Presidential Maladministration
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BLACKMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018 2:48 PM PRESIDENTIAL MALADMINISTRATION Josh Blackman* In Presidential Administration, then-Professor Elena Kagan re-envi- sioned administrative law through the lens of the President’s personal in- fluence on the regulatory state. Rather than grounding Chevron deference on an agency’s “special expertise and experience,” Kagan would “take unapologetic account of the extent of presidential involvement in adminis- trative decisions in determining the level of deference to which they are entitled.” The stronger the President’s fingerprints on the executive action, a practice she praises as “presidential administration,” the more courts should defer. There is a flipside to Kagan’s theory: four species of high-level influ- ence, which I describe as “presidential maladministration,” are increas- ingly problematic. First, where an incoming administration reverses a pre- vious administration’s interpretation of statute, simply because a new sheriff is in town, courts should verify if the statute bears such a fluid con- struction. Second, where an administration discovers a heretofore un- known power in a statute that allows it to confer substantive rights, courts should raise a red flag, especially when the authority exercised was one Congress withheld. Third, where an administration declines to enforce a statute that Congress refuses to repeal, under the guise of prosecutorial discretion, courts should view the action with skepticism. Fourth, where evidence exists that the White House attempted to exert its influence and intrude into the rule-making process of independent agencies, courts should revisit the doctrine concerning altered regulatory positions. As the Federal Register has recently turned the page from Obama to Trump, this Article provides a timely analysis of how courts react to un- presidented approaches to maladministration. * Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. 397 BLACKMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018 2:48 PM 398 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 399 II. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION ............................................... 401 A. Chevron Classic .................................................................. 401 B. Chevron Redux ................................................................... 403 III. PRESIDENTIAL MALADMINISTRATION ........................................ 405 A. Presidential Reversals ........................................................ 405 1. “Entitled to considerably less deference” .................... 406 2. “Upon further reflection” ............................................ 408 3. “Such oscillation is a normal phenomenon of American politics” ....................................................... 414 4. “Consistency with earlier and later pronouncements” ......................................................... 416 5. “Not instantly carved in stone” .................................... 416 6. “Election of a new President” ..................................... 418 7. Reversing Reversals ..................................................... 422 B. Presidential Discovery ....................................................... 423 1. “Never asserted authority” .......................................... 424 2. “Change of policy” ...................................................... 427 3. “Violation of Article I of the Constitution” .................. 429 4. House of Representatives v. Burwell ........................... 434 a. Cost Sharing Reduction Program .......................... 435 b. “Risk” .................................................................... 437 c. “Torpor” ................................................................ 440 C. Presidential Nonenforcement ............................................. 444 1. The Administrative Fix ................................................. 445 a. “If you like your insurance, you can keep your insurance.” ............................................................. 445 b. “An idea that will help” ......................................... 446 c. West Virginia v. Burwell ........................................ 447 d. “You can’t just shake your head and say no” ........ 448 2. Executive Actions on Immigration ................................ 450 a. The Five Ds ........................................................... 451 i. Deliberation .................................................... 451 ii. Disclaimer ....................................................... 451 iii. Defeat .............................................................. 452 iv. Debate ............................................................. 454 (a) Libya .......................................................... 454 (b) DACA ........................................................ 459 (c) DAPA ......................................................... 461 v. Discovery ........................................................ 463 b. Unaccountability .................................................... 465 D. Presidential Intrusion ......................................................... 467 BLACKMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018 2:48 PM No. 2] PRESIDENTIAL MALADMINISTRATION 399 1. Open Internet ................................................................ 467 2. Presidential Administration and Independent Agencies ....................................................................... 468 3. “Hybrid” Approach ..................................................... 469 4. November 10, 2014 ....................................................... 471 5. “Pressure” ................................................................... 474 6. “Is really anything new?” ............................................ 476 IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 479 V. POSTSCRIPT ................................................................................ 480 A. Revisiting Reversals ............................................................ 480 B. Discarding Discoveries ...................................................... 482 C. Reinforcing Enforcement .................................................... 483 D. Intruding Further ................................................................ 484 I. INTRODUCTION In Presidential Administration, then-Professor Elena Kagan re-envisioned administrative law through the lens of the President’s personal influence on the regulatory state.1 To Kagan, Chevron deference should not be grounded primar- ily on the agency’s “special expertise and experience.”2 Rather “a sounder ver- sion” would “take unapologetic account of the extent of presidential involve- ment in administrative decisions in determining the level of deference to which they are entitled.”3 Under this view, courts should apply a “variable deference regime, dependent on the role of the President in an agency’s interpretive deci- sionmaking.”4 The stronger the President’s fingerprints on the executive action, the more courts should defer. Kagan’s perception of presidential administration is uniformly positive. The President, she explains, is politically accountable to the populace and can use his influence to coordinate and achieve ambitious regulatory goals within an otherwise ossified bureaucracy. If the executive ever goes too far, Kagan main- tains, the courts stand ready to check arbitrary and capricious activity. These parameters—apart from technocratic expertise—she argues, should give the courts comfort in deferring to the White House’s regulatory agenda.5 There is a flipside to Kagan’s theory of presidential administration. Certain instances of high-level influence may be less salutary. First, where an incoming administration reverses a previous administration’s interpretation of statute, simply because a new sheriff is in town, courts should verify if the statute bears such a fluid construction. Second, where an administration discovers a hereto- fore unknown power in a statute that allows it to confer substantive rights, courts 1. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001). 2. Id. at 2374. 3. Id. at 2372. 4. Id. at 2373. 5. Id. at 2252. BLACKMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2018 2:48 PM 400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 should raise a red flag, especially when the authority exercised was one Con- gress withheld. Third, where an administration declines to enforce a statute that Congress refuses to repeal, under the guise of prosecutorial discretion, courts should view the action with skepticism. Fourth, where evidence exists that the White House attempted to exert its influence and intrude into the rule-making process of independent agencies, courts should revisit the doctrine concerning altered regulatory positions. This Article puts Kagan’s thesis to the test by analyzing these four species of executive influence, assessing when the virtues of presidential administration deserve deference, and considering when the vices of presidential maladmin- istration warrant skepticism. Part II provides an overview of Chevron’s approach to administration and introduces Professor Kagan’s remix of that doctrine. Section III.A explores pres- idential reversals. Within the context of Chevron deference, courts view ambig- uous statutes as susceptible to evolving interpretations, which can explicitly change from presidency to presidency. Chevron itself arose when the