspectives on objectivity to which I allude above originate in Frege’s writings that address mathematical and scientiﬁc objectivity. Indeed, as I show below, most approaches from the nineteen sixties represent attempts to gen- eralize and improve on Frege’s terse remarks, or they are reactions against them.

30 Mathematical and Scientiﬁc Objectivity

We ﬁnd something akin to a discursive perspective in Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, where Frege ((1893) 1964, 15) concludes famously,

Surveying the whole question, it seems to me that the source of the dispute lies in a difference in our conceptions of what is true. For me, truth is something objective and independent of the judging subject; for psychological logicians it is not.

When Frege elaborates these claims—that is, truth is objective or truth is independent of the judging subject—he often calls attention to what I call truth’s autonomy. It is a theme to which Frege returns again and again. After all, it occurs not only in Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, but also in his writings devoted to logic and mathematical-cum-scientiﬁc language.2 Frege’s remarks about truth’s autonomy raise a question, namely, what does it mean to say that truth is objective or independent of the judging subject? The view that truth is autonomous is summed up by Frege’s (1979, 131-132) catchphrase that “what is true is true independent of our recognizing it as such.” At one point, Frege ((1897) 1979, 127, my addition in brackets) even claims that recognition- independence is a feature of the meaning or sense of the word ‘true’.

The independence of being recognized by us [as true] is integral to the sense of the word ‘true’.

Of course, Frege’s point about autonomy is not merely limited to truth. After all, Frege is explicit that what goes for truth goes for falsity, too. Although Frege does not himself address the issue, at least to my knowledge, in the spirit of the view, 2See Frege’s “Logic” ((1889-1891) 1979), “Logic” ((1897) 1979), “Introduction to Logic” ((1906) 1979), “A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines,” “Logic in Mathematics” ((1914) 1979), and lastly, “My Basic Logic Insights” ((1915) 1979).

31 we should accept autonomy claims with respect to other semantic notions too, for instance, reference, satisfaction, and validity.3 Frege’s catchphrase is that what is true is true independently of our assertions, beliefs, and thoughts. Since the catchphrase is unqualified, there is an inclination to think that Frege advocates truth’s autonomy as a global thesis about truth talk. Nevertheless, in at least some passages, Frege explicitly limits his view to what he calls “truth in the scientific sense,” and he contrasts a scientific notion of truth with fiction and myth. Given these passages, there is evidence that Frege’s view is that the catchphrase about truth’s autonomy sheds light only on truth talk in mathematics and science, where we are not dealing with fiction or myth—at least according to Frege. On this reading, Frege’s view at least allows that we might use the expression ‘true’ in something other than a scientific sense. Yet setting aside questions about whether Frege takes truth’s autonomy as a global thesis about the content of the expression ‘true’, it is evident that the focal point of Frege’s attention is truth in the scientific sense. In that sense, Frege ((1897) 1979, 133) argues,

In order to be true, thoughts—e. g., laws of nature—not only do not need to be recognized by us as true: they do not have to have been thought at all. 3For Frege’s remarks about truth and independence, see Frege ((1889-1891) 1979, 2-3, 7). For his remarks about falsity, see Frege ((1897) 1979, 138). (Unlike Frege, Dummett explicitly extends autonomy talk to semantic notions another than truth (e. g., see Dummett (1993)).) While Frege makes explicit claims about truth’s autonomy, he is equally well-known for his proto-deflationist remarks about truth talk’s content. For instance, there are several passages where Frege advances claims along the follow lines. It is also worth noticing that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has just the same content as the sentence ‘It is true that I smell the scent of violets’. So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth (Frege ((1918) 1977a, 6)). Since I focal point of the discussion is how Frege influenced discursive perspectives on objectivity in the nineteen sixties, I set aside this interpretive question about how to square Frege’s views about truth’s autonomy with his proto-deflationist remarks. For further discussion of deflationism, see below in both Section 2.4 and Chapter 3.

32 As an illustration, consider Johannes Kepler’s ﬁrst law of planetary motion, namely, that the planets elliptically orbit the Sun, where the Sun is at a focus of the ellipse. For argument’s sake, let us suppose not only that Kepler’s law is true, but also that astronomers believe it—or at least that they think about it. On Frege’s view, it is one thing that astronomers think about or believe Kepler’s law, and it is another thing that Kepler’s law is true. That is, there is a truth about the orbital path along which a planet moves in relation to the Sun, and it is neither here nor there what astronomers think, believe, and assert about it. So, when the notion of “truth in the scientiﬁc sense” is under discussion, truth, thought, belief, and assertion are conceptually autonomous notions.4

Truth in the Scientiﬁc Sense

There are several claims that are integral to Frege’s picture of truth in the scientiﬁc sense. First, Frege claims that, when truth is independent in a relevant sense, our assertions, beliefs, or thoughts might be mistaken. Independence engenders the possibility of human error. It is thus possible that a person asserts, believes, or considers that a content is true, even though it is false.5 Frege ((1897) 1979, 133) also suggests that, since truths are independent of what humans assert, believe, and think, some truths might not be the objects of thought, belief, or assertion. In other words, there might be truths that no one believes, or even that no one entertains in thought. Along with the possibility of error, the autonomy of truth thus gives rise to the possibility of unconsidered truths. As such, it is possible that a content is true, even though no person believes that it is true—and perhaps even though no person entertains that content at all. 4 I address the Kepler example in further detail in Chapter 5. 5Logical truths and other similar examples might raise a problem for this mark of truth’s autonomy. However, given Frege’s attention to scientiﬁc discourse, we may presume that he is disregarding such cases.

33 In addition, when we are dealing with mind-independent truths, Frege indicates that not every true content is true because someone asserts, believes, or thinks it. That is, a content’s truth might have nothing to do whatsoever with whether someone believes or thinks it. As such, someone might believe a truth that he or she discovered—and not merely invented or fabricated. As Frege ((1897) 1979, 133) says,

A law of nature is not invented by us, but discovered, just as a deserted island in the Arctic Ocean was there long before anyone had set eyes on it.

Accordingly, it is possible that a content is true, a person believes it, or at least entertains it in thought, and yet there is no explanatory connection between that content’s truth and that person’s belief or thought (see Frege ((1897) 1979, 127)). Lastly, Frege ((1906) 1979, 186, Frege’s emphasis) relentlessly insists that, when we are dealing with truth in the scientiﬁc sense, “every thought is either true or false.” When a content’s truth is mind-independent, either it is true, or it is false. No exceptions are allowed, at least on Frege’s view. Consequently, when a content is mind-independent, we are assured that what is often called the principle of bivalence is valid across the discourse as a whole. In the discussion hereafter, I understand bivalence in terms of a regimentation along these lines.

Principle of Bivalence Either hΦi is true or hΦi is false.

In the formulation above, ‘Φ’ is a schematic variable that ranges over sentences and either angle brackets are quotation marks for forming a token sentence’s name, or they are a similar name-forming linguistic device.6 6For further discussion of bivalence, see Frege ((1906) 1979, 186) and ((1897) 1979, 129-130). In Chapter 3, I address not only the principle of bivalence, but also the passage from Frege above.

34 In summary, Frege accounts for truth talk’s autonomy—what he calls truth in the scientific sense—in terms of the extent to which (i) our scientific and mathematical thoughts, beliefs, and assertions might be false, (ii) there might be scientific or mathematical truths that we fail to consider, the fact that (iii) scientific and mathematical truths are discovered (and not invented), and lastly, (iv) the universal validity of the principle of bivalence. Of course, we should raise questions about whether Frege’s account is correct. For instance, consider Frege’s commitment to the general validity of the principle of bivalence: every mathematical and scientific content is either true or false. Given the inevitable vagueness in both language and thought, even in scientific and mathematical language, where our inclinations about objectivity are strongest, we should worry about whether bivalence is valid across the board (e. g., see Wright ((1986) 1993) discussion). Even if we ultimately reject Frege’s picture of truth in the scientific sense, we may still appreciate Frege’s effort to account for objectivity in terms of the features of the languages that we use, especially the conditions in which the sentences in our languages are true or false. Indeed, while Frege’s approach to truth in the scientific sense is no longer in the spotlight, his attention to semantic content and truth conditions influenced several subsequent generations. Frege’s attempt to account for scientific and mathematical objectivity in terms of scientific and mathematical languages, especially his attention to scientific and mathematical truth, is a salient historical background against which I recommend we see not only Kreisel’s dictum that I mention above in Section 2.1, but also the widely discussed discursive perspectives that emerge in the nineteen sixties and thereafter. In addition, I suggest below in Chapter 3 that we should utilize Frege’s approach to truth in the scientific sense to shed light on vexed debates about what

35 notion of truth best explains objectivity—at least as it is best understood in the discursive tradition. Before I turn to that issue, let us consider the differences between Frege and the philosophers that he inﬂuenced, especially Dummett and Williams.

2.3 Dummett, Bivalence and

Recognition-Independent Truth

Frege’s account of mathematical and scientific objectivity garnered the attention of several philosophers at the University of Oxford in the nineteen sixties, especially Michael Dummett and Bernard Williams. The drift of the discussion above in Sec- tion 2.2 is that, at least for Frege, what accounts for scientific and mathematical objectivity is the language that we use to talk about numbers, laws of planetary motion, and so forth, especially the fact that these languages are associated with what Frege calls “truth in the scientific sense” (see Frege ((1906) 1979, 186)). Along with the general validity of the principle of bivalence, truth in the scientific sense underwrites the possibility of human error, unconsidered truth, and discovery (as opposed to invention). While the discursive perspective on objectivity and realism originates in Frege’s emphasis on truth in the scientific sense, the notoriety of the discursive perspective is due to the efforts of Michael Dummett, Bernard Williams, and the subsequent generations of philosophers who their efforts inspired. Much of Dummett’s work is devoted to shedding light on objectivity and realism, and as with Frege, Dummett draws attention to the languages that we use to talk about mathematics, science, and other subject-matters. As I show below, both Frege and Dummett emphasize not only semantic content, but also truth conditions. Aside from the latter similarities, Frege and Dummett defend different

36 accounts ultimately. As an illustration, consider that, even as far back as nineteen ﬁfty-nine, in the well-known paper, “Truth,” Dummett ((1959) 1978, 14) claims,

... the correspondence theory expresses one important feature of the concept of truth ... that a statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of which it is true. Although we no longer accept the correspondence theory, we remain realists au fond; we retain in our thinking a fundamentally realist conception of truth. Realism consists in the belief that for any statement there must be something in virtue of which either it or its negation is true.

We ﬁnd a similar characterization in Dummett’s (1981, 434) subsequent work.

The primary tenet of realism, as applied to some given class of statements, is that each statement in the class is determined as true or not true, independently of our knowledge, by some objective reality whose existence and constitution is, again, independent of our knowledge.

While Dummett draws on a semantic principle akin to bivalence, he does not focus on the other features of Frege’s scientific notion of truth. Instead, Dummett assigns a central role to the correspondence talk that is familiar from traditional correspondence conceptions of truth. For Dummett, when we are dealing with a subject matter that is objective, such as mathematics or science, even our best opinions about some truths might be unjustified, and correspondence talk highlights this fact and the contrast between truth and justification.7

Bivalence

As I mention above in Section 2.2, given that Dummett focuses on a semantic principle akin to the principle of bivalence, there is a similarity between Frege and Dummett. Of course, strictly speaking, the semantic principle that Dummett highlights is not bivalence, but another schema, namely, that either hΦi is true or h¬Φi 7I address a similar point in the context of Wright’s notion of epistemic constraint below in Chapter 3.

37 is true. (As above, I treat ‘Φ’ as a schematic variable that ranges over sentences, and either angle brackets are quotation marks, or they are a similar linguistic device with which we form a sentence’s name. Nevertheless, the differences between bivalence and the latter schema seem negligible. Suppose that, for the target discourse, a given sentence is false if and only if that sentence’s negation is true. Given this assumption, we may reason classically from bivalence to Dummett’s schema, and vice versa. They are thus more or less equivalent, at least under these assumptions.8

Recognition-Independent Truth

While the appeal to a schema other than bivalence is an unlikely point of con- tention between Frege and Dummett, at least given that we equate falsity with truth of negation, there remains a noteworthy difference between these philosophers, namely, the relative importance of correspondence talk. As I mention above in Section 2.2, Frege characterizes truth in the scientiﬁc sense by pointing out that we might assert or believe something false, there might be truths that we never consider, and we do not invent truths, we discover them. Unlike Frege, Dum- mett calls attention to the language that is commonly used to give voice to the correspondence theory of truth.9 For instance, in the passages above, Dummett focuses on the schema that hΦi is true only if there is something in virtue of which hΦi is true. Dummett’s discussions about this schema—and correspondence talk generally—suggest what is often called recognition-independent truth. As an illustration of recognition-independent truth, let us consider Dummett’s (1978, 17) well-known illustration, namely, the sentence ‘A city will never be built 8For further discussion about negation, see the distinction that I draw between choice and exclusion negation below in Chapter 3. 9For Frege’s attitude toward correspondence talk, see Frege ((1918-1923) 1977a, 3-4) .

38 here’ (see also Dummett (1993, 250, 293)). We are invited to imagine not only that the sentence ‘a city will never be built here’ semantically expresses a content, but also that this content is associated with truth-conditions. However, the truth conditions of that semantic content are such that either the sentence ‘a city will never be built here’ is true or its negation is true. Given what makes the sentence or its negation true—that is, the fact to which it corresponds—our beliefs about whether either it is true or its negation is true might be unjustiﬁed, even when we are in a situation that is evidentially or epistemically ideal. Of course, the above example might be problematic. The illustration brings with it semantic complexities that are required to account for the fact that the referent of the expression ‘here’ might vary across different context of use.10 More importantly, just as vagueness raises questions about Frege’s appeal to the principle of bivalence in his account of objectivity, so too it might cause us to worry about Dummett’s emphasis on a similar semantic schema, namely, that either a sentence or its negation is true. After all, not only is it a vague matter whether something is a city, but it is a vague matter where a city is located. As such, the truth of the relevant instance of the target schema is doubtful, namely, that either the sentence ‘a city will never be built here’ is true or that sentence’s negation is true. However, there are other examples without these problems. As Dummett ((1970) 2000, 3) points out, we do not currently know whether the sentence ‘some number is both perfect and odd’ is true. Seven is an odd number, since an odd number is an integer that is not divisible by two without a remainder and there is a remainder when you divide seven by two. By deﬁnition, a perfect number is a positive integer that is half the sum of all it positive divisors, including itself, so six is a perfect number because it equals half the sum of all of its positive divisors. As things 10I address how semantic content might vary across contexts of use in detail in Chapter 5.

39 stand, while there is no proof that the sentence ‘some number is both perfect and odd’ is true, there is also no proof that its negation is true. Even so, there is at least an inclination to accept a relevant instance of the Dum- mettian schema that I discuss above, namely, either the sentence ‘some number is both perfect and odd’ is true, or its negation is true. In addition, at least in comparison to the expression ‘city’, there is little inclination—and perhaps no inclination— to think that it is a vague matter whether a number is in the extension of the predicate ‘is both perfect and odd’. Arguably, the latter instance of Dummett’s schema remains plausible even if we suppose that, no matter how we idealize our circumstances, we have no justiﬁed beliefs about whether it is true that some number is both perfect and odd. If this much is right, we might accept that truths about what numbers are both perfect and odd are recognition-independent, in the sense that I describe above. Given these examples, I recommend we understand recognition- independent truth along the following lines.

Recognition-Independent Truth The expression ‘true’ is recognition-independent with respect to a discourse if and only if for some token sentence in that discourse, it expresses a semantic content, either that content or its negation is true, and given what makes it or its negation true, it is possible that a person is not justiﬁed in accepting that content—even in evidentially or epistemically ideal circumstances.11

2.4 Williams, Substantial Truth, and Deﬂationism

While Dummett is arguably the most widely discussed philosopher in the nineteen sixties who defends the view that a subject-matter’s objectivity is reﬂected 11I draw attention below in in Chapter 3 to a parallel conception of truth that Wright introduces, namely, epistemically unconstrained truth.

40 in facts about the discourse that we use to talk about that subject-matter, he was not the only philosopher during the nineteen sixties who defends a discursive perspective on objectivity. After all, only a few years following Dummett’s ((1959) 1978) pronouncement—i. e., that realism consists in the belief that for any statement there must be something in virtue of which either it or its negation is true— Williams (1966) defends something broadly similar in a classic article, namely, Williams’ “Consistency and Realism.” In this context, Williams addresses an issue that I explore below in Chapter 4, namely, that when a disagreement arises over an issue that is objective, cognitively speaking, someone must be at fault. When disagreements arise over issues that are not objective, there is a difference. While someone might be at fault, cognitively speaking, we grant the possibility that the disagreement is faultless. If our expectations are correct and in disagreements over an objective issue, as Williams (1966, 18) suggests, something must go wrong, then we need to account for why disagreements over issues that are not objective are different. Like Frege and Dummett, Williams’ view is that two linguistic factors explain the link between disagreement and cognitive fault, namely, the relevant discourse’s semantic content and the truth-conditions associated with that content. In particular, Williams (1966, 18) claims,

... this is the important point ... if one is going to rely on the notion of truth in giving the account of assertion and consistency, it will have to be a substantial notion of truth.

A few pages thereafter, Williams (1966, 20) adds,

... If there is anything in this, the peculiar signiﬁcance of consistency, and the substantial notion of truth that appears to go with it, will be linked to the idea which may be called ’realism’, that there is an independent order of things which it is the concern of this sort of discourse to reﬂect.

41 The passages above illustrate a continuity between Frege and Dummett. When Williams glosses what it is about truth-conditions that matter for realism and objectivity, he turns to remarks that harmonize with both Frege’s scientiﬁc notion of truth and Dummett’s recognition-independent truth, especially Williams’ (1966, 20) idea that “a discourse aims to reﬂect an independent order of things.” So, while Williams adopts the term substantial truth, there are important similarities.

Substantial Truth and Deﬂationism

Williams’ remarks are important for reasons other than the continuity with Frege and Dummett, too. Along with illustrating the continuity, the passages above are signiﬁcant because they bring attention to an important consideration about the accounts of truth talk that are integral to the views that Frege inspired—that is, following Williams, what I call substantial conceptions of truth talk. The key consideration is that, whatever exactly is the account of substantial truth talk that we ultimately adopt, the account must go beyond the commitments that are tradition- ally associated with the deﬂationary conception of truth talk. Williams (1966, 18) argues,

None of the requirements [that link objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault] ... will follow from the thesis that assertions basically aim at truth if all that thesis is taken to mean is that ’true’ is the word we use in registering the acceptability of assertions .... In particular, these consequences will not follow if we accept the view that the nature of truth is sufﬁciently explained by the consideration that in saying ’P is true’ we merely conﬁrm, re-assert, or express agreement with P.

Strictly speaking, ‘deﬂationism’ is a cover term for a family of views that originate in Gottlob Frege ((1918) 1977b), William Ernest Johnson (1921), Frank Plumpton Ramsey (see both Ramsey (1927) and ((1927-1929) 1991)), Alfred Jules Ayer (see

42 Ayer (1935), (1936) and (1963)).12 Different members of the deflationist family en- dorse different claims. For example, some deflationists claim that the expression ‘true’ is a device of disquotation (e. g., see W. V. O. Quine (1970)). Others also claim that it is a device of endorsement, too (e. g., see Peter Strawson (1950)). Another claim that deflationists often defend is that the expression ‘true’ does not semantically express a property, or if it does express a property, it is not a property akin to, say, the properties that we investigate in science, where there is an underlying nature that awaits our discovery (e. g., see Paul Horwich (1998)). In other words, the expression ‘true’ might semantically express a a property, but if it does, it is something without an “underlying nature,” as it is often said. Setting the above claims aside, I concentrate on a claim that classical deflationists advocate about truth talk’s content, since it is central to the account of semantic discursivism that I articulate in Chapter 3. Classical deflationists claim that the rough-and-ready semantic content of the expression ‘true’ is provided by either instances of the disquotational schema or the equivalence schema.13 In the discussion below, I understand these schemata along the following lines.

Disquotational Schema hΦi is true if and only if Φ.

Equivalence Schema It is true that Φ if and only if Φ.

As above, I treat ‘Φ’ in the disquotational schema as a schematic variable, where ‘Φ’ ranges over sentences and angle brackets are a linguistic device with which we form a sentence’s name. In the equivalence schema, ‘Φ’ is a schematic variable that ranges over semantic contents. While the expression ‘true’ occupies the grammat- 12For a survey article about deﬂationist conceptions of truth, see Bradley Amour-Garb and JC Beall (2005). 13I add the qualiﬁcation ‘rough-and-ready’ because there are often further complications, e. g., about pathological sentences associated with the semantic paradoxes. However, these raise issues that are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

43 ical position of a predicate in the disquotational schema, it occupies an operator position in the equivalence schema. From a semantic perspective, these are different creatures. As we might say, while a predicate expresses a function from objects in the domain to truth-values, an operator is a function from truth-values to truth-values—at least if it is a truth-functional operator.14 Williams’ point is that, given the theoretical job that we are assigning to truth talk, namely, to account for objectivity in discourse, in conjunction with semantic facts about that discourse at least, there must be more to truth talk’s content than what a classical deflationist claims. In other words, there must be more to truth talk’s content than instances of either the disquotational or equivalence schema. On reflection, this consideration is already implicit in Frege’s remark that I mention above in Section 2.2, namely, that truth’s autonomy from the judging subject is integral to how we understand the expression ‘true’. Since Frege’s remark suggests that there is more to the content of truth talk than is licensed by the instances of either the disquotational and equivalence schemas, at least with respect to mathematics and science, Frege’s scientific conception of truth talk is richer than a classical deflationary conception. We might make similar remarks about Dummett’s recognition-independent truth, too. In the decades that followed the nineteen sixties, we find wide agreement among philosophers about Frege’s basic picture of objectivity that I discuss above in Sec- tion 2.2. In particular, we find a consensus that a debate over whether a subject- matter is objective is a controversy over the language or discourse that we use to 14For further discussion of the differences between predicates and operators, see Jason Stanley (2005). I suggest below in Chapter 3 an alternative way to think about the classical deflationist’s approach to truth talk’s content. According to the alternative that I defend, neither do the instances of the disquotational schema completely account for truth talk’s content, nor do the instances of the equivalence schema. It is the inferential practices that lead to these schemata and their instances that accounts for truth talk’s semantic content, especially the rules that govern whether a speaker’s inferences using truth talk are correct.

44 talk about that subject-matter, where the two linguistic factors that account for objectivity are semantic content and, borrowing Williams’ phrase, substantial truth. Given that there is no widely adopted terminology for this shared assumption, I adopt semantic discursivism. At the outset of this chapter, I suggest that what is common among discursivist perspectives on objectivity is the primacy of the language that we use to talk about a subject-matter, but I acknowledge that this characterization left open exactly what linguistic factors account for discursive objectivity. Semantic discursivism is one way that we might ﬂesh out the discursivist perspective, and more importantly, it is the most widely accepted discursive approach. I offer a fuller discussion of the semantic discursivist approach below in Chapter 3. However, before I consider what is more or less essential to a semantic discursivist approach to discursive objectivity, I consider the differences between a focal point of classical deﬂationism, namely, the disquotational schema, and another widely discussed schema.

2.5 Tarski’s T-Schema

On the surface at least, the disquotational schema that I mention above is analogous to the centerpiece of Alfred Tarski’s (1994, 344) celebrated semantic conception of truth, namely, the schema that “x is a true sentence if and only if p.” Following Tarski (1994, 344), I call this the T-schema. For example, as Tarski (1983a, 155-156) emphasizes, both ‘p’ and ‘x’ are schematic variables, where the variable ‘p’ ranges over sentences and the variable ‘x’ ranges over expressions that refer to sentences. Tarski also emphasizes a constraint on what substitution instances are permissible: given the sentence that we substitute for ‘p’, that sentence should

45 also be a translation of whatever expression that we substitute for ‘x’. As an illustration, Tarski (1983a, 156) calls attention to a permissible substitution instance, namely, “‘it is snowing’ is a true sentence if and only if it is snowing.” Given that the expression ‘it is snowing’ translates the sentence that flanks the right hand side of the biconditional, it qualifies as a permissible substitution instance. However, given the sentence to which the expression ‘it is snowing’ refers, the following is not a permissible substitution instance: ‘it is snowing’ is a true sentence if and only if grass is green. It fails because the expression ‘it is snowing’ does not translate the sentence that flanks the right side of the biconditional, namely, the sentence ‘grass is green’. Given how Tarski intends that we interpret the T-schema, it is evident that, in order to transform the T-schema into a sentence, we must supply a specific expression on the left hand side of the biconditional that translates the sentence that is used on the right hand side. Tarski mentions two expression types with which we might refer to sentences (see Tarski (1983a, 156-157) for an extended discussion). As the illustration above shows, we might refer to a sentence utilizing a quotation mark name. For a given sentence, when we form a quotation mark name that refers to that sentence, we enclose it in single quotation marks. Accordingly, we may refer to Tarski’s famous sentence with the expression ‘it is snowing’. Along with quotation mark names, Tarski calls attention to what he calls structural- descriptive names. As Tarski (1983a, 1565-157) says,

We shall apply this term to names which describe the words which compose the expression denoted by the name, as well as the signs of which each single word is composed and the order in which these signs and words follow one another.

Accordingly, while we might refer to Tarski’s famous sentence with the expression ‘it is snowing’, we might also form a structural-descriptive name akin to the fol-

46 lowing: ‘it’a‘is’a‘snowing’, where, as a matter of convention, we take for granted that there is a space between any two words connected by the concatenation sym-

bol (‘a’). Tarski (1983a, 153) often calls his view a “definition of truth.” In “Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik,” Tarski even claims that the permissible substitution instances of the schema “explain in a precise way, and in conformity with common usage, the sense of all expressions of the type: the sentence x is true” ((1936) 1983b, 404). However, Tarski also emphasizes several important qualifications. Given Tarski’s qualifications, there are crucial to the differences between Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and the classical deflationist approach to truth talk’s content. For instance, while Tarski frequently calls his approach a definition of truth, he (1983a, 154) also emphasizes that his view concerns not the definition of the expression ‘true sentence’ generally, but only with respect to a given language. As such, Tarski (1983a, 155) repeatedly says that what is on offer is merely a “partial definition” of the expression ‘true sentence’: it is a partial definition insofar as the scope of the definition is a single language. We should distinguish Tarski’s claim that a semantic conception of truth is only a partial definition, that is, in the sense that it is a definition that is relative to a specific language, from a stronger claim that Tarski advances. For example, Tarski (1936 1983b, 402) claims,

it has not always been kept in mind that the semantical concepts have a relative character, that they must always be related to a particular language.

47 We might agree that the semantic conception of truth is only a partial deﬁnition in the above sense, even if we deny that semantic concepts must be relative to a given language. Given that, as Tarski formulates the T-schema at least, the relativization to a speciﬁc language is left implicit (see schema (3) in Tarski (1983a, 155) and schema (T) in Tarski (1994, 344)), it is a common practice among philosophers to replace his

original formulations with the alternative below, where ‘L ’ indicates the language under discussion.

T-schema hΦi is true in L if and only if Ψ.

As in Tarski’s formulation above, we treat both ‘Ψ’ and ‘hΦi’ as schematic variables, ‘Ψ’ ranges over sentences, and ‘hΦi’ ranges over sentential names. As I also mention above, substitution instances of the T-schema is subject to the constraint that the reference of the schematic variable ‘hΦi’ always be a sentence that translates the sentence that we substitute for ‘Ψ’. Another qualification that Tarski (1983a, 153, 154, my addition in brackets) emphasizes is that his partial definition does not constitute a “thorough analysis of the meaning [of the expression ‘true sentence’] in” natural language. Remarks akin to this serve to remind Tarski’s readers that he intentionally disregards what they might regard as part of truth’s definition. For instance, Tarski explicitly disregards pragmatist conceptions of truth, where, as he (1983a, 153) as sees the matter, we mean a sentence is true in so far as it is “in a certain respect useful.” Tarski is also emphasizing that the expression ‘true sentence’ is not defined for a given natural language, but a formal language such as set theory. Tarski’s theory is thus not a straightforward account of the expression ‘true sentence’ in English or its cognates in other natural languages.

48 Given that a Tarski-style partial definition of the expression ‘true sentence’ is applied only to a specific formal language, he contrasts the language that is under investigation from the language in which the theory is given. While the former is the object-language, the latter is the meta-language (see Tarski (1983a, 167) and Tarski (1994, 349-350)). He draws a distinction between the object-language and meta-language because the differences between the two languages are crucial. A formal language such as set theory contains neither the expression ‘true sentence’, nor any sort of name for sentences in set theory. Tarski’s idea is that we invent another language—i. e., the meta-language—and we stipulate that it contains set theory, or another suitable object-language. Just as, say, set theory contains a logical terminology, so too the metalanguage contains logical terminology (see Tarski (1983a, 170-172)). In addition, the metalanguage contains names that refer to sentences from the object language, in particular, structural-descriptive names. Lastly, it contains the expression ‘true sentence’. Tarski (1983a, 187-188) claims that a partial definition of truth is both “formally correct” and “materially adequate” if the metalanguage that contains that partial definition entails every relevant instance of the T-schema. As I note above, what matters is the instances that we form from the sentences in the metalanguage that correspond to sentences in the object language and the structural descriptive names of those sentences in the metalanguage. For each of the latter sentences and each associated name, we may form a substitution instance of the T-schema, and if the metalanguage entails that sentence, then, on Tarski’s view, we have a partial definition of truth with respect to that language that is formally correct and materially adequate. This constraint is what Tarski calls convention T , and he (1983a, 187-188) describes it as follows.

49 CONVENTION T. A formally correct deﬁnition of the symbol ‘T r’, formulated in the metalanguage, will be called an adequate deﬁnition of truth if ... all sentences which are obtained from the expression ‘x ∈ T r if and only if p’ by substituting the symbol for ‘x’ a structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol ‘p’ the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into the metalanguage.

Tarski utilizes ‘T r’ to refer to the class of true sentences in the object language. Again, ‘x’ and ‘p’ are schematic variables, and we interpret them in the fashion that I mention above.

2.6 Conclusion

The origins of discursive perspectives on objectivity in the nineteen sixties that I address above are historical stage-setting for the topic that I address in Chapter 3, namely, the semantic discursive perspectives that emerge in the post-sixties era, especially Wright’s prominent contributions in the nineteen eighties and nineties. I sketch below in Chapter 3 a principled account of the discursive perspectives on objectivity that Frege inﬂuenced. In addition, I explore the differences between Wright’s (1992) approach to objectivity and the discursive perspectives on objectivity that preceded it, including Dummett’s and Williams’ conceptions.

50 Chapter Three

Truth Talk: Inﬂation, Substance, and Pluralism

The division between the inﬂationist and deﬂationist positions is in some ways the most fundamental divisions within the theory of content and meaning (though ... the line between the views is not absolutely sharp).

Hartry Field, “Deﬂationist Views of Meaning and Content”

The independence of being recognized by us [as true] is integral to the sense of the word ’true’.

Gottlob Frege, “Logic”

51 ... there is a prospect of pluralism—that the more that there is to say [about truth] may well vary from discourse to discourse—and that whatever may remain to be said, it will not concern any essential features of truth.

Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity

3.1 Introduction

HEPERSPECTIVESON discursive objectivity and realism—not only in the nine- T teen sixties, but in subsequent decades, too—originate in Gottlob Frege’s attempt to account for mathematical and scientific objectivity in semantic and truth- theoretic terms. As I discuss above in Chapter 2, Frege observes that our mathematical and scientific beliefs and assertions might be false. When we engage in a scientific or mathematical inquiry, we thus risk error. Frege also notes that there are mathematical and scientific truths that go unconsidered, or at least there might be truths like that. In addition, Frege claims that mathematical and scientific truths are not invented: they are discovered. Lastly, Frege insists that mathematical and scientific beliefs and assertions are either true or false. It follows that the principle of bivalence and semantic principles akin to it are valid across the board. Frege ((1906) 1979, 186) claims not only that these features are integral to a conception of “truth in the scientific sense,” but also that these features account for the objectivity that we associate with mathematics and science (see Frege ((1893) 1964, 15)).

52 Substantial Truth

There remains an obstacle to our understanding of a semantic discursivist’s approach to objectivity, namely, the notion that Williams (1966, 18) dubs substantial truth talk. As I show above in Chapter 2, while substantial truth is the centerpiece of the semantic approaches to discursive objectivity in the nineteen sixties, there are important differences between the conceptions of substantial truth talk that Frege, Dummett, and Williams defend. These differences simply foreshadow the even greater variety that emerges in the decades that follow the nineteen sixties. As we look back on philosophical discussions in the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties, we find many philosophers whose accounts of discursive objectivity harmonize with the semantic discursivist picture that Frege influenced, including David Wiggins (1980), Hilary Putnam (1981), and Crispin Wright (e. g., in both ((1986) 1993) and (1992)). Yet we also find that little or no consensus emerges among these philosophers about how to interpret the vexing notion of substantial truth talk. Despite the differences in how philosophers interpret substantial truth, the diverse pictures that we inherited from Frege and his successors continue to influence contemporary research about objectivity and realism, including Max Kölbel (2002), Michael Lynch (2009), and Stewart Shapiro (2009). While Frege’s work sheds light on the historical origins of the perspectives on discursive objectivity that emerged in the nineteen sixties, I turn to some difficult foundational questions about the semantic discursivist project, especially the idea that truth talk’s semantic content is substantial. After all, it is difficult to say what philosophical commitments are more or less essential to the semantic discursivist projects that Frege influenced until we arrive at a more principled way to think about what gives substance to truth talk’s content.

53 As I emphasize above in Chapter 2, Williams (1966, 18) claims that a substantial account of truth talk’s content is incompatible with a deflationist’s approach. While I exclusively address a classical deflationist view above in Chapter 2, I bring attention to another alternative. On an inferential deflationist approach that I defend, the content of truth talk stems not from the equivalencies that are the focal point of classical deflationism—for instance, either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white”—but the inferential practices that lead to these equivalencies. Against the backdrop of Gerhard Gentzen’s (1969a) approach to inference, I show that a speaker’s commitment to rules that govern whether the inferences that we make using truth talk are correct are also commitments that lead a speaker to a classical deflationist’s equivalencies. Once we consider how a substantial account of truth talk’s content differs from either a classical deflationist or inferential deflationist approach, we are in a position to better understand a substantial account of truth talk’s content. This also puts us in a better position to understand the semantic discursivist picture that Frege influenced. Yet the connection between substantial and deflationist truth is more complicated than we might at first expect. As I argue below, while there are some approaches to truth talk’s semantic content that are incompatible not only with classical deflationism, but also inferential deflationism, these approaches still do not qualify as substantial approaches. Of course, an approach to truth talk’s content is not substantial unless there is more to truth talk’s content than a deflationist recommends. Yet while this is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition. After all, a substantial account of truth talk’s content also rules out other approaches to truth talk’s content, too.

54 If we aim to give a principled account of what makes truth talk substantial, we need an account that addresses not simply the factors that make truth talk’s content inflated, but also the additional factors that make it substantial. Given the emergence of pluralistic attitudes in recent decades, this is a difficult task. While Frege, Dummett, and Williams defend alternative conceptions of substantial truth, they assume that, whatever we ultimately say about substantial truth, the correct story is uniform. However, Wright (1992) defends an idea that is incompatible with this assumption, namely, the view that there is a plurality of substantial truths (see also Lynch (2009)). The substantial account of truth talk that I articulate draws attention to two aspects of truth talk’s semantic content. First, when truth talk’s content is substantial, the rules that govern the inferences that a person draws using the word ‘true’ for the purposes of semantic shift do not completely account for that word’s semantic content, where a semantic shift at least involves either an inference to a truth attribution from the sentence to which truth is attributed, or an inference to a given sentence from a truth attribution regarding that sentence. Second, since Frege’s notion of scientific truth is the prototype for substantial truth, truth talk’s content is not substantial unless it exhibits most or all of the marks of Frege’s scientific notion of truth. For instance, we might be mistaken, there are truths that we never consider (or might be such truths), we discover truths (we do not invent them), and either a claim is true, or it is false. In addition, I show how the marks of Frege’s scientific notion of truth are closely aligned with considerations about compositional semantics. In particular, it is compositionality considerations about a discourse that make it credible to claim that truth talk’s content displays marks akin to Frege’s scientific notion of truth.

55 3.2 Deﬂationary Truth

As a first step toward clarifying the muddle over substantial truth talk, let us consider some deflationary approaches to truth talk’s semantic content. When we say that something is deflated, we indicate that the air from that item is released, either literally or metaphorically. For a deflationist, the content of truth talk is akin to a deflated balloon. Just as the deflated balloon has little or no air left in it, so too truth talk has little or no content left in it, especially when we contrast it with an inflationist approach. For an inflationist, truth talk is more like an inflated balloon than a deflated balloon. Just as an inflated balloon is puffed up with air, so too truth talk is puffed up with additional content. Given the deflated balloon analogy, deflationists agree that truth talk has little or no content. Even so, there are differences among deflationists about what factors best account for truth talk’s semantic content. As I indicate above, a classical deflationist claims that there is not much to the content of truth talk other than equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” Before I turn to inflationist approaches to truth talk’s semantic content, I consider an alternative to classical deflationism. Unlike his classical counterpart, an inferential deflationist claims that the content of truth talk does not stem directly from equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” As I suggest below, an inferential deflationist shifts attention away from the classical deflationist’s equivalencies to the rules that govern whether an inference using truth talk is correct.

56 Classical Deﬂationism

Let us return to a view that I address above in Chapter 2, namely, the classical de- ﬂationist’s conception of truth talk and its semantic content. Setting worries about semantic paradox aside, a classical deﬂationist claims that it is either the disquotational schema’s instances or the equivalence schema’s instances that account for the expression ‘true’ and its semantic content. As I also emphasize in Chapter 2, the disquotational schema and the equivalence schema are different, at least on a standard interpretation. The expression ‘is true’ is a predicate expression in the disquotational schema.

Disquotational Schema hΦi is true if and only if Φ.

However, in the equivalence schema, the expression ‘it is true’ is an operator.

Equivalence Schema It is true that Φ if and only if Φ.

While the disquotational schema is different from the equivalence schema, I set the equivalence schema aside in much of the discussion below, and I concentrate on the disquotational schema. Not only does this focus simplify expository matters, but there is also no loss of generality. After all, the claims that I address about the disquotational schema apply mutadis mutandis to claims about the equivalence schema, too. Setting aside the rhetorical complications to which the equivalence schema gives rise, let us treat the classical deﬂationist view simply in terms of the thesis that the disquotational schema’s instances completely account for the semantic content of truth talk—again disregarding worries about semantic paradox.1 1See Chapter 2 for further discussion about the disquotational schema and the equivalence schema, the differences between them, and the differences between them both and Tarski’s T- sentences. While I say above that, on a classical deﬂationist view, we may account for truth talk’s semantic content in terms of either the disquotational schema’s instances or the equivalence schema’s

57 Another Alternative

Given our simplifying assumption, the classical deflationist focuses primarily on the disquotational schema and its instances. While a classical deflationist claims that the instances of the disquotational schema completely capture the content of the expression ‘true’, there are other deflationist approaches that focus on the rules that govern whether an inference using truth talk is correct. For example, when Hartry Field ((1994) 2001) addresses the relation between a sentence that expresses a truth attribution and the sentence in that attribution to which truth is attributed, he calls attention to not either the disquotational schema or its instances, but the inferential connections between them. On Field’s view, when two sentences are cognitively equivalent relative to a given person’s understanding, he ((1994) 2001, 106n2) claims,

the person’s inferential procedures license a fairly direct inference from any sentence containing an occurrence of one to the corresponding sentence with an occurrence of the other substituted for it.

As Field’s remark suggests, when two sentences are cognitively equivalent for a person, that person may correctly draw substitution inferences from sentences containing one to sentences containing the other, and vice versa. Of course, this is a simpliﬁcation, as Field ((1994) 2001, 106n2) notes. For instance, substitution inferences are not allowed within quotation marks, intentional attitude ascriptions, and other opaque contexts. Still, we might set complications akin to these aside. The aspect of Field’s proposal to which I call attention is how he accounts for the cognitive equivalence relation between a truth attribution and the sentence to which instances, I am already simplifying the classical deﬂationist view somewhat. As Anil Gupta (1993, 79n16) points out, “a full explanation of ‘true’ may require not only the T-biconditionals [i. e., instances of the disquotational schema] but also some such claim as ’only sentences are true.”’ For simplicity’s sake, I leave additional assumptions akin to the latter implicit, since they are orthogonal to the discussion below.

58 truth is attributed. Field ((1994) 2001, 106n2) appeals to the “inferential procedures” that makes a person’s substitution inferences correct. Along with Field, there are other philosophers that address how our inferential practices matter to truth talk and its semantic content, including Anil Gupta (1993). As Gupta (1993, 74) conceives an inferential approach, it “uses the idea that the meaning of certain items in our language is speciﬁed by their inferential roles.” Gupta (1993, 72) draws attention to something akin to the disquotational schema, namely, “(T) ‘____’ is true if and only if ____ .” After Gupta draws attention to (T), he (1993, 74) claims that, for an inferential deﬂationist,

The meaning of the truth predicate ... is given by the rules of inference embodied in (T): to infer ’“____” is true’ from ’____’; and, conversely, to infer ’____’ from ’“____” is true’.

While Field ((1994) 2001) defends something akin to an inferential approach, Gupta (1993) simply raises it as an alternative for consideration and criticism. Even so, Gupta’s inferential deflationism is clearly an alternative to the classical deflationist. While a classical deflationist proposes to account for the content of the expression ‘true’ in terms of the disquotational schema and its instances, Gupta’s inferential deflationist looks elsewhere. In particular, when an inferential deflationist seeks to account for the content of the expression ‘true’, he appeals to the rules that govern whether an inference using the expression ‘true’ is correct. Even though these sketches of the inferential alternatives that we find respec- tively in Field ((1994) 2001) and Gupta (1993) are brief, they clarify how an inferential deflationist differs from a classical deflationist. While a classical deflationist claims that instances of the disquotational schema completely account for truth talk’s semantic content, at least disregarding semantic paradoxes, the inferential deflationist calls attention to our inferential practices using truth talk. When a per-

59 son makes an inference using the expression ‘true’, he makes what I call an alethic inference. There are inferential rules that govern whether an alethic inference is correct, including the rules of inference to which Gupta (1993, 74) calls attention. On an inferential alternative to classical deﬂationism, what gives semantic content to truth talk is our alethic inferential practices and the rules that govern them. In addition, the inferential deﬂationist claims that these rule-governed practices underwrite our commitment to not only the disquotational schema, but also its instances—or at least those that do not lead us to paradox-mongering.

Inferential Deﬂationism

Before I consider more carefully how inflationary approaches to truth talk’s semantic content differ from deflationary approaches, I explore how the rules that govern correct inference using truth talk that give rise to a commitment to the disquotational schema and its instances. In studies of logical inference, especially those studies that are modeled after Gerhard Gentzen’s (1969a) work, the extent to which a given inference is correct comes down to whether it conforms to a suitable rule of inference. When an inferential deflationist claims to account for truth talk’s semantic content in terms of the rules that govern our alethic inferences, I recommend that we understand this idea in terms of Gentzen’s (1969a) approach. Once we reflect on the rules that govern our alethic inferences, at least setting worries about semantic paradox aside, it is clear how the latter rules interact with strictly logical inference rules in a fashion that leads to both the disquotational schema and its instances.

60 Alethic Inferences

As a preliminary, let us consider Gentzen’s (1969a) approach with respect to simple inferences using the word ‘and’, at least where ‘and’ functions to coordinate sentences. For argument’s sake, suppose not only that Jones is married, but also that he has children, where these are conceived as two separate assumptions. Given these assumptions, a person might correctly infer that both Jones is married and he has children. Alternatively, suppose that both Jones is married and he has children, where this is conceived as a single assumption. Given this assumption, a person might correctly infer that Jones is married, or a person might correctly infer that he has children. While we judge that these inferences are correct, there is a “Why?” question that we should address, namely, why are these inferences correct?

Conjunction Inferences In view of Gentzen’s (1969a) work, when we seek to account for whether an inference is correct, we look to see whether the inference conforms to the relevant rule or rules. Since the inferences to which I draw attention above conform to the inference rules for conjunction, they are correct inferences. The word ‘and’ is associated with what is commonly known as the rule for and- introduction, as well as the rules for and-elimination. Following Gentzen (1969a), let us treat inference rules in schematic terms.

ΦΨ And-Introduction Φ and Ψ

Whereas the schema above gives us the and-introduction rule, the schemata below give us the two and-elimination rules.

Φ and Ψ Φ and Ψ And-Elimination Φ Ψ

If we follow Gentzen’s model, the fact that a given inference is correct comes down to whether it is an instance of a schema that is associated with an inference rule.

61 It is correct to infer that both Jones is married and he has children from the two claims that I mention above, since the inference is an instance of the schematic rule for and-introduction. Similarly, from the conjunction claim that I mention above, someone might infer that Jones is married, or someone might infer that he has children, since both inferences are instances of an and-elimination rule.

Alethic Inferences Just as we infer claims using the conjunction word ‘and’, so too we infer things using the word ‘true’. While there are a wide array of inference rules that we might associate with the word ‘true’, for simplicity’s sake, I concentrate on the rules that account for what Dummett (2002, 249) dubs “semantic shift” (see Dummett (2002) for further discussion). Let us consider inferences that we might draw from (3.1 a) and (3.1 b).

(3.1) (a) The Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical.

(b) ‘The Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is true.

If the Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical, as Kepler suggests, a person might correctly infer that (3.1 b) ‘The Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is true. In that scenario, there is an inferential transition, that is, we infer (3.1 b) from (3.1 a). Alternatively, given that (3.1 b) ‘The Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is true, someone may correctly infer (3.1 a), namely, the Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical. In that case, there is a different inferential transition: we infer (3.1 a) from (3.1 b). Given Gentzen’s (1969a) model that I sketch above, we may understand whether inferences involving the word ‘true’ are correct in terms of whether those inferences conform to the relevant inference rules. Just as the word ‘and’ is associated with introduction and elimination rules, so too the word ‘true’ is associated

62 with introduction and elimination rules, at least disregarding issues about semantic paradox.

Φ Truth-Introduction hΦi is true

Whereas the above schema represents a truth-introduction rule, the schema below represents a truth-elimination rule.

hΦi is true Truth-Elimination Φ

Introduction and elimination rules akin to these account for whether the inferences associated with semantic shift are correct or incorrect. For instance, when a speaker is committed to the truth-introduction rule, he might correctly infer that (3.1 b) ‘The Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is true on the basis of (3.1 a). Given a similar commitment to the truth-elimination rule, someone might correctly infer (3.1 a) the Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical on the basis of (3.1 b).

Disquotational Schema

As I suggest above, from an inferential deflationist perspective, not only do the rules that govern whether inferences using truth talk are correct completely account for truth talk’s semantic content, but how these rules interact with strictly logical inference rules also account for a commitment to the disquotational schema and its instances. After I consider how the rules that govern alethic inference lead to the disquotational schema and its instances, I consider the differences between deflationary and inflationary approaches to truth talk’s semantic content. Let us consider how a commitment to the above truth-introduction and truth- elimination rules might lead a speaker’s commitment to the disquotational schema and its instances. As a preliminary, we might note that when we accept inference rules akin to these, a sentence that expresses a truth attribution is equivalent to

63 the sentence to which truth is attributed, at least in one sense. Let us say that two sentences are inferentially equivalent when our rules of inference allow us to derive one directly from the other, and vice versa. Once we adopt the above introduction and elimination rules, a sentence to which we attribute truth is inferentially equivalent to the sentence that expresses the truth attribution. In other words, given the truth-introduction rule, we may directly infer that a sentence is true from the sentence itself, and given the truth-elimination rule, we may directly infer a sentence itself from a sentence that attributes truth to the latter sentence. Accordingly, the sentence ‘the Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is inferentially equivalent to a truth attribution, namely, ‘the sentence ’the Earth’s orbit around the Sun is elliptical’ is true’.2 While this takes us fairly close to the centerpiece of classical deﬂationism, namely, the disquotational schema, it does not yet deliver the schema itself. As I indicate above, it is not merely the truth-introduction and truth-elimination rules that deliver the disquotational schema and its instances—it turns on how these rules interact with other strictly logical inference rules. As an illustration, consider how 2As I understand the notion of inferential equivalence, it is different from a notion akin to truth-functional equivalence, though there are obvious parallels. When two sentences are truth- functionally equivalent, there is no truth-value assignments on which the two sentences have different truth-values. Also, we might qualify the claim that a truth attribution and the sentence to which truth is attributed are inferentially equivalent. As Field ((1994) 2001) points out, while we may infer an existential claim from a sentence akin to “the utterance ‘snow is white’ is true,” namely, that some utterance is true, we may not make the same inference from a lone utterance that snow is white. For this reason, when Field discusses his preferred cognitive equivalence relation between an utterance and the complementary truth attribution, he suggests that we relativize that equivalence relation to the relevant utterance’s existence. On Field’s ((1994) 2001) view, a utterance u is cognitively equivalent for a person to the utterance that u is true relative to the existence of u. Even given that we shift attention to sentences rather than utterances, it remains plausible that a truth attribution akin to “the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true” entails an existential claim, namely, that some sentence is true. For reasons akin to Field’s, we might think of the inferential equivalence between a sentence and the complementary truth attribution as relative to the sentence’s existence. In other words, there is an inferential equivalence between a sentence to which we attribute truth and the relevant truth attribution modulo the sentence’s existence. Leaving the relativization to a sentence’s existence implicit, there remains a rough-and-ready inferential equivalence between a truth attribution and the sentence to which truth is attributed.

64 the rules that govern truth-introduction and truth-elimination interact with a biconditional introduction rule. We may infer a biconditional if, as in the schema below, we can infer the left hand sentence when we assume the right hand sentence, and vice versa. (The schematic variable above each inset line represents an assumption.)

Φ Ψ

Biconditional-Introduction Ψ Φ

Φ if and only if Ψ

As is evident, truth-introduction rule gives us one requisite derivation for relevant biconditional, and the truth-elimination rule gives us the other requisite derivation. The illustration suggests how a commitment to introduction and elimination rules for alethic inferences might give rise to a commitment to the disquotational schema and its instances, at least in conjunction with other strictly logical inference rules. While a classical deflationist calls attention to the disquotational schema, or at least that schema’s instances, from the inferential deflationist’s perspective, neither does the disquotational schema account for truth talk’s semantic content, nor does that schema’s instances. After all, from Gentzen’s perspective, there are inference rules that govern whether an given inference is correct or incorrect. The inferential deflationist draws our attention to the rules that govern correct inferences using truth talk. When a speaker has a commitment to these rules and other rules for strictly logical inferences, the deflationist shows how these commitments lead that speaker to the disquotational schema and its instances.

65 As usual, I am setting aside issues about semantic paradox. When we take the semantic paradoxes into consideration, matters are more complicated, especially since we might adopt different commitments regarding strictly logical inferences. However, if something along these lines is correct, a deﬂationist should emphasize not either the disquotational schema, or even that schema’s instances, but the facts about our inferential practices that lead to them, namely, the rules that govern which inferences using truth talk are correct. Of course, while we set the equivalence schema aside above for expository purposes, similar considerations motivate the idea that facts about our inferential practices underwrite our commitment to the equivalence schema, too.

3.3 Inﬂationary Truth

Since we have a clearer view of two alternative approaches to deflationism, namely, the classical deflationist and the inferential deflationist, I turn to the view that truth talk’s content is inflated. As I suggest above, while a deflationist claims that truth talk’s content is similar to a deflated balloon, an inflationist adopts a different analogy. When we say that something is inflated, we indicate that it is swollen or puffed up, at least as if with air. An inflationist treats truth talk’s content as similar to an inflated balloon. Just as an inflated balloon is puffed up with air, so too there are additional factors that puff up truth talk’s semantic content—at least for an inflationist. Given this alternative analogy, an inflationist claims that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” do not give us a complete story about truth talk’s content. Not only do the additional factors that puff up truth talk’s

66 content make inflationism incompatible with deflationism, but they also clarify the centerpiece of the semantic discursivist project, namely, the substance of truth talk. After I review the considerations that might motivate an inflationist conception of truth talk’s content, I consider how it sheds light on substantial truth.

Inﬂationary Truth

While I mention the inflated balloon analogy, let us consider a more careful formulation of the inflationist approach. How we formulate the inflationist approach is relative to the form of deflationism that we favor. While I draw attention to two alternative approaches to deflationism, namely, classical and inferential deflationism, I recommend that we concentrate on inferential deflationism, at least for simplicity’s sake. Following the discussion above, we might regiment an inferential deflationist view along these lines.

Inferential Deﬂationism The expression ‘true’ is inferentially deﬂated with respect to a discourse if and only if the rules that govern whether an alethic inference is correct completely account for the semantic content of the expression ‘true’ with respect to that discourse.

In the discussion above, I put semantic shift into the spotlight, namely, an alethic inference either from a sentence to a truth attribution regarding that sentence (truth- introduction) or from a truth attribution to the sentence it regards (truth-elimination). Given that we set aside the equivalence schema, as well as worries about semantic paradox, as I recommend above, an inferential deﬂationist might focus on the rules that govern semantic shift. Of course, once we consider either the equivalence schema or semantic paradoxes, there are other alethic inferences that are relevant, too. Yet given a more narrow focus, the inferential deﬂationist’s view

67 is that rules akin to truth-introduction and truth-elimination give us the complete story about truth talk’s semantic content. An inflationist approach to truth talk’s content differs from the deflationist’s approach, since the inflationist claims that there is more to truth talk’s semantic content than the rules that govern whether an alethic inference is correct. An inflationist agrees (or might agree) with the deflationist up to a point. In other words, the inflationist might grant that rules akin to truth-introduction and truth-elimination give us a partially correct story about truth talk’s content. Even so, the inflationist maintains that this is only a partially correct story. Given this difference, we might regiment the inflationist approach along different lines.

Inﬂationism The expression ‘true’ is inﬂated with respect to a discourse if and only if the rules that govern whether an alethic inference is correct do not completely account for the semantic content of the expression ‘true’ with respect to that discourse.

Putting the spotlight on the disquotational schema, again, when truth talk is inflated, the inference rules that govern semantic shift do not give us a complete picture of truth talk’s content.3 3While I advocate an inferential approach to deflationism over a classical approach, it is possible to understand the contrast between deflationism and inflationism in terms of the classical approach, too. Let us regiment a classical deflationist approach in the following terms. Classical Deflationism The expression ‘true’ is classically deflated with respect to a discourse if and only if with respect to that discourse, the instances of the disquotational schema (or the instances of the equivalence schema) completely account for the semantic content of the expression ‘true’. Given that we favor classical deflationism, we might treat inflationism in parallel terms. Accord- ingly, when the expression ‘true’ is inflated with respect to a discourse, neither do the instances of the disquotational schema with respect to that discourse completely account for the content of the word ‘true’, nor do the instances of the equivalence schema.

68 Motivating Inﬂationary Truth

Before I turn to the contrast between insubstantial and substantial truth, let us consider the motivation for an inflationist approach to truth talk’s content. As the discussion above shows, the linguistic basis for a deflationist’s account of truth talk’s semantic content is relatively straightforward—at least setting aside the usual worries about semantic paradox. For an inferential deflationist, the basis for truth talk’s content is the rules that govern whether our alethic inferences are correct. An inferential deflationist claims that these rules completely account for truth talk’s content. While a classical deflationist defends a different account, it remains a straightforward matter. For a classical deflationist, the linguistic basis for truth talk’s content is either equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” In other words, a classical deflationist maintains that the instances of either the disquotational or equivalence schema give rise to truth talk’s content. As I mention above, an inflationist agrees (or might agree) with a deflationist up to a point, and, to that extent, an inflationist’s story about truth talk’s content resembles a deflationist’s story. For an inflationist, the inferential deflationist’s rules—or perhaps the classical deflationist’s equivalencies—at least partially account for truth talk’s semantic content. Setting this point of agreement aside, an inflationist claims that there is something more to truth talk’s semantic content. Otherwise, there is no difference between the two positions. Given an inflationist’s claim that truth talk’s content is more puffed up than a deflationist claims, the inflationist owes a story about the factors that contribute to truth talk’s content. In other words, along with the inferential deflationist’s rule and the classical deflationist’s equivalencies, an inflationist must marshal some evidence that confirms that there is something more to truth talk’s content. Inflationists in the semantic

69 discursivist tradition often look to considerations about compositionality to establish that truth talk’s content is somehow puffed up.

Compositionality Considerations

Following Donald Davidson’s ((1967) 2001a) inﬂuential work on theories of meaning and truth, compositionality considerations loom large in research concerning natural language and its semantics (see also Davidson ((1966) 2001b, 3)). When a sentence occurs subsententially within another, relatively more complex sentence, that sentence acquires a compositional semantic role with respect to the complex sentence. The compositional semantic role of a target sentence with respect to a complex sentence is the contribution that the target sentence makes not only to the complex sentence’s semantic content, but also its truth conditions. As an illustration, consider a sentence and its corresponding negation. For instance, the negation of the sentence ‘snow is white’ is ‘it is not the case that snow is white’. Since the sentence ‘snow is white’ occurs subsententially within the negation ‘it is not the case that snow is white’, ‘snow is white’ has a compositional semantic role with respect to its negation. As a result, the semantic content and truth conditions of the negation ‘it is not the case that snow is white’ is partially a function of the sentence that occurs subsententially within it, namely, the sentence ‘snow is white’. Since it is widely accepted that both semantic content and truth conditions are compositional, considerations about compositional semantic role are often treated as a constraint on a satisfactory semantic theory. As Davidson ((1967) 2001a, 17) famously claims,

... a satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words.

70 Of course, even though Davidson’s remark explicitly concerns compositionality considerations with respect to the words that make up a sentence, similar considerations apply to the target sentences that make up a relatively more complex sentence. When a semantic theory for a target discourse is adequate, compositionally speaking, the theory does not simply represent a sentence in the target discourse, its semantic content, and its truth conditions. After all, in order to account for a target sentence’s compositional semantic role, a semantic theory must also represent the complex sentences in which the target sentence occurs subsententially. In particular, it must show how a complex sentence’s semantic content and truth conditions at least partially arise from the target sentence’s semantic content and truth conditions. When an inflationist defends his view about truth talk’s semantic content, he might draw attention to a number of considerations (e. g., see Amour-Garb and Beall (2005)). Yet in the context of the semantic discursivist tradition, inflationists often draw attention to compositionality considerations, especially whether those considerations teach us something about truth talk’s semantic content. As I suggest above, a compositionally adequate semantic theory helps us not only to picture an array of complex sentences in which the target sentence occurs subsententially, but also how their semantic content and truth conditions are a function of the target sentence’s semantic content and truth conditions, at least partially. Yet an adequate account of a sentence’s compositional semantic role might require that we make assumptions about truth talk’s content. In particular, an adequate account might require some assumptions that go beyond a deflationist account of truth talk’s content. In the semantic discursivist tradition, inflationists often seek to show that, given an adequate account of discourse’s compositional semantic role, truth talk’s content goes beyond either the inferential deflationist’s rules or the

71 classical deflationist’s equivalencies (e. g., see Dummett (1991), (1993), and (2002)). Given that an inflationist can establish on the basis of an adequate compositional semantics that truth talk’s content is puffed up, compositionality considerations give the inflationist an advantage over his deflationist rivals.

Choice Negation and Inﬂated Truth

An inflationist claims that our reflections the inferential deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies do not tell us the whole story about truth talk’s semantic content. In the semantic discursivist tradition, when inflationist’s seek to motivate their view about truth talk’s content, they marshal linguistic evidence regarding a discourse’s compositional semantic role. Before I address how an inflationist’s approach to truth talk’s content sheds light on the semantic discursivist’s conception of substantial truth, let me illustrate how compositionality considerations require assumptions about truth talk’s content that go beyond deflationary truth. Let us consider two alternative approaches to sentential negation. Evert W. Beth (1965, 20) attributes these alternatives to Gerrit Mannoury, since Mannoury draws a distinction between keuzenegatie and uitsluitingsnegatie (see also Bas C. van Frassen (1971)). On one approach, a sentence’s negation is true if and only if the negated sentence is false. Following Mannoury’s terminology, we might regiment choice negation in terms of a schema akin to (3.2), where the tilde ‘∼’ is a sentential operator that expresses choice negation.

(3.2) h∼ Φi is true if and only if hΦi is false.

On another approach, a sentence’s negation is true if and only if either the negated sentence is false, or it is somehow indeterminate. Following Mannoury again, we

72 might regiment exclusion negation in terms of a schema akin to (3.3), where the hook ‘¬’ is a sentential operator that expresses exclusion negation.

(3.3) h¬Φi is true if and only if either hΦi is false, or hΦi is indeterminate.

As I suggest above, a target sentence’s compositional semantic role with respect to another, more complex sentence is how the target sentence contributes to the complex sentence’s semantic content and truth conditions. Since sentential negation is one means that a language has for forming complex sentences, choice negation and exclusion negation represent different compositional semantic roles that a sentence might display with respect to their negations. In the semantic discursivist tradition, inflationists draw attention to compositional semantic roles akin to choice negation and exclusion negation to show that truth talk’s semantic content goes beyond either the inferential deflationist’s inference rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies. As an illustration, let us set exclusion negation aside for argument’s sake, and let us focus on choice negation. In other words, let us take for granted that a schema akin to (3.2) is unrestrictedly valid. When choice negation best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role with respect to sentential negation, there is a familiar tension between deflationist approaches to truth talk’s semantic content and alethic indeterminacy. As Dummett famously ((1959) 1978, 5) argues,

In general, it will always be inconsistent to maintain the truth of every instance of ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ while allowing there is a type of sentence which under certain conditions is neither true nor false.

If we adopt a deﬂationist approach to truth talk’s content, we cannot consistently allow that there is a sentence, say, ‘P ’, that is alethically indeterminate, at least where indeterminacy amounts to an assumption akin to (3.4).

73 (3.4) ∼ (hP i is true) and ∼ (hP i is false)

Of course, there might be other approaches to alethic indeterminacy, and a deflationist approach to truth talk’s content might be consistent with these alternatives (e. g., see J C Beall (2003)). However, when alethic indeterminacy amounts to (3.4), alethic indeterminacy conflicts with deflationist approaches. While there are different ways that we might represent the conflict, let us consider that p∼ (hP i is true)q is materially equivalent to p∼ P q, since we derive the latter from the former by properly substituting ‘P ’ for ‘hP i is true’. Since the tilde

‘∼’ expresses choice negation, phP i is falseq materially equivalent to ph∼ P i is trueq. In addition, given either a truth-elimination rule or a suitable instance of the disquotational schema, we can get ph∼ P i is trueq from p∼ P q. As a result, we may get p∼∼ P q from p∼ (hP i is false)q by properly substituting ‘∼ P ’ for ‘hP i is false’. From this line of reasoning, it follows that when we adopt the assumption that a sentence is alethically indeterminate, that is, both p∼ (hP i is true)q and p∼ (hP i is false)q, there is a contradiction. Since p∼ (hP i is true)q is materially equivalent to p∼ P q, and since p∼ (hP i is false)q is materially equivalent to p∼∼ P q, the assumption that both p∼ (hP i is true)q and p∼ (hP i is false)q amounts to the contradiction that both p∼ P q and p∼∼ P q. The argument above elicits a tension between three elements: alethic indeterminacy, deflationism, and choice negation. Given either an inferential deflationist’s rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies, and given that choice negation best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role with respect to negation, we cannot consistently accept that a sentence ‘P ’ is alethically indeterminate, at least where indeterminacy is understood in terms of (3.4). While steps in the argument draw on either the inferential deflationist’s rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies, neither a deflationist nor an inflationist should find these steps

74 problematic. After all, an inflationist agrees (or might agree) with a deflationist up to a point, as I emphasize above. As a result, an inflationist accepts that we may partially understand truth talk’s content in terms of either the inferential deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies. In addition, we stipulated that choice negation best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role with respect to negation, so this assumption is not up for debate either. Given these assumptions, it seems that both a deflationist and an inflationist should grant the relevant conclusion about alethic indeterminacy. Yet inflationists in the semantic discursivist tradition tend to claim that these considerations show that truth talk’s semantic content is more inflated than a deflationist is willing to accept. Consider our conclusion about alethic indeterminacy in the context of Frege’s notion of truth in the scientific sense, especially Frege’s claim that if we are dealing with truth in the scientific sense, the principle of bivalence holds across the board. Following my suggestion above in Chapter 2, we might regiment the principle of bivalence in terms of a schema akin to the following.

Principle of Bivalence Either hΦi is true, or hΦi is false.

For a deflationist, truth talk’s content is neutral with respect to the principle of bivalence. After all, there is nothing more to truth talk’s semantic content other than either the deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies. But given how choice negation interacts with either the inferential deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies, an inflationist points out that there are consequences for alethic indeterminacy, namely, that we cannot consistently assume that there is alethic indeterminacy. However, this consequence amounts to Frege’s insistence that the principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid. Accordingly, an inflationist maintains that our reflections on a sentence’s compositional semantic role

75 with respect to negation establishes something about truth talk’s content, namely, that there is more to truth talk’s semantic content than a deflationist claims. In addition to either the inferential deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies, we learn that that the principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid. As we might expect, this line of reasoning does not successfully establish that truth talk’s content is inflated. After all, the argument is based on a stipulation about compositionality, namely, that choice negation best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role. When we reflect on various discourses in natural language, this is not something that we may stipulate. After all, following Stephen Cole Kleene’s (1967, 332-340) paradigm, some semantic theories assume that every sentence is either true, false, or indeterminate, where we may interpret indeterminacy in a sense that is incompatible with deflationism. Given Kleene’s paradigm, we have an alternative to bivalence, namely, a multi-valued schema akin to (3.5).

(3.5) Either hΦi is true, hΦi is false, or hΦi is indeterminate.

Given a multi-valued schema, we might claim that exclusion negation (as opposed to choice negation) best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role with respect to negation. Not only might a deﬂationist challenge whether choice negation best explains a sentence’s compositional semantic role, but there are other issues that require careful consideration too (e. g., see J C Beall (2003)). Still, what I wish to emphasize is that when we are considering whether a deﬂationist account of truth talk’s content with respect to a given discourse is correct, we need to take into consideration semantic facts about the compositional semantic role of that discourse. When we consider the compositional semantic role of a sentence with respect to negation, the existence of a sentence that is both not true and not false, where ‘not’ expresses choice negation, leads us to contradiction, at least assuming that we can reason

76 from either an inferential deflationist’s rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies. Yet once we reject alethic indeterminacy, we countenance a notion of truth where the principle of bivalence is unrestrictedly valid, and this favors an inflationist account over a deflationist account. While the choice negation illustration does not establish that an inflationist approach to truth talk’s content is correct, it does suggest a general moral about the debate between deflationists and inflationists. When an inflationist claims that his approach has an advantage over his deflationist competitor, it is considerations about compositionality that he brings to the table, and his primary com- plaint is that the inflationist approach to truth talk’s content better accounts for compositionality considerations. In this sense, the extent to which a discourse’s compositional semantic role requires assumptions about truth talk that favor an inflationist approach is a deep point of disagreement between a deflationist and an inflationist. Accordingly, there is no strong motivation to adopt an inflationist thesis about truth talk’s semantic content with respect to a discourse unless an inflationist shows that considerations about that discourse’s compositional semantic role support an inflationist thesis. When a discourse’s compositional semantic role does not require that we make additional assumptions about truth talks content, in particular, assumptions that go beyond deflationary truth, we should favor a deflationist approach to truth talk’s content over an inflationist approach. As a prelude to the discussion below in Part II, a few words about why these compositionality considerations are important to the success of a semantic discursivist approach to discursive objectivity. Since truth talk’s content is not substantial unless it is a least inflated, and since the semantic discursivist utilizes a substantial account of truth talk to account for discursive objectivity, it follows that there is no strong motivation to think semantic discursivist approaches are successful unless

77 a semantic discursivist shows that truth talk is inflated. Given how compositionality considerations are a crucial background motivation for semantic discursivism, we might expect not only that there is an array of compositionality considerations to which semantic discursivists have drawn attention, but also that these considerations give credibility to semantic discursivist claims about inflated truth. Yet as we reflect on the compositional motivation for semantic discursivist claims about inflated truth, we find a discouragingly inconclusive record. Indeed, as I suggest below in Chapter 5, the semantic discursivist record with regard to compositionality is not merely inconclusive—there are cases where an inflationist approach is unmotivated by compositionality considerations. A representative case that I consider in Chapter 5 is Raffman (1994) and Shapiro’s (2006) approach to the truth conditions of vague sentences. While they defend an inflationist approach to the truth conditions of vague sentences, I show how the compositional semantic role of vague discourse does not support their inflationist claims.

3.4 Insubstantial Truth

Given that we have a better picture of the deflationist-inflationist contrast and their respective approaches to truth talk’s semantic content, I turn attention to the vexing notion that is the centerpiece of a semantic discursivist project, namely, substantial truth. The contrast between deflationist and inflationist ways of thinking about truth talk’s content is important to the foundational question about semantic discursivism that I raise above, namely, what qualifies a conception of truth talk’s content as substantial? As I claim above, the deflationist-inflationist contrast gives us some purchase on the operative notion of substantial truth. Following Williams’ (1966) lead, an account of substantial truth talk that incorporates a the-

78 sis that substantial truth is incompatible with deflationism (see the discussion of Williams (1966) in Chapter 2). Since the content of the word ‘true’ is inflated on every substantial conception of truth, the contrast between deflationism and inflationism reveals at least a necessary condition for substantial truth. Truth talk’s semantic content is not substantial with respect to a discourse unless the content of the word ‘true’ is also inflated with respect to that discourse. In other words, a substantial conception of truth talk requires at least that there is more to truth talk’s content than either a classical deflationist’s equivalencies or an inferential deflationist’s rules. Yet this is an incomplete picture of substantial truth, since an inflationist thesis about truth talk’s content does not completely capture the idea that truth talk’s content is substantial. The difficulty is that there are ways of thinking about truth talk’s content where there is more to content than what a deflationist claims, even though the additional content is not substantial in a semantic discursivist’s intended sense. So, while an inflationist thesis is necessary for substantial truth, inflationism is not a sufficient condition for substantial truth. Given this problem, we are likely to wonder about the additional factors that matter for substantial truth. Since it is difficult to completely account for the semantic discursivist’s notion of substantial truth in terms of inflationism, I explore how truth talk’s content could be puffed up in a sense that is relevant for a semantic discursivist’s project. On the account that I article, while there are different ways that truth talk’s content might be inflationist, the additional content to which an inflationist calls attention must give rise to something that resembles Frege’s scientific notion of truth that I addressed in Chapter 2.

79 Alethic Minimalism

Before I explore what factors transform an inflationist thesis about truth talk’s content into a substantial account of truth talk, let us consider why the thesis that truth talk’s content is substantial is not equivalent to the thesis that truth talk’s content is inflated. If we adopt an inflationist thesis, that is, that truth talk’s content goes beyond what a deflationist sanctions, we have a guarantee that truth talk’s content has a shape. Yet since a semantic discursivist seeks to account for discursive objectivity in terms of substantial truth, he needs an account of truth talk’s content with suitable contours. In other words, given the explanatory role that a semantic discursivist expects substantial truth to play, not only should truth talk’s content be puffed up, but it should be puffed up in a fashion that accounts for differences with respect to discursive objectivity. An inflationist thesis alone does not give us a guarantee that truth talk accounts for differences with respect to discursive objectivity. As an illustration, it is useful to consider an account of truth that Crispin Wright (1992) defends as an alternative to classical deflationism.4 Since Wright does not address inferential deflationism that I outline above, I set it aside at this point. Wright (1992) defends a view according to which there is more to truth talk than a classical deflationist sanctions, but—and this is the crucial point—the additional 4There is a wide-ranging body of philosophical literature that addresses Wright’s Truth and Objectivity. See Edwards (1996), Terrance Horgan (e. g., in Horgan (1995) and (1996), Paul Horwich (1996), Frank Jackson (1994), Alexander Miller (2002), Philip Petitt (1996), R. Mark Sainsbury (1996), Stewart Shapiro and William W. Taschek (1996), James Van Cleve (1996), Michael Williams (1995), and Timothy Williamson (e. g., in Williamson (1994a) and (1996)). Several years after the publication of Wright’s Truth and Objectivity (1992), Wright also published Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity (2003), and it contains his previously published responses to discussions of Truth and Objectivity (1992). See also J. A. Burgess (1997), Jon Divers and Alexan- der Miller’s joint work (e.g., in (1994), (1995a), (1995b), and (1999)), Michael Hand (1998), Timothy Kenyon (1999), Max Kölbel (1997), J. L. Kvanvig (1999), Alexander Miller’s other works (e.g., in (1998), (2003a), (2003b), and (2004)), Mark Powell (1998), Michael Smith (1994), Tadeusz Szubka (2000), Folke Tersman (1998), and Paul Tomassi (2006).

80 content is not suitable to account for discursive objectivity. Accordingly, while Wright’s account of truth talk’s semantic content qualifies as an inflationist approach, it does not qualify as a substantial approach to truth talk, or at least it does not qualify without further supplementation. The centerpiece of Wright’s (1992) alethic minimalist approach to truth talk’s content is a claim about the conceptual connections between truth talk’s content and other concepts, including assertion, epistemic justification, and correspondence. Wright talks about these connections in terms of platitudes about assertion, justification, and correspondence. In particular, Wright (1992, 34, authors’s emphasis in italics) claims,

... we should not look for more of a truth predicate than its compliance with a certain set of very general, very intuitive principles—indeed, a set of platitudes. ... If an interpretation of “true” satisﬁes these platitudes, there is, for minimalism, no further, metaphysical question whether it captures a concept worth regarding as truth (see also Wright (1992, 24-25)).

As I claim above, an inflationist account of truth talk’s content is compatible with the deflationist up to a point, and accordingly, Wright includes among these platitudes instances of both the disquotational schema and equivalence schema. How- ever, given Wright’s account is inflationist, the conceptual connections that the other platitudes express go beyond the equivalencies to which these deflationist’s schemata give rise. While the platitudes that I list below give us some idea of what Wright has in mind, the list is not exhaustive (see Wright (2003, 271-272) for an extensive list of platitudes).

Transparency “that to assert is to present as true and, more generally, that any attitude to a proposition is an attitude toward its truth—that to believe, doubt

81 or fear, for example, that p is to believe, doubt, or fear that p is true” (see Wright (2003, 271-272); see also Wright (1992, 23. 34)).

Contrast “a proposition may be true without being justiﬁed, and vice-versa” (see Wright (2003, 271-272)).

Correspondence “for a proposition to be true is for it to correspond to reality, accurately reﬂect how matters stand, ‘tell it like it is’ and so on” (see Wright (2003, 271-272)).

On the account of inflationism that I defend above, the primary motivation for an inflationist account of truth talk’s semantic content is the thesis that there are facts about compositional semantic role that are difficult to square with a classical deflationist’s exclusive attention to equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” From the perspective of Wright’s (1992) minimalist, the semantic content of the word ‘true’ is intimately aligned not merely with the classical deflationist’s equivalencies, but also with platitudes that express conceptual connections between truth, assertion, epistemic justification, and correspondence. Yet just as with other inflationist approaches to truth talk’s content, considerations about compositionality loom large for Wright’s alethic minimalism. The conceptual connections to which the minimalist approach draws our attention are motivated by considerations not only about the word ‘true’, but also its compositional semantic role with respect to the relevant platitudes. In particular, when Wright accounts for truth talk’s semantic content, the linguistic factor that he highlights is the uniform compositional semantic role of truth talk with respect to transparency, contrast, correspondence, and the other platitudes. Wright (1992) maintains that when a linguistic expression expresses a concept of truth, platitudes

82 such as transparency, contrast, and correspondence, remain true if that expression is properly substituted for the word ‘true’ within the platitudes. Yet Wright’s attention to truth-preserving substitution instances is out of place in an account of truth talk’s semantic content unless the compositional semantic role associated with these truth-preserving substitution instances matters for truth talk’s semantic content. Given Wright’s emphasis, the thesis that a linguistic expression expresses a concept of truth is ﬁrmly associated with a suitable compositional semantic role on Wright’s alethic minimalist approach, where the relevant role is given by the minimalist’s platitudes, including those that address transparency, contrast, and correspondence.

Alethic Pluralism

While the alethic minimalist account of truth talk’s content is inflated—due to the fact that it attributes content to truth talk other than what a deflationist sanctions— it give us no guarantee that the additional content associated with truth talk makes it suitable to account for discursive objectivity. The point that the additional content that alethic minimalism attributes to truth talk’s content does not immediately give rise to substantial truth is closely aligned with Wright’s influential defense of alethic pluralism (see Wright (1992, 23n15)). Given Wright’s alternative to classical deflationism, he reasons that what matters is not only the instances of either the disquotational schema or the equivalence schema, but also the compositional semantic role of the expression ‘true’ with respect to the other platitudes, including transparency, contrast, and correspondence. However, Wright claims that alethic minimalism is consistent with the prospects of an alethic pluralism. As Wright (1992, 75, original emphasis) puts the point,

83 ... there is no reason to expect that the minimal platitudes will constrain their interpretation to uniqueness. A variety of predicates may qualify as truth predicates, and we have to be receptive to the possibility that the truth predicates across different regions of discourse may differ in important respects (see also Wright (1992, 23n15)).

A rough-and-ready way to think about alethic pluralism is that there are (or might be) expressions that make the same compositional contribution to the platitudes, even though their semantic contents are different in other respects—that is, respects about which the platitudes are neutral. Wright’s alethic minimalism entails that both expressions are associated with the concept of truth. After all, both expressions are associated with a suitable compositional semantic role. Yet it consistent with alethic minimalism that there are semantic differences between the two expressions, as long as these differences are orthogonal to the truth of the alethic minimalist’s platitudes. As I argue above, alethic minimalism gives rise to an account of truth talk’s content that is inflationist. However, alethic minimalism is compatible with alethic pluralism, and for this reason, there is at least logical space for a scenario where truth talk’s content is inflated, even though the additional content attributed to truth talk is not suitable to account for discursive objectivity. In other words, once we accept an alethic minimalist perspective on truth talk’s semantic content, we must also accept that truth talk’s association with the relevant platitudes somehow puffs up truth talk’s content. While this additional content gives rise to an inflated account of truth talk’s content, alethic minimalism is compatible with the idea that there is not much else to truth talk’s content. Yet if there is not much else to truth talk’s semantic content, truth talk’s semantic content is—or at least might be— unsuited to account for discursive objectivity.

84 Insubstantial Truth

In the discussion above, I draw attention to the distinction between deflationist and inflationist ways of thinking about truth talk’s semantic content. Given there is at least logical space for an inflationist account of truth talk that falls short of a substantial account, I recommend that we contrast a substantial account of truth with an insubstantial account, where an approach to truth talk is insubstantial if and only if that it is inflated but it is somehow unsuited to account for discursive objectivity. This leaves us with a theoretical distinction not merely between deflationism and inflationism, but also between two ways truth talk’s content might be inflated, namely, insubstantial and substantial. Before I tackle exactly what additional platitude-orthogonal content might be suited to play an explanatory role within a semantic discursivist theory—and so, further clarify the operative notion of substantial truth—it is useful to explore an illustration of insubstantial truth. A widely discussed illustration of insubstantial truth is an idealization that Wright defends regarding epistemically justified assertion or belief—the idealization at issue is what he calls “superasertibility” (see Wright (1992) and (2003)). For sake of argument, suppose that Smith believes that coffee is available in the lounge, and imagine that Smith’s belief is epistemically justified at that time, at least given his other beliefs, perceptions, memory, and so on. Of course, as time goes on, Smith acquires new beliefs, perceptions, and memories, and these might change the jus- tificatory status of his belief that coffee is available in the lounge. For example, his becomes unjustified when Smith sees that the coffee pot is empty. However, his belief that coffee is available might remain justified, too. After all, we can imagine that his new beliefs, perceptions, and memories continue to support the belief. Wright (1992) imagines that we might idealize the idea that a belief or assertion is epistemically justified with respect to, say, a collection of beliefs, perceptions,

85 memories, and so forth. The idealization involves a belief or assertion that is not only epistemically justified at a time with respect to a person’s beliefs, perceptions, memories, and so on, but also remains epistemically justified no matter how that person’s beliefs, perceptions, or memories improve over time. When an assertion or belief is ideal in this sense, it is not merely epistemically justified or assertible— Wright says that it is superassertible. As Wright (1986 / 1993, original emphasis) describes the idealization,

Superassertibility is assertibility which is stable under both rescrutiny of the pedigree of what we take to be our existing knowledge and further accretions to that knowledge.

We might regiment Wright’s idealization of epistemic justiﬁcation along these lines (see also Wright (1992, 48)).

Superassertibility It is superassertible that Φ with respect to a information state i if and only if not only is Φ epistemically justiﬁed with respect to i, but no matter how i improves over time, epistemically speaking, Φ is epistemically justiﬁed with respect to that improved information state, where an information state is a set of beliefs, perceptions, memories, and so forth.

Wright defends an alethic minimalist account of truth in terms of superassertibility, and he marshals an impressive array of arguments that the minimalist’s platitudes remain true for some discourses, even once we substitute the word ‘superassertible’ for the word ‘true’ within them (see Wright ((1986) 1993) and (1992)). If Wright’s argument’s are successful, superassertibility is associated with a suitable compositional role with respect to the minimalist’s platitudes, including transparency, contrast, and correspondence. While we might raise questions about whether Wright successfully establishes that superassertibility is associated with a suitable compositional semantic role, at

86 this point I highlight another issue. Even if we grant that we can understand truth talk’s content in terms of superassertibility, given Wright’s minimalist framework, this account of truth talk’s content is unsuited to explain discursive objectivity. As Wright (1992, 61, original emphasis) observes,

... superassertibility is also, in a natural sense, an internal property of the statements of the discourse—a projection, merely, of the standards, whatever they are, which actually inform assertion within the discourse. It supplies no external norm—in a way that truth is classically supposed to do—against which the internal standard might sub specie Dei themselves be measured, and might rate as adequate or inad- equate. In this way, it is metaphysically neutral, and betrays the metaphysical neutrality of the minimal conception of truth which, under the right circumstances, it models.

Wright’s remarks bring into concrete focus the more abstract possibility to which I allude above. When we account for truth talk’s content in terms of superassertibility, we are going beyond a classical deflationist’s account in terms of equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” Yet the inflated content that superassertibility gives to truth talk is simply an idealization based on epistemically justified belief and assertion. Since the content that superassertibility supplies for truth talk “supplies no external norm,” as Wright (1992, 61) says, there is little or no reason to think that this inflated content might account for discursive objectivity.

3.5 Substantial Truth

As I mention in Chapter 2, Frege and Dummett defend approaches where the operative notion of substantial truth should be consistent with the principle of bivalence, or a semantic principle akin to it. Aside from this similarity, there are many differences. Frege’s discussion suggests that discourses that trafﬁc in objec-

87 tivity are semantically associated with truth in his scientific sense. As such, Frege emphasizes the fact that what we accept might be mistaken, that there might be unconsidered truths, and that we do not invent truth—we discover it. Dummett’s writings suggest that what matters is recognition-independent truth, so he focuses on correspondence talk and the fact that, loosely speaking, our best opinions about a subject-matter might be epistemically unjustified. While we should acknowledge the above differences between Frege and Dum- mett, there is another attitude about truth talk’s content that they share. Both Frege and Dummett implicitly assume that the aspect of truth talk’s content that accounts for objectivity—that is, what Williams calls the ‘substance’ of truth talk’s content— is a univocal and discourse-invariant factor, or at least a content-invariant factor. In other words, Frege and Dummett assume that there is a single way to think about substantial truth conditions, and it is a fixed fact whether that content is associated with substantial truth conditions. While they both concede that there is a univocal and content-invariant notion that accounts for objectivity and realism, they disagree about how to understand that notion. Frege focuses on truth in the scientific sense, and Dummett focuses on recognition-independent truth, they both concede that there is one univocal and invariant notion that explains objectivity and realism. I call this assumption monism about substantial truth. The monist approach to substantial truth talk contrasts with a pluralist approach, where there is no assumption that there is a uniform fact about truth talk’s semantic content that accounts for truth talk’s substance. Once we accept the possibility of alethic pluralism, the issue of substantial truth amounts to whether there are platitude-orthogonal aspects of truth talk’s inflated content that not only de- fine, but also clarify the content of debates over discursive objectivity and realism. For this reason, when it comes to evaluating whether an inflationist approach to

88 truth talk’s content is also a substantial conception, Wright (1992, 78, original emphasis) stresses,

The crucial matter for debate ... is, in all cases, whether any of the properties of a local truth predicate additional to the essential minimal set may somehow justiﬁably inspire a realist perspective on the discourse concerned.

Is ’Substance’ a Univocal Notion?

In the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties, the monist assumption about substantial truth comes under attack by philosophers who are otherwise sympathetic to the semantic discursivist perspectives on objectivity that Frege inﬂuenced. In particular, David Wiggins (1980) and Crispin Wright (1992) challenge the idea that discursive objectivity is explained by some univocal notion of substantial truth, say, truth in the scientiﬁc sense or recognition-independent truth, it is also important that these challenges lead to a pluralistic attitude toward substantial truth that is more familiar in contemporary discussions (e. g., see Lynch (2009)). In a pluralist spirit, Wright develops several (more or less) conceptually orthogonal ways truth talk might qualify as substantial. For instance, while Wright grants that recognition-independent truth is substantial, he also argues that some forms of recognition-dependent truth might have other features that qualify it as substantial, too. In the discussion below, I focus the fact that, with respect to different discourses, truth talk exhibits various epistemic and cognitive features. While there are other differences that make a difference to objectivity and realism, at least according to Wright (1992), I do not address them here.

89 What We Can Know

As I discuss above, Wright’s (1992) view is that the platitudes provide the semantic content of truth talk as truth talk, though the platitudes do not give us the whole story. As an illustration, consider that, at least from Wright’s (1992) perspective, truth talk’s connection with concepts such as knowledge and justiﬁed belief varies with respect to different discourses. Consequently, Wright argues that, given what discourse is under discussion, truth talk might be more or less evidentially or epistemically constrained. When Wright explains the view that the expression ‘true’ expresses an evidentially and epistemically constrained concept of truth with respect to some discourses, he often deploys two schemata. First, Wright (1992, 41) calls attention to what I call the evidential constraint schema, namely, “If P is true, then evidence is available that it is so.” I regiment the evidential constraint schema as follows.

Evidential Constraint If it is true that Φ, then it is possible that a person’s belief that Φ is epistemically justiﬁed—at least in epistemically ideal circumstances.

‘Φ’ is a schematic variable that ranges over semantic contents. Wright explains that if every member of a given discourse satisﬁes the evidential constraint schema, there is epistemic justiﬁcation available for every truth, and consequently, the concept of truth is evidentially constrained with respect to that discourse. In addition to evidential constraint, Wright (1992, 58, 75) calls attention to what I call the epistemic constraint schema, namely, “P ↔ P may be known” or “P ↔ P is knowable.” I regiment this schema along the following lines.

Epistemic Constraint Φ if and only if it is possible that a person knows that Φ—at least in epistemically ideal circumstances.

90 Stewart Shapiro (2007a, 339) points out that if we adopt two further assumptions, the two constraints are more or less equivalent. The first assumption is that only truths are knowable. The second assumption is that the relevant notion of epistemic justification is conclusive—that is, justification sufficient for knowledge. Once we adopt these assumptions, it follows that when every member of a discourse satisfies the epistemic constraint schema, the concept of truth is epistemically constrained with respect to that discourse. Consider the illustration due to Dummett that I discuss above in Chapter 2, namely, the sentence ‘some number is both perfect and odd’ (see Dummett ((1970) 2000, 3)). As Dummett observes, there is no proof that it is true, but there is no proof that its negation is true either. Still, it seems plausible that one or the other is true. Even when we imagine that it remains unknown and unjustified no matter how the envisioned possibility is idealized, whether evidentially or epistemically, it seems plausible that one or the other is true. Using Wright’s terminology, we may say that truth talk is not evidentially or epistemically constrained with respect to discourse about perfect and odd numbers. On the supposition that some truths in that discourse are (potentially) unknowable, Wright (1992, 77-78) argues,

we shall be forced to think of the truth of its statements as conferred by factors other than those which determine proper practice within the discourse, and hence as being, in whatever sense is thereby imposed, not of our making but a matter of substantial relationship between language, or thought, and independent states of affairs (see also Wright (1992, 77)).

This is a point of similarity between the approach to objectivity and realism that Wright defends and the view that I attribute to Dummett above in Chapter 2. On Dummett’s view, when a discourse is objective, it is because it is semantically associated with contents whose truth-conditions are recognition-independent. Wright

91 incorporates this insight into the approach to objectivity that he defends. On Wright’s view, if the content that we semantically associate with a discourse has truth-conditions that are recognition-independent, then that discourse is objective. Another connection between Dummett and Wright is the worry that not every discourse is semantically associated with contents with recognition-independent truth-conditions. Wright often appeals to humor discourse as an illustration. Are the predicates ‘funny’ and ‘perfect and odd’ on the same footing, for example? As an illustration, consider the sentence ‘Chris Rock’s stand-up routine is funny’ or some other sentence about what is humorous. We may grant that if that sentence is true, then it is possible that a belief about whether it is true is epistemically justiﬁed—at least in ideal circumstances. According to Wright, we should make analogous concessions for other sentences about humor, too. In other words, there is a true substitution instance of the evidential constraint schema for every member of humor discourse. On Wright’s view, truth talk does not express a recognition- independent notion of truth with respect to humor discourse, and as such, this makes it different in an important way from the notion that truth talk expresses when we evaluate it with respect to discourse about what numbers are both perfect and odd.

Cognitive Fault

While the connections between truth talk and concepts such as knowledge and justiﬁed belief provides some insight into discursive objectivity, Wright maintains that this is not the whole story about discursive objectivity. Indeed, Wright maintains that we might grant that some discourses are objective, even though we grant that truth talk is evidentially or epistemically constrained. Wright’s position stems from his observation that the platitudes are also neutral with respect to the con-

92 nection between truth talk and concepts such as representation and fact. This is a surprise. After all, as I mention above, the correspondence platitude is that for a “statement to be true is for it to correspond to the facts, ‘tell it like it is’, etc.” (see Wright (1992, 82)). So, it explicitly uses both the concept of representation (‘tell it like it is’) and the concept of fact (‘correspond to the facts’). So, a minimalist is thus obliged to maintain there is some conceptual connection between truth, representation, and fact. We can better understand Wright’s neutrality claim if we remember that the realist intends a speciﬁc interpretation of the concepts representation and fact. Not every way to conceive of the concepts representation and fact will suit the realist’s interpretation. Wright’s point is that we are not obliged to adopt the realist’s interpretation simply because the phrases ‘tell it like it is’ or ‘correspond to the facts’ occur in the correspondence platitude. Otherwise stated, according to an alethic minimalist, it is semantically possible that a linguistic expression is a truth expression, even though it displays no conceptual connection with the concept representation or the concept fact—that is, at least as the realist interprets them. Wright (1992, 85) argues,

the key question is whether the relational term [‘corresponds’], and the object term [‘facts’], are, with respect to a particular discourse, properly interpreted in ways which exceed the content conferred on them by the derivability of the platitude from the minimal constraints, and whether they do so in a fashion which gives concrete shape to the imagery of mirroring by which realism pre-theoretically deﬁnes itself.

Wright suggests that truth is substantial if the truth conditions of a semantic content make “blameless disagreement” conceptually impossible. He formulates the issue in terms of what he calls cognitive command, where, for Wright (1992, 144, 163), when a discourse exhibits cognitive command,

93 It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness in the disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. ... any differences of opinion concerning them, when no material vagueness is involved, must be attributable to something worth regarding as a cognitive shortcoming.

In the above formulations, Wright draws on the notion of a cognitive shortcoming to elucidate cognitive command, and in another formulation, he (1992, 92-93) further elaborates that notion.

... it is a priori that differences of opinion arising within it can be satis- factorily explained in terms of “divergent” input, that is, the disputants working on the basis of different information (and hence guilty of igno- rance or error ...), or “unsuitable conditions” (resulting in inattention or distraction and so in inferential error, or oversight of data ...), or “mal- function” (for example, prejudicial assessment of the data, upwards or downwards, or dogma ...) ....

As I discuss below in Chapter 4, when a disagreement is interpersonal, not only do two or more participants accept two different truth-conditional contents, but also those contents are jointly inconsistent. When a discourse displays cognitive command, there is a connection between disagreements over the truth-conditional contents from that discourse and cognitive fault. In particular, Wright’s view is that when cognitive command is operative and a disagreement arises, we can know a priori that someone in that disagreement will or must be ignorant, inattentive, distracted, prejudiced, dogmatic, or otherwise cognitively at fault. As I see the matter, the most likely basis for a priori knowledge that a discourse satisﬁes cognitive command is conceptual necessities to which that discourse’s truth-conditional content gives rise.5 In other words, we recognize that, due to 5Wright’s discussion of cognitive command raises interesting questions, both philosophical and interpretive. As the quotations above illustrate, while Wright frequently emphasizes the epistemic

94 the discourse’s truth-conditional content, there is a conceptually necessary connection between disagreement and cognitive fault. If we take the modal idiom as fundamental over the epistemic and temporal idiom, we may regiment something akin to Wright’s view along the following lines.

Cognitive Command The semantic content and truth conditions of Φ display cognitive command if and only if it is conceptually necessary that, setting vagueness issues aside, if there is a disagreement over whether Φ, someone is cognitively at fault.

When Wright elaborates the notion of cognitive command, he raises a subtle point about quantiﬁcation in the clause ‘someone has a cognitive fault’. As I suggest above, it is consistent with the fact that truth talk exhibits cognitive command with respect to a given discourse, even though truth talk is also evidentially or epistemically constrained with respect to the same discourse. If truth talk is constrained, Wright’s view is that we should interpret the phrase ‘someone’ in something akin to a constructive or intuitionistic fashion—at least when truth for the discourse under consideration is epistemically constrained. As Wright (1992, 163, author’s emphasis, my addition in brackets) claims, given truth is epistemically constrained,

... it cannot be ... that such a [cognitive] shortcoming is indefinitely unidentifiable. For if that were so—if a situation were possible where we could definitely say that one of a pair of disputing theorists was guilty of a cognitive shortcoming, but there was no way of saying who— there could be no identifying the winner (if any) in the dispute either; and that would be as much as to allow that a true theory might be idiom ‘a priori’, he also utilizes both the temporal idiom‘will always’ and the modal idiom ‘must’ to formulate cognitive command (e. g., see also Wright (1992, 147, 149)). Since it is the philosophical issues on which I concentrate, I duck the interpretive questions about Wright’s intended approach, including the connections between the epistemic, temporal, and modal idioms.

95 unrecognizable after all. When truth is regarded as essentially epistemically constrained, Cognitive Command requires the identiﬁability of cognitive shortcoming wherever it occurs.

In order to bring out the constructive or intuitionistic interpretation of the quanti- ﬁer phrase, at least when it is suitable, we may amend the formulation of cognitive command that I prefer along the following lines.

Cognitive Command Under Epistemic Constraint The semantic content and epistemically constrained truth conditions of Φ display cognitive command if and only if it is conceptually necessary that, setting vagueness issues aside, if there is a disagreement over whether Φ, a person can identify at least one spe- ciﬁc participant who has one speciﬁc cognitive fault—at least setting vagueness issues aside.

3.6 Semantic Discursivism

As is evident from the discussion, both above and in Chapter 2, there is not a strictly unified semantic discursivist perspective on objectivity. After all, when we reflect on the semantic discursivist approaches that Frege influenced, including Dummett, Williams, and Wright, we find a family of view-points that more or less resemble one another. Even granting the differences among these approaches, there is a limited range of linguistic factors that are treated as relevant to questions about discursive objectivity. When the philosophers that Frege’s influenced seek to account for a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity, they draw attention to three factors: the discourse that we use to talk about a subject-matter, the semantic contents of the sentences in

96 that discourse, and the truth conditions associated with those contents. From a semantic discursivist perspective, when a discourse is objective, truth talk’s content is substantial with respect to the semantic contents associated with the sentences in that discourse. When a discourse is not objective, truth talk’s content is insubstantial with respect to the semantic contents associated with the sentences in that discourse. As a result, we might regiment the semantic discursivist picture in the following terms.

Semantic Discursivism A discourse is objective if and only if the semantic content of the expression ‘true’ is substantial with respect to that discourse.

As I note above in Chapter 2, the controversy about how we should understand the notion of truth that best accounts for realism and objectivity extends at least as far back as the nineteen sixties, when Williams (1966, 20) raises an influential question. —What is substantial truth like? Following Williams’ lead, I claim that the content of truth talk is not substantial unless it is inflated. As I suggest above, there are different ways to understand the thesis that truth talk’s content is inflated, since there are different ways to understand the parallel thesis that truth talk’s content is deflated. Given inferential deflationism, the idea is that there is more to the content of the expression ‘true’ than is captured by, say, the inference rules that govern semantic shift. While there is a consensus that truth talk is not substantial unless it is inflated, there is little or no consensus about exactly what additional content transforms truth talk from inflated to substantial. Yet even if there is no agreement about the proper positive conception of substantial truth, I survey above several examples that are widely acknowledged. When Frege highlights “truth in a scientific sense,” he (1979, 131-132) espouses a maxim about truth—namely, “what is true is true independent of our recognizing it as such.” I suggest that Frege’s maxim encapsulates a prototype for substantial

97 truth (see the discussion above in Chapter 2). From Frege’s perspective, there are several marks of truth in a scientific sense: human errors, unconsidered truths, discoveries, and the validity of tertium non datur. While subsequent accounts of substantial truth do not conform exactly to Frege’s approach, there is a broad resemblance. Just as Frege’s approach appeals to truth’s autonomy, Dummett’s approach appeals to recognition-independent truth and Wright’s approach appeals to either epistemically-unconstrained or evidentially-unconstrained truth. Just as Frege’s approach appeals to human error, both Williams’ and Wright’s approaches appeal to cognitive faults. Given these resemblances, we might treat the marks of Frege’s scientific notion of truth as a prototype for substantial truth. Accordingly, when truth talk is substantial with respect to a given discourse, truth talk’s content more or less resembles Frege’s scientific notion of truth. When truth talk is insubstantial, it’s content displays few—if any—of the marks Frege’s scientific notion of truth.

3.7 Conclusion

The discussion in Part I addresses not only the historical origins of semantic discursivism in Frege’s writings about scientific and mathematical objectivity, but also foundational questions about how we should understand the approach, especially in view of more recent discussions. The discussion’s twists and turns establish that we should treat semantic discursivism as a thesis about truth talk’s semantic content. In particular, a semantic discursivist claims that truth talk is inflated with respect to an objective discourse. As I note above, this amounts to different claims, given how we understand the thesis that truth talk’s content is deflated. Given classical deflationism, the thesis amounts to the claim that the instances either of

98 the disquotational schema or the equivalence schema do not completely capture the content of the expression ‘true’. Of course, I introduce an alternative to classical deflationism, namely, inferential deflationism. Given this approach, a semantic discursivist claims that, when we are dealing with an objective discourse, we do not capture truth talk’s semantic content if we give exclusive attention to the inference rules that govern semantic shift. Along with the requirement that truth talk’s content is inflated, I suggest that a semantic discursivist defends another requirement on truth talk’s content. A semantic discursivist claims that truth talk’s content is substantial. Since this vexing notion is the centerpiece of a semantic discursivist approach, I devote much attention to how we should understand this claim. I recommend that we use Frege’s scientific notion of truth as a prototype, and, accordingly, I suggest that truth talk’s content is substantial when it displays all or most of the marks of Frege’s scientific notion of truth. However, I also show that semantic discursivists utilize compositionality considerations to motivate claims about substantial truth. In other words, it is a discourse’s compositional semantic role that confirms whether truth talk is substantial with respect to that discourse. While I survey and clarify a semantic discursivist account of objectivity in Part I, I devote the discussion in Part II to critical worries about semantic discursivism, especially the extent to which a substantial account of truth talk accounts for discursive objectivity. These worries motivate an alternative to semantic discursivism that I explore below in Part III.

99 Part II

Against Semantic Discursivism

100 Chapter Four

Disagreement and Cognitive Fault

Put extremely crudely, the point comes to this: when two people come out with inconsistent assertions, there must be something wrong.

—Bernard Williams, “Inconsistency and Realism”

4.1 Introduction

OGNITIVE FAULTS FIGURE in a familiar contrast between disagreements that C differ with respect to objectivity. When the disputed subject-matter is objective, someone must be inattentive, confused, prejudiced, or otherwise cognitively at fault. When it is not objective, the disagreement might be faultless, cognitively speaking. While this connection between objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault is a theme that I address above in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, there are apparent counter-examples that threaten to undermine this contrast, at least as it is often understood. After all, science is a paradigm of objectivity, and it is conceptually possible that no one is cognitively at fault in some scientiﬁc disagreements. I recommend a resolution that is based on the modal idiom, cognitive fault talk,

101 and their interpretation. I claim not only that the modal idiom expresses necessity relative to everyday or commonplace disagreements, but also that cognitive fault talk is subject to several contextual restrictions, including contextually supplied standards of cognitive fault.

4.2 Disagreement and Cognitive Fault

Before I turn to cognitive fault, a few words about disagreement are in order. In an interpersonal disagreement, there are two or more participants at a given time, one accepts one token sentence’s truth-conditional content, the other accepts another token’s content, and one content is inconsistent with the other. I adopt acceptance as a cover term, both for belief and sincere assertion. On a traditional picture, two truth-conditional contents are mutually inconsistent if and only if it is impossible that both contents are true. If a given content itself cannot be true, then it is also impossible both that it and any other content are true. The operative modal notion is something akin to conceptual impossibility. In the relevant sense, it is conceptually impossible that a geometric ﬁgure is both a triangle and a square. While the latter impossibility is obvious enough, others are more difﬁcult to spot. The traditional picture allows that two participants might accept two mutually inconsistent views, even though either one is ignorant about the inconsistency, or they are both ignorant. Along with interpersonal disagreements at a given time, there are disagreements between two participants at different times. There are also individuals who accept mutually inconsistent views, whether at a given time or at different times. Still, there is no loss of generality if the focus is on interpersonal

102 disagreement at a given time, since the traditional picture applies mutatis mutandis to the other cases, too.1 When an interpersonal disagreement arises, we wonder why. An interpersonal disagreement demands an explanation. Even so, our explanatory expectations are not uniform. As I mention above, cognitive faults ﬁgure in a familiar contrast between disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity. When a disagreement arises over an objective matter, we expect that someone must be inattentive, prejudiced, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. As Bernard Williams (1966, 12) notes, these are scenarios where, “when two people come out with inconsistent assertions, there must be something wrong.” We expect poor reasoning, muddled thought, insufﬁcient attention, or even wishful thinking. Yet when a disagreement arises over an issue that is not objective, we expect that someone might have a cognitive fault, but we equally allow for a scenario where no one is at fault. In other words, we allow for a possibility where, cognitively speaking, the disagreement is faultless. When it comes to disagreement and its varieties, cognitive faults thus give rise to a difference that demands an explanation.

A Subjective Use of ’For Me’

While the explanatory difference with respect to cognitive fault is familiar, there is a commonplace use of the expression ‘for me’ that gives it credibility, namely, where a speaker intends ‘for me’ to allude to desires, feelings, moods, and other 1As I discuss below in Chapter 6, Robert Stalnaker (2002) uses the term ‘acceptance’ in a slightly broader sense than the use that I describe above (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). There are some conﬂicting attitudes or speech acts that the traditional picture does not cover, even though we might say these cases involve a disagreement, including what Charles Leslie Stevenson (1944) calls a “disagreement in attitude.” Even setting aside disagreements in attitude and similar con- ﬂicts, John MacFarlane (2007) calls attention to several cases that do not qualify as disagreements on the traditional account, even though there is an inclination to say that his cases involve a disagreement. However, I concentrate on a traditional account in the discussion below, since a broader alternative that covers both attitudinal disagreements and MacFarlane’s cases introduce additional complexities that are orthogonal to my goals.

103 mental states like that. I call this a subjective use of the expression ‘for me’. Of course, the phrase has other uses, too. For instance, we use it to convey the strength of our conviction. Still, I concentrate on the subjective use in the discussion below. As a starting point, consider Peter Lasersohn’s (2005, 643) example: “Roller coasters are fun.” Imagine an interpersonal disagreement about this claim, and for argument’s sake, assume that it conforms to the traditional picture. In other words, one participant accepts what the token sentence ‘roller coasters are fun’ expresses, another accepts what ‘roller coasters are not fun’ expresses, and the two expressed contents are mutually inconsistent. In addition, suppose that there is back and forth banter about whether roller coasters are fun, and then someone asserts (4.1).

(4.1) Roller coasters are fun for me.

It is not too difﬁcult to interpret the assertion as deploying the expression ‘for me’ in the subjective sense. The speaker indicates that roller coasters are fun, at least given his desires, feelings, or moods. The subjective use of ‘for me’ in illustration (4.1) provides little—and perhaps no—comfort to an interlocutor who protests that it is an unsatisfactory explanation of the disagreement at hand. After all, it might be a ﬂawed explanation. We might imagine the interlocutor raises a question, “Wait, don’t you get scared when you ride roller coasters? How is that fun for you?” Even granting that an argument might arise over the explanation’s success, interlocutors do not protest that the assertion is infelicitous. There is nothing amiss about a speaker putting it forward as an explanation. Other things being equal, a speaker may felicitously assert the sentence ‘roller coasters are fun for me’, where he intends the expression ‘for me’ to refer to his desires, feelings, or moods. While we grant that, when used subjectively, ‘for me’ is felicitous in illustration (4.1), there are other scenarios where the subjective use appears infelicitous. Con-

104 sider a disagreement between physicists over whether the universe is indeﬁnitely expanding, and for sake of argument, suppose that it conforms to the traditional picture of interpersonal disagreement. Imagine that each physicist in the disagreement addresses some supporting evidence, and then one physicist asserts (4.2).

(4.2) The universe is expanding indeﬁnitely for me.

When we reflect on how the physicist might use ‘for me’ in the above assertion, it is tempting to interpret it in something other than the subjective sense. We might say that the physicist uses ‘for me’ to emphasize either a conviction about the expanding universe, or the conviction’s strength. Setting the above temptation aside, consider a scenario where as a matter of stipulation, in the illustration (4.2) ‘the universe is expanding indefinitely for me’, the phrase ‘for me’ is used in a subjective sense. While everyone might agree that, when used subjectively, the use of ‘for me’ in illustration (4.2) is infelicitous, we should still clarify why it feels infelicitous. The feeling stems from a conflict between two issues. On the one hand, we assume that, in asserting it, the physicist aims to convey a true belief, and on the other hand, it is difficult to see what true belief the physicist aims to convey with it. When a physicist uses ‘for me’ in the subjective sense, what he intends to indicate is that, given his desires, feelings, and moods, the universe is expanding indefinitely. Setting concerns about vagueness aside, whatever is the referent of the expression ‘the universe’, there is little or no inclination to say that it is an item that hinges on the physicist’s subjective mental states. The same goes for the extension of the expression ‘expands indefinitely’. Since these considerations suggest that illustration (4.2) is either false or otherwise semantically deviant if a speaker uses ‘for me’ in the subjective sense, a competent speaker would not use it to express a truth. Since the audience assumes that the physicist is competent, they infer

105 that he or she aims to convey some other truth. We stipulated that the assertion is used in the subjective sense, so this rules out the non-subjective interpretations. The looming conclusion is that, other things being equal, a speaker may not felicitously assert ‘the universe is expanding indeﬁnitely for me’, where the expression ‘for me’ refers to the speaker’s desires, feelings, moods, or similar mental states. The conclusion that we should draw from the above considerations is that the phrase ‘for me’ is not invariably felicitous, at least in the subjective sense. While it is acceptable in disagreements over whether roller coasters are fun, it is unacceptable in disagreements over whether the universe expands indeﬁnitely. Our felicity judgments lend credibility to the idea that I addressed above, namely, there are differences with respect to cognitive fault that demand an explanation. When ‘for me’ is out of place, at least in the subjective sense, we expect that someone in a disagreement must exhibit prejudice, confusion, or another fault like that. When a subjective ‘for me’ is acceptable, our expectations are different. Of course, while we expect that someone in a disagreement might have a cognitive fault, we equally admit there is a possibility where no one is at fault, cognitively speaking.2

4.3 Disagreement, Cognitive Fault, and Cognitive

Command

I draw attention above in Section 4.1 to the fact that, when we consider our explanatory expectations in disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity, we ﬁnd a difference with respect to cognitive fault. Our judgments about the sub- 2I address Lasersohn’s roller coaster example again in Chapter 5. While remarks above about the semantics of the subjective use of ‘for me’ are largely informal, I discuss Lasersohn’s formal semantics in more detail in Chapter 5. I offer an extended argument that propositional attitudes akin to ‘Jones ﬁnds Smith boring’ should be interpreted in something akin to a subjective sense, too.

106 jective ‘for me’ and its felicity corroborate that our explanatory expectations vary from case to case, but those judgments alone do not account for that variation. What factors account for these systematic patterns of expectation regarding objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault? The family of views on which I concentrate seeks to account for our different explanatory expectations in terms of truth-conditional content. For many philosophers, including Bernard Williams (1966), Crispin Wright (e. g., see (1992), (2002), and (2006)), and Max Köbel (e. g., see (2002) and (2003)), the culprit is the fact that the truth-conditional content of what we accept might be more or less autonomous from our subjective mental lives. What gives rise to the systematic patterns of expectation regarding whether cognitive fault must explain a disagreement—or merely might do so—is the contents at issue in that disagreement and their truth conditions, especially with respect to whether they incorporate our desires, feelings, and moods. Some truth-conditional contents are strictly cognitive. They incorporate few factors—if any at all—that demand that we attend to our subjective mental lives. Other contents are not strictly cognitive. They somehow incorporate our desires, feelings, moods, and similar mental states. Given the truism that we should accept what is true, the family of views under discussion entails that what we should accept might be more or less autonomous from our subjective mental lives. When the content at issue in a disagreement is strictly cognitive, what everyone should accept rarely—and perhaps never—turns on desires, feelings, or moods, so we expect that cognitive fault must be what explains that disagreement. However, when the disagreement is over a content that is not strictly cognitive, subjective mental states matter (or might matter) to what participants ought to accept as true. In terms of the division of labor, we put our subjective mental states to explanatory work. When we expand the range of ex-

107 planatory factors, we also make room for a possibility where, cognitively speaking, no one in a disagreement is at fault. In that possibility, we look not for bias, forgetfulness, or inattention, but for idiosyncratic desire, warped sensibility, or bad mood.

Cognitive Command

While there are different ways to ﬂesh out how factors about semantic content and truth conditions give rise to the explanatory disparity that I address above in Section 4.2, I begin with an approach that is due to Crispin Wright. As I show above in Chapter 3, Wright formulates the issue in terms of what he calls cognitive command, where for Wright (1992, 144, 163), when a discourse exhibits cognitive command,

It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vagueness in the disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. ... any differences of opinion concerning them, when no material vagueness is involved, must be attributable to something worth regarding as a cognitive shortcoming.

When a discourse displays cognitive command, there is a connection between interpersonal disagreements over the truth conditional contents from that discourse and cognitive fault. As I propose above in Chapter 3, we may regiment something akin to Wright’s view along the following lines.

Cognitive Command The semantic content and truth conditions of Φ display cognitive command if and only if it is conceptually necessary that, setting vagueness issues aside, if there is an interpersonal disagreement over whether Φ, someone is cognitively at fault.

108 The Challenge of Scientiﬁc Disagreement

While the cognitive command approach is designed to account for the systematic patterns of expectation that I describe above in Section 4.1, namely, our expectations regarding objectivity, disagreement, and cognitive fault, it is doubtful whether the account ultimately succeeds. Science is a paradigm of not only objectivity, but also strictly cognitive content. Even so, either there are or might be scientiﬁc disagreements where no one must be cognitively at fault. If there are conceptually possible disagreements over strictly cognitive contents where no one is cognitively at fault, the cognitive command approach does not ultimately vindi- cate our explanatory expectations regarding disagreement and objectivity. Before I consider an alternative to the cognitive command approach that I sketch below in Section 4.4, I explore a challenge that scientiﬁc disagreements pose for the cognitive command approach to strictly cognitive content and truth conditions.

Cognitive Immodesty

If we say that everyone has a cognitive fault in a cognitively modest disagreement, then, in a contrasting sense, we may say that no one has a cognitive fault in a cognitively immodest disagreement. On a cognitive command approach, it is conceptually impossible that a disagreement over strictly cognitive content is cognitively immodest, at least setting aside those that arise from vagueness. A cognitive command approach utilizes this conceptual impossibility to account for our expectation that someone must be cognitively at fault in a disagreement over a strictly cognitive content. However, a worry that arises is that cognitively immodest disagreements are conceptually possible, even when we are considering disagreements are over strictly cognitive contents.

109 Stewart Shapiro discusses some scenarios where it seems plausible to claim not only that there is an interpersonal disagreement over a strictly cognitive content, but also that the disagreement is cognitively immodest (e. g., see Shapiro (2007b, 356) and Shapiro (forthcoming)). The scenarios are drawn from ideas that are familiar from W. V.O. Quine, especially Quinean views about how our scientific theories are underdetermined by scientific data. When there is a disagreement about a scientific issue, it might be that the participants are epistemically justified in accepting different, mutually inconsistent scientific theories even though the evidence either will not or cannot improve. In the terminology that I adopt, Shapiro assumes that while a scientific disagreement’s truth-conditional content is strictly cognitive, the available evidence underdetermines what scientific views we should accept. Given the wiggle-room of underdetermination, it is a conceptual possibility that a cognitively immodest disagreement arises over a strictly cognitive content. As an illustration, Shapiro (2007b, 356) offers that following scenario.

Suppose, for the sake of argument (at least), that ordinary science exhibits something in the neighborhood of Quine’s underdetermination of theory by data. So it is possible for two scientists to reach reflective equilibrium, but come to conflicting conclusions, because they made different tradeoffs in the process. Suppose that one of them, William, says P , and the other, Karen, says ¬P – and assume that each attaches the same meaning to P . Assume also that no further available data will knock either of them out of reflective equilibrium, and thus break the tie. In other words, we assume that the overall epistemic situation will not improve, and perhaps cannot improve. Their theories are empirically equivalent, and score as rough equals on overall theory assessment. On the combination of assumptions in play here, there may be nothing to fault either scientist. Each has followed the proper methodology flawlessly, and so each displays no cognitive shortcoming – or so it seems. They just come to different conclusions using the same, fallible methods.

110 Consider an interpersonal disagreement between two scientists over a scientific issue: one scientist accepts a given truth-conditional content, the other accepts another content, and the two contents are mutually inconsistent. Shapiro imagines that the disagreement takes place in epistemically special circumstances—what Shapiro (2007b, 356) calls “reflective equilibrium.” While the scientists are epistemically justified in accepting their respective scientific views, the justification for these views will not improve, and perhaps it cannot improve. While he takes for granted that scientific disagreements are strictly cognitive, Shapiro observes that no one must be cognitively wrong. Shapiro (2007b, 356, my additions in brackets) reasons that in a scientific disagreement “the foregoing admittedly simplified assumptions are possible,” so “Blameless disagreement [in science] is possible.” Like Shapiro, I presume that, if any content is strictly cognitive in the relevant sense, surely a scientific theory’s truth-conditional content is strictly cognitive— setting aside the usual considerations about vagueness. Moreover, even granting that it is controversial exactly what wiggle-room underdetermination allows in our epistemic situation, an account of why we expect cognitive fault must—or merely might—explain a disagreement should be consistent with underdetermination. Yet if scientific disagreement might be cognitively blameless, as Shapiro urges, there is pressure to think that our expectations regarding cognitive fault in disagreements over strictly cognitive matters are somehow problematic. After all, we expect that there must be fault, even when there might be none. Yet given the considerations about the subjective use of ‘for me’ that I address above in Section 4.1, there are independent reasons to resist a conclusion that there is no explanatory difference between disagreements. It is still infelicitous to utilize ‘for me’ in the subjective sense in a scientific disagreement, even when the disagreement occurs in circumstances where the epistemic justification will not or

111 cannot improve. When two scientists reach reﬂective equilibrium, there is little or no reason to expect that, in a subjective sense, one scientist will assert, say, “the universe is expanding indeﬁnitely for me,” and the other will assert, “Well, for me, it doesn’t.” While cognitively faultless disagreements that arise from underdetermination cast doubt on the cognitive command approach, it is questionable whether they cast doubt on the disparity phenomenon itself.

4.4 Quotidian Disagreement and Cognitive Fault

I return to a question that I raise at the outset of Section 4.3, namely, what semantic and truth-conditional factors account for the differences between disagreements with respect to objectivity? I develop and defend a view that differs from the cognitive command approach in terms of how we interpret not only the modal idiom, but also cognitive fault talk. While cognitive command deals with conceptual necessity, there is another modality that better accounts for the differences that are under discussion. The modality is roughly akin to “someone must be cognitively wrong in view of a commonplace disagreement.” Along with the attention that I give to the modal idiom, I highlight below in Section 4.5 the fact that cognitive fault talk is sensitive to germane facts about the context of utterance, including the standards of cognitive fault that are contextually supplied.

Modal Idioms

Before I turn to cognitive fault talk, consider how we should interpret the modal idiom in terms of which we are characterizing our explanatory expectations regarding disagreement, namely, the expectation that someone must be cognitively at fault. In particular, I concentrate on two semantic features of the modal idiom

112 in natural language that Angelika Kratzer emphasizes (e. g., see Kratzer (1977), (1991a), and (1991b)). An advantage of the interpretation of the modal idiom that I defend over the cognitive command approach is that we may consistently claim that, in a scientiﬁc disagreement, something must be cognitively wrong with someone, even though it remains conceptually possible that no one in the disagreement is cognitively at fault.

Circumstantiality

When we evaluate the truth of a sentence that contains a modal expression, the circumstances relative to which we evaluate that sentence’s truth are often limited. For sake of illustration, consider Kratzer’s example (1991a, 346).

Suppose I acquire a piece of land in a far away country and discover that the soil and climate are very much like at home, where hydrangeas prosper everywhere. Since hydrangeas are my favorite plants, I wonder whether they would grow in this place and inquire about it.

Given the above context of utterance, Kratzer considers illustration (4.3), how we should interpret it, and how we should evaluate its truth.

(4.3) Hydrangeas can grow here.

As Kratzer points out, given the context of utterance, the truth of illustration (4.3) ‘hydrangeas can grow here’ just turns on the far away country’s climate, soil, hydrangeas, and other factors like that. If the far away country’s soil differed from the soil at home, where hydrangeas prosper, the sentence ‘hydrangea can grow here’ might turn out false. Every other country’s climate, soil, and so forth are irrelevant to the sentence’s truth or falsity. As such, example (4.3) illustrates how some modal sentences and their truth-conditions require that we attend to the possibilities and necessities to which a limited range of circumstances give rise. Given how

113 we interpret these modal sentences and their truth-conditions, I call the semantic feature at at issue circumstantial modality.

Gradation

Along with circumstantial modality, there is a second semantic feature of some modal idioms that merits our attention. Consider another illustration (inspired by Kratzer (1991a, 644-645)). Jones is murdered on his way home. The police investigator does not know who is Jones’ murderer, but he draws a conclusion based on the evidence available to him. There is evidence that while Smith never really liked Jones, Brown and Jones got along ﬁne. The police investigator thus concludes that (4.4).

(4.4) Smith must be the murderer.

The murderer illustration deals with evidence that is available to the police inspec- tor, so consider our inclination to accept that the police investigator’s conclusion (4.4) is true, even though the available evidence is consistent with many circumstances in which Smith is not the murderer. For example, the available evidence is consistent with the slight possibility that Brown is the murderer. It is also consistent with other more far-fetched possibilities: for instance, that Jones’ murderer was someone from another town, from another country, from another continent, or even from another planet. Even so, there is nothing faulty about our inclination to accept that the police investigator’s conclusion is true. Kratzer argues that what makes the investigator’s conclusion acceptable is due to the fact that the scenarios under consideration in which Smith is not the murderer are far-fetched. In Kratzer’s words, these scenarios do not “correspond to the normal course of events” (1991a, 645, author’s emphasis). When we evaluate

114 whether the investigator’s conclusion is true, what matters is not simply the scenarios that are consistent with the available evidence, but also how closely those scenarios resemble the normal course of events. What example (4.4) illustrates is that, for some modal sentences, their truth-conditions turn not merely on some limited domain of circumstances, but also how closely those circumstances resemble the normal course of events. In Kratzer’s view, we must look not only to the scenarios that are consistent with the investigator’s evidence, but also look at how closely those scenarios resemble the normal course of events. We interpret those scenarios that bear little or no resemblance to the normal course of events as truth conditionally irrelevant. Given that, when we interpret some modal sentences, similarity to the normal course of events plays a crucial role in our interpretation, we may call the second semantic feature gradation with respect to the normal course of events.

Modality and Quotidian Disagreement

The above excursion into the modal idiom helps us account for the differences that I discuss above in Section 4.1, namely, that our explanatory expectations about cognitive fault are not uniform. When two scientists disagree over whether the universe is expanding indeﬁnitely, we expect that someone must be dogmatic, biased, or something like that. However, when there is a disagreement in the amusement park over whether roller coasters are fun, we expect someone might be dogmatic, confused, etc. , but we do not expect that someone must be cognitively at fault. The operative modality in our expectations about disagreement displays both circumstantiality and gradation. In the expectation that someone must be forgetful, prejudiced, or otherwise cognitively faulty, the modal idiom ‘must’ expresses necessity with respect to in-

115 terpersonal disagreements that arise in normal, everyday, commonplace, or similar circumstances. The truth-conditional content of the modal idiom ‘must’ requires attention to a limited domain of circumstances, namely, those in which there is interpersonal disagreement. Since the truth-conditional content does not depend on every conceptually possible circumstance, it is unlike the modality operative in cognitive command, namely, conceptual necessity. Yet what matters to the truth- conditional content of the modal idiom ‘must’ is not every circumstance where there is interpersonal disagreement, but those that arise in the normal course of events. Adopting a slogan, we might say that the modality is necessity with respect to quotidian disagreement. The basis for the differences among disagreements is thus a connection between cognitive fault and quotidian disagreement. In quotidian disagreements over matters that are strictly cognitive, someone in the disagreement is cognitively at fault. Quotidian disagreements over matters that are not strictly cognitive are different. While there is cognitive fault in some quotidian disagreements, there are other cases where no one is at fault. When we interpret the modality at issue in our explanatory expectations as both circumstantial and graded with respect to quotidian disagreement, the interpretation makes it sensible for our explanatory expectations to vary from case to case in this systematic fashion. In view of quotidian interpersonal disagreements over, say, whether the universe is expanding indeﬁnitely, someone must be dogmatic, forgetful, or otherwise cognitively at fault. In view of quotidian disagreements over, say, whether roller coasters are fun, someone might be cognitively at fault. However, there is little or no inclination to say that someone must be cognitively at fault. The circumstantiality and gradation of the modality at issue vindicates the differences that we expect between disagreements.

116 Are Cognitively Immodest Disagreements Still Problematic?

I discuss above in Section 4.3 the conceptual possibility that some scientific disagreements are cognitively immodest. In particular, I draw attention to a conceptual possibility in which there is an interpersonal disagreement between two scientists in reflective equilibrium. In that scenario, each scientist has an epistemically justified view, these respective justifications will not improve, and perhaps, they cannot improve. While these scenarios are apparent counter-examples to the cognitive command approach, they are consistent with the alternative approach that I defend above. For sake of comparison, let us revisit illustration (4.4) ‘Smith must be the murderer’. Given that circumstantiality and gradation are operative in the relevant modality, the police investigator truly asserts, “Smith must be the murderer,” even in circumstances where an alien from another planet actually murdered Jones. As I show above, the only circumstances regarding Smith’s murder that are truth- conditionally relevant are circumstances that are in the normal course of events. Since the circumstance in which an alien travels to Earth and kills Jones is far- fetched, it is a truth conditionally irrelevant circumstance—even when it is actually true. Just as the investigator truly asserts, “Jones must be the murderer,” in the above scenario, so too we may truly assert, “Someone must have a cognitive fault,” even when a scientific disagreement in reflective equilibrium is (or might be) cognitively immodest. The reason is that, as in the alien murderer scenario, cognitively immodest scientific disagreements in reflective equilibrium are far-fetched. When disagreements occur in the normal course of events, the participants op- erate under epistemic and doxastic limitations, and these limitations bring out the fact that scientific disagreements in reflective equilibrium are far-fetched. In the normal course of events, two individuals might have good enough epistemic jus-

117 tification for their respective views. Nevertheless, it is at least possible that a person’s justification could improve, and perhaps, it will so improve. Disagreement is quotidian only under something akin to these epistemic-cum-doxastic circumstances. The upshot is that scientific disagreements that arise in reflective equilibrium are not quotidian.

4.5 Cognitive Modesty and Cognitive Fault Talk

I defend an alternative account of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions in Section 4.4, and I claim that it accounts for variations in our explanatory expectations regarding disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity. We might schematically regiment the alternative approach along these lines.

Quotidian Disagreement Approach The semantic content and truth conditions of Φ are strictly cognitive if and only if in view of quotidian disagreements over Φ, someone must be cognitively at fault, at least setting issues about vagueness aside.

An advantage of the above alternative over the cognitive command approach is that it is consistent with the conceptual possibility that some scientiﬁc disagreements are cognitively immodest. Yet even granting that this is an advantage, it might remain doubtful whether the alternative approach vindicates the differences in our expectations about cognitive fault. In order to clarify a potential problem for my own account, recall the distinction between cognitively modest and immodest disagreements to which I allude in Section 4.3. When a disagreement is cognitively modest, everyone has some cognitive fault. Yet something is cognitively wrong with every human, both in the actual world and worlds similar to it. After all, humans are faulty creatures, in the cognitive sense. It follows that, in every ac-

118 tual quotidian disagreement, every participant is dogmatic, irrational, or somehow cognitively faulty. However, if everyone in a quotidian disagreement has a cognitive fault, our explanatory expectations should be similar even across disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity, at least given the interpretation of the modal idiom that I recommend. For example, consider quotidian disagreements over whether roller coasters are fun, where the disagreement is over an issue that is not objective. Since everyone has a cognitive fault, we should conclude that, in the relevant sense, someone must have a cognitive fault. In general, we should expect that someone must have a cognitive fault—at least in view of a quotidian disagreement. The fact that everyone has some cognitive fault in quotidian disagreements raises questions about how we should interpret clauses akin to ‘someone has a cognitive fault’, especially the quantiﬁer phrase and cognitive fault talk. As I mention above in Chapter 3, when Wright elaborates the notion of cognitive command, he raises a subtle point about quantiﬁcation in the clause ‘someone has a cognitive fault’. His point turns on another issue that I mention above in Chapter 3. For this discussion, what matters is the consideration that, when truth is epistemically constrained, then something akin the following schema holds for the relevant discourse and the sentences within it.

Epistemic Constraint Φ if and only if it is knowable that Φ.

As Wright (1992, 163, author’s emphasis, my addition in brackets) claims, given truth is epistemically constrained,

119 and that would be as much as to allow that a true theory might be unrecognizable after all. When truth is regarded as essentially epistemically constrained, Cognitive Command requires the identiﬁability of cognitive shortcoming wherever it occurs.

When we are dealing with an epistemically constrained discourse, Wright thus recommends that we interpret the phrase ‘someone’ in a constructive or an intuitionistic fashion. In order to bring out the relevant interpretation of the quantiﬁer phrase, at least when it is suitable, I recommend above in Chapter 3 that we regiment the amended formulation of cognitive command as follows.

Cognitive Command Under Epistemic Constraint An epistemically constrained discourse displays cognitive command if and only if it is conceptually necessary that, vagueness considerations aside, if there is interpersonal disagreement, a person can identify at least one speciﬁc participant who has one spe- ciﬁc cognitive fault.

Nevertheless, even if we adopted something akin to a constructive or intuitionist interpretation of the quantifier phrase in ‘someone must have a cognitive fault’, this does not resolve the problem that quotidian disagreement raises. For arguments sake, suppose not only that everyone in a quotidian disagreement has some cognitive fault, but also that a person could identify one specific fault in each specific participant. If we adopt this assumption, we should still expect that, in the relevant sense, someone must have a cognitive fault, since every participant has an identifiable fault.

Cognitive Fault Talk in Context

The problem of cognitive modesty is that, in an quotidian disagreement, everyone has some cognitive fault. Given the modality that I recommend that we adopt

120 above in Section 4.4, it follows that someone in a quotidian disagreement must have a cognitive fault—no matter what is the dispute’s subject-matter. Once we consider cognitive fault talk’s context sensitive features, it is easier to see why this is unproblematic. In particular, I call attention to the fact that a cognitive fault predicate’s extension depends on a standard of fault, and it is the context of utterance that supplies the standard. In addition, there is a contextual restriction to cognitive faults that explain the fact of quotidian disagreement.

Cognitive Standards

As I suggest above, whether a person is in a cognitive fault predicate’s extension at a circumstance of evaluation depends on how that person stands with respect to a standard of cognitive fault, where this standard is supplied by the context of utterance. For illustration, consider a scenario where Smith regularly forgets his wedding anniversary. Imagine that Smith’s wife asserts (4.5) ‘Smith is forgetful’ to a friend.

(4.5) Smith is forgetful.

Given the utterance context, the fact that Smith regularly forgets his wedding anniversary sufﬁces to put Smith into the extension of the predicate ‘forgetful’. After all, it is likely that the wife intends that the comparison class is the average hus- band who regularly remembers his wedding anniversary. So, when Smith’s wife utters ‘Smith is forgetful’, her assertion is true. However, imagine another utterance context where one nurse asserts (4.5) ‘Smith is forgetful’ to another nurse. Suppose that while the facts about Smith are the same—i. e., he regularly forgets his anniversary—the utterance context supplies a different standard, namely, a standard ﬁxed by comparison to the forgetfulness of

121 the average Alzheimer’s patient. Even given that Smith regularly forgets his wedding anniversary, Smith is not as forgetful as the average Alzheimer’s patient, and so, Smith is not in the extension of the predicate ‘forgetful’. When the nurse utters ‘Smith is forgetful’, the nurse’s assertion is false. The approach to cognitive fault predicates that I sketch above is analogous to the standard approach to paradigmatic gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘rich’, and ‘expensive’. On the standard view, whether a given object is in a gradable adjective’s extension at a given circumstance of evaluation depends on how that object stands with respect to a given standard, for instance, a standard of height for ‘tall’, of wealth for ‘rich’, and of cost for‘expensive’. Moreover, the a context of utterance supplies the standard relative to which the adjective’s extension is fixed at a circumstance of evaluation. When a gradable adjective is conjoined with a relativizing modifier such as ‘for an eight year old’, the utterance context explicitly supplies the standard. In other cases, the standard is implicitly supplied. I claim that cognitive fault predicates and gradable adjectives are similar, and given their similarity, there is an independent motivation for the approach for cognitive fault predicates that I sketch above. As Jeffrey King (2006, 1036) notes, gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘short’, ‘rich’, and ‘expensive’ exhibit three widely acknowledged linguistic features, and cognitive fault predicates display similar features. One linguistic feature of gradable adjectives is that when we change the context of utterance, a gradable adjective’s extension changes, or at least it might change, even when we hold the circumstance of evaluation fixed. In short, a gradable adjective’s extension is shifty. Consider King’s (2006, 1036) illustration: ‘The watch David bought is expensive’, where we imagine that the watch costs three hundred dollars. While the latter sentence is true when someone who has never paid for a watch utters it, the sentence is false when it is uttered by a wealthy,

122 Rolex-wearing socialite. As my discussion of illustration (4.5) ‘Smith is forgetful’ suggests, cognitive fault predicates also display shifty extensions. Another linguistic feature of gradable adjectives is that they may occur in conjunction with modifier constructions. In particular, we may felicitously use a gradable adjective with a degree modifier such as ‘very’. As such, a speaker may felicitously utter, ‘the watch David bought is very expensive’. We may also felicitously use a gradable adjective with a relativizing modifier. For example, a speaker may felicitously say, ‘the watch David bought is expensive for a diver’s watch’. Like gradable adjectives, cognitive fault predicates may occur in modifier constructions, both modifiers of degree and of relativization. For instance, there is nothing infelicitous about sentences such as ‘Smith is very forgetful’ and ‘Smith is forgetful for a person with so much education’. Along with modifier constructions, gradable adjectives may occur in in com- parative constructions. In other words, a speaker may felicitously utter, ‘the watch David bought is more expensive than Sally’s watch’. The same goes for cognitive fault predicates. For instance, ‘Smith is more forgetful than Jones’ may be felicitously uttered.

Explanatory Faults

Along with the fact that a cognitive fault predicate’s extension is semantically sensitive to features of the utterance context, especially the standard of fault that a context supplies, there is another context sensitive issue that merits attention. Con- sider that when we judge whether something must be cognitively wrong with a participant in a disagreement, we ignore some cognitive faults outright, especially those faults that are explanatorily irrelevant to the disagreement under discussion. In other words, when speakers judge whether there must be something cognitively

123 wrong with someone in a disagreement, they judge some cognitive faults are truth- conditionally irrelevant. This feature of our linguistic practice suggests that there is an additional contextual restriction associated with cognitive fault talk. When we interpret our expectation that there must be something cognitively wrong with someone, the interpretation should include a contextually restricted domain of cognitive faults over which the quantificational phrase ‘something’ ranges, when it occurs in a clause akin to ‘something must be cognitively wrong with someone’. As an illustration, consider a scenario where Smith and Jones are discussing an arithmetic problem, and they accept inconsistent solutions. Smith accepts that the answer is forty-five, and Jones accepts that the answer is thirty-two. In this scenario, we find an explanatory difference between fault predicates such as ‘careless’ and ‘paranoid’. Other things being equal, while we grant that illustration (4.6) is true, we believe that (4.7) is false.

(4.6) It is probable that Smith and Jones disagree because at least one of them is careless.

(4.7) It is probable that Smith and Jones disagree because at least one of them is paranoid.

Given an explanatory difference between the two cognitive fault predicates, the contextual restriction under discussion selects carelessness—but not paranoia— to include in the domain of quantiﬁcation over which the quantiﬁcational phrase ‘something’ ranges. When we consider whether someone must be cognitively at fault in the disagreement between Smith and Jones, we judge paranoia as truth- conditionally irrelevant, even if someone is actually paranoid. For sake of comparison, suppose that Smith and Jones are arguing over whether Brown poisoned White. Smith accepts that Brown poisoned White, but Jones ac-

124 cepts that Brown did not poison White. In this context, while paranoia is explanatory, color blindness is unexplanatory, at least other things being equal. Accord- ingly, while we grant that illustration (4.8) is true, we deny that (4.9) is true.

(4.8) It is probable that Smith and Jones disagree because at least one of them is paranoid.

(4.9) It is probable that Smith and Jones disagree because at least one of them is color blind.

In this scenario, the explanatory difference between paranoia and color blindness implies that paranoia—but not color blindness—is included both in the domain of cognitive faults over which ‘something’ ranges. So, when we consider whether someone must be cognitively at fault in the disagreement, we adopt a different stance. In this case, we judge paranoia as truth conditionally relevant.

Is Cognitive Modesty Problematic?

The worry that I raise about cognitive modesty is that everyone in a quotidian disagreement has some cognitive fault or other. Even when we are considering a quotidian disagreement over an issue that is not objective, everyone has a cognitive fault. Given the interpretation of the modality that I defend above in Section 4.4, the fact that everyone in a quotidian disagreement is cognitively faulty raises a concern, namely, that we are entitled to conclude that someone in every quotidian disagreement must be cognitively at fault. If we are entitled to this conclusion, our expectations about cognitive fault should be uniform even across disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity. While cognitive modesty seems to challenge whether the approach that I develop accounts for the facts that we seek to explain,

125 the dimensions along which cognitive fault talk is sensitive to the utterance context do not allow us to draw the problematic conclusion. In order to see why, let us revisit the analogy between cognitive fault predicates and gradable adjectives. Given the analogy, a cognitive fault predicate’s extension depends on a standard of cognitive fault, where the standard is supplied by the context of utterance. The analogy raises a worry about the thought that initially prompts the challenge of cognitive modesty, namely, that everyone in a quotidian disagreement has some cognitive fault. Just as it is inappropriate to accept that Smith is forgetful using a nurse’s standards, when the relevant context supplies Smith’s wife’s standard, so too it is inappropriate to accept that humans are faulty creatures, while ignoring the standards of cognitive fault operative in the contexts in which participants expect that, in view of a quotidian disagreement, someone must be cognitively at fault. A worry about the initial thought is that there are different standards deployed in the two utterance contexts at issue, or at least there might be differences. The problematic conclusion can be drawn only if the standards of cognitive fault are similar to those supplied by the appropriate utterance context. Even setting worries about standard shifting aside, there is a further obstacle to drawing the problematic conclusion. As I mention above, when we speak about our expectation that something must be cognitively wrong with someone, there is a domain of quantiﬁcation associated with the existential quantiﬁer ‘something’, and faults that are included in that domain are restricted by the utterance context. For example, faults that are explanatorily irrelevant are not included in the domain. When we consider whether cognitive modesty licenses the problematic conclusion that in every quotidian disagreement, someone must be cognitively at fault, domain restrictions play a crucial role. After all, even if we grant that

126 everyone in a quotidian disagreement has a cognitive fault, we are not thereby granting that everyone in a quotidian disagreement has a fault that is explanatorily relevant to the disagreement under discussion. In other words, even if every quotidian disagreement is cognitively modest, we can imagine scenarios where the cognitive faults at issue are explanatorily irrelevant. For example, we may grant that everyone in a quotidian disagreement over whether roller coasters are fun has a cognitive fault. However, we can also imagine that none of these faults are explanatorily relevant to either beliefs or assertions about roller coasters and our amusement. The problematic conclusion does not follow unless everyone in a quotidian disagreement has an explanatorily relevant cognitive fault, and it is difﬁcult to see a motivation for that claim.

4.6 Conclusion

The focal point of the above discussion is cognitive fault, especially how it ﬁgures in a familiar contrast between disagreements that differ with respect to objectivity. When the disputed subject-matter is objective, someone must be inattentive, confused, prejudiced, or otherwise cognitively at fault. When it is not objective, the disagreement might be faultless, cognitively speaking. However, apparent counter-examples threaten to undermine this contrast, at least on the cognitive command approach. After all, while science is a paradigm of objectivity, there are conceptually possible scientiﬁc disagreements where no one is cognitively at fault. I recommend that we reconsider the modal idiom, cognitive fault talk, and their interpretation. On the alternative that I defend, the modal idiom expresses necessity relative to everyday or commonplace disagreements, and cognitive fault talk

127 is subject to contextual restrictions, including contextually supplied standards of cognitive fault.

128 Chapter Five

Judge-Dependence, Subjective Attitudes, and Vagueness

CLOV(fixed gaze, tonelessly): Finished, it’s finished, it must be nearly finished. ... Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there’s a heap, the impossible heap.

Samuel Beckett, End-Game

5.1 Introduction

HENASENTENCE’S truth conditions are judge-dependent, not only do we W think that sentence’s truth-value varies systematically with respect to germane facts about human attitudes, but we also think that those attitudes account for that truth-value, at least in some cases. While matters of taste are paradigms of judge-dependent truth, for example, what is fun, what is boring, or what is cute, it is now widely thought that other domains exhibit judge-dependent truth conditions, too. For instance, some claim that, just like taste terms, vague terms are judge-dependent. As I discuss in Chapter 3, compositionality considerations

129 provide an important motivation for the thesis that truth conditions are either substantial or insubstantial. Given that judge-dependent truth conditions are a widely acknowledged species of insubstantial truth, I explore how a compositional semantics might confirm or disconfirm the thesis that truth conditions are judge- dependent. In particular, I explore the compositional semantic role of both taste discourse and vague discourse with respect to attitude ascriptions akin to ‘Jones finds Smith boring’. While studies of ‘find’ confirm that taste terms are judge- dependent, they also show that some clauses that contain a vague term are unacceptable under ascriptions akin to ‘find’. In addition, I discuss how we might represent judge-dependent truth conditions in a semantic theory based on Shapiro’s (2006) model-theoretic approach.

5.2 Judge-Dependence and Compositional Semantics

In the Fregean tradition, human judgments play little—and perhaps no—role in how we think about truth, especially when it comes to science and mathematics. When a scientiﬁc or mathematical claim is true, it is not true simply because someone asserts, believes, or accepts it. After all, we look to the attitude independent world alone to settle the matter. As I point out above in Chapter 2, Gottlob Frege compared scientiﬁc and mathematical truth to a deserted island that was around long before we discovered it. As Frege ((1897) 1979, 133) claims,

A law of nature is not invented by us, but discovered, just as a deserted island in the Arctic Ocean was there long before anyone had set eyes on it, so the laws of nature, and likewise those of mathematics, have held good at all times and not just since they were discovered. This shows us that these thoughts, if true, are not only true independently of our recognizing them to be so, but that they are independent of our thinking as such.

130 On this view, while Johannes Kepler asserted that the planets elliptically orbit the Sun, with the Sun at one focus, Kepler’s attitude was strictly irrelevant to the truth about their orbital path. As Frege might say, Kepler discovered the first law of planetary motion. It was no invention. The Fregean view is plausible when we focus strictly on examples like the latter, or at least that is what I assume throughout this discussion. Still, we might wonder whether there are limits to the view. Borrowing Frege’s picturesque terms, the question is whether truth is ever an invention. Setting scientific and mathematical examples aside, when we reflect on other domains, human judgments appear germane. Consider Peter Lasersohn’s (2005, 643) example that I explore above in Chapter 4, namely, the sentence ‘roller coasters are fun’. If Lasersohn’s example is analogous to Kepler’s first law of planetary motion, at least as Frege conceived it, it was true before anyone got excited about roller coasters, just like Frege’s deserted island was there before its discovery. However, there is a widely shared resistance to that idea. After all, we say it is true because that is how we regard it. Unlike Kepler’s first law of planetary motion, we do not discover that ‘roller coasters are fun’ is true. If it is true at all, it is true because we regard roller coasters as amusing, entertaining, and exciting. In Fregean terms, truth is an invention or a fabrication. Presumably, if any truths are judge-dependent, what is fun and other matters of taste are judge-dependent.

Judge-Dependent Truth

While invention, fabrication, and similar Fregean idioms are helpful, at least initially, I recommend that we adopt two informal assumptions about judge-dependent sentences and their semantics. Of course, there is controversy about how exactly

131 to think about the semantics of judge-dependent sentences, but the assumptions below are neutral on the controversial issues. If our focus is strictly on factors other than speakers, their feelings, and their amusement, the truth of the sentence ‘roller coasters are fun’ is an unsettled matter. The attitude independent world leaves the issue unresolved. Scientific and mathematical claims are different in exactly this respect, at least according to the Fregean. On this view, the planets and their orbital paths around the Sun leave nothing unsettled about the truth of the first law of planetary motion. So, we may first assume that if we are dealing with a judge-dependent sentence, the facts that are independent of speakers and their attitudes do not settle whether that sentence is true, at least in some cases.

Assumption 1 Some judge-dependent sentences are unsettled, at least in view of the attitude independent facts.

However, there is more to judge-dependent truth than mere indeterminacy in light of the attitude independent world. After all, once we bring speakers and their attitudes into the picture, it is (or might be) settled whether ‘roller coasters are fun’ is true. Our amusement and excitement pushes the lingering indeterminacy aside. While a strict Fregean insists that no scientiﬁc and mathematical sentences are unsettled, we might consider a more relaxed attitude, at least for argument’s sake. Nevertheless, even the lax Fregean would deny that what we assert, believe, or accept remedies that indeterminacy. So, we may also assume that a judge-dependent sentence is true because a speaker accepts that it is true, at least in some cases.

Assumption 2 When the attitude independent facts do not settle whether a judge- dependent sentence is true, it is true because a judge or judges accept that it is true, at least in some cases.

132 Standard Approaches

As I mention above, these two assumptions are informal enough to be consistent with different ways of thinking about the semantics of judge-dependent sentences. I show how we might implement our assumptions about judge-dependence in a formal semantics based on Shapiro (2006) below in Section 5.4 , but a few words about the two standard approaches are in order, namely, contextualism and relativism.1

Contextualism A typical strict contextualist akin to Michael Glanzberg (2007) defends a semantics for judge-dependent predicates along the following lines. Bor- rowing David Kaplan’s (1989, 494) familiar terminology, a token predicate expression that is judge-dependent semantically expresses an intension, where, as tra- ditionally conceived, an intension is a function from a circumstance of evaluation to an extension, that is, a set of items in a domain. The intension is the predicate’s semantic content—or at least it models it. For a strict contextualist, a judge- dependent predicate’s semantic content—and hence, the intension it expresses— can vary with respect to the context in which the speaker uses that predicate. In particular, the context of utterance supplies a judge or judges relative to which a 1Along with strict contextualist and relativist semantics that I address above, another option is a blended approach that Mark Richard defends (in (2004) and (2008)). He co opts a familiar idea that the notion that what a token predicate expresses depends on a reference class, where the context in which the predicate is used supplies the reference class (see David Lewis Lewis (1979b, 351-354) on vagueness). However, Richard argues that a notion’s extension at a circumstance of evaluation depends not just on how things stand in the world, but also a contextually-supplied standard. If the focus is a predicate such as ‘boring’, Richard advocates something along the following lines. A token predicate ‘boring’ semantically expresses a function from a context of use to the notion hboring for an F i, where the value of the parameter F is the reference class and the context of use supplies the reference class (e.g., the average American teenager). In particular, the reference class is given at least by the interests, beliefs, and intentions of the individuals in the context of use. The notion hboring for an F i semantically expresses a function from a circumstance of evaluation to an extension, where a circumstance is an ordered pair that includes both a possible world and a standard of boring. Again, borrowing MacFarlane’s terminology, we may say that an assessment context supplies the standard of boring, where the interests, beliefs, and intentions of the participants in the assessment context supply the relevant standard.

133 predicate’s extension is semantically evaluated. When different contexts supply different judges, a judge-dependent predicate’s content changes, too.2

Relativism A strict relativist akin to Lasersohn (2005) defends a semantics for judge-dependent predicates along different lines. Like the strict contextualist, strict relativists maintain both that a token predicate semantically expresses an intension and that this intension at least models the predicate’s semantic content. Unlike strict contextualists, strict relativists maintain that the intension expressed by a judge-dependent predicate is invariant across changes in the context of use. Accordingly, the predicate’s semantic content is invariant. However, in another sense, context plays a role in the semantics for judge-dependent predicates. Bor- rowing John MacFarlane’s (2009) terminology, the strict relativist focuses not on intensions that are merely functions from circumstances of evaluations to extensions, but on functions from both circumstances of evaluation and contexts of assessment to extensions. A strict relativist claims that a predicate’s extension varies when germane features of the assessment context changes. Of course, since we are interested in a judge-dependent semantics, the relevant feature is a judge or judges.

Compositional Semantics

Granting that truths about taste are judge-dependent, as I recommend above, we still might wonder how widespread is judge-dependent truth. This is a question about scope. Given the Fregean tradition, we should expect that it is a marginal notion at best. However, given a glance at the contemporary discussion, it appears 2While I defend a contextualist approach to predicates of cognitive fault below in Chapter 4.3, I do not claim that that standard of fault on which the extension of a a fault predicate depends depends essentially on a judge or judges.

134 commonplace. After all, there are judge-dependent approaches to aesthetics, epistemic modals, future contingents, knowledge, mathematics, morality, and other domains.3 Why should we accept such approaches? What considerations support the semantic thesis that truth is judge-dependent? Given the considerations regarding insubstantial truth that I address above in Chapter 3, I suggest that we look to compositional semantics.

Vague Sentences

As a case study, consider a pervasive feature of natural language, namely, vagueness. If we ignore use-mention niceties, we might say that a predicate is vague insofar as there is no determinate division between what falls under and outside it, or at least not one that we could know (see Timothy Williamson (1994b)). Along with the sorites paradox, the presence of vagueness makes us wonder what linguistic factors give rise to it, especially what semantic factors are operative. While Diana Raffman (1994) ﬁrst suggested a judge-dependent account of vagueness, we ﬁnd similar proposals elsewhere, including Stewart Shapiro (2006). Raffman (1994, 43) argues,

... where vague predicates are concerned, logic and semantics are more intimately entwined with psychology than one might have otherwise supposed.

Shapiro (2006, 41) defends an analogous view, namely, that “vagueness turns on judge-dependence. If there is no judge-dependence, there is no vagueness.” There is a common thread between Raffman and Shapiro: a vague sentence’s truth con- 3For discussion about aesthetics, see Max Kölbel (2002). For discussion about epistemic modals, see Andy Egan, John Hawthorne, and Brian Weatherson (2005) and Tamina C. Stephensen (2007a) and (2007b). For discussion about future contingents, see John MacFarlane (see both (2003) and (2008)), as well as Shapiro (2006). For discussion about knowledge, see MacFarlane (2005) and Mark Richard (2004). For discussion about mathematics, see Stewart Shapiro (2006). For discussions about morality, see Kölbel (2004).

135 ditions are judge-dependent, at least partially. Given our informal assumptions above, the view is that the attitude independent world might leave a vague sentence’s truth unsettled, and, when this situation arises, the facts about what speakers assert, believe, and accept might resolve the indeterminacy at issue.4 Again, why should we accept their semantic thesis? Why think that a vague sentence’s truth conditions are judge-dependent? Given that the thesis under discussion is semantic, we might explore whether compositionality considerations support a judge-dependent approach to vagueness. If judge-dependent truth occupies a place in a sober compositional semantic theory, judge-dependent truth has a compositional semantic role, so we could look to see what sentences play that role. Compositionality considerations help tell us whether it is suitable to interpret truth as judge-dependent. From that vantage point, it is unlikely that a sentence’s truth conditions are judge-dependent unless there is evidence that it plays the compositional semantic role that we associate with judge-dependent truth.

5.3 Subjective Attitude Ascriptions

What role in compositional semantics might judge-dependent sentences play? Fol- lowing Kjell Johan Sæbø (2009) and Christopher Kennedy (2010), the focal point of the discussion below is an unusual propositional attitude verb, namely, ‘ﬁnd’. Be- fore I address how we should think about either the semantics of ‘ﬁnd’, or the compositional connection to judge-dependent truth, I need to raise some informal observations about this attitude verb, what it means, and when it is acceptable to use it. 4See Raffman (1996), (2000), (2005a), (2005b) and (2009), as well as Shapiro (2003), (2005), (2008), and (2009). See also Crispin Wright (1987).

136 The Verb ’Find’

When a school counselor asks a parent about a child’s attitude toward math class, it is easy to imagine a parent who admits, “He finds it boring.” Alternatively, imagine that a couple are looking to furnish their home office. They are in an office furniture store, and they are discussing whether to purchase a chair. One asks the other, “How does it feel?” In response, the other might admit, “I find it uncomfortable.” As the examples below illustrate, this use of the word ‘find’ has drawn attention not merely in recent years, but at least back to the nineteen seventies.

(5.1) (a) I ﬁnd Sam appealing. (due to Ann Borkin (1973, 44))

(b) Sam ﬁnds the cake tasty. (Stephenson (2007b, 59))

While the attitude that is ascribed in these examples resembles a discovery by first- hand experience, much of the academic interest in the word ‘find’ stems from an interpretation where the attitude ascribed is more subjective than a discovery. As the Oxford English Dictionary confirms, while there are other meanings that we associate with ‘find’, the above ascriptions mean “To feel to be (agreeable, disagree- able, etc.), to consider or regard as (ridiculous, excellent, etc.).” As such, the examples above exemplify what I call a subjective attitude ascription.5 5For further discussion of the subjective interpretation of ‘find’, see Borkin (1973), Kennedy (2010), Rick Nouwen (2007), Sæbø (2009) and Stephenson, both in (2007b) and (2007a). Bas Aarts (1992, 70) also discusses Borkin’s illustration above in (5.1 a). Both Kennedy (2010) and Nouwen (2007, 4) address examples that resemble Stephenson’s in (5.1 b). I address another meaning of ‘find’ in Section 5.3, namely, what I call the fact-finding interpretation.

137 To-Charlie Sentences

An approach to subjective attitude ascriptions and their semantics is constrained by considerations about acceptable use. Even as far back as the nineteen seventies, there is wide agreement that subjective attitude ascriptions are unacceptable when the embedded complement contains an offending prepositional phrase. As Borkin (1973, 44) notes, while a person might acceptably assert ‘I find Sam amusing’, it is unacceptable to assert (5.2) ‘I find Sam amusing to Charlie’, where the complement contains an offending prepositional phrase, namely, the expression ‘to Charlie’. Stephenson’s (2007b, 62) illustration ‘Sam finds the hamster wheel fun for the hamster’ is a variant of Borkin’s To-Charlie example, and there are many other variations in the contemporary literature. (The hash mark ‘#’ indicates unacceptability.)

(5.2) #I ﬁnd Sam amusing to Charlie. (Borkin (1973, 44))

While the observation that To-Charlie sentences are unacceptable is old news, it seems, another example (5.3) that Stephenson discusses—and which she (2007b, 39) attributes to Kai von Fintel—suggests that the unacceptability is not merely limited to cases where an ascription explicitly contains a complement with an offending prepositional phrase.6

(5.3) #Anna ﬁnds the cat food tasty (because the cat ate it all up).(due to Kennedy (2010))

Consider a scenario where a person asserts the sentence ‘Anna ﬁnds the cat food tasty’, where it is evident in the context of use that we may suitably paraphrase 6Arts (1992, 70), Stephenson (2007b, 62), and Kennedy (2010) address examples akin to (5.2). Strictly speaking, (5.3) is a variant that Kennedy (2010) discusses, but it is based on the example “I think it’s taste, because the cat has eaten a lot of it,” which Stephenson (2007b, 39) discusses. She reports that the example is based on a personal communication with Kai von Fintel.

138 ‘tasty’ as ‘tasty for the cat’. In that scenario, the sentence ‘Anna ﬁnds the cat food tasty’ is unacceptable, even though it does not explicitly contain the prepositional phrase ‘for the cat’. This suggests that the unacceptability of variations on the To-Charlie illustration that Borkin recognized in the nineteen seventies is more widespread than previously acknowledged.

Judge-Shifting Semantics

While the above observations are not the only considerations about the verb ‘find’ that constrain a suitable semantics, as I discuss below in Section 5.3, they suffice for a preliminary discussion. I concentrate on Sæbø’s (2009) approach to subjective attitude ascriptions. His approach originates not in quintessential approaches to doxastic attitude ascription, for instance, Jaakko Hintikka’s (1962) approach to ‘believe’, but in Lasersohn’s (2005, 666) study of phrases akin to ‘fun for me’ and ‘tasty to me’. On Lasersohn’s view, we assume that the predicate ‘fun’ is somehow semantically sensitive to germane facts that a context supplies about a person’s judgment. Whether we adopt contextualism, relativism, or another alternative, to account for this sensitivity, what matters ultimately is that the extension of ‘fun’ is assigned only relative to someone who supplies the requisite attitudes. Given this assumption about ‘fun’, the compositional function of the phrase ‘for Jones’ is fixing the judge-relative to which the extension of ‘fun’ is assigned. As such, when we consider the extension of the phrase ‘fun for Jones’, it is a function of the extension of ‘fun’, except where Jones is the relevant judge. A similar treatment is given to the phrase ‘to me’ in constructions akin to ‘boring to me’. Given the phenomena that inspired it, it is unsurprising that Sæbø’s (2009) semantic theory differs sharply from standard treatments of attitude ascriptions. Even so, it has garnered support from others, including Kennedy (2010). On this

139 view, an ascription akin to ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ is analogous to ‘Smith is boring to Jones’, where ‘Smith finds’ is conceived after the manner of ‘for Jones’ and ‘to me’ in the discussion above. On this view, we should understand a subjective attitude ascription in terms of two semantic requirements that an ascription places on its complement, especially on the primary predicate contained therein. One semantic requirement is that the primary predicate’s extension is semantically sensitive to germane facts about a contextually supplied judge, and the other requirement is that the predicate’s extension is semantically evaluated with respect to the subject to whom the attitude is ascribed. On this view, the truth of the sentence ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ turns on two points. The predicate ‘boring’ is judge-dependent, and, when that predicate is evaluated with respect to Jones, its extension contains Smith. I call this model judge-shifting semantics because, semantically speaking, ‘find’ seeks a judge-dependent predicate and it forces whomever is the attitude ascription’s subject to be the judge with respect to whom we evaluate the predicate’s extension. A judge-shifting semantics accommodates the observations about subjective attitude ascriptions that I address above in Section 5.3, at least in conjunction with Lasersohn’s semantics for phrases akin to ‘fun for Jones’. Borkin’s (1973, 44) To- Charlie illustration and recent variations are evidence that some subjective attitude ascriptions are unacceptable when the embedded complement contain predicates akin to ‘amusing to Charlie’ or ‘fun for Jones’, at least when the attitude ascription’s subject is neither Charlie nor Jones. If we adopt Lasersohn’s (2005) approach to the semantics of such predicates, the upshot is that, while ‘amusing’ is a judge-dependent predicate, when we concatenate it with ‘to Charlie’ to form a complex predicate, the newly formed predicate is not sensitive to germane facts about human judgment. Given the view that Sæbø (2009) and Kennedy (2010) de-

140 fend, a complement that is acceptable under a ﬁnd ascription must contain a judge- dependent predicate, so complements that contain ‘amusing to Charlie’, ‘fun for Jones’, and other predicates like that, are unacceptable.

Compositionality Considerations

While the upshot of the above discussion is that some linguistic evidence points toward a judge-shifting compositional semantics for subjective attitude ascriptions, the discussion also sheds new light on our question about scope, namely, how wide spread is judge-dependent truth? In particular, I explore this question in the context of a compositionality constraint.

Compositionality Constraint

The rough-and-ready idea is that if a subjective attitude ascription functions as a judge-shifter, as the evidence suggests, there is little motivation to interpret a sentence as judge-dependent, at least when it is unacceptable under a subjective attitude ascription. So, subjective attitude ascriptions place a constraint on judge- dependent truth. We might express the compositionality constraint along these lines.

Compositionality Constraint In view of a sentence’s compositional semantic role, there is no strong motivation for the semantic thesis that its truth conditions are judge-dependent unless the small clause (syntactically) associated with it may occur as a complement under an acceptable subjective attitude ascription akin to ’ﬁnd’.

Subtleties aside, the basic intuition is that there is not much motivation to claim a sentence is judge-dependent unless it may occur under a subjective attitude as-

141 cription that is acceptable. However, let me address why an appeal to the small clause in the compositionality constraint is an advantage that might go unnoticed.

Fact-Finding Ascriptions v. Subjective Ascriptions

An example from M. A. K. Halliday (1967, 74-75) illustrates a common view, namely, that the verb ‘find’ is ambiguous (e. g., see Borkin (1973, 45) and Sæbø (2009, 328)). In the sentence ‘He found her alive’, there is an ambiguity in the word ‘find’ that corresponds to an ambiguity in the word ‘alive’. On one customary use, a person might utter it in a fact-finding sense, and, as Halliday (1967, 74-75) recommends, on that use a sentence akin to ‘He found her, and she was alive (not dead)’ is a suitable paraphrase. On an equally customary use, a person might utter it in the subjective sense, and on that use, the sentence ‘He found her very lively’ is a more suitable paraphrase. While Halliday’s illustration of this ambiguity involves a small clause, I claim that the advantage of the small clause is that it controls for this ambiguity, or at least it helps to control it. When we consider what interpretation of ‘find’ is more natural with respect to different types of complement clauses, the fact-finding interpretation is more natural in some, and the subjective interpretation is more natural in others. As an illustration, consider which interpretation is most natural in some examples due to Borkin (1973, 46), where the complement is a that-clause in the first, and a small clause in the second. (See also Aarts (1992, 68).)

(5.4) (a) I ﬁnd that this chair is uncomfortable.

(b) I ﬁnd this chair uncomfortable.

As Borkin (1973, 45) notes, it is more natural to use the ﬁrst (5.4 a) ‘I ﬁnd that this chair is uncomfortable’ when reporting the results of a consumer reaction survey

142 over the second (5.4 b) ‘I find this chair uncomfortable’. However, consider a context akin to the one to which I allude above, where a couple are shopping for home office furniture. If one asks the other how a chair feels, it is more natural to use the second (5.4 b) ‘I find this chair uncomfortable’ over the first (5.4 a) ‘I find that this chair is uncomfortable’. Considerations about what interpretation is more natural with respect to clause type at least suggests a tendency. While a fact-finding interpretation is more natural when the complement that ‘find’ embeds is a that-clause, the subjective attitude interpretation is more natural when it is a small clause. Given this tendency, the subjective interpretation is a default semantic interpretation, at least when the complement of an attitude ascription akin to ‘find’ is a small clause. For this reason, the appeal to small clauses in the compositionality constraint is not idle.7 7There are other attitude ascriptions that, on some occasions of use, more or less resemble ‘find’, including words such as ‘consider’, ‘feel’, and ‘think’, and, to that extent, they are subjective attitude ascriptions, too. Both Sæbø (2009) and Stephenson (in both (2007b) and (2007a)) discuss examples where ‘think’ is used to ascribe a subjective attitude. (5.5) (a) Sam thinks that the cake is tasty. (due to Stephenson (2007b, 25)) (b) She thinks the game is fun. (Sæbø (2009, 334)) Nouwen (2007, 3) addresses an example that resembles the example from Stephenson above. Kennedy (2010) also discusses the subjective use of ‘think’, though to a lesser extent than the others. Borkin (1973) discusses examples where ‘consider’ is used to ascribe a subjective attitude, though she does not use this terminology. David Dowty (1976) and Arts (1992) also mention relevant examples, though their focus is different, too. (5.6) (a) I consider Harriet coarse and unfeeling. (Borkin (1973, 44)) (b) Mary considers John obnoxious. (Dowty (1976, 218n9)) In respect to ambiguity, ‘find’ is like its counterparts ‘consider’ and ‘think’, since these words display fact-finding and subjective interpretations, too. Insofar as ‘think’ is similar to ‘believe’, small clauses are not acceptable complements. As such, we cannot use small clauses to help disambiguate the appropriate interpretation. In respect to the small clause, ‘consider’ is closer to ‘find’, since they are acceptable complements. Even so, my impression is that acceptability judgments about the subjective interpretation of ‘find’ are more robust than than ‘consider’, and so, I concentrate on small clauses under ‘find’ in the compositionality constraint, as well as the discussion throughout.

143 Is Vagueness Judge-Dependent?

If something along the lines of the compositionality constraint is correct, we can use it to make some headway on the question of scope that I raise above in Section 5.2. Let us put judge-dependent approaches to vagueness in the spotlight again. Given the compositionality constraint, when we embed a vague small clause under a subjective attitude ascription, we should expect an interpretation where the judge with respect to whom we evaluate that sentence’s truth is the ascription’s subject. This in turn requires that every vague sentence may occur under an acceptable subjective attitude ascription, or at least the associated small clause. How- ever, given that some vague clauses are unacceptable under subjective attitude ascriptions, the compositional truth conditions of vague sentences are not judge- dependent. Given this line of reasoning, the important question is whether there are any unacceptable vague clauses.

Big-Bowl Sentences

Along with acceptability judgments regarding Borkin’s To-Charlie sentences, speakers make other relevant acceptability judgments with regard to subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘find’. Kennedy (2010) observes that not only are some find ascriptions unacceptable when the complement contains an offending prepositional phrase akin to ‘to Charlie’, but also when it contains vague dimensional predicates akin to ‘big’, ‘large’, ‘small’, and ‘cold’. Following Kennedy’s illustration (5.7 a), while a person might acceptably assert, ‘Anna finds her bowl of pasta delicious’, it is unacceptable to assert (5.7 a) ‘Anna finds her bowl of pasta big’.

(5.7) (a) #Anna ﬁnds her bowl of pasta big/large/small/cold. (due to Kennedy (2010))

144 Sæbø (2009, 328) points out that even when the complement of an ascription contains a vague dimensional predicate coordinated with an otherwise acceptable predicate, the ascription is unacceptable. For instance, Sæbø (2009, 328) mentions it is unacceptable to assert ‘She finds him handsome and below forty five’. In light of the compositionality constraint, variations on Kennedy’s Big-Bowl illustration give us traction against the judge-dependent approach to vagueness. As Shapiro (2006, 137) notes, it entails that the truth conditions of a vague sentence are judge-dependent, at least partially. Given the compositionality constraint, this semantic thesis is unmotivated unless the small clause associated with every vague sentence may occur under a subjective attitude ascription akin to ‘find’. However, given our acceptability judgments about the Big-Bowl illustration and variants, some vague sentences are not associated with small clauses that are acceptable under ‘find’. So, judge-dependent approaches to vagueness are unmotivated. As I mention above in Section 5.2, the conception of judge-dependence under discussion is not a concrete formal framework, but simply two informal assumptions about judge-dependent sentences and their semantics. As such, the conclusion that I am defending—that a judge-dependent approach to vagueness is in unmotivated in light of the compositionality constraint—is consistent with adopting some broadly contextualist, relativist, or another similar formal semantic framework for vague sentences, so long as a judge or judges do not play an integral role. In other words, we might think that features other than judges play some role in the semantics of vague sentences, and contextualism, relativism, etc., sheds light on that role.

145 Should We Care about Acceptability Judgments?

I address two pieces of evidence in the above discussion: acceptability judgments that speakers make about both To-Charlie sentences akin to Borkin’s ‘I ﬁnd Sam amusing to Charlie’ and Big-Bowl sentences akin to Kennedy’s ‘Anna ﬁnds her bowl of pasta big’. As I mention in Section 5.3, my assumption is that a semantics for subjective attitude ascriptions is constrained by facts about acceptable use. While this assumption might appear initially innocent, once the judge-dependent approach to vagueness is under threat, we might raise questions about it. How seriously should we take these judgments? Some worries about the relevant acceptability judgments are due to expectations to which familiar propositional attitude ascriptions give rise, especially ‘know’ and ‘believe’. When we focus strictly on ‘know’ and ‘believe’, no matter what that-clause we embed under them as a complement, speakers judge them uniformly acceptable, or at least this is a common view. As the examples below illustrate, the same goes for variations on To-Charlie and Big-Bowl sentences (see Kennedy (2010).)

(5.8) (a) Anna knows/believes that Sam is amusing to Charlie.

(b) Anna knows/believes that her bowl of pasta is big.

Given that speakers do not discriminate between complements under epistemic and doxastic attitude ascriptions, there is an expectation that other attitude ascriptions will be the same, including subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘ﬁnd’. If we only compare the ascription ‘ﬁnd’ to ‘know’ and ‘believe’, the unacceptability of both To-Charlie and Big-Bowl illustrations is somewhat puzzling, and we might dismiss them.

146 Hammer-Ugly Sentences

When we consider a wider array of examples, it is easier to resist the expectation that our acceptability judgments should be uniform across different complements. After all, there are many, many examples where speakers ﬁnd differences with respect to the acceptability of different complements. As an illustration, consider a notable example due to James D. McCawley, namely, the instrumental verb ‘hammer’. As McCawley (1971, 29) observes, a person might acceptably assert ‘He hammered the metal ﬂat’, but it is unacceptable to assert ‘He hammered the metal ugly’.

(5.9) (a) He hammered the metal ﬂat.

(b) #He hammered the metal ugly. (due to McCawley (1971, 29))

In a similar vein, Georgia M. Green calls attention to the fact that while ‘He wiped it clean’ is acceptable, ‘He wiped it stained’ is not so.8

(5.12) (a) He wiped it clean.

(b) #He wiped it stained. (due to Green (1972, 83))

Given examples akin to the latter, we should not permit our judgments about the behavior of complements under ‘know’ and ‘believe’ to give us false expectations. Subjective attitude ascriptions are more closely allied with verbs akin to ‘hammer’ and ‘wipe’, at least with respect to acceptability judgments. 8McCawley mentions unacceptable variations on the Hammer-Ugly illustration that involve ‘beautiful’, ‘dangerous’, and ‘safe’. McCawley also draws attention to another pair of similar illustrations (5.10) (a) He hammered the rod straight. (b) #He hammered the rod bent. (due to McCawley (1971, 30)) For other discussions of the hammer-ﬂat and wipe-stained type examples, see Dowty (1976, 217- 218) and Aarts (1992, 61). Another similar illustration that is often discussed is to to Green (1972). (5.11) #She shot him paranoid. (due to Green (1972, 83))

147 5.4 Judge-Dependence, Judge-Shifting, and Shapiro

Semantics

I made two informal assumptions about judge-dependent sentences and their semantics in Section 5.2. The ﬁrst assumption is that some judge-dependent sentences are indeterminate, at least when we focus strictly on attitude independent facts. The second assumption is that, in these cases, there are other factors that might settle the issue, namely, speakers, their feelings, and their attitudes. As I emphasize above, these assumptions are consistent with the standard semantic approaches to judge-dependent sentences, including contextualism and relativism. While it is worth showing how we might interpret the above assumptions in a formal framework, there are several controversies about contextualism, relativism, and blended alternatives. Since these controversies are beyond the scope of this discussion, I concentrate on a neutral framework. In particular, I address a simpli- ﬁed theory based on Shapiro’s (2006) model-theoretic approach, and I show how we might incorporate judge-shifting attitude ascriptions after the manner of Sæbø (2009). Insofar as Shapiro limits attention to an extensionally adequate semantic theory (see Shapiro (2006, 43)), his framework is neutral on the controversies between the standard alternatives.9 9For some discussion about the controversy over contextualism and relativism, see MacFarlane (forthcoming). Shapiro often writes as if he has no obligation to choose between the standard options (cf. Shapiro (2008, 315) notwithstanding). This attitude stems from the fact that he limits attention to an extensionally adequate semantic theory (see Shapiro (2006, 43)). Raffman (1994, 66) adopts a similar attitude. Given that what is under discussion is an extensional semantic theory, there is no reason to choose between contextualism and relativism unless there is an extensional difference between them. Perhaps there is such a difference, but at least Isidora Stojanovic (2008) argues otherwise.

148 Partial Interpretations, Frames, and Sharpenings

We can see how to implement our two semantic assumptions in terms of three model-theoretic notions to which Shapiro (2006) appeals, namely, the partial interpretation, the frame, and the sharpening.

Partial Interpretations

The centerpiece of Shapiro’s semantics is the partial interpretation. A partial interpretation is an ordered pair whose components include a (non-empty) domain of interpretation and a denotation function that assigns suitable denotations from that domain to linguistic expressions. Shapiro (2006, 61) suggests that a partial interpretation models the semantic facts associated with a language at a given stage in a conversation. A partial interpretation also reflects the first assumption that some judge-dependent sentences are unsettled, at least to an extent. In particular, given that an interpretation is partial, when an item in the domain is not in a judge-dependent predicate’s extension and it is not in its anti-extension, the associated judge-dependent sentence is indeterminate. For example, a sentence akin to ‘Smith is boring’ is true under a partial interpretation provided that the extension of ‘boring’ contains the denotation of ‘Smith’, it is false provided that the anti-extension contains that denotation, and when it is in neither, the sentence is indeterminate (see Shapiro (2006, 61-62)). While partial interpretations help us picture how a judge-dependent sentence is unsettled, they do not completely reflect the first assumption. After all, the assumption is not simply that some judge- dependent sentences are indeterminate: they are indeterminate with respect to the attitude independent facts.

149 Frames

While the advantage of the partial interpretation is that it permits indeterminacy, we need a semantic device that tracks an indeterminacy’s pedigree. Shapiro (2006, 75-76) introduces another semantic notion that remedies this shortcoming, namely, the frame. A frame is an ordered pair whose components include a partial interpretation that is the frame’s base and a set of partial interpretations that contains the base. As Shapiro (2006, 76) indicates, the frame’s base represents the issues that the attitude independent world settles not only at the initial stage in a conversation, but also every subsequent stage. The first assumption is reflected in the fact that some judge-dependent sentences are indeterminate under the interpretation that is the frame’s base. Along with the first assumption, the frame also helps us to picture the second assumption, namely, that speakers and their attitudes might push aside the indeterminacy that remains after we consider the attitude independent facts.

Sharpenings

As the second assumption suggests, what folks accept is true varies from case to case, and, as such, we need a semantic device that enforces and tracks parallel shifts in truth-value. In order to see how frames give us such a device, I focus on Shapiro’s (2006, 65) requirement that every interpretation associated with a frame is one that sharpens the base, in a sense that is familiar from supervaluationist semantics. When one interpretation sharpens another one, they are alike in some respects, and different in other respects. Insofar as they are alike, interpretations share a domain, and they agree on the constants and their denotations. In addition, the second interpretation agrees with the ﬁrst one regarding every sentence that is deemed true, as well as every sentence that is deemed false. Insofar as they

150 are (or might be) different, some sentences are true (or false) under the second interpretation that are indeterminate under the ﬁrst interpretation. As an illustration, consider a partial interpretation that represents a conversation at a stage where the sentence ‘Smith is boring’ is indeterminate. Imagine that Jones starts thinking about Smith, and he decides that Smith is a boring fel- low. Given the second assumption, we should expect that, in light of Jones’ novel judgment, ‘Smith is boring’ shifts from indeterminate to true. Consider an interpretation that sharpens the latter insofar as it is like the former in every relevant respect, except that the sentence ‘Smith is boring’ is true. Given Jones’ attitude toward Smith, the sharpening represents a subsequent conversation stage where ‘Smith is boring’ is no longer unsettled but true. As such, the sharpening requirement on frames gives us a semantic mechanism with which we can track how truth values shift in a systematic fashion with speakers and their attitudes.

5.5 Judge-Shifting in a Shapiro-Style Semantics

While the above discussion gives us a glimpse into how to represent our two assumptions about judge-dependent truth in a formal framework, I submit that we need to deviate from Shapiro’s model, at least if we want a semantics that is faith- ful to the spirit of the judge-shifting approach, both in Lasersohn (2005) and Sæbø (2009).

Communal Consensus

While the object language that Shapiro considers does not include subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘ﬁnd’, the problem is not simply that we need to supple- ment the object language with the relevant vocabulary items. Shapiro’s semantics

151 is designed to model judge-dependence in conversations where, as he (2006, 18) claims, we can “insist on a communal verdict in each case.” Of course, Shapiro ac- knowledges that some might dissent from the majority opinion, but he (2006, 19) concentrates on conversations where everyone goes along with the majority verdict, at least to maintain a communal consensus. Shapiro (2006, 19, my addition in brackets) imagines that as

the group proceeds [considering each different case] ... more and more of the participants will demur, or feel like demurring. At some point, enough of them will demur that the consensus ... will break down.

For instance, if the reigning consensus is that ‘Smith is boring’ is true, and we are facing a scenario where there is a breakdown, then the conversationalists must then agree that it is false, even if that means a few folks hold back their dissent to go along with the new majority. When we consider the judge-shifting approach to subjective attitude ascriptions, it appears that judge-dependent truths are semantically sensitive not to the communal verdict at a given stage in a conversation, but to individual speakers and their attitudes at a stage. When we are considering only conversations where there is a consensus about every case under consideration, this point makes little or no difference. However, when we also consider conversations where consensus is not enforced, in the fashion that Shapiro imagines, it makes a difference. After all, consider that the sentence ‘Smith is boring’ is unsettled, at least when we focus on the attitude independent world. Imagine that while Smith fancies himself the life of a party, Jones thinks that Smith is boring. Is the sentence ‘Smith is boring’ true, false, or indeterminate? If there is no enforced consensus, Shapiro semantics is too coarse-grained to shed light on a conversation akin to this. Of course, I do not intend this as a criticism: it was not designed to accommodate them. However,

152 for the present purposes, I submit that it is the verdicts of individual speakers that are the semantically relevant factor for judge-dependent truth.

Judge-Shifting Semantics

In my view, we might remedy the problem by relativizing our conceptions of sharpening and frame to a judge. I revisit these notions in turn, and I then show how to think about the semantics of subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘ﬁnd’.

Sharpenings Revisited

In a judge-shifting semantics, a sharpening is not a dyadic relation between two partial interpretations, but a triadic relation between one partial interpretation, another partial interpretation, and a judge. We retain Shapiro’s idea that a sharpening represents the semantic facts at a possible stage in a conversation, in particular, a stage where a speaker’s judgment clears up (or might clear up) some indeterminacy from the base that it sharpens. However, a speaker’s judgment in Shapiro’s semantics always reflects the consensus of others in that conversation, and, as such, it assumes what amounts to a single judge across the whole conversation. Given that we relativize a sharpening to a judge, there is no assumption that a speaker’s judgment reflects the consensus of his conversational peers. As such, different sharpening relations reflect how different speakers might remedy the indeterminacies left over from the attitude independent facts.

Frames Revisited

The change in our conception of a sharpening should be accompanied by a change in our conception of a frame. While a frame is an ordered pair in Shapiro seman-

153 tics, we treat it as an ordered triple in the deviation under discussion. Of course, the first two constituents are the same, namely, the collection of partial interpretations and the frame’s base. The novel addition is a sharpening relation with respect to a judge, where the partial interpretations in the frame’s collection are subject to the constraint that every partial interpretation sharpens the base, at least with respect to the relevant judge. In Shapiro’s semantics, a frame represents the semantic facts at every possible conversation stage in a fashion that is consistent with the base (the attitude-independent facts), as well as other constraints. Given that each frame is associated with a judge-relative sharpening relation, the idea is that a frame represents the semantic facts at every possible conversation stage for a judge. As I emphasize above, there is no assumption that a judge’s attitudes reflect the attitudes of his or her conversational peers. Given these adjustments, we should think about subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘find’ along these lines. Like other sentences in the language, subjective attitude ascriptions are assigned truth-values with respect to a partial interpretation and a frame. For instance, the ascription ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ is true, false, or indeterminate with respect to an interpretation M and a frame F . Compo- sitionally speaking, the semantics of ‘find’ tells us to grab a frame that represents every way that the subject, namely, Jones, might resolve indeterminacies that remain after we consider the attitude independent facts. In other words, when we assign truth, falsity, or indeterminacy to the ascription ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ with respect to a partial interpretation M and the original frame F , we need to look for a frame where sharpenings are relativized to the extension of ‘Jones’ under M and F . Given Jones is the subject, let J be such a frame. Once we have a frame J, that is, the frame that represents how Jones might resolve indeterminacies, the semantics of ‘find’ tells us to focus on the extension and anti-extension of ‘boring’

154 at interpretation M and the new frame J. On this view, the truth-value that we assign to ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ with respect to a partial interpretation M and the original frame F depends on what the predicate ‘boring’ denotes at M and the new frame J. In particular, the semantics of ‘find’ asks us to look and see whether the extension or the anti-extension contains the extension of ‘Smith’ with respect to M and F . Loosely speaking, when the extension contains Smith with respect to J, ‘Jones finds Smith is boring’ is true under M and F . When the anti-extension contains Smith with respect to J, it is false under M and F . Lastly, when neither the extension nor the anti-extension contains Smith with respect to J, it is indeterminate under M and F .

Technical Digression

The above discussion of subjective attitude ascriptions is intentionally loose. In a more formal setting, we might understand the proposal along the following lines. We treat judge-relative notions of sharpening and frame in terms of (5.13 a) and

(5.13 b), where M1 = hd1,I1i and M2 = hd2,I2i.

(5.13) (a) A partial interpretation M2 sharpens another partial interpretation M1

M1 M2 with respect to a judge j if and only if d1 = d2, α = α , for every J K J K constant α, and (iii) both β+ M1 ⊆ β+ M2 and β− M1 ⊆ β− M2 , for J K J K J K J K every predicate β. When M2 sharpens M1, we write M1 j M2.

(b) Fj = hW, B, ji is a frame with respect to a judge j, where B ∈ W is the

base of Fj, W is a collection of partial interpretations, j is a sharpening relation with respect to j such that for every partial interpretation

M ∈ W , B j M.

155 The recursive clauses that assign truth conditions to subjective attitude ascriptions are something akin to (5.14 a), (5.14 b), and (5.14 c).

(5.14) (a) α finds β boring Fj ,M = true if and only if β Fj ,M ∈ boring+ Fx,M , J K J K J K where x = α Fj ,M J K (b) α finds β boring Fj ,M = false if and only if β Fj ,M ∈ boring+ Fx,M , J K J K J K where x = α Fj ,M J K (c) α finds β boring Fj ,M = indeterminate if and only if both J K β Fj ,M ∈/ boring+ Fx,M and β Fj ,M ∈/ boring+ Fx,M , where x = α Fj ,M J K J K J K J K J K

5.6 Conclusion

The discussion above addresses a widely recognized species of insubstantial truth, namely, judge-dependent truth. I focus on how a discourse’s compositional semantic role with respect to subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘find’ might confirm or disconfirm the thesis that a discourse’s truth conditions are judge-dependent. As a case study, I focus on the thesis that the truth conditions of vague sentences are judge-dependent. Since some vague complements are not acceptable under subjective attitude ascriptions, I conclude that there is no strong motivation to claim that the truth conditions of vague sentences are judge-dependent. Along with how compositionality considerations might support the claim that truth conditions are judge-dependent, I discuss how we might modify an Shapiro-style model-theoretic semantics to represent the informal assumptions about judge-dependent truth that I adopt.

156 Part III

Beyond Semantic Discursivism

157 Chapter Six

Acceptability, Dynamics, and Linguistic Communication

And time for all the works and days of hands That lift and drop a question on your plate.

T. S. Eliot, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

6.1 Introduction

HENASEMANTIC discursivist accounts for a discourse’s status with re- W spect to objectivity, he calls attention to the expression ‘true’, especially truth talk’s substance. As I show above in Part I, for a semantic discursivist, the semantic content of an objective discourse is associated with substantial truth conditions, and the semantic content of a non-objective discourse is associated with insubstantial truth conditions. In addition, whatever status truth talk has with respect to substance, that is, whether truth conditions are substantial or insubstantial, the discourse’s compositional semantic role requires that we make such assumptions about truth talk’s content. I aim to establish above in Part II that these

158 commitments are problematic. Not only can we explain some facets of discursive objectivity without recourse to substantial truth, but a discourse’s compositional semantic role might not confirm a discourse’s status with respect to discursive objectivity. Since these worries suggest the need for an alternative to semantic discursivism, I articulate and defend a non-semantic approach to discursive objectivity in Part III. As I discuss above in Part I, contemporary semantic discursivism originates in Frege’s writings on mathematical and scientific objectivity, especially his notion of scientific truth. Even though contemporary semantic discursivists give attention to substantial truth, this notion originates in Frege’s picture of scientific truth. Yet the inspiration for the alternative to semantic discursivism that I sketch below is neither Frege’s scientific notion of truth, nor successor notions akin to substantial truth. I recommend in Part III that we shift attention away from considerations about truth talk’s semantic content to considerations about how a speaker uses a discourse in linguistic communication, especially what a speaker takes for granted is information that everyone in a conversation shares. Yet in order to understand pragmatic factors about how speakers use discourse in linguistic communication, we need to understand some developments in the philosophy of language. In particular, I concentrate on contemporary approaches to linguistic communication that Paul Grice (1989b) influenced, including David Lewis ((1979) 1983), Robert Stalnaker ((1978) 1999), and Craige Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)). Before I discuss the salient theoretical backdrop for the alternative to semantic discursivism that I sketch below, let me review not only the worries that I raise about semantic discursivism above in Part II, but also how these worries shape the alternative that I defend.

159 Against Semantic Discursivism

The case against semantic discursivism that I defend above in Part II turns on the two issues that I emphasize in Part I, namely, the semantic discursivist’s commitment to substantial truth’s explanatory role and the semantic discursivist’s commitment to a compositionally motivated account of substantial truth. After I rehearse the worries that I raise about these two commitments above in Part II, I explore what constraints they impose on an alternative to semantic discursivism.

Substance and Discursive Objectivity

A semantic discursivist has a commitment to the explanatory role of truth talk’s substance. As I show above in Chapter 2, a semantic discursivist seeks to account for a target discourse’s status with respect to objectivity, and he appeals to the truth conditions associated with the target discourse’s semantic content, especially whether those truth conditions are substantial. As I argue above in Chapter 3, an account of truth talk’s content is neither substantial nor insubstantial unless there is more to truth talk’s content than either an inferential deflationist’s inference rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies. Given a semantic discursivist’s explanatory commitment, we should expect that it is difficult—and perhaps impossible— to account for different facets of discursive objectivity, at least so long as we stick to a strictly deflationist account of truth talk’s content. Given the themes that I explore above in Chapter 4, we are in a better position to see how this is a misguided expectation. Given a semantic discursivist’s commitment to the explanatory role of both substantial and insubstantial truth, I explore above in Part II the extent to which we can account for a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity without attributing substance to truth talk’s content. In particular, I call attention to one widely

160 acknowledged facet of discursive objectivity above in Chapter 4, namely, strictly cognitive content and truth conditions. The thesis that a discourse’s content and truth conditions are strictly cognitive is closely aligned with our expectations that someone must be cognitively at fault, at least if there is a disagreement over a strictly cognitive issue. As with other facets of discursive objectivity, a semantic discursivist seeks to account for differences with respect to strictly cognitive content in terms of a substantial notion of truth, and I concentrate on Wright’s (1992) cognitive command approach. Given a semantic discursivist’s commitment to the explanatory role of substantial truth, we should expect that it is difficult or impossible to mark out the intended contrast—i. e., the idea that cognitively faultless disagreement is impossible—without a substantial account of truth talk. When we take a closer look at strictly cognitive content and truth conditions, substantial truth does not play the explanatory role that we should expect it to play, at least given a semantic discursivist picture. After all, the account of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions that I defend is compatible with a deflationist’s strictures about truth talk’s content. On this account, what matters for strictly cognitive content is whether someone in quotidian disagreement must be cognitively faulty—at least setting issues about vagueness aside. Unlike Wright’s cognitive command approach, this alternative does not appeal to conceptual connections between disagreement, cognitive fault, and a discourse’s semantic content and truth. Indeed, the modality in question is not conceptual necessity, but something akin to “necessity with respect to everyday or commonplace disagreement.” Given that the modality in question is something other than conceptual necessity, my account is compatible with a strictly deflationist approach to truth talk’s content. Accordingly, it is possible that account for some facets of objectivity without recourse to a substantial notion of truth.

161 Given this study of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions, there are general concerns about the explanatory role of the centerpiece of semantic discursivism, namely, truth talk’s substance. As the above study of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions shows, it is possible to account for some facets of discursive objectivity without a substantial account of truth talk’s semantic content. Since a semantic discursivist suggests that it is either difﬁcult or impossible to account for discursive objectivity without substantial truth, this is evidence against semantic discursivism. As the study of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions also reveals, an account that deploys a strictly deﬂationist account of truth talk might even have advantages over those that deploy substantial truth. For instance, the account that I defend handles Shapiro’s cases that I address above in Chapter 4, namely, the conceptual possibility that a disagreement over a strictly cognitive content is cognitively faultless. While semantic discursivists seek to explain discursive objectivity in terms of substantial truth, the case study of strictly cognitive content that I explore suggests that the explanatory role of truth talk’s substance is more limited than a semantic discursivist project requires.

Substance and Compositional Semantics

Along with the worry that I raise about the explanatory role of truth talk’s substance, I address the compositional motivation for substantial and insubstantial truth. As I discuss above in Chapter 3, some deflationists focus on rules that govern correct inferences with truth talk, and other deflationists focus on equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” While a deflationist claims that we can tell a complete story about truth talk’s semantic content with these linguistic resources (or similar resources), an inflationist claims that they only give us a partial

162 story. An inflationist claims not only that there is more to truth talk’s content, but also that there are additional considerations about compositional semantics that motivate these inflationist assumptions about truth talk’s content. I draw on the disagreement between a deflationist and an inflationist over truth talk’s content, especially whether compositional semantics motivates the inflationist’s assumptions about truth talk’s content, to shed light on the contrast between substantial and insubstantial truth. As I claim above in Chapter 3, truth talk is neither substantial nor insubstantial unless truth talk’s content is also inflated. In other words, if truth conditions are substantial, or if truth conditions are insubstantial, there is more to truth talk’s semantic content than either an inferential deflationist’s rules or a classical deflationist’s equivalencies. In addition, since truth talk’s content is inflated when it is either substantial or insubstantial, we should expect that considerations about compositional semantics support these additional assumptions about truth talk’s content. When a semantic discursivist claims that a discourse is objective, he claims that truth talk is substantial with respect to that discourse. When a semantic discursivist claims that a discourse is not objective, he claims that truth talk is insubstantial with respect to that discourse. Yet given the link between truth talk’s substance and compositional semantics, we should expect that for every claim that a semantic discursivist defends regarding truth talk’s substance, the target discourse’s compositional semantic role requires us to adopt these assumptions about truth talk’s substance. For instance, when a semantic discursivist claims that truth talk is substantial with respect to a discourse, we should expect that considerations about that discourse’s compositional semantic role somehow mandate that truth talk is substantial. Similarly, when we are dealing with a claim that truth talk is insub-

163 stantial, we should expect that the target discourse’s compositional semantic role supports this claim. I am skeptical about the extent to which compositional semantics systematically supports a semantic discursivist’s claims about truth talk’s substance. A case study that I explore above in Chapter 5 is a widely acknowledged species of insubstantial truth, namely, judge-dependent truth. In particular, I focus on a semantic discursivist thesis that Raffman (1994) and Shapiro (2006) defend, namely, that a vague sentence’s truth conditions are judge-dependent, at least partially. As I discuss above in Chapter 5, when truth talk is judge-dependent, the attitude independent facts do not settle whether every judge-dependent sentence is true. Moreover, when the attitude-independent facts do not settle whether a judge-dependent sentence is true, it is true because a judge (or judges) accept that it is true, at least in some cases. Given the link between truth talk’s substance and compositional semantics, we should expect that the compositional semantic role of vague sentences mandate that we adopt an assumption that a vague sentence’s truth conditions are judge-dependent. As I argue above in Chapter 5, a semantic discursivist who aims to show how compositional semantics supports the thesis that truth is judge-dependent with respect to a discourse should look to subjective attitude ascriptions akin to ‘Jones ﬁnds Smith boring’. Given a judge-shifting semantics, a subjective attitude ascription places a requirement on the semantic content and truth conditions of an embedded complement clause, namely, that it is judge-dependent. As such, we learn something about the truth conditions of complements that are acceptable under subjective attitude ascriptions, namely, something goes beyond how a deﬂationist conceives those truth conditions. As I discuss above in Chapter 5, there is no strong motivation to claim that a sentence’s truth conditions are judge-dependent unless

164 an associated complement is acceptable under a subjective attitude ascription. Yet I also show above in Chapter 5 that some vague sentences are not acceptable under subjective attitude ascriptions. If this line of argument is correct, it follows that there is no strong motivation for the thesis that the truth conditions of vague sentences are judge-dependent. While the case study of vagueness and subjective attitude ascriptions suggests that vague sentences do not have judge-dependent truth conditions, it also illustrates a discouraging record. In order to motivate claims about truth talk’s substance, a semantic discursivist is obliged to show how a discourse’s compositional semantic role requires that truth talk is either substantial or insubstantial. The attention that I give to a compositional semantic theory for subjective attitude ascriptions highlights the sort of considerations on which a semantic discursivist should focus, at least if he aims to motivate his assumptions about truth talk’s substance. In the case of vague sentences, once we take a closer look into their compositional semantic role, we see that this role does not motivate the claim that vague sentence’s have judge-dependent truth conditions. Since the case of vagueness is typical, it illustrates a general tendency among semantic discursivists. While either semantic discursivists claim that truth is substantial, or they claim that it is insubstantial, the compositional semantic role of the target discourse often does not motivate these claims about truth talk’s substance. Given the extent to which compositional semantics does not support claims about truth talk’s substance, I am skeptical about the extent to which truth conditions are substantial or insubstantial.

165 Beyond Semantic Discursivism

Given the worries that I raise above in Part II about the semantic discursivist project, we might explore further considerations about how a semantic discursivist should respond. As I mention above, I defend an account of strictly cognitive content and truth conditions, and I claim that my account is compatible with a strictly deflationist account of truth talk’s content. Since a semantic discursivist assigns truth talk’s substance an explanatory role with respect to discursive objectivity, a semantic discursivist might worry about whether my account is ultimately consistent with a strictly deflationist account of truth talk’s content. Alternatively, I exploit the semantic discursivist’s commitment to a compositionally motivated account of inflationist truth, since I claim that the compositional evidence does not neatly line up with semantic discursivist claims about truth talk’s substance. As I mention above, I show that compositionality considerations do not confirm the thesis that vague sentences have judge-dependent truth conditions. However, a semantic discursivist might somehow loosen up this compositionality requirement, or even jettison it. Yet rather than explore how we might tinker with the formulation of semantic discursivism that I defend above in Part I, or even how a semantic discursivist might challenge the case against semantic discursivism that I address above in Part II, I suggest that we explore an alternative to the semantic discursivist project that Frege initiated. Once we have an alternative approach in view, we are in a better position to evaluate whether it is worth returning to a semantic approach.

Methodological Deﬂationism

Given the direction of investigation that I suggest above, we are looking for an alternative to semantic discursivism according to which truth talk’s substance does

166 not play an explanatory role. Given this constraint, we should consider Hartry Field’s ((1994) 2001) suggestion that we take a strictly deflationist account of truth talk’s semantic content as a working hypothesis. Of course, this hypothesis varies according to which form of deflationism we favor. For instance, given an inferential deflationism that I address above in Chapter 3, the hypothesis is that, say, the inference rules that govern semantic shift completely account for the content of the expression ’true’. However, if we adopt a classic deflationist position, the hypothesis is that equivalencies akin to either “‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” or “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white” bestow content on the expression ‘true’. Field ((1994) 2001) calls this position methodological deflationism. As Field ((1994) 2001) observes, given a methodological deflationist position about truth talk’s content, it could turn out that strictly deflationist resources completely account for truth talk’s semantic content, but it could equally turn out that truth talk’s content is somehow inflationist. In other words, it might turn out that there is more to truth talk’s content than, say, the inference rules that govern semantic shift. Field ((1994) 2001) even claims,

It could also turn out that we ended up constructing something that might or might not be regarded as the inflationist’s relation “S has the truth conditions p”; in that case, the line between inflationism and metaphysical deflationism will turn out to have been blurred.

As a result, Field’s methodological deflationism is even consistent with a middle ground position between deflationism and inflationism. Yet if we adopt methodological deflationism, we must assume that a deflationist story is more or less correct unless—and until—we encounter contrary evidence. If we assume methodological deflationism, that is, if we assume something akin to a strictly deflationist account of truth talk’s semantic content as a work-

167 ing hypothesis, the puzzle that we face is how we should conceive of discursive objectivity. Of course, the focal point of a semantic discursivist project is truth talk’s substance. Yet we can no longer appeal to differences with respect to truth talk’s substance to explain differences with respect to objectivity, at least assuming a strictly deflationist’s story is correct. After all, truth talk’s content is neither substantial nor insubstantial, especially given the linguistic basis for a deflationist’s account of truth talk’s content (i. e., the inferential deflationist’s rules or the classical deflationist’s equivalencies). But even if a deflationist’s story about truth talk’s content is correct, we can still raise a question about the factors that influence discursive objectivity. In other words, even when we can no longer draw on differences with respect to truth talk’s substance, there remains a question about the factors influence discursive objectivity. Accordingly, I suggest that we look for an alternative to semantic discursivism that is at least consistent with methodological deflationism.

An Alternative to Semantic Discursivism

What factors inﬂuence a discourse’s status with respect to discursive objectivity? What is the linguistic basis of discursive objectivity? I suggest that we look to pragmatic factors about how a speaker uses a discourse in conversation. In particular, I defend a view that the linguistic basis for discursive objectivity is not truth talk’s substance, but a speaker’s attitudes toward information that is shared in conversation. While a semantic discursivist conceives discursive objectivity in terms of requirements on truth talk’s content, I recommend below in Chapter 7 that we conceive it in terms of requirements on a speaker’s attitude toward information that everyone in a conversation shares. I put the spotlight on two requirements that discursive objectivity places on a speaker and his attitudes about conversation. While

168 I briefly address these requirements below, I discuss them in more detail below in Chapter 7. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, that speaker must take for granted that the conversation is over a question, in particular, a question such that someone in a quotidian disagreement over the correct answer must be biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. In other words, discursive objectivity requires that a speaker take for granted that the conversation addresses a question that is strictly cognitive, in the sense that I defend above in Chapter 4. In that sense, a question is strictly cognitive provided that someone in an everyday or commonplace disagreement over that question’s answer must be cognitively at fault. As this requirement suggests, there are semantic and truth- conditional factors that contribute to discursive objectivity. Yet since the operative modality is not conceptual necessity but something akin to “necessity with respect to quotidian disagreement,” it follows that while semantic factors regarding cognitive content contribute to discursive objectivity, these factors are consistent with methodological deflationism. Along with the requirement concerning cognitive questions, discursive objectivity places another requirement on a speaker’s attitudes. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, the speaker should take for granted that there is a common goal among the participants in the conversation, namely, to coordinate only either what everyone knows, or what everyone believes. In other words, a speaker who uses an objective discourse must take for granted that the conversation over a question addresses only knowledge or belief. Of course, there are many attitudes other than knowledge and belief, including subjective attitudes akin to ‘Jones finds Smith boring’ that I mention above in Chapter 5. Moreover, a speaker might take for granted that a conversation aims to

169 coordinate these other attitudes. Yet when a discourse is objective, it is a requirement that a speaker takes for granted that epistemic and doxastic attitudes are the only attitudes that a conversation serves to coordinate. Before I consider how we should develop these requirements in more exact terms and explore their consequences, I survey some general considerations about linguistic communication. After I review an approach to linguistic communication that I favor, namely, the information structure approach that Craige Roberts (in both Roberts (1996) and (2002a)) defends, I draw on these general considerations below in Chapter 7 to give a more careful description of the alternative to semantic discursivism that I defend.

6.2 Linguistic Communication

As I mention above in Part I, a popular conception of semantic discursivism is due to philosophical work in the nineteen sixties, especially writers such as Dummett and Williams. A theme in the literature of this period that I discuss, both in Part I and Part II, is how semantic and truth-conditional factors account for discursive objectivity. During the same period, we ﬁnd other philosophers—for instance, Paul H. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker—wrestling with the extent to which both semantic and truth-conditional factors could account for other aspects of language, especially linguistic communication. Can we account for linguistic communication with semantic and truth-conditional factors alone? A common theme emerges in these discussions. On one hand, there is wide acknowledgment that there is a suitable place for considerations about semantic content and truth conditions within our approach to linguistic communication. On the other hand, it is difﬁcult to account for linguistic communication

170 strictly in terms of both semantic and truth-conditional factors. In order to account for linguistic communication, we need to look for something more. According to an information structure approach, what is missing is the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation. Yet before I elaborate the information structure approach, let us consider two observations that generate the worry that it is difﬁcult to formulate an account of linguistic communication simply in terms of semantic content and truth conditions. After I discuss these two observations, I turn to the account of linguistic communication that I favor, namely, Roberts’ information structure approach.

Conversational Acceptability

As I suggest above, when addressing whether we can completely account for linguistic communication with an exclusive focus on semantic content and truth conditions, there are two observations that are often cited. The first observation concerns our acceptability judgments. When a participant contributes to a conversation, for instance, when he asserts something, competent speakers make judgments regarding whether that contribution is acceptable with respect to the conversation. There are factors that influence a competent speaker’s acceptability judgments, and a theory of linguistic communication should account for these factors. Of course, the speech act’s semantic content and truth conditions influences our competent acceptability judgments. Yet there is some evidence that there is more going on than a competent speaker’s attention to semantic content and truth conditions. If that is right, even if a theory of linguistic communication requires a theory of semantic content and truth conditions, there are other factors that merit our theoretical attention, too.

171 Let us consider a phenomenon that illustrates how factors other than semantic content and truth conditions inﬂuence our acceptability judgments, namely, pragmatic presupposition. As a preliminary, let us say that a speaker pragmatically presupposes something with respect to a conversation provided that not only does he take it for granted in that conversation, but he also takes it for granted that everyone else takes it for granted, too. I address pragmatic presupposition more carefully below (see Section 6.4), where I suggest that we conceive pragmatic presuppositions in terms of what a speaker accepts is common information among everyone in a conversation (e. g., including common knowledge and common belief). However, even given this preliminary characterization in terms of what a speaker takes for granted, it is widely agreed that pragmatic presuppositions inﬂuence a competent speaker’s judgments regarding whether a speech act is acceptable with respect to a conversation. Yet a speaker may pragmatically presuppose something in conjunction with a speech act, even though that speech act’s semantic content and truth conditions do not fully account for the relevant presupposition. This consideration supports the concern that I address above, namely, that we cannot completely account for linguistic communication in terms of semantic content and truth conditions. As an illustration, we may consider some examples that are due to Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234), though perhaps the examples originate in Stalnaker (1973). If we adopt the standard truth-functional interpretation of the expression ‘and’, the truth conditions of example (6.1 a) and example (6.1 b) are identical.

(6.1) (a) Fred has children, and all Fred’s children are asleep.

(b) #All Fred’s children are asleep, and Fred has children. (Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234))

172 After all, the only difference between the two examples is the ordering of the con- juncts with respect to the expression ‘and’, and this difference is orthogonal to both semantic content and truth conditions. If the only factors that inﬂuence a competent speaker’s acceptability judgments are either semantic or truth-conditional factors, we should expect that competent speakers judge these sentences alike with respect to conversational acceptability. Yet a competent speaker judges examples (6.1 a) and (6.1 b) differently with respect to acceptability. While a competent speaker judges that example (6.1 a) is acceptable, he judges that (6.1 b) is unacceptable (where the hash mark ‘#’ indicates unacceptability).1 As Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234) notes, “it is peculiar to say, out of the blue, ‘All Fred’s children are asleep, and Fred has children.’” He offers an explanation for these different acceptability judgments (see Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234, my additions in brackets)).

The ﬁrst part [‘All Fred’s children are asleep’] requires and thereby cre- ates a presupposition that Fred has children; so the second part [‘Fred has children’] adds nothing to what is already presupposed when it is said; so the second part has no conversational point. It would not have been peculiar to say instead “Fred has children, and all Fred’s children are asleep.”

On Lewis’ diagnosis, when a competent speaker assertively utters the sentence ‘All Fred’s children are asleep’, that speaker not only takes it for granted that Fred has children, but he also takes it for granted that everyone else takes it for granted that Fred has children. Given this presupposition that accompanies the speaker’s 1As I indicate above, the examples from Lewis that I discuss above are remarkably similar to some examples that Stalnaker (1973) addresses in a prior publication, though Lewis does not explicitly acknowledge that Stalnaker inspired the examples. Like Lewis, Stalnaker (1973) suggests that while competent speakers judge that example (6.2 a) is acceptable, they judge that example (6.2 b) is unacceptable (where the hash mark ‘#’ indicates unacceptability). (6.2) (a) John has children, and all of his children are asleep. (due to Stalnaker (1973, 455)) (b) #John’s aardvark is sleeping, and John has an aardvark. (due to Stalnaker (1973, 454))

173 speech act, Lewis worries that it is difficult to see the point of asserting the final conjunct, namely, ‘and Fred has children’. After all, the speaker already takes for granted that Fred has children. Indeed, he takes it for granted that everyone else takes for granted that Fred has children. Since it has no point, as Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234) suggests, a competent speaker judges that it is unacceptable, at least other things being equal. Lewis’ illustration shows how a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions influence his competent judgments about a speech act’s acceptability, even though neither the speech act’s semantic content, nor its truth conditions cover these presuppositions. As I mention above, a theory of linguistic communication seeks to account for the factors that influence a competent speaker’s judgments about conversational acceptability. Since a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions influences competent acceptability judgments, and since there are cases where semantic content and truth conditions do not completely account for a speaker’s presuppositions, a theory of linguistic communication should take into account factors other than semantic content and truth conditions.

Conversational Dynamics

While the ﬁrst observation concerns our judgments about conversational acceptability, the second observation concerns our judgments about conversational dynamics. Again, consider a participant who makes a contribution to a conversation, for instance, an assertion. When a competent speaker reﬂects on that assertion, he judges how it changes the subsequent conversation—or at least how it would change the conversation if it were accepted by everyone. After all, if no one challenges an assertion in a conversation, both the speaker and everyone else takes it for granted in subsequent conversation. A speaker’s judgments about how a per-

174 son’s contributions to a conversation change an ongoing conversation (or would change it modulo everyone’s acceptance) are judgments about that speech act’s conversational dynamics. Since a theory of linguistic communication should account for a speaker’s competent judgments about conversational dynamics, we need an account of the factors that influence these judgments, too. Just as with conversational acceptability, a speech act’s conversational dynamics is partially a matter of the speech act’s semantic content and truth conditions. However, just as there is evidence that there are other factors influence competent judgments about conversational acceptability, there is evidence that other factors influence competent judgments about conversational dynamics, too. We can again turn to pragmatic presuppositions, since they illustrate some factors that influence conversational dynamics. Let us revisit the example above from Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234). Suppose that Smith is talking to Jones, and Smith asserts that all Fred’s children are sleeping. In addition to his assertion, Smith pragmatically presupposes that Fred has children. Of course, when a competent speaker reflects on how Smith’s assertion changes subsequent conversation (or how it would change conversation modulo everyone’s acceptance), he takes into consideration semantic and truth-conditional factors. For instance, the speaker attends to the semantic content and truth conditions of Smith’s assertion that all Fred’s children are sleeping. It follows that if Jones accepts Smith’s assertion, both Smith and Jones take it for granted in subsequent conversation that all Fred’s children are sleeping. They also take for granted that the other takes it for granted, too. Yet this is not all that Smith and Jones take for granted, at least given Smith’s presupposition. For argument’s sake, let us assume that the sentence ‘All Fred’s children are sleeping’ does not entail the sentence ‘Fred has children’. Given the semantic content and truth conditions of these sentences, the former might be true even when

175 the latter is false. If Jones finds Smith’s assertion acceptable, both Smith and Jones take more for granted in subsequent conversation than simply that all Fred’s children are sleeping. After all, they both take the presupposition for granted, too. In other words, Smith and Jones take for granted in subsequent conversation that Fred has children. Indeed, they take for granted that the other person takes for granted that Fred has children. However, the semantic content and truth conditions of Smith’s speech act does not capture this presupposition, given our assumption that the semantic content and truth conditions of the sentence that Smith asserts does not entail Smith’s presupposition. Along with our acceptability judgments, the discussion above suggests that there are factors other than semantic content and truth conditions that influence competent judgments regarding conversational dynamics. When a speaker evaluates a speech act’s conversational dynamic, he evaluates how the speech act influences subsequent conversation, or how it would influence it modulo the fact that everyone else accepts it. Just as in the case of acceptability judgments, the pragmatic presuppositions that accompany a speech act influence our judgments regarding conversational dynamics. Since a speech act’s semantic content and truth conditions often do not cover a speaker’s additional presuppositions, a theory of linguistic communication requires more than a theory of semantic content and truth conditions.

6.3 Information Structure

I call attention to two facets of linguistic communication in the discussion above, namely, conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. Since a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions inﬂuence his competent judgments about both accept-

176 ability and dynamics, it is difficult to account for linguistic communication simply in terms of semantic content and truth conditions. Given this difficulty, I concentrate on an account of communication that does not make this assumption. In the discussion below, I concentrate on Craige Roberts’ information structure approach to linguistic communication (see both Roberts (1996) and (2002a)). An advantage of Roberts’ approach is how it synthesizes insights from prior approaches, including Paul H. Grice (1989b), David Lewis ((1979) 1983), and Robert Stalnaker ((1978) 1999). While Roberts’ information structure approach is the focal point of the discussion, I call attention how her view incorporates these other views, too. Once I address the central aspects of Roberts’ approach to linguistic communication, I turn to how it accounts for the factors the influence competent judgment about both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics.2

Communication and Scorekeeping

Roberts (1996, 92-93) draws attention to an analogy between linguistic communication and games. However, the analogy is widely acknowledged, and other discuss it too, including both Lewis ((1979) 1983, 236-238) and Stalnaker ((1978) 1999, 88). The analogy is often attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein, and he (1958) coined the term ‘language-game’. Before I investigate Roberts’ information structure approach to linguistic communication, let us consider Lewis’ discussion of the similarities between scorekeeping in the game of baseball and what he ((1979) 1983, 238) calls conversational scorekeeping. 2Along with Lewis ((1978) 1983), see Lewis’ other work in the nineteen seventies, especially Lewis (1973) and (1979a). Stalnaker’s inﬂuential publications from the nineteen seventies are also relevant, i. e., Stalnaker (1970), (1973), (1974), and (1978). In addition, see Stalnaker’s subsequent publications, including Stalnaker (1998), (1999), (2002), (2004), (2006), and (2008). Unlike both Lewis and Stalnaker, Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)) focuses on common inquiry in linguistic communication (see also Roberts (1998a), (1998b), (2002b), (2004b), and (2004a)). Her co-authored work is also relevant (see Kadmon and Roberts (1986), as well as Paul C. Davis, Robert T. Kasper, and Craige Roberts (1999)).

177 In a baseball game, there are two teams, namely, the home team and the visiting team. A game is divided into different innings, and for each inning, there is both a top half and a bottom half. During each half, while one team tries to score runs, the opposing team tries to get the other players out. In view of these goals, players on each team make moves: for instance, throwing a pitch, hitting the ball, catching the ball, running to base, and so on. Once they get three outs, the game moves to the next inning. At that stage, a team’s role also shifts. For instance, the second team tries to score runs, and the ﬁrst team tries to get players out. As a baseball game proceeds, the score changes as a partial function of the moves in the game. For instance, when a player runs across home plate, the team gets an additional run; when a pitcher pitches a third strike, the opposing team gets an additional out. As the game score changes, the moves that are acceptable in the game change, too. For instance, once a team gets three outs during a given inning, they can no longer go up to bat, and the players on the opposing team get to bat. As I mention above, Lewis ((1979) 1983, 233) suggests that there are facets of a “well-run conversation” that are analogous to the components of a baseball game. While Lewis discusses several comparable features, I focus on three similarities in the discussion below: scorekeeping, acceptability, and dynamics.

Conversational Scorekeeping

An important similarity between baseball and communication to which Lewis calls attention is our practice of keeping score. As Lewis ((1979) 1983, 236) suggests, we might conceive the score of a baseball game at a given stage as an ordered set whose members include the visiting team’s runs, the home team’s runs, the half (whether top or bottom), the inning, the strikes, balls, and the outs. As the game proceeds, we track how the game’s score changes. In other words, we look for

178 additional runs, inning changes, strikes, and so on. Lewis suggests that there is something akin to a scorekeeping practice in a conversation, too. Just as we may conceive of a baseball game’s score as an ordered set, so too we might think of the score of a conversation at a given stage as a ordered set. As the conversation proceeds, we track how the score changes. Lewis’ observation that we keep score in conversation is widely accepted, for instance, both Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) and Roberts (1996) accept something akin to it. However, there is little or no consensus over exactly what are the components of conversational score. According to Lewis ((1979) 1983, 236), the score in a conversation is a set that includes, among other things, what is commonly taken for granted in the conversation. When Lewis emphasizes that the conversational score includes what is commonly taken for granted in conversation, he is following Stal- naker’s lead. As I discuss below, Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) highlights how we keep track of common knowledge, common belief, and other similar common attitudes. Unlike both Lewis and Stalnaker, Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)) emphasizes how we keep track of questions, especially questions that are the target of common inquiry.

Conversational Acceptability

Along with the scorekeeping analogy, Lewis ((1979) 1983) draws attention to another analogy between baseball and conversation. The second similarity is the fact that a move’s status with respect to acceptability is partially a function of the score. As I mention above, baseball players make various moves in the game, for instance, a player might hit the ball. However, whether hitting the ball is an acceptable move is a function not only of the player’s team, but also whether it is the top or bottom half of an inning. It is unacceptable for a player to hit the ball unless

179 his team is up to bat at that half of the inning. Just as with baseball, Lewis suggests that we make moves in conversation, and the status of a move in conversation with respect to acceptability turns on the conversational score. The examples due to Lewis ((1979) 1983, 234) that I address above—namely, the sentences ‘All Fred’s children are asleep’ and ‘Fred has children’—illustrate how a speech act’s acceptability turns on matters of conversational score. If a speaker asserts that all Fred’s children are asleep, and everyone accepts that assertion, then it is commonly accepted in subsequent conversation that all Fred’s children are asleep. However, when a speaker asserts that all Fred’s children are asleep, he also pragmatically presupposes that Fred has children. When everyone accepts the speaker’s assertion, they also accept his presupposition. It follows that the speaker’s presupposition—i. e., that Fred has children—is also commonly accepted in subsequent conversation . Given that it is commonly accepted that Fred has children, it is unacceptable for the speaker to subsequently assert that Fred has children.

Conversational Dynamics

A ﬁnal point of comparison between a baseball game and a conversation is what Lewis ((1979) 1983, 236) calls the “kinematics of score.” As I mention above, when we move from the top half to the bottom half, or we move from one inning to the next, the score in a baseball game changes as a function of the moves that players make. When the opposing team gets a player out, the number of outs changes; when the pitcher throws a strike, the number of strikes changes, too. Lewis claims that the score in a conversation is partially a function of the moves in the conversation, too. In particular, Lewis ((1979) 1983, 236) claims,

180 Score evolves in a more-or-less rule-governed way. There are rules that specify the kinematics of score: ... If at time t the conversational score is s, and if between time t and time t0 the course of conversation is c, then at time t0 the score is s0, where s0 is determined in a certain way by s and c.

In the terminology that I utilize above, the idea is that a speech act displays conversational dynamics—that is, it changes subsequent conversation modulo that fact that everyone accepts it. The score in a conversation changes to reflect not only the fact that a speaker performs a speech act, but also to reflect the fact that everyone accepted it. For instance, since what is commonly taken for granted is a facet of the score at a given stage in a conversation, when everyone accepts what a speaker asserts at that stage, the conversational score changes to reflect this fact.

An Information Structure Approach

As I mention above, I favor Roberts’ information structure approach to linguistic communication (see both Roberts (1996) and (2002a)). On an information structure approach, a competent speaker associates a conversation with a body of information that everyone in the conversation shares. In this respect, an information structure approach builds on Lewis’ ﬁrst analogy between baseball and communication, namely, the practice of scorekeeping. From an information structure perspective, the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation is akin to the score of a baseball game. Just as the score changes as a baseball game proceeds, so too does the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation. As I suggest above, there little consensus over what are the elements of conversational score. Accordingly, there is disagreement over precisely what information a speaker associates with a conversation.

181 Even though there is disagreement about the information that a speaker associates with a conversation, Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)) highlights two more or less uncontroversial facets of the body of shared information that a competent speaker associates with a conversation. When a speaker reﬂects on a conversation, the speaker pays attention to what is commonly known, commonly believed, and other similar shared attitudes. Following Stalnaker ((1978) 1999), this facet of the information that a speaker associates with a conversation is often called the common ground of a conversation. Along with the common ground, Roberts observes that speakers also give attention to questions, especially questions that are under common inquiry in a conversation. In other words, when a speaker considers a given conversation, he concentrates on questions that are under common investigation in a conversation. Following Roberts, I call this the questions under discussion in a conversation. After I address the common ground and the questions under discussion, I return to pragmatic presuppositions that I discuss above. Following both Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) and Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)), I suggest that we think about a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions in terms of what he accepts regarding both the common ground and the questions under discussion. After I utilize the common ground and the questions under discussion to shed light on a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions, I revisit conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. An information structure approach draws on the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation to account for competent judgments that the speaker makes regarding both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. In other words, when a speaker evaluates whether a speech act is acceptable (or what Roberts (2002a, 198) calls “felicitous”), his evaluation partially rests on the common ground and questions

182 under discussion that he associates with that conversation. An information structure theorist gives a similar story regarding conversational dynamics. A competent speaker’s evaluation of a speech act’s conversational dynamics rests partially on the body of shared information that he associates with the conversation, especially his views about what is common ground and what are question under discussion.

Common Ground

Famously, Grice observes that some claims have what he calls a “common ground status” with respect to a conversation (e. g., see Grice (1989b, 65, 274)). When something has a common ground status in a conversation, the status is partially due to the fact that our conversations occur against a background of common belief and common knowledge. Stalnaker ((1974) 1999, 48) recalls Grice’s observation, when he claims,

Communication ... normally takes place against a background of beliefs or assumptions which are shared by the speaker and his audience, and which are recognized by them to be shared (see also Stalnaker (1973, 448)).

While Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) argues that there is more to the common ground than common belief and common knowledge, let us explore common belief and common knowledge before I address other factors that inﬂuence the common ground. When is something commonly believed or commonly known? As an illustration, let’s consider Robert Stalnaker’s ((1978) 1999) well-known stray goat example. Imagine that Smith and Jones are talking, and, during their conversation, they are both startled to see a goat walk through the door. Given this situation, we can also imagine that Smith believes that there is a goat in the room, and Jones believes the same thing. Indeed, Smith believes that they both believe that there is a goat in the room, and Jones believes that this is what they both believe, too. Given these

183 imagined facts, it is evident that they share a belief about the stray goat: it is a common belief among Smith and Jones that there is a stray goat in the room. A general picture of common belief emerges from Stalnaker’s ((1978) 1999) stray goat illustration. When something is a common belief with respect to a conversation, everyone in the conversation believes it, everyone believes that everyone believes it, everyone believes that everyone believes that everyone believes it, and so on ad infinitum (see Stalnaker (2002, 706)). In the imagined scenario, it is thus a common belief that there is a goat in the room. When it comes to common knowledge, the picture is similar mutadis mutandis. In other words, if it is commonly known that there is a goat in the room, everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so forth. While many theories of linguistic communication accept that common knowledge and common belief are factors that influence competent judgments about both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics, it is also widely agreed that there are other factors that influence these judgments, too. Along with both common knowledge and common belief, Stalnaker (2002) calls attention to shared assumptions, pretenses, and other attitudes that accompany our conversation. When we talk to one another, we often adopt shared temporary assumptions about the subject-matter under discussion, or we even just pretend together. Just as with knowledge and belief, assumptions and pretenses might acquire a common ground status in a conversation. As a result, the common ground includes not merely common knowledge and common belief, but also common assumptions and common pretenses. As an illustration, consider a conversation inspired by Stalnaker’s ((1974) 1999, 51) barber shop example. Imagine that Jones is getting a hair cut. It is snowing

184 outside, and it is both common belief and common knowledge between Jones and his barber that it is snowing. After some idle discussion, they run out of things to say to one another. In order to avoid an awkward silence, the barber raises a question about the weather. In the imagined situation, the barber pretends not merely that he does not know that it is snowing outside, but also that he does not even believe it. Jones knows that it is both common belief and common knowledge that it is snowing outside. After all, he knows his barber can see the snow outside the window. Still, Jones pretends along with his barber. We can imagine that the barber believes that they are both pretending that he does not know or believe that it is snowing outside, and Jones believes the same thing. As we might expect, it becomes a common pretense between Jones and his barber that the barber does not know or believe that it is snowing outside. When Jones tells the barber about the snowy weather, his remarks thus occur against a shared pretense that the barber does not know or believe that it is snowing, even when it is in fact common knowledge and common belief. Following Stalnaker’s (2002) common ground approach, we might adopt a gen- eralization that covers these different cases, despite the fact that knowledge, belief, assumptions, and pretenses are different attitudes. Stalnaker (2002, 716) recommends that we treat ‘acceptance’ as a cover term that includes not only knowledge and belief, but also assumptions, pretenses, and other similar attitudes. On Stalnaker’s (2002, 716) view, when a person accepts a semantic content as true, he treats it as true for some reason, and he ignores the possibility that it is false, at least temporally. Conversation thus occurs against the background not merely of our common knowledge and common belief, but what we commonly accept—that is, what Stalnaker (2002, 716) calls a conversation’s common ground. When something is commonly accepted with respect to a conversation, everyone accepts it (for

185 the current purposes of that conversation), everyone accepts that everyone accepts it, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone accepts it, and so on ad inﬁnitum (see Stalnaker (2002, 716)).3

Questions Under Discussion

As I mention above, Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)) synthesizes Stalnaker’s insights regarding the common ground of a conversation. On her information structure approach, a speaker associates a body of shared information with a conversation, and this information includes the common ground. In other words, when a speaker reﬂects on a conversation, he pays attention to what is common ground in that conversation. As I indicate above, there is more to the common ground of a conversation than what is commonly known or commonly believed—there are also common assumptions and common pretenses. However, Roberts suggests that there is even more to the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation than these additional factors. Roberts develops another insight from Grice (1989b, 26), namely, Grice’s observation that a conversation has a “common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.” Along with a conversation’s common ground, Roberts claims that our conversations occur against the background of common goals or purposes. Among the goals that we share when we engage in a conversation, Roberts (1996) emphasizes the signiﬁcance of common inquiry. When we talk to one another, not only is there a common ground in the background, but there are also questions that are under communal investigation. Given that there is a 3While I utilize the term ‘acceptance’ above in Chapter 4, Stalnaker’s use of this is broader than the characterization that I adopt in Chapter 4. As I use the term above, a person who accepts something either believes or asserts it, but Stalnaker’s use of the term also includes, say, assumptions and pretenses. Since the differences do not matter much for the discussion below, I will leave it to context to disambiguate the different uses.

186 shared interest in answering a given question, Roberts’ idea is that the question acquires a common ground status that resembles the common ground status that we assign to common knowledge, common belief, and so on. Roberts calls this facet of the body of information that a speaker associates with a conversation the questions under discussion (see Roberts (1996, 100) and (2002a, 202)). As an illustration, consider that Smith and Jones are talking together about a homework assignment. They are stuck on the third problem. Given this situation, we can imagine that Smith intends to answer a question, namely, what is the solution to the third problem? Jones has a similar intention, too. Smith believes that they both intend to answer that question, and Jones believes the same thing as Smith. Given the imagined scenario, we are dealing with a conversation where there is a question under discussion. After all, Smith and Jones have something in common, namely, an intention to ﬁgure out the third problem. As I indicate above, an item is common ground in a conversation provided that everyone accepts it, everyone accepts that everyone accepts it, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone accepts it, etc. We can think about common inquiry in a similar fashion. When an issue is a question under discussion with respect to a conversation, everyone in that conversation intends to answer that question (for the purposes of conversation), everyone accepts that everyone intends to answer that question, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone intends to answer that question, and so on. On the information structure approach that Roberts defends, a speaker not only associates a conversation with what is common ground among the participants, but also what questions are under discussion.

187 Information Structure

Before I turn to how the information structure approach to communication bears on presupposition, let me summarize the facets of information structure that I address above. According to an information structure approach to linguistic communication, competent speakers associate a conversation with a body of share information. Roberts (in both (1996) and (2002a)) incorporates Stalnaker’s insight that competent speakers associate a conversation at least with what is commonly known, commonly believed, etc. We might regiment something akin to Stalnaker’s common ground along these lines, where ‘Φ’ is a schematic variable that ranges over semantic contents.

Common Ground It is common ground that Φ with respect to both a conversation if and only if in that conversation, everyone accepts that Φ (for the purposes of that conversation), everyone accepts that everyone accepts that Φ, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone accepts that Φ, and so on ad inﬁnitum.

In addition to the common ground, Roberts highlights how competent speakers associate a conversation with questions that are under common investigation. We might regiment something akin to Roberts’ questions under discussion in similar terms.

Question Under Discussion It is a question under discussion whether Φ with respect to both a conversation if and only if in that conversation, everyone inquires whether Φ (for the purposes of that conversation), everyone accepts that everyone inquires whether Φ, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone inquiries whether Φ, and so on ad inﬁnitum.

188 6.4 Pragmatic Presupposition

As I suggest above, a competent speaker’s judgments about both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics are inﬂuenced by pragmatic presuppositions. I gave a preliminary characterization of pragmatic presupposition in terms of not only what a speaker takes for granted, but also what he takes for granted that everyone else takes for granted (see above in Section 6.2). However, given the attention that I given that the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation, especially the common ground and the questions under discussion, there is a more subtle way to think about pragmatic presuppositions. Following both Stalnaker and Roberts, I suggest that we conceive a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions in terms of what he accepts is information that everyone in a conversation shares, especially what is common ground and what is under discussion. The members of a conversation have attitudes regarding what is common ground in that conversation. In some cases, we know things about the common ground, or at least we have beliefs about it. In the stray goat illustration that I address above (see Section 6.3), it is common ground between you and I that there is a goat in the room. In addition, I believe that this is common ground, and you do too. When I ask you a question about the goat—for instance, “How did that thing get in here?”—it is in view of what I know or believe about the common ground that I contribute to our discussion. Along with my knowledge and beliefs about the common ground, there are other attitudes about the common ground that matter for conversation, including assumptions and presumptions. Consider another illustration from Stalnaker (1999, 48-49). Imagine I am getting a haircut, as I mention above, but my stylist and I broach a political issue. Suppose that I do not know how much he follows the current political situation, or even have any beliefs about the matter at all. Even so, I assume or presume that he knows some

189 basic facts about our political situation. For instance, I assume that he knows that Barack Obama is the current president of the United States. Given the direction that I recommend above, it might be useful to describe the situation in terms of what I accept rather than what I know or believe, where acceptance is a cover term for a range of propositional attitudes, as I mention above. In those terms, I accept that it is common ground between my stylist and I that Barak Obama is the current president, even if I do not know or believe this is common ground. Generally speaking, when a speaker makes a contribution to a conversation, she does so in view of what she accepts about the common ground of that conversation (see Stalnaker (1973, 447) for further discussion). In Stalnaker’s view, we can think about our views about the common ground in a conversation in terms of a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions. Stalnaker ((1978) 1999, 84) claims,

Roughly speaking, the presuppositions of a speaker are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted as part of the background of the conversation. ... Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the COMMONGROUND of the participants in the conversation, what is treated as their COMMONKNOWLEDGE or MUTUALKNOWLEDGE.

On this view, as Stalnaker (1970, 279) emphasizes, it is not linguistic items that are the bearers of presuppositions, at least primarily, it is speakers. Following Stal- naker, we might understand pragmatic presupposition in terms of what a speaker accepts regarding the items that are common ground in a conversation, or at least partially as the regimentation below suggests.

Common Ground Presuppositions If a speaker accepts that it is common ground that Φ with respect to a conversation, then that speaker pragmatically presupposes that Φ in that conversation.

Given the formulation above, a speaker presupposition reﬂects a speaker’s current attitudes about the conversation’s common ground. While a speaker often has

190 attitudes about the conversation, we might extend this approach to pragmatic presuppositions, so that it includes attitudes that a speaker simply acts as if he adopts regarding the common ground. As Stalnaker often emphasizes, we might understand a speakers pragmatic presuppositions not in terms of a speaker’s current attitudes about the common ground, but in terms of how a speaker is disposed to act regarding what is common ground in a conversation. For example, Stalnaker (1970, 279) claims that “a person need [not] have any particular mental attitude toward a proposition,” and a person need not “assume anything about the mental attitudes of others in the context.” Given this direction, Stalnaker (1970, 279) claims that that presuppositions are “best viewed as complex dispositions which are manifested in our linguistic behavior.” Accordingly, when Stalnaker formulates his analysis of presuppositions, he often uses disposition talk, too. For instance, Stalnaker (1973, 448) claims,

A speaker’s presupposes that P at a given moment in conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his linguistic behavior, as he he takes the truth of P for granted, and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so.

Yet since this difference is immaterial to discussion below, it would needlessly complicate the discussion to take it into consideration. As such, I stick to the simpler formulation in terms of a speaker’s current attitudes abut the common ground. I highlight in the discussion above that a speaker has views about what is common ground in a conversation. Following Stalnaker ((1978) 1999), I suggest that we understand a speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions partially in terms of his views about what is common ground. When he accepts that something is common ground, he pragmatically presupposes it. Yet a speaker’s views about a conversation’s information structure are not limited simply to what is common ground.

191 A speaker also has views about what is under discussion in a conversation. Fol- lowing Roberts (1996), we can understand these views in terms of pragmatic presupposition, too. In other words, a speaker who accepts that a question is under discussion in a conversation is someone who presupposes it. Just as a speaker who presupposes something does not explicitly assert what is presupposed, so too a speaker who presupposes a question does not explicitly raise the question. According, we may understand another dimension of presupposition along these lines.

Q.U.D. Presuppositions If a speaker accepts that it is a question under discussion whether Φ with respect to a conversation, then that speaker pragmatically presupposes the question Φ in that conversation.

6.5 Assertion and Inquiry

Following Grice (1989a), Roberts observes that a participant’s linguistic conduct is rule-governed. There are rules that govern the language that a participant uses, both syntactic and semantic. Yet there are also rules that govern whether the participant’s linguistic conduct is rational (see Roberts (1996, 93)). As Roberts (1996, 92) observes, linguistic communication is a practice with a purpose, namely, to share information. This is what she (1996, 94) calls a discourse goal. Given an information structure approach, we can conceive this purpose in terms of the body of shared information that a speaker associates with a conversation. The purpose of linguistic communication is to inﬂuence the body of information that everyone in the conversation shares. The rules that govern whether linguistic conduct in a conversation is rational stem from whether that conduct promotes the goal of discourse, namely, sharing information.

192 As I suggest above, when a person makes a contribution to a conversation, his contribution serves to promote a purpose of conversation, namely, sharing information. For instance, if a speaker asserts something in a conversation, his assertion serves to transform the body of shared information that the speaker associates with that conversation. This is true not merely of assertions, but other speech acts, too. Following Roberts (1996, 93), I concentrate on both assertion and inquiry (i. e., ask- ing questions). The purpose that is associated with assertion and inquiry is similar to Lewis’ third analogy between baseball and communication that I address above, namely, conversational dynamics. Just as moves in a baseball game change the score in a systematic fashion as the game proceeds, so too moves in conversation change the body of information that a speaker associates with a conversation. We may think about how assertions and inquiries change this body of shared information in terms of a speech act’s semantic content (or what Roberts (1996, 93) calls “proffered content”) and presupposed content.

Assertion If a speaker sincerely asserts a content in a conversation, and everyone else in that conversation accepts that assertion, then other things being equal, that speaker updates the body of shared information that he subsequently associates with that conversation.

Inquiry If a speaker sincerely asks a question in a conversation, and everyone else in that conversation accepts that question, then other things being equal, that speaker updates the body of shared information that he subsequently associates with that conversation.

193 6.6 Conclusion

An information structure approach to linguistic communication is the focal point of my remarks above. For an information structure theorist, a speaker associates a conversation with a body of shared information, and that body of information serves to explain that speaker’s competent judgments, both about conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. According to Roberts’ information structure approach, a speaker associates a conversation not only with a common ground (i. e., what is commonly accepted), but also the questions under discussion (i. e., the questions that are the target of common inquiry). While I brieﬂy address in the remarks above the alternative to semantic discursivism that I defend, I offer a more detailed exposition below in Chapter 7. An information structure approach serves as the theoretical framework in terms of which I frame this alternative account of discursive objectivity. As I show in both Part I and Part II, a semantic discursivist calls attention to semantic factors about truth talk’s content. Unlike a semantic discursivist, I concentrate on pragmatic factors about how a speaker uses a discourse, especially the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation. Accordingly, I recommend that we conceive discursive objectivity in terms of requirements on the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation.

194 Chapter Seven

Questions, Attitudes, and Objectivity

Our conceptions of coherence and acceptability are ... deeply interwoven with our psychology. They depend on our biology and our culture; they are by no means ‘value free’. But they are our conceptions, and they are conceptions of something real. They deﬁne a kind of objectivity, objectivity for us, even if it is not the metaphysical objectivity of the God’s Eye view. Objectivity and rationality humanly speaking are what we have; they are better than nothing.

Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History

7.1 Introduction

HE ATTENTION THAT I give to linguistic communication above in Chapter 6 T marks an important transition, especially given that the focus is a semantic approach to discursive objectivity in both Part I and Part II. The motivation for

195 the transition stems from a recommendation that I put forward above in Chapter 6, namely, that we should seek an account of discursive objectivity that is compatible with a working hypothesis that we can account for truth talk’s content in strictly deflationist terms. This is the hypothesis that Field ((1994) 2001) calls methodological deflationism. For instance, from an inferential deflationist perspective, methodological deflationism amounts to the hypothesis that the rules that govern semantic shift completely capture the content of the expression ‘true’—at least setting issues about semantic paradox aside. Of course, what methodological deflationism comes to ultimately depends on the deflationist view that we adopt, and I call attention to other alternatives above in Chapter 3. No matter how exactly we implement this recommendation, it follows that we can no longer appeal to a semantic approach to discursive objectivity. As I indicate above in Chapter 6, an information structure approach to linguistic communication serves as the theoretical backdrop for an alternative to semantic discursivism that I develop below. Like other approaches to linguistic communication, it seeks to account for the linguistic factors that influence competent judgments about speech acts in conversation. In particular, I put the spotlight on both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. While conversational acceptability concerns our judgments about whether, say, an assertion is acceptable in a conversation, conversational dynamics concerns our judgments about how a speech act changes a conversation, or at least how it would change the conversation if everyone had accepted it. An information structure approach highlights how speakers associate a conversation with a body of shared information, and this information influences competent judgments about conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics. While various approaches conceive this body of information differently, I call

196 attention above in Chapter 6 not only to what Stalnaker ((1978) 1999, 84) calls a conversation’s common ground, but also to what Roberts (1996, 100) calls the questions under discussion in a conversation. The common ground of a conversation includes information regarding common knowledge, common belief, common assumptions, and common pretenses. The questions under discussion in a conversation includes information regarding questions that are the target of a common inquiry. Before I say more about an alternative approach to discursive objectivity, let me rehearse why semantic discursivism is incompatible with methodological deﬂationism (see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

Semantic Discursivism

As I mention above, methodological deﬂationism is incompatible with semantic discursivism. The incompatibility stems from the requirements that a semantic discursivist places on truth talk’s content with respect to an objective discourse. As I argue above in Chapter 3, we should understand the semantic discursivist approach to objectivity in terms of two requirements on truth talk’s semantic content. One is the inﬂationist requirement, and the other is the substance requirement.

Inflation I recommend above in Chapter 3 that we utilize deflationism to understand the inflationist requirement. For instance, given inferential deflationism, the inflationist requirement is that there is something more to the content of the expression ‘true’ with respect to an objective discourse than what is captured by the inference rules that govern semantic shift. Of course, how exactly we formulate the requirement depends on which form of deflationism that we adopt. An alternative that I also consider is classical deflationism. Given this alternative, the inflationist requirement is that there is more to truth talk’s content than is captured by in-

197 stances of either the disquotational schema or the equivalence schema. No matter which alternative we favor, the upshot is that the account that a deﬂationist favors does not capture truth talk’s content, at least if a discourse is objective.

Substance Along with the inflationist requirement, the semantic discursivist defends a second requirement on truth talk’s content. The substance requirement is that the content of the expression ‘true’ with respect to an objective discourse is substantial. In addition, truth talk’s content is insubstantial with respect to a discourse that is not objective. I claim above in Chapter 3 that the substance requirement amounts to two different claims. First, since Frege’s scientific notion of truth is the prototype of substantial truth, when truth talk’s content is substantial, it displays most or all of the marks of Frege’s scientific truth (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). For instance, we might be mistaken, there are truths that we never consider (or might be such truths), we discover truths (we do not invent them), and either a claim is true, or it is false. When truth talk is insubstantial, it lacks most or all of these marks. Second, the compositional semantic role associated with a discourse confirms that truth talk is substantial or insubstantial. In other words, given the semantic content and truth conditions that a sentence in the target discourse contributes to complex sentences in which it occurs subsententially, we must adopt assumptions about whether truth talk’s content displays either most or all of the marks of Frege’s scientific conception of truth.

Beyond Semantic Discursivism

The requirements that a semantic discursivist places on truth talk’s content—i.e., that truth talk’s content displays substance—make it incompatible with methodological deﬂationism. Since our assumption is that we can completely account

198 for truth talk’s content in strictly deflationist terms, our working hypothesis prac- tically rules out that there are differences with respect to truth talk’s substance. After all, if there are such differences, a strictly deflationist account does not completely capture truth talk’s content. Since this is precisely what a methodological deflationist denies, at least as a working hypothesis, methodological deflationism also rules out semantic discursivism. Yet if we rule out semantic discursivism, even just as a working hypothesis, methodological deflationism does not rule out discursive objectivity. Once we adopt methodological deflationism, the question that we face is how to account for the factors that matter for discursive objectivity. As I indicate above, the alternative approach that I explore shifts attention to how a speaker uses a discourse in a conversation, especially a speaker’s attitudes about a conversation’s information structure. After I quickly sketch the basic approach, I explore the proposal in further detail, and I consider some consequences of the view with respect to linguistic communication.

Speaker Discursivism

My view is that a discourse’s objectivity rests on not only the speaker who is using that discourse, but also what that speaker takes for granted about the conversation and its information structure. When we consider whether a discourse is objective, we thus look to both a speaker and conversation. In particular, we look to the body of shared information that a speaker associates with that conversation. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, this status places two requirements on the information structure that the speaker associates with that conversation. I brieﬂy address these requirements, and then I discuss them in further detail below.

199 Cognitive Question One requirement for discursive objectivity concerns the questions under discussion in that conversation, or at least what a speaker pragmatically presupposes are questions under discussion. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, there is a token question from that discourse, that question is strictly cognitive, and that speaker pragmatically presupposes that this strictly cognitive question is under discussion in that conversation. As this formulation suggests, discursive objectivity requires that the question be strictly cognitive: it does not sufﬁce that a speaker simply accepts that it is strictly cognitive. However, given we are dealing with a strictly cognitive question, the idea is that a speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion in a conversation. While I explore how we should understand the claim that a question is strictly cognitive below, at this stage I highlight an important consequence. It follows that a discourse’s objectivity with respect to both a speaker and a conversation imposes a requirement on the information structure that a speaker associates with the conversation. The cognitive question requirement is that not only is there a strictly cognitive question from that discourse, but also that a speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion. In other words, discursive objectivity requires that both a speaker accept that there is a common inquiry in conversation and this inquiry is directed toward a question that is strictly cognitive.

Classical Inquiry Along with the cognitive question requirement, discursive objectivity imposes an additional requirement on the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, the speaker pragmatically presupposes something about conversational inquiry and its aim. When an inquiry is epistemic,

200 the inquiry serves to coordinate what is known, and when an inquiry is doxastic, it serves to coordinate what is believed. The objectivity of a discourse relative to both a speaker and a conversation partially rests on whether the speaker pragmatically presupposes the inquiry regarding the question under discussion is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. In other words, a speaker pragmatically presupposes that the common inquiry in a conversation functions to coordinate what is known or believed about the question under discussion and its answer. Moreover, the speaker presupposes that the inquiry only functions to coordinate what is known or believed. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, a speaker presupposes that there are no other attitudes that the inquiry functions to coordinate other than knowledge and belief. Let us say that a classical inquiry is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. We may thus say that the classical inquiry requirement is that a speaker takes for granted that conversational inquiry over the question under discussion is strictly classical. Before I consider how we should understand these two requirements in further detail, let me address some broad differences between this view and semantic discursivism. A semantic discursivist not only focuses on semantic content and truth conditions, especially truth talk’s substance, but he also focuses exclusively on these factors. While the alternative that I sketch above gives attention to semantic content and truth conditions, at least with respect their cognitive character, the alternative approach that I develop does not require either that truth talk’s content is substantial, or that it is insubstantial. It follows that this alternative is consistent with a methodological deﬂationist position that I recommend above. There is a further difference between semantic discursivism and the alternative that I defend. While semantic discursivism focuses exclusively on semantic content and truth conditions, the alternative that I defend also looks to pragmatic

201 factors about linguistic communication. It follows that, according to a speaker discursivist, a discourse’s status with respect to objectivity varies with respect to the speaker who uses that discourse, especially that speaker’s attitudes about a conversation’s information structure. Since linguistic communication varies according to the presuppositions that a speaker makes about the attitudes that an inquiry functions to coordinate, the alternative that I sketch has consequences for conversations that involve objective discourse. Given how the alternative that I defend contrasts with a semantic approach to discursive objectivity, I call this alternative speaker discursivism. Of course, the terms ‘semantic discursivism’ and ‘speaker discursivism’ allude to Saul A. Kripke’s (1977, 263-264) well-known distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference.

7.2 Speaker Discursivism

While a semantic discursivist focuses exclusively on semantic content and truth conditions, a speaker discursivist highlights a speaker’s attitudes regarding a conversation’s information structure. Given the sketch that I provide above, we might regiment speaker discursivism along these lines.

Speaker Discursivism A discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation if and only if in that conversation, it is a strictly cognitive issue whether Φ (where ‘Φ’ is a semantic content associated with that discourse), that speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is a question under discussion whether Φ, and that speaker pragmatically presupposes that the inquiry regarding whether Φ is classical.

202 From a speaker discursivist’s perspective, discursive objectivity imposes requirements on the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation. Given a close connection between communication and speaker attitudes, speaker discursivism implies that communication varies according to whether or not a speaker uses an objective discourse. However, before I turn to considerations about how discursive objectivity inﬂuences linguistic communication, we should take a closer look at both the cognitive question requirement and classical inquiry requirement.

Cognitive Question

From a speaker discursivist perspective, when we evaluate a discourse’s objectivity, we must look to additional parameters, namely, a speaker and a conversation. In particular, we must look to what a speaker pragmatically presupposes about the conversation and its information structure. As I mention above, one requirement that discursive objectivity imposes concerns whether there is a strictly cognitive question that a speaker presupposes is under discussion in a conversation. Before I address the sense in which objectivity requires that a question under discussion is strictly cognitive, let me brieﬂy review the aspect of the information structure that is at issue (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). After I discuss how we should understand cognitive questions, I consider which presuppositions regarding a conversation’s information structure that the cognitive question requirement rules out, especially presuppositions that involve judge-dependent questions.

What is a Question Under Discussion?

As I suggest above in Chapter 6, different theorists conceive a conversation’s information structure differently. I call attention to two aspects of information struc-

203 ture. Stalnaker ((1978) 1999, 84) emphasizes the conversation’s common ground, and, among other things, the common ground includes common knowledge, common belief, common assumptions, and common pretenses. Roberts (1996) highlights another aspect of the body of shared information that speakers associate with a conversation. Along with the common ground, a speaker associates a conversation with an array of questions that are the target of common inquiry—what Roberts (1996, 100) calls the questions under discussion. What is at issue in the cognitive question requirement is not the common ground of a conversation, but the questions under discussion, or at least what a speaker pragmatically presupposes about them. As I discuss above in Chapter 6, when a question is under discussion with respect to a conversation, not only is everyone inquiring about that question’s answer, but everyone accepts that everyone is inquiring into the answer, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone is inquiring into the answer, and so on. Yet the issue is not over what questions are actually under discussion with respect to a conversation. The crux of the matter is thus the speaker’s presuppositions about which questions are under discussion. As I also discuss above in Chapter 6, we should think about these presuppositions in terms of what a speaker accepts about the questions under discussion. It follows from the cognitive question requirement that if a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, there is a strictly cognitive question from that discourse, and that speaker accepts that it is a question under discussion, at least for the purposes of conversation. In order to prevent confusion about how I intend that we interpret the cognitive question requirement, let me call attention to a scope ambiguity, or something akin to it. On one interpretation, the cognitive question requirement is simply

204 that a speaker pragmatically presupposes that a cognitive question is under discussion, where the question’s cognitive character is part of the presupposition’s content. On this interpretation, when the requirement is satisfied with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, the speaker has an attitude about the question’s cognitive character. It is consistent with this interpretation that there is a scenario where the requirement is satisfied, even though the speaker mistakenly presupposes that the question is cognitive. This is not how I intend that we interpret the requirement. As I intend that we interpret the requirement, the requirement is not satisfied unless a speaker presupposes of a cognitive question that it is under discussion. On this interpretation, the requirement is not satisfied unless the relevant question is cognitive. Indeed, whether a speaker has a specific attitude regarding the cognitive character of the question under discussion is orthogonal to whether the requirement is satisfied. The crux of the requirement is that there is a cognitive question, and a speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion. Of course, as I note above in Chapter 4, speakers frequently have attitudes regarding whether issues are cognitive. While speakers often expect that scientific discourse is strictly cognitive, they expect that matters of taste are not strictly cognitive. Even if speakers do not have explicit attitudes about differences with respect to strictly cognitive content, they often act as if they expect that there are such differences. However, what I wish to emphasize is simply that, suitably interpreted, the requirement is that there is a cognitive question, and a speaker pragmatically presupposes something about it, namely, that it is under discussion. A speaker may also have attitudes about the cognitive character of the question. Even so, those attitudes are orthogonal to whether the requirement is satisfied.

205 What is a Strictly Cognitive Question?

Since the above remarks gives us a sense of what it is for a speaker to presuppose that a question is under discussion in a conversation, I turn to what it is for speaker to presuppose that a strictly cognitive question is under discussion. The cognitive question requirement addresses a theme regarding discursive objectivity that I consider above in Part II. As I argue above in Chapter 4, the link between disagreement and cognitive fault gives rise to one facet of discursive objectivity, namely, that cognitively faultless disagreement is impossible. In a disagreement over an objective issue, someone must be cognitively at fault, at least on some favored interpretation of the modal idiom. Since we may presume that scientiﬁc issues are strictly cognitive, someone in a scientiﬁc disagreement must be, say, confused, inattentive, or biased. Disagreements over issues that are not objective are different. After all, when we disagree over an issue that is not objective, it might be that no one is cognitively at fault. For instance, in a disagreement over whether roller coasters are fun, it might be that no one is forgetful, irrational, or stubborn. Given the cognitive question requirement, there is a link between speaker discursivism and the cognitive fault facet of discursive objectivity. As I suggest above in Chapter 4, it is a contrast between disagreements with respect to cognitive fault that gives rise to considerations about strictly cognitive content and truth conditions. The tricky part of the contrast—and hence, considerations about strictly cognitive content and truth conditions—is interpreting the modal idiom. I recommend an alternative to the standard way to think about differences with respect to strictly cognitive content and truth conditions, namely, Wright’s (1992) cognitive command approach. Before I suggest how we can implement the alternative that I defend to account for the cognitive question require-

206 ment, let me quickly review the differences that I discuss above in Chapter 4 between the cognitive command approach and the alternative that I recommend. As I interpret Wright’s (1992) view, the operative modality is conceptual necessity, and, consequently, when a discourse’s semantic content and truth conditions are strictly cognitive, it is conceptually necessary that if there is a disagreement, someone in that disagreement is biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. If a discourse’s semantic content and truth conditions are not strictly cognitive, it is merely a conceptual possibility that if there is a disagreement, then someone in that disagreement is cognitively at fault. In contrast, I claim that the operative modality is not conceptual necessity, but something akin to “necessity with respect to quotidian disagreement.” Given this alternative, if there is a disagreement over a strictly cognitive issue, then, in view of commonplace disagreement, someone in the disagreement must be cognitively at fault. However, when we disagree over an issue that is not strictly cognitive, everyone might be cognitively faultless, even when we are dealing with a disagreement that arises in everyday circumstances. Not only does my view have an advantage over the cognitive command approach, at least when it comes to handling a range of cases, but it is consistent with methodological deflationism, too. As I indicate above in Chapter 4, scientific matters are paradigmatic strictly cognitive issues, but it is conceptually possible that no one in a scientific disagreement is cognitively at fault. However, this conceptual possibility is consistent with the fact that in view of a quotidian scientific disagreement, someone must be cognitively at fault. The alternative that I defend is thus compatible with cases that are counter-examples to a cognitive command approach. After all, if we adopt a cognitive command approach, it appears that we are forced to say that scientific disagreements are not strictly cognitive. More- over, since the alternative that I recommend does not require that the modal idiom

207 is conceptual necessity, it is consistent with the hypothesis that the content of the expression ’true’ is completely captured in strictly deﬂationist terms. I recommend that we think about the requirement that the question under discussion is strictly cognitive in terms of the account that I defend above in Chapter 4. Setting aside issues about disagreements that are due to vagueness, I concentrate on how we might extend this approach to questions and their semantics, where ‘Φ’ is a schematic variable ranging over semantic contents. I recommend that we regiment this approach in terms akin to the following.

Strictly Cognitive Question A question over whether Φ is strictly cognitive with respect to a conversation if and only if in that conversation, someone must be cognitively at fault—at least in view of a quotidian disagreement over whether Φ.

When we apply the quotidian disagreement account to questions, the idea is that we focus on everyday or commonplace disagreements over a question’s answer. Given these quotidian disagreements, we then look to see whether someone must be, say, biased, inattentive, or confused. Since scientific matters are our paradigm of issues that are strictly cognitive, let us consider how questions that we might raise about scientific matters satisfy the cognitive question requirement. As an illustration, we might consider an example akin to one that I address above in Chapter 4, namely, whether the universe expands indefinitely. Let us imagine a scientist in a conversation who pragmatically presupposes that it is a question under discussion whether the universe is expanding indefinitely. Given that the speaker’s presuppositions satisfy the other requirement, namely, that he presupposes that the inquiry over that question is strictly either epistemic or doxastic, we may say that scientific discourse is objective with respect to that speaker and that conversation.

208 Discussing Judge-Dependent Questions

The remarks above address the cognitive question requirement, how we should think about it, and when it is satisfied. However, there is also a question about what the cognitive question requirement rules out. In other words, given this requirement, we might consider which attitudes a speaker might adopt regarding the question under discussion that precludes discursive objectivity. There is a relevant theme that I address above in Part II, namely, how desires, feelings, and moods influence a discourse’s semantic content and truth conditions. As I discuss above in Chapter 5, our subjective mental life plays a crucial role in the idea that a discourse’s semantic content and truth conditions are judge-dependent. Does the cognitive question requirement rule out scenarios where a speaker pragmatically presupposes that a judge-dependent question is under discussion? Given that we adopt the account of cognitive question that I outline above, I show how some judge-dependent questions are ruled out, and others are not—as I suggest below, it all depends on who is the judge. As I mention above in Chapter 5, we may understand judge-dependence in terms of two assumptions about a discourse’s semantic content and truth conditions. First, when we are dealing with a discourse that is judge-dependent, there are some judge-dependent sentences that are unsettled, at least with respect to the attitude-independent world. For instance, it is unsettled whether the sentence ‘roller coasters are fun’ is true, when we focus strictly on facts about the world other than speakers, their desires, their feelings, and their amusement. Second, in cases akin to the latter, where the attitude-independent world does not settle the matter, our attitudes influence the truth of the matter (or might influence it). For instance, the fact that a speaker is excited about roller coasters makes the sentence ‘roller coasters are fun’ true, or at least it might do so. I claim above in Chapter 5

209 that these assumptions give some intuitive content to the idea that a discourse is judge-dependent, even though the assumptions are neutral on many controversial semantic issues that divide different accounts of judge-dependence. The particular semantic theory for judge-dependence that I defend above in Chapter 5 is designed to support and clarify these assumptions, but a person might still adopt them without adopting the semantics that I defend. We can apply these assumptions to questions mutatis mutandis. When dealing with judge-dependent questions, some questions have no correct answer, at least with respect to the attitude-independent world. For example, let us assume that the question ‘Are roller coasters fun?’ is judge-dependent. We might also imagine that there is no correct answer to the question ‘Are roller coasters fun?’, at least when we only consider the attitude-independent world. Second, given that we are dealing with a judge-dependent question without a correct answer, in the latter sense, a speaker’s attitude inﬂuences (or might inﬂuence) which answer is correct. For instance, if a speaker is excited about roller coasters, this might give the question ‘Are roller coasters fun?’ a correct answer, namely, that roller coasters are fun. Just as with the above assumptions about judge-dependent truth conditions, these semantic assumptions give some intuitive content to the idea that a question is judge-dependent. Moreover, they are consistent with a wide range of different approaches to the semantics of judge-dependent questions. Given the above assumptions, let us consider scenarios where a speaker pragmatically presupposes that a judge-dependent question is under discussion in a conversation. Does the cognitive question requirement rule out such scenarios? In other words, can a scenario where a speaker pragmatically presupposes a judge- dependent question is under discussion satisfy the cognitive question requirement? This comes down to a worry about whether the idea that a question is

210 strictly cognitive is incompatible with the idea that the same question is judge- dependent. As I indicate above, given how I interpret the claim that a question is strictly cognitive, these are compatible. However, before I consider my approach to cognitive questions, it is useful for sake of comparison to consider the issue from the perspective of Wright’s (1992) cognitive command approach.

Cognitive Command Approach It follows from Wright’s (1992) cognitive command approach that no judge-dependent question is strictly cognitive. After all, a cognitive command approach appeals to conceptual necessity. Just as when an assertion displays cognitive command, when a question displays cognitive command, it is conceptually necessary that if there is a disagreement over that question’s answer, someone in that disagreement is cognitively at fault. Yet if we are dealing with a judge-dependent question, it is conceptually possible that no one in that disagreement is cognitively at fault. As an illustration, imagine a conversation where there is a disagreement over whether roller coasters are fun, but let us suppose that the attitude-independent world does not settle the correct answer. Given our assumptions about judge- dependence, a judge’s attitudes inﬂuences the correct answer, or might inﬂuence it. Consider a scenario where both participants in the disagreement are judges, and a correct answer to the question is assigned relative to their (incompatible) attitudes. Both participants are correct, and, more importantly, neither participant is biased, inattentive, or otherwise cognitively at fault. It thus follows from Wright’s cognitive command approach that no judge-dependent question is strictly cognitive.

Quotidian Disagreement Approach However, I recommend that we adopt not a cognitive command approach, but an extension of an alternative that I outline

211 above in Chapter 4. On this approach, if a question is strictly cognitive, someone in a quotidian disagreement over that question must be confused, prejudiced, or otherwise cognitively at fault. As I emphasize above, this alternative appeals not to conceptual necessity, but something akin to “necessity with respect to quotidian disagreement.” Even if it is a conceptual possibility for a given judge-dependent question that there is a cognitively faultless disagreement over it, the issue at hand is over whether it is a possibility in view of a quotidian disagreement. Given this difference, I suggest that the status of a judge-dependent question with respect to the cognitive question requirement rests partially on who is the judge. As an illustration, consider a conversation where it is a question under discussion whether the average consumer finds a chair comfortable. Imagine that Smith owns a furniture store, and he is choosing chairs to sell to his customers. One chair has less cushion than another, and Smith wonders whether this factor might influence his customers. Since Smith’s friends do consumer research, he talks to them about whether the average consumer finds the chair comfortable. Let us assume that subjective attitude ascriptions have a judge-shifting semantics that I address above in Chapter 5. We may understand judge-shifting semantics in terms of two requirements that the verb ‘find’ places on complement clauses. First, a complement clause is not acceptable under a subjective attitude ascription unless the clause’s semantic content and truth conditions are judge-dependent. In other words, the truth of an acceptable complement clause is semantically sensitive to germane facts about the subjective mental life of a suitable judge. Second, the judge with respect to whom we should evaluate the complement’s clause’s truth is the subject of the attitude ascription. For instance, given the ascription ‘Smith finds Jones boring’, we should evaluate the complement’s truth with respect to Smith. Given a judge-shifting semantics for subjective attitude ascriptions, the judge is the

212 average consumer, since there is a question under discussion whether the average consumer ﬁnds the chair comfortable. Given these assumptions, we may consider whether the question under discussion, i. e., the question ‘Is the chair comfortable?’, is strictly cognitive, as I recommend that we understand this claim. The crux of the matter is whether no one in a quotidian disagreement over whether the chair is comfortable is cognitively at fault, where the judge is the average consumer. When we reﬂect on quotidian disagreements over whether the chair is comfortable, and when we assume that the judge is the average consumer, there is no possible scenario where disagreements over this question’s answer are cognitively faultless. After all, if the average consumer is the judge, the participants in a quotidian disagreement could acquire more evidence about average consumers and their attitudes toward the chair— and perhaps they will acquire more evidence. This suggests something about the cognitive position of participants in a quotidian disagreement akin to this, namely, that someone must display a cognitive fault. In view of a quotidian disagreement over whether the chair is comfortable, where the average consumer is the judge, someone in the disagreement must be confused, biased, or irrational. As a result, there are at least some judge-dependent questions that the cognitive question requirement does not rule out.

Classical Inquiry

From a speaker discursivist’s perspective, a discourse’s objectivity with respect to both a speaker and a conversation imposes a requirement on the information structure that the speaker associates with the conversation. In short, the speaker pragmatically presupposes that there is a question under discussion that is strictly cognitive. Since I address the cognitive question requirement above, I turn to the

213 other requirement that discursive objectivity places on the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation. The additional requirement concerns not what question is under discussion, but the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. In particular, when a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, a speaker pragmatically presupposes that the discussion strictly coordinates what is known or believed. In the terminology that I introduce above, we may say that the speaker takes for granted that there is a classical inquiry over the question under discussion. After I discuss the classical inquiry requirement on the information structure that a speaker associates with a conversation in further detail, I compare it to inquiries that serve to coordinate the subjective attitudes that I consider above in Chapter 5—for instance, how a person ﬁnds something.

What is a Classical Inquiry?

As I discuss above in Chapter 6, when a question is under discussion in a conversation, everyone in the conversation inquires about that question and its answer. A person who inquiries about a question’s answer considers his or her attitudes about the answer. In an inquiry over a question’s answer, what is at stake in the inquiry is what attitude that person forms regarding the question and its answer. Yet there are different attitudes that a person might take regarding a question’s answer, and, accordingly, there are different ways in which everyone in a conversation might inquire about an issue. The classical inquiry requirement concerns what a speaker presupposes about the attitudes that an inquiry inﬂuences. As a preliminary illustration, consider an epistemic attitude akin to knowledge. Suppose that it is a question under discussion in a conversation whether the bank closes early on holidays. Given it is a question under discussion, everyone in the

214 conversation investigates whether the bank closes early on holidays, everyone accepts that everyone is investigating the issue, and so on. Yet when the conversational inquiry is epistemic, the inquiry over whether the bank closes early coordinates what everyone in the conversation knows about the issue. In this scenario, a participant in the conversation considers whether he or she knows that the bank closes early on a holiday. While the above illustration represents an epistemic inquiry, an inquiry might address attitudes other than knowledge, too. For instance, a conversational inquiry might be doxastic instead. In that scenario, the inquiry does not coordinate what everyone in the conversation knows—it serves to coordinate what they believe. When we are dealing with an inquiry akin to this, a participant considers whether he believes that the bank closes early on a holiday, too. According to the classical inquiry requirement, a speaker pragmatically presupposes that an inquiry over a question only coordinates either doxastic or epistemic attitudes. Given the terminology that I introduce above, we may say that an inquiry is classical when it does not serve to coordinate attitudes other than knowledge and belief. Since there are attitudes other than belief and knowledge, and since an inquiry might serve to coordinate these other attitudes, it follows that there are non- classical inquiries, or at least there might be. As an illustration, consider an attitude akin to hope. Along with what everyone knows or believes, we might use an inquiry to coordinate what everyone hopes is the answer. For instance, imagine that it is a question under discussion among school children whether school closes early due to snowy weather, but suppose that the inquiry serves to coordinate what everyone hopes is the answer. Perhaps the school children hope that school closes early, so that they can play in the snow. In a scenario akin to this, an inquiring child considers whether he hopes that school closes due to the snowy

215 weather. Along with our hopes, there are other attitudes that an inquiry might coordinate too, including our desires, feelings, fears, preferences, wishes, etc. Of course, the question over whether school closes early might serve to coordinate not merely what everyone hopes, but also what they believe or know. These are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, in the bank conversation, the question over whether the bank closes early on a holiday might function to coordinate not merely what everyone knows or believes, but also what they hope. For example, we may imagine that the participants hope that the bank is not closed on a holiday, especially since they want to deposit a check. Yet in a classical inquiry, the speaker pragmatically presupposes that inquiry does not serve to coordinate either our hopes, desires, feelings, or fears. As the remarks above suggest, we may regiment the notion of classical inquiry in the following terms.

Classical Inquiry A discussion over a question is a classical inquiry with respect to a conversation if and only if in that conversation, everyone accepts (for the purposes of conversation) that the discussion only serves to coordinate what everyone knows or believes about that question’s answer, everyone accepts that everyone else accepts that the discussion only serves to coordinate what everyone knows or believes about that question’s answer, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone accepts that the discussion only serves to coordinate what everyone knows or believes about that question’s answer, and so on ad inﬁnitum.

Subjective Inquiry

While I brieﬂy address how an inquiry might address our hopes in the remarks above—and I mention several other attitudes that might go into a non-classical inquiry, including desires, fears, feelings, preferences, and wishes—it is useful to

216 take a closer look at inquiries that serve to coordinate the attitudes that I address above in Chapter 5, namely, subjective attitudes. The paradigm of a subjective attitude ascription is ‘find’, as when we say, “Jones finds Smith boring,” but I call attention to other candidates too. For instance, some argue that ‘consider’ and ‘regard’ are also subjective attitude ascriptions (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Just as an inquiry might address our hopes or fears, an inquiry might function to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes. As an illustration, consider a conversation where it is a question under discussion whether Smith is boring. When a conversation’s members inquire into whether Smith is boring, we might imagine that the inquiry is either epistemic or doxastic. In a scenario akin to this, a participant considers what he knows or believes about whether Smith is boring. If the inquiry over whether Smith is boring is only epistemic or doxastic, we are dealing with a classical inquiry. However, we might imagine that the inquiry is not classical. Perhaps the conversational inquiry aims to coordinate not merely what a participant knows or believes, but the inquiry also coordinates whether everyone finds Smith boring. In that scenario, while a participant considers whether he knows or believes that Smith is boring, he also considers whether he finds Smith boring. Since an inquiry over a question is doxastic if it serves to coordinate what everyone believes, and since it is epistemic if it serves to coordinate what everyone knows, we might say that an inquiry is subjective if it serves to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes. In other words, when an inquiry over something is subjective with respect to a conversation, everyone accepts that the discussion functions to coordinate how he finds the issue, everyone accepts that everyone else accepts that the discussion functions to coordinate how he finds the issue, etc. Of course, we might distinguish the inquiries that are strictly subjective, where the

217 inquiry is limited to everyone’s subjective attitudes, since these differ from the partially subjective inquiries. In a partially subjective inquiry, everyone considers his or her own subjective attitudes about an issue, but they also consider other attitudes, for instance, their doxastic or epistemic attitudes. Since the subjective attitudes are addressed in the above illustration alongside epistemic and doxastic attitudes, it represents a partially subjective inquiry. However, we might imagine that the inquiry only serves to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes regarding whether Smith is boring. It follows from the classical inquiry requirement that if a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, that speaker pragmatically presupposes that the inquiry over the question under discussion is not even partially subjective. Since discursive objectivity requires that a speaker pragmatically presupposes a classical inquiry, and since an inquiry is classical only if it strictly functions to coordinate either epistemic or doxastic attitudes, this rules out scenarios where the speaker presupposes a subjective inquiry, whether partially or completely.

7.3 How Objectivity Inﬂuences Communication

From a speaker discursivist’s perspective, how a speaker uses a discourse matters to that discourse’s status with respect to objectivity. In particular, what settles whether a discourse is objective is a speaker’s attitudes about a conversation’s information structure, especially the questions under discussion and the attitudes that an inquiry addresses. Our communication with each other is closely tied up with the attitudes that we take toward the information that everyone in a conversation shares. Since objectivity places requirements on our attitudes about what

218 information is shared, objectivity shapes linguistic communication, too. When we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, there is more latitude. A consequence is that communication with a discourse that is not objective has different contours. Since the aspects of communication on which I concentrate in Chapter 6 are conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics, I explore how a discourse’s status with respect to discursive objectivity influences them. First, I consider how objective discourse influences linguistic communication. I then turn to discourses that are not objective, and I discuss their influence on communication.

Communication with Objective Discourse

As the discussion above suggests, a speaker discursivist conceives of discursive objectivity in terms of two requirements regarding what a speaker pragmatically presupposes about the information structure associated with a conversation. For a discourse that is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, there is some token question, it is strictly cognitive, and the speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is a question under discussion in the conversation. In addition, the speaker presupposes that the inquiry over that cognitive question is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. In short, he presupposes a classical inquiry. Given the attitudes that a speaker adopts toward a conversation’s information structure, when he uses an objective discourse, what is linguistic communication like? In particular, what differences does discursive objectivity make to a competent speaker’s acceptability judgments? What about competent judgments regarding conversational dynamics?

219 How Objectivity Inﬂuences Acceptability

Let us consider how discursive objectivity influences a speakers judgments regarding whether a speech act is acceptable with respect to a conversation. In particular, let us consider how discursive objectivity influences a speaker’s judgments regarding not only judge-dependent assertions, for instance, an assertion that Smith is boring, but also subjective attitude ascriptions (e. g., the ascription ‘Jones finds Smith boring’). Given the requirements that discursive objectivity places on a speaker’s presuppositions about a conversation’s information structure, a competent speaker who uses an objective discourse judges that at least some judge- dependent assertions are unacceptable. A competent speaker who uses an objective discourse judges that some subjective attitude ascriptions are unacceptable, too.

Some Judge-Dependent Assertions are Unacceptable When a competent speaker pragmatically presupposes that a question is under discussion in a conversation, this presupposition inﬂuences that speakers judgments about which speech acts are acceptable. In particular, if a competent speaker judges that a speech act is acceptable, that speaker also judges that it is at least an answer to a question that is under discussion. In short, a competent speaker does not judge a speech act as acceptable unless it is an answer. This consideration about how presuppositions inﬂuences our acceptability judgments interacts with the cognitive question requirement. When a discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, the speaker pragmatically presupposes that a strictly cognitive question is under discussion. So, a competent speaker who uses an objective discourse does not judge that a speech act is acceptable unless that speech act is an answer to a strictly

220 cognitive question. Yet any speech act that qualifies as an answer to a strictly cognitive question is also strictly cognitive. For instance, if the question ‘Is the universe expanding indefinitely?’ is strictly cognitive, so are the answers to it— i. e., ‘Yes, the universe is expanding indefinitely’ and ‘No, it is not expanding indefinitely’. Given that answers to a strictly cognitive question are also strictly cognitive, it follows that a competent speaker who is using an objective discourse judges that only strictly cognitive speech acts are acceptable. As I discuss above, the consideration about whether a judge-dependent issue qualifies as strictly cognitive rests on who is the judge. But given that we are dealing with a judge-dependent issue that is not strictly cognitive, a competent speaker who uses an objective discourse judges that a judge-dependent assertion about this issue is not acceptable. Generally, when a speaker pragmatically presupposes there is a strictly cognitive question that is under discussion, he judges that every assertion that is not strictly cognitive is an unacceptable assertion.

Subjective Attitudes Ascriptions are Unacceptable While the influence of discursive objectivity on our judgments regarding judge-dependent assertion stems from the cognitive question requirement, the classical inquiry requirement also influences our acceptability judgments. Given the classical inquiry requirement, a speaker who uses an objective discourse pragmatically presupposes that inquiry over a question under discussion is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. In other words, the discussion over a question only serves to coordinate what everyone knows or believes. When a speaker reflects on whether an assertion is acceptable, we should expect this requirement to influence how the speaker judges attitude ascriptions, or at least those ascriptions that concern answers to the question under

221 discussion. While a speaker judges epistemic or doxastic attitude ascriptions as acceptable, the speaker judges other attitude reports as more or less unacceptable, including all subjective attitude ascriptions. A competent speaker does not judge that such attitudes ascriptions are acceptable unless they are evidence for the answer to a strictly cognitive question. This stems from a speaker’s presuppositions about the attitudes that an inquiry serves to coordinate. Since the speaker takes for granted that the inquiry is classical, the inquiry does not serve to coordinate either subjective attitudes (or any other additional attitudes for that matter). Consider an illustration inspired by Christopher Kennedy (2010). For argument’s sake, let us set issues about vagueness aside, and assume that the question ‘Is the dish vegetarian?’ is a strictly cognitive question. Moreover, we may assume that vegetarian discourse is objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation. If Smith is the speaker, he pragmatically presupposes that it is a question under discussion in the conversation whether the dish is vegetarian. Smith also presupposes that inquiry over that question is strictly either epistemic or doxastic. The inquiry does not function to coordinate other attitudes, including subjective attitudes. Given our assumptions, it follows that Smith presupposes that both question (7.1 a) and question (7.1 b) are under discussion in the conversation.

(7.1) (a) Is the dish is vegetarian?

(b) Does everyone know or believe that the dish is vegetarian?

Yet neither does Smith presuppose that question (7.2 a) is under discussion, nor does he presuppose that question (7.2 b) is under discussion.

(7.2) (a) Does everyone ﬁnd the dish vegetarian?

(b) Does everyone hope that the dish is vegetarian?

222 Given a scenario akin to this, let us consider Smith’s acceptability judgments regarding attitude ascriptions. If an assertion reports either an epistemic or a doxastic attitude, other things being equal, Smith judges the assertion as acceptable with respect the conversation. For example, both question (7.3 a) and question (7.4 b) are acceptable with respect the question under discussion.

(7.3) (a) I believe that the dish is vegetarian.

(b) I know that the dish is vegetarian.

In contrast, when an assertion reports other attitudes, including subjective attitudes, Smith’s acceptability judgment is different. For instance, both (7.4 a) and (7.4 b) are more or less unacceptable attitude ascriptions (where ‘#’ indicates unacceptability).

(7.4) (a) #I ﬁnd the dish vegetarian.

(b) #I hope that the dish is vegetarian.

In other words, Smith judge’s that attitude ascriptions akin to both (7.4 a) and (7.4 b) are unacceptable unless he accepts that these attitudes might bear on the answer to the question under discussion, namely, whether the dish is vegetarian. For instance, if it seems that there is a correlation between a speaker’s subjective attitudes and the fact that the dish is vegetarian, he might judge that a subjective attitude ascription is acceptable. Otherwise, Smith judges that attitude ascriptions akin to both (7.4 a) and (7.4 b) are unacceptable. As we might expect, it is Smith’s presuppositions about the information structure that shape his acceptability judgments. Since Smith does not presuppose that the inquiry over whether the dish is vegetarian functions to coordinate either everyone’s subjective attitudes or everyone’s hopes, these attitude ascriptions are

223 more or less unacceptable in that conversation. Yet since Smith presupposes an inquiry that is classical, the situation differs with regard to everyone’s epistemic and doxastic attitudes. Accordingly, he judges that epistemic and doxastic attitude ascriptions are acceptable.

How Objectivity Inﬂuences Dynamics

Along with conversational acceptability, a theory of linguistic communication seeks to account for our judgments concerning how a speech act changes a conversation, or perhaps how it would change a conversation if everyone had accepted it. Since the above remarks concern how communication using an objective discourse influences conversational acceptability, I turn to how it influences conversational dynamics. As I address above in Chapter 6, Stalnaker ((1978) 1999) introduces common ground as a cover term for various shared attitudes in a conversation, including common knowledge, common belief, common assumption, and common pretense. When something is common ground with respect to a conversation, everyone accepts it, everyone accepts that everyone accepts it, and so on. As I also argue above in Chapter 6, assertions are speech acts that function to transform a conversation’s common ground, and when everyone accepts them, they succeed in changing the common ground. If a speaker asserts something, and if everyone in a conversation accepts what that speaker asserts, the common ground at least changes to reflect what the speaker asserts, the assertion’s semantic content, and its truth conditions. When a presupposition accompanies an assertion, how the assertion functions to change the common ground is more complicated. After all, when everyone accepts an assertion with a presupposition, the common ground changes not only to reflect the assertion, but also the presupposition. As an illustration, consider

224 Lewis’ ((1979) 1983, 234) sentence that I discuss in Chapter 6, namely, the sentence ‘All Fred’s children are asleep’. When a speaker asserts it, he presupposes that Fred has children. In order for everyone to accept his assertion—that all Fred’s children are asleep—they must also accept the presupposition, namely, that Fred has children. Accordingly, when everyone accepts an assertion akin to this, they also accept the presupposition. The common ground is thus updated to reflect both the assertion and the presupposition. Given the cognitive question requirement, a speaker who uses an objective discourse pragmatically presupposes that there is a strictly cognitive question that is under discussion. As I discuss above in Chapter 4, the fact that a question is cognitive is often reflected in our expectations about patterns of cognitive fault (though not invariably). In particular, when a question is strictly cognitive, we often expect that someone in a quotidian disagreement over that question’s answer must be cognitively at fault. When a person in a conversation sincerely expresses disagreement, he asserts something that is incompatible with another participant’s assertion. A speaker’s expectations regarding disagreement and cognitive fault changes how sincere expressions of disagreement in a conversation dynamically change the common ground. As an illustration, let us consider a strictly cognitive question and a speaker who pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion. For instance, we might imagine that he presupposes it is a question under discussion whether the universe is expanding indefinitely. Given his expectations about cognitive fault, he realizes that when there is a quotidian disagreement over this question, someone must be at fault—at least cognitively speaking. Since he presupposes that this strictly cognitive question is under discussion, he also presupposes that everyone else realizes the same thing. So, he will not sincerely disagree over whether the uni-

225 verse is expanding indefinitely unless either he is prepared to take it for granted that someone must be cognitive at fault, or he accepts that the disagreement is not quotidian. Given the above illustration, we can see that when the speaker sincerely expresses disagreement in the conversation, he pragmatically presupposes either that someone must be cognitively at fault, or the disagreement is not quotidian. Given this disjunctive presupposition that accompanies an assertion that expresses sincere disagreement, there is a systematic effect on how they transform the common ground. If everyone accepts a sincere expression of disagreement, not only does the common ground change to reflect the fact that there is a disagreement over the issue that is under discussion, but it also changes to reflect the presupposition that either someone in the disagreement must be cognitively at fault, or the disagreement is not quotidian.

Subjectivity in Communication

As the reﬂections above establish, the attitudes that objective discourse demands from a speaker in a conversation give that speaker’s communication a distinctive contour. A speaker who uses an objective discourse must take for granted something about information structure. This demand changes not only what speech acts are acceptable, but also how assertions change a conversation’s information structure (or would change it modulo everyone’s acceptance). When a discourse is not objective, the demands on a speaker who uses that discourse in conversation are different. After all, there is more latitude granted to a speaker regarding his attitudes—at least from a speaker discursivist perspective. In particular, a speaker is allowed to take for granted that there are questions under discussion in a conversation that are not strictly cognitive, including any judge-

226 dependent question. In addition, a speaker is allowed to take for granted that an inquiry regarding a question serves to coordinate attitudes other than knowledge and belief. An speaker may even take for granted that the inquiry coordinates subjective attitudes. Of course, neither option is permitted in scenarios where a speaker communicates with an objective discourse. This latitude gives communication with a discourse that is not objective different contours.

How Subjectivity Inﬂuences Acceptability

When a speaker uses an objective discourse in conversation, that discourse’s objectivity inﬂuences his judgments about conversational acceptability. As I argue above, not only are some judge-dependent assertions unacceptable, but also some subjective attitude ascriptions are unacceptable. When we are considering a speaker who uses a discourse that is not objective, our acceptability judgments are different.

Judge-Dependent Assertions are Acceptable As the reader might expect, there is a variation with respect to judge-dependent assertions and their acceptability that correlates with the objectivity of the discourse in communication. Since discursive objectivity requires that a speaker pragmatically presupposes a question is under discussion that is strictly cognitive, this rules out at least some judge- dependent questions. As a result, it makes some judge-dependent assertions unacceptable. In contrast, a speaker who uses a discourse that is not objective may pragmatically presuppose a judge-dependent question. After all, when a discourse is not objective with respect to both a speaker and a conversation, a speaker is permitted to presuppose that a question that is not strictly cognitive. As an illustration, consider a question that is judge-dependent, namely, whether roller coasters are fun. Imagine that Smith pragmatically presupposes that it is a

227 question under discussion whether roller coasters are fun (see Lasersohn (2005)). Since Smith takes for granted that ‘Are roller coasters fun?’ is a question under discussion, Smith judges that answers to this question are acceptable, even though they are judge-dependent. Unlike when we are dealing with an objective discourse, these question remain acceptable no matter who is the judge. Even when we are dealing with a scenario akin to the one that I address above, where there are two judges with incompatible attitudes, the assertions remain acceptable.

Subjective Attitude Ascriptions are Acceptable Along with the fact that judge- dependent assertions are acceptable, there is another difference that we might expect from communication with a discourse that is not objective. Discursive objectivity demands that a speaker presuppose something about inquiry, namely, that it is classical. A consequence is that a speaker judges that attitude ascriptions other than either knowledge reports or belief reports are unacceptable unless they are somehow evidentially relevant. However, there is no such demand if we are dealing with communication with a discourse that falls short of objective. In scenarios akin to this, a speaker may presuppose an inquiry serves to coordinate either knowledge or belief. However, a speaker may also presuppose that it coordinates other attitudes, including subjective attitudes. A speaker might even presuppose that an inquiry over a question is strictly subjective, where the inquiry only serves to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes. In this scenario, the speaker judges that assertions that report these additional attitude ascriptions are acceptable. As an illustration, consider a scenario where Smith is typing up a writing assignment in the university computing lab. He struggles to get comfortable as he sits, but it is difﬁcult for him, especially since he hurt his back a few weeks ago. He starts up a conversation with a lab assistant. For argument’s sake, imagine

228 that the question ‘Is the chair comfortable? ’is judge-dependent. In the conversation, Smith pragmatically presupposes not only that it is a question under discussion whether the chair is comfortable, but also that the inquiry over that question is strictly subjective. In other words, he takes both question (7.5 a) and question (7.5 b) for granted as questions under discussion in the conversation.

(7.5) (a) Is this chair comfortable?

(b) Does everyone ﬁnd this chair comfortable?

Since Smith also presupposes that the inquiry over (7.5 a) is strictly subjective, he does not accept that the inquiry serves to coordinate any other attitudes, including either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. As a result, Smith does not presuppose that either (7.6 a) or (7.6 b) are questions under discussion.

(7.6) (a) Does everyone believe that the chair is comfortable?

(b) Does everyone know that the chair is comfortable?

Given a scenario akin to this, Smith judges that subjective attitude ascriptions are acceptable. For instance, when the lab assistant talks to Smith, if the lab assistant reports his subjective attitude to Smith (e. g., a report akin to (7.7 a)), then Smith judges that the lab assistant’s assertion is an acceptable contribution to the conversation.

(7.7) (a) I ﬁnd the chair uncomfortable.

As this illustration shows, a speaker who uses a discourse that is not objective has more latitude. But the latitude not simply over the questions that are under discussion, but also the attitudes that an inquiry serves to coordinates This latitude changes our acceptability judgments with respect to both judge-dependent assertions and subjective attitude ascriptions.

229 Multiple Judges Along with acceptability judgments regarding judge-dependent assertions and subjective attitude ascriptions, when we are dealing with a non- objective discourse, there is another difference in our acceptability judgments. This difference stems from the judge-shifting semantics that I address above in Chapter 5. As an illustration, consider another conversation where a speaker takes for granted a judge-dependent question is under discussion. For argument’s sake, let us suppose that the question ‘Is grading tedious?’ is judge-dependent. In addition, imagine that the speaker takes for granted that the inquiry over whether grading is tedious is either completely or partially subjective. In a scenario akin to this, the speaker pragmatically presupposes both question (7.8 a) and question (7.8 b) are under discussion in a conversation.

(7.8) (a) Is grading tedious?

(b) Does everyone ﬁnd grading tedious?

Given a judge-shifting semantics for subjective attitude ascriptions, the judge relative to which we evaluate the truth of an attitude ascriptions complement clause is the ascription’s subject. This semantic requirement has consequences when we consider a speaker who pragmatically presupposes either a completely or partially subjective inquiry. When a speaker presupposes that there is a subjective inquiry over whether the grading is tedious, the speaker presupposes that the inquiry over that question serves to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes. As a result, the speaker takes for granted a question akin to (7.8 b) is under discussion. Yet this question does not concern some particular speaker in the conversation and his or her subjective attitude toward grading. After all, it concerns everyone in the conversation. Since the subject of the subjective attitude question is every mem-

230 ber of the conversation, everyone is thereby a judge relative to which we should evaluate the truth of the complement clause. As I note above, the fact that the inquiry serves to coordinate everyone’s subjective attitudes helps account for our acceptability judgments regarding subjective attitude ascriptions. However, it also explains why subjective attitude ascriptions regarding each member of the conversation are acceptable. For instance, if Smith, Jones, and Brown are participants in the conversation above, subjective attitude ascriptions for each of them are acceptable in that conversation.

(7.9) (a) Smith ﬁnds grading tedious.

(b) Jones ﬁnds grading tedious.

In other words, not only is (7.9 a) an acceptable attitude ascription with respect to the conversation, but in the same conversation, so is both (7.9 b) and (7.9 c).

7.4 Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter addresses an alternative to the semantic approach to discursive objectivity. On a semantic approach, objectivity in language stems from facts about the truth conditions associated with semantic content, especially truth talk’s substance. I survey an alternative the shifts attention to how speakers use language in communication, in particular, what a speaker presupposes about the information that everyone shares in a conversation. When a discourse is objective with respect to a speaker and a conversation, there is a strictly cognitive question from that discourse, and the speaker pragmatically presupposes that it is under discussion in that conversation. In addition, the speaker presupposes something

231 about the attitudes that the inquiry serves to coordinate. In an objective discourse, the speaker presupposes that the discussion over a question serves to coordinate only knowledge and belief. On this speaker discursivist approach, objectivity is closely aligned with a speaker’s attitudes about the body of information that everyone in a conversation shares, and, as a result, objectivity inﬂuences how people communicate. I survey how differences with respect to objectivity matter to judgments about both conversational acceptability and conversational dynamics.

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