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Virtuozzo Hybrid Server 7 Virtuozzo Hybrid Server 7 User's Guide September 30, 2021 Virtuozzo International GmbH Vordergasse 59 8200 Schaffhausen Switzerland Tel: + 41 52 632 0411 Fax: + 41 52 672 2010 https://virtuozzo.com Copyright ©2016-2021 Virtuozzo International GmbH. All rights reserved. This product is protected by United States and international copyright laws. The product’s underlying technology, patents, and trademarks are listed at . Microsoft, Windows, Windows Server, Windows NT, Windows Vista, and MS-DOS are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Apple, Mac, the Mac logo, Mac OS, iPad, iPhone, iPod touch, FaceTime HD camera and iSight are trademarks of Apple Inc., registered in the US and other countries. Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. All other marks and names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. Contents 1. Learning the Basics ................................................ 1 1.1 Virtuozzo Hybrid Server Overview .................................... 1 1.2 Differences between Virtuozzo Hybrid Server and OpenVZ ..................... 2 1.3 OS Virtualization Layer ........................................... 2 1.3.1 Basics of OS Virtualization .................................... 2 1.3.2 Virtuozzo Containers ....................................... 3 1.3.2.1 Virtuozzo Container Hardware ........................... 5 1.3.3 Memory and IOPS Deduplication ................................ 5 1.3.4 Templates ............................................. 6 1.4 Hardware Virtualization Layer ...................................... 7 1.4.1 Hardware Virtualization Basics ................................. 7 1.4.2 Virtuozzo Virtual Machines ................................... 8 1.4.2.1 Intel Virtualization Technology Support ...................... 8 1.4.3 Virtual Machine Hardware .................................... 8 1.4.4 Virtual Machine Files ....................................... 10 1.4.5 Support of Virtual and Real Media ............................... 10 1.4.5.1 Supported Types of Hard Disks .......................... 11 1.4.5.2 Virtual Hard Disks .................................. 11 1.4.5.3 CD/DVD Disc Images ................................. 11 1.5 Virtuozzo Hybrid Server Configuration ................................. 11 1.6 Resource Management .......................................... 11 1.7 Understanding Licensing ......................................... 12 1.8 Physical Server Availability Considerations ............................... 12 2. Managing Virtual Machines and Containers ................................ 14 2.1 Creating Virtual Machines and Containers ............................... 14 2.1.1 Choosing OS EZ Templates for Containers .......................... 14 i 2.1.1.1 Listing OS EZ Templates ............................... 14 2.1.1.2 Installing and Caching OS EZ Templates ..................... 15 2.1.2 Creating Containers ....................................... 16 2.1.3 Creating Virtual Machines .................................... 17 2.1.4 Supported Guest Operating Systems ............................. 17 2.1.4.1 Virtual Machines ................................... 18 2.1.4.2 Containers ....................................... 19 2.2 Performing Initial Configuration of Virtual Machines and Containers ............... 19 2.2.1 Using cloud-init for Virtual Machine Guest Initialization .................. 20 2.2.2 Installing Virtuozzo Guest Tools ................................ 20 2.2.3 Configuring Network Settings .................................. 23 2.2.4 Setting Passwords for Virtual Machines and Containers .................. 23 2.2.5 Setting Startup Parameters ................................... 24 2.3 Starting, Stopping, Restarting, and Querying Status of Virtual Machines and Containers .... 25 2.3.1 Starting Virtual Machines and Containers ........................... 25 2.3.2 Stopping Virtual Machines and Containers .......................... 25 2.3.3 Restarting Virtual Machines and Containers ......................... 25 2.3.4 Checking Status of Virtual Machines and Containers .................... 26 2.4 Listing Virtual Machines and Containers ................................ 26 2.5 Cloning Virtual Machines and Containers ................................ 27 2.5.1 Creating Linked Clones ..................................... 28 2.5.2 Configuring Default Directories ................................. 28 2.6 Suspending Virtual Machines and Containers ............................. 29 2.7 Running Commands in Virtual Machines and Containers ...................... 29 2.8 Deleting Virtual Machines and Containers ............................... 30 2.9 Viewing Detailed Information about Virtual Machines and Containers ............... 31 2.10 Managing Virtual Machine and Container Backups .......................... 32 2.10.1 Creating Virtual Machine and Container Backups ...................... 32 2.10.1.1 Using a Temporary Directory for VM Backups . 34 2.10.2 Listing Virtual Machine and Container Backups ....................... 34 2.10.3 Restoring Virtual Machines and Containers from Backups ................. 36 2.10.4 Deleting Virtual Machine and Container Backups ...................... 38 2.10.5 Backing Up Entire Servers .................................... 39 2.10.6 Attaching Backups to Virtual Machines and Containers ................... 39 2.10.6.1 Attaching Backups to Linux Virtual Machines . 40 ii 2.10.6.2 Attaching Backups to Windows Virtual Machines . 41 2.10.6.3 Attaching Backups to Linux Containers ...................... 42 2.10.7 Detaching Backups from Virtual Machines and Containers ................ 43 2.10.8 Best Practices for Handling Page Cache When Working with Backups .......... 43 2.10.8.1 Performing Backups from the Page Cache Angle . 43 2.10.8.2 Limiting Memory Pressure from Node Processes . 45 2.11 Managing Templates ............................................ 47 2.11.1 Creating Templates ........................................ 47 2.11.2 Listing Templates ......................................... 48 2.11.3 Deploying Templates ....................................... 48 2.11.4 Migrating Templates ....................................... 49 2.11.5 Storing Templates on Virtuozzo Storage ........................... 49 2.12 Managing Snapshots ............................................ 50 2.12.1 Creating Snapshots ........................................ 50 2.12.1.1 Creating Virtual Machine Snapshots ........................ 51 2.12.1.2 Creating Container Snapshots ........................... 51 2.12.1.3 Snapshot Branching ................................. 52 2.12.1.4 Restrictions and Recommendations ........................ 52 2.12.2 Listing Snapshots ......................................... 52 2.12.3 Reverting to Snapshots ..................................... 54 2.12.4 Deleting Snapshots ........................................ 54 2.13 Migrating Virtual Machines and Containers ............................... 54 2.13.1 Offline Migration of Virtual Machines and Containers ................... 55 2.13.2 Live Migration of Virtual Machines and Containers ..................... 56 2.13.3 Migrating Virtual Machines and Containers from Virtuozzo 6 to Virtuozzo Hybrid Server 7 .............................................. 58 2.14 Performing Container-Specific Operations ............................... 60 2.14.1 Reinstalling Containers ..................................... 60 2.14.1.1 Customizing Container Reinstallation ....................... 60 2.14.2 Repairing Containers ....................................... 62 2.14.3 Enabling VPN for Containers .................................. 63 2.14.4 Setting Up NFS Server in Containers .............................. 63 2.14.5 Mounting NFS Shares on Container Start ........................... 64 2.14.6 Managing Container Virtual Disks ............................... 64 2.14.6.1 Adding Virtual Disks to Containers ......................... 64 iii 2.14.6.2 Configuring Container Virtual Disks ........................ 67 2.14.6.3 Deleting Virtual Disks from Containers ...................... 67 2.14.7 Restarting Containers ...................................... 68 2.14.8 Creating SimFS-based Containers ............................... 68 2.14.9 Bind-Mounting Host Directories Inside Containers ..................... 68 2.15 Performing Virtual Machine-Specific Operations ........................... 69 2.15.1 Pausing Virtual Machines .................................... 70 2.15.2 Managing Virtual Machine Devices ............................... 70 2.15.2.1 Adding New Devices ................................. 71 2.15.2.2 Initializing Newly Added Disks ........................... 72 2.15.2.3 Configuring Virtual Devices ............................. 75 2.15.2.4 Deleting Devices ................................... 76 2.15.3 Making Screenshots ....................................... 77 2.15.4 Assigning Host Devices to Virtual Machines ......................... 78 2.15.4.1 Assigning USB Devices to Virtual Machines .................... 78 2.15.4.2 Assigning PCI Devices to Virtual Machines .................... 80 2.15.4.3 Using PCI I/O Virtualization ............................. 81 2.15.5 Configuring IP Address Ranges for Host-Only Networks .................. 82 2.15.6 Configuring Virtual Machine Crash Mode ........................... 83 2.15.7 Enabling Secure Boot for Virtual Machines .......................... 83 3. Managing Resources ............................................... 86 3.1 Managing CPU Resources ........................................
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