146 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW Aflinnation of Statehood and Territorial Integrity of (1)

Hrvoje Kacic

Elected in the first multiparty elections in 1990 legitimacy for Communist Yugoslavia and, on the to the Parliament of Croatia as a representative of other, of attracting support from the Croatian popu- the district ofDubrovnik, the author served as Presi- lation. dent of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign This said, it is important to point out that the Affairs, 1990-1992. provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the So- Croatia's tradition of statehood extends back cialist Republic of Croatia guaranteed the right of through the medieval period over thirteen centuries, nations to self-determination - to include the right and continued until the establishment by the to secede - and also guaranteed precisely determined Versailles Peace Treaty of the entity of the Slovenes- borders among the republics. This was to have a sig- Croatians- (in essence what came to be the nificant impact on Croatia's achieving diplomatic Kingdom of Yugoslavia). The Croatians' experience recognition. with 's Karadjordje dynasty during the inter- In order to understand fully Croatia's situa- war period and with Tito in the second Yugoslavia tion during this crucial period of 1990-1992 - to only validated and strengthened traditional yearning which the fate or collapse of the second, Commu- of all Croatian to have their own state. nist, Yugoslavia was also closely connected - it is The creation of the necessary to take into con- Banovina of Croatia in The article gives a historical sideration the political situ- 1939, and even that of the ation abroad, and especially overview of the political Independent State of Croatia that in Europe, as well as to developments leading to the in 1941 under adverse con- assess the political balance break-up of Yugoslavia and, ditions' were expressions of within the former Socialist that same desire shared by subsequently, affirmation of the Federal Republic of Yugo- all Croatians. The affirma- Croatian state and its territorial slavia (SFRY) itself. tion of the golden thread of integrity. The initial international In the present assess- Croatian statehood contin- situation was not in favour of ment, I wi IInot deal in great ued subsequently during the Croatian independence since the detail with the domestic po- Communist period, where it international community intended litical situation. Rather, I was expressed in the deci- to preserve the common Yugoslav will focus on the interna- sions taken by the ZAVNOH state. After the Croatian (and tional political context over (State Anti-Fascist Council Siovenian) declaration of the last several years, one for the People's Liberation independence (1991) the EC and whose principal actors were of Croatia) and in Croatia's UN began to see the impossibility not favourably disposed to constitutions, beginning of a Yugoslav state, a fact soon the disintegration and col- with that of 1946 and con- highlighted by the aggressive lapse of even an artificially- tinuing to the last constitu- Belgrade's military intervention. created state (or the tion, the 1974 Constitution Further, particular role of Germany "Yugoslav tragedy" as it has of the Socialist Republic of and diplomatic recognition of been called with good rea- Croatia. All these initiatives Croatian state are discussed son). reflected the basic quest for including an overview of the Croatian independence, de- developments concerning the The International spite the fact that they were Balance final recognition of Croatian manipulated from the top territorial integrity. with the intent, on the one To understand inter- hand, of creating the illusion national relations more of legality and of building Key words: Croatia, Yugoslavia completely, especially ]UNY - DECEMBER 1998 147

within the European context, would require an analy- evident in the United Nations' behavior, especially sis in considerable detail of the Congresses of Vienna when De Cuellar was its Secretary-General. Given and Berlin, the Versailles and Rapallo Treaties, and this framework, it was not by accident that Budimir the league of Nations, as well as of the Monroe, Loncar, the Foreign Minister of the SFRY - then Wilson, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan Doc- already in its death-throes - sought to frighten and trines. In dealing with these very important prin- threaten the world at the CSCE summit in Berlin on ciples, we will have to limit ourselves, however, only 19 June 1991 by claiming that "The collapse ofYu- to those historical sources which have a direct bear- goslavia would be like a time-bomb in the middle of ing on an understanding of present-day international Europe and could even now spark a chain reaction relations, such as the United Nations Charter, the on the old continent, in which there are already forty- Helsinki Final Act, the basic documents of the Con- six ethnic conflicts." ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe De Cuellar's successor as Secretary-General (CSCE), and the 1989 Paris Charter. One is com- of the United Nations, Butros Butros Ghali con- pletely justified in viewing these documents as the firmed his support for the maintenance of the status basis for generally-accepted terms of reference and quo during the initial period of his term by his even as the legal basis of the present-day interstate sys- greater insistence that the United Nations would no tem in Europe, also taking into account, of course, longer be able to respect the principle of "national the role of NATO and the European Union. self-determination", since that would confront the Here, I will address only one basic principle international community with massive upheaval, which was established by the Wilson Doctrine just given the fact that would lead to the emergence of before the end of World War I, and which even to- more new states than the total of those which exist day is, still seen as the keystone of that doctrine, at present, forcing the United Nations to cope with a namely "the right of peoples to self-determination". situation in which there would be more than four This principle, and rightly so, found a prominent hundred states. place in the principles of the League of Nations and, later, in the United Nations Charter, as well as in Looking at the international world order at the CSCE documents. end of the twentieth century, one can conclude with- This principle played determinant role in the out exaggerating that the Slovenes and Croatians new framework after World War I as well as in the caught one of the last trains of independence, al- international process of deco Ionization. though clearly also relying heavily on the principle However, although the principle of national of a nation's right to self-defense. At the same time, self-determination was applied when the interna- Croatia must be aware that, now that right has been tional community recognized Croatia and Slovenia, taken advantage of and used up, the contemporary today it is no longer the keystone principle, nor is it principles of the world order must take precedence, decisive, in international relations. which in the case of Croatia is eminently pragmatic. Significantly, President Bush's term in office, The principle of national self-determination must which coincided with the collapse of the Commu- now be treated as a historical category. Croatia must nist system and the disintegration of the last two neo- adhere to the concept of the world's great powers to colonialist states in Europe - the USSR and the the effect that this principle from the Wilson Doc- SFRY - introduced and made part' of the United trine, despite its continuing presence in the United States' day-to-day conduct of foreign policy a new Nations Charter, has undergone a revision. doctrine which was diametrically opposed to the Wilson Doctrine. Known as the Bush Doctrine, the However, it was not only because of the evo- latter held that "States may neither be destroyed nor lution in the world's understanding of the right of created." That, in fact, meant that those countries self-determination that Croatia's prospects for which were recognized in late eighties of the present achieving the Croatian people's centuries-old desire century present cannot be allowed to disappear or to for an independent Croatia were daunting. There disintegrate, and, by the same token, that one can- were also other obstacles: not allow new states to be born. All this is in line with the very well known attitude of "the great pow- 1. Yugoslavia's standing and reputation around the ers" in favor of preserving the status quo ante, which world which it achieved in 1948 as the first "dissi- is also the prevailing ethos of international relations, dent" state by standing up to Stalin and the especially as conducted by the great powers of the Cominform and, subsequently, as a leader in the Non- world. Confirmation of this way of thinking was Aligned Movement. 148 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

2. The interests of the permanent members of the Europe into thinking that armed conflict would no United Nations' Security Council. longer be possible in Europe, and that it was only a a. Great Britain and France. They were the main pa- painful memory from the past. The Paris Charter, trons of the creation of Yugoslavia - or Greater Serbia filled as it is with wonderful declarations about or- - following both world wars, and there was close der in Europe as the Eastern Bloc was disappearing, diplomatic coordination among Belgrade, London is basically: flawed, however, since it does not pro- and Paris. Of course, there is an additional reason vide for penalties sanctions and for those who do for this sensitivity, for one cannot exclude the possi- not respect the Charter's principles and prescriptions. bility of similar movements in Northern Ireland, Clearly, Europe underestimated the possibility for Wales or, in Scotland and, as far as France is con- tyrants such as Saddam Husayn or Idi Amin to still cerned, in Corsica and in its Basque region. emerge in Europe. 1 b. The United States, as a result of its experience in Vietnam has consistently followed a policy of avoid- 4. The international community saw the breakdown ing becoming engaged militarily in crises which do of the "Extraordinary" Congress of Yugoslavia's not threaten directly its vital interests and in which League of Communists in January 1990 and the re- it cannot guarantee a successful and quick outcome. sults of the first democratic elections as part of a In the case of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, gradual democratization process within the continu- the United States has taken advantage of its inertia ing framework of Yugoslavia and as the result of the and indecisiveness, delivering the problem first to- meltdown of Communism. Within that context, the ward the European Community and subsequently fact was ignored that power in Slovenia,Croatia, steering it toward the United Nations. Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had passed c. Following the collapse of the "Eastern bloc" and newly emerged to genuinely democratic political the voluntary but unavoidable dissolution of the parties, while in Serbia and Montenegro the same Warsaw Pact - which accompanied the convulsions totalitarian Communist parties remained in power, of the USSR's economic collapse, Russia, using its only cynically "Communist" from their name. position on the Security Council to ensure that de- velopments in and the lessons from the Balkans did 5. In January 1991,Europe and the rest of the world not spread to its Eurasian landmass, supported were focused on the Gulf War. Only thus can one Yugoslavia's continued existence. The first Russian explain that the ultimatum from the leadership of ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Kerestezhants, acknowl- the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army on January edged that formerly for Russia Belgrade was equiva- 9, ordering the surrender of the Territorial Defense lent to Yugoslavia, as a result of which no attention Forces' arms in Croatia and Slovenia, and the "Com- at all was paid to the other republics and peoples in munique" by the Information Directorate of the Fed- the former Yugoslavia. This was the case not only in eral Secretariat for National Defense on January 24 Russia or in the former USSR, but also in most of were completely ignored by governments abroad and the rest of the world and even in Europe. In addi- even largely passed over by the world media. Even tion, the impact of Russia's also being Orthodox and though there was talk at the time of a "quiet" mili- of its traditional alliance with Serbia should not be tary coup or of a creeping toward military rule, one underestimated. can take January 24, 1991 as the date when that oc- d. China was also hesitating because of its ethnic curred. It was on that day that the Yugoslav Army composition and its determination that while accept- announced that it was the leading and the determin- ing the need for changes in its social structure by a ing force in the former Yugoslavia, and that it was gradual adoption of market conditions it would above and outside any official political body in the freeze the democratization of its political system. state, disregarding at this stage a role of Slobodan Above all China viewed the example of Croatia and Milosevic his right-hand man Borisav Jovic may Slovenia as an unwelcome precedent for the future have played in shaping events. of Tibet and even Taiwan. 6. During the first half of 1991, official positions 3. The end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of the throughout Europe toward the Yugoslav crisis were USSR from the world's political stage as a "super- identical to those of France and Great Britain. For power" the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, example, at the end of the European Community the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful coup Summit on 7 April 1991 , Jacques Santer announced attempt in Moscow in August 1991 - which all oc- the European Community's agreed-upon positions. curred without the firing of a single shot - lulled a. That the European Community has a duty to sup- ]UNY - DECEMBER 1998 149 port Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity. of the United States of America towards Yugoslavia b. That individual republics, with Slovenia and and Croatia. The year 1990 can be considered the Croatia specifically mentioned, as integral parts of year of strong and efficient Croatian lobbying in the Yugoslavia, must not foster any illusions about their USA. prospects of joining Europe. That opportunity will However, the Serbian lobby was also efficient be available in the future only to Yugoslavia. during that period. Regarding direct influence on the c. That the European Community sees no reason to course of events in Croatia, in the middle of 1990, become involved in the SFRY's sensitive internal we also have to mention the role of Mrs.Helen matters. Delich Bentley.

7. The visit by the United States' Secretary of State, Kosovo crisis 1989/1990 James Baker, to Belgrade in June 1991, his terse dis- and Knin barricades cussions with the president of each of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and his statement before During the year of 1989, due to the repres- he departed, reflected the international community's sion of Serbian authorities on the prevailing Alba- stand on the Yugoslav crisis, which Belgrade inter- nian population in Kosovo, there soon were world- preted as a "green light" to use armed force to bring wide appeals to Yugoslav authorities, to stop the use under control the "troublemakers" in Slovenia and offorce. Because of disrespect of human rights, Yu- Croatia. goslavia was condemned from the USA congress and many other parliament institutions in the world. 8. On June 24,1991, the European Community an- Helen Delich Benltey, member of the House nounced that it had approved a loan to Yugoslavia- of Representatives of the State of Maryland, was a read Belgrade - for 730 million ECUs, which the well-known lobbyist for the interests of Yugoslavia. federal president, Ante Markovic, viewed as a tri- At the beginning of August 1990, she visited umph for his personal policy. This initiative on the Belgrade where she met Mr. Jovic, President of part of the European Community can only be ex- SFRY, and Mr. Milosevic. The basic idea of her ad- plained as the resolute intention that all the relevant vice and warnings to her Belgrade friends was to players should get the message that the European loosen their policy towards the population ofKosovo, Twelve stood behind a "united" Yugoslavia. In for- and that iff or any reason Serbia was not able to com- mal terms, this was cast as support for the Ante ply with that request, it would certainly be in the Markovic government but in real terms, at the same interest of Serbia to divert the attention of the world time this also served as encouragement to Milosevic public from Kosovo by generating some other cen- and the military and communist leadership, who tres of crisis in the former Yugoslavia. were now assured that they could use force and move It was understandable that Serbian military toward final armed confrontation without any fear leadership, which controlled a tremendously supe- of sanctions or responsibility or punishment. rior military potential, thought the alternative sug- gestion of Mrs. Delich much more acceptable. Con- 9. The approaching of the Communist system's dis- sequently, Jovic, met Raskovic, Babic, and Opacic, integration in the world made additional initiatives leaders of Serbs in Knin, without the presence of for political involvement of Croatian diaspora, the any representative of Croatian government, (which process of which became especially prominent in was a deviation from the usual way of communica- the USA and other countries of the New World. It is tion), especially when it was made public that the difficult to mention all the self-sacrificing and de- meeting took place. On the next day, August 16, IN A voted actions, or the help Croatian diaspora gave to troops were put on the highest level of alert, and on the "old country". Results of the first multi-party August 17, 1990, Serbs from the town of Knin put elections marked the newest Croatian revival in the barricades (beams) on roads in the areas of Knin, homeland and we can freely say that Croats around Gracac, and Obrovac, This was the beginning of the the world have also greeted it with great enthusi- so-called "beam" revolution of which the role of the asm. leader of the Serbian lobby in the USA, held by Mrs. Delich Bentley, should not be neglected. Under the influence of such a process, Ameri- The aim of this entire staging was to provoke can officials like R. Dole, C. Pell, de Conto D' Amato, intervention of Croatian police against local Serbs, and many others, have been pleading for Croatia and who would then be protected by JNA for being using their authority to criticize the official policy "threatened". National groups, in this case Serbs, 150 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

being threatened by "Ustasha-like" authorities in Sudetes (the Czech Republic) and Danzig (Poland), Zagreb, was a frequently used delusion. In this way after which Great Britain and France, although un- the instrumental of certain categories of the popula- prepared, announced war on Hitler's Germany. This tion in those areas was achieved, even though the is the beginning of World War II. possibility of some national groups being threatened Disregarding the achievements and traditions could not be denied, this being the case in areas of European civilization concerning human rights where a particular national group was a minority, and rights of minorities and national groups, in agree- rather than in areas where Serbs held absolute ma- ment with the principles and particular solutions of jority, such as in Knin. Authorities in Knin, on all the Treaty of Paris, Milosevic's strategy contains the levels, are under complete control of Serbs. nationalistic slogan, which was the only means of The fact that the "Knin barricades" - one of achieving a more perfidious goal: imposing Belgrade whose protagonists was partly Mrs. Delich Bentley, centralistic-unitarian government upon all republics who was obsessed with assessments that Croatia eco- of the former Yugoslavia, except upon Slovenia. nomically could not exist as an independent state - Milosevic could have never received support in did not offer a pretext for direct military confronta- Serbia if he had intended to restrict himself to the tion and did not force a change in the democrati- territory of Serbia, Montenegro, and those areas in cally elected government in Croatia, left a military Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, where Serbs option as the main and the only solution for were in majority. Hypocritical Milosevic was sure Milosevic. that under the mask of Markovic's federal govern- Of course, in relying on enormous military ment, politically exploiting his role as "protector of superiority, Belgrade chose the military solution fol- the undivided Yugoslavia" and deluding Serbia and lowing indisputable assessments, coming from both the world, that he represented the same positions as Yugoslav Counter Intelligence and Yugoslav diplo- the rest of the world headed by the USA and espe- macy, that Europe and the world would idly tolerate cially the relevant international institutions he would the use of heavy weapons for the purpose ofpacifi- achieve his goals. cation of those republics which chose parliament Milosevic used demagogy, deceptions, and democracy as the basic value of political activity. also force to convince that with the help of IN A and The only topic left open was when and under which others he would be able to impose his regime upon excuse the Serbian Army would attack on democrati- regions from Gevgelija to Varazdin, Umag and Pula. cally elected governments in Croatia and Slovenia. These were the appetites of those who represented the idea of Great Serbia and unitarian Yugoslavia, Belgrade's choice - war option as well as of the radicals when they began the con- quest, allegedly only to the line of Karlobag- Slovenia was the first one to be attacked, but Karlovac- Virovitica. after the 6-day war the Serbian Army facing defeat, The United States of America gave Milosevic restricted the creation of Serbo-slavia' to Yugosla- 6 months, from June until December of 1991, to carry via, without Slovenia. On July 6, 1991 General out his demonic ambitions. For the sake of histori- Blagoje Adzic paraphrased the adventure in Slovenia cal truth it is also necessary to put before the public in his aggressive speech:"We lost a battle, but not that during the period when Milosevic had a green the war". Thorough personnel and other preparations light to carry out his Greater Serbian intentions, there to regain the spoiled reputation of the Yugoslav Army were attitudes in relevant places which differed from were hastily made. official policy, then conducted by the EC and the Milosevic - Saddam of the Balkans - for USA. The author of these lines was a witness to those whom the British Guardian already in the Summer events. In the political department of NATO in Brus- of 1991 said that he was "leading Serbian into a para- sels, already in mid-June 1991, a working model noia of wilderness" and who was described by The titled Europe's Lebanon was made in which it was New York Times as a "Butcher of the Balkans" and suggested in a drafted working paper that NATO and most certainly of the last communist regime in Eu- the EC jointly should, among other lines, contain rope - adjusted his policy after the, 6-day war to the following elements: their realistic abilities as seen from the Belgrade per- quote spective. His slogans,"All Serbs in one state", serv- a) "identification of the aggressor in the ing the protection of Serbian hood, are actually Nazi. Yugoslav conflict and the condemnation of chang- Let us recall Hitler, with his "blunt und boden" theory ing borders between republics by force; started with Anshluss (Austria), continued with b) appeal to all democratic forces to oppose ]UNY - DECEMBER 1998 151

the use of force and to search for a solution to the The Maturing of conflict by means of negotiations on the basis of prin- the European Community ciples and stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act and Treaty of Paris; The Declaration ofIndependence proclaimed c) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and unanimously by the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) on any other republic pronouncing independence, pro- June 25, 1991 (on the same day the Slovene Parlia- vided that it guarantees rights of minorities within ment proclaimed Slovenia's independence) is of con- the borders established after World War II, as siderable historical significance and represents the well as the fulfilment of obligations form the inevitable and resolute, as well as the justified, ex- Helsinski Final Act and Treaty of Paris; pression of the will and centuries-old aspirations of d) beginning a diplomatic campaign for in- the Croatian people. ternationalization of the conflict within the UN; By so doing, Croatia became a legally-inde- e) possibility of economic embargo on Serbia pendent actor sui generis, notwithstanding the hos- with a remark put in brackets that it would be tile stance of what remained of the federal govern- counter-productive to impose an arms embargo upon ing structure - and especially of the military estab- all Yugoslav republics, since Serbian militia and lishment - dominated by Milosevic's hypocritical JNA, compared to other forces, were military better policy of maintaining a unified Yugoslavia, and the equipped." activation of the federal government headed by Ante This initiative within NATO, which was not Markovic and Budimir Loncar on the international only one of the most important, but also the only scene with the intent of preserving Yugoslavia. indisputable strong international military institution, The arrival of J. Poos, Hans van den Broek, was unfortunately blocked by some members of and Gianni De Michelis just three days after Croatia's NATO, led by Greece. The explanation was that the declaration of independence, the Brijuni Declara- political department of NATO was not allowed to tion, numerous visits by parliamentary delegations take political stands before official political bodies and official representatives of other states and inter- of its members had discussed certain questions, and national organizations, the European Community's before certain viewpoints had been accepted at the declaration of August 27, 1991, and the October highest levels of NATO. 1991 UN Security Council Resolution 713 on Yu- In this way a precious and critical period of goslavia were all indications that Croatia had be- six to nine months was lost. At that moment, French come an independent actor and that it had established diplomacy was flirting with WEU, and the USA was its sovereignty. passively observing and waiting for things to de- The first decision taken by the European velop, unfortunately encouraging the aggressor by Community's Arbitration Commission on Decem- its inertness. ber, 7 1991 (which was chaired by Robert Badinter, Having seen that they could not extend the who was the president of France's Constitution re- "anti-bureaucratic revolution" to Ljubljana and sponse to a request for clarification from Lord Zagreb by means of "peace and solidarity rallies" Carrington, the President of the Conference on Yu- using the masses which had gathered at Gazimestan goslavia, and clearly noted the position in section 1 (Kosovo, in June 1989), the ruling circles in Belgrade (a) that, in accordance with the intent ofintemational - and especially Milosevic and the military's top law, "the existence or disappearance of a state is a leadership - were convinced that they could make question offact, and the effect of recognition by other the disobedient Slovenes and Croatians submit state is of a declarative nature only". through the use of force. It is worth quoting here the often-forgotten That juncture approached especially after the summary decision by the European Community's results of the first democratic Elections in all the Arbitration Commission, which is expressed in three republics of the former Yugoslavia (apart form Serbia points: and Montenegro). It was only a question of when, * The SFRY is in the process of disintegrat- and using what pretext for the benefit of world, not mg. local, opinion. * It is up to the republics to settle the ques- In that complex context and, given the bal- tions of state succession, subject to the principles ance of military power, the exploitation of the and rules of international law, especially with re- "precani" Serbs (i.e. those living outside Serbia) gard to respecting human rights and the rights of became a convenient means, as well as a staged national groups and minorities. motive. * Those republics which may wish to do so 152 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIO SREVIEW may form a new association which would contain Doctrine", especially in light of the frequent high- democratic institutions of their choice. lighting by international players of the need to pre- To Croatia, the European Community's dip- serve a united Yugoslavia. Belgrade believed that, lomatic initiatives and other political steps taken in the meantime, Croatia's resistance would be bro- around the world appeared to be slow, bureaucratic, ken using military force and that with a "fait and ineffective. This is perhaps not a surprising re- accompli" it could create a Greater Serbia. By add- action for a country which lacked everything except ing a few cosmetic initiatives on transitioning to a self-sacrifice and courage in its struggle to defend market economy; on the respect of human rights, its native soil from aggression by a militarily much etc., Milosevic believed he could create a "modem more powerful foe. Days seemed like weeks, and federation" according to his vision; which would sat- months like years, to those who experienced the isfy Europe while also serving the interests of a martyrdom of the inhabitants of Vukovar, Osijek, Greater Serbia. At the same time, such a Yugoslavia Petrinja, Karlovac, Sunja, Slunj, Kojevo, Skabmja, was to be capable of withstanding the alleged Dubrovnik, and Cavtat. This notwithstanding, we "Vatican-Comintern" conspiracy against Yugoslavia must assess objectively the facts, circumstances, and and, specifically; against Serbia. what was possible within the context of the interna- Van den Broek and the other European lead- tional situation, and acknowledge that Croatia's rec- ers were convinced that political means backed up ognition by the European Twelve on January 15, by threats of economic sanctions and various prom- 1992, as well as by many other states, came more ises, especially in the economic arena, would be suf- quickly than we could have expected or hoped for ficient to bring about a cease fire. This approach, in the Summer and Autumn of 1991. however, was the main cause for the failure and in- It is important to also assess what factors in- effectiveness of the European Community in deal- fluenced this chain of events. ing with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Serbia's de- The draft of the Hague "Convention on Yu- termination to "pacify" all its opponents by using goslavia" contained the accepted and unchallenged every available means, including brute force, was to option that each republic of the former Yugoslavia, lead to a race against time. if it wished to, could become independent and that The Croatian Sabor, having respected the act in and of itself was sufficient for recognition by three-month moratorium on implementing the Dec- the European Community and, consequently, by the laration of Independence, passed on 8th October 1991 international community. The third section of this a resolution cutting all its constitutional links to the draft also contained a complete plan for the estab- other republics and autonomous provinces with lishment of joint economic and transportation rela- whom Croatia had established the SFRY. tions which took as their model relations at a some- As soon as Milosevic realized that he would what lower level of integration than was the cases not be able to achieve his objectives by using the among the countries of the European Community European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia prior to Maastricht. A closer examination of the draft and that he would not be able to frustrate the Euro- was enough to convince anyone that accepting those pean Community's plans for the former Yugoslavia, proposals would not lead to a "Third Yugoslavia". Serbia began to obstruct any progress by the Con- The British (Lord Carrington), Dutch (van den ference on Yugoslavia, although Montenegrin presi- Broek), and French (Badinter) trio planned, in a prag- dent Momir Bulatovic on October 18, 1991, an- matic way, to impose that structure on all the repub- nounced at the Conference that Montenegro would lics of the former Yugoslavia as part of a package of accept the draft resolution as envisioned by the Con- comprehensive solutions, accompanied by automatic ference. Yugoslav diplomacy, in effect Serbia, how- diplomatic recognition of the complete sovereignty ever, now became active in steering any further ne- and independence of all those republics who re- gotiations on the Yugoslav crisis toward the United quested that. However, this was meant to be only Nations, counting on Russia's favoritism, and the upon the conclusion of the conference. The Confer- support of some non-aligned nations. The intention ence on Yugoslavia, as it was envisioned by the Eu- all of this was to buy time and to prevent the diplo- ropean Community, under the chairmanship of Lord matic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, with the Carrington, de facto was the requiem for Yugosla- aim of rescuing the notion of a third Yugoslavia via. which was envisioned along hegemonic lines. Belgrade's approach (that is Milosevic's ap- During this critical period, many foreign proach), however, was based on an assessment that policymakers were erroneous due to serious mistakes the European Community would respect the "Bush in their public statements, most often because of their ]UNY -DECEMBER 1998 153

lack of understanding of what was happening in this eign Affairs that Germany's unification too would region and, in particular, because they did not grasp not have happened if the "European dogma" about what kind of conflict this was. Thus, there were as- the inviolability of borders had been followed to the sessments claiming that in Yugoslavia was a "civil letter. The right of people to self-determination must war" or a "religious war" and there were declara- also be taken into account and, Bengemann added tions along the lines that "any solution which is on that occasion, "As far as the legitimate principle reached by peaceful means will be accepted." How- of non-interference in the internal affairs of indi- ever, Belgrade always interpreted such calls for peace vidual states is concerned, we cannot conclude that as "let us continue the violence, since there is no a unified Yugoslav state must be preserved at all solution until the militarily weaker opponent is de- costs ... Likewise, as we evolve our position, the Eu- feated, which will result in a peace which the world ropean Community cannot exert its influence from will accept", as had been a true after the Tia-nan- outside only in favor of a unified Yugoslavia". men Square massacre in China. Declarations by the United States that it had vital interests in Macedonia by default implied that Germany Comes (Steps) Forward it did not have such interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thereby gave Serbia a clear signal that it would Even after the very recent unification of the have a free hand in the latter. two Germanies, unified Germany as referred by Time was a key factor in implementing the many western politicians remains "an economic gi- plans envisioned by the main players of the Euro- ant and a political dwarf'. However, Germany's eco- pean Conference. Due to Serbia's obstruction, the nomic power was a significant factor in international Conference was unable to achieve the results which politics, particularly in Europe. Germany, in fact, was the member-states expected, while at the same time the fulcrum of the European Community and, along violence directed by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army with France, the hub of European integration and of escalated into full-scale aggression against Croatia. the political direction of the New Europe. The first appeals and calls for an end to the violence With the escalation of aggression against and for measures to halt Serbia were starting to come Croatia and with the seizure of Croatian territory and, from official sources in Austria, Germany, and the particularly, as a reaction to the terror and the at- Vatican, in no small part thanks to the great efforts tempt to destroy everything in the occupied territo- by the Croatian diaspora. ries that was Croatian, Germany, together with Aus- Although it is not possible to scrutinize ex- tria, was the first to use its diplomacy in a resolute actly at this stage how events developed day-by-day manner to respond to the appeals from the Croatian within the European Community, we do know that and Slovene leaders, and was the first to take the the positions of the twelve member-states toward initiative to have Croatia and Slovenia recognized Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of indepen- as soon as possible. dence were not all the same. A polarization within The German public as well as all relevant po- the European Twelve was evident very early. On one liticalleaders were able to identify the causes of the side stood France, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain, escalation of violence in former Yugoslavia even that met Croatia's and Slovenia's desire for freedom earlier, thanks to the following factors: and independence with unconcealed disfavor. At 1. The German community which had lived first, Italy and the Netherlands also held positions in former Yugoslavia - especially on the plains - close to these. On the other side, Germany, Belgium, had been subjected in the 1920s to an intensive colo- and Denmark and, to a certain extent, Luxembourg, nization (predominantly by Serbs) in the towns and showed considerably more sympathy for Croatia's villages which they had inhabited and on the fertile and Slovenia's sovereignty and independence, while lands they had owned for centuries. Ireland and Portugal took no stand. 2. At the end of World War II, there were about Although European and international public 500,000 ethnic Germans living in Srijem, , opinion firmly supported the need to maintain the Backa, and Eastern Slavonija. About half of them unity of Yugoslavia up to June 1991, the first dissi- were forced out, the other half killed. This extermi- dent voice within the official European structure was nation was part of a Communist terror campaign, heard in the first week of June 1991, when, just be- the same phenomenon which today is called euphe- fore a meeting in Dresden, Germany's Martin mistically "ethnic cleansing". Most of the expelled Bangemann, as Vice-President of the European Par- ethnic Germans moved to Austria and Germany. liament, reminded the European Ministers of For- These events were not written down nor taught in 154 CROATIAN INTERNATIONALRELATIONS REVIEW

the schools and, correctly, this contributed to the rec- the Yugoslav secret operative in Great Britain, for onciliation process on which the New Europe is example, the latter was apprehended before the mo- based. Nevertheless, many Germans remained con- tive for the attack had become clear. Sindicic was scious of what had happened, thanks in particular, sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but only for a to an oral tradition kept alive by relatives, descen- purely criminal act. Thus, the British public, as that dants, and friends of those expelled. in France in the Bruno Busic case, was deprived of 3. The German public always looked very the full truth or of information about the criminal negatively at Yugoslavia's Communist system, given nature of some of the former Yugoslavia's govern- the Germans' own direct experience with the tyr- ment institutions. anny and dictatorship of the East German regime. Even Tito's dissidence toward Moscow in 1948 did It is commonplace that interest and power are 1 not win for Yugoslavia any exoneration in Germany the basic factors of politics. Although this is unde- I for the undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav system. niable, in this case it is not correct to assume that In the 1970s, there was also the scandal surround- Germany abandoned the well-established guidelines ing the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, some of adopted by the European Community because of its whose members evaded arrest by seeking asylum in own interests, such as the expansion of its spheres Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav police demanded the sur- of influence. Alongside the initiative in German di- render of five Croatian emigres who were living and plomacy led by Foreign Minister Hans Dieter working in Germany as a condition for the extradi- Genscher (obviously working together with Chan- tion back to Germany of these five proven German cellor Helmut Kohl), it is important also to stress terrorists. Naturally, such an exchange was not ac- the following: Without detracting from the ability ceptable to Germany, and the Yugoslav authorities and devotion of Germany's Foreign Minister and of facilitated the Baader-Meinhofterrorists' subsequent many other German officials in their efforts to gain escape to the Middle East. The considerable public- diplomatic recognition for Croatia, Germany's di- ity which Yugoslavia received in the German media plomacy could not have acted differently, since it at the time contributed - and justifiably so - even was responding to pressure from its entire public further to Yugoslavia's negative image. opunon. 4. Many of the German media's reporters - I believe that it is abundantly evident that pub- such as Karl Gustav Strohm, Viktor Meier, Hans- lic opinion in Germany as well as in Austria, Hun- Petar Rullmann, and Johann Reismuller - knew the gary, and Australia, for different reasons) on the is- Slavic languages in use in Yugoslavia. They were sue of diplomatic recognition for Croatia and thus able to travel the breadth of the former Yugo- Slovenia was radically different from public opin- slavia and to report with greater credibility and with ion in Great Britain, France, and the United States, a better grasp of events than their counterparts from and especially from that in the Soviet Union and in Paris, London, and Washington, who sat in Belgrade the vast majority of other countries. and who sent back home an image exclusively as The United States had relinquished the initia- seen from their window in Belgrade. tive on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia completely 5. It is well-known that the Yugoslav UDBA to the European Community and, in November 1991, (secret police), with the help of Yugoslav diplomats senior officials in the Bush Administration informed and consular representatives abroad, systematically their German counterparts that the United States was organized dozens of attacks against Croatian prepared to support any initiative which Germany emigres. Most of these attacks occurred in Germany might undertake, assessing that this would contrib- and, in some of these cases, the German legal sys- ute to the development of freedom, peace, and de- tem correctly and with solid proof was able to dis- mocracy. • cover the motives for the attacks and to implicate official Yugoslav agencies in the assassinations. Second part of the article Moreover, these results were made public in Ger- will follow in the next issue. many. On the contrary, in the case of the killing of Bruno Busic in Paris and of Maksim Krstulovic in London, the local police knew that they had been carried out by Yugoslav agents, but did not pursue an investigation. In the case of the attempted assas- sination ofNikola Stedul (in Scotland) by Sindicic,