Institutions of Integration: the Incorporation of Frontiers in Modern Democracies, 1864-1912

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INSTITUTIONS OF INTEGRATION: THE INCORPORATION OF FRONTIERS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES, 1864-1912

Soren I. Fanning

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2010

Committee:

Tiffany Trimmer, Advisor

Irina Stakhanova Graduate Faculty Representative

Rebecca Mancuso

Edmund Danziger

Stephen Ortiz ii

ABSTRACT

Tiffany Trimmer, Advisor

The purpose of this study was to compare the cultural and political incorporation of the western frontiers of Canada and the United States in the late nineteenth century. The work examined the process of territorial integration (the transplantation of cultural and national identity from the state core into the peripheral frontier) in two geographically similar yet politically divergent democracies in the late nineteenth century. To accomplish this, the perspectives of both state authorities and frontier residents were explored through the use of personal memoirs, newspaper articles and editorials, formal reports from state agents, as well as official governmental records and legislative debates.

Documents reveal that while law enforcement institutions were frequently chosen by the government to accomplish the task of cultural colonization, in every case the de facto objectives of these institutions transformed from enforcing the will of the national core to advocating for the needs of frontier residents. Since national identity in the late nineteenth century was based almost exclusively on a single ethnic identity, that of Anglo-Saxon Protestants, national governments could not afford to alienate these settlers politically. Therefore, the government consciously catered to the desires of its white Protestant settlers, even when conforming to popular dictates meant overriding the advice and judgment of law enforcement institutions. In the power relationship between the core and frontier, frontier residents occupied a greater position of power and agency. The historical differences between the United States and Canada, however, along with divergent geographic constraints, led the two countries to create two starkly different methods of accomplishing the same task. iii

This work is dedicated to my father, who inspired me to follow in his footsteps. iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work could not have been completed without the contribution and assistance of many individuals. My dissertation committee, headed by Dr. Tiffany Trimmer, and assisted by

Dr. Rebecca Mancuso, Dr. Edmund Danziger, Dr. Stephen Ortiz, and Dr. Irina Stakhanova, provided invaluable guidance and advice during the entire writing process. The outstanding staff at the Jerome Library at Bowling Green State University was tireless in tracking down vital sources of information. Similarly, the staffs of the National Archives and Records

Administration in Washington, DC, and the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa were of immeasurable assistance in locating many of the documents the composed critical sections of this work. Finally, no acknowledgment would be complete without thanking Ms. Tina Thomas and

Ms. Dee Dee Wentland of the BGSU history department, without whose advice, hard work, and superhuman patience I would not have graduated. v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER ONE: THE FRONTIER PHENOMENON ...... 1

The Importance of Identity ...... 7

Nature of the Frontier...... 13

The Footprint of History…...... 19

Comparisons and Cases …...... 26

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FRONTIER...... 35

An Overview of Frontier Historiography ...... 36

A Cultural Catalyst: The Frontier in American History ...... 46

The Faces of Janus: The Frontier in Canadian History …...... 56

The Omnipresent Force: The Frontier in Alaskan History …...... 61

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORGANIC FRONTIER OF MONTANA, 1867-1912 ...... 65

Origins of American Settlement Policy ...... 69

Settlement of the Montana Territory ...... 74

Economic Influences on Territorial Governance ...... 82

Weakness of Gubernatorial Power...... 87

Settler Autonomy and Indian Affairs ...... 96

Whiteness Matters ...... 101

A Hybrid Society ...... 108

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLANNED FRONTIER OF CANADA, 1867-1912 ...... 113

First Efforts at Unification ...... 118

Origin of the Mounted Police ...... 124 vi

Relations with the First Nations ...... 129

Becoming a Western Institution...... 134

Cultural Makeup of the Canadian Prairies ...... 141

The Mounted Police as a Cultural Conduit ...... 148

Nation Building through Negotiation ...... 156

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SUDDEN FRONTIER OF ALASKA, 1867-1912 ...... 160

A Region Apart ...... 162

The Beginnings of American Rule ...... 166

The Rise of Informal Institutions ...... 172

Native Alaskans and Cultural Assimilation ...... 182

The Lessons of Alaska ...... 193

CHAPTER SIX: INCORPORATION AND ACCOMODATION ...... 197

Differing Policies in Differing Settings ...... 199

A Fluid Core/Frontier Relationship ...... 205

Vox Populi…...... 210

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 214

CHAPTER ONE: THE FRONTIER PHENOMENON

Territorial expansion, in the popular imagination, is a process associated primarily with military conquest. Expansion is, after all, ultimately a zero-sum proposition, as states expand their borders by seizing land claimed by another. North America is no exception, home to two states that rank among history‟s most successful expansionist nations. Throughout the nineteenth century, Canada and the United States undertook a wave of territorial expansion both rapid and truly continental in scope, bringing both staggering natural wealth and a host of diverse populations into their borders. It took only 65 years through diplomatic and military means for the United States to lay claim to what is today the contiguous boundaries of the country, in addition to the massive territory of Alaska. Canada was even more industrious; the Ottawa government amassed the world‟s second largest territorial borders in roughly the same amount of time.1

North America in the late nineteenth century offers historians the opportunity to study three similar frontiers at varying degrees of incorporation into their nations. In 1889, Montana was formally admitted to the Union after a quarter century of political apprenticeship as a dependent territory of the United States. Admission brought not only full political representation in Congress, but more importantly, the right of Montanans to finally choose their own governor, who up until this point had been appointed by lawmakers thousands of miles to the east. Formal incorporation into the nation, far from being a symbolic designation, represented the political and

1 Canada remains the world‟s second largest country in terms of sheer size, second only to the Russian Federation. Demographic Yearbook – Table 3: Population by sex, rate of population increase, surface area and density. United Nations Statistics Division, 2007.

2 economic maturation of the frontier, elevating the region to a level of equality with the older, more established states of the Union.2

Just over the border in Canada, the regions of what would become the provinces of

Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta had been opened to white settlement only four years earlier. Under a program of settlement enacted by the Ottawa government, large numbers of immigrants from Europe were offered both incentives and public assistance to create settlements in the great expanses of prairie that stretched between Ontario and the Rocky Mountains. The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway allowed peripheral communities like Winnipeg to grow rapidly into young cities, while smaller settlements were growing into towns with sustainable economic and social infrastructures.3 Guided by the North West Mounted Police

(NWMP), western settlement in Canada was both encouraged and directed by state authorities in a way utterly foreign to American frontiersmen.

Further north, the American colony of Alaska was just beginning to develop a civil society. Distance, climate, and geography had combined to frustrate efforts at settling the region during the first decades of American rule. The first settlement all but collapsed within a decade; even the Army had been withdrawn in 1877. Until gold was discovered in southeastern Alaska in 1880-1, there was effectively no American state presence in Alaska at all.4 Even in 1889, twenty two years after purchasing the territory from Russia, American business interests governed Alaska far more effectively than did the federal government in Washington. Alaska‟s population was so miniscule that it would not achieve that status of even a formal Territory until

1912.

2 Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires: Governors and Territorial Government, 1784- 1912 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), 3-5. 3 Douglas Hill, The Opening of the Canadian West (London: Heinemann, 1967), 205. 4 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 183.

These three frontiers provide a robust illustration of how frontiers become integrated into their respective states. Moving north to south, Alaska, Manitoba, and Montana in 1889 represent frontiers at the beginning, middle, and end stages of incorporation, respectively. The similarities between these regions make them particular attractive to study; all three occupy the same geographic area and experienced the integrative process during the same time span. Further, both the American and Canadian governments were popular democracies who inherited their political and legal traditions from Great Britain. Given these similarities, it would be logical to expect the process of frontier settlement and territorial integration to be virtually identical in both states.

In reality, these two countries employed vastly different strategies to accomplish their goals. Divergent historical experiences and political priorities, as well as physical factors such as geography and climate, influenced the United States and Canada to pursue completely different national goals with regard to frontier settlement. Although both governments sought to use national identity to ensure territorial integrity and promote political unity, the manner in which those governments went about achieving that goal reveals much about the relationship between the state and frontier in modern democracies.

In the age of mass media and widespread literacy, democratic governance conferred an attribute to the state authorities that was crucial to the task of territorial integration: legitimacy.

If the vox populi bestowed power, however, it also demanded conformity to its dictates. Unlike in times past, where the pace and manner of territorial acquisition was determined by the state elites with relative impunity, elected officials in an age of mass media were forced to take

4 popular sentiment into account when deciding territorial policy.5 This periodically led to policy conflicts when the objectives advocated by the core clashed with the popular desires of the frontier residents. These conflicts became acute when the state was attempting to foster loyalty to the national identity in the same population that was opposing state policy. In situations like these, the limitations of coercive power fell into stark relief, as most states proved unwilling to directly oppose the desires of a favored region or populace. Nowhere was this more apparent than in relations with the indigenous peoples of the Americas, in which the voices calling for social accommodation were repeatedly drowned out by popular demands for removal.

Understanding the process of state integration, then, can no longer focus solely on the actual acquisition of territory, whether by pen or sword. Instead, the reconciliation of the various cultural groups, ostensibly under the jurisdiction of a single national authority, is the critical challenge to multicultural states. These groups were defined by human elements, such as religion or language, as well as environmental and economic factors. Internal migrations, the dilution of state power projected over thousands of miles, and differences in perception between the imperial core and the periphery of the settlement frontier all contributed to the complexity of governance. The strategies used to win the loyalty of these populations to the national identity, and the institutions selected to carry out that strategy, depended greatly on the both the perception of the frontier by national policymakers and the historical experiences – the

„institutional memory‟ – of those organizations charged with integrating new territories.6

5 Not all classical or even medieval empires were free from the dictates of popular will. For example, the Roman Republic chose to engage in wars of conquest, most famously against Carthage, only after mobilizing popular sentiment toward that cause. However, it was frequently the case of the state leading the populace, and not the reverse, that characterized policymaking in past empires. See Michael Crawford, The Roman Republic (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993), 166. 6 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1.

Nineteenth-century North America provides a crucial window into this phenomenon.

The United States and Canada, while separate and sovereign states, had much in common. Both countries carried a shared British history, a common English language, and British-derived state institutions. Geographically, the North American nations shared numerous climactic and geographic conditions, both along the 49th parallel and in the far northwest, home to the Alaska and Yukon territories. Significantly from the standpoint of national identity, the two states also shared not only large populations of indigenous peoples, but large linguistic and religious minorities within their borders.

In reality, two vastly different strategies of territorial incorporation were adopted. The

United States, with its burgeoning population and a tradition of decentralized government, preferred a policy of subsidizing, rather than directing, settlement of new territories.7 Typically, the military was dispatched to secure the region, a process that involved formally claiming territory and relocating native peoples either through negotiation or by force. Once the land was catalogued, it was sold at subsidized prices to potential settlers, who would then populate the region and dictate the pace and tone of integration.8 Conversely, the state took a far more active role in directing settlement in Canada. Through its primary institution of integration, the

Northwest Mounted Police, the Canadian government sought not only to establish a state presence in advance of settlement, but also to prepare local conditions in a way that would

7 The American territorial system was founded upon the premise of establishing state institutions as needed by the settler populace. The actual settlement of new territories was to be done by common citizens at their discretion, as opposed to a formal state program of settlement. See Bryan Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires: Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968); Earl Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861-1890: Studies in Colonial Administration (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947); and Walter Nugent, The Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 2008). 8 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002): 163. Specifically, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided the template for the bulk of frontier settlement.

6 populate the frontier in accordance with the wishes of the metropolis. In this manner, the

Canadian policy represents the inversion of its variant in the United States; the central government possessed initiative agency, while the settlers were left primarily reacting to state policy. Explaining these differences in territorial policy in two states that seem to share so many characteristics is the primary task of this work.

Although both the United States and Canada descended from the British tradition of constitutional government, the institutions crafted by these governments gained characteristics specific to their North American setting.9 Establishing both settlement and trade between the frontier territories and the metropolitan core was an essential ingredient toward incorporation in

North America, as it was elsewhere throughout the world. Commerce, settlement, and state loyalty were self-reinforcing processes.10 In the North American context, this meant that the institutions charged with imperial integration were responsible for a wide array of essential government functions, effectively transplanting the state into the frontier. The need to establish not just legal authority but also municipal order and civic infrastructure over tremendous distances required that institutions be granted considerable autonomy to respond to changing frontier conditions. In the prairies of Canada, the Mounted Police spent far more time administering veterinary care and distributing seed grain that investigating crimes. Similarly,

Alaskan law enforcement officials utilized their prisons as homeless shelters and soup kitchens as often as actual penitentiaries. In both instances, the demands of frontier life required available state organizations to take on the most necessary duties, even if they fell far outside their formal functions.

9 See North, ch. 1. 10 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151.

The Importance of Identity

In many ways, any study of cultural identities is complicated by the somewhat ephemeral nature of the subject. Unlike economic, military, or political power, cultural influences are far more difficult to track, quantify, or even define.11 Culture can be understood as the social linkages and memories (both actual and mythologized) of populations that share common experiences and lifestyles.12 These linkages, however, are not exclusive; a bond of religion, for example, does not exclude one from sharing an economic bond with other groups of the same socioeconomic stratum. Given the confluence of economics, environment, and settlement patterns, identities tend to bond in distinct areas, leading to an additional regional identity weaving throughout the others. Cultural identity, from the perspective of a multiethnic state, is not a dichotomous concept, but a layered one.

Reconciling different and sometimes competing cultural identities within a polity is a challenge. A cultural balancing act emerges within the state whenever there is potential conflict between needs of the government and the desires of a segment of the populace, centered upon the dominant national identity.13 A broad identity is more accessible by a greater population, and thus in theory has greater appeal, but does so at the expense of opening the empire to a greater diversity of cultural groups which could come into conflict with one another. A narrow,

11 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 68. 12 For a complete exploration of the „horizontal linkages‟ of popular cultures, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2002). 13 “Identity,” in this context, does not refer to specific policy or set of beliefs, but rather the central characteristics that defined a member of the empire. Instead of an „ism,‟ national identity serves as the outer cultural boundary between those that were members of (and thus protected by) the state and the „others,‟ who fell outside the ideological markers. See Alejandro Colás, Empire (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), and Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

8 exclusive identity, by contrast, much more firmly roots state loyalty in a set of shared cultural touchstones, but may remain inaccessible to all but the rigidly defined few. In every case, the state‟s objective is to ensure that the national identity remains a stronger attraction than the subaltern cultural identities, whether defined by region, class, religion, or other criteria.

It was the modern age (and its later ideology of nationhood) that brought exclusive national identities into predominance. An important factor in this shift was the growth of maritime empires, in which a metropolitan core, or “mother country,” held sway over a wide- ranging array of overseas frontiers. The physical separation, combined with the face that distant frontier populations shared few (if any) cultural commonalities with the metropolis, sharpened the distinction between the government and the governed. The colonial peoples became the

“other,” a population apart culturally and physically, from those for whom the empire existed.

These overseas territories could be conquered and held, but never truly incorporated, as the societies incubated within could never be accepted as full and equal partners in the imperial enterprise.14

This arrangement, however, left the imperial authorities with the dual challenges of maintaining imperial rule among an alien populace while ensuring civil order. In her study of colonial integration between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lauren Benton examines the complex nature of the task as well as the institutions charged with its success. Moreover,

Benton places cultural influences at the heart of the integrative process, arguing that the agents- of-empire dispatched to the colonial possessions relied for more upon cultural adaptation and synthesis than legal or military coercion to support imperial governance.

14 Arthur James Balfour, Speech to the House of Commons, “Problems with Which We Have to Deal in Egypt.” 13 June 1910. The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report). Fifth Series, Vol. 17, London, 1140-44. Reproduced in William D. Bowman et. al, eds. Imperialism in the Modern World: Sources and Interpretations (Pearson: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 2007), 38-40.

In Benton‟s analysis, the success or failure of empires, particularly maritime empires where the bulk of colonized territory was physically separated from the imperial core, relied on the creation of what she terms “global legal regimes.”15 These are defined as the structuring of multiple legal authorities that rationalize the basis of exchange for goods and information; in other words, they set the “rules of the game.”16 The regimes then act as intermediaries between the imperial metropolis and its colonized frontier, establishing a legal setting that allowed radically different cultures to interact in an accepted format. Benton comes to term this arrangement “pre-indirect rule.”17

Empires in this context rely less on brute force and suppression (although this is not to say that these unsavory tactics are absent or even rare) and far more on accommodation in order to survive. By adapting existing native legal codes into the overlaid imperial system, the whole institution of jurisprudence becomes a medium through which alien cultures could be reconciled, even when separated by vast distances.18 Further, this medium cut both ways: it provided the colonized peoples a vehicle to influence to imperial state, while allowing the metropolis to govern an alien culture in a recognizable context.19 In this way, imperial rule became an interaction between regions rather than simply a one-way conduit of hierarchy.

In practical terms, the dominant national identity in the late nineteenth century for both the United States and Canada was an Anglo-Saxon, largely Protestant, set of cultural norms based on ethnicity.20 The continued presence of large numbers of indigenous peoples in the

15 Benton, 25. 16 Ibid., 5. 17 Ibid., 127. 18 Ibid., 161. 19 Ibid., 78. 20 While Protestants were the religious majority in the western frontiers, Catholics and Jews were not excluded from participating in nearly all aspects of daily life. In the United States, those religious minorities were subjected to the casual social prejudice without losing any legal rights or protections. Due to the history of the Canadian government

10 frontier West, combined with the continued influx of immigration from non-English speaking peoples, gave rise to fears of a cultural erosion that could lead to political fragmentation. With ethnic identity firmly bound up in national identity, territorial integrity could be established only by populating the frontier with settlers who could spread those cultural norms into frontier regions.21 Welding political loyalty to a specific ethnic identity – in both cases, the white,

Protestant identity that dominated the core regions of the nation – necessarily meant that democratic governance could only be extended to those who embraced that identity. Other groups whose cultural practices fell too far outside these parameters were considered too deviant to be included in the practice of democratic self-government.22

This formalized confluence of state and ethnic identity would have two profound consequences for territorial policy. First and foremost, it established the settlement of the North

American frontier as a practice of cultural colonization.23 Those populations who could or would not assimilate and adopt Anglo-Saxon cultural norms were either removed or exterminated. Discussions of the time among state officials debated the manner, pace, and technique of cultural assimilation, but never that actual policy itself.24 By restricting participation in self-government to only those populations that embraced the national identity,

vis-à-vis Quebec, Catholic populations in the prairies became a much more politically sensitive issue than in the USA. See Marian C. McKenna, “Above the Blue Line: Policing the Frontier in the Canadian and American West, 1870-1900” in The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests, ed. Sterling Evans (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 88. 21 Eblen, 22. 22 Ibid., 31. 23 Shiela McManus, “‟Their Own Country‟: Race, Gender, Landscape, and Colonization around the Forty-ninth Parallel, 1862-1900” in Evans, 118. 24 Governor‟s Report for Dakota, 1885, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA, 12. See also 40th Congress, Memorial of the Dakota Legislative Assembly, 30 December 1867, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA.; Alan and Maureen Gaff, eds., Adventures on the Western Frontier by Major General John Gibbon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 244. In many instances officials decried the conditions of Indian reservations or the general neglect shown to Native Americans by the federal government. However, in every case Indian/white coexistence was predicated on the cultural assimilation of Indians into white-dominated American society.

11 the federal government assured that the West would develop socially and politically as an extension of the East.

Adopting an ethnically-based national identity held an unforeseen consequence, however.

Settlers from the national core now became the sole arbiters of political legitimacy with the exclusion of other ethnic groups. As such, the government was required to enact policies based upon the popular approval of its white settlers. This led to instances of both governments overriding the advice of its own appointed officials and even the adopted platform of the governing party in order to accommodate settler demands. Frontier settlers, not political leaders in national capitals, decided territorial policy.

It thus fell to institutions of integration, such as the Mounted Police of Canada or the territorial governors in the United States, to be active membranes of transmission for ideologies, policies, and philosophies between the cultural core of the nation and the developing frontier. To reconcile these divergent and occasionally contradictory tasks, it would be institutions of law enforcement – territorial governors, police forces, and the military – to which the North

American nations turned. These integrative institutions found themselves in something of a

“twilight zone” of competing needs and mandates. While ostensibly representatives of the state and charged with implementing its policies, these agents were also bound by the need to serve the communities under their jurisdiction. More importantly, these institutions found themselves depending upon the cooperation of the local populations in order to perform their duties. A strange, seemingly contradictory dual role emerged for these institutions, serving simultaneously as both enforcer of state policy and advocate for the developing frontier communities.

It is perhaps counterintuitive that it was the legal arm of the state that became the advocate for cultural accommodation within an empire. Upon closer inspection, however, these

12 are the same bodies that determined how heavy the imperial hand would lie upon the frontier; it is natural, then, that these institutions would adapt the process of administering law in a method that would ease their burdens. Benton highlights that European law codes by the nineteenth century had already had to navigate the conflict between secular and canon law at home. In that context, the ad hoc incorporation of existing „native‟ law codes, to the extent they did not contradict imperial laws, was a natural progression.25

By adapting native techniques and innovations to compensate for inadequate state support, the overseas agents of empire grafted indigenous customs onto the prevailing national identity. What resulted from these adaptations was not a transplanted metropolis, but a hybrid population with elements of both metropolitan and indigenous social linkages. Quebec was not

Paris on the St. Lawrence, nor was Mexico ever truly another Spain; the Métis and mestizo cultures of the colonial Americas were too well-adapted to their environment and established in colonial society to be cast aside because they failed to meet the standards of an exclusive imperial ideology.26 The growth of Orientalist movements, particularly in British-controlled

India as typified by the Asiatic Society, indicated a sotto voce acknowledgement of the limitations of both imperial state control and cultural conformity. These limitations were on full display near the end of the eighteenth century; when in the midst of a struggle for political autonomy, the British colonists of North America found cultural friction between colony and metropolis another reason to seek outright independence.27

25 Ibid., 128. 26 Cooper, 167. 27 This is not to say that the cultural differences between Philadelphia and London were so vast as to make reconciliation impossible, nor do I assert that the differences were somehow invented as a propaganda ploy by the Patriot cause. What is demonstrably true is that there were significant cultural differences between Britain proper and its American subjects, and those differences were both noted and on occasion cause for friction between colonial and imperial officials. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 113-114.

Nature of the Frontier

Understanding the relationship between the federal government and the territories it wished to absorb into the nation requires viewing the state and its frontier as formalized social networks.28 The core of the state itself, comprised of those territories in which the inhabitants possess the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship, serves as the national metropolis. In

North America, the metropolitan states or provinces are those possessing unabridged representation in the national legislature and whose citizens enjoy the full protection of civil law. In frontier territories, the inhabitants are frequently governed under different law codes, whether under military rule or some other form of colonial jurisprudence. These regions, with sparse populations (relative to the core states or provinces) and lacking full political and legal privileges, make up the national „periphery‟ of territories claimed by the state but lacking formal state organizations and recognition.

Because the frontier is physically contiguous in continental states, the delineation between „core‟ and „periphery‟ is a gradual one.29 As an example, no citizen of the French

Empire could mistake Senegal or Indochina for Provence or Gascony, as the physical separation from France itself served to reinforce the radically different climates, languages, and ethnicities of the colonies. In the United States, however, there was no such unmistakable distinction between Minnesota and the Dakota Territory, or between Canadian Manitoba and western

Ontario. For these frontiers, there existed no stark delineation where the metropolis ended and the frontier began. There was only the increasing sparseness of population, the gradually more

28 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 11. See also pp. 7, 347. 29 Lieven, 223.

14 numerous indigenous peoples, and the growing paucity of state institutions and services to hint that one had crossed into a colonial territory.

From the perspective of the metropolis, the frontier was conceptualized in two radically different ways at the same time. One view was that of the frontier as an outgrowth of the national core, the colonial process of self-replication by which settlers would transplant Eastern social structures, legal machinery, and cultural infrastructure into the barren (of Anglo-Saxon

Protestants, certainly) Western territories. This perceived frontier was the one to be nurtured and protected, whose residents were to be heeded and whose favor was to be courted. Frontiers were also truly colonial, as the objective of state policy was to colonize the region with settlers from the metropolis, to transform the periphery into the core.

The Dakota Territory of the United States provides a vivid example of this dichotomy.

When Governor John L. Pennington bombarded the Postmaster General with pleas and outraged demands that postal service be extended to the western fringes of the territory, he did not do so as a proconsul determined to assert control over a distant province; rather he did so “obeying the commands of these people whom it is my duty to serve.”30 The federal government was so secure in the cultural loyalty of these largely white, Protestant settlers that no distinct agency or division of the Interior Department was charged with their administration. Rather, the bulk of the actual business of governing the Territories fell under the division of the Interior labeled

“Miscellaneous and Patents.”

The other perception of the frontier was that of a realm inhabited by populations utterly foreign to American political traditions and cultural life. Indians, Mormons, Latinos in the

30 Letter, Pennington to Key, 11 August 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, National Archives and Records Administration (hereinafter referred to as NARA).

15 southwest, Chinese immigrants – these were the populations whose presence represented an impediment to integration. Governor Gilbert A. Pierce of Dakota succinctly spelled out this view: “It is quite impossible that two such distinct and entirely different modes of life should exist in close contact without difficulties; and that these difficulties should increase is quite as inevitable.”31 Given such a stark assessment, the options for dealing with these populations fell into the categories of either removal or assimilation.

Such a bifurcated view is a necessary consequence of adopting an exclusive national identity. One population, the white Protestant settlers, is viewed as politically and culturally loyal; all others are seen as incompatible, and thus are only acceptable for membership through subscription to the national identity. To do so requires the abandonment of those elements of cultural identity, whether religious, economic, or political, that the settler populace deemed unacceptable for social membership. In this way, the federal government in both the United

States and Canada was not dealing with a single cultural frontier, but rather two frequently antagonistic ones.

The relationship between the national metropolis and its frontier was not a fixed one, but instead a series of continual negotiations and interactions, evolving as each region sought to pursue their own goals and objectives. As the twin foci of local and state authorities interacted over time, it is imperative to study the way in which their interactions developed and changed according to new political, economic, and cultural circumstances. Game theory, as put forward

31 Governor‟s Report, Dakota Territory, 1885, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA, p. 12.

16 by Fritz Scharpf, offers a helpful way in which to demonstrate these interactions, during which the two factions attempted to maximize their advantages and achieve their respective goals.32

Perhaps the most important contribution of game theory to historical analysis is its ability to model interactions between interest blocs, either in isolation or in frequent iterations. While frequently cited in reference to international relations, game theory is of great use in the study of regional identity, particularly for those states that are seeking to promote a single national identity in states with multiple ethnic or cultural groups. These situations are well suited to game theory due to the fact that each faction frequently has multiple objectives vis-à-vis its counterpart and those objectives can often find themselves in contradiction.

Typically, the primary issue is loyalty of the minority group to the state which is dominated by the majority. A frequent assumption in these disputes is that the majority holds a position of unassailable strength. In fact, the majority often finds itself in circumstances where the minority group is in an advantageous position, which forces the authorities to quickly re- evaluate its strategy for ensuring (or even negotiating) state loyalty. While Fritz Scharpf‟s

“Chicken” and “Prisoner‟s Dilemma” are the most widely cited examples of game theory, these particular arrangement are less well suited for intra-state conflicts, in which issues of identity and interest are more opaque.

As helpful as game theory can be in studying these processes, care must be taken to avoid incorrect or misleading analysis. In particular, the goals of each actor must be carefully researched before applying any of Scharpf‟s matrices, as it is easy to misconstrue the goals of one actor can result in applying one game when, in reality, another is being played. Further, game theory rests on the assumption that all participants are utilizing rational choice

32 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 36.

17 methodology; any student of history can attest that rationality is more a goal than an abiding rule of crafting state policy, frequently because the participants do not possess a complete set of facts.33

Nevertheless, Scharpf‟s methods do provide the policy scholar with a potentially powerful tool. The great utility of game theory is not in its prescriptive quality, but rather its usefulness in clarifying the goals of the participants and the rationales for their subsequent actions. Iterative versions of these „games‟ shows the progression of events over time, and in some instances, illustrates how the conflict can move from one game (i.e., one set of objectives) to another. If we accept the proposition that each state can have multiple actors, then game theory‟s application can move beyond international relations and into the realm of domestic policy and historical development.

In the context of nineteenth-century North America, this framework provides a coherent explanation for an apparent paradox: that despite being governed by virtually autocratic institutions and possessing much smaller populations, the settler populations in both frontiers were able to win tremendous regional autonomy from the metropolis. Politicians in both

Washington and Ottawa would repeatedly defer to settler demands and political pressure, even going as far as removing unpopular political appointments and overriding the recommendations of federal agents in order to accommodate the wishes of the frontier populace.34

Applying game theory shows how the different priorities of the two parties (the federal government and the white settler population) created this political arrangement. For the state authorities in both countries, the minimal goal of territorial policy was to convince the settler

33 Ibid., 57. 34 The case of Congressman James Ashley of Ohio, who served briefly as Governor of the Montana Territory, is particularly illustrative of this tendency. Ashley, a radical Republican, was so universally disliked for his arrogant style of governance that he was recalled by President Grant, a fellow Republican, after only a few months. His short and politically disastrous tenure is explored in Chapter 3.

18 population to subscribe to the national identity, and thus embrace cultural and political membership in the nation.35 Settlers, however, sought domestic autonomy as their minimal objective, and therefore sought to parlay their loyalty to the state into tangible benefits, such as military protection, disaster relief, and the de facto (if not de jure) right to replace unacceptable officials. In this way, the negotiations between metropolis and frontier were generally symmetrical, as loyalty of the frontier was considered by the state worth the price of such wide ranging autonomy. Given the degree to which the federal governments of both countries acceded to the demands of frontier settlers, despite broad legal authority to impose their will with theoretical impunity, there is ample evidence that these relationships were ones of negotiation and accommodation.

How did such a legally (and politically) weak populace achieve negotiating power on par with its own government, particularly in the absence of full political representation? The ethnically-based, exclusive national identity fostered by both states ensured that white, Protestant settler population was favored over other racial or religious minority groups. By investing one specific population with the power to decide regional loyalty, the government avoided the need to adapt divergent cultural attitudes to a single identity; this convenience, however, mandated that white settlers had to be courted at the expense of all others. This gave an enormous amount of negotiating power to a relatively small population, which possessed a monopoly on national loyalty, the minimal objective of the national government.

35 In this context, minimal goal refers to absolute minimum acceptable outcome; in other words, the single most important objective. Conversely, the maximal goal would be the most desirable set of outcomes for a given party. Frequently in these interactions, actors are willing to sacrifice maximal goals in order to secure their minimal goal. See Scharpf, ch. 2.

The fate of other minority groups, such as Native Americans, Métis, Mormons, and religious minorities, is a vivid counterpoint.36 Unlike the culture of the white, Protestant settlers, these groups possessed cultures that were deemed incompatible with the national identity. As such, their presence in the frontier represented a threat to the cultural and political integrity of the state as a whole. This perception led to an uncompromising policy of either cultural assimilation or physical removal, which was adopted by both the United States and Canada. In this case, the minority populations possessed little negotiating ability, leading to a heavily asymmetrical power relationship with the federal government. For these groups, their options for resolution were depressingly few, either to acquiesce to cultural assimilation or resist the state with force. The end result of cultural assimilation was tantamount to the extinction of the group‟s cultural identity; armed resistance ended with a far more literal extinction for the peoples involved.

The Footprint of History

Examining the evolving relationship between the national metropolis and its frontier provides context and rationale for the evolution of territorial policy over time, but this is at best only a partial explanation. Both the United States and Canada shared the need for integrative institutions act as a cultural and governmental liaison between core and periphery, and also shared a need to win the subscription of their settler populations to the national identity. What is not explained is how these two states adopted such different methods to accomplish these goals,

36 A note must be made about nomenclature regarding the indigenous peoples of North America. The United States and Canada use different terminology with regard to these groups, a situation complicated by the fact that the accepted term in the United States is considered politically incorrect at best in Canada. The term “American Indian” will be used only when referring to those indigenous peoples in the United States, while the term “First Nations” or “First Nations peoples” will be used regarding those in Canada. For general purposes, I have elected to use the neutral term “Native American.”

20 and why these policies were retained even after conditions had rendered those policies obsolescent or ineffective.

Economist Douglass North developed a framework to explain the persistence of inefficient or counterproductive institutions despite the availability of more efficient or effective alternatives. Although originally developed for a study of economic institutions, his theory is suitable for an analysis of political and cultural institutions, as it takes both institutional history and cultural influences into account.37 North theorized that states create agents to govern economic and political activity based upon the needs of the state at a discrete point in history.

Eventually, however, institutions that have become inefficient or ill-suited to changing conditions or imperatives are retained because the transactional cost of change, be it financial, political, or cultural, is deemed less desirable than existing inefficiency.38 Thus, over time, the adoption of certain institutions and organizations – those bodies that define the „rules of the game‟ – will expand or limit the perceived options of that state.39

It is in describing this perception of options that path dependence becomes useful for understanding the process of policy formation. As indicated previously, policy makers do not operate with a clear, universal view of all available data, but rather with a series of perceptions; the reports of conditions in the periphery, the interpretation of peripheral populations, and the judgment of which courses of action are acceptable and which ones are not. Frequently, as North

37 North, 69. 38 A frequent analogy to this process is the persistent use of the QWERTY-style keyboard. Originally created to slow the typist‟s speed in the days of mechanical typewriters, the layout has persisted despite being deliberately inefficient. Failure to adopt more efficient keyboard layouts, such as the Dvorak design, is explained by the cost of not only purchasing new keyboards, but requiring everyone to relearn typing skills from square one. 39 Ibid., 104.

21 describes, it is the limitations of outmoded institutions (or institutions created for a defunct purpose) that circumscribe the actions of the state.40

Path dependency‟s strength as an analytic framework is the ability to explain why states persist in employing seemingly irrational modes of operation. Gaining this window into a government‟s decision-making process, particularly in the realm of historical policy study, is of immense value, precisely because it defines the boundaries of those options perceived by policymakers to be viable. Therefore, path dependency can illustrate that for a state to abandon an existing institutional framework, a situation would have to arise in which the transactional costs in radically overhauling the existing institutional framework would be considered more acceptable than the costs of maintaining the status quo.41 In this way, North‟s theory is a descriptive theory and not a predictive one, a difference that is as fundamental as that between a diagnosis and an obituary.

It is important to note that what constitutes a more acceptable transaction cost is not limited to economics alone. Political and societal costs are frequently as potent, if not more, a deterrent to adopting new and unfamiliar institutions as economic costs. Pierson notes a study of decolonized countries in which the determining factor in selected legislative electoral formulas was not efficiency of design, but rather which European country had colonized the state in question, and on which continent that state was located.42

None of this is to imply that path dependence is without its limitations. As a method of analysis, it places a heavy emphasis upon rational choice as the preferred form of decision making. North himself admits that institutions are necessary because actors frequently have

40 Ibid., 54. 41 Paul Pierson cites Oliver Williamson that the development of a form of organization is “the result of the efforts of rational actors to reduce transaction costs.” Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 107. 42 Ibid., 111.

22 incomplete information, which would undercut the emphasis on rational choice, which assumes complete possession of data.43 Further, there is an element of subjectivity, as the scholar must make a judgment on which particular point in history is the crucial one that sets the path dependency in motion. These limitations, however, remain largely incidental to the role path dependency plays in contextualizing the formation of institutions and defining the psychological boundaries of historical decision-makers.

When examining the process of imperial integration, the usefulness of path dependence becomes clear. The United States and Canada share a number of characteristics that have presented them with similar challenges; yet while both faced the same issue of how best to accomplish this incorporation while maintaining the loyalty of frontier regions, strikingly different method of imperial integration was selected. Path dependence explains the reasons for these divergent approaches by illuminating how the historical development of these states affected both the institutions of those states and the perception of the authorities toward their outlying territories.

In the United States of the nineteenth century, civil administration had been established as operating independently of, and frequently possessing superior legitimacy than, the federal government as a consequence of the political break from Great Britain. The Northwest

Ordinance of 1787 had enshrined the principle of popular sovereignty, long before the term was coined, in the process of territorial acquisition. While this settlement policy in many ways made the state captive to the actions of the populace – an unprovoked attack on Native Americans would force Washington to unconditionally come to the support of white settlers – the institutions of governance that had been established made it the most attractive option.

43 Ibid., 57.

Conversely, Canada, by virtue of its British imperial heredity, possessed was a strong tradition of civic institutions and constitutional government (even if there was no actual written constitution) that emphasized the legal and political supremacy of the imperial core. As such, policy makers in Ottawa were conditioned to favor state-directed settlement with an emphasis on creating a strong civic framework for the maintenance of public order. Relations with indigenous peoples lacked the violence that characterized the American experience, due in large part to the fact contact between settlers and indigenous peoples were prepared in advance by the

Mounted Police.

Institutional heritage, however, only explains why certain states are predisposed to certain strategies, creating a form of instinctive response established by bureaucratic traditions and the political culture of the state. In the case of Alaska, a state-directed approach to settlement, in the Canadian mold, would theoretically have encouraged population growth while establishing a strong enough legal presence to deter the kind of outlaw regimes that dominated

Skagway in the 1890s.44 Further, there was much enthusiasm among continental business for expansion into Alaska in the late 1860s. The creation of a robust state infrastructure to regulate trade and facilitate transportation could well have avoided, or at least drastically ameliorated, the early settlement failure of the mid-1870s which had been brought upon by the collapse of the

Alaskan trade economy. Yet the United States persisted in using its established, laissez-faire approach to settlement despite conditions to which that policy was dramatically ill-suited.45

44 Collier’s Weekly, 9 November 1911. See also Clarence C. Hulley, Alaska: Past and Present (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1970), ch. 5. 45 Earl Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861-1890: Studies in Colonial Administration (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 2-3. In addition, historians Howard Lamar and Jack Ericson Eblen have made great contributions to the study of the historical development of American territorial governance. Clark Spence‟s work on the development of Montana‟s political system within the framework of American territorial governance is particularly insightful in this context, as he ably demonstrates the relationship between political developments in Washington and popular opinions in Montana. Due to the bifurcated nature of Montana‟s

The explanation for this seemingly illogical decision can be found in the institutional heritage of the United States and its history of territorial integration. American organs of territorial administration and its legal machinery had been crafted specifically for the purpose of organic, publicly-driven settlement and incorporation. This is because at the time these frameworks were adopted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the federal government lacked the ability to both coordinate such large-scale migrations over and direct the creation of legal and economic infrastructure.46 To do so would require the development of railroads and steamboats to reliably supply far-flung settlements at reasonable costs, as well as providing a dependable system of communication between the imperial core and its agents in the frontier. It would not be until the middle of the nineteenth century that advances in technology would make state-directed settlement on a continental scale feasible.

Providentially, Canada began crafting its settlement policy at a time during which these technologies were becoming widely available. State-directed settlement, coupled with the expansion of state institutions into frontier regions before whole scale settlement, was therefore a technologically viable option. Canadian immigration institutions, western transportation networks, and the North West Mounted Police were all created to support a policy of planned

(and delayed) settlement, and the parameters of their operation were defined by the goals set forth by the federal government. A century and half after their creation, the Mounted Police are

geography, two works in particular are useful for understanding the growth of frontier social institutions. Everett Dick‟s monograph on the northern Plains describes processes in the Dakota territory that are mirrored in eastern Montana, and Thomas Clinch‟s work on the Populist movement illustrates the relationship between the dominant mining industry of western Montana and the growth of territorial political parties. See Eblen, 5-12; Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966); Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 1864-89 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Everett Dick, The Sod-House Frontier, 1854-1890: A Social History of the Northern Plains from the Creation of Kansas & Nebraska to the Admission of the Dakotas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954); Thomas A. Clinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana (Helena: University of Montana Press, 1970). 46 Daniel R. Headrick, Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 35.

25 still classified as a paramilitary organization, with much broader powers than most state law enforcement agencies, because of their genesis within the greater national plan of settlement.

Technological capability is only one factor that contributed to the formation of state policy. When deciding how to settle and integrate new territories into the empire, governments base their policies upon the perceived security and needs of the state. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the American government saw little threat to its national security from the Indian tribes west of the Appalachians; the primary security concern was to the North, in British North America.47 A large military presence to the west, therefore, was not needed to ensure the safety of potential settlers. The relative poverty of the American government reinforced the emphasis on fiscal restraint in the settlement of western territories. It was not until the balances of population and military capability had shifted decisively toward the Americans that a more robust military presence was dispatched to complete the task of Indian removal.48

Similarly, the preponderance of American political and military strength precluded any realistic threats to Washington‟s governance of Alaska after 1867, as the entire military presence was withdrawn within a decade.

For Canada, the situation was reversed. It was precisely due to concerns about maintaining territorial integrity that the Canadian government crafted its integrative policy to be centrally directed and governed by a strong paramilitary force. At the time of independence, the

American military dwarfed that of Canada at the same time that prominent American statesmen were preaching the gospel of annexation and expansion.49 Strong cross-border exchanges of both trade and culture threatened the survival of the Canadian state, while a history of political

47 Pomeroy, 44. 48 Eblen, 83. 49 Robin Winks, The Civil War Years: Canada and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 1998), 68.

26 antagonism with the United States remained fresh in the minds of national leaders. Presented with what appeared to be a tenuous grip on its own territory, the Canadian government directed patterns of settlement, construction, and financial exchange specifically to strengthen linkages between its western regions and the eastern core of the country.

Institutional path dependence further complicates the task of adapting state policy to new conditions by increasing the perceived costs of changing existing institutional structures. Once an approach to territorial integration has been selected, subsequent institutional and administrative structures are developed to conform to that strategy. Over time, bureaucracies will modify existing institutions and organizations rather than abolishing those whose structure of function have become obsolescent. The rationale lies in the greater perceived transactional costs of changing the bureaucratic infrastructure of territorial governance against adapting a less efficient but already established institutional framework.

Comparisons and Cases

Part of the difficulty in examining processes as broad as territorial integration is the question of universality. Due to the considerable disparity in the historical context, technological development, and geographic constraints, the selection of case studies is of particular importance. If the cases are restricted to a single state over time, the findings are inapplicable beyond that one state. Conversely, comparing states over a vast gulf of time (for example, comparing the Mongol Empire of the thirteenth century and the French Empire of the twentieth) introduces so many variable factors as to render the exercise without useful conclusions. The cases must therefore share enough characteristics to make a comparative study meaningful, lest

27 the project quickly devolve into the realm of apples and oranges, while maintaining enough distinctiveness from one another to afford a thorough examination of multiple integrative processes. In this manner, the diverse methods of territorial integration can be studied under conditions that remained relatively constant.

Marc Bloch, one of the intellectual godfathers of the comparative method, provided a thorough explanation of the benefits of historical comparisons. “This is to make a parallel study of societies that are at once neighboring and contemporary, exercising a constant mutual influence, exposed throughout their development to the action of the same broad causes just because they are close and contemporaneous, and owing their existence in part at least to a common origin.”50 Certainly the United States and Canada of the late nineteenth century meet

Bloch‟s criteria, which makes the development of their divergent national strategies all the more important from a comparative perspective.

An excellent example of how the case study approach can highlight crucial details sometimes lost in large-scale theoretical work is found in Donald Wright‟s The World and a

Very Small Place in Africa. Wright, in a departure from the classical Wallerstein method that endorsed a holistic survey, sought to connect events in localities to the trends, processes, and movements at the macrohistorical level.51 By examining one specific location over centuries, the state of Niumi along the Gambia River, Wright shows how Max Weber‟s “tidal wave of modernity” affected not just the core of Wallerstein‟s world-system, but also those regions firmly

50 Marc Bloch, “Towards a Comparative History,” quoted in Alette Olin Hill and Boyd H. Hill, Jr., “Marc Bloch and Comparative History,” The American Historical Review, vol. 85, no. 4 (October 1980), 830. Other historians have called explicitly for a comparative approach both geographically (focusing on North American frontiers) and institutionally (the examination of social and political organizations in frontier development). See Marvin W. Mikesell, “Comparative Studies in Frontier History,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 50, no. 1 (March 1960), 65, and Raymond Grew, “The Case for Comparing Histories,” The American Historical Review, vol. 85, no. 4, (October 1980), 765. 51 Donald R. Wright, The World and a Very Small Place in Africa (Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 1997), 17.

28 rooted in the economic periphery. Far from the assumption of gradual progression from inefficient feudalism toward progressive capitalism, the study shows how path dependency greatly impeded the economic development of Niumi.52

Wright demonstrates in his study that a great strength of the case study approach is the ability to explore variations within historical theory in the realm of cultural or ethnic influences.

He describes ethnicity in language mirroring that of Benton as a “permeable membrane,” allowing for transferred imperatives, dependencies, and objectives from core to periphery and back again.53 This is a critical feature for comparing similar yet distinct states and systems within the larger context of historical theory.

In the North American context, the locations of Montana, Alaska, and the Canadian prairies share enough conditions to provide a representative sample of the integrative process in both countries. The two most dominant forms of economic activity, pastoral agriculture (such as farming and ranching) and resource extraction (mining and timber harvesting) were present in abundance in all three regions. Frontier economics drove more than simply the local economy, as settlement patterns depended heavily upon the type of economic base a region possessed.

Pastoral regions tended to attract settlers in family groups, which typically meant the influx of more women and children; further, these settlers came of their own initiative and set up local political and social organizations with relative speed.54 Ethnically, the vast majority of pastoral frontiers were made up of groups whose cultures were viewed as compatible with the national identity, and thus able to subscribe to it. Territories settled by pastoral, settler groups tended to

52 Ibid., 275. 53 Ibid., 56. 54 Dick, 14.

29 have stable population growth, stronger political institutions, and as a result, moved with greater speed toward full incorporation into the state.55

Conversely, regions dominated by resource extraction tended to be more unstable, both economically and politically. The migrants to these regions were typically and overwhelmingly male, single, and enticed to the frontier under the sponsorship of private company.

Organizations and institutions in these communities were created to serve the needs of the labor force rather than to forge enduring social and political bonds. Exacerbating the instability of these communities was their dependence upon the fortunes of the company that dominated the area; cycles of boom and bust were correspondingly magnified when the majority of residents worked for a single employer. Ironically, many of these mining or timber communities featured proportionally more ethnic minorities than pastoral communities, as private companies were willing to employ laborers regardless of ethnicity or cultural practices, particularly if that offered a corresponding drop in wages.56

Despite their shared characteristics, there were significant differences between the

American and Canadian frontiers that extended beyond historical path dependency. These differences affected both the makeup of the frontier populations of the two states as well as the institutions created to incorporate them into the nation. Broadly speaking, the westward migration of core settlement occurred much earlier in the United States than in Canada, a consequence of both geographic and human factors. The colder climates of the 49th parallel featured a growing season much shorter for the Canadian prairies than for regions further south,

55 Walter Nugent, “Frontiers and Empires in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Western Historical Quarterly vol. 20, no. 4 (Nov. 1989), pp. 400-1, 404-7. 56 Ibid., 402.

30 as well as winter frosts that were lethal to the crops of the early nineteenth century.57

Compounding the physical obstacles was the fact that Canada did not gain political autonomy from Britain until 1867, nearly a century after American independence. Whereas American settlers began claiming territory west from the moment of independence, their Canadian counterparts were restrained by policies crafted in London throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.

Another key difference was that the American frontier generally featured a much weaker state presence in proportion to its population. This is due in part to the simple arithmetic of population, as the United States experienced higher rates of immigration from Europe than

Canada. Throughout their history, the American population has outstripped that of their northern neighbors, a fact that fed Canadian fears of cultural annexation of its thinly-populated western frontier throughout the century.58 Indeed, it was the striking difference in how the two countries viewed their territorial integrity that played perhaps the greatest role in the nature of their institutions of integration.

Relatively secure in its boundaries and facing divided and technologically disadvantaged rivals among the Native Americans, the United States were content to let its populace dictate the pace and manner of incorporation. The Indian reservation system was extended repeatedly, frequently over opposition from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in order to conform to popular desires for removal. Territories were granted civil government and gained admission to the

Union based upon popular demand, even when that demand violated the very ordinances established to govern territorial admission. On a cultural level, the national identity was both

57 McKenna, 83. The climactic and geographic barriers to settlement in Canada will be examined in greater detail in chapter 4. See also Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 268. 58 Winks, 82.

31 inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive, for citizenship was predicated in the acceptance of popular democracy and the universality of secular law, and exclusive, for the legally exalted status of white, Protestant citizens that defined the popularly accepted definition of “Americanism.”

British North America, and later Canada, viewed their own territorial security far more gravely and with a much stronger tradition of state activism. Carrying the legacy of a large minority population with memories of conquest, the newborn Canadian state after 1867 could not afford the luxury of laissez-faire incorporation. Canada, lawmakers believed had to be united through bonds of both culture and commerce, and given the unforgiving nature of the Canadian environment, that could only occur with direct and vigorous direction from the state. Whereas the state followed settlement in the United States, the Canadian state preceded settlement, preparing the prairie for colonization. The precedent for such activity was set in the inherited institutions of the British Empire, from the Royal Irish Constabulary to the Government of India

Act, and presented a ready solution to the task of western incorporation.59

The following chapters will examine how these democratic empires incorporated their frontiers, the institutions they selected to accomplish the task, and the reasons why these states followed such divergent paths. Chapter two will explore the relevant studies of the American

West, Canadian Prairies, and Alaska as well as the primary schools of thought on the nature of state frontiers. This examination will ground the relevant terminology and concepts of core/frontier interaction in established scholarship, as well as provide the historical context for the three case studies.

Chapter three studies the American territory of Montana and the relationship between territorial officials and the settlers they governed. Between 1864 and 1889, Montana progressed

59 R. C. Macleod, The North West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 47.

32 from a territory with little political representation and few legal rights to an incorporated state of the Union. This effort at incorporation occurred in the aftermath of the American Civil War, when the issue of territorial loyalty was of critical importance to lawmakers in Washington. At the same time, the Indian Wars of the 1870s crushed the last attempt of Native Americans to resist the twin blows of territorial dispossession and cultural colonization at the hands of white settlers. The settler demand for land was so great that the government repeatedly ignored the counsel of its own agents, breaking Indian settlements into smaller and smaller units as settlement pushed westward unhindered. It was this overpowering need to conform to settler demands that formed the main characteristic of the territorial experience in Montana. The territorial governors, granted sweeping powers and expected to keep their territories content and prosperous, would be the primary organ of the federal government in the American context.

Chapter four explores the Canadian Prairies and the North West Mounted Police, illustrating how the demands of state-directed settlement transformed the Police into a mediating organization between the core and periphery between 1867 and 1914. After gaining domestic independence in 1867, the Canadian government embarked on a deliberately crafted program of frontier settlement to avoid losing its western territories to American annexation. To enforce state rule, particularly after a rebellion by Catholic Métis frontiersmen in 1869, the government created the North West Mounted Police.60 The Police, however, became as much a creation of the frontier as of the national government, and evolved into a mediating force between Ottawa and its western settlers. The force became so popular among prairie residents that when the

Liberals came to power in the 1890s, public outcry forced Prime Minister Laurier to reverse

60 The Métis are a people descended from Native Americans and French-speaking Quebecois who moved west, in part to avoid living under English rule. The prospect of extension of Canadian rule into the prairies prompted both the 1869 rebellion and another in 1885, both led by Louis Riel.

33 party policy and retain the organization. The story of the Mounted Police illustrates how the form, function, and responsibilities of state institutions are shaped and changed by the physical and cultural demands of the frontier.

Chapter five illustrates how the American process of incorporation ran afoul in Alaska, and why the United States chose to modify their existing settlement policy rather than adopting a

Canadian-style, centrally-driven method of governance. Grassroots settlement, so crucial to

American territorial policy, failed miserably in the first decades following the purchase of Alaska in 1867. Even the discovery of gold in southeastern Alaska was not enough to spur the large- scale settlement that came only with the Klondike Gold Rush of 1895-6. Previous to 1895, formal American governance of the region almost disappeared. Only the intervention of private institutions in the form of mining corporations and missionary movements provided the necessary public infrastructure to facilitate settlement. Institutionally and developmentally, nineteenth-century Alaska represents a frontier in its embryonic form, as the region did not achieve status as a Territory until 1912. The Alaskan experience demonstrated how entrenched the American tradition of settlement was in official policy, and by extension, how profoundly the historical development of the United States affected the incorporation of its frontiers.

The final chapter demonstrates how the demands of popular democracy gave frontier settlers, not the federal government, primary agency in crafting territorial policy. Newspaper editorials, correspondence among state officials, and personal accounts from these regions show the strength of popular opinion in the Western frontiers. Even in cases where the populations live without the full extension of civil law and political representation, the desires of frontier settlers. For the democracies of North America, territorial expansion was far more a task of

34 cultural integration than of simple military or diplomatic conquest; in that task, it would be the frontier settlers, not the federal government that held the greatest power over the outcome.

Yet even with these similarities, the differences between American and Canadian frontiers were deep and fundamental. American expansion occurred organically over the course of the nineteenth century, aided by favorable geography and political traditions that elevated local autonomy over national authority. Canada, faced with the need to settle its frontier much more quickly and over much less hospitable terrain, brought the full power of the state into directing western settlement. These differences show how two states with similar cultural origins and geographic locations can arrive at vastly different strategies toward state-building due to the influences of climate, political development, and the requirements of democratic governance.

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FRONTIER

If the geographic, climatic, and physical similarities of Montana, Alaska, and the

Canadian prairies make them compelling cases for comparison, then so too do the different ways those frontiers were interpreted by their respective policymakers. The

American and Canadian viewed their distant frontiers through varying cultural and historical lenses, views which helped shape the pace and manner in which those frontiers were settled. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States had either conquered or purchased its western frontier regions, and had bracketed them with the settled states of California and Oregon in the west, Texas to the south, and the trans-

Mississippi states in the east.1 When Canada gained internal independence from Britain in 1867, conversely, it was confronted with a series of British territories and colonies that had to be convinced to join the Confederation, in some cases through political and economic negotiation.

The two nations, therefore, evolved different frontier policies from different concerns. With its frontier in essence surrounded by the metropolis, American lawmakers were consistently occupied with potential internal threats to stability. In

Canada, territorial policy was centered upon securing the frontier from potential external threats of annexation Similarly, American and Canadian scholars viewed the frontier experience with different emphases. An examination of the concept of frontiers

1 In this context, frontier regions refer to those areas that were designated as Territories of the United States without the formal institutions and inclusion in the Union that came with being an accepted State, complete with representation in Congress. At the time of the American Civil War (1860-65), the frontier regions of the United States were comprised of the western Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, and the Great Basin region of the southwest.

36 themselves, and their impact upon the development of continental states, is necessary before examining the different natures of North American historiography.

An Overview of Frontier Historiography

States on a continental scale, at some point in their histories, must come to terms with the presence of a frontier and the effect these regions have upon the expansion of the state itself. Frontier regions exert multiple pressures upon the officials of the state – economic, political, and social – that impact both state policy and the manner in which it is implemented. Clarifying both the meaning of the term “frontier” and its relationship to the state proper is an essential step toward understanding the mutual impact each region has upon the other. In the words of Michael P. Malone, the term itself is “perversely mischievous,” as it carries multiple connotations with few concrete definitions.2

At their most fundamental level, frontiers are regional units. These regions may encompass multiple environmental areas or cultural populations, but they remain geographic regions.3 Specifically, these frontier regions are areas in which the ability of the state to project its will through established civil institutions becomes progressively weakened. A number of factors may combine to create this effect, including environment and geography, but the largest factor in this „muting‟ of the state voice is an increasing

2 Michael P. Malone, “Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward a New Approach to Western American History,” The Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 4 (Nov. 1989), 424. 3 Ibid., 417. See also, Raymond D. Gastil, Cultural Regions of the United States (Seattle, 1975). Gastil makes a compelling argument regarding how environment creates natural boundaries that delineate cultural characteristics, thus causing a great deal of synchronicity between the two. Settlers in arid regions will adopt ways of life that maximize their chances of survival, while those in colder climates will adopt different methods of subsistence. Over time, these climatic boundaries will become cultural ones, as lifestyles become entrenched in the societal norms of the populations.

37 sparseness in the population of state citizens to participate in those civil institutions.4

Beyond a certain (and necessarily ambiguous) point, the state must resort to extraordinary measures or organizations to implement its policies upon the region.

In The Nine Nations of North America, Joel Garreau offered a modification of the regional definition of frontiers. Instead of the frontier forming a single, cohesive region,

Garreau postulated a frontier that was an amalgamation of several distinct climatic zones, each with its own agricultural and society imperatives.5 While compelling on a conceptual level, Garreau‟s analysis can be frustratingly inconsistent. Beyond referring to the interior West as an “empty quarter,” Garreau is inconsistent in the criteria that differentiate these regions, alternating between agriculture, climate, and cultural factors.

Frontiers, therefore, only exist from the perspective of the state in which they formally reside. While this may seem self-evident, this precondition creates two crucial effects which govern virtually every stage of the state‟s policy toward the frontier, from conception to implementation. In the relationship between state and frontier, the state effectively possesses only reactive agency, as it is crafting policies to accommodate, alter, or abolish conditions of the frontier itself. The frontier thus establishes the parameters of state action within it, with adjustments in policy coming as the state reacts to events in the frontier. This may seem counterintuitive, as frontiers are frequently viewed as junior partners (or vassals, as we shall see later) of the state, but as the state creates policy, it must do so with the conditions of the frontier in mind.

4 In this context, civil institutions are described as those institutions through which the state enforces policies through both public participation and legal compulsion. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1999), and Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 5 Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America (New York: 1981), pp. 6-18.

The second effect has a profound impact upon the first. At the risk of sounding existentialist, the state does not react to the frontier, but rather to the frontier as it is perceived by the state. Particularly during the nineteenth century, reports of frontier conditions reached the state after being filtered through a number of institutional ears, leaving the officials with a concept that bore a resemblance, but only a resemblance, to the reality of the frontier.

Two scholars, Michael P. Malone and John Friedmann, not only offer compelling theories about the role of frontiers in intrastate relations, but suggest workable definitions of frontiers that allow them to be studied as concrete historical occurrences. In confronting the ambiguity of the term frontier, Malone suggested four distinct criteria for the American frontiers.6 In the first place, climate and geography create a unifying environmental characteristic that impacts all subsequent efforts at settlement.

Economically, the nature of frontier life necessitates both a heavy reliance upon the state itself for basic civic functions as well as a disproportionate dependence on distinctive (if not unique) regional resources. Finally, these factors in turn directly affect the cultural development of the region‟s inhabitants, leading to the creation of a „frontier culture‟ that differentiates those settlers from their fellow citizens in the state core.7

Friedmann takes a different tack, describing the frontier in terms of economic transactions by differentiating cultural frontiers from resource frontiers. As described in his study of Venezuela, resource frontiers share a number of characteristics. They are overseen by an agency from the country‟s developed core, are far removed from the centers of consumption, are predominantly urban (as cities are placed near desired

6 Malone, 417. 7 Ibid., 419.

39 resources), and import virtually everything they consume while exporting all they produce.8 As such, they have characteristics in common with such diverse regions as the

Amazon basin, the Canadian prairies, and Australian outback, thus making them world historical phenomena. Further, the sheer size and wealth of resources available in these areas magnifies both the benefits and difficulties of governing and integrating these regions into their respective state cores.9 Thus, resource frontiers remain economic appendages of the state, retained less for their political or strategic importance than their economic wealth. In the Friedmann model, frontiers are to be integrated only if it is necessary to retain access to their resources.10

World historian L.S. Stavrianos applies the frontier concept on a global scale in his Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age. Building upon Wallerstein‟s thesis of economic modernity, Stavrianos describes an ever-expanding series of economic frontiers, each subordinated to the capitalist “core” of western Europe. In this conceptualization of the core/frontier dynamic, less economically developed regions become subordinated to the core of the economic system, in effect „colonized‟ by the advent of capitalism.11 As these regions are integrated into the capitalist world-system, however, the frontier expands to other regions, starting the process anew. Thus, as

Eastern Europe and the near East were integrated into the capitalist system, the frontier moved to Africa, the Americas, and Asia. His view has been buttressed by later works by

8 John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case of Venezuela (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966) 77-83. 9 Ibid., 81. 10 Ibid., 83. 11 L. S. Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age (New York: 1981), ch. 1.

40 historians such as Theodore Van Laue, and Wallerstein himself as he sought to expand his world-system into the realm of political interactions.12

There are similarities between Friedmann‟s concept of a resource frontier and

Stavrianos‟ vision of a frontier as a tributary to a dominant economic system. In both instances, the designated frontiers are dependent upon the core to drive their economies, and as such, are dependencies of the systemic cores. Although the systems differ in scale

- Friedmann‟s system is a single state and Stavrianos sees the global economy as a single coherent system – the relationships between core and frontier remain essentially constant.

Stavrianos also has much in common with Malone‟s conceived frontier, in that his state frontiers are in part characterized by reliance on an outside authority to provide sustenance and economic energy.13

What separates Stavrianos‟ frontier from those of other historians is that he explicitly seeks to avoid definition. The salient characteristic of a frontier in this framework is the relationship between two zones of economic development, one more efficient and therefore powerful, another less so.14 Part of the explanation for this can be found in the broader scope of Stavrianos‟ study; whereas Malone and Friedmann are describing frontiers within specific states, and by extension, the process of governing them, Stavrianos seeks to apply the role of a frontier to much wider and gradual process.

The frontier in Stavrianos‟ narrative, then, is a region that is colonized by a stronger partner, simultaneously dependent upon the core and forced to adapt its economy to the core‟s needs and dictates.

12 Theodore H. Van Laue, The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective (New York: 1987), 21; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge: 1984), 13-17. 13 Malone, 417-18. 14 Stavrianos, ch. 3.

William McNeill, whose seminal Rise of the West in 1963 put forward a comprehensive view of world history as an ongoing process of cultural fusions, applied this perspective to the frontier phenomenon twenty years later in The Great Frontier. In it, McNeill tackled the question of what effect the presence of a frontier had on state society as a whole. McNeill held that the most important factor was the absence of available labor in frontiers, which he held tended to lead to the creation of exploitative, hierarchical societies.15 Crucially, however, McNeill posited that under certain circumstances, that labor shortages could result in the development of egalitarian societies along classically liberal lines, as theorized by Frederick Jackson Turner. In

McNeill‟s analysis, the outcome depended greatly on both the historical and cultural inheritance of the state‟s citizens, as well as the environmental and cultural conditions in the frontier itself. In this respect, McNeill‟s work dovetails nicely with the theoretical work of Kenneth Pomeranz, who emphasized the role of uncontrollable factors (such as geography, coincidental chronology, and asynchronous decision-making) in the development of societies within a world-system.16 By referencing factors in the imported culture of settlers into the frontier, McNeill reinforces Pomeranz‟s basic concept.

This divergence in frontier development has been categorized by Walter Nugent, who divided the most common types of frontiers into two broad categories. In the first, which he refers to as Type I, settlement patterns were based upon pastoral communities and the intent to colonize the region, populating the frontier until it became indistinguishable from the state proper. In the second (Type II) the frontier was

15 William H. McNeill, The Great Frontier: Freedom and Hierarchy in Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 3-25. 16 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 212.

42 organized around resource extraction, whether mineral or agricultural in nature. This frontier type tended to be less stable than its pastoral counterparts, governed by resource rushes and crashes, with far less emphasis placed upon integrating the region into the state itself.17 One intriguing distinction that Nugent makes is that between „colonization‟ and „imperialism‟; in his analysis, Nugent considers colonization less violent and exploitative than imperialism, which is associated with a far more capricious and exploitative form of frontier governance.18 This aspect of Nugent‟s work illustrate the difficulty in arriving at workable definitions for these terms, as well as the importance of developing a format in which the integrative process can be studied without resorting to vague phraseology.

Most relevant to the task of studying territorial integration as an undertaking of cultural synthesis was the work of Herbert Eugene Bolton. A student of Frederick

Jackson Turner, Bolton broke with his mentor by rejected Turner‟s determinist, linear history of expansion by portraying the frontier as a region of extended cultural cross- pollination. Presaging today‟s scholarship that emphasize the concept of borderlands over that of a frontier, Bolton emphasized the degree to which the supposed conquerors of the West and indigenous peoples borrowed customs and norms from one another. In this way, Bolton echoes the work of Lauren Benton in asserting that colonization is a process that works both ways, resulting in a hybrid society.19

Bolton‟s work, and in particular his focus on how rivalries between colonizing states affected the nature of state expansion, has led other historians to examine the

17 Nugent, pp. 400-1. 18 Ibid., 401. 19 David J. Weber, “Turner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands,” American Historical Review, vol. 91 (February 1986): 66-81.

43 impact of international politics on integrative policy within states. Treaties that ceded frontier regions to respective colonial states, for example, dramatically reduced (or eliminated) the autonomy of indigenous peoples as they lost the ability to play one imperial state off against its competitor. In this way, as Jeremy Adelman and Stephen

Aron put it, “conflicts over borderlands shaped the peculiar and contingent character of frontier relations.”20

In sum, the nature of the frontier emerges from recent scholarship as a composite, its specifics varying depending upon the lens through which the researcher observes.

These regions are economic vassals of the state core, heavily dependent upon it for civil services and support. In each instance, the populations of these frontiers are either sparse, or comprised largely of populations outside the body of the state‟s citizenry, or frequently, both. Finally, these frontiers are comprised of environmental or geographic zones that directly impact the society of the settlers and the ability of the state to impose its will upon the region. Further, frontiers by the state are seen as possessing two important functions: as a repository of valuable resources, and as territory to be settled, and thus become amalgamated into the core itself.

That much is the consensus. It is when the question of the nature of the frontier/core relationship is examined that the scholarship of frontiers begins to diverge.

Broadly speaking, scholarly writing regarding North American frontiers falls into two general camps. The first group regards the presence and experience of frontiers as a universal process, one which impacts the state core as profoundly as the frontier region

20 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History.” American Historical Review, vol. 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 816.

44 itself. This view holds that the frontier and its attendant closing represent a crucial element in the formation of national identity. Frederick Jackson Turner remains the most famous (or notorious, depending upon one‟s perspective) voice of advocacy for this interpretation. Countering this perspective is the argument that the cultural impact of the frontier is much more limited, and plays out almost exclusively within the frontier itself.

In this view, the frontier experience is a regional phenomenon that has impact upon the state as a whole, but not in the fundamental way the Turner postulates. Henry Nash

Smith, Gerald Friesen, and Earl Pomeroy are some of the more pronounced exponents of this theory.

Between both „universal‟ and „regional‟ schools, and utilizing the work of both are scholars that subscribe to the colonial or „plundered province‟ theory, which postulates that frontiers have largely served as tools for the economic expansion of the state, with typically negative effects for frontier residents. Walter Prescott Webb,

Bernard DeVoto, and William Morton have all presented this theory as a framework to understanding core/frontier relationships in North America. William G. Robbins takes this theory a step further, arguing that the settlement of the west was directed by financial interests of both the East and California, and developed primarily for their profit. The connections between “the metropolis and hinterland” existed primarily “through investment and market relations.”21 Several modern historians, including many New

Western scholars such as Patricia Nelson Limerick and Michael P. Malone, have argued

21 William G. Robbins, Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 193. To a lesser degree, Richard White echoes the „plundered province‟ thesis. The key difference is that while Robbins asserts that the financial colonization of the West was part of a directed, planned process, White argues that it was the rapid concentration of the Western populace in urban communities that concentrated power in the hands of financial institutions. See Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21.

45 that the colonial school is somewhat obsolescent given the new focus on local and social history.22

Much of the scholarship on Montana‟s territorial period is inspired from the plundered province school, due primarily to the large part resource extraction played in the economic development of the territory. James R. Shortridge, in studying the political development of Montana, argues that the perception that the territory was being milked by the conniving of outside financiers led to the success of the anti-banking Populist

Party in the late 1800s. Thomas Clinch‟s study of the mining industry in Montana lends weight to these charges, particularly in cataloging the number of both Eastern and foreign

(primarily British) financial interests that dominated the mountainous west of Montana during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other historians such as Anne F.

Hyde, W. Thomas White, and Daniel Gallacher also credit the plundered province thesis for explaining much of the social and economic development of Montana, although Hyde hastens to point out that the territory could not have been plundered without the widespread assistance of its residents.23

Submerged beneath these larger theories lie a number of more specific analytical questions that appear consistently throughout frontier historiography. The tension between whether the urban or rural frontier should be studied in greater detail is a particularly rich debate. Other scholarly debates include the degree of ethnic, gender, or other identity studies in the literature, issues of social class and mobility, and the study of

22 Malone, 416, and Patricia Nelson Limerick, Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 6. 23 James R. Shortridge, “The Expectations of Others: Struggles Toward a Sense of Place in the Northern Plains,” in Wrobel, David M. and Steiner, Michael C., eds., Many Wests: Place, Culture, and Regional Identity (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 122. See also Thomas A. Clinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana (Helena: University of Montana Press, 1970) and James McClellan Hamilton, History of Montana: From Wilderness to Statehood (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1970), 580-8.

Indian/settler relations in non-state settings, such as informal economic or societal arrangements. In the cases of the American West, Canadian Prairies, and Alaska, each of these historical issues will present themselves, although in markedly different ways.

A Cultural Catalyst: The Frontier in American History

Few historians fulfill Oscar Wilde‟s admonition about the risks of being talked about more fully than Frederick Jackson Turner. His frontier thesis remains the most widely debated in American western historiography, and even his detractors will concede that no single, holistic, competing model has arisen to challenge it.24 In brief, Turner articulated the view that it was the presence of the frontier that transformed the culture of the United States from an appendage of northern European constitutional monarchy into an egalitarian, liberal capitalist society. Credited with this transformation was the necessity of self-reliance for frontier settlers, the cooperative nature of frontier communities, and a pragmatic culture of decision-making demanded by challenging environment.25

Turner‟s thesis thus formed the bedrock of the first major school of frontier historiography in the United States. While this theory has been modified, refashioned, and updated periodically since its introduction in 1893, this deterministic view of the frontier remains a resilient force in modern scholarship. Ray Allen Billington is credited with leading the neo-Turnerian movement following the second world war with his

24 Malone, 423. 25 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American Society (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1920), 8-9.

American Frontier Heritage. In it, Billington argued for a multicultural, complex interpretation of Turner‟s thesis, taking into account factors including environment, political participation, and origin of settler populations.26 Other supporters of the Turner thesis, such as Frederick Merk and Frederick L. Paxson, have promoted different aspects of his general theory while buttressing its deterministic thrust. Recently, Michael C.

Steiner, in particular, argued heavily that Turner‟s specific regional emphasis was overlooked in his general theory.27

In discussing the cultural impact of the frontier, Richard Slotkin took the underlying thesis of Turner‟s work and applied an element of cultural path dependence.

The frontier experience in Slotkin‟s analysis, through its depiction through the nascent mass media, became a “mass culture mythology” that elevated the attributes of individual action (as opposed to communal action) and informal institutions as shibboleths in both western culture and national identity as a whole.28 Slotkin‟s frontier, however, is far from the irresistible march of Anglo-American progress of Turner. Instead, it is a frontier experience “shaped from the beginning by the meeting, conversation, and mutual adaptation of different cultures.”29

In his analysis, Slotkin vividly described why a shared identity was so crucial to political and territorial integrity. Identity, he argues, represents “the beliefs and practices

[such as the frontier myth] that hold societies together (and) are the product of a long

26 Ray Allen Billington, America’s Frontier Heritage (New York: 1966), p. 17. 27 Michael C. Steiner, “The Significance of Turner‟s Sectional Thesis,” Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 19 (January 1988), 5-20. Steiner argues that Turner devoted the bulk of his analysis to the western frontier as a cohesive region, but the implications of his thesis on a national cultural level overshadowed the thrust of his work. 28 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Atheneum, 1992), 401-2. 29 Ibid., 655.

48 historical interaction between ideas, experience, and remembering…to impose change as if from outside the culture, appealing for authority to values that the culture has not generated and accepted for itself, is to assert dictatorship.” For the government to secure the cooperation of their settlers, particularly in a regional culture that cherishes individual freedom of action and informal authority to state hierarchy, it was crucial for federal authorities to operate within “the language of the frontier myth.”30 While challenging the racial and ethnic supremacy of Turner‟s frontier, Slotkin shares his assessment that the frontier experience forged distinctive elements in the regional identity of western settlers.

As with Newtonian physics, any profoundly influential work helps give rise to an equally vocal counter-reaction. The primary complaints about the Turner thesis lay in its determinism and the monochromatic character of its frontier. Carleton Hayes, George

Wilson Pierson, and Henry Nash Smith all took issue with what they felt were oversimplifications of the American cultural experience. Smith, notably, objected to the overemphasis Turner placed on agricultural settlement in the history of the American republic, arguing that it glossed over the equally important industrial heritage of westward migration.31

Another group of critique focused on the sui generis nature of frontier culture that

Turner advocated. One of the most influential was Earl Pomeroy, who put forward two interpretations that have proved resilient over time. The first was that frontier settlers tended to borrow far more from existing or traditional cultural structures that to create wholly new, unique ones; the second was that cities, not rural homesteads, were the

30 Ibid., 655-6. 31 Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge: 1950), 11.

49 engine that drove cultural importation.32 Other historians, such as Carleton Hayes and

George Wilson Pierson further developed this analysis of cultural formation, while Ben

Wright, Jr. contended that American society was a more a variation of European civilization than an independent civilization on the globe. Bernard Bailyn, writing in

1986, supported this view when he described the American frontier as the Atlantic seaboard during the seventeenth century, describing it as “a ragged outer margin of a central world…a diminishment of metropolitan accomplishment.”33

David M. Potter posited that the frontier had little to do with the specific character of American culture, arguing instead that it was the natural abundance and wealth of the

North American continent that allowed American society to develop along its own distinct path.34 As the American West provided the bulk of the industrial wealth that allowed that unprecedented prosperity to take root, its exploitation was engine that drove the whole of American civilization, making Potter a supporter of the colonial school, even if he concludes that such exploitation was ultimately to the general good, unlike many other colonialists.

William Cronon, writing in support of Turner‟s thesis, argued that the determinism present in Turner‟s thesis led another group of historians to postulate that it was the environment in particular that exerted the strongest influence on the formation of frontier culture.35 In his seminal The Great Plains, Walter Prescott Webb argued that it was the aridity of the frontier west that compelled the changes in the society, culture, and

32 Earl Pomeroy, “The Changing West,” in The Reconstruction of American History, ed. John Higham (New York: 1962), ch. 4. 33 Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of North America: An Introduction (New York: 1986), 113. 34 David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: 1954), 18. 35 William Cronon, “Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson Turner,” Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 18 (April 1987), 157-76.

50 institutions of settlers in order to cope with their new setting.36 In Webb‟s analysis, the frontier is a crucible within the state itself, a distinct region into which the existing state culture is molded, shaped, and modified in accordance with the demands of the natural environment. Webb‟s theory was emphasized by Donald Worster in his Rivers of

Empire, which portrayed the scarcity of water as the single most influential factor in the formation of frontier culture. Worster would later expand upon this concept, going so far as to describe the west as a “hydraulic society”.37

As supporters of Turner, both Webb and Worster maintained that the arid frontier had a crucial impact on the development of American society; as a scholar of the colonial school, however, they also argued that the region itself possessed its own internal dynamics that molded its social and political development.38 Bernard DeVoto, whose prolific career both inside and outside of academia has prompted a number of historians to preface his name with something akin to an asterisk, laid out the „plundered province‟ theory in no uncertain terms.39 DeVoto describes the western frontier as little more than an economic vassal state within the United States, a region whose natural wealth was diverted to the benefit of established eastern interests and who political institutions were manipulate for the prosperity of the same suspects.40

36 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Waltham, MA: 1931), 8-9. 37 Donald Worster, “New West, True West: Interpreting the Region‟s History,” Western American Quarterly, vol. 18 (April 1987), 141-56. 38 Webb, 22. 39 Rodman W. Paul and Michael P. Malone, “Tradition and Challenge in Western Historiography,” Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1 (Jan. 1985), 35. DeVoto‟s publishing success in the field of popular, nonacademic histories caused some of his contemporaries to consider his work less serious and less rigorous than other academic publications. 40 Bernard DeVoto, “The West: A Plundered Province,” Harper’s Monthly, vol. 169 (Aug. 1934), 355-64. See also DeVoto, The Course of Empire, (Boston, 1953), ch. 3.

Webb thus represents a shading of the theoretical spectrum between the

Turnerians and anti-Turnerians, who dedicated the bulk of their historical analysis to studying the frontier vis-à-vis the state, and following scholars who would increasingly study interactions solely within the frontier itself. Indeed, this new intra-regional focus not only gave rise to the “New West” movement within the historical field, but also an increasing depth of work on the different frontier populations that had traditionally been relegated to the status of „contributing factors‟ in frontier historiography. This focus illustrated one of the key differences between American and Canadian frontier scholarship; whereas the study of religious and ethnic populations had long received scrutiny in the Canadian academy, it would be the American frontier specialists that would break the first substantial ground in the studying gender history.41

Howard Lamar remains one of the seminal voices of regional history, focusing his study on the governance of western territories. His Dakota Territory put forth the view that the political institutions in the frontier were those imported from the east, and as such, exerted a powerful influence on western society. In Lamar‟s analysis, these offshoots of the state core taking root in the western plains had developed a role of

“primary economic importance during the region‟s development.”42 By emphasizing the contribution of local populations in political framework designed and implemented by the eastern power brokers, Lamar became the progenitor of what would eventually become the New West movement. His later work on the American southwest, with its study of

41 Royden Loewen, “On the Margin or In the Lead: Canadian Prairie Historiography,” Agricultural History, vol. 71, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 27-31. 42 Howard Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861-1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 280.

Hispanic contributions to political and social life, cemented his position as a leading voice in the intraregional scholarly tradition.

Patricia Nelson Limerick sought to present a cohesive theoretical framework outside of Turner in her Legacy of Conquest. Rather than a presenting western history as a narrative about the frontier and its attendant closing, Limerick presented the region‟s history as one of environmental and cultural conquest by the eastern United States.43 In doing so, Limerick identified a range of sub-fields of western history that required more study – women‟s history, Hispanic history, Indian history – but also to reject the core of

Turner‟s thesis, that the closing of the frontier „locked‟ both the culture of the American west and its relationship to the rest of the country in place. In fact, Limerick and subsequent New West historians have openly questioned when the frontier actually closed, if at all, given the evolving nature of the Western population and increasing migration from the East.44

Another leading historian of the New West, Michael P. Malone, offered a more concrete delineation between New and Old West history when he argued that frontier scholarship should specifically focus on “true regionalism,” by studying phenomena and process situated exclusively within the frontier region.45 He also reinforced Limerick‟s regional thesis by arguing that in addition to Webb‟s environmental classification, the most important unifying influence to the frontier as a region as its “common bond of

43 Patricia Nelson Limerick, Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 20 44 John Mack Faragher, "The Frontier Trail: Rethinking Turner and Reimagining the American West," American Historical Review 98: February 1993, pgs. 106-117. 45 Michael P. Malone, "The New Western History: An Assessment," Montana: The Magazine of Western History, vol. 40 (Summer 1990), 65-67.

53 history and common store of legend.”46 In Malone‟s analysis, the frontier is not Turner‟s catalyst of cultural innovation, but rather a separate nation within a greater American empire, one whose historical and cultural development must be studied on its own merits.

The debate between the universalist and regionalist scholars also provided an intellectual seed-bed for one of the more vigorous discussions in frontier historiography in recent years. Both American and Canadian scholars have questioned the traditional primacy of rural society in most treatments of the frontier. The origin of such pride of place is relatively forthright: the American narrative has traditionally revolved around the concept of pastoral yeoman-citizens, and much of the early westward expansion to

Oregon and the near Plains was driven by a desire to secure more farmland. The

Canadian example is even more overt, as the Ottawa government made a conscious policy decision to establish farming communities in what would become the prairie provinces.

Despite its pastoral heritage, the question of whether countryside or city was the cultural heart of the frontier has sparked considerable academic study. Richard Wade‟s

1959 Urban Frontier established the countervailing thesis that it was in cities that frontier culture was forged and incubated, as the development of any culture requires the congregation of significant numbers of people.47 Buttressed by John Reps‟ Cities of the

American West twenty years later, the urban hypothesis dovetails Lamar‟s work, portraying a frontier anchored by a few cities, dominated by imported state institutions,

46 Paul and Malone, 29. 47 Richard Wade, The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Citizens, 1790-1830 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 17.

54 supporting a latticework of rural farms and ranches.48 The new emphasis on the urban frontier is another challenge to the Turner thesis, in that Turner specifically cited the rural settlements as the font of frontier culture. The work of Gunther Barth, who studied the development of the western metropolises of San Francisco and Denver, sought to explore this urban cultural engine in greater detail.49

One aspect of frontier historiography in which academics in the United States have lagged behind their Canadian counterparts is in the exploration of the role of social class in frontier societies.50 While the study of frontier class societies has picked up in recent years, the majority of studies in this area are found in the examinations of urban society. Peter Decker provided a rich exploration of this subject in his Fortunes and

Failures, which illustrated two seemingly contradictory trends. On one hand, Decker contends that the impermanence of many settlements as well as the nature of life on the frontier made social mobility uncommonly easy, even by frontier standards; on the other, he demonstrates how the merchant classes invariably dominated western society and in so doing, had a disproportionate influence in forming its nascent culture.51

Studies of frontier social class inevitably lead to scholarship on Indian history, and in particular, on Indian policy. Francis Paul Prucha has been a leading voice in this arena, authoring several influential works on both official Indian policy from Washington and, more regionally, efforts to assimilate the Indians into American society through the

48 John Reps, Cities of the American West: A History of Frontier Urban Planning (Princeton: 1979), ch. 4. 49 Gunther Barth, Instant Cities: Urbanization of San Francisco and Denver (New York: 1975). 50 See Lyle Dick, Farmers Making Good: The Development of Abernethy District, Saskatchewan, 1880- 1920 (Ottawa: Canadian Park Service, 1989), and Paul Voisey, Vulcan: The Making of a Prairie Community (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 51 Peter R. Decker, Fortunes and Failures: White-Collar Mobility in Nineteenth-Century San Francisco (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 24.

55 efforts of Christian societies.52 Along with Robert Utley, Prucha has also examined the role of the U.S. military in Indian policy.53 The image of the Army that emerges from these portraits is far removed from either the Limerick‟s conquering warriors or Turner‟s heroic citizen-soldiers, but rather a put-upon state institution struggling to adapt to a theater with little infrastructure, frequently bending (or inventing) policy as events warrant.

Efforts at studying Indian/settler relations beyond official institutions have borne similar fruit. Lewis Saum, in his Fur Trader and the Indian, represents the beginning of a movement away from the traditional approach to ethnography, as well as illustrating the different interactions between populations outside of the state framework.54 The majority of work on this front has fallen, in the main, under the aegis of New West history, as it seeks to examine Indian society within its own context, regardless of its influence with the formal United States government. Saum has been supported by the work of Robert

Berkhofer, who has adopted a more interdisciplinary approach in his research.55

Elements of frontier scholarship that have transcended the national divide between American and Canadian academics. Questions of class mobility and influence, the role of social, ethnic, and linguistic populations, as well as urban/rural emphasis have all made their mark on the historiography of the Canadian prairie frontier. Yet as we will see, these similarities do not mask the fundamental differences in the frontier experience

52 See Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865- 1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976) and The Churches and the Indian Schools, 1888-1912 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979). 53 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890, (New York: Bison Books Press, 1973), and Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York: MacMillan, 1968). 54 Lewis O. Saum, The Fur Trader and the Indian, (Seattle, 1965). 55 Robert Berkhofer, “The Political Context of a New Indian History,” Pacific Historical Review, vol. XL (Aug. 1971), 362.

56 between the United States and Canada, differences that have charted markedly different developmental paths for both states.

The Faces of Janus: The Frontier in Canadian History

Perhaps the most significant difference between the American and Canadian views of the frontier is the role of environment in the two cultures. Within the historiographical debate on either side of the Turner thesis in the United States, the environment represents a set of conditions that are manipulated to suit human habitation.56 Among Canadian scholars, however, the environment takes on a far more immutable image, owing in no small part to its severity in the northern plains of North

America. As Royden Loewen put it, “the very harshness of Canada‟s climate seemed to indicate that there was little to say historically about the human manipulation of the environment.”57 Thus, the climate and geography of the Canadian frontier was less adapted for human settlement as human settlement was adapted to the environment.

Similar processes played out in the American experience, as chronicled by Walter

Prescott Webb and Donald Worster. But even within Worster‟s hydraulic society, the actions of the settlers molded great swaths of the frontier to the needs of pastoral communities. In the Canadian experience, the environment was seen as far more unyielding; a major reason that the Canadian settlement of the west was delayed, vis-à-

56 Turner, Webb, Limerick, and DeVoto all based their work in one manner or another on this environmental view. This is not to say that any environment could be altered at whim to suit human desires, as Webb‟s aridity thesis illustrates. However, the general narrative in these studies is the settlement and „taming‟ of the frontier environment. 57 Royden Loewen, “On the Margin or in the Lead: Canadian Prairie Historiography,” Agricultural History, vol. 73, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 36-7.

57 vis their American cousins, was that only the introduction of hybrid strains of wheat late in the nineteenth century made farming in the prairies a successful prospect.58

From a historiographical perspective, this dominance of the natural environment meant that the Turner thesis was far less applicable to the studies of Canadian academics.

Thus, it would not be until the middle of the twentieth century that a theory of frontier development was introduced in Canadian scholarship that would define the contours of scholarly debate as profoundly as Turner did in the United States. Canadian historiographical scholarship, then, does not revolve as much around supporting and opposing views of a single theory. Instead, a series of successive theories were introduced to explain the development of the Canadian state and the impact of its western

(and northern) frontier. These theories were retroactively grouped into a number of competing, and occasionally complimentary, historiographical schools.

The first of these schools was, in some ways, also one of the most parochial. The

„Britannic‟ school argued that it was not the frontier, but rather the home country of Great

Britain, that exerted the strongest cultural gravitation on Canadian society. Put forward by W. N. Sage in 1928, the Britannic school was an attempt to reconcile the Turner thesis in a Canadian setting.59 Sage asserted that, like in the United States, Canadian culture was driven by the dynamic tension of westward pull and eastern tradition. In the

Canadian context, there existed multiple frontiers; the Ohio Valley, the maritime communities of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, as well as the Prairies themselves.

Canada, then, was not a new innovation, but rather Britannia-on-the-Frontier, the mother

58 Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984), 82. 59 W. N. Sage, “Some Aspects of the Frontier in Canadian History,” Canadian Historical Association, Report of 1928, 2.

58 country made manifest. Later historians, such as Frank Underhill, would underscore

Sage and Turner, arguing that it was the presence of the frontier that forged a separate

Canadian identity.60

Sage‟s thesis has not aged well in the intervening decades, largely due to the nature of Canadian settlement on the Prairies. The harsh environment combined with a heavy reliance on state infrastructure limited migration to the pace at which state services could be established.61 Therefore, no mass migration of independent-minded citizenry could have issued forth from the East to grapple with the frontier, at least not in Turner‟s sense. Those that did move ahead of the state, such as Métis peoples or religious dissidents, did so not to serve as settlers of the state but rather as those seeking to escape the state‟s influence, and even then in relatively tame numbers compared to their southern brethren. In the words of Marvin Mikesell, “the Canadian west was never „wild‟ in the

American sense of the word.”62

The second major problem encountered by those seeking to adapt Turner‟s thesis was the presence of the United States itself. One of the conditions Turner predicated his thesis upon was that the frontier was a magnet attracting those seeking a „better‟ life, or at least one outside the state core. In the American setting, the only other viable location was the frontier itself. In the Canadian context, however, there was an alternative to life in central Canada or in the harsh conditions of the Prairies63. The eastern seaboard of the

United States, and New York in particular, siphoned off a substantial proportion of those

60 Frank Underhill, “The Conception of a National Interest,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 1, no. 3 (August 1935), 398-99. 61 Mikesell, 68. 62 Ibid., 69. 63 “Central” Canada is usually defined as the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, which was home to the vast majority of the Canadian population and served as the state core.

59 settlers who could have otherwise served as the vanguard of settlement in the Canadian

Prairies. The same spirit of innovation and self-reliance that could settle a frontier could serve just as well in taming the urban conditions of the United States, and in a considerably less demanding climate.

With the Turner thesis falling out of favor, another group of historians sought to explain the development of Canada through a more pragmatic and economic lens. By far the most influential was Harold Innis, who pioneered what became known as the Staples thesis. Innis argued that Canadian development was guided by the growth of various economic goods that formed the staple of local economies, notably fishing, fur trapping, and timber.64 As these items were valuable primarily because they were valued by

European merchants, the bonds of communication, society, and culture between the

Canadian colonists and British state grew in strength over time. Innis also proposed that it was the early emphasis on the fur trade that strengthened Canada‟s bond with Britain and weakened its connection to the southern thirteen colonies.65

The Staples thesis is predicated on a dominant core/subsidiary periphery model of economic interaction, which has survived in various refinements in the majority of analyses of state/frontier relations. Other historians, such as George Brintwell and

Vernon Fowke, have expanded upon the Staples thesis. Fowke imported Innis‟ theory to the Canadian Prairies, arguing that the reliance upon wheat to settle the region formed the basis of Canada‟s “political and economic empire.”66 While critics of the Staples thesis point out that economies based upon extractive industries seldom achieve stability, let

64 Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), 16. 65 Ibid., ch. 3. 66 Vernon C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 192.

60 alone prosperity, supporters contend that the economic boost granted by staple exploitation allowed Canadian society to develop a broader economy that enabled it to transition to a more robust commercial base. William Morton used the Staples thesis to put forward a Canadian interpretation of the „plundered province‟ theory in his study of

Prairie politics.67

Innis‟ theory spun off a related theory of development centered on the St.

Lawrence River and its subsidiary waterways. Advocated by Donald Creighton in his

Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, the Laurentian school posits that the St.

Lawrence River functioned as the main artery of communication and transportation for early Canada.68 Thus, all subsequent economic efforts were oriented toward the use of the St. Lawrence, even after it was proved to be less cost-effective than later railroads in an early demonstration of path dependence. Thus, Canada developed not as a single entity, but as a conglomeration of regions and frontiers, with a Laurentian core dominating the others in proportion to their distance from the St. Lawrence. The

Laurentian school put forward a view of Canadian development as a loose alliance of vastly differing regions, referred to by Mason Wade as “intense regionalism.”69

The main differences between Canadian and American exploration of frontiers tend to reside in the details rather than the overall theories of state development. The multiplicity of analysis advocated by the New West movement has been in existence for decades among Canadian scholars. Environmental concerns, economic development, and a dependence upon the state core all remain essential elements of frontier study. In the

67 William Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1950). 68 Donald Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937), ch. 2. 69 E. R. Adair, “The French Canadian Seigneury,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 35 (Sept. 1954), 187- 207.

61 case of the United States‟ self-described “Last Frontier,” however, the situation is dramatically different.

The Omnipresent Force: The Frontier in Alaskan Historiography

Two characteristics dominate examinations of the frontier with respect to Alaska.

In the first place, American historians include Alaska in discussions of the West only reluctantly; many maintain it is a realm apart from the continental frontiers of the plains and southwest.70 In the realm of historical analysis, Alaska possessed American social, economic, and political systems yet climatically situated within the Canadian experience.

Its history as a far-flung Russian province which never quite entered the cultural orbit of

St. Petersburg further isolates Alaska from the other frontiers of the United States.

Alaska remains, both in scholarship and in geography, cut off from the rest of America.

The second characteristic is that most scholarship on Alaska is gathered secondarily, as part of other studies of American or Russian history. The contributions of

Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, who provided much political context on mid-nineteenth century

Alaska, did so as part of a larger work on American-Russian relations during the century.71 Similarly, Ronald Jensen‟s work on the sale of Alaska, as well as Mary

Wheeler‟s on the institutions of the Russian-American Company, came as part of a larger international relations body of research.72

70 Paul and Malone, 28. 71 Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, Русско-Американские Отношения и Продажда Аляски, г. 1834-1867 (Russian-American Relations and the Sale of Alaska, 1834-1867), (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), in Russian. 72 Ronald Jensen, The Alaska Purchase and Russian-American Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975); S. Frederick Starr, ed. Russia’s American Colony (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).

Unlike in American or Canadian historiography, however, there is little debate among theories of frontier development in Alaska. The colonial school advocated by

DeVoto dominates the literature of Alaskan development, to the point where Jensen himself commented that there was really little debate in the historiographical field.73 In particular, Clause Naske argued the colonial status of Alaska in his History of Alaska

Statehood. While focusing much more on the prominent individuals associated with the push for statehood, Naske heavily researches the views of Alaskan residents over time, concluding that a clear majority felt themselves second-class citizens to an unelected government in Washington.74

This view is echoed by the leading historian of Alaska today, Stephen Haycox. A student of Earl Pomeroy‟s, he asserts that while Alaska was (and remains) a colony of industrial interests from the continental United States, Alaskans themselves possess a somewhat bipolar view of their own situation.75 Haycox‟s Alaska is a culture perpetually shifted by repeated cultural fusions, and while residents may resent their dependence upon the American government, Haycox argues that Alaska as an entity could not have been formed without it. Throughout his work, Alaskan natives and settlers are forming informal associations and ad hoc institutions, frequently independent of the interests described as „absentee landlords‟. Here, Haycox provides an American interpretation of the Canadian Metropolitan thesis on a grand scale. William Hunt reinforces Haycox‟s

73 Jensen, 14. 74 Claus M. Naske, A History of Alaska Statehood. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985). 75 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), xv.

63 economic theories, arguing that Alaska remains a virtual feudal dominion of U.S. industries.76

Russian scholar E. V. Alekseeva, in her book Russian America: American

Russia?, reinterpreted environmental determinism, arguing that the forging of a distinct

Alaskan (non-Russian) identity was the result of distance from Russia and the climate that forced settlers to adapt native Alaskan methods of survival.77 Her portrait of isolated

Europeans and native Alaskans, inching toward a hybrid culture, has found warm reception with the new emphasis on ethnic histories. Paul Holbo challenged the prevailing view in American historiography, asserting that the drive to annex Alaska was not rooted in economic imperatives, but simple imperial expansionism – a Manifest

Destiny for the Arctic.78 As in the settlement of Alaska itself, the relative paucity of historiographical work belies the region‟s vague status. Both frontier and state, neither part of the American frontier experience nor independent of it, Alaska has remained, with few exceptions, in either the realm of Russian history before 1867, or of purely local history following the Gold Rush of 1894. Its role in the history of comparative national frontiers, therefore, remains largely unexplored.

Economics, environment, and the struggle over what factors forge regional identity have marked the historiographical debates over the role of frontiers. What remains, then, is to establish those theoretical frameworks that will allow historians to explore these interactions. To that end, their characteristics, roles, and most importantly functions of the institutions charged with this task must be studied in detail. In the

76 William Hunt, North of 53° (New York: MacMillan, 1974). 77 E. V. Alekseeva, Русская Америка: американская Россия? (Russian America: American Russia?) (Ekaterinburg: Rossiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1998) 78 Paul Soethe Holbo, Tarnished Expansion: The Alaska Scandal, the Press, and Congress, 1867-1871 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983).

64 following chapters, we will examine three relevant cases of imperial integration in the late nineteenth century; the American west, the Canadian prairies, and Alaska. Each of these cases highlights the implementation (and occasionally modification) of policies and institutions of territorial integration on a continental scale. The primary advantage that this method provides is that while the physical, cultural, and historical context remains constant, the circumstances under which the integrative process was undertaken differed dramatically. It is therefore possible to study the character of various integrative institutions, the policies implemented by the national governments, and examine the impact of contrasting policies on the speed, effectiveness, and their historical consequences.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORGANIC FRONTIER OF MONTANA, 1864-1889

Western settlement in the United States was the story of two cultural frontiers.

The territories that subscribed to the overall national identity – those with majority populations of white, English-speaking Christian farmers and entrepreneurs – were granted an astounding degree of effective autonomy, so much so that despite having little formal authority, that the inhabitants of these territories dictated both the pace and policy of settlement. The residents of these regions, through their delegates and the weakness of the territorial governors, exerted the most influence in deciding Indian policy, settlement rates, and in some cases, achieved statehood without meeting the population threshold set forth in the Northwest Ordinance. Although Westerners would later levy charges of colonial exploitation against the federal government, and in the economic sense this was certainly true, from a political standpoint the accusation is groundless. Political power in the territories was far too diffuse to be oppressive, at least as far as white Americans were concerned.1

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States had concluded a monumental series of territorial gains. In 1846, Great Britain and the United States concluded a treaty to resolve a border dispute in the Oregon Territory, firmly establishing the American northern border. Two years later, victory in the Mexican War formally legitimized the annexation of Texas, as well as awarding virtually all of what is today the southwest United States, including the rich state of California.2 By the time the Gadsden

Purchase was concluded in 1853, the young American republic had fulfilled its own

1 Pomeroy, 107. 2 Hamilton, 94. 66 philosophy of Manifest Destiny, having conquered the entire middle of the North

American continent.

Politically, however, the American West of the mid-nineteenth century was very much a work in progress. While both coasts and the eastern half of the country had been formally integrated into the United States, the vast region encompassing the Great Plains,

Rocky Mountains, and remaining territories won from Mexico remained colonial possessions, governed without the extension of full civic autonomy accorded to states.3

Unlike the majority of comparable European empires, the American nation was predicated on the gradual integration of colonial possessions into the state.4 For

Americans living in Montana, the question was not whether the territories would be admitted to the Union, but rather simply a question of when. The inability to elect their own governing officials and frequently living “beyond the legal pale” was not a permanent state of oppression, but rather a temporary arrangement that would midwife the Territory from colony to statehood.5

In this context, the term colonial refers primarily to the cultural goals of the federal government, although it also applies to the economic status of Montana during the territorial period, particularly in the western regions where mineral extraction was the financial lifeblood of most communities. The “distinctly imperial character” of nineteenth century capitalism, in the words of David Emmons, held most frontier

3 Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires, 3. Far from being threatened by neighboring powers, the United States during this period was the main threat to the territorial integrity of both Canada and Mexico. Texas and the southwest had been conquered outright in 1848, and the American army had invaded Canada in 1812. 4 Pomeroy, 2-3. 5 Judith K. Cole, “A Wide Field for Usefulness: Women‟s Civil Status and the Evolution of Women‟s Suffrage on the Montana Frontier, 1864-1914,” The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 34, no. 3 (July 1990), 264. 67 communities in a state of fiscal servitude to foreign investment – foreign being defined as regions beyond Montana.6 Indeed, the degree to which frontier entrepreneurs depended upon such business interests is a major reason why most of Montana‟s historiography is derived from the “plundered province” scholarship. A cross-section of prominent

Western scholars, including James R. Shortridge, Clark Spence, W. Thomas White,

Michael P. Malone, and Richard B. Roeder, have all endorsed this interpretation of

Montana‟s economic development, and are well-supported by the preponderance of evidence of corporate power in frontier regions.7

Economic dependence upon outside capital interests, however, was more an effect of territorial policy than its aim. Corruption of government officials, particularly by the railroad industry, was endemic and frequently led Montanans to view the federal government as a hindrance rather than a resource.8 However, the principal aim of

Washington was consistently to secure the cultural loyalty of frontier settlers and the

“Americanization” of those cultural groups considered incapable of embracing the national identity.9 Indeed, if Montana was “plundered” by outside bankers, it was done

6 James R. Shortridge, “The Expectations of Others: Struggles Toward a Sense of Place in the Northern Plains,” in Wrobel, David M. and Steiner, Michael C., eds., Many Wests: Place, Culture, and Regional Identity (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 119. While a great deal of investment did indeed come from other countries, most prominently Great Britain, financiers from the East and California were also considered “foreign”. 7 The plundered province theory is covered in detail in Chapter 2. In summary, the theory postulates that the settlement and later social and political development of Western territories was determined and limited by the requirements of Eastern (and foreign) investments. The West therefore was colonized, in a manner similar to Africa or India, to serve the economic needs of the East. 8 W. Thomas White, “The War of the Railroad Kings: Great Northern-Northern Pacific Rivalry in Montana, 1881-1896,” in, Rex C. Myers and Harry W. Fritz, eds., Montana and the West (Boulder: Pruett Publishing Company, 1984), 45 and 51. Montana Delegate Martin Maginnis, who received much approbation from his fellow Montanans as a champion of their interests, would not be immune to the siren call of graft; in 1886, he received $3000 from railroad magnate James J. Hill to lobby President Grover Cleveland to grant the railway transit rights through land in Montana. 9 Frank Van Nuys, Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890-1930 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 195. 68 so, according to historian Anne Hyde, with the enthusiastic assistance of Montanans and not as part of the overall federal policy of Western integration.10

Montana and its sister territories were conceived by the federal government primarily as cultural, rather than economic, colonies of the Eastern national core. The rapid migration of American citizens into the frontier also transplanted the cultural foundations of the Anglo-Saxon derived national identity; far from directing this migration, the government found itself following its own settlers, who dictated the pace and manner of westward settlement. Over time, this tendency would become formalized policy. The United States government would employ the bulk of its authority and financial resources not to destroy Western industries at the behest of corporate partners, but rather to isolate, assimilate, or eliminate those cultural groups that refused to subscribe to the national identity.11

Most crucially, the dependence of the United States on settler cooperation compelled it to favor the white, Protestant majority settlers and to adopt their social mores and norms as the acceptable cultural model. The identity of the White landed farmer had become the strongest single cultural aspect of the American national identity, and was the cornerstone of the cultural policy of assimilation. At a time in which the

Western territories were desperately short of skilled tradesmen, the few vocational schools that existed were teaching Indians how to farm in eastern climates.12 Yet even though the Western territories were radically different in terms of climate and technology

10 Anne F. Hyde, “Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Rocky Mountains and Extractive Industry” in Many Wests: Place, Culture, and Regional Identity, eds. David M. Wrobel and Michael C. Steiner (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 110. 11 Van Nuys, 194. 12 Thomas G. Alexander, A Clash of Interests: Interior Department and the Mountain West, 1863-96 (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1977), 162. 69 from the settlement of the first frontier east of the Mississippi, the same methods of territorial governance were adopted. Although the precise offices and duties were adjusted over time, the territorial ideology that governed the West was essentially the same one that dominated federal thinking since late eighteenth century. Indeed, cultural loyalty had been one of the cornerstones of territorial policy from its beginning.

Origins of American Settlement Policy

The American process of territorial integration was hardly the product of a deliberately crafted federal program. Rather, it was a legislative aggregate, an evolutionary heritage of numerous laws, policies, and directives enacted over time to address specific conditions and circumstances.13 While this left territorial policy necessarily vague and frequently self-contradictory on many specifics, including what internal powers would be extended to the territories and when, the ad hoc nature of the integrative process possessed a flexibility that allowed the system to adapt to changing physical, political, and cultural circumstances.14

The settlement of the American West was characterized by an unplanned, organic process to which the federal government more often reacted than actively directed.

Territorial functions were parceled out across multiple agencies (particularly the

Treasury, Interior and War Departments), a characteristic that contributed to the relative acquiescence of Washington to events on the frontier. The territorial governors, who on

13 Pomeroy, 1. 14 Ibid., 79. 70 paper had virtually dictatorial authority, frequently found themselves without adequate funding or political support to contradict the will of territorial interest groups.15

From its inception, the American process of territorial integration was more a political tradition than a specific legal procedure. The cornerstone of territorial policy was laid down with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, itself a revision of an earlier ordinance crafted by Thomas Jefferson. Although the precise mechanisms and requirements for admission to the Union would be revised, three core principles emerged from the Ordinance that would drive all subsequent territorial policy. First, any settlement was predicated on the removal of Indians to lands further west or concentrated on small reservations; the territories were to be expressly settled by migrants from the national core.16 Next, land would be allotted to those core settlers, ensuring a replication of the dominant economic and cultural norms that held sway further east. Finally, new territories would have to be accepted by the existing states before being allowed to become full and equal members of the state.17

During the period of Confederation and the early Republic, the issue of national loyalty and cultural identity were of great concern to policymakers.18 Much of the territories inherited by the United States were inhabited by either native Americans or

French subjects, neither of whom were seen as adequately familiar or accepting of republican traditions. So skeptical were the early American statesmen that republican democracy could be established further west that on two separate occasions a number of lawmakers (including President Jefferson) suggested that a number of allied (and

15 Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966), 309. 16 Eblen, 22 and 54. 17 Nugent, 222. 18 Eblen, 55. 71 presumably dependent) independent republics be sponsored to the west as an alternative to direct incorporation.19

Adoption of the Northwest Ordinance also enshrined the primacy of the settler in the formation of territorial policy. It was the population of settlers, those citizens that held land and therefore could vote, that determined when a territory was ready for statehood. Foreigners would count after a residence period of two years, by which time they would ideally have been educated in the American manner of republican government. The extension of some form of self-government, particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was a device to placate settler demands and defuse any potential resentment against the distant national core.20

To keep order in the interim, and to provide a stabilizing force in the unstable frontier, lawmakers turned to the British model and created the office of territorial governor.21 It is somewhat counterintuitive that a system predicated on the autonomy of the territorial settler and the primacy of republican self-government would incorporate one of the most legally autocratic officers in the annals of American governance.

Designed to manage vast territories that technically were the property of the United

States “to which representative institutions are not accorded,” territorial governors possessed broad powers to create counties and municipalities, conduct affairs with Indian tribes, command militia; in effect, the power to rule by decree.22 In 1850 the United

19 Ibid., 4 and 31. 20 Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 124. 21 Eblen., 42. 22 Lawson and Seidman, 106. Max Farrand went further in describing American rule in Alaska, declaring in 1900 that there was „no immediate probability of it being so incorporated [as a state]” as justification for governance by executive fiat (cited in Lawson and Seidman). For broad duties and powers of the governors, see also Eblen, 239. 72

States Supreme Court went even further, deciding that the governors were not subject to the Constitution‟s “complex distribution of the powers of government.”23

As political appointees, the governors oversaw the development of the colonial possessions of the United States explicitly on behalf of the federal government. In theory, this was to safeguard the loyalty of the territory from the selfish interests of its own residents. While defending the practice of appointing non-residents as governors, one senator in 1884 reiterated the thoroughly colonial nature of the territories: “…it is almost impossible to select impartial and unprejudiced persons…from residents [of the territories]. The Territories being the common property of the United States…the committee can see no good reason why these Territorial officers may not be selected from the States having an interest in these Territories.”24

It is clear from the records of gubernatorial appointment that, as far as Western territories were concerned, the national loyalty of the territories was not a pressing concern for lawmakers. Party loyalty and activism brought appointments rather than experience with the conditions and demands of the frontier. Candidates were lauded for their efforts in recent elections, with territorial governorships advocated as “a just reward for his services [to the party]”.25 Others were selected out of personal loyalty to the sitting president, or because they hailed from crucial states in a recent election.26 Party loyalty was a useful advantage long after a governor assumed office; as Governor of the

Dakota Territory, John Pennington cited his party bona fides while pleading for the

23 Benner v. Porter, 50 US (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850), as cited in Lawson and Seidman, 133. 24 Senate Reports, (48th Congress, 1st Session), No. 496, 1-2. 25 Letter, Seymour to Cleveland, 1 June 1893, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, National Archives and Records Administration (Hereinafter referred to as NARA), 85. 26 Letter, Morton to Grant, 18 December 1878, Ibid., 142, and Letter, Oglesby to Hurlbut, 3 April 1877, Ibid., 139. 73 resumption of a postal route to the Black Hills region.27 Support of commercial interests, particularly mining and other resource extraction companies, frequently won appointments, often in very forthright terms. J.C. Green, an owner of a large mining interest in Alaska urged President Grover Cleveland that “the business interests of Alaska demand [A. P. Swineford] be placed at the head of affairs.”28 Benjamin Potts, an otherwise very popular and bipartisan governor, removed control of Montana‟s penitentiaries from the territory‟s superintendent of prisons, whom he described as “one of the most inveterate enemies of President Grant‟s administration…and the most active in support of the Democratic party.”29

On paper, the governor possessed tremendously broad authority, and had the legal authority to govern at will. The realities of frontier life, however, turned this arrangement on its head, as many governors discovered that their ability to function depended almost entirely on the cooperation of the settler population. In the case of

Montana, where many governors clashed politically with the locally-elected legislature, the result was dramatic: of the nine appointed between 1864 and 1889, only one completed a full term.30 That appointee, Republican Benjamin Potts, served three full terms during a time in which the esteem of a governor was measured in length of time in office. This is largely due to Potts‟ willingness to cooperate with moderate Democrats in an overwhelmingly Democratic state, as well as his recognition that the fastest way to earn support in a territory was to criticize the conduct of Congress. Potts‟ successful

27 Letter, Pennington to Key, 21 July 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 28 Letter, Green to Cleveland, May 1893, Ibid., 85. 29 Spence, 82. 30 Clark C. Spence, “The Territorial Officers of Montana, 1864-1889,” The Pacific Historical Review, vol. 30, no. 2 (May 1961), 128. 74 tenure illustrated how a governor‟s freedom of action was circumscribed by the attitudes and composition of the settlers he was supposed to govern.

Settlement of the Montana Territory

The settlement of what would become the Montana territory occurred in a series of distinct phases. Following the Lewis and Clark expedition of 1803-4, the few non-

Native residents of the region were predominantly fur trappers working as agents for the powerful fur companies of the time, either the British Hudson‟s Bay Company, or the

American Rocky Mountain Fur Company or American Fur Company.31 A large minority of these trappers were of French origin or Métis, those individuals of both Native

American and French parentage.32 The introduction of steamboat travel up the Missouri

River into Montana in 1832 gave American trappers a decisive advantage, forcing the

Hudson‟s Bay Company further north into what would become the Canadian prairies.33

No other geographic factor influenced the settlement of Montana more than the presence of the Missouri River. Despite a strong downstream current leading southeast to the Mississippi and regions of shallows that occasionally demanded crews pole craft into deeper water, the river provided a natural highway for settlers from the eastern United

States. Given an overland road that was little more than a cleared path that could be

31 James McClellean Hamilton, History of Montana: From Wilderness to Statehood (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1970), 72 and 80. The Hudson‟s Bay Company differed from its American counterparts in that it was a public/private venture with the British government, similar to the earlier British East India Company. During the early nineteenth century, the border between the United States and British North America was undefined, and trappers of both countries hunted in the same territories simultaneously. 32 Arthur Jerome Dickson, ed. Covered Wagon Days: From the Private Journals of Albert Jerome Dickson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1957), 44. 33 Hamilton, 84. 75 quickly closed by hostile Indian tribes, the Missouri allowed relatively regular traffic deep the Plains of eastern Montana. Early keelboats also carried up to fifteen tons of cargo; the steamboat era featured cargoes of up to five hundred tons.34

The ability to move such vast amounts of passengers and cargo with regularity made the river an indispensable natural highway when gold was discovered in Montana in 1860. The discovery began the first great influx of settlers into the territory and would dominate the region‟s economic life for the next several decades. This is due in part to how little capital was required to set up an individual placer mine; modest tools and an affordable recorder‟s fee gave a prospector the legal right to pull wealth from the soil.35

Such opportunity, combined with the easy access granted by the Missouri, led to a mining rush that coincided with the onset of the Civil War.

The Civil War represented the single greatest threat the United States faced to its territorial integrity, and greatly impacted the political attitudes of Montana‟s settlers.

Once again, it was the Missouri River that helped determine those attitudes. The nautical highway that led to Montana passed through the border state of Missouri as well as gathering traffic from Kentucky and the slave states of the lower Mississippi.

Geographic features along the route testify to the political leanings of the passengers;

Confederate Gulch, Jeff Davis Gulch, and a town wistfully named Dixie give witness to the pro-Southern attitudes of these settlers.36

In the aftermath of the rebellion, many former Confederate sympathizers chose to move west, travelling from St. Louis up the Missouri River and into the Montana

34 Ibid., 145. 35 Ibid., 211. 36 Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 1864-89 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 21 76

Territory. Some had been former members of Confederate General Sterling Price‟s army, while most were Copperhead Democrats (those Democrats who favored negotiation and separation with the Confederacy) and others whose inclinations had either supported the

Confederacy, or been critical of the Union war effort. In 1866 one Treasury official characterized the territory as four fifths secessionist, declaring the area less loyal than

Kentucky or Tennessee during the Civil War.37 It easy to see why, when the Territory was organized in 1864, the potential governor was required to be “the choice of the loyal people of Montana.”38 Even the nominally Democratic newspaper Montana Post argued that it would be “suicide to send any other than a true and reliable Union man” to govern the territory.39

Despite this chorus of demands for a strong hand to bring Montana ideologically back to the Union, the first three governors appointed to the Territory met with frustration, repeatedly failing to bring the Democratically-dominated territorial legislature to heel. Legislatures would slow the movement of government to a standstill, repeatedly submitting previously vetoed bills, issuing legal challenges to gubernatorial actions, or simply investigating unpopular appointees, essentially blocking the ability of the governor to carry out his duties. The most radical Republican nominee of the three, former representative James M. Ashley of Ohio, met with such vehement opposition that he complained that he had barely unpacked when he received word of his dismissal.40

Even in an age characterized by the mercurial and often sudden removals of territorial officers, Ashley‟s brief tenure in Montana was viewed by both Montanans and the federal

37 Ibid., 21. 38 Letter, Langford to Lincoln, 17 March 1864, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, NARA, 38. Emphasis added. 39 Editorial, Montana Post, 8 October 1864. 40 Letter, Ashley to Grant, 20 December 1869, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers (Montana), NARA. 77 government alike as disastrous.41 While his replacement, Benjamin Potts, was considerably more popular and effective, Montana remained staunchly Democratic throughout the territorial period.

Partisanship takes on particular importance during the decade of Reconstruction

(1865-1876). The Civil War had split the country along sectional lines, and when the south seceded, most Democratic lawmakers went with it. The result was twofold, handing unquestioned control of the federal government to the Republicans, while also linking membership in the Democratic Party to support for the Confederacy. More troubling for the Republican officials dispatched to the territory was that pro-

Confederacy sentiment (if not secessionism) was widespread enough to defeat the vehemently unionist candidate for Congressional delegate, Wilbur Fisk Sanders, in an election that occurred while the Civil War was still raging. Tempering the pro-

Confederate bloc within the Democratic party of Montana was a large number of foreign- born citizens. The 1870 census revealed that of the 20,595 settlers in Montana, 7,979 were born outside the United States.42 These foreign settlers, primarily Irish and German, tended to vote for Democrats more for the party‟s pro-agrarian policies than its Civil War affiliations.

Once the Civil War had ended, the federal government moved to heed the chorus of demands from Montana‟s settlers to remove the Native American tribes from regions of white settlement. Beginning in 1866 and culminating with the surrender of the

Cheyenne, Sioux, and Nez Perce between 1876 and 1878, settler encroachment on Indian

41 Editorial, New North-West, 24 December 1869. 42 Michael P. Malone and Richard B. Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 74-6. 78 lands led to a series of military campaigns that systematically disarmed and removed remaining Indian tribes into reservations. These reservations would be the cause of much later friction between whites and Indians, were designed to abolish the tribes‟ nomadic lifestyle and heritage, and assimilate them into American society.43 In short, the objective was to replace the cultural identity of the Indians with the national identity of the American settlers.44 Despite numerous treaties and legal rights to the territories,

Indian resistance was crushed by the United States Army, and Indian removal inaugurated the last great migration to the Montana Territory.

Major General John Gibbon fought in many of the Indian Wars of the 1870s, and his writings indicate a contradictory view of his opponents. Gibbon expresses outright admiration for Indian society in general, praising them for their adaptability, ingenuity, and commitment to a familiar form of representative government.45 He also decries what he describes as the “cruel wrong and injustice” done upon Indians by the American government.46 At the same time, the Indians in Gibbon‟s view are “wild animals,”

“inferior,” and “untamed.”47 As to the ultimate fate of the Native Americans, Gibbon bluntly states, “I make no complaint that he (the Indian) is being driven from this continent. That is inevitable: He must go, and we might as well complain of the steam engine for running over a bull imprudent enough to venture on to the railroad track.”48

43 Ibid., 109. 44 The dominant American national identity was derived from the largely Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority of the Eastern United States. See p. 9. 45 Alan and Maureen Gaff, eds. Adventures on the Western Frontier by Major General John Gibbon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 238. 46 Ibid., 250. 47 Ibid., 237. 48 Ibid., 242. Emphasis original. 79

The third and final phase of Montana‟s settlement occurred at the end of the

Indian wars. As the gold and silver lodes of Montana began to run out at the end of the

1870s, pastoral ranching exploded across eastern Montana. So sudden was this new economic boom that when Granville Stuart first visited the region in 1880, it was virtually devoid of white settlers.49 Indian removal and the near-extinction of American buffalo opened tremendous tracts of land for open-range ranching at precisely the same time that urban populations in the East were growing rapidly, increasing the demand for beef.50 Montana thus developed something of a “divided consciousness,” as the mining interests that dominated the western regions of the territory were joined by the pastoral ranchers of the eastern.51

Previously, western settlement had been primarily driven by individuals seeking to establish family farms in the Mississippi Basin and eastern Plains. Comprised primarily of ethnically homogenous families, this social stability had grown the cultural infrastructure of town life: churches, theaters, and social clubs.52 While the pastoral settlers of the Mississippi Basin and Great Plains were overwhelmingly white, there was diversity in both their religion and ethnic origin. Catholic Irish and French families established communities, along with large enclaves of Scandinavians, Germans, and

Scots. While many families in the Plains emigrated from Russia or Austria-Hungary, the

49 Paul C. Phillips, ed. Forty Years on the Frontier: As Seen in the Journals of Granville Stuart, Gold- Miner, Trader, Merchant, Rancher, and Politician (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1925), 108-9. 50 Malone and Roeder, 115. 51 Mary Murphey, “Searching for an Angle of Repose: Women, Work, and Creativity in Early Montana,” in Many Wests: Place, Culture, and Regional Identity, eds. David M. Wrobel and Michael C. Steiner (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 158. 52 Everett Dick, The Sod-House Frontier, 1854-1890: A Social History of the Northern Plains from the Creation of Kansas & Nebraska to the Admission of the Dakotas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954), 238. 80 overwhelming majority of those immigrants were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically

German.53

The miners, however, would bring a different pattern of frontier settlement and new social institutions to the American periphery. Privately funded and dedicated to profit through resource extraction, these communities were utterly isolated from neighboring towns, overwhelmingly male, and far more economically unstable than their pastoral counterpart.54 They did feature, ironically, a far more diverse ethnic makeup as a result of crippling labor shortages. Mexican, Indian, and Chinese laborers made up large minorities of the working population, although with different degrees of public acceptance. Indians and Mexicans had been part of the economic life of Montana since the fur trapping era, and if they were not received with open arms, they certainly did not face the violent discrimination and isolation doled out to the Chinese laborers. They were tolerated by business leaders and fellow workers alike, in arguably the most tepid sense of the term.55

Gilt Edge in Fergus County, Montana, provides a good example of the conditions of a frontier mining settlement. Lillian Hazen arrived in 1899 with her family and discovered a small town with residents from virtually every other region of the United

States.56 Part of the attraction to such an isolated part of the country was the attraction of a new start, for many of the town‟s residents were not poor prospectors or threadbare laborers, but middle class professionals whose careers in the East had failed for one

53 James Shortridge, Peopling the Plains: Who Settled Where in Frontier Kansas (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 103. 54 Hyde, 95-6. 55 Ibid., 99. 56 Joyce Litz, The Montana Frontier: One Woman’s West (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 102. 81 reason or another.57 Her home had two bedrooms and a combined living room and kitchen, making it one of the more luxurious in the area. Hazen was more fortunate than most wives, as her husband had procured beds, chairs, a table, lamps, and a crib in addition to other luxuries such as flatware and saucepans.58 Most residents lacked even these basic necessities.

Despite the isolation, Hazen recorded that the mining company had invested heavily in the town. “Steam drills, electric lights, and every other labor saving device known to man could be found in Gilt Edge.”59 This contrasted with the primitive conditions that pervaded in the residential part of town, where most residents were

“deprived of decent food as if they were on a whaling vessel.”60 Hazen herself was obliged to plant a sizeable garden to meet the caloric demands of her family, and the chronic hunger of the town certainly did not aid the cause of public health. As Hazen described succinctly, the entire mining camp was “a pest house.”61 This led to another characteristic of mining towns, the incredibly high mortality and casualty rate among working men. In a three year span between 1910 and 1913, the mines of Butte claimed

162 lives and crippled 5,233 men.62

In spite of the human cost, the mines of Montana provided tremendous wealth and influence to the business interests of the territory. It was not uncommon for a mining company to control every aspect of life in a small town, from the newspapers to the

57 Ibid., 103. 58 Ibid., 96. 59 Ibid., 96. 60 Ibid., 100. 61 Ibid., 105. 62 Hyde, 103. 82 lumber mills to the timber camps.63 Smaller entrepreneurs that made their living catering to the needs of the camp populace, such as saloons, dry goods stores, and butchers could be shut down instantly should the company choose to close the mine for any length of time. In theory, the office of the territorial governor could be brought to bear to prevent this sort of disruption into community life. However, it would be the constant tightness of territorial budgets that would deprive the governors of much of their independence from local pressures.

Economic Influences on Territorial Governance

The perennial desire of Congress to save money was a primary motivation for the development of the American territorial system. Although the rationale for granting such broad internal autonomy to territories was to allow them to govern themselves as economically as possible, the ideal of the self-sufficient, economically viable, and dependent territory was far more wishful thinking than reality. Federal subsidies kept territorial finances from collapsing utterly, although most territories ran deeply into debt; contrary to the hopes of lawmakers in Washington, the treasury spent far more in supporting the West than it ever received back.64 Indeed, one of the primary reasons that many territories were admitted as states long before they had officially met the residence requirements was to move them off the federal dole.65 So dependent were the territories on federal subsidies that, in the words of Earl Pomeroy, “one of the strongest arguments

63 Ibid., 105. 64 Alexander, 173. 65 Eblen, 70. 83 against statehood was the loss of the congressional appropriation.”66 Thus was born the

Western tradition of decrying federal rule while demanding federal support.

These financial shortcomings translated to monumental problems on the frontier.

As late as the 1880s, Montana not only lacked the money to publish its own laws, but had no facilities to store the public records of the territory.67 Even this was an improvement over the situation in 1870, when Montana had had to turn to the War Department to transport a library of legal texts and statues to the territory so the legislative assembly could conduct its business.68 Montana was so desperate for resources that even after admission to the Union, the legislature refused to surrender equipment such as wagons, tools, and even desks used during the territorial period to federal authorities, as the newborn state had neither their own supplies nor the money to replace them.69

Even the Office of Indian Affairs, arguably the most visible and vital office of the

Interior Department, suffered from budget shortfalls. In early May of 1881, the Bureau utterly ran out of money; rather than authorize the agency to operate under a deficit, the

Bureau simply shut down operations.70 The shutdown stranded Indian inspectors, many in transit to their assignments, without any guarantee of reimbursement for travel costs; agents were informed to keep a running tally of costs with receipts, in the hope of eventually being repaid.71 Secretary Samuel J. Kirkwood telegrammed to an inspector en route to a reservation where abuses had been reported, “If you have funds proceed with

66 Pomeroy, 99. 67 Eblen, 73-4. 68 Letter, Meigs to Belknap, 31 December 1870, RG 48, Records of Int. Department, Letters Received Regarding Territorial Matters, NARA. 69 Eblen, 235. 70 Letter, Kirkwood to Gardner, 5 May 1881, RG 48, Records of Interior Department, Press Copies of Letters/Telegrams sent to Indian Inspectors, NARA. 71 Letter, Kirkwood to Gardner, 5 June 1881, Ibid, also Memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Interior, 21 May 1881, Ibid, and Letter, Kirkwood to Haworth, 21 May 1881, Ibid. 84

Inspection of Tule River, no money available until July first.”72 After completing his inspection at his own expense, one agent found himself stranded in California, until the

Bureau received new funding.73

Several efforts to improve the lot of Indians on federal reserves, from efforts to use irrigation to promote farming to funding for trade education, languished for lack of financial support.74 Such penury was both ironic and self-defeating, coming from the same Congress that had appropriated funds to “best advance the said Indians in agricultural and mechanical pursuits, and enable them to sustain themselves without the aid of government.”75 Cost-cutting measures that placed ever higher Indian populations on fewer and fewer reservations were a key factor in Indian uprisings in Idaho and

Arizona in period between 1875 and 1885.76 Throughout the period, correspondence between Indian agents in the field and the Department are filled with requests for financial accounts, in some cases to resolve inconsistencies over amounts as little as six cents.77

Caught in a bureaucratic cul-de-sac between the Interior and Treasury

Departments, Indian agents were frequently subjected to invasive scrutiny in the name of economy. Use of telegraph and railroad were jealously guarded, while new equipment and supplies could be purchased only after an outside panel declared that the need was

72 Letter, Kirkwood to Gardner, 21 May 1881, Ibid. 73 Letters, Kirkwood to Gardner, 24 and 27 May 1881, Ibid. 74 Alexander, 179. 75 Senate Bill 418, Section 5. 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 2 December 1862, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA. Emphasis added. 76 Alexander, 179. 77 Letter, Chandler to Morill, 26 January 1877, RG 48, Department of the Interior, Letters Received from Commissioner Of Indian Affairs, NARA. 85 real and unavoidable.78 The miserly attitude of Congress toward any appropriation for the benefit of the Indians, whether for education, transportation, or attempts to promote pastoral farming, frequently resulted in inadequate equipment and deeply flawed legislation.79

Nor were Indians or their advocates in Indian Affairs singled out for such fiscal discipline. Governors, too, had to fight for educational funding, not only with Congress but periodically with their own territorial legislatures.80 Reports to Congress cited the need to increase salaries for territorial officers, who were expected to transport their families to distant towns where housing was either in desperate need of renovation or non-existent.81 Given the technology and infrastructure of the time, a posting to distant

Montana was a trek to a land with minimal comforts or contact with the homeland.

Alaska, by comparison, might as well have been on the moon. Governors‟ salaries themselves were so low as to necessitate that the candidate either possess an independent source of income or force territorial legislatures to appropriate added compensation to retain competent officers.82

Congress provided governors‟ salaries, theoretically to keep them loyal to the national government and uninterested in the special interests of their territories.

Unfortunately, the salaries were so low that prospective governors faced two realistic possibilities to make ends meet. The first was to engage in some business in addition to the official duties in the territory. Benjamin Potts established a sheep farm while in

78 Alexander, 108. 79 Ibid., 179. 80 Eblen, 210. 81 Governor‟s Report for Dakota Territory, 1880, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Letters Received And Related Correspondence, NARA, p. 6. 82 Letter, Potts to Sherman, 30 March 1877, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, NARA, James H. Mills file. Also Pomeroy, 98-99. 86

Montana, while the territorial secretary ran a newspaper to supplement his income. Potts would later recommend bachelors for territorial office, as “a man of a family could not accept the place and live on the salary.”83 The governor of the Wyoming Territory went further, issuing a bipartisan declaration that it was “impossible to live here on the salary, however economical one might be…the salary is insufficient as appropriated for democrat or republican.”84 Even Interior Secretary Henry Moore Teller feared that the low pay was directing otherwise talented officers into other careers.85

The inadequate salaries opened the door for wealthy business interests to corrupt territorial officials. In predominantly agrarian territories such as Dakota before the discovery of gold in the Black Hills region, the most powerful interests were the railroads. In these cases of corruption, the governor and the legislature participated in a rare display of cooperation; Governor Newton Edmunds approved the charter of a railway in the Dakota Territory in which he was the railroad‟s president and the legislature served as the incorporators, to a man.86 Even in instances where there was no wrongdoing, the appearance of corporate favoritism led many to suspect the worst.

Edwin McCook, Secretary of the Dakota Territory in 1873, suffered the most extreme form of censure when a city banker, P. P. Wintermute, shot him to death following an argument. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that McCook had supported an expansion of the Dakota Southern Railway while Wintermute‟s firm had supported a competing railroad.87

83 Ibid., 36. This business of moonlighting was commonplace, but efforts were made, in the main, to engage in businesses that were investments in the territory. 84 Pomeroy., 36. 85 Lamar, 107. 86 Eblen, 207. 87 New York Times, 13 September 1873. See also New York Times, 21 September 1873. 87

Mining interests dominated the Montana economy in the late nineteenth century, contributing more than $134 million between 1862 and 1875. The lure of mining attracted foreign investment as well, with at least thirty-nine companies of British origin doing business in the territory between the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of

World War I. These enterprises and their supporting businesses wielded enormous power in distant communities. In every mining town was a general store that acted as a virtual retail monopoly, offering services from food and alcohol to extending lines of credit.

Naturally, the same business, in cooperation with the mining company, had the power to garnish wages for non-payment.88 With a stranglehold on the economy of many mountain towns, business interests were challenged at the governor‟s own political risk.

Weakness of Gubernatorial Power

Despite the power officially available to them, many governors found themselves hamstrung by the perpetual indebtedness of their territory. Montana‟s treasury was so empty that when a war band of Nez Perce threatened the western frontier of the territory,

Governor Benjamin Potts called out the militia with the proviso that they would have to provide their own equipment and pay for their own transportation.89 He had earlier sent off urgent messages to the sheriffs of several frontier communities imploring them to care for the weapons he was able to provide, keep accurate muster rolls, conserve ammunition,

88 Thomas A. Clinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana (Helena: University of Montana Press, 1970), 1-8. 89 Proclamation, 26 July 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 88 and above all, return all weapons and equipment promptly.90 Montana was so deeply in debt that a wealthy business magnate, N. S. Vestrel, had offered to buy the territory‟s debt at six percent interest. When the legislature balked, Potts castigated the assembly for turning down an attractive offer that would have cleared Montana‟s ledger.91

If a governor refused to operate (or operate in collusion with) a separate business, then the only economically viable path was to have an independent source of wealth.

This carried with it a new set of political risks. Moonlighting governors were potentially corrupt, but from the perspective of territorial interests, that corruption could benefit the territory; independently wealthy governors, however, were almost universally outsiders with no connection to the territory, and as such were viewed with even greater suspicion.

One of the main causes for territorial indebtedness was the tendency of legislatures to vote additional compensation to governors, judges, and other territorial officers to offset their inadequate funds, a practice designed to swing the institutional loyalty of these officers from the federal government to that of the territory.92

In theory, such a governor could call upon the support of the federal government to bolster his authority and override rebellious legislatures. During the final years of territorial status in Utah, the federal government backed efforts by governors to end the power of the Mormon religion through immigration restrictions, judicial legislation, and above all taxation on practically all church functions outside of worship services.93 This level of federal cooperation was unique to territories viewed as alien or hostile to the

90 Letter, Potts to Sheriffs of Missoula, Deer Lodge, and Beaverhead, 9 July 1877, Ibid. 91 Letter, Potts to Legislative Assembly, 28 January 1879. The Dakota Territory was so mired in debt that to house its own clinically insane, Governor Howard built an asylum from his own personal funds, which the territory later bought once it had finally balanced its finances (Eblen, 309). 92 Pomeroy, 98-99. 93 Lamar, 342-5. 89 national identity. For those territories that were seen as transplants of the settled East, the attitude of Congress was one of accommodation. With expansion and settlement proceeding apace and territories requiring little intervention or expenditure, many in

Congress saw no need to provoke a confrontation with citizens that were, after all, spreading the cultural and social norms that formed the bedrock of national identity.94

Consequently, governors that attempted to invoke their legal authority were frustrated by the reluctance of Congress to support them.

This laissez-faire approach to territorial governance gravely weakened the statutory power of governors, who found themselves deprived not only of financial support but more crucially, political support. Unpopular governors could not exercise their legal powers freely, as had James Ashley (April-December 1869) of Montana, since

Congress was unwilling to risk the ire of the territorial legislature. As a consequence, governors found themselves in a position of having to curry favor with the territorial residents they were charged with overseeing, even when that favor directly contradicted their defined duties.95 So accustomed were territorial residents to Congressional acquiescence that rather than negotiate with an unpopular official, territorial residents were able to simply demand their dismissal.96

This tendency was on full display during the tenure of Governor Benjamin Potts

(1870-1883) in Montana. His territorial secretary, James Mills, had established a newspaper to supplement his income, one which began to strongly criticize competing newspapers that had been critical of the administration and President Rutherford B.

94 Eblen, 270. 95 Ibid., 257. 96 Clark, 42-54. 90

Hayes. In retaliation, Mills was accused of abandonment of duty by several citizens in

Helena who demanded his removal.97 Potts was forced to intervene in an appeal to the

Senate Territorial Committee arguing that the accusations had “no foundation whatsoever... (The charge of neglect) no doubt comes from R. E. Fisk or W. F. Sanders, the bitter opponents of the President and his administration. Captain Mills publishes the only true Republican paper in Montana and is the most popular lawman of either party.”98

Mills‟ retention was due more to Potts‟ own popularity within the territory among moderate Democrats in Montana than any support the governor could wring from

Congress.99

If Congressional intervention and investigations of officers was troubling, it had the backhanded benefit of being infrequent. As the century wore on territorial governors were left increasingly to their own resourcefulness to handle affairs as they developed.

This translated to an increased dependency on the territorial legislature to ensure that the everyday business of governance could be carried out. On those occasions when governors would ask their superiors in Washington to define the precise scope of their authority or for a clear statement of public policy, their requests were met with dismissive silence. On more than one occasion, an exasperated Interior Department instructed the requesting governor to simply reread his territory‟s Organic Act.100 The message from

97 Letter, Potts to Schurz, 14 December 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. Potts had been a general during the Civil War and a personal friend of President Hayes; his vehement support of the President, in light of his typical political flexibility, seems to have been motivated primarily by friendship and personal loyalty rather than partisan affiliation. See Spence, “Territorial Officers of Montana,” 128. 98 Letter, Potts to Rodgers, 18 December 1877, Ibid. 99 Spence, Territorial Politics, 98. Potts preferred to work with the territorial legislature whenever possible, but was unafraid to appeal to Congress when the legislature balked. 100 Eblen, 301. An Organic Act is the law which formally creates a territory and specifies which institutions possess which governmental powers. 91 the national core was clear: maintain the peace, keep your residents happy, and above all, do not trouble the Congress with territorial concerns.

The distant relationship between Washington and territorial governors was compounded by yet another division of authority. The American tendency to parcel out specific territorial functions meant that governors had to share political power with territorial delegates who, unlike the governor, were popularly elected. Despite possessing no official power– delegates could „advise‟ the Congress but could not vote – these territorial ambassadors quickly pooled their efforts, forming an unofficial lobbying group to secure favorable legislation. This “syndicate,” in the words of the Rocky Mountain

Gazette, was to “consult and aid each other in the preparation and passage of measures through both houses. They style themselves the „territorial syndicate.‟”101

One of the leading figures of this syndicate was Martin Maginnis of Montana, a popular figure who enjoyed a congenial working relationship with Governor Potts, despite being a Democrat.102 Maginnis‟ popularity was due to his ability to both win

Congressional appropriations in the form of military forts and reduced Indian reservations. This meant more land available for disbursement among white

Montanans.103 Together with his fellow delegates, Maginnis was able to forge “quite an influential body of men,” whose ability to deliver federal influence for their territories quickly made them powerful agents within the territorial system. Aside from a decade-

101 Rocky Mountain Gazette, 27 December 1871. 102 Spence, Territorial Politics, 98. 103 Clinch, 18. 92 long interlude between 1875 and 1885, delegates could even introduce amendments into legislation, dramatically increasing their influence on territorial legislation.104

For governors, this was at best a mixed blessing. While the benefits of a skilled lobbyist in the corridors of Congress are legion, particularly if the governor and delegate could cooperate effectively, the power of the delegates also stripped governors of yet another of their official functions. In theory, a potent tool of territorial governors was their ability to act as liaison between core and periphery, to be the eyes and ears of the government on the distant frontier. The delegates and their territorial syndicate, however, were far more effective in that role. Unlike governors, they were present in Washington and had immediate and personal access to lawmakers, including the all-powerful House

Appropriations Committee. Deprived of this crucial face-to-face link with the national core (and more importantly, the ability to dispense patronage jobs) as well as political or financial support, governors found many of their official, formal powers impotent without the consent of territorial residents.105 The chief executive of a colonial territory, autocratic on paper, had become dependent upon the goodwill of his charges to carry out his tasks.

Thus, under the American territorial system, most of the governors‟ functional powers came from unofficial privileges of the office. Patronage, in particular, remained a valuable tool for building a base of support, only this time that base resided in the territory rather than in the national capital.106 Governors also became de facto lobbyists, often quietly advocating for particular businesses or communities during legislative

104 Alexander, 174. 105 Pomeroy, 89. 106 Eblen, 204. 93 sessions.107 Yet by the end of the century even these powers demonstrated how little independent power governors possessed, for these abilities were contingent upon good relations with the territorial legislature. Even the gubernatorial power of appointment was greatly reduced, since legislatures commonly moved to make every possible appointed office an elected one. On the eve of statehood, the governor of Dakota no longer had the authority to call a legislative special session.108 Not even Benjamin Potts was immune to this trend. The Montana legislature attempted in 1879 to consolidate the number of executive offices in an effort to reduce the number of appointments the governor could make. This prompted the normally-agreeable Potts to blast what he saw as an attack on gubernatorial power.109

It is remarkable that in the same region and during the same time, the federal presence in two neighboring territories could be at once unstoppable and passive. The loyalty of Montana was no less critical to the territorial integrity of the United States than any other, and perhaps more so, given Montana‟s proximity to the border with Canada and the penchant of the two populations to intermingle. Governor Benjamin Potts of

Montana warned Washington of a more direct threat coming from this cross-border traffic, as disgruntled Indians had managed to circumvent the American prohibition of buying arms by crossing the 49th parallel and purchasing not only small arms, but cannon as well.110 Yet, while the population of Montana contained large elements that sympathized with the Confederate separatist movement, its population was able to secure

107 Letter, Church to Honey, 18 March 1887, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 108 Letter, Church to Burk, 10 May 1887, Ibid. See also Eblen, 205. 109 Letter, Potts to Legislative Assembly, 20 February 1879, Ibid. 110 Letter, Potts to Rodgers, 10 July 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 94 the dismissal of unpopular territorial governors and maintain virtually unchecked social autonomy. The Mormons of Utah, by contrast, found their distinctive culture and social structure ever more constricted by the federal government until the most distinctive elements were eliminated.

Contributing to this territorial autonomy was a tremendous amount of federal bureaucratic diffusion regarding the administration of the territories. While Indian affairs and the business of territorial officers was divided both through the State and Interior

Departments until 1873 (when Interior acquired sole nominal authority), a myriad of other territorial functions were parceled out among various cabinet-level agencies.111

Governors appointed notaries, but the appointments of justices and their conduct fell under the Justice Department. Officer salaries and the financial accounts of the territories were under the dominion of the Treasury Department, while the soldiers governors frequently relied upon in case of Indian raids were under the jurisdiction of the War

Department.112

Carl Schurz, a former Civil War general, was arguably one of most active Interior

Secretaries in terms of consolidating control over the territories from other agencies, to the point where it was said that “[a]s to the territories, Mr. Hayes‟ Secretary of the

Interior was to all intents and purposes the President of the United States.”113 Yet even as

Interior Secretary, Schurz was unable to rationalize the various agencies and organizations within his domain.114 The division of powers had grown so diffuse by

111 Pomeroy. 6-12. There was an additional, overlapping office of Indian Affairs in the War Department that dealt with responding to military threats from Indian tribes. The State and War Department offices were combined under Interior in 1849. 112 Eblen, 48. 113 Letter, Swan to Arthur, rec‟d 11 April 1882, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, NARA, 169. 114 Pomeroy, 27. 95

1887 that the acting governor of Dakota was forced to beg the War Department to aid flood victims along the Missouri River, as the dispatch of such aid fell outside his authority as an officer of the Interior Department.115

A good deal of this inability to reform came from bureaucratic inertia.

Cooperation between the Interior and War Departments was common, with the military frequently supporting the necessary civilian surveys of distant territories with men, materiel, and crucially, funding.116 Treasury and Interior tended to keep their distance from one another, with Interior frequently ignorant of territorial finances and possessing no ability to reimburse agents for travel or communication costs.117 Treasury was equally unaware of the appointment or termination of territorial officers; in many instances, the first notice the department would receive of a new appointment was a request for an officer‟s salary.118 The Justice Department‟s attitude can be adequately summarized in which territorial matters were characterized as “of purely local concern, in which the

General Government is not interested...”119

If the Territories suffered from powers being vested in too many sources, their governors faced the opposite problem. Until 1873, when responsibility for Indian affairs was permanently assigned to a separate bureau, several governors served as both the chief executive of the territory and superintendent of Indian affairs, in addition to a myriad of

115 Letter, McCormack to Secretary Endicott, 4 April 1887, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 116 William H. Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire :The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West (Knopf: New York, 1966), 425. 117 Pomeroy, 26. 118 Letter, Lawrence to Schurz, 18 November 1880, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, NARA, 168. 119 Letter, Williams to Cowen, 8 October 1874, as cited in Pomeroy, 25. 96 other tasks.120 Territorial residents also viewed the governor as a catch-all authority for petitions, writing the governor for all manner of requests, from explanations of vetoes to requests for divorces.121

The dual duties of the territorial chief executive and Indian superintendent were conceived, as were many policies that became unpopular within the Interior Department, as a cost-saving measure. Indian affairs were easily the most pressing concern of both territorial governors and Congressional committees, and the union of the two positions was rooted in both practicality (to lessen the potential conflict between two officers) and in tradition, having been crafted in 1787.122 Viewed from Washington, the other executive duties of the governor were of little concern. With the territories already enjoying limited self-government, several with elected assemblies, and the Justice

Department handling the disposition of judges and magistrates, there was no visible reason why governors could not devote the bulk of their time to Indian concerns.123

Settler Autonomy and Indian Affairs

Nowhere was the dependence of territorial governors upon settler opinion more obviously on display than in the realm of Indian Affairs. Even after the duties of Indian superintendent had been removed from the governor‟s formal portfolio, he was still officially responsible for both the safety of territorial residents and the well-being of

120 Eblen, 239. 121 Letters, March – May 1887, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. Specifically, Goodner to Randall, (1 March 1887) and Church to Honey (18 March 1887). 122 Pomeroy, 16-17. 123 Congressional Globe, (40th Congress, 2nd Session) 2800-1. 97

Indians on reservations.124 A political Gordian knot quickly emerged, as the popular will in the territories was consistently in direct opposition to the well-being of the Indians.

Governors were thus trapped between an official mandate to rein in their citizens and the utter inability to effectively do so; deprived of official government support, the only recourse was to call in the Army, an action that was certain to spark a demand for his removal.125

Land was, of course, the pivotal issue. Control over land policy became a matter of paramount importance for territorial legislatures, particularly as public land outside of

Indian reservations disappeared.126 In a memorial to Congress, the Dakota legislature in

1867 argued that the smaller Indian reservations be scrapped and all tribes moved to a larger parcel in the western part of the territory. That way, the gold-rich Black Hills region would lie outside this new reservation. The same memorial petitioned Congress to give the territories the right to govern Indian affairs, effectively abolishing the Bureau of

Indian Affairs. Special criticism was heaped upon the agents of the Bureau, described as

“destitute of every principle of honesty (and) morality.” As for the prospect of the Army taking over Indian affairs once more, the legislators were adamant: “the men of the Army are not the men to lead the Indians from a savage life to a pastoral, agricultural, and civilized life.”127

Ever adept at conforming to changing political moods, Governor Potts made certain to point out that troubles with Indians in Montana were clearly due to the

124 Eblen, 257. 125 Ibid., 265. 126 Dakota Governor‟s Report, 1885, Ibid., 12-13. 127 40th Congress, Memorial of the Dakota Legislative Assembly, 30 December 1867, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA. The exact words of the memorial, disingenuous at best considering how long the region had been inhabited, were, “While this country [the Black Hills] is indispensable to the future growth and of the entire northwest it is of no particular value to the Indians.” 98 ineptitude of Indian agents, rather than any provocation of the territory‟s settlers. During an incursion of Bannock Indians into western Montana, he blamed the local Indian agent‟s supposed failure to deliver supplies and hear Indian grievances for the outbreak of hostilities. Potts‟ solution, far from discouraging white squatting on Indian land, was to ensure that “some competent person” was sent from Washington to manage Indian supplies and sentiment responsibly.128

In truth, despite an increasing emphasis on the professionalization of the Bureau, most Indian agents were simply ineffective rather than corrupt.129 Their job was to assist in the assimilation of the Indians into American culture and society, in short, to facilitate their subscription to the national identity. Instructions from the Interior Secretary spelled out the most important duties of Indian agents: to ensure the transition to a pastoral way of life and to set an example of proper moral character.130 Notably, the correspondence between the Interior Department and their agents indicated, at the very least, a good faith effort to care for the interest of the Indians. Charges of corruption or ill conduct were rapidly (for the standards of the day) investigated and reported, illegal trading or supply theft prosecuted, and all agents were required to submit frequent reports on conditions and expenditures.131 Of the thirty-eight ordered inspections in 1881, the same year the

Bureau suspended operations for three months due to financial insolvency, thirteen were

128 Letter, Potts to Schurz, 25 July 1878, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 129 Alexander, 168 and 180. 130 Letter, Kirkwood to Howard, 6 July 1881, RG 48, Press Copies of Letters/Telegrams sent to Indian Inspectors, NARA. 131 Letters, Schurz to Pollack, 13 April 1880, Schurz to Haworth, 24 April 1880, Schurz to McNiel, 18 June 1880, and 10 February 1881, and Kirkwood to Pollack, 11 October 1881, Ibid. 99 urgent calls to respond to allegations of malfeasance, indicating strong efforts were made to stamp out fraud within the department.132

As the century progressed, new innovations were brought to bear on the task of cultural integration. The advent of telegraph and railroad enabled a greater degree of federal control over their far-flung agents, while a new emphasis on irrigation methods and universal education offered the possibility of integrating Indians into American society. By this time, the reservation system had transformed into an end unto itself; rather than being a temporary safe haven to grant Indians time to learn how to become proper Americans, reservations were a convenient holding pen into which an alien population would be placed.133

This was done despite the observations of territorial officials that the reservation system was ultimately self-defeating. If the objective was to acculturate Indians into

American society and to promote subscription to the national identity, then it made little sense to keep the Indians utterly segregated from contact with other Americans.134 The

Dawes Severalty Act, which was passed over the objections of many territorial officers, including Senator and former Interior Secretary Henry Moore Teller, hoped to assimilate

Indians into American society by breaking up tribal lands and promoting single family farms.135 These criticisms proved prophetic; the effort not only failed to end the

132 This figure does not include routine inspections that were part of the expected duties of Indian agents. Judging from the amount of travel these agents undertook, it appears that the amount of time they spent in a posted office was minimal. 133 Alexander, 180. 134 Governor‟s Report for Dakota, 1885, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA, 12. See also Alexander, 181. 135 Eblen, 11. Teller‟s familiarity and sympathy for western policies would eventually lead him to abandon the Republican party in 1896 over the issue of bimetallism. 100 reservation system but also led to additional land losses, widespread hunger, and poverty among the Indians.

The severalty effort was doomed far more by the ecological conditions of the Far

West rather than by any fundamental flaws in the policy itself. Farming simply was not a viable means of self-sufficiency there. Irrigation was a constant problem, so much so that

Henry Moore Teller had advocated promoting ranching as an alternative to the farming of individual plots.136 These conditions were hardly unknown to white settlers; after all,

Montana, a territory whose eastern half lay in the Great Plains and western half lived an isolated existence in the Rockies, had an economy based on the twin pursuits of mineral extraction and livestock ranching.137 Despite this, the program went forward, resulting in plots that were too small to farm effectively or failed due to lack of water.138

The underlying cause for this policy failure lay in the fundamental difference between the reality of the frontier and its perception by the organs of state.

Policymakers, particularly in the Senate Territorial Committee, based their decisions upon conditions they were familiar with, generally the wetter, pastoral climates of the

Midwest and Eastern Seaboard.139 These views went unchallenged largely because the policies, however detrimental to the Indians, conformed to the general desires of western settlers, which was to break up the large tribal lands into smaller plots, leaving more desirable land for White settlement.140 Arizona delegate Mark Smith repeatedly decried

136 Alexander, 102. 137 Clinch, 12 138 Letter, Noble to Commissioner, 12 July 1890, RG 48, Press Copies of Letters/Telegrams sent to Indian Inspectors, NARA. 139 Alexander, 176. 140 Governor‟s Report for Dakota, 1885, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA, 13. John Pennington, governor of Dakota, went so far as to boast of this land as an attraction for 101 the ignorance of Eastern politicians to Western realities, arguing that it did little good to transform Indians into Ohio farmers when they were living in Arizona.141

Whiteness Matters

The fixation on assimilating Native Americans highlighted the key element of the federal policy toward territorial integration. Education systems, the Bureau of Indian

Affairs, and law enforcement were engaged in a massive program to ensure that the West, culturally, became a seamless part of the exiting American national identity. Frank Van

Nuys described the process as the efforts of the government “through its organized channels…[to] Americanize the West when larger processes of national integration are concerned.”142

In practice, this meant that Whiteness mattered. The ultimate purpose of

Americanization was to force alien cultural groups to adopt the largely European-derived,

Protestant, pastoral cultural norms that were defined as the American identity. Even as the Americanization process moved forward, the racial factor dominated virtually all other aspects of cultural assimilation. When one teacher sought to reassure a student that there was little difference between English and Spanish, a young Latina student observed,

“but our skin is different.”143 Adopting the national identity meant adopting the culture, society, and habits of transplanted whites from the East.

more immigration to the territory. Letter, Pennington to La Drie, 30 July 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 141 Alexander, 165. 142 Van Nuys, 195. 143 Ibid., 191. 102

The history of relations with Native Americans demonstrates how their culture was perceived as a threat to national unity. During the early republic, Indian tribes were viewed as “domestic dependent nations,” leading the government to place administration of western territories nominally under the jurisdiction of the State Department; by the middle of the nineteenth century, however, attitudes had changed.144 With the acquisition of territory spanning the continent, there was no longer a far western boundary to which to remove Indian tribes. Indians lost their status as sovereign (if dependent) powers; they were “wards of the Government,” and as such, had to be governed by some federal authority.145 By 1849, responsibility for Indian Affairs, the single most important function of western administration from the perspective of the government, passed from the War Department to the Interior Department.146 These alien populations had passed from being an external, purely military, concern to an internal one.

A telling example of how far the status of Indians had fallen by the latter half of the century can be found in the case of Sergeant Samuel B. Hanway, who in 1873 hired a lawyer to petition the War Department for back pay owed him during his time in the

Indiana Home Guards. Of mixed Indian and European ancestry, Hanway‟s claim soon became enmeshed in a legal debate over whether or not he was an Indian or not. If he was, as the war department claimed, “this office will recognize no power of attorney, filed by attorneys claiming to act in behalf of Indian claimants for arrears of pay and bounty.”147 Any Indian seeking pay owed would have to pursue that claim through the

144 Pomeroy, 5. 145 Letter, French to Bowles, 11 June 1873, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Letters Received from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, NARA. 146 Eblen, 58-59. 147 Letter, French to Bowles, 11 June 1873, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Letters Received from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, NARA. 103

Bureau of Indian Affairs, rather than the War Department.148 This prompted his outraged lawyer to respond with a stunning indictment of the status of Indians in the United States:

“My client – Hanway - is not an Indian, but a white man, endowed with all the rights of an American citizen.”149

Religion played an equally large role in determining how the federal government perceived the loyalty of its frontier populations. Montana‟s Jewish population, while always a minority, was a crucial part of the merchant class in the territory. Largely hailing from Germany and Poland, these settlers faced the sort of casual prejudice that allowed Protestant society to register its disapproval while permitting the Jews of

Montana to continue doing business.150 Chief among these restrictions was the widespread practice within the financial industry of either denying loans to Jewish businesses outright, or charging much higher interest rates.151 The justification for this practice was that Jews were considered bad credit risks, ironic given the prevalent stereotype of the miserly moneylender that was applied to Jews universally.

Despite ethnic and religious prejudice, the Jews of Montana were not excluded from daily life nor faced persecution on a level that Native or black Americans did. In part, this is due to their fairly low population; in 1868, the Jewish population of Helena was only 78 out of a population of just under 7500.152 More salient to the issue of cultural integration was that regardless of their distinctive religious practices, the Jews

148 Letter, Commissioner Smith to Bowles, 5 July 1873, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Letters Received from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, NARA. 149 Letter, Bowles to Secretary Delano, 8 July 1873, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Letters Received from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, NARA. 150 Delores J. Morrow, “Jewish Merchants and the Commercial Emporium of Montana,” in Rex C. Myers and Harry W. Fritz, eds., Montana and the West (Boulder: Pruett Publishing Company, 1984), 19. 151 Ibid., 28-9. 152 Ibid., 30. 104 embraced the American identity as a facet of their own. Outside of religious services, for the typical Montana settler, there was little to distinguish between a Jewish pioneer and a

Christian. Further, Jewish merchants provided the vital services of retail trade, exchanging gold for coin, and extending credit, particularly to those who were denied loans from larger institutions.153 Through the development of more stable financial and commercial institutions, the merchant class helped midwife mining camps like Helena into full-fledged towns and cities.

Other religious groups fostered cultural institutions that directly challenged the

American national identity. In Utah, the federal government employed virtually all its agencies in a continual campaign against the Mormon Church, which government officials viewed as “disloyal and traitorous to the core.”154 By establishing what amounted to a theocratic state along the main route to California, the Mormons presented to the United States a perceived territorial and cultural threat to the integrity of the state.

Leaving aside such practices such as polygamy, the very institutional structure of Utah was radically different from the accepted form of admitted states. The very ideas of secular government, public education, and an independent judiciary were abandoned, while land was not parceled out to individual families but rather held in common or in trust to the church.155 From a perspective of cultural integration, the Church of Latter-

Day Saints (LDS) was as divergent from the dominant American cultural identity as neighboring Indian tribes.

153 Ibid., 18. 154 Letter, Connor to Drum, 21 July 1864, cited in Lamar, 313. 155 Lamar, 352. The Mormons referred to Utah as Deseret, and throughout the nineteenth century ran what amounted to a shadow government in the Territory. 105

The federal government applied the policies of Reconstruction toward breaking the power of the LDS. Military units were assigned to police the Territory and prevent armed insurrection while the battle over polygamy moved from the executive to the judicial branch of government. Congress repeatedly sought to break up communal land ownership and introduce a land office, while also establishing a public school system to compete with religious education. Most tellingly, more mining interests were encouraged to move to Utah. This not only brought in large numbers of Gentiles to the territory, but mining communities proved extremely resistant to the Mormon ideal of communal property.156

Ultimately, it was the issue of cultural identity that separated the fates of Jews and

Mormons. Jewish Montanans openly subscribed to the national identity, despite being frequently ignored by their neighbors. There was no thought of abolishing private property, or referring business affairs to religious authorities in Jewish communities. As far as they were able, Jewish settlers participated in the social and cultural life of their communities, whereas the Mormons repeatedly practiced social segregation.157 By rejecting the national identity outright, the Mormons assured that the federal government would perceive them as a direct threat, and therefore would be satisfied with nothing less than the assimilation or elimination of Mormonism.

Montana‟s Jews depended upon informal social institutions to bypass those cultural barriers to full participation in frontier life. Utilizing family connections in addition to relationships with coreligionists across the country, Jewish merchants were able to construct financial and social support networks that operated independently of

156 Ibid., 313-324. 157 Morrow, 30. 106 established organizations. These relationships not only provided financial support in case of natural catastrophe or simple business failure, but it provided capital that was immediately invested in local communities and new industries. By the 1880s, the Jewish merchant class was investing heavily in the ranching industry, and had procured large amounts of grazing land in eastern Montana.158

Informal social institutions were also ubiquitous in the mining camps, particularly among ethnic minorities that faced persecution or censure. In part, this was to provide some kind of reliable social support network in an age when public assistance with utterly unknown. The realities of life in mining communities, however, made these informal networks a necessity. Mining companies designed their settlements to be temporary, functional for only as long as wealth could be extracted from the ground, leaving to a dearth of cultural and social institutions. This lack of “social glue” compelled most residents to create their own social infrastructure to cope with economic and community instability.159

Nor were these informal institutions unique to mining communities. On the ranching frontier, isolation and the weakness of territorial authorities compelled cattlemen to form stockmen‟s associations in lieu of state protection and support. These associations quickly assumed many of the duties and powers of government authorities, including protection for Indian attacks, prairie fires, veterinary services, as well as drawing up laws and regulations governing the use of water and public lands.160 The fact that these associations created Vigilance Committees to mete out frontier justice to bands

158 Ibid., 30. 159 Hyde, 101. 160 Hamilton, 404. 107 of rustlers is a clear sign of how isolated from the state these ranchers were. Association members even patrolled the border with Canada and coordinated actions with the North

West Mounted Police.161 An institutional kinship existed between the associations and the Mounted Police, for both exercised virtually identical functions, with one key difference: whereas the stockman‟s association was a product of collective settler initiative, the Mounted Police were a powerful and well-equipped organ of the state.

Granville Stuart provided a vivid illustration of the reason for the creation of the stockman‟s association. “There were conditions facing the stock growers that called for serious consideration anyone which if not controlled, threatened the very life of the industry…[The experienced cattle men] gathered the stock laws of our western states and territories and the rules and regulations of other associations and from these were culled and arranged, by a committee of experts, assisted by counsel, such parts as suited our locality and circumstances, and gave the best satisfaction when in force…it was apparent to the most casual observer that there must be the closest cooperation between the companies if we were to succeed, and what benefited one, must benefit all. From this time on, the entire range business was under the Montana Stock Grower‟s Association and the business run as one big outfit.”162

The creation of populist organizations was influenced by the ethnic makeup of the ranching frontier. Many of the Scandinavian immigrants to Montana, having learned their trade in a culture of communal effort, spearheaded organizations such as the

Nonpartisan League, which drove the creation of state banks and public grain elevators in

161 Ibid., 404. The stockman‟s association became such an institution that provisions for their support with tax levies was written into the Montana constitution. 162 Phillips, 176-7. 108 the northern Plains.163 This movement built upon the legacy of the Populist Party, which had been particularly strong in the region. With the dawn of the Progressive Movement, the League would champion such causes as increasing taxes on Eastern capital in the form of railroads, utilities, and banks, while making tax exceptions for farms and ranches.164

Immigration patterns, political affiliations, and above all environmental factors combined to create a distinct culture in Montana, both clearly subscribing to the dominant

American identity yet remaining specific to the region. Unlike the societies of Native

Americans or Mormons, this regional identity was tolerated because the inhabitants were seen as both compatible with the dominant American identity and considered themselves part of the greater American nation. These settlers were overwhelmingly white,

Protestant, and immigrants from the national core; the fact that they had adopted a regional identity within the greater national one therefore was not a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Regional identities, provided they did not displace the national identity, were accepted as part of the process of territorial integration.

A Hybrid Society

The West throughout the process of integration became a hybrid culture. Its predominant culture mores, standards, and habits were transplanted directly from the

East, while the environment and economy of the West changed and molded them to suit different circumstances. Under these conditions, it is only natural to assume that the form

163 Shortridge, “Expectations,” 122. 164 Ibid., 122. 109 and function of territorial government would change as well, both to meet the physical needs of the frontier as well as the demands of the settler populace.

It is difficult to imagine a greater divergence between the perspective of lawmakers and those of the governors themselves. Given the distances between frontier communities, the governor‟s dual role necessarily meant a great deal of time away from his office in the capital, leaving the administration of the territory to the territorial secretary. In the words of one beleaguered governor, “[To attempt to combine the two functions] is futile, or rather involves the sacrifice of one class of duties to the other.” In an age when absenteeism was a chronic problem and leaves had to be approved from the

Interior Secretary on a case-by-case basis, this was no small concern.165

Conflicts of interest were another serious concern. The twin duties called upon the governor to both provide for the welfare of the Indians under his jurisdiction and carry out the desires of territorial settlers. Indeed, this frequently irreconcilable conflict would lead to the dismissal of a number of governors as the century wore on.166

A vivid example of what Lauren Benton referred to as the „hybrid‟ nature of colonial legal systems can be found in the pardons issued by territorial governors in their role as chief law enforcement officer. Unlike the settled and incorporated states of the

American East, living conditions and the relative paucity of state officials in the West necessitated modification to customary crimes and legal consequences. Between 1877 and 1879, Governor Benjamin Potts pardoned or modified the sentences of eight individuals in the Montana Territory. Three men were pardoned with no preconditions, for crimes of forgery, petit larceny, and assault. Another three were pardoned upon

165 Pomeroy, 9 and 16. 166 Eblen, 257. 110 condition of sobriety, for forgery, assault, and second-degree murder.167 Of these, John

Kaveney (forgery) was pardoned due to his status as sole provider for his family; another,

Christian Humphreys (assault), was pardoned after 200 townspeople petitioned Potts, including the wife he had assaulted while drunk.168 The punishments meted out to those convicted of more serious crimes also speaks to both the lack of state facilities and the need to placate public sentiment. Two men, S. J. Perkins and James Thompson, were convicted of assault with intent to murder when Potts commuted their sentence from death to exile from Montana.169 While the reasons for the modified sentence are not spelled out in Potts‟ address, evidence suggests placating the sentiments of the citizenry was considered a greater service to law and order than carrying out the full letter of the law.

Records of the Interior, War, and Treasury departments show a government struggling to gain a cohesive view of its own territories. The federal government‟s dependence upon settler cooperation and consent frequently led it to disregard or countermand the recommendations of its own officials in the name of facilitating further settlement. Policies decided upon at the country‟s founding would continue to guide expansion long after the conditions those policies were predicated upon had evaporated.

The Congressional attitude of „benign neglect‟ held sway, outside of a few select instances, largely due to the effect it had on regional loyalty; settlers with broad autonomy within their own territory imported the political and cultural infrastructure of

167 Address, Potts to Legislative Assembly, 3 Febraury 1879, Ibid. 168 Pardon of Christian Humphreys, 28 February 1877, Ibid. 169 Address, Potts to Legislative Assembly, 3 February 1879, Ibid. 111 the national core, in essence transplanting the national identity further west.170 Regional differences within the national identity, then, were both recognized and tolerated within a flexible legal framework that eased the transition between territory and statehood.171

The success of the Montana Democrats is proof of this tolerance. Certainly a large number of Democrats, who with the exception of Grover Cleveland‟s two terms as president (1885-9 and 1893-7) found themselves as a perpetual minority in government for nearly half a century, had cut began their life in Montana as either active secessionists or Confederate sympathizers. By accepting the American national identity and working within the provided legal framework, however, they were able to exercise tremendous power over political appointees from Washington. Moreover, the policies of Montana

Democrats quickly overrode fears of treason or secession, as they repeatedly dominated the Montana territorial legislature. As historian Clark Spence argued, the protests over perceived gubernatorial high-handedness and indifference were “too broad and too often cut across party lines to be shrugged off as mere partisan politics.”172 In short, the former

Confederates and their allies traded their secessionist identity for a regional, Western one, and so doing gained both legitimacy and autonomy, provided they gave their loyalty to the United States.

The first frontier therefore prospered at the expense of the second, the frontier whose societies and cultures fell too far outside the boundaries of the American identity.

170 Eblen, 318. For example, upon reaching territorial status, Montanans established a bicameral legislature which would assume legislative powers derivative of those possessed by Congress. The fact that so many Montanans elected legislators from the opposition Democratic party (as the Republicans dominated national politics during much of the late nineteenth century) without federal interference is evidence of considerable domestic autonomy. See also Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 1864-89 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). 171 Pomeroy, 98. 172 Spence, “Territorial Officers”, 124. 112

While those boundaries waxed and waned over time, reaching their most narrow in the late 1800s, the inhabitants of this frontier confronted a much more unified and hostile federal presence. By the end of the nineteenth century, these societies were brought into relative conformity with the dominant culture of the United States, or in the case of the theocratic state of Deseret in Utah, broken beyond cohesion.

Yet it should be noted this assault on dissenting identities was not the result of specific policy; indeed, no single policy governed any aspect of Western settlement. It was, instead, the tradition of settlement and the political conventions that evolved to accommodate it. This approach led the government to allow one group of settlers to establish the benchmarks for cultural loyalty to the state, and demand all others assimilate or vacate. And while the American government refused (and in some cases was politically incapable) of countermanding the demands of its settlers, it was not so in

Canada. In comparing the two nations, the historian James Shortridge argued that with regard to their respective frontiers, “differing national purposes over the decades have created distinct cultures.”173 The history and political imperatives facing Canada in the late nineteenth century would lead their federal government to take a far different and far more directed approach to integrating its western possessions.

173 Shortridge, “Expectations,” 116. 113

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLANNED FRONTIER OF CANADA, 1867-1912

Rarely in history do two events, occurring almost simultaneously and in utter isolation from one another, so radically define the policy decisions of a single country.

For Canada, the last week of March in 1867 was a period in which tremendous promise and peril surfaced within the span of a single day. On the 29th, the British North America

Act received royal assent, formally granting Canada self-administration over its territory.

None could have been more pleased that John A. Macdonald, one of the political parents of Confederation, who had a vision of an enlarged and unified country, a separate political entity that would stand as an equal in North America to the United States of

America.1

The very next day, however, the United States announced the conclusion of a treaty that would cede all Russian territory in North America, what would become

Alaska, to the United States for $7.2 million.2 Euphoria among Canadian leaders immediately gave way to a state of grave concern. Canada‟s western possessions were now encircled by American territory, giving rise to fears of eventual annexation by the

United States. The loss of the west would not only deprive Canada of a Pacific port and its attendant resources, restricting its commerce to the Atlantic and the United States, but would also imperil the security of the Prairie regions and potentially the rest of Canada as well. The notion of American annexation was not confined to alarmists, as the fate of

Texas lingered in the minds of many as a cautionary tale.

1 Friesen, 171. 2 Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 93.

114

The history of relations between the United States and Canada was no more reassuring. During the American Civil War, numerous commentaries from both media sources as well as government officials (notably Secretary of State Seward), indicated sentiment toward the annexation of the western regions of British North America into the

United States.3 While in some instances these sentiments were exaggerated, or at the least confined to economic terminology, there were considerable instances of genuine expansionist sentiment. Seward himself repeatedly made reference to the eventual union of North America under the American republic, while newspapers presaged the sale of

Alaska as a natural outcome of American political growth.4 Even President Lincoln‟s statement about the Civil War being one against „unnatural borders,‟ a phrase aimed at the Confederacy, was interpreted by Canadian lawmakers as a veiled prediction of

American territorial designs further north.5

Canada‟s traditional protector in the face of American aggression, both real and threatened, had been the mother country, Great Britain. There were ample signs in 1867 that the British commitment to Canadian security was eroding. The devolution of political power to Ottawa, even if only over internal affairs, had led the British military to reduce its presence in North America at the same time American military strength was at its apogee. Most ominous of all, Britain had briefly entertained the possibility of ceding

British Columbia to the United States outright. While it was completing the sale of

Alaska, the United States was negotiating reparations with Britain (who had allowed

Confederate warships to be constructed on British soil during the Civil War) and had

3 Winks, 34. 4 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, vol. III (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), 346. 5 Winks, 82.

115 suggested that the handover of British Columbia as an adequate settlement. In the end, it had been the concerns of the Royal Navy and its need for its base at Esquimalt, and not its concern for Canadian territorial integrity, that had scuttled the deal.6 These incidents convinced Macdonald and other members of his nascent government that the west had to be politically, economically, and culturally welded to the rest of Canada if the country‟s independence was to be maintained.

The Canadian west in particular was viewed as crucial for a number of reasons.

First and foremost, it was a vulnerable resource frontier with tremendous potential in terms of natural wealth for an expanding state. Commercially, the west also promised a

Pacific port to bring in trade with China, the Indies, and the other British territories of the

Pacific. Without the west, Canada would be confined to the northeast quadrant of North

America, and in all likelihood, become an economic appendage of the United States. The

Prairies were described by Conservative politicians as “our great gold mine” and thus were critical to the economic and political survival of Canada.7 Before it could be utilized to forge a Canadian nation, however, the problems of connecting the far-flung frontier communities with the national core had to be resolved.

The importance of routes of transportation and communication in Canadian historiography is more evidence of the omnipresent force of nature in the settlement of the frontier. It would be this emphasis that gave rise to the Metropolitan school, a theory of development that would become as iconic in the Canadian field as Turner‟s theory was to the Americans. Most directly stated in Donald Masters‟ Rise of Toronto, the basis of

6 Barman, 94. 7 John A Eagle, The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Development of Western Canada, 1896-1914 (Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 1989), 69.

116 the Metropolitan theory lies in the inordinate power wielded by cities over the attendant countryside.8 J.M.S. Careless became the most visible and vocal proponent of

Metropolitanism, arguing that Canadian society was dependent upon urban centers due to the sparseness of its population and the sheer size of its territory.9

Careless himself described the Metropolitan theory in less than idealistic terms.

Writing in 1954, he declared, “The metropolitan relationship is…an almost feudal chain of vassalage.”10 Subsequent regional histories of the prairies have supported Careless‟

Metropolitan theory, in part because the growth and function of cities fit the Canadian pattern of settlement far better than Turner‟s frontier theory.11 With the rapid growth of

Canadian regional history beginning in the 1970s, the Metropolitan school assumed the status of theory de rigueur. Work focusing on local institutions, such as farming cooperatives and the advance of the social gospel, noted the influence of nearby cities on these institutions. The work of David Breen, Patrick Dunae, and Cecelia Danysk all note this phenomenon even in research looking beyond city life in the Prairies. Ian

MacPherson and John Thompson‟s study of farm-based economic methods, in particular, noted the partiality of metropolitan-based institutions even in rural environments.

Among those championing a reevaluation of the importance of rural communities are Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen, whose seminal Canadian Prairies remains a cornerstone of studies on the prairie region. Notable for focusing his research on ethnic populations and social class, Friesen distributed his research equally among urban and

8 Donald C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto, 1850-1890, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947). 9 J.M.S. Careless, “Aspects of Urban Life in the West,” in The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History, ed. Gilbert Arthur Stelter and Alan F. J. Artibise (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1979), 125-41. 10 J.M.S. Careless, “Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 35 (Mar. 1954), 17. 11 Mikesell, 69.

117 rural settlements.12 An important contribution of Friesen‟s work is the emphasis on social class and economics, illustrating the tensions between capitalist speculators and rural cooperatives, as well as exploring the importance of social class and mobility in what Turner imagined would be a classless, egalitarian frontier.13

Canadian scholars in the main have devoted a great of deal time and energy into exploring the impact of social class on frontier society. This, in many ways, is an outgrowth of the surge in local histories that has marked the past twenty years of Prairie historiography. Paul Voisey and Lyle Dick have both explored the formation of rural communities in Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively, and have come to two different conclusions. Voisey, studying Vulcan, Alberta, draws upon the Metropolitan school and a study of environmental determinism; he cites the expense of labor (as the Prairies were perennially short of manpower) as a chief motivation for an adoption of capitalism in rural communities otherwise prone to communal action.14

Where Voisey, presents a frontier replete with cooperation across faint class lines, however, Dick narrates a frontier that is far more impermeable to class divisions. In his analysis of Abernethy, Saskatchewan, Dick suggests that cities acted as conduits that

„transplanted‟ the Calvinist values of capitalism to the frontier.15 In Dick‟s analysis, the social conventions and institutions brought to the frontier reinforced, rather than eliminated, class lines. Other scholars that have studied the adoption of capitalist

12 Friesen, 283. 13 Ibid., 311. 14 Paul Voisey, Vulcan: The Making of a Prairie Community (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 24. 15 Lyle Dick, Farmers Making Good: The Development of Abernethy District, Saskatchewan, 1880-1920 (Ottawa: Canadian Park Service, 1989), ch. 4.

118 institutions in the frontier include Donald Loveridge and Allan Kulikoff; yet even in these portraits of rural life, cities function as the engine of social transformation.16

The importance of prairie cities lends a great deal of validity to the Metropolitan thesis, particularly given how central urban centers like Winnipeg were to the settlement of the region. Serving as major transportation hubs, cities functioned as gathering points for supplies, information, as well as immigrants from central Canada and abroad.

However, cities were only one component of the transmission of cultural constructs and social customs. The institutions of the frontier, those organizations and structures that promoted survival and prosperity in peripheral communities, exerted an influence at least as strong as those of cities. In that capacity, the North West Mounted Police would serve as a driving force.

First Efforts at Unification

If the fears of economic servitude were not sobering enough, neither were the fears of American annexation the anxious imaginings of pessimists. Officials within the

U.S. State Department had already argued that the purchase of Alaska alone could very well induce British Columbia into joining the United States, while plans had also been circulated to purchase the Hudson‟s Bay Company from Britain prior to the end of the

Civil War.17 Before the war had been concluded, those in Washington contemplating the possibility of southern secession were pressing a “compensation” plan, under which the

16 Allan Kulikoff, “The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 46 (Jan. 1989), 120-43. 17 Winks, 160-5.

119

Union would adapt to the loss of its southern territories by forging a union with Canada, either by purchasing the territory from Britain or a combination of political and economic pressure.18 Even as late as 1901, cabinet officials and high-ranking party leaders remained concerned about the loyalty of Canada‟s border regions, with reports that

Alberta miners were planning a popular plebiscite to invite American annexation.19

Prime Minister Macdonald was well aware that London‟s torpid response to

American expansion had cost the empire the Oregon territory; he could well imagine that any delay in securing the west could result in the loss of all Canada.20 With this in mind,

Macdonald drafted a policy that would extend state control over its new hinterland and tie it to central Canada (the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). Economically, its primary goal was to replace the north-south trade between western settlements and the United

States with an east-west trade that would strengthen the Canadian economy. The key to the enterprise was to persuade British Columbia to join the Confederation, a plan made easier when Britain ceded the Hudson‟s Bay Company territory to Ottawa, as it gave the

Canadian government de jure control over the land to the border with British Columbia.

Despite London‟s blessing, the union with Canada was far from a forgone conclusion. Many in British Columbia had had little contact with Canada, as most trade was either with Britain proper or, more usually, south with the United States. There were strong cultural links with the United States as well; baseball was more commonly played than cricket, the dollar existed alongside the pound sterling, and the Fourth of July

18 Ibid., 29. 19 Journal Entry 23, November 1901. Papers of John Elliot Gilbert, Fourth Earl of Minto, vol. 2., National Archives of Canada (hereinafter referred to as NAC). 20 Morton, Prairie Society, 6.

120 observed as a holiday.21 By the time Macdonald‟s government was able to begin negotiating with the colonial government in earnest, it was reported that a petition had been prepared among several prominent citizens asking the American Congress to formally annex British Columbia.22 The Canadian offer was a generous one, promising the assumption of colonial debt, the immediate implementation of responsible government, and most importantly, a rail link between the new province and central

Canada. British Columbia agreed, and none too soon. In 1871, the same year it joined the Confederation, Britain formalized the border between Canada and the United States and withdrew the last units of its army from North America, leaving Canada militarily to its own devices.

In order to maintain geographic and political cohesion over its vast and largely empty possessions, Macdonald and his allies crafted a program of public works, economic policies, and institutional reforms. Revealingly referred to as the National

Plan, its purpose was to create economic and infrastructure bonds to keep the west from falling into the political orbit of the United States, while creating state institutions to oversee the orderly settlement of these regions by a population loyal to the Canadian state.23 Two institutions in particular were key to Macdonald‟s program; a railway to unite the territory geographically, promote intra-Canadian trade, and allow facilitate access to British Columbia, and a paramilitary force to keep public order, discourage illicit trade between the west and the United States, and establish a state presence in the frontier. Thus, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the force that would become the North

21 Barman, 94. 22 Ibid., 96. 23 Winks, 337.

121

West Mounted Police became the two institutional keys to Macdonald‟s program, intended to be the respective economic carrot and political stick of the Canadian government in the west.

The Canadian Pacific Railway was conceived as the centerpiece project of

Macdonald and his Conservative Party. While private enterprise (and more specifically, private capital) was integral to the creation of the railway, the impetus for its construction came not from rural prairie communities, but from the Ottawa government.24 Moreover, the main target of the railway‟s benefit, outside of its own boardrooms, was not the welfare of the frontier provinces but rather the economic and security needs of central

Canada.25 While nominally a private enterprise, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company was the equivalent of a contracted agent for the Canadian government, giving the state a much more powerful voice in the railway than existed in the American experience. It is testimony to the remoteness of the Canadian frontier that both the CPR and the Mounties would quickly assume state duties that expanded well beyond the intended function of both institutions.

The one region beyond central Canada that enthusiastically supported the CPR was British Columbia, the main beneficiary of the line. During the latter 1800s, it was said that “everything in Vancouver was CPR,” a direct reference to the number of industries dependent upon the line for their survival.26 Fishing, timber, mining, even the provincial government depended upon the line to link their isolated settlement with the rest of the country. A visitor in the 1890s could be forgiven for assuming that the

24 Friesen, 185. 25 Ibid., 176. 26 Barman, 108.

122 government in Victoria was, in fact, the board of directors for the CPR, as the Company was a generous source of support for many politicians in return for favorable legislation.27 It would not be until the Klondike gold rush of the late 1890s that British

Columbia would become financially independent of the CPR.28

The adjoining prairie regions, however, were uniformly hostile to the CPR, due in no small part to its heavy handed policies. Freight rates, established in Ontario and bearing little impact in Vancouver, were utilized as a primary method of financing the railway, a fact that pushed many early farming communities into severe economic hardship.29 As the CPR was a state-supported monopoly, farmers and ranchers had little alternative but to pay these fees, which were often established based upon the economic needs of the railway and done without knowledge of the financial wherewithal of the prairie communities. Compounding this policy of seeming indifference was the fact that the vast majority of prairie residents had little means of affecting railway policy. MPs from the prairies were hopelessly outnumbered by their colleagues from central Canada and British Columbia. A tale, apocryphal but illustrative, held that a farmer who witnessed a hailstorm destroy his crop shook his fist at the sky and bellowed, “God damn the CPR!”30

Part of this divide in opinion is due to cultural differences between Canada‟s new regions. British Columbia was, in most ways, Macdonald‟s idealized vision of his new nation. Cut off geographically from Canada, those residents that did not identify with their Yankee neighbors adopted cultural elements heavily from Britain itself. Tea times

27 Ibid., 109. 28 Ibid., 112. 29 Eagle, 44. 30 Ibid., 69.

123 were strictly observed, as were the latest fashions from London for the prominent and well-heeled families.31 The class divide in British Columbia was wider than in virtually any other region of Canada, where both the elites and the laboring classes behaved with a condescension or deference that could have been native to Whitehall or Surrey. This conscious emulation of all things British contributed to the dark, vicious circle of racism that chronically afflicted Vancouver as scores of Chinese laborers poured in to construct the CPR. While the Chinese were never welcomed in Canada, the anti-Chinese legislation was harshest in Canada‟s „gateway to the Orient‟, which furthered the cultural, linguistic, and economic isolation of Asian immigrants to Canada.

The prairies, by contrast, were a far different case. Settlement of the Canadian west lagged behind that in the United States, due in part to geography and climate.32 One result in this delay is that the residents of the prairies prior to the building of the CPR were those Canadians sufficiently motivated to relocate away from the central regions of the country. Large numbers of Métis, indigenous peoples, and others that sought a new start populated the prairies, where the conditions required a certain degree of communal cooperation, if for no other reason than simple survival. Indeed, the climate was a key factor in shaping the “prairie bias” in regional affairs,33 and would differentiate the frontier experience in the Canadian prairies from its counterparts in the United States.34

It is a supreme irony that the very policies designed to strengthen the Canadian national identity would contribute more than any other factor in strengthening the prairie

31 Barman, 139. 32 McKenna, 83. The virtually impenetrable Canadian Shield country, a region where a very thin layer of topsoil covers pre-Cambrian bedrock, made organized farming extremely difficult, forcing immigrants to travel much further west to reach the prairies. Once there, farming was meager until new strains of wheat were developed to withstand the long, harsh winters. 33 Friesen, 343. 34 Ibid., 268.

124 bias. More than any other region, the prairies bore the cost of Macdonald‟s National

Policy, in the form of agricultural tariffs, trade barriers, and high freight rates designed to defray the cost of the CPR‟s construction.35 These policies, which struck at the very economic heart of farming communities, were detested across the region and held up as a clear indication of Ottawa‟s indifference to the prairies. For its part, the government appealed to the prairie communities to do their part for the good of Canada as a whole, portraying the costs as a step toward the forging of the Canadian nation. This appeal would fall largely upon deaf ears, as farmers and ranchers viewed this vision of Canada as one that would enrich rail barons while draining their wallets.36

Origin of the Mounted Police

It was this national ambivalence in the prairies that drove the Macdonald government to seek a method of establishing order and loyalty in the interior of the country. It was not enough to entice the loyalty of British Columbia. The Canadian interior, with its potential for agricultural wealth, had to be tied to the national core, both economically and culturally. In 1869, a rebellion of French-speaking Métis peoples in the Red River region of modern Manitoba threatened a civil war before a peaceful resolution was negotiated. The rebellion further reinforced the need for peace, order, and above all, state control over the western territories.37 For this purpose, the National Plan established the North West Mounted Police (NWMP).

35 Ibid., 188. 36 Eagle, 47. 37 Macleod, 42.

125

Macdonald‟s concern for the establishment of pubic order was acute, particularly in light of the abject failure of the Hudson‟s Bay Company in this capacity.38 The large number of Métis, combined with the rebellion, amplified fears that the west could produce a second Quebec, a hostile region blocking central Canada off from British

Columbia. While elements of the Conservative government argued for a military force to pacify the region, Macdonald and his advisers modified this proposal to call for the creation of a Mounted Police force, organized in a similar manner to the Royal Irish

Constabulary.39

The fact that the RIC was selected as Macdonald‟s template for the Mounted

Police does much to illuminate his view of the inhabitants of the prairies. Fearing a

French invasion of Ireland brought about by civil unrest, the Irish Constabulary was created in 1814 with the duty of keeping the island pacified and fortified against foreign invasion. While officially a civil organization, the RIC had been endowed with broad authority that included the use of military force as well as the ability to govern through the implementation of martial law. The fact that the Conservatives in Ottawa felt that a similar situation was brewing in the Canadian west is a vivid example of the seriousness with which the government viewed the western situation. The perceived threat of

American annexation, combined with the Rebellion of 1869 prompted the Conservative government to create a paramilitary force to both prepare for, and keep public order and loyalty during, settlement of the prairies.

In conceiving the force, Macdonald and his allies expected it to operate in two distinct phases. During the first phase, the Mounted Police would be dispatched to the

38 McKenna, 88. 39 Ibid., 91

126 prairies with the intent of preparing the indigenous peoples there for the impending settlement of white farmers and ranchers. Once this was done, the government would deliberately settle groups deemed “reliable” – primarily Anglophone, Protestant people of northern European descent – across the prairies, whereupon the Mounties would enforce the laws of Canada, assist the settlers, and ensure the proper assimilation of these groups into Canadian society. The force was not intended to operate in perpetuity; once the population had risen to the point where a number of self-sufficient cities had been established, it was assumed the force would be drawn down and eventually eliminated, as their purpose would have been fulfilled.40

Much like the territorial governors in the United States, the Mounted Police found themselves advocating for frontier needs and priorities with their nominal political masters in Ottawa. Unlike their southern counterparts, however, the Canadian Mounties never faced the threat of recall or censure in defying territorial desires to achieve long- term stability. The explanation for this disparity lies in how both the imperial core and periphery viewed their respective positions and goals, both of which contrasted greatly with the situation in the United States.

Due to factors of both climate and geography, the settlement of the Canadian prairies required far more logistical and state support than the settlement of the American

West. During the critical years of territorial formation, the Mounted Police were the state presence; even after provincial status had been attained, the force served as an advocacy organization as well as a law enforcement institution. To the residents of the prairies, they served as an irreplaceable pillar of frontier society and government. These were the

40 Ibid., 22.

127 same settlers that policymakers had favored in order to win the loyalty of the prairies when the integrity of the state was seen as in doubt. From the perspective of the imperial core, the potential cost of alienating these settlers was simply too high. Further complicating Ottawa‟s position was the effectiveness of the force. As an instrument of law and order, the Mounted Police were a spectacular success as well as being remarkably cost-effective. Much like the territorial governors, however, living among their charges led to the force becoming an institution of the prairies, frequently siding with the frontier in policy disputes with the national core.

The tremendous autonomy and power of the force in policymaking, contrasting with the relative weakness of American governors, was due in large measure to their concentration of duties and responsibilities. Governmental powers and jurisdictions were heavily divided in the American tradition, as a guarantor of individual liberty. With so many crucial functions concentrated in one set of organizational hands, the Mounties were able to act with considerable freedom of action, able to periodically challenge both popular opinion and the dictates of national political leaders.

Much has been made, both in government records and in later histories of the force, of the decision to so closely model the NWMP along the British traditions of military organization. It is clear that Macdonald firmly sought ways in which to emphasize or exaggerate the differences between Canada and the United States; much rode on the ability of the Canadian state to establish not just a separate identity, but a distinct and unmistakable identity, one that would add a cultural barrier between the two societies in addition to the existing political and economic ones. In official correspondence, the proposed appearance, uniform, and manner of the force are debated

128 in an unusually strong manner, with repeated insistence that the Mounted Police present themselves in a British style and bearing.41 While there is virtually no support for the argument that the Indian peoples of the prairies respected and trusted soldiers in red coats, it is evident that policy makers in Ottawa did, and wished to invest the North West

Mounted Police with that same aura.42

Generally speaking, the existence of the force in the prairies occurred in three distinct chronological phases. The first phase occurred between 1875 and 1885, in which the NWMP was dispatched into the frontier in order to prepare conditions for white settlement. This is arguably the most important period for the later evolution of the force, for it was during this period that the functions, duties, and manner of operation that the

Mounted Police would later rely upon were established. Between 1885 and 1895, the force was responsible for overseeing the steady migration of new settlers into the frontier and protecting the new towns and cities that grew in the prairies. Finally, the Klondike

Gold Rush would give the Mounties renewed purpose and arguably save the force from extinction during the final period between 1895 and the outbreak of the First World War.

The Mounties and the U.S. Army were analogous entities in the west, as both were sent out in advance of settlement for both reconnaissance and pacification purposes; the similarities ended once those purposes were filled, however. 43 The American army tended to move on once settlers arrived, while the civil functions of governance were relegated to territorial officials and the Department of the Interior. In contrast, the

Mounties fulfilled both civilian and military functions, which had the effect of

41 Ibid., 14. 42 Macleod, 33. 43 Ibid., 84.

129 establishing cultural and political continuity between settlement and frontier. Surviving in the prairies, which required communal action and the pooling of information and resources, was instrumental in not only the success, but the widespread popularity, of the

NWMP.44

Relations with the First Nations

The difference in emphasis paid tremendous dividends in the realm of relations with indigenous peoples. The Mounties were assisted by the fact that there were fewer indigenous peoples to contend with in Canada than in the United States. Even so, the

NWMP were able to establish surprisingly good relations with most indigenous peoples.45 Most viewed the Mounties not as a sign of repression, but rather as agents of protection against incursions from white settlers.46 An illustrative example can be found in expenditures for 1885 the United States spent more than the entire Canadian budget, nearly $20 million, on various Indian policies and wars. That same year, the Canadian government paid out barely $400,000 for the same tasks.47

A large measure of the force‟s success in managing relatively peaceful relations between indigenous peoples and white settlers was due to a nearly decade-long interval between the dispatching of the Mounted Police to the prairies and the arrival of white settlers in large numbers. In contrast to the American practice of rapid settlement, the centralized nature of Canada‟s settlement policy allowed the Mounties a grace period in

44 Friesen, 168. 45 Hill, 136. 46 McKenna, 91. 47 Friesen, 165.

130 which to prepare the Indigenous for the inevitable tide of white migration.48 For the first ten years of its existence, the force established itself as a resource for the indigenous reservations, devoting the bulk of its efforts toward ensuring adequate food and provender.49 This policy allowed the Mounted Police to establish themselves as both a police force as well as an organ of civil service, a duality of purpose that was intended as much to save money as establish public trust and reliance in the force.50

From the perspective of both the officers in the field and their superiors in

Ottawa, this approach met with considerable success. Colonel James Macleod, two years prior to being named Commissioner of the force, reported that the indigenous peoples in his jurisdiction were appreciative of the aid rendered by his men and had requested that his detachment remain nearby.51 The Macleod Gazette offered considerable praise for the ability of the Mounted Police to handle relations with the native peoples, and more importantly, to defuse potential conflicts quickly.52 While still serving as a secretary to

Prime Minister Macdonald, Frederick White would write as early as 1876 that the First

Nations had apparently accepted the government‟s policy, and were “giving up the fight.”53 While the sheer magnitude of the defeat of indigenous tribes by the American

48 Desmond Morton, “Cavalry or Police: Keeping the Peace on Two Adjacent Frontiers, 1870-1900,” in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, ed. William M. Baker (Regina: University of Regina, 1998), 4. 49 NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1884, p. 1, NAC. also the first year in which interactions with prairie residents make a distinction between white and native peoples, indicating the dearth of white settlement until this point. 50 Letter, Supt. L.N.F. Crozier to Commissioner A.G. Irvine, 7 October 1881, NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1881, p. 48, NAC. Crozier references the declaration by the Governor General that the force was intended to fulfill civic duties in an effort to promote good relations with the residents of the prairies as well as make the most efficient use of state funds. 51 Letter, J. Macleod to Commissioner French, 15 December 1974. NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1874, p. 67, NAC. 52 Editorial, Macleod Gazette, 3 February 1883, p.1. The North-West Council in Regina also praised the force‟s adroitness in relations with the natives, 14 September, 1883, p.1, NAC. 53 Letter, White to Macdonald, 30 December 1876. NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1874, Appendix D, p. 22, NAC.

131 army would have been a tremendous factor in convincing those in Canada to seek alternatives to conflict, there is considerable evidence that the Mounted Police presented, at the very least, an acceptable alternative.

Acceptance of the NWMP by indigenous peoples was certainly aided by the willingness of the force to exercise their authority against fellow whites, particularly against squatters who would encroach upon reservation lands. In this respect, the hierarchical nature of Canadian settlement greatly aided the Mounted Police. Their authority was derived from Ottawa instead of being conferred by popular opinion, granting them enough independence of action to sanction the more politically powerful white population. Further, by ensuring that white encroachment onto indigenous lands was curtailed, the force earned the respect of the farmer and merchant populations, to whom conflict with the First Nations would have been ruinous.54 For their part, the

Mounted Police successfully fought any intrusion of other bureaucracies into the handling of affairs with the First Nations, fearing their own carefully cultivated reputation would be undercut by competing departmental agendas.55

There was another motivation for the early comity between the First Nations and the NWMP. During the first decade of the Police presence in the prairies (1874-1885), whites were a clear minority as the force sought to establish the infrastructure for later settlement. Fears of American annexation pushed the Canadian government to view its territorial integrity as its top priority, gearing policy decisions toward that goal. Prime

Minister Macdonald had remarked bluntly, “I would be quite willing, personally, to leave that whole country a wilderness for the next half-century but I fear if Englishmen do not

54 Editorial, Macleod Gazette, 23 December 1882, p. 1 55 Macleod to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 23 December 1878. RG-18, B-3, vol. 47, #253, NAC.

132 go there, Yankees will…”56 With such a premium placed on regional loyalty, the

Mounted Police were generous in their dealings with indigenous peoples by the standards of the day, and certainly in relation to the conflicts raging south of the border.

Initially, this policy paid handsome dividends. A crackdown on liquor smuggling between 1886 and 1892, (an issue that would haunt the force in another decade) combined with controlling the horse trade between tribes, gained the force much-needed legitimacy among the tribes. Further, the relative peace and stability of the Canadian prairies brought a degree of prosperity to both First Nations and those white traders that had ventured into the west.57 A Blackfoot chief, with a dramatic flair perhaps supplied by the interpreter, stated that before arrival of the Police, “the Indian crept along, now he is not afraid to walk erect.”58 The policy of cooperation was validated when the

Blackfoot publicly rejected an offer of alliance with the Sioux against American settlers in 1876. In the words of Chief Crowfoot, “we will not join with the Sioux against the

Whites, but will depend upon you [the Mounted Police] to protect us.”59 Relations between Canada and the Blackfoot in 1877 had grown warm enough for the tribe to volunteer men to fight as auxiliaries in the Army and to pledge “unaltered loyalty to the

British crown.”60

Relationships between the two peoples were buttressed by the fact that the Police took pains to treat indigenous peoples with the same legal protections as whites during the first crucial decades in the prairies. When the Indian Department ordered the force to

56 Morton, 6. 57 NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1874, p. 67, NAC 58 Ibid., 65. 59 NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1876, p. 22, NAC 60 NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1877, p. 21, NAC

133 restrain the First Nations to reserves in violation of treaties, the Police firmly refused.61

Efforts to exclude indigenous people from social events were noted and recorded with disapproval by Police inspectors, one of whom characterized the efforts as “short- sighted.”62 Crucially to the function of law enforcement officials, several instances of false charges against natives, including murder, were dismissed due to flimsy or nonexistent evidence.63 When a group of Cree were being deported to Canada from the

United States, Captain Richard Burton Deane reminded his officers that, “we have no right to coerce them and the law will hold us responsible for the abuse of its powers.”64

Despite these efforts, state policy could not change the fundamental attitudes of whites toward indigenous peoples. A merchant named William Wallace Clarke, traded heavily with the First Nations and thus ostensibly had the most to gain from fruitful relations with them, described them as “miserable, ragged, filthy, crawling wretch(es)” with whom the thought of sharing heaven filled him with “horror and loathing.”65 In praising the fair-minded policies of the Canadian government, a Winnipeg editorial declared, “The basis of this happy state of the relations between the white and red population of Canada is ultimately the treatment in good faith of the weaker race.”66

Captain Deane, who had earlier vigorously defended the rights of the First Nations, revealed his own feelings when he wrote, “The Indians must be duller than we take them

61 Letter, Steele to Herchmer, 19 June 1893. RG-18, A-1, vol. 218, #763, NAC. 62 Calgary Monthly Report, July 1898. RG-18, A-1, vol. 143, #18, NAC. 63 Regina Monthly Report, July 1898. RG-18, A-1, vol. 113, #8, NAC. 64 Lethbridge Monthly Report, June 1896. RG-18, A-1, vol. 114, #25, NAC. 65 Macleod, 145. 66 Editorial, Winnipeg Daily Free Press, 5 July 1877.

134 for if they cannot appreciate the difference between the moral coercion under the Union

Jack and the physical force under the Stars and Stripes.”67

Becoming a Western Institution

This pattern of behavior represents a key factor in the success of the NWMP in integrating these frontier regions into the Canadian state. As a body whose stated task was law enforcement, it was imperative that the officers of the Mounted Police have the cooperation and confidence of the white settlers in order to carry out their duties.

Simultaneously, however, the force‟s conduct with indigenous peoples had to seen as both productive in keeping the peace as well as fair in order to secure the cooperation of the First Nations. Compounding this was the force‟s directive from Ottawa to both maintain order in the frontier as well as endure the loyalty of a region already chafing under financial strain. To balance these competing demands, the Mounted Police developed a dual role; cooperation among the settlers would be won through the administration of vital services to frontier communities, a cooperation that would in turn allow the force to perform its law enforcement duties without being perceived as a foreign body. In short, the Mounties had to integrate themselves into the frontier in order to weld the frontier to Canada.68

It is doubtful this absorption of additional tasks would have been institutionalized had it not been for the constant presence of Frederick White. Appointed by Prime

67 Lethbridge Monthly Report, June 1896. RG-18, A-1, vol. 114, #25, NAC. 68 John Jennings, “Policemen and Poachers: Indian Relations in the Ranching Frontier” in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, William M. Baker, ed. (Regina: University of Regina Press, 1998), 46.

135

Minister Macdonald in 1880, White would function as the liaison between the government and the force for the next thirty-two years. In that time, he provided a steady source of support, direction, and advocacy for the Mounted Police in a time in which a commissioner served for an average of five years.69 All correspondence between the force and Ottawa was routed through him, and it was his support for decisions made in the field that allowed the force to adapt to local circumstances with a minimum of interference from the capital.

From the outset, the civil service duties of the Mounted Police took on a much more vital role in the day-to-day operations of officers and constables than the actual business of law enforcement.70 With the notable exception of liquor smuggling, which would bedevil the force for decades, much of the emphasis was placed on tasks such as establishing telegraph lines, fighting prairie fires, distributing emergency seed grain, and veterinary services. Even before the force moved to the prairies, Commissioner French pressed the case to the government that the development of infrastructure and other tasks important to the general welfare of the region should be a priority for the Mounted

Police.71

All these functions shared the characteristic of addressing matters of collective concern to all frontier communities. Communications were vital for both gathering information and calling for aid, while prairie fires were both frighteningly common and

69 A. Bowen Perry was appointed commissioner in 1900, and served until 1923, finally breaking the cycle of brief-tenured leaders of the NWMP. George Arthur French served for three years, James F. Macleod for four, A. G. Irvine for six, and Lawrence W. Herchmer for four. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, History of the RCMP Commissioners, 2010. http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/hist/comms-lst-eng.htm. 70 Carl Betke, “Pioneers and Police on the Canadian Prairies, 1885-1914”, in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, William M. Baker, ed. (Regina: University of Regina Press, 1998), 212. 71 Letter, French to Minister of Justice, 14 November 1873. RG-18, A-1, vol. 1, #6, NAC.

136 had the capacity to wipe out entire homesteads or even communities.72 The distribution of seed grain, begun in the early days of the force‟s operation, allowed Canadian farmers to survive killing frosts and other natural disasters that would have otherwise destroyed their livelihood. Police surgeons examined herds of cattle and horses for early signs of infectious disease, and if a potential outbreak was detected, moved swiftly to impose quarantine.73 These duties, often assumed when the need arose and later institutionalized, provided immediate and often personal assistance to a population whose sustenance was frequently balanced precariously on the whims of nature. The function of the force as ex officio state welfare providers was accidentally reinforced in the late 1890s when Sir

Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior under Prime Minister Laurier, withheld assistance to immigrant farmers as a matter of policy, for fear of creating an underclass of perennial poor supplicants.74 It fell then to the Mounted Police to fill the civil service void.

If the public gratitude toward the force was welcome, it was also quite necessary as far as Ottawa was concerned. For all practical purposes, the North West Mounted

Police were not just the face of the Canadian government in the West, they were also its hands, eyes, and ears. As much as possible, the force sought to avoid intruding in urban affairs, as both its mandate and duties were concerned primarily with rural, isolated, and vulnerable settlements.75 A further deterrent to involvement in city affairs, beyond conflicts between competing jurisdictions, was a desire to maintain the force‟s independence, particularly from civic leaders whose interest horizon ended at the city

72 Letter, J.H.Price to Howe, 4 September 1894. RG-18, A-1, vol. 96, #470., NAC. 73 Betke, 119. Responsibility for veterinary care in many western communities would reside with the Mounted Police until 1896, when it was transferred to the Department of Agriculture. 74 Ibid., 118. 75 Letter, White to Department of the Interior, 27 April 1895. RG-18, A-1, vol. 82, #370, NAC.

137 limits.76 Simply put, the Mounted Police could not risk the cooperation of settlers in order to further the ambitions of mayors and other urban interests.

A decision that would inform later policies regarding the prosecution of crimes in the frontier territories illustrated how seriously the force took its public reputation.

During the first years of operation, the leadership of the Mounted Police directed their officers to place priority on those crimes that were most detrimental to keeping peace and order. For those crimes that could be resolved without bringing the state into direct conflict with indigenous peoples, precedents were established to avoid formal prosecutions.77 In the case of laws that were simply unenforceable, such as the prohibition of repeating rifles for indigenous peoples, the force urged the government to remove the unnecessary laws from the criminal code.78 This emphasis on the preservation of peace and order would become a hallmark of the force‟s approach to law enforcement, even if it meant sacrificing elements of the criminal code for the sake of public tranquility.

An incident in 1895 illustrated this emphasis on public order over strict enforcement of laws. James Donaldson, a tenant in a lodging house in Lethbridge, had been tarred and feathered by a gang of citizenry after his conspicuous affair with the wife of his landlord, Charles Gillies, drove the man to suicide. Superintendent R. Burton

Deane, who had been assigned to Lethbridge in 1888, not only had been aware of a plot against Donaldson due to his extensive contacts among the leading townsfolk, but also knew that any attempt to prosecute those responsible for his assault would be not only

76 Macleod, 51. 77 Macleod, 27. 78 Frederick White memo, 6 October 1876. RG-18, A-1, vol. 9, #69, NAC.

138 doomed but would also invite the enmity of the residents.79 Indeed, the primary action taken by Deane was to both reprimand a sergeant who had taken part in the assault and assure him that he would not face jail time.80

What makes this case illustrative are the inherent contradictions that the Mounted

Police had to reconcile in cases like these. Assault, as crimes went, was not considered especially serious in the frontier society of the Canadian prairies.81 As the victim elected to leave town (and indeed was so intimidated that he declined to press charges), there was no likelihood of repeat offenses. From the perspective of the Mounted Police, therefore, the matter had been brought to a conclusion with a minimum of public disturbance; indeed, prosecuting the matter would create more disorder than simply letting the incident go unaddressed. From Deane‟s perspective, the most troubling aspect of the case was the participation of an off-duty member of the force; a certain detachment from local affairs was deemed crucial for effective discharge of the duties of the NWMP, and to have a member of the force taking part in such activities imperiled the force‟s reputation.82

Even so, the degree to which the Mounties and the communities under their care were enmeshed managed to intrude upon the force‟s internal conduct. The transfer of

Constable Ferguson from Fort Saskatchewan to Regina in the spring of 1897 caused enough of a sensation to involve no less than Commissioner L. W. Herchmer,

Comptroller White, and Alberta MP Frank Oliver. By the time the matter was concluded,

79 Anna-Maria Mavromichalis, “Tar and Feathers: The Mounted Police and Frontier Justice”, in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, William M. Baker, ed. (Regina: University of Regina Press, 1998), 112. 80 Ibid., 116. 81 Ibid., 115. 82 Ibid., 116.

139 the deadly mixture of partisan politics and a war of personalities would threaten the continued existence Mounted Police.

In December of 1896, Ferguson was reprimanded for being absent from duty, allowing another constable to be absent, and hesitating to obey orders. These infractions, combined with Ferguson‟s history of “very undesirable connections” within the community of Fort Saskatchewan, prompted his superior to request the transfer.83 Unable to purchase his own discharge, Ferguson was transferred to Regina in January of 1897, leaving his wife and family at Fort Saskatchewan.

At this point, Ferguson‟s family lodged a protest with Mr. Oliver, who in turn, suspected a political motivation for the transfer. The election of 1896 had brought Sir

Wilfrid Laurier to power, and his new liberal government had long suspected the NWMP of being little more than a governmental organ of the Conservative Party.84 The fact that all key officials of the force were Conservatives fed fuel to the fire of suspicion.

Comptroller White, while respected, had a long Conservative pedigree and had been John

A. Macdonald‟s private secretary. Commissioner Herchmer, however, possessed none of

White‟s reservoir of good will. Blunt to the point of harshness in his manner, taciturn, and holding a rigid world view, Herchmer was frequently described as arrogant and

83 Letter, Herchmer to White, 1 February 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 134, #162, NAC. At this time, Ferguson‟s brother-in-law was imprisoned at Fort Saskatchewan for theft. Herchmer takes the time to detail the undesirable character of Ferguson‟s in-laws, and concludes by describing Ferguson as a “leading Orangeman” and “prominent liberal”. Letter, Herchmer to White, 14 January 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 133, # 145, NAC. 84 Macleod, 61. Supposed partisanship on the part of the force was a longstanding suspicion among Liberal politicians. Prime Minister Mackenzie, the first Liberal to be Prime Minister, had expressed the same sentiment, and would have eliminated the force outright had it not already been posted in Manitoba in the aftermath of the 1869 Red River rebellion.

140 tyrannical.85 His obvious competence and technical expertise provided no refuge from criticism once his patron, Macdonald, had passed from the scene.

On 25 January, 1897, a notice appeared in the Edmonton Bulletin that not only reported on the transfer of Constable Ferguson, but went so far as to declare that his transfer was “the commissioner‟s reprimand for having voted for the supporter of the present government in the last election.”86 The unnamed supporter was obviously Frank

Oliver, and the appearance of political patronage within the Mounted Police led to a public firestorm. Three days later, the Bulletin in a scathing editorial heaped vitriol upon

Commissioner Herchmer. He was described as “sneering,” “bragging,” and “wreaking vengeance on whomever he pleases,” while the transfer of Ferguson is portrayed as being done “out of pure devilishness.”87 Outcry rose to the point where Herchmer was forced to provide documentation of a physical examination to prove that Ferguson had not physically suffered due to the transfer, as well as guaranteeing that the constable could return to Fort Saskatchewan once his tour at Regina was complete.88

In the midst of the controversy, it is notable that no public criticism was mounted against the Mounted Police as an institution. The attacks upon Herchmer, however, reached such a fever pitch that White felt compelled to request an audience with Prime

Minister Laurier and secure his support for both Herchmer and declaring that the

Mounties should be “absolutely non-political.”89 The fallout from the Ferguson affair was one of grave concern for White, who so feared for the reputation of the force‟s

85 Ibid., 53. 86 Letter, Herchmer to White, 1 February 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 134, #162, NAC. 87 Enclosure, Herchmer to White, 1 February 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 134, #162, NAC. 88 Letter, Herchmer to White, 12 March 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 134, #162, NAC. 89 Letter, White to Herchmer, 21 January 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 133, #145, NAC.

141 officers that he openly hoped that members of the Mounted Police would be stripped of the right to vote.90

Cultural Makeup of the Canadian Prairies

For all the official rhetoric, the very notion of Canadian nationalism was greeted with reactions the ranged from amusement to scorn.91 The classism that was so pronounced in British Columbia and present throughout the country prevented many of the „laboring classes‟ from having much of a stake in society beyond providing for the immediate needs of their families.92 In the prairies, where survival and a common dissatisfaction with Ottawa served as cultural touchstones, the loyalty to central Canada was tenuous indeed. Many prairie residents even developed something of a love-hate relationship with their neighbors to the south, seeing Montanans and Dakotans as fellow people of the prairies while remaining disdainful of the perceived lawlessness of the

American prairie communities.93 In some cases, the proximity to the border encouraged immigration, as it allowed groups that faced discriminatory practices in one country to escape those policies without moving to a radically different environment.94

It was this national ambivalence in the prairies that drove the Macdonald government to pursue a colonization policy to the interior of the country. It was not enough to entice the loyalty of British Columbia. The Canadian interior, with its

90 Ibid. 91 Berton, 18. 92 Ibid., 18. 93 Ibid., 22. 94 Peter S. Morris, “Charles Ora Card and Mormon Settlement on the Northwestern Plains Borderlands” in The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests, ed. Sterling Evans. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 178.

142 potential for agricultural wealth, had to be tied to the national core, both economically and culturally. The 1885 Métis rebellion under Louis Riel simply confirmed

Macdonald‟s worst fears; the suggestion that the rebellion had been precipitated by

Ottawa‟s efforts to homogenize the population and disenfranchise minorities was given a deaf ear.95 Specifically, the government sought to attract “capitalists, farmers with capital, farm laborers, and domestic servants.”96 To bring in the immigrants it needed, the government sought help from none other than the CPR.

In general, two groups settled the Canadian prairies in large numbers. The first were traditional farming populations of the Old World, particularly from northwest

Europe. Large groups of Germans, Icelanders, Norwegians, and Swedes arrived in

Manitoba and Saskatchewan in the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s, and were openly preferred by the Canadian government on the belief that their largely Protestant, Anglo-

Saxon background would naturally be more loyal to the Canadian nation. While this was true in many cases, the „protection in groups‟ culture of the prairies took hold all the same, even leading one group of Icelandic settlers to create a “Republic of New Iceland” that sought autonomy from Ottawa.97

The second group was composed of religious or ethnic minorities that sought to escape oppressive conditions in their homelands. In the 1890s large numbers of

American Mormons, Russian Doukhobors, Mennonites, Hutterites, and later in the 1920s,

95 Hill, 186. With racial and religious tensions strained to the breaking point, Louis Riel and his predominantly Metis allies staged a rebellion against the Ottawa government in Manitoba in 1885. The rebellion was crushed, and Riel hanged for his leadership of it. Among the institutional repercussions of the failed rebellion were the scuttling of a plan to include Metis units within the North West Mounted Police, in a manner similar to the Indian units of the British Indian Army. See Macleod, “The NWMP and Minority Groups” in Baker, Prairie Society, 124. 96 Betke, 213. 97 Friesen, 261.

143

Ukrainians fleeing the chaos of the Russian Revolution, would find a haven in the prairies. The Doukhobors in particular would gain a reputation for impassioned social agitation, largely due to Peter Venegin‟s Sons of Freedom and their penchant for arson and nude protest. Despite this, the majority of Doukhobors were content in their adopted land, and amassed an impressive history of volunteerism and community activism.98

Protestantism, while greatly desired, was considered less vital than commitment to public order by the Ottawa government. In this respect, Canadian settler policy differed greatly from the United States. The Mennonites displayed the same aversion to secular education as had the Mormons of Utah, but were viewed with approval by the

Canadian authorities primarily due to their orderliness and work ethic. The Orthodox

Ukrainians received similar high marks despite their poverty, due to their tendency to be

“frugal, industrious, and certainly the best workers in the country. It is believed by many that they will eventually form the best settlers of the district.”99

American immigrants presented a unique set of challenges for Canadian officials.

While prized as settlers due to their familiarity with the environment and agricultural techniques, Americans were also seen as more culturally alien and in need of

“Canadianization” than immigrants from central or eastern Europe. In comparison to the prairies, the American West was viewed as a hotbed of chaos and anarchy, the antithesis of what the Canadian government envisioned for its western frontier. In part this view was a consequence of the high proportion of whiskey smugglers and Army deserters among the Americans migrating to Canada, while national chauvinism and the prevalence

98 Hill, 236. 99 Macleod, “The NWMP and Minority Groups,” in Baker, Prairie Society, 126.

144 of exaggerated cultural stereotypes contributed equally.100 Superintendent J. O. Wilson spoke for many officers when he lamented in 1903 that Americans “are imbued with the

American western idea of law and order and consequently will have to be taught that they cannot do as they like on this side of the line.”101

While there were several other private colonization firms operating at the time, the CPR was by far the most effective and influential of these private organizations.102

With vast reserves of productive land at its disposal and possessing the means to transport immigrants to that land, the Company was singularly well-positioned to facilitate immigration to the interior. The drive for immigrants was not a simple case of land sales; the CPR was determined to settle, not merely sell, the land under its control.103 Altruism or short-term profit was not what motivated the Company to assume this duty that normally was the reserve of the state; without farming communities to service, the CPR faced financial starvation.104 Offering a reasonably affordable package that included land, legal assistance, and transport, the CPR became one of the most effective organizations in populating the prairies.

New immigrants to the prairies tended to settle in ethnically segregated communities, in part due to the policies and methods used to transport them. The government encouraged group settlements, where the residents shared a common religion, ethnic background, and language. This method fostered a strong sense of communal responsibility, and led to the creation of many community organizations,

100 Ibid., 129. 101 Ibid., 130. 102 Ibid., 186. Friesen notes that the main effect of the efforts of the private colonization firms was to create profits with a negligible effect on immigration to Canada. 103 Eagle, 174. 104 Friesen, 181.

145 which conveniently filled needs that the state would otherwise have to fund. Even the colonist cars touted by the CPR as a selling point contributed to communal activity and solidarity. Days of travel in a communal car quickly fostered a sense of community before the immigrants even arrived at their destinations, which were typically group settlements.105

Once arrived in the prairies, however, it would be the Mounted Police that rendered the greatest assistance in establishing new settler communities. Through their system of outposts and patrols, the force was not only able to monitor the numbers and makeup of new arrivals, but also to distribute seed grain, relief supplies, and to contain diseases that threatened to decimate herds. By 1896, the Mounted Police had grown so synonymous with these duties that legislation formally granted them the right to unilaterally declare animal or human quarantines; it is a sign of the esteem with which the force was held that ranchers supported this policy.106

Further assisting the Canadian immigration drive was the coincidence of good timing. The year 1893 saw the „official‟ closing of the American frontier, coinciding a few years later by the development of hardier strains of grain that could survive the harsh prairie winters.107 The CPR began to advertise the prairies as the „last, best west‟ in the late 1890s, which coinciding with the Klondike gold rush, sparked a dramatic rise in immigration rates. In marked contrast to the American pattern of expansion, migrants

105 Ibid., 254-5. 106 Betke, 219-221. 107 Hill, 203.

146 from the national core were never the majority of prairie settlers. Instead, it would be settlers from abroad that comprised the bulk of new prairie residents.108

The influx of immigration had a transformative effect on the city of Winnipeg distinct from the rest of the province. While Manitoba itself steadily grew more

Protestant, Anglophone, and (to the delight of Macdonald and his supporters) conservative, Winnipeg quickly grew into the west‟s first metropolis.109 The city‟s population exploded a hundredfold in the fifteen years between 1871 and 1886, and the attendant growth of immigrant communities changed the city into a patchwork of ethnic communities and enclaves. The term “ethnic” underwent a change in meaning in the late

1800s, eventually coming to refer to any immigrant group arriving from Europe to the west.110

Winnipeg‟s population boom grew to such a degree that downtown real estate in

1882 was more expensive than that in Chicago.111 The city‟s booming fortunes also brought the rapid growth of an elite class, those who had made tremendous wealth either from the CPR itself, those industries the railway services, or ominously, in providing dubious services to new immigrants with limited knowledge of custom, law, or the language. These elites were swift to import the same social stratification that prevailed in other affluent cities of Canada and the British Empire, a process reinforced by the myriad social clubs, associations, and citizens‟ leagues that sprang up in the late nineteenth

108 Macleod, 143. 109 Hill, 205. 110 Friesen, 244. It is important to note that “ethnic” in this context was a mildly derogatory but not racist term. It also did not apply to Asian immigrants, for whom a panoply of harsh derogatory terms were applies. First Nations and Métis peoples were also exempt from this term. 111 Pierre Berton, The Impossible Railway (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 270.

147 century.112 The mood of the city was summed up by George Hann, who wrote,

“If there ever was a fool‟s paradise, it sure was located in Winnipeg. Men made fortunes

– mostly on paper – and life was one continuous joy-ride.”113

Notwithstanding the self-imposed isolation of the elites, Winnipeg had become an international city, adopted the prairie ethos of communal action in an effort to redress an old grievance. Freight rates had long been a detested burden among prairie farmers, and no less onerous to the Winnipeg Board of Trade, which by the 1880s had become a formidable force in its own right. When the economy took a sharp nosedive in 1882 and into 1883, the CPR found itself financially overextended and in need of a bailout. While the federal government debated, the city of Winnipeg stepped in, guaranteeing loans to the railway in exchange for more equitable freight rates and the routing of more trains through the city.114 In a stroke, Winnipeg assured itself a position as the central hub of western transportation and removed an economic straitjacket from its residents.

For the Mounted Police, the growth of urban centers like Winnipeg meant a retreat further into the frontier. As Commissioner A. B. Perry noted, the NWMP were frontier police, not civil police.115 The duty of civil police was to uphold the laws of their municipality; the objective of the Mounted Police was to maintain order, and as the

Lethbridge incident illustrated, the two were not always the same thing. Patrolling urban areas with overlapping jurisdictions increased the complexity of law enforcement several times over. Even though the force had the authority to override local police, doing so

112 Friesen, 211. 113 Berton, 274. 114 Friesen, 206. 115 S. W. Horall, “The North-West Mounted Police and Prostitution on the Canadian Prairies,” Prairie Forum, vol. 10, no. 1, (Spring 1985): 127.

148 eroded the goodwill that was so integral to the NWMP‟s success. For these reasons, the force restricted itself to rural environments as settlement progressed westward.

The Mounted Police as a Cultural Conduit

The borderline obsession with the conduct of the Mounties by Comptroller White

(and Commissioner Herchmer in particular) was directly tied to both their efficacy in the field as well as their visibility as a symbol of the Canadian government. Unlike the

American army, the leaders of the Mounties were filled by the sons of the elites, frequently by experienced Army officers from Britain proper.116 So many of the early nucleus of the force was British, in fact, that when A. G. Irvine was named commissioner of the force in 1880, his general ineffectiveness was initially overlooked by the fact that he was the first Canadian-born officer to hold the post. These officers were highly educated, frequently having attended elite schools as renowned as Eton and Hull, and were expected not only to carry out the law but to set a social example in their communities. In this, the Mounties were a particularly Canadian creation. The myth of the U.S. Marshal is that of a lone man of exceptional character and ability, single- handedly establishing order by whatever means necessary. By contrast, the Canadian

Mounted Police represented as a collective body, the irresistible force of civilization, progress, and community.117

The same, however, could not be said of the enlisted ranks in the early days of the force. Despite the later reputation the Mounted Police earned for being selective in

116 Freisen, 170. 117 Friesen, 165.

149 recruitment, many of the original constables were far more like their counterparts in the

U.S. Cavalry than anyone in the Macdonald government would care to publicly admit.

Drunkenness was common, an embarrassment to a force whose duties included the abolition of liquor smuggling.118 Many were in less than ideal health, a factor that exacerbated the punishing 1874 “March West.” Although this ordeal is now blamed by many historians on inadequate preparation and organizational failures on the part of

Commissioner French, it entered the mythology of the Mounted Police as the crucible from which the core values of the force was established. A crucible it certainly was, for desertions rose to alarming levels during the years 1874-5.119 So dire were the straits of the new force that upon hearing it criticized in the press, Commissioner French was sufficiently exercised to report to Ottawa that, “one would have hoped that Canadian journalists actuated by any feeling of patriotism would have endeavoured to have hidden the flaws that might have been exposed in a novel organization…from a Military standpoint, I would submit that such conduct is as criminal as it is unpatriotic.” 120

Those who both lived through the experience and remained with the force, however, came to symbolize the qualities the force wished to project, and became the template upon which further recruiting would be based.

Through their duties as law enforcement officials, ex officio judges, and social service providers, the Mounted Police became, in the words of one former officer, “dry nurses to the community.”121 Once mustered out of the force or simply retired, many

118 Macleod, 45. 119 Ibid., 84. 120 G. A. French, Report to the Comptroller. NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1874, pp. 24-5, NAC. 121 Keith Walden, “Character”, in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, William M. Baker, ed. (Regina: University of Regina Press, 1998), 282.

150 former Mounties used the contacts they had established to create private lives for themselves in frontier towns, frequently becoming leading citizens due to their special combination of experience, abilities learned through service, and public reputation.

High-ranking officers, particularly superintendents, inevitably became high-profile members of frontier communities, and acutely aware of the need to live up to social expectations. R. Burton Deane, while stationed at Lethbridge, once fell ill and was unable to attend the performance of a play; the next morning, news of his illness was reported in the paper, along with the editor‟s profound best wishes that such an esteemed gentleman recover quickly.122

The Mounted Police frequently found itself performing social functions well beyond their traditional duties to safeguard the livelihood and security of prairie residents. Deane, for example, had helped establish the theatre community in Lethbridge after watching a company production; other divisions organized charity drives, held social dances and balls, and created other community events that integrated the force into the daily lives of the frontier settlements.123 While hardly considered important and rarely mentioned in official reports, these efforts, combined with the tendency of former officers to remain in the community as private citizens, lay the foundations of a middle class in the regions that represented the furthest extent of Ottawa‟s territorial grip. If the border between American and Canadian blurred among the working classes, it was vivid and unmistakable among the gentry; indeed, it was the cultivation of this middle class that Macdonald had gambled upon when the National Plan was crafted.124

122 Baker, 256. 123 Ibid., 247. 124 Ibid., 259.

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While all policemen down to constables were expected to set a proper social example, it was the absence of such duties south of the 49th parallel that most reinforced the cultural divide between the two countries. To Canadian eyes, Montana was a lawless, wild country populated by the same unsavory characters that the Mounties forced out of the improbably named Fort Whoop-up, a region that left many communities without a single agent of the government to establish peace and order.125 What was more shocking to many Canadians, with their views on social class and the origin of crime, is that many crimes, including liquor smuggling, were committed by the „better classes‟ of American society.126 The American west may have been a largely egalitarian, individualistic country, but viewed from the north, it was classless in both senses of the term, a land that seemed to view both the benefits and costs of civilization as abject tyranny.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the main goals of the North West Mounted

Police – maintaining public order, securing Canada‟s territorial integrity, and fostering cultural loyalty to the Canadian state – were being realized with noticeable success. The turn of the century saw Alberta and Saskatchewan on the verge of admission as full provinces, and many in the government, including the new commissioner, A. Bowen

Perry, felt that the twilight of the Mounted Police had arrived.127 With the prairies comfortably in the embrace (if not the outright grip) of Ottawa, the raison d’être of the force was vanishing. The death of John A. Macdonald marked the beginning of a period of increased pressure on the force to reduce its numbers as a means of saving money.

Herchmer‟s annual reports to Ottawa beginning in 1894 are prefaced with repeated calls

125 McKenna, 87. 126 Friesen, 169. 127 Macleod, 57. L. W. Herchmer had lingered on as commissioner despite the formal enmity between himself and the Laurier government until the outbreak of the Boer War. He applied to serve with the Canadian troops in South Africa, which Laurier‟s government granted with remarkable alacrity.

152 for more men, citing difficulties in performing duties expected of the force by local communities.128

Even the respected and long-serving White found himself fending off demands for further personnel reductions. In 1892 he pointed out that the entire strength of the

NWMP was one third to one quarter the size of the American troops stationed in

Montana and North Dakota.129 Fearful of drastic and premature cuts to the Mounted

Police, he argued that the increasing settlement of the frontier “necessitates the establishment of new detachments to give protection, assistance and confidence to the new arrivals.”130 Once again, the role of the Mounted Police as guarantor of both physical and cultural security is referenced. Despite this, the pressure to reduce the size of the NWMP continued apace, leading White to inform Herchmer that the Prime

Minister was inquiring about progress in reducing expenses “every time I go into [his] office.”131

The Liberal victory of 1896 brought to power a new group of politicians motivated by more than economic concerns to reduce the size and influence of the force.

A former Mountie, James Morrow Walsh, issued a memorandum by way of his friend

Clifford Sifton, who had become Interior Minister under Laurier.132 In it, he argued that the force had become a “political partisan machine,” a recruiting pool for Tory loyalists,

128 NWMP, Annual Commissioner’s Report, 1894, p.1, NAC. Also in the report for 1895 (p.1), 1896 (p.6), 1897 (p.19) and 1898 (p.3). 129 Memo, White to Prime Minister Abbott, 16 May 1892. RG-18, A-1, vol. 72, #864, NAC. 130 Ibid. 131 Letter, White to Herchmer, 20 October 1894. RG-18, A-1, vol. 96, #499, NAC. 132 Walsh had been sent to Cypress Hills, Saskatchewan, and rose to prominence by building a relationship of trust with Sitting Bull, who had moved with his warriors across the border after the Battle of Little Bighorn. Known in the American press as “Sitting Bull‟s boss,” his notoriety became a diplomatic embarrassment to John A. Macdonald‟s Conservative government, who transferred him in 1880 and forced his retirement in 1883. Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. XIII, 1901-1910, http://www.biographi.ca

153 and that any cuts could only benefit the country.133 It was this political atmosphere that would contribute to the public firestorm over the Ferguson affair early the next year.

At this point, it is entirely probable that the North West Mounted Police would have been phased out without intervention from beyond the realm of politics. Indeed, it was during these crucial years in which the force came very close to elimination that its social and cultural investment in prairie communities paid vital dividends. Ottawa may have been convinced that the force had outlived its usefulness in early 1897; however, it was abundantly clear that the residents of the prairies most emphatically disagreed and sought to retain the Mounted Police.

Laurier‟s plan had been to gradually fold the force into the existing military, based on the assumption that the primary role of the Mounted Police was to act as a deterrent against incursions from Native peoples or avaricious Americans.134 Both the

Macleod Gazette and Regina Standard issued sharp condemnations of the proposal, with the Standard noting dryly that the force was one of policemen first, not “soldiers doing useless things.”135 Businessmen, faced with the prospect of losing the force not only as insurance against outside crimes but also labor unrest, protested that the Mounted Police were “a God send.”136 Most tellingly, a petition was sent to Ottawa by a collection of

Alberta ranchers, asking the force be restored to full strength, citing not only the ability of the Mounted Police to reduce crime and secure the national boundaries, but also “the priceless value of their services in preventing and extinguishing prairie fires and the admirable way in which the law of the land is maintained and enforced, presenting in this

133 Laurier Papers, vol. 19, Walsh to Laurier, 15 September 1896, NAC, as cited in Macleod, 59. 134 Parliamentary Debates, Oliver and Laurier, 10 May 1897 , NAC. Also Macleod, 61. 135 Editorial, Macleod Gazette, 29 May 1896, and Editorial, “Playing Soldier”, Regina Standard, 7 August 1901, as cited in Macleod, 61. 136 Macleod, 62.

154 respect such a vivid contrast to many of the Western [United] States, some of which are still reeking with the crimes and outraged recently perpetrated…”137

Public outcry of this magnitude was not lost upon members of Parliament. Frank

Oliver, once of the force‟s most vocal opponents, once apprised of his constituent‟s concerns, was seemingly visited with an epiphany equal to that of Paul the Apostle, and began pressing Laurier to halt reductions in the force in early 1897.138 Those regions that had already seen force reduction began directing their complaints directly at Sir Clifford

Sifton, Laurier‟s Minister of the Interior who had devoted much of his energy into trying to circumvent Frederick White‟s authority by cutting him out of policy decisions.139 One such letter came from a timber agent, James Conners of Manitoba, who complained of

Americans stealing timber in the absence of Mounted Police patrols. “Perhaps you are not aware,” Connors noted, “that the Americans have so many friends and relations connected by marriage and otherwise on this side of the Boundary that they work into one another‟s hands by smuggling.”140 Left unsaid but not unnoticed was the implication that regular patrols, whose policy was to know all residents along their route personally, could have easily prevented the crime.

This is not to imply that public pressure alone convinced the Laurier government to preserve the NWMP, as two other events intervened to the benefit of the force. The discovery of gold in the Yukon sparked a gold rush in the middle of the decade, requiring not only an expansion of the force much further north but also required the existing

137 Petition, Wood et al. to White, 8 May 1895. RG-18, A-1, vol. 108, #318, NAC. 138 Ibid., 63. 139 Minto Papers, Journal Entry 10 October 1902, p. 206-7, NAC. 140 Letter, Connors to Sifton, 14 June 1897. RG-18, A-1, vol. 133, #139, NAC.

155

Mounted Police facilities in the prairies to remain operational for logistical support.141 In

1899, the outbreak of the Boer War not only drew so many officers away that a recruiting drive for the Mounted Police had to be undertaken, but it also removed the politically toxic L. W. Herchmer, who was granted leave to fight in South Africa. His replacement,

A. B. Perry, was far more acceptable to Liberal politicians, and removed many concerns about the force remaining a hotbed of Tory discontent.142

What the near-death experience of the Mounted Police illustrates, however, is the remarkable degree to which the inhabitants of the Canadian prairies both depended upon and were protective of the force. As an institution of integration, the Mounted Police occupied an unusual niche; it operated as a buffer between a core frequently viewed with a mixture of resentment and apprehension and a growing frontier region of crucial importance. Through the shared experience of living in the frontier and the performance vital services, the force was able to establish a store of trust and goodwill that were indispensable. Instructions from the capital were adapted, modified, and softened to best function in a physical and social environment officers knew intimately, while concerns and demands from local communities could be presented to the government in a manner best suited to produce a sympathetic response, due to the extensive contacts the force possessed in Ottawa.

Finally, and most frustrating to opponents of the Mounted Police, it proved politically and culturally impossible to eliminate the force after so much formal and informal authority had been vested in it. The tasks performed by the force on the frontier in many cases could not be performed by any other body; indeed, there was frequently no

141 Macleod, 62. 142 Ibid., 63.

156 other institution to turn to. In any event, the Mounted Police had become the face of the

Canadian state, in large measure by design. It was no more possible, in the final analysis, to ask the Canadians of the prairies to banish the Mounties than it was to ask them to surrender their horses. By standing in place of the Ottawa government, the North West

Mounted Police provided the frontiersmen, in many respects the most reluctant

Canadians outside of Quebec, with an identity and tradition they could claim as their own. It is testimony to the attachment to the force that the prairie provinces were prepared to offer considerable concessions in order to keep the NWMP alive, including federal control of public lands, publicly supported Catholic schools, and even the assumption of the operational costs of the force.143

Nation Building Through Negotiation

It is ironic, in light of Macdonald‟s National Plan, that the institution that was originally envisioned as the potential bludgeon to enforce obedience to the state would be fated to be the most visible and popular of state institutions. Ultimately, it was the unusual combination of broad and deep authority combined with a large degree of operational autonomy from the central government that allowed the North West Mounted

Police to manage the settlement of the frontier. With one foot metaphorically in the national core and other in the frontier, the force acted as a political, social, and cultural conduit that bound the state together.

143 Ibid., 69.

157

By contrast, the CPR was a project in which the residents of the prairies had not even a token voice, as represented by the decision that the money to subsidize the construction would come from freight rates and other fees paid primarily by the prairie regions. This policy, while ensuring the power of the federal government, thoroughly alienated the inhabitants of the provinces.144 Appeals to nascent nationalism, that this sacrifice should be born for the good of all Canadians, fell on utterly deaf ears. The

Métis and First Nations inhabitants of the prairies had long been treated with indifference or hostility by Ottawa, and were never invited to subscribe to the new Canadian national construct. The newer settlers, however, in whom Macdonald had hoped to incubate a sense of nationalism, found themselves in a position of being asked to pay for a project designed by outsiders for the benefit of other outsiders.

Even the North West Mounted Police, with its mythologized reputation and symbolic status, could not invent a Canadian nationalism to which prairie communities subscribed. Quite the reverse; its function as a frontier institution served as a focal point of a regional identity, strengthening the prairie bias of those settlers. The bedrock of the prairie identity was the shared experiences of frontier life, an environment in which the

Mounted Police helped make not only survivable, but a source of prosperity for those who settled there. Settler reliance on the force, and its ubiquitous presence in the lives of prairie residents, provided a common denominator that united immigrants that had originated from a multitude of countries and lifestyles.

Foreign immigration was a key part in the primacy of regional identity. In the

United States, however, regional identities never overpowered the national identity.

144 Ibid, 407.

158

Montanans distrusted Eastern capital and financiers, but never saw Easterners as foreign, primarily because so many of them had come from the East themselves. Canada, however, relied heavily on immigration from all over Europe as well has from the United

States to populate its frontier. With only a minority coming from central Canada, there were no pre-existing cultural bonds to tie the prairie settlers to the national government, only legal and political ones. Situated between central Canada and the insular, distinct society of British Columbia, prairie communities formed bonds based upon the necessities of frontier survival and their shared experiences, the North West Mounted

Police were an indispensable element of both.

This is not to say that no sense of unity existed within Canada. Canadian unity was based not in a national identity, as in the United States, but rather in a national experience. There was no single cultural construct that frontier settlers adhered to in the

Canadian prairies. While the majority was of European descent, it included peoples from southern and eastern Europe, who in the United States would have been deemed in great need of cultural assimilation. Most were Christian, but featured large numbers of non-

Protestant denominations, groups the American government would (and did) insist abandon cultural habits that were at odds with the national identity. The Ottawa government, desperately short of residents, simply could not afford to be as culturally discriminatory.

Instead, Canada became what historian Richard Atkin described as “a country stitched together by…necessity.”145 The regions of Canada, possessing their own distinctive identities, subscribed specifically to the political identity of the Canadian state,

145 Ronald Atkin, Maintain the Right: The Early History of the North West Mounted Police, 1873-1900 (New York: John Day, 1973), 19.

159 choosing it as an alternative to membership in the American nation. Thus membership the Canadian nation was more a negotiated agreement and political alliance than the embrace of a cultural nationalism. This did not make that membership any less real or successful, as the continued existence of the Canadian state proves. Cultural nationalism, therefore, is not a prerequisite for success of political or territorial integrity.

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CHAPTER FIVE: THE SUDDEN FRONTIER OF ALASKA, 1867-1912

There is little indication that when policymakers in Washington purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire, barely two years after the conclusion of the American Civil War, that any of them saw its actual governance as a major concern. The system of settlement and territorial government that had extended American control across the continent had successfully created states over a diverse array of climates and regions.1 Secretary of State Seward himself expressed confidence that Alaska would swiftly become the latest in a long line of self-governing American territories during a visit in 1869.2 So solid were the assumptions of timely settlement and integration that Congress spent much early debate attempting to limit the extension of local government for fear that fishing revenue would remain in Alaska instead of returning to

Washington.3 No one, certainly, predicted that it would take nearly half a century to achieve even territorial status, and nearly another to reach statehood.

It was in Alaska that, for the first time, the American model of territorial integration had to be significantly modified. The laissez-faire approach to incorporation, in which settlers were allowed to claim land and extend the dominant national identity according their own dictates, had utterly collapsed within a decade of the purchase of Alaska.4 During the twenty years between the end of the first attempt at settlement and the Klondike Gold Rush, the governance of

Alaska would introduce several new elements of territorial policy that would influence the development of America‟s northern colony. The absence of white settlement necessitated a

1 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 13 January 1869, p. 342. One of the fiercest advocates of developing Alaska was none other than Congressman James Ashley of Ohio before his disastrous appointment as Governor of the Montana Territory. 2 Library of Congress, William H. Seward, Speech at Sitka, Alaska, 12 August 1869 (Washington: J.J. Chapman, 1879) p. 12. See also Haycox, 175. 3 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 13 January 1869, p. 341. 4 Hulley, 211. See also Haycox, 183.

161 grudging inclusion of Native Americans into Alaskan life. This was accompanied by a vigorous and sometimes implacable effort at cultural assimilation; the early social leaders of Alaska were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the West.5

Most notably, the federal government would assume a far more dynamic and interventionist role in Alaska than in the continental West. This was fed both by the earlier failure of settlement and by the evolving nature of Alaska, as it moved from an underdeveloped backwater to a booming resource frontier by the end of the century.6 Further, the advent of

Progressivism would buttress the active role of the government, turning its emphasis toward education and social issues. By the time the Alaska Territory was established in 1912, the

American experience in the far north would have much in common with the Canadian prairies.

Unlike their Canadian cousins, however, Alaska‟s early leaders would not be its police or statesmen, but reformers and entrepreneurs. Bolstered by ranks of missionaries and businessmen, these two interest groups would define the cultural and political landscape of

Alaska as well as its policies.7

In theory, Alaska had much in common with the mountain West of the United States.

What little economic base existed in the region did so as a result of resource extraction, whether of wildlife or of minerals. As one lawmaker put it, “if there be any value at all in this territory of

Alaska it is in the seal fisheries.”8 The companies that profited from these resources were located

5 Sheldon Jackson, Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1877, as cited in Ted C. Hinckley, The Americanization of Alaska, 1867-1897 (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1972), 117. 6 Generally defined, resource frontiers are those regions which export all they produce to the national core, and consume all they import. See John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy: A Case of Venezuela (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966) 77-83. 7 Letter, A. P. Swineford to Secretary Smith, undated 1893, RG 59, Recommendations for Public Office, NARA, 85. Swineford listed among his qualification for office that owning mining interests in Alaska make him “as close to Alaskan as possible.” The first several governors of the District of Alaska would have close ties to the business community, which placed them at loggerheads with the reformers and social activists. See also Ted C. Hinckley, The Americanization of Alaska, 1867-1897 (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1972), 160. 8 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 13 January 1869, p. 341

162 in the contiguous United States, most commonly in San Francisco or Seattle; this required

Alaska to essentially export everything it produced and to import the vast majority that it consumed. In this way, Alaska was dependent upon support from Washington and the continental United States from its earliest days as an American possession. Finally, the presence of Native Americans was even more pronounced in Alaska than in the continental West given the low non-native population, which was estimated at less than 1500 “white men, Russians, and creoles.”9 Until the population began to rise significantly during the Klondike Gold Rush, the simple lack of human labor would prevent the same wholesale removals of Indians that had dominated the experience in the West.10

A Region Apart

For all the similarities between the two regions, crucial differences would force the

United States to dramatically alter its policy of territorial integration. The most far-reaching factor was also the most obvious: the physical separation of Alaska from the rest of the United

States. Alaska was the first non-contiguous possession of the United States, a characteristic that complicated virtually every aspect of governance.11 With British Columbia persuaded to remain within the Canadian state, the only route was by sea through the Alexander Archipelago, a series

9 40th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 February 1868, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Alaska Territory, NARA. No official census was attempted until 1880, making any population count an estimation based on reports from the territory. The „official‟ figure of 900 residents in the capital of Sitka (New Archangel) is corroborated in multiple sources, lending credence to the 1868 estimate. See also Hinckley, 31. 10 Haycox, 161. 11 Paul S. Holbo, Tarnished Expansion: The Alaska Scandal, the Press, and Congress, 1867-1871(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 15. Within weeks of finalizing the sale of Alaska, Secretary of State Seward would arrange the sale of the Caribbean islands of St. Thomas and St. John from Denmark, making the American Virgin Islands the second non-contiguous possession of the U.S.

163 of inlets with channels and reefs that took decades to chart completely.12 Passage was both infrequent and expensive, leaving many state officials little alternative but to depend upon the few private companies for transportation. The Alaska Commercial Company enjoyed such a monopoly on supplying and transporting agents anywhere beyond the Alexander Archipelago that the government surveyors dispatched to evaluate the worth of the territory did so on ACC ships and with the assistance of ACC employees.13 Understandably, this arrangement gave the

ACC tremendous influence in the shaping of territorial policy.

While the raw materials for the region‟s infrastructure were in abundance, the necessary ingredients of immigration and capital were not. Although the climate of what became known as the panhandle – the Alexander Archipelago and its communities of Sitka, Fort Wrangell, and what would become Juneau – was relatively temperate, the soil quality and local geography made pastoral farming difficult at best.14 The Alaska Commercial Company dominated the seal trade as well as the sale of dry goods to most residents, leaving precious little room for new commercial ventures or new workers.15 Without either new industries to employ residents or residents to create a demand for new goods, the economy and population remained stagnant.

It was this catch-22 that pushed the Russian government to sell Alaska in the first place, for all the difficulties encountered by the Americans had been magnified for the Tsar. Reaching

Alaska had required the Russians to traverse the even vaster wilderness of Siberia, an area the size of the continental United States, before undertaking the sea voyage across the Bering Sea.

Without rail lines or even a single road, the Siberian leg of the voyage alone routinely took six

12 Hinckley, 23. 13 Haycox, 181. The Alaska Commercial Company was the reincarnation of the old Russian-American Company, whose assets had been purchased by a San Francisco firm after the sale of Alaska. 14 Hinckley, 23. 15 Hulley, 211.

164 months.16 The Russian-American Company, the first joint-stock corporation ever created by the

Russian government, overcame the communication lag that could easily last up to eighteen months and exercise better control over the furthest outpost of the Russian Empire.

Russian rule in Alaska was further complicated by international politics. British and

Russian ambitions in western Asia clashed numerous times during the century, culminating in the unofficial military adventurism known as “the Great Game.”17 When Russia and Britain fought each other in the Crimean War, however, the colony in Alaska was both exposed and woefully short of manpower.18 The leadership of the Russian-American Company, in a series of unofficial diplomatic maneuvers, managed to negotiate a neutrality pact with the Hudson‟s Bay

Company, which enjoyed a similar monopoly over western Canada.19 Located on the opposite side of the world from the Russian heartland and separated by a wilderness of land and water spanning twelve time zones, Alaska was simply too remote for the Russian government to adequately protect.

Economics, along with security, was another factor that prompted the sale of the territory.

An economic recession in 1860 had struck the Russian-American Company particularly hard, but it was more a case of aggravating an existing condition. The primary industries of mining and whaling had required considerable subsidies from the Russian government to remain viable, and while the Company itself had turned minor profits, the result had been a net loss for the Tsar.20

16E. V. Alekseeva, История Русской Америки в англоязичной историеграфии, 1950-1980-х гг [History of Russian America in English Historiography, 1950-1980](Ekaterinburg: Rossiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1992), 34. 17 Russian expansion into what is today Afghanistan and northern Iran had met with British expansion northward from India into the Himalayas and the modern region of Kashmir. “The Great Game” became the popular moniker for the military and diplomatic intriguing that preoccupied both governments during the late nineteenth century regarding this region, as both sides sought to establish dominance in the region. 18 Hulley, 177. 19 Ibid., 194-5. 20 James R. Gibson, “The Sale of Russian America to the United States,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., Russia’s American Colony (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 274.

165

This, combined with the widespread belief that the United States would eventually absorb the whole of western North America and a desire to deny the British a new possession, prompted the

Alaskan Purchase of 1867.21

Secretary William Seward, the author of the purchase, also had geopolitical ambitions as a priority. Having made an expansion of Pacific trade one of his cherished causes over his career, Seward also believed fervently that the United States needed a strong naval presence in the Pacific, a conviction that was strengthened after the attacks of the Confederate raider

Shenandoah during the civil war.22 With Perry‟s forceful opening of Japan to American trade coming only fourteen years earlier, an Alaskan naval base would allow the United States to open more markets and goods in Asia to the American economy. As he put it, Alaska would serve as the “stepping stones between the two continents.”23

Alaska was not, however, an untouched virgin wilderness, a fact that was perhaps the greatest difference between it and the continental experience. In the American West, settlement had for the most part occurred in regions that had only known the presence of Native Americans, and had no preexisting, European-derived economic or political infrastructure. Indigenous sociopolitical structures had been discarded or wiped out, native economies replaced with

American economic systems geared either toward pastoral farming or resource extraction. With the purchase of Alaska, the United States inherited an entire economic and social infrastructure that had never been profitable or self-sustaining. Due to the difficulties of travel and the fact that the country had no machinery for the state-directed settlement of new colonies, it was extremely

21 Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, “The Sale of Russian America in the Context of Russian American Relations,” Pacifica 2, (1990): 156-69. See also Hulley, 199, and Haycox, 149. 22 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State, vol. III (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), 346. The Shenandoah had been attacking Union shipping in the North Pacific and was planning a raid on San Francisco when the war ended. 23 Haycox, 174.

166 difficult for the United States to abolish these established lifestyles through migration, as they had in the West.

The Beginnings of American Rule

One of the first decisions made regarding the governance of Alaska provides an example of how entrenched the continental model of settlement was in American policymaking.

Following the pattern of expansion, the Army was given control over the new territory in the absence of civil authority, giving General Jefferson C. Davis absolute authority over the governance of the Alaskan settlements.24 The assumption, based upon previous experience, was that the Army would provide security for new settlers until the population rose high enough to establish civil government. “It is presumed,” wrote the commander of the Department of the

Pacific, H. W. Halleck, “that the transfer of the country will be followed by an organized territorial civil government with the extension over it of the general laws of the United States.”25

The fact that the Army was given jurisdiction over a network of islands and isolated settlements in an archipelago, all reachable only by sea, shows how unaware the American government was of how different Alaska was from its continental territories. From the beginning, the Army was forced to either ask the Navy to transport them to their outposts or charter private vessels, usually from the Alaskan Commercial Company.26 After arriving, these troops found travel even among the islands of the Alexander Archipelago difficult at best; inadequate charting of the passages and inexperience caused the first detachment to Fort Kenay

24 No relation to the former President of the Confederate States of America. Letter, Davis to Dodge, 6 December 1867, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 25 Quoted in Ernest Gruening, The State of Alaska (New York: Random House, 1954), 34. 26 Letter, Tidball to McIntire, 1 May 1869, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, District of Kenay, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. See also Hulley, 209.

167 to wreck their boat in the Cook Inlet, delaying their arrival for months.27 When the Army was withdrawn in 1877 to fight Chief Joseph in the continental West, General O. O. Howard publicly suggested that the Navy was far better suited to exercise military rule in Alaska.28

Relying on transportation outside the command of the Army led to critical supply failures. Shortages of meat and fresh vegetables took their toll on the health of both soldiers and civilians, which only exacerbated the “totally insufficient” state of medical supplies.29 Despite being surrounded by islands with abundant timber, the need for firewood was so acute that soldiers had to cannibalize boats waiting to be repaired for fuel.30 To remedy these shortages on short notice, the Army had little recourse but to procure supplies from the Alaska Commercial

Company at government expense.31

In the absence of civil government, however, the Army was able to establish some basic state functions in Alaska in relatively short order. Facilities left behind by the Russian government were universally decrepit; reports from outposts at Kenay, Sitka, and Fort Wrangell all told of buildings and docks “terribly run down,” “unserviceable,” and “not worth keeping.”32

To compensate, the Army undertook a modest program of public works aimed at constructing new public buildings and establishing some municipal infrastructure.33 Without a judicial system, it fell to the Army to both prosecute criminals and jail them, a practice that sat badly

27 Haycox, 176. 28 New York Times, 13 April 1877. 29 Letter, McGilvray to McIntire, 15 May 1870, Register of Letters Received, Fort Kenay, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA; Letter, Hoff to Davis, 12 December 1867, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, 1867-70, Ibid. 30 Letter, Thatcher to Halleck, 14 January 1868, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, 1867-70, Ibid. 31 Letter, Crawford to Curtis, 7 May 1870, Register of Letters Received, Fort Kenay, Ibid. 32 Letter, McGilvray to McIntire, 30 September 1869, Register of Letters Received, Fort Kenay, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA; Letter, Tidball to McIntire, 1 May 1869, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, District of Kenay, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA; Letter, Davis to Sherburne, February 1868, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 33 Letter, McGilvray to McIntire, 2 October 1869, Register of Letters Received, Fort Kenay, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA

168 with both military personnel and civilians. Soldiers and their commanders were not trained as criminal investigators or judicial officers, and found themselves struggling to perform duties they had not trained for; the civilian population found the army‟s interpretation of justice heavy- handed at best. 34 Less than a year after the Alaska Purchase, the residents of Sitka sent a memorial to Congress seeking the establishment of civil government, stating that the colony

“[had] only military authority to govern them, not meant for loyal and law-loving men…”35

Not content with simply requesting a territorial government, the citizens of Sitka went a step further, declaring that they were “were compelled, in the absence of lawful civil rules and any orders of Congress, to meet in mass and adopt a charter for municipal government.”36 The response of General Davis to this direct challenge to military authority reveals how uncomfortable the Army was with its new role in territorial affairs. In a letter to the citizens of

Sitka dated three months before the memorial was read to Congress, Davis asserts that as long as the people of the town were willing to pay for their own services, he would welcome civil government.37 Taken in the context of the other correspondence from the region, it is clear that both the military officers in charge of governing Alaska and their civilian charges were deeply uncomfortable living under martial law.

Alaska‟s low population, however, was the chief barrier to the creation of an Organic Act that would have conferred territorial status. Even if Congress had believed the grossly inflated population estimate of 1500 citizens provided by the hopeful residents of Sitka, it fell well short

34 Letter, Davis to Dodge, 6 December 1867, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 35 40th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 February 1868, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers Related to the Alaska Territory, NARA. 36 Ibid. 37 Letter, Davis to Citizens of Sitka, 16 November 1867, Senate Territorial Papers Related to the Alaska Territory, NARA.

169 of the 5000 resident threshold required for such legislation.38 Immigration was retarded by the difficulties in getting to the territory, both in terms of expense and physical travel. Once there, the prospective settler was confronted with a land ill-suited to pastoral agriculture, no regular mail service or navigational support (such as maps or lighthouses) to facilitate contact with the continent, and a complete lack of either a legal code or a judicial system to enforce it.39

Despite this, the single largest problem that crippled early settlement in Alaska was the absence of reliable land surveys.40 Without them, there was no legal basis for land purchase, transfer, or ownership.41 Plots for farming in the warmer, more fertile panhandle could not be purchased with any confidence, and industries that could have augmented or supplanted the dominant fishing and sealing interests could not be established. Until a minor gold vein was discovered in Gastineau channel in 1880, establishing mineral extraction as the primary economic engine of Alaska, fishing was the only source of profit from the region. When the

United States established the Customs District of Alaska in 1868, it specifically protected the fur and fishing interests from outside competition.42 Without a solid basis for land ownership, the

Army was compelled to arrest settlers who had no legal claim to hold land. Secretary Seward

38 Hinckley, 41. Organic Acts are Acts of Congress that establish both a formal dependent territory of the United States as well as the agencies or legal institutions that govern them. Once an Organic Act is passed, the new Territory is entitled to send delegations to Congress, elect its own officials, and is accorded the benefits of the civil laws of the United States. 39 Haycox, 180. Travel to Alaska was so infrequent that regular mail service outside of Sitka would not be established until 1885. See Hulley, 207. 40 40th Congress, Memorial from American Geographical and Statistical Society, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers Related to the Alaska Territory, NARA. 41 Letter, Ball to Schurz, 20 April 1880, RG 48, Department of the Interior, M-430, Roll 1, NARA. See also Hinckley, 51, and Haycox, 181. 42 Ronald Lautaret, Alaskan Historical Documents Since 1867 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1989), 18. Congress also extended the outright sealing monopoly to the ACC based on the company‟s claim that any competition would erase any profits the trade brought in. See Haycox, 177.

170 himself had to warn General Davis that with no legislation passed to create legal land holdings, he would have to use force to drive off “squatters.”43

As a result, Alaska experienced a full cycle of boom and bust in the span of six years.

Immediately after the purchase of the territory, there was a brief influx of settlers, including those such as John Kinkead and William Sumner Dodge, who had experience in creating civil society in new territories.44 Sitka‟s first newspaper was established within a year of the purchase, and with General Davis‟ blessing, the city created a municipal government by 1869.45

Despite these efforts, the economic base remained too fragile to support enough immigration to sustain the community. The Alaska Times remarked, “Our merchants have become discouraged, and have been forced to close trading posts which would otherwise have yielded a large trade and good profit on investment.”46 The same year that the Times issued its economic postmortem, both Kinkead and Dodge abandoned Alaska for California; by the time the economic panic of

1873 struck, the Army estimated that the non-Indian population of Sitka had fallen to only 314.47

Four years later, the entire Army garrison was withdrawn from Alaska, leaving only a lone customs officer as the entire state presence in the region.48

When dissecting the failure of the first colonization attempt in Alaska, three primary obstacles are apparent. The most obvious was the iron logic of economics, for the region simply did not turn a profit. After purchasing the territory for $7.2 million, the United States

43 Letter, Seward to Davis, 28 October 1867, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 44 Both men would play important roles in the early history of Alaskan governance. Kinkead had been a leading figure in the push to admit Nevada as a state before it had reached the requisite population limit, and would serve as the first governor of the District of Alaska. Dodge, who had established a career as a treasury agent, would be the first mayor of the de facto capital of Sitka. See Hinckley, 42. 45 Hinckley, 39-41. 46 Alaska Times, 17 September 1870. 47 Hinckley, 59. A silver lining for Sitka‟s upper crust, had they remained, was that the city‟s prostitute population had also dropped by almost 50%. 48 Haycox, 183.

171 government paid an additional $116,000 for what little state services could be extended during the first decade of settlement; total revenues for the same period barely reached $57,000.49 The

Alaska Herald forecast that San Francisco entrepreneurs would control the Alaskan economy for the foreseeable future, stating, “the few firms and individuals who continue it have undergone an apprenticeship which has not cost them lightly…”50 Some legislators, despairing of ever seeing a return on the country‟s investment, suggested with a heavy dose of graveyard humor that the

United States pay another $7.2 million to any “respectable European, Asiatic, or African power” that would be willing to take Alaska off their hands.51 Another Congressman suggested that the only useful purpose Alaska could serve would be as a penal colony, a North American version of

Siberia.52

Frustration in the halls of Congress highlighted the second obstacle to incorporating

Alaska. For the first time in America‟s colonial experience, the established method of organic settlement was inadequate to the task. Migrating to Alaska was a far more difficult and expensive undertaking than migrating to the equally undeveloped West had been, given the costs of travel and unreliable routes of supply. The first settlers of Alaska, led by Mayor Dodge, had simultaneously decried military rule as “unwarranted and despotic” and demanded further government subsidy of their settlement.53 By the time the Sitka government collapsed in apathy in 1873, it was clear that if Alaska were to become a territory that the government would have to take a far stronger role than ever before in facilitating settlement. Resistance to this conclusion, the evidence for which was apparent shortly after the first wave of settlers arrived in 1867-68, can be attributed to institutional path dependence within American colonial policy.

49 Hulley, 212. 50 Alaska Herald, 27 December 1873. 51 Congressional Globe, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, 13 January 1869, p. 342. 52 Ibid., 343. 53 Hinckley, 54.

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The Rise of Informal Institutions

Any effort by the federal government to involve itself directly in the settlement of Alaska was complicated by fierce disagreements about the manner in which the territory should be developed. Shortly after the purchase from Russia, two broad but distinct factions had coalesced among those with an interest in Alaska‟s future. It would be these two groups, the industrial and commercial interests and the social reformers, frequently working at cross-purposes, which would form the main institutions of Alaskan integration. The industrial faction was comprised primarily of business interests, entrepreneurs, miners, loggers, and those who sought to benefit from the resource potential of Alaska. Funded by financiers located primarily in California and

Washington State, the industrialists benefited from the weak (or nonexistent) state presence in

Alaska. The main voice and driving force of the industrialist faction was the Alaska Commercial

Company.

It had been the ACC that played a significant role in slowing legislation regarding Alaska during the first decade of American rule.54 Certainly, its absolute monopoly on sealing and inherited dominance on travel and commerce anywhere beyond the Alaskan panhandle discouraged settlement and the growth of new businesses. Along with the ACC, salmon fisheries, timber companies, and mining firms, along with their employees, made up the rank and file of the industrialist movement. Their goals were similar to businesses throughout the

American West, and lobbied Congress assiduously for them: few regulations, little government interference in commerce, and low taxes. In the seventeen years between the purchase of Alaska

54 Haycox, 181.

173 and the adoption of its Organic Act, no less the twenty-five efforts to establish territorial status were introduced, all stymied by Senators friendly to Alaska‟s industrialists.55

Yet, it was the ACC‟s own dominance outside of the panhandle that made it one of the most powerful institutions of integration in a vast region populated almost exclusively by Native

Americans. The remote trading posts maintained by the Company not only employed explorers, scouts, and frontiersmen, but also provided a stable source of medical aid and training.56 Support was given to both Protestant and Russian Orthodox missions and schools, and the first surveys of the interior were done with the direct logistical support of the ACC.57 Each outpost maintained a record book as detailed as any found with the North West Mounted Police, detailing everything from business transactions and weather reports to accounts of scouting parties equipped and their intended destination.58 So integral were ACC operations to the opening of Alaska that former federal officials left their posts to join the Company, including a collector of customs named

John F. Miller, whose political connections were so close the White House that he became the president of the ACC.59 Possessing agents in Washington to influence federal policy, a steady source of revenue, and both equipment and capital provided from San Francisco, the Company was a stronger American presence in most of Alaska than the federal government for decades.60

The influence of the ACC was evident in fostering settlement in south-central Alaska after the decline of Sitka. Settlements had been established through Company activity at Kodiak

55 Henry Clark, History of Alaska (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 96. The ACC was accused of giving the brother of President Grant a seat on its board of directors specifically to block further legislation regarding Alaska. See also Hulley, 211. 56 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1873 (Washington, DC: 1874), NARA. 57 Hinckley, 93, and Haycox, 181. 58 Record Book, Station Tonyak File, Alaska Commercial Company Collection, University of Alaska, College, Alaska. 59Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, DC, 1961): 1331, Library of Congress. 60 The majority of information about Alaska that Congress received was provided either by ACC employees or scouts who depended upon the company and would later become employees. See Clark, 94.

174

Island, the eastern Aleutians, and most importantly from the perspective of American consolidation over the interior, at St. Michel and Fort Yukon along the route to the Yukon

River.61 In fact, it had been the ACC that had outfitted and provided support for the first

American interior survey and had acquired Fort Yukon from the Hudson‟s Bay Company in

1869.62 The fact that the Pribilof Islands, the ACC‟s main sealing grounds, were located north of the Aleutian Islands was another powerful factor in pushing for the establishment of a new capital, which they suggested be located on Kodiak Island, south of modern-day Anchorage.63

In the far north the ACC, for all intents and purposes, was the government of Alaska.

Possessing the vital Fort Yukon and employing virtually all the experienced explorers and scouts in the territory, the Company controlled both trade and access to the Yukon Valley well into the

1890s.64 Even after the introduction of competition to the Yukon the ACC remained dominant, possessing a fleet of twelve river steamers and providing limited electricity for the region by

1901.65 Profit for the ACC, however, did not necessarily mean profits for the United States. It was not until 1906 that river traffic and freight to the United States on the Yukon exceeded that headed to Canada; during the 1880s, Canadian trade outnumbered its U.S. counterpart two to one.66

In the absence of civic law and administration in the Alaskan interior, the most common form of civil governance was the adoption of miner‟s codes. As in the continental West, miners would commonly meet and draw up a list of conventions and rules to govern conduct in the absence of formal law. While the bulk of the provisions dealt with the setting of proper claims

61 Hinckley, 91. 62 Ibid, 89. 63 Alaska Herald, 9 July 1873. 64 William R. Hunt, North of 53°, (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 7. 65 Ibid., 185-6. By this time, the ACC operations in the far north were placed under a subsidiary, the Northern Commercial Company (NCC). 66 Sidall, 374.

175 and mining procedures, these codes strongly encouraged communal action and responsibility, an indication of how precarious and isolated these mining settlements were from the influence of the federal government. In the Harris district near modern-day Juneau, water rights were circumscribed so no individual‟s water use would “conflict with the interest of the river miners.”67 For more serious crimes, such as murder, the miner‟s laws allowed the death penalty.68 In remote Alaska, banishment was an acceptable substitute, as the end result was often the same.

The discovery of gold in Gastineau Channel, while not the sensational event that the later

Klondike rush was, created an impetus for settlement that would result in the Organic Act of

1884. News of the gold strike brought a wave of immigration, not just of fortune seekers and gold miners, but for the occupations necessary to support a growing community. Within a decade, the town of Harrisburg (later renamed Juneau) possessed hotels, restaurants, multiple stores, lumber mills and blacksmiths, as well as social institutions like saloons, opera houses, and barbershops.69 The maturation of Juneau from a mining boom town into a stable community was aided by the growth of the salmon canning industry, which provided a separate foundation for the community‟s economy.70

With the growth of towns and communities with diverse economic bases and increasing populations came a desire for an organized government. Meeting in Juneau (then called

Harrisburg) in August of 1881, the residents produced a memorial to Congress that demanded the institution of civil government to the territory. In part, the memorial decried that since the

67 Lautaret, 25. 68 Clark, 97. 69 U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office, Eleventh Census of the United States, economics section (Washington, DC., 1891), 238. Harrisburg was named after Richard Harris, who along with Joe Juneau discovered gold in Gastineau Channel. 70 Hinckley, 126.

176 purchase of Alaska, “[t]he supreme power of the proprietary government…has failed through all that time to prescribe any rule of action or civil code by which [our] rights might be determined or protected…[The residents of Alaska] are, therefore, reduced to that state of society in which their natural rights must be asserted through their own spontaneous act…”71 It is worth noting that the memorial was issued in the name of the people of southeastern Alaska, differentiating the relatively settled region of the panhandle from the sparsely populated interior.

The growth of full-fledged communities also brought the social reform movement to prominence in Alaska. Frequently acting opposite the industrialists was a coalition of upper- class social activists, educators, missionaries, and journalists that would form the bedrock of the later Progressive movement. As early as 1869, a sizeable segment of Sitka‟s population had made efforts to refurbish old schools and build new ones, both secular and parochial.72 Led by

Lizzie Kinkead, wife of John Kinkead, along with Chaplain William H. Van Horne, the reform faction placed their emphasis on education and religion, preferably working hand in glove.73 So intertwined were these two vehicles of social advancement that when Alaska finally gained an

Organic Act in 1884, the public and parochial education systems were merged, due in no small part to the efforts of Van Horne.74 Over time, the social faction would become synonymous with

Protestant missionary activity, so much so that opponents came to refer the missionaries as

“Jesus Christ and Company.”75 It is from the missionary community that Alaska‟s most effective advocate arrived in 1877.

Sheldon Jackson, a protestant missionary with experience organizing Indian schools in the Rockies, was one of the most powerful voices in both Washington and the popular media

71 U.S. Government Printing Office, 47th Congress, 1st Session, House Report #560, 1882, 2. 72 C. Delavan Bloodgood, “Eight Months in Sitka”, Overland Monthly, vol. 2 (February 1869), 180. 73Hinckley, 45. 74 Ibid., 46. 75 Jeannette Paddock Nichols, Alaska (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1924), 112.

177 influencing government policy regarding Alaska. The leader of a core group of missionaries that arrived in Alaska between 1877 and 1884, including future governor John Green Brady, Jackson would travel to Washington at least once per year, both to develop political connections and to stand as a counterweight to the industrial lobby in the capital.76 Although both the industrialists and reformers sought to develop Alaska as an integral part of the United States, they did so for opposing goals. Unlike the business lobby, which sought a resource frontier with little governance and regulation, the reformers pushed to transform Alaska from a collection of boom towns into a network of settled, residential communities. Only then, they reasoned, could the social blights of drunkenness, prostitution, and graft be brought under control.77 To that end,

Jackson lobbied Congress vigorously for extensions of civil law to Alaska and increased funding for schools throughout the early 1880s, eventually leading to the Organic Act of 1884.78

An incident in 1879 brought the need for some form of civil government in Alaska into stark relief. Tensions between whites and Indians in Sitka, fueled by alcohol, erupted in a series of racially motivated assaults during the winter of 1878-79 that caused many settlers to believe that a full Indian attack on the city was imminent.79 With no U.S. authorities to turn to, the residents of Sitka sought aid from Canada, seeking that “all forms of etiquette between governments” be overlooked in this emergency.80 The HMS Osprey was dispatched to defuse the situation, and remained at anchor outside of Sitka until relieved by the USS Jamestown under

Captain L. A. Beardslee. Although the Canadians had gained permission from Washington before sending the Osprey, the fact that a foreign power had to be called upon to provide security

76 San Francisco Bulletin, 6 February 1884. See also Haycox, 185. 77 Hinckley, 120. 78 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session, 5747. Over eighty petitions from both Alaska and Jackson‟s supporters in established states were received leading up to the Organic Act of 1884. See Nichols, 75. 79 Hinckley, 131. 80 Haycox, 184.

178 for Americans was deeply embarrassing, so much so that control over Alaska was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Navy. Captain Beardslee, determined to avoid another such incident, issued a full report on the situation in Sitka with his recommendations.

Beardslee‟s report was damning. He described Sitka as a “headless community” with “no such thing as public spirit or community of interest in Sitka.” Blame for the racial tensions

Beardslee placed on “drunkenness,” while characterizing the Indians as “not naturally savages.”

As for establishing law and order, he reported that “both whites and Indians manifested a disposition to rely on government forces for everything, and look upon me…to supply all of the deficiencies incident to the entire absence of any other governing power or code of laws.”

Beardslee soon found himself in a position of establishing some form of civic administration in region in which the residents were “willing to leave the whole task of governing, as well as all other public business to whoever would assume it.” 81 Assuming direct control of civilian affairs, however, was a deeply uncomfortable proposition for an American military officer.

Beardslee encapsulated the challenge of integrating new territories into the country when he catalogued the paradox of Navy rule in Alaska:

“I was fully cognizant of the fact that neither my commission nor my instructions, broad as were

the latter, conferred upon me the lawful power to make an arrest of a citizen, or to inflict a

punishment; yet I was equally certain that unless I did assume the responsibility of doing both, the

presence of the Jamestown at Sitka would have been comparatively profitless, for among both

whites and Indians there were men who were dangerous to the rest of the community, and who it

was necessary to control by force, and we alone had that. I was fully convinced that an

assumption of the functions of governor by myself would prove unsuccessful unless I should

receive the consent and support of the people whom I assumed to govern. Should the Indians

81 U.S. Government Printing Office, 47th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document Number 71, 1882, 13- 18.

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refuse to recognize my authority, the means at my disposal were not sufficient to enforce

obedience; and if the whites refused, there was no method which I could adopt to coerce them

which would not render me personally liable to a civil proceeding.”82

Beardslee‟s report contained several key conclusions that would form the basis of later federal policy toward Alaska. First and foremost was the balance of power between Indians and whites in the territory. Unlike in the continental West, there were simply not enough settlers moving into Alaska to compel the Indians to move to reservations. Accommodations had to be made to allow some degree of coexistence between the two groups if a state of continual conflict was to be avoided. As happened with the settlement of the continental West, the policies and officials imposed Alaska required the consent and support of the white settlers. Once again, the national core would be reacting to social and political conditions on the frontier, rather than directly molding them. To that end, Beardslee‟s report combined with the growth of Juneau convinced political opinion in Washington that some kind of territorial governance was necessary for Alaska.

The Organic Act, which finally granted a measure of civil government to Alaska, is testimony to both the influence of the reform movement and the reluctance of Congress to become directly involved in the development of a frontier territory. While civil government was extended to the vast region, a system of courts and marshals established, and a governor appointed from Washington, the Act was far more limited than previous legislation regarding new territories. Most notably, it established Alaska as a District, not a formal Territory; as such, it could not create a legislature, nor send a delegate to Congress.83 Further, its civil laws were an

82 Ibid. Emphasis added. 83 Organic Act of 1884, section 1, as reproduced in Lautaret, 39. Not only was Alaska the only of the fifty states to be organized as a district, the language in the Act itself speaks of uncertainty as to the region‟s future; Sitka is formally listed as the „temporary capital‟ of Alaska.

180 extension of those in Oregon, yet no counties could be organized within a District.84 The author of the Act, Indiana Senator Benjamin Harrison, himself admitted that the legislation was incomplete at best. “It is a mere shift,” he wrote, “it is a mere expedient; it is a mere beginning in what we believe to be the right direction toward giving a civil government to Alaska. I hope the more will follow…”85

Despite these shortcomings, the Organic Act was also heavily influenced by the reform movement and Dr. Jackson in particular. The Act limited the expansion of mining or other resource industries “provided that the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation,” stating that any attempt to negotiate the purchase of Indian lands had to be done through Congress.86 Further, the land laws of the United States were explicitly withheld from Alaska in order to safeguard Indian territory from settler encroachment.87 Section 13, however, represented the major victory for the reformers. It stipulated that a “needful and proper provision” was necessary for education of children in Alaska “without reference to race.”88 Congress not only allocated $25,000 for the immediate needs of education in the new district, but it also established Sheldon Jackson as the

General Agent of Education for Alaska.89

With the Organic Act, Washington was able to appoint officials to oversee local governance. From 1884 until 1912, when Alaska became a formal territory, party loyalty was far less important to a gubernatorial appointment than the blessing of the business interests. During the brief periods of Democratic rule under Grover Cleveland, the majority of the industrialists

84 Hulley, 221. 85 Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 1st Session, 564. 86 Organic Act of 1884, section 8. 87 Ibid., 40. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. See also Haycox, 190.

181 happily gave their blessing to Wisconsin native A. P. Swineford (1885-1889), despite his party affiliation.90 The Alaskan ran no less than three editorials during the winter of 1892-93 endorsing Swineford‟s appointment for a second term, while the rival Alaska Journal proclaimed that the Wisconsin native “[for] all intents and purposes…is Alaskan.”91 Retail entrepreneur J.

C. Green spoke for the business community when he wrote Cleveland, stating, “The business interests of Alaska demand that just such a man as Governor Swineford be placed at the head of affairs there again.”92

The close relationship between the industrialists and Alaska‟s appointed governors was a recipe for friction with the social reformers under the best of circumstances; with Sheldon

Jackson representing the reform movement, it was an unmitigated disaster. Jackson feuded with almost every governor appointed during his tenure as Education Agent for Alaska.93 From the beginning, Governor John Kinkead‟s (1884-1885) plans to expand mining rights and land sales earned Jackson‟s ire; Jackson saw such settlers as “profane, obscene, and threatening,” and opposed the introduction of any more such people into Alaska.94 Kinkead responded by savaging Jackson‟s schools in his report to Washington, accusing the missionary of seeking to

“destroy the Industrial Schools” for Indians, so that his religious schools would face no competition.95 Swineford‟s driving ambition convinced Jackson that the new governor sought to remove him from his post; what followed was an acrimonious war of words between the two

90 Letter, Nowell to Swineford, 20 February 1893, Swineford File Recommendations for Public Office (Cleveland- Harrison), RG 59, NARA. 91 Newspaper clippings, Ibid. 92 Brief of Endorsements, Ibid. 93 Lazell, 72-4. The lone exception was John Green Brady, whom had been a missionary under Jackson in the 1880s. 94 Letter, Jackson to Gambell, 13 November 1900, Letters Received, Department of the Interior (Office of Education), RG 393 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 95 Report, Kinkead to Secretary of the Interior, 30 June 1885, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 481, NARA.

182 men that played out in the Alaskan press.96 Throughout his career, Jackson would be accused of everything from neglecting the education of white children in favor of Indians to hoarding reindeer for his congregations while allowing others to starve.97

Native Alaskans and Cultural Assimilation

In Alaska the reform movement assumed exceptional power, particularly in regard to

Native Americans. By the late nineteenth century, the tales of land fraud, influence peddling, and conditions of Indian reservations in the continental West were widely disseminated to the general public through the press.98 A report by H. W. Elliot, one of the few familiar with the region, served as a blueprint for the new federal policy toward Alaska. In it, Elliot wrote that,

“[T]he Indians there are undisturbed, they in turn will not disturb us, and the subject of law and order thus becomes a very simple one indeed, and inexpensive. In order that the natives may continue self-supporting, it is the duty of the government to suppress all agencies which tend to debauch and ruin them.”99

In this report, lawmakers saw an opportunity to satisfy both the national conscience and the national pocketbook. Indian removal, particularly in the continental sense with the forced exodus to reservations, was an unrealistic option in Alaska; the government lacked the military force required for such an undertaking, the willingness to spend the necessary money, and the political will to potentially ignite another round of Indian wars. The withdrawal of the Army in

96 Lazell, 72-3. 97 Hulley, 235-242. 98 Letter, Potts to Schurz, 25 July 1878, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents – Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. Also see 40th Congress, Memorial of the Dakota Legislative Assembly, 30 December 1867, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA. 99 H. W. Elliot, “Ten Years‟ Acquaintance With Alaska, 1867-1877,” Harper’s, vol. 55 (November 1877), 803. Emphasis added.

183

1877 had been justified by the need for more troops to pursue Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce in the continental West; the government could hardly justify the same policies that had led to the that conflict in Alaska.100

Jackson and his colleagues were also inspired by the Metlakatla settlement in British

Columbia. Headed by Dr. William Duncan, Metlakatla was an attempt to acculturate the

Tsimshian nation to the expectations and norms of Victorian life without the rapid culture shocks and violent social changes that came with reservation-style removal.101 It was unapologetic cultural imperialism, a program to mold Tsimshian society into the Canadian cultural ideology.

At the same time, it was also an attempt to do so without the physical and emotional suffering associated with Indian reservations in the continental West, which had come under withering public fire in the years after the Civil War.102 In his report as Commissioner of Education,

Jackson extolled the virtues of the Metlakatla system. “There are no paid officials,” he wrote in

1877, “no annuities, no treaties, and no thieving Indian agents, but the whole is managed just as any community of white people manage their own affairs.”103 Mission-based schools quickly became the favored approach to cultural assimilation within the U.S. Congress, as they had the benefits of being both inexpensive and politically popular.

An indivisible component of cultural assimilation had been the prohibition of alcohol, a cause that lay at the very heart of the reform movement. Liquor had long been a plague upon

Indian communities, both in Alaska and the continental West; Captain Beardslee blamed the escalating hostility among both whites and Indians that led to an 1879 near-riot in Sitka on “very

100 Haycox, 183. 101 Hinckley, 114. 102 Ibid. 103 Sheldon Jackson, Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1877, as cited in Hinckley, 117.

184 powerful rum.”104 Reverend Hudson Stuck, visiting Fort Yukon at the turn of the century, reported that many miners had taken to “peddling and giving liquor to Indians and the subsequent debauchery which inevitably follows has been altogether unchecked.”105 Reverend

Stuck was blunt in his opinion of the settlement: “[The peddlers] have one of two purposes, when he does not have both – either the gambling with the natives for their furs or the debauching of their women…Fort Yukon is the worst place on the river and that conditions there cry aloud for some attention at the hands of justice.”106

Liquor smuggling was hardly unique to Alaska, for the issue had bedeviled the Canadian government as well. Not only had the introduction of white settlers to the Prairies crippled efforts at prohibition in the mid-1880s, drunkenness had begun to appear as a regular problem among members of the North West Mounted Police.107 Attempting to enforce prohibition had led to a major breach of trust between the force and the settlers, which threatened the very ability of the Mounted Police to perform their duties.108 Eventually, the issue was resolved when new laws transferred responsibility for enforcement to local police, freeing the NWMP from the burden of enforcing a wildly unpopular and virtually unenforceable law.109 In the struggle between law and order when it came to prohibition, the Mounted Police opted for order.

The statistics from the period testify to the near-futility of enforcing a complete ban on alcohol. In order to distill their own alcohol, the roughly 1700 residents of Sitka consumed an

104 U.S. Government Printing Office, 47th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document Number 71, 1882, 13- 18. 105 Hudson Stuck, Statement on Conditions on the Yukon and its Tributaries, 1906, Correspondence and Reports, Office of Education, Alaska Division, RG 75 (Bureau of Indian Affairs), NARA. 106 Ibid. 107 Macleod, 132-5. 108 Letter, Superintendent W. M. Herchmer to Commissioner Herchmer, 8 December 1887, RG-18, A-1, vol. 15, no. 34, NAC; Letter, Herchmer to White, 11 September, 1890, RG-18, A-1, vol. 44, no. 741, NAC; Letter, White to Herchmer, 27 September 1890, Ibid. 109 Macleod, 142.

185 average of 100 barrels of molasses per month.110 Smugglers from Canada did a brisk business; reports from officials complain of Canadian entrepreneurs bringing whiskey into Alaska, in amounts rising to 60,000 gallons of alcohol per year by 1896.111 Even Army officers were caught up in the bootlegging, with one major even arrested for stealing army supplies to sell liquor to the residents of Sitka.112 During one four-year period from 1895 to 1898, the U.S. government was forced to spend $150,000 chasing down illegal alcohol purveyors at a time when Alaska was supposed to be moving toward self-sufficiency.113

In the struggle over prohibition John Kinkead, Alaska‟s first governor, sided against the missionaries. His stance was all the more remarkable considering that it was his wife, Lizzie

Kinkead, that had spearheaded Alaska‟s first temperance movement during their years in Sitka in the late 1860s.114 Kinkead‟s compromise proposal was Solomonic in character; licenses could be purchased by established businessmen and saloons, while bootleggers, smugglers, and other outlaws that pushed alcohol on the Indians could be arrested and punished. The license proposal, which came to be called „high license,‟ also had the benefit of raising money for the district‟s coffers. “I can see no good reason,” he wrote in 1884, “why saloon-keepers, merchants, traders, and others should contribute their mite in the way of license.”115 Like many compromises,

Kinkead‟s proposal satisfied few, and opposition from the reformer faction buried it. It would

110 Clark, 91. 111 Letter, Davis to Fry, 3 August 1868, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. The frustration in this correspondence in directed at the Hudson‟s Bay Company, which the American officials viewed as a de facto arm of the British government. See also Clark, 91. 112 Letter, McIntire to Wood, 14 October 1868, Letters Sent, Department of Alaska, RG 353 (Army Continental Commands), NARA. 113 Clark, 91. 114 Hinckley, 43-45. It should also be noted that John Kinkead‟s business was caught smuggling liquor while his wife was heading up the temperance movement. See Hinckley, 55-56. 115 Governor’s Annual Report, 1884, (Washington, DC, 1884), 2.

186 not be until the Klondike gold rush that high license would be enacted, and then only out of necessity.116

Reverend Stuck may have appealed to the hands of justice, but those hands were bound by the same realities that had governed official action in the continental West. Local officials could not afford to alienate their charges, especially in Alaska, where in the case of Fort Yukon the nearest law enforcement was three days‟ journey, and even then usually consisted of one or a handful of men.117 Stuck, while praising Judge Harlan at Fort Yukon as an “upright and honorable man,” lamented that it was “impossible for him to take a decided stand in repressing the lawless element…he yields to pressure.”118 Stuck admitted that most townspeople opposed the temperance movement because “there is always a strong sentiment in a mining town against the suppression of vice as being bad for business.”119

A vivid example of the kind of pressure Judge Harlan faced erupted when Stuck successfully persuaded the district attorney and marshal for Fort Yukon to deny a saloon a new license on the grounds the establishment also ran a brothel. When Stuck returned a few months later, the saloon had its new license and the brothel remained in operation. Judge Harlan explained to Stuck that his office had been “besieged for days by women of the dance hall and by dealers in millinery and other women‟s groups and that he had withdrawn his protest under pressure brought by this class, which found its livelihood threatened.”120 Even in instances where liquor smuggling was detected, law enforcement refused to prosecute all but the most serious cases. In one instance, federal officials arrested six whiskey peddlers in one raid while

116 Hinckley, 162. 117 Hudson Stuck, Statement on Conditions on the Yukon and its Tributaries, 1906, Correspondence and Reports, Office of Education, Alaska Division, RG 75 (Bureau of Indian Affairs), NARA. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid.

187 allowing their confederates to go free. Explaining this action, the governor wrote, “Several more arrests could have been made, but Messrs. Harding and Hagler, under my advice, refrained from bringing complaints against men except in cases where it was practically certain that the evidence was of such conclusive character as would lead to indictment by the grand jury and conviction in the District court.”121

It was not only the moral issues of insobriety that troubled Alaskan leaders, for the dissemination of liquor also had a corrosive impact on the local economy. Due to the extremely low population of whites to Native Americans, Alaskan governors soon realized that the Indians would have to be integrated into the workforce to a much greater degree than in the continental

West. Social activists decried the impact of alcohol on domestic life while governors lamented the lost productivity and cost to their meager treasury. As late as 1908, Governor Hoggart wrote,

“Whiskey selling to Indians employed at the Treadwell Mines and living in Douglas City is

rapidly destroying the usefulness of the Native as a workman and depriving him of the proper

fruits of his labor. These Natives are industrious, and two hundred of them now have an

opportunity of making and excellent living in the Treadwell Mines, if they can be protected from

the whiskey seller. The evil is greater at Douglas City at present than anywhere else in the

District, owing to the large amount of wages earned by the Natives living in that city.”122

Hoggart‟s report illuminates two crucial differences in Indian policy between Alaska and the continental United States. Native Americans were a necessary part of the Alaskan labor force, far more so than in any other territory. Even as late as 1906, well after the Klondike gold rush had swollen Alaska‟s white population, a “very liberal estimate” placed the number of non-

121 Letter, Clark to Fisher, 31 July 1911, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 329, NARA. 122 Letter, Hoggart to Attorney General, 10 October 1908, Ibid.

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Indian residents at 33,000, of which 6,000 were of mixed parentage.123 Reservation policies, even if they had not become unpopular, were simply not viable in a region that was already suffering from a labor shortage. The necessary integration of Native Americans led to an arrangement where Alaskan Indians lived either in or immediately adjacent to white settlements, and were paid wages substantially higher than those of their continental brethren.

A vivid example of how important Native Americans were to the functioning of early

Alaska was the introduction of Indian policemen. Created by Beardslee in the aftermath of the

Osprey incident to help keep order in native communities, the policemen were restricted to patrolling native villages.124 When A. P. Swineford replaced John Kinkead as governor, he found salaries for the Indian police over six months in arrears; it is testimony their perceived importance that Swineford immediately paid the amount out of the district‟s treasury before asking the Interior Department to reimburse him.125 In addition to speeding the process of cultural assimilation, the presence of the Indian police was a great asset in cracking down on liquor smuggling into native communities.126 Multiple governors, both Republicans and

Democrats, lobbied Congress to continue funding the force even after Alaska was granted full territorial status in 1912.127

123 Governor’s Report, 1906, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 220, NARA. The same report gloomily pointed out that the single largest import into the territory for four years running had been illegal liquor. 124Letter, Acting Secretary of the Interior to Comptroller of the Treasury, 12 May 1910, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 329, NARA. The natives of the Alaskan panhandle, unlike their Great Plains counterparts, lived in settled villages and practiced subsistence farming, a lifestyle that made American-style police work more effective. See Hinckley, ch. 1. 125 Statement, Swineford to Interior, 24 May 1888, Ibid. In his statement, Governor Swineford explained that, “I deemed it essential and necessary to good order in the native village to continue the force.” He went on to blame his predecessor for the neglect and swindling of the Indian policemen. 126 Letter, Clark to Ballinger, 6 August 1912, Ibid. 127 Ibid.

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Economics alone spoke in favor of the Indian police. The total cost of maintaining the

Indian police in Alaska for the whole of 1911 came to $5,520.128 Compared with patrolling

Indian reservations in the continental West, ignoring the much lower labor and transportation costs, the police were a relative bargain. This argument was laid out in stark relief by Governor

Clark when Congress failed to appropriate funds for the police in 1911.129 He wrote, “[The] entire native population [is] becoming demoralized through lack of any peace officer in several settlement where to station deputy marshals would cost twenty thousand per annum and where native officers at twenty dollars per month would suffice. Present condition forms a crisis rendering any backward step in means of preserving law and order particularly unjustifiable.”130

Generally speaking, the Native Americans of Alaska benefited greatly from two key factors. The first was the low white population during the first few decades of American rule, which „locked in‟ policies that favored Indian autonomy and a greater degree of accessibility to

Alaskan society. The second was the power of the social reform movement and the ascendancy of the Progressives. Inspired by the social reform movement, Progressivism reached deep into

Alaskan politics, resulting in the adoption of popular labor laws, wage regulations, and protection of native lands.131 The pinnacle of the Progressive movement in Alaska was the adoption of the 1905 Nelson Act, which funneled revenue from liquor licenses into education and road building.132

While the lot of Alaskan natives was considerably better than that of the Indians in the continental United States, any measure of civil rights was heavily tied to subscription to the dominant cultural ideology. In modern terms, this meant the heavy application of cultural

128 Letter, Ballinger to Clark, 9 January 1911, Ibid. 129 Letter, Clark to Fisher, 1 April 1911, Ibid. 130 Letter, Clark to Ballinger, 4 January 1911, Ibid. 131 Haycox, 219-221. 132 As cited in Lautaret, 50-52.

190 imperialism to Indian society. While praising the Indians of southeast Alaska as “generally friendly,” Governor Kinkead spelled out his plan for the assimilation of many Indians into

American society. “The destruction of Shamanism,” he wrote in 1885, “with its accompanying superstitions would do more to civilize the Natives that all other influences combined. It must be done before they can reach any commendable degree of civilization.”133 Resistance to American rule, and the subsequent changes to native culture, was met with overwhelming force. Said

Kinkead, “A few severe but needed lessons taught them the folly of contending with the whites and subdued in great measure their warlike disposition. The destruction of two of their towns by the military and naval authorities with their „big guns‟ effectually settled the question of

„Mastership‟.”134 He finished by noting that the spread of Protestantism among Alaskan Indians since 1867 saw “their superstitions gradually giving way to better influences, their allegiance to their Chiefs and Doctors and Shamans loosening…”135

Despite the supremacy of American cultural ideology, by the turn of the century attitudes towards Native Alaskans had changed noticeably. Sheldon Jackson, while building missionary schools based on the Metlakatla settlement, also urged his fellow missionaries to preserve Indian artifacts and goods for future generations, amassing a collection that he hoped would be the foundation of a museum of Indian culture.136 His protégé and eventual governor of Alaska, John

Green Brady, called for Indian suffrage in 1903, an unpopular position that was upheld in court two years later.137 Alaska‟s district courts had argued that existing American law was unduly harsh on Indians whose cultural practices, particular involving cohabitation of sexes, were so

133 Report, Kinkead to Secretary of the Interior, 30 June 1885, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 481, NARA. Emphasis original. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Hinckley, 413-414. 137 Hulley, 290-292.

191 different from those of American society.138 President Roosevelt, in an effort to demonstrate his concern for the welfare of Alaska‟s indigenous population, dispatched Navy Lieutenant G. T.

Emmons to evaluate the status and needs of Native Alaskans in 1904.139

Lieutenant Emmons‟ report speaks volumes about how the federal government‟s view of native Alaskans had shifted in twenty years. The Indians were described thus: “They are a simple, kindly race, who have ever held out the hand of friendship to our people, and in return they have been deceived and imposed upon to the limit of their endurance.”140 He catalogued two broad groups of Indians, “Those who are self-sustaining and need only supervision education, and moral support…[and those whose] inability to help themselves is more the result of circumstances than their own fault.”141 The most immediate needs, Emmons recorded, were humanitarian. Hospitals, schools, and the full extension of civil rights were emphasized as critical to the survival of native Alaskans.142 Emmons finished with an impassioned plea for the preservation of an otherwise alien culture: “The wants of these people, so few in number, can be easily supplied by the Government at a limited expenditure…[otherwise] this population, replete with local knowledge, acclimated, and trained to hardship, will have passed away and their loss will be keenly felt, when by a little care they can be made a strong factor in the opening up of a little-known and a valuable country.”143

The paucity of social services was not limited to Indian communities. Although the

Organic Act had granted a degree of territorial government, the extent and influence of that

138 Special Report of the Grand Jury, District Court of Alaska, December 1907, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 201, NARA. 139 Report, G. T. Emmons to Roosevelt, 19 January 1905, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 201, NARA. President Roosevelt‟s thoughts are included in the foreword to the published report. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.

192 government was incredibly weak. Schools, which until 1890 did not offer education beyond the

8th grade, were also one of the few places Alaskans could receive rudimentary health care or any sort of welfare assistance.144 Local police frequently charged wounded or ill Alaskans of any race with vagrancy, so aid could be dispensed through the penitentiary system, as no other aid program existed.145 The Alaskan, writing in 1892, castigated Alaska‟s treatment at the hands of

Washington lawmakers as “worse than Gaul…at [the] hands of the Roman Empire.”146

Contrary to public perception, the federal government was quite active in Alaska from the time of its purchase, more so than in its other, continental territories.147 The U.S. Army had returned to Alaska with the Organic Act of 1884, and had forged a healthy collaboration with the

North West Mounted Police during the gold rush era, particularly in the border town of Skagway during efforts to wrest control away from the criminal leader “Soapy” Smith.148 While it is unclear as to whether the Army openly copied practices from the NWMP, it is undeniable that the Army took on a much more active role in building the infrastructure required to facilitate settlement in Alaska. The Army Signal Corps built miles of telegraph cables, linking Alaska to the continental United States by way of the Canadian telegraph network.149 Agricultural stations were built to support efforts at farming in the Alaska panhandle.150 While the Army was not directing settlement or determining the nature of the settlers, these initiatives represented a

144 Letter, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 29 May 1911, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 201, NARA. See also Hulley, 243. 145 Letter, Superintendent of Prisons LaDow to Chief Clerk, Interior Department, 10 January 1912, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 201, NARA. When the practice was discovered, the Justice department curtly informed Interior that this practice would no longer be allowed, so any allowance for social aid should be sought through Congress. 146 The Alaskan, 10 September 1892. 147 Haycox, 231. 148 Ibid., 211. 149 Governor’s Report, 1906, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 220, NARA. It should be noted that the Signal Corps did so without permission from Washington. Given the praise heaped upon it by Governor Clark and the subsequent approval for reimbursement, the Signal Corps proved the adage that it is better to seek forgiveness than permission. See also Haycox, 213. 150 Haycox, 214.

193 fundamental shift in territorial integration, a compromise between the organic approach of the continental West and the state-directed approach of the Canadian prairies.

By the time Alaska achieved formal status as a Territory in 1912, the traditional pattern of American integration had reasserted itself. The white population of Alaska had risen sevenfold between 1890 and 1910, ending the reliance on Indian labor.151 The Indian police had done such an effective job of prosecuting liquor smuggling in native communities that they were phased out that year.152 The passage from District to Territory marked Alaska‟s transition to genuine self-government. Yet it had been an unparalleled experiment in state activism, a project of political, economic, and cultural colonization that had midwived Alaska to full territorial status. Congressman William Moody of Massachusetts openly described Alaska as a colony of the federal government, whose development had to be guided with a far more interventionist hand than the country‟s continental possessions.153

The Lessons of Alaska

America‟s Alaskan experience heralded a new period of territorial expansion in which the

United States acquired non-contiguous territories throughout the Caribbean and Pacific. Of these new conquests, only the island chain of Hawaii would achieve full integration into the American nation.154 All of these regions shared characteristics that made colonization and assimilation

151 Ibid., 210. 152 Letter, Clark to Ballinger, 6 August 1912, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 329, NARA. 153 Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, 2235. 154 The vast majority of these maritime holdings would be acquired during the Spanish-American War (1898-1901). While most of these former territories gained independence during the twentieth century, the United States still retains a number of territories, dependencies, and commonwealths with differing levels of autonomy. Guam and Puerto Rico remain arguably the most visible remnants of this American empire.

194 extremely difficult. With the exception of Puerto Rico, these were far-flung island chains located thousands of miles from the continent of North America and populated by inhabitants whose cultures were far different from the American national identity. Distance and lack of a strong economic base in these territories made large-scale white migration impossible.

Yet, this fate could easily have been Alaska‟s. Without delving too deeply into the counterfactual, it had been the Klondike Gold Rush of the late 1890s that had driven immigration into Alaska to the point where the American system of territorial governance could function.

That system had been predicated on a steady flow of migration from the national core to the frontier. Had the Gold Rush not occurred, it is likely to assume that white migration into Alaska would have continued to stagnate.

What the Alaska experience demonstrates is how strongly institutional path dependence held the American government to an organic model of settlement. The Canadian experience in the prairies had proven that the federal government could take an active role in directing settlement, through incentives, private enterprise, and state policy. Doing so, however, would have required the establishment of entire new organizations and institutions, as well as striking at the heart of American settlement policy. The entire territorial system assumed that the majority of territorial residents would be settlers from the East (or in this case, the continental United

States). To import vast numbers of migrants from Europe, as the Canadians had done, would have undercut the fundamental goal of extending American nationalism into frontier territories.

Even such radical change might well have become necessary, had it not been for the existence of the informal institutions of industrial interests and social reformers. Although relations between the two camps ranged from indifference to outright hostility, the two factions complemented each other perfectly from an immigration standpoint. Industrial firms established

195 an economic base and wealth potential that attracted potential immigrants, while the social support systems established by the reformers provided the cultural “glue” that formed the foundation of stable communities that could endure periodic boom-and-bust cycles. In the

Canadian context, the federal government had undertaken both of these tasks. The American government might well have been compelled to follow suit had these competing interest groups not undertaken these responsibilities of their own accord.

Changing racial views also contributed to the distinct character of Alaska. By the time the region became a formal territory in 1912, the Progressive movement championed by

Theodore Roosevelt was directing much of federal policy, including the Bureau of Indian

Affairs. The continental habit of removing Indians to reservations was now seen as a recipe for disaster, and in any event, the government lacked the ability to do this on the same scale in

Alaska. The new solution was to treat Indians in the same way as immigrants from Eastern or

Southern Europe, to Americanize them through education and vocational training so they could be integrated into mainstream society. The slow pace of white settlement helped to further moderately improve the lot of Native Alaskans, as it had for the First Nations of the Canadian prairies. As late as 1940, Indians made up half of the Alaskan population, and were so integral to the labor and consumer markets that institutionalized removal was never a viable option.155

Whiteness still mattered in Alaska, but it was now a matter of simply behaving like a white man as opposed to being one.

Those necessary departures from traditional policy established Alaska as a distinct society within the national identity. For the first time, lawmakers grappled overtly with the need for cultural flexibility within the American cultural framework. One of the first statements of

155 J. S. Whitehead, “Noncontiguous Wests: Alaska and Hawai‟i” in Wrobel and Steiner, Many Wests, 329.

196 twentieth-century multiculturalism came from the Secretary of the Interior, who wrote in 1908 that, “The social and moral ideals and practices of natives are at so great variance from those [of] the United States [that] statutes are not adapted to them. The penalties are too severe, and when inflicted are unproductive of reform…”156 Alaska was a vivid lesson on the difficulties of incorporating distant and diverse regions into the national identity, as well as demonstrating how vital cultural flexibility was to the success of that integration.

If Alaska had forged one of the strongest regional identities in the United States, it still remained, in the words of historian J. S. Whitehead, “an integral part of the nineteenth century

West.”157 The method and manner of its settlement, however convoluted, still feel within the established format of the continental West. Its economic structure had more in common with

Nevada and western Montana than Hawaii. Heavily dependent upon resource extraction as well as foreign capital (in this case, from San Francisco and Seattle), Alaska‟s population fit the profile of other mining regions. Largely male and racially diverse, much of Alaska was home to a few pockets of urban stability in a largely unstable collection of mining camps and single- industry villages. While physically separated from the American West, Alaska was culturally, socially, and economically an equal part of it.

156 Memo, Secretary of the Interior, 21 January 1908, District Court of Alaska, December 1907, Department of the Interior, Office of the Territories, Classified Files, RG 126, Box 201, NARA. 157 Whitehead, 335.

197

CHAPTER SIX: INCORPORATION AND ACCOMODATION

For the United States and Canada, the task of incorporating vast regions of new territory into the existing political and cultural framework presented a number of challenges. Political control had to be both established and maintained, settler communities had to be protected, and the infrastructure of their economic survival developed. Despite the differences in geography and climate, these imperatives remained constant, whether the territory was Montana,

Saskatchewan, Alaska, or somewhere in between. Local conditions created variations that had to be accounted for, requiring modifications of state policy or different types of integrative institutions, but the same basic problems had to be overcome by both governments. All of these requirements, however, were subordinated beneath a single universal imperative: the need by the national core to secure the loyalty of the inhabitants of the peripheral frontier.

The need to balance both the requirements and desires of the settler population explains why legal regimes evolved so drastically once in the frontier; Mounties dispensed farm aid as well as pursued smugglers, while territorial governors became political advocates for the same people they were supposed to be keeping under control. Both the territorial governors and

Mounted Police had the task of both reconciling the cultural distinctions between peripheral communities and national cultural norms while establishing legal and political order.1 These organizations were commonly the most visible, if not the only, state presence accessible to new settlers. This meant that in the course of carrying out their official functions, organs of law enforcement were compelled to take on additional and unofficial duties that went beyond their formal mandate to facilitate both settlement and settler loyalty.

1 Benton, 253.

198

Nor was this „duty drift‟ relegated only to the lower levels of law enforcement. In the

United States, territorial officials up to the governor were accessible to the public in ways that are difficult to fathom in the twenty-first century, and frequently acted as a mediator for all types of disputes, as well as having to move outside official channels to procure basic supplies and resources. Many governors found themselves required to leave the territorial capital for weeks at a time to address issues further afield, such as river flooding or the construction of a new penitentiary.2 When attempting to manage these situations, many governors found that their legal mandate did not extend to such basic functions as providing monetary aid to flood victims.3

The common resolution to this impasse was to circumvent the law by using extralegal means, deputizing a branch of the administration (such as Indian Affairs) to tend to settler needs that technically lay outside their purview.

Similarly, the duties of the Mounted Police changed dramatically once the force established itself in the frontier. For new farmers in an unknown environment, veterinary services, reliable communications and protection from prairie fires were as important, if not more, than investigations of illegal liquor and border smuggling. Within twenty years, the

Mounted Police had gone from a body designed to simply protect frontier communities to one charged with building, maintaining, protecting, and advocating for them. There ubiquitous presence and established relationships with community leaders was the chief reason for the change, as no other government agencies possessed the resource or social capital to accomplish these tasks.

2 Letter, Pennington to Newbold, 23 July 1877, RG 48, Miscellaneous and Patents, Transcripts of Executive Proceedings and Related Correspondence, NARA. 3 Letter, McCormack to Endicott, 4 April 1887, Ibid.

199

The same logic applied to Alaska, where business interests and missionary groups made up the only two sizeable social institutions for the first thirty years of American rule. In the absence of formal state institutions, private organizations such as mining companies or missionary groups adopted functions of governance that they required to function. Exploration, trade, and banking were facilitated by entrepreneurs and industrial groups, while education and social services fell under the control of the social reform movement and its associated organizations. This arrangement was only abolished after the Alaska colony had amassed a high enough population for official state organizations to function. Prior to this point, the federal government was willing to allow the private sector to assume the state‟s traditional roles.

Differing Policies in Differing Settings

By far the most glaring difference between American and Canadian policies was the role played by the state in settlement. In the United States, federal policy was to accommodate the desires of Western settlers rather than to direct them.4 This resulted in an institutionalized policy of the state “following” its own citizens, whose migration dictated both the pace and regions of settlement. Canadian integration, however, took the opposite approach. The federal government in Ottawa not only determined the scope and pace of frontier settlement, but also directed national economic and infrastructure projects (such as the Canadian Pacific Railway) specifically to encourage immigration to key regions.5 Settlement, north of the 49th parallel, followed the state.

4 Lawson and Seidman, 124. 5 Winks, 334.

200

Geography and divergent historical experiences combined to create such radically different policies. While the climate and ecology of the northwestern plains of North America included the prairie provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan as well as the state of Montana, the political boundary between Canada and the United States determined that geographic features hundreds of miles to the east would dictate patterns of settlement. American settlers enjoyed an abundance of rivers that functioned as natural avenues to the West.6 The Ohio-Mississippi-

Missouri river network effectively linked distant Montana with the older and more populated core of the United States. Canals and maritime traffic on the Great Lakes extended this reach as far east as New York and the states of New England. Development of railroad connections, made easier by the relatively serene topography of the Midwest, would transform the cities of

Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City into major hubs of westward settlement.

Canada possessed no such advantageous terrain. The Canadian Shield, a vast region in which pre-Cambrian bedrock lies beneath a very thin layer of soil, effectively isolated the political and populated core of the country from its frontier.7 Farming was virtually impossible in this region, and the bedrock that comprised the Shield made excavation for roads and railways exceedingly difficult. A “dead zone” of settlement, therefore, stood between the heartlands of

Ontario and Quebec and the prairies, magnifying the difficulties in transportation and communication that distance imposed. With British Columbia located even further and behind the imposing Rocky Mountains, it is little wonder that the Ottawa government offered a king‟s ransom to entice the Pacific province to enter into Confederation. Such physical isolation

6 Theodore Binemma, “The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History: The Northwestern Plains as Bioregion” in Evans, 19. 7 Ibid., 19.

201 contributed to the unique cultural development of British Columbia, whose settlers habitually identified far more with Great Britain than with Canada itself.8

Ease of migration thus became a defining factor for national settlement. With its larger population and natural east-west corridors of travel, the American government could colonize its frontier regions while expending little or no effort on promoting settlement. In fact, despite numerous treaties with neighboring Native Americans, the federal government was powerless to prevent its own citizens from encroaching upon Indian lands; in these cases, the United States was obliged to use military force to support what amounted to an illegal fait accompli by frontier immigrants.9 Overcoming the presence of the Canadian Shield, by contrast, required more capital, investment, and sympathetic regulation than any private firm could hope to mobilize without state assistance. Canadian geography mandated western settlement become a public/private venture.

Divergent historical experiences drove these policies even further apart. Fears of foreign invasion or annexation of existing territory were non-existent among American policymakers.10

The only invasion of the continental United States had occurred in 1814, a punitive raid on

Washington in retaliation for the American invasion of Ontario. Correspondence from territorial officials expresses concern not of foreign threats to American territory, but rather internal threats to the cultural integration of frontier regions.11 The Civil War, as high as its human and financial cost had been, had conclusively established the supremacy of the federal government over its

8 Richard Maxwell Brown, “The Other Northwest: The Regional Identity of a Canadian Province” in Wrobel and Steiner, 284. Many prominent Canadian scholars, including Walter N. Sage and J. M. S. Careless, have concluded that British Columbia was not settled by Canadians, but rather by the British, a crucial cultural distinction. See Brown, 298. 9 Eblen, 31-34. 10 Pomeroy, 2-3. 11 Governor‟s Report for Dakota, 1885, RG 46, Senate Territorial Papers related to Dakota Territory, NARA, 12. See also Lamar, 313, and Alexander, 181.

202 territories as well as its ability to mobilize the Army to enforce its rule. Under these conditions, it made both economic and political sense to support the white Protestant majority, those that embodied the national identity, and require minorities to either adopt that identity or be removed.

The opposite sentiment ran high in Ottawa. The National Plan put forward by Prime

Minister Macdonald was a fervent, almost desperate desire to maintain the independence of

Canada in the face a much more populous, wealthy, and militarily powerful neighbor. Memories of the American invasion of 1812 and strained tensions during the American Civil War accentuated Ottawa‟s feeling of weakness in the face of American strength. Only by promoting the economic and cultural bonds between central Canada and its far-flung possessions, the official logic declared, could the Canadian state survive next to the United States.

Sir Leonard Tilly articulated this position in an 1879 speech to Parliament, in which he declared, “[T]he time has arrived when we are to decide whether we will be simply hewers of wood and drawers of water… [or whether we] make this a great and prosperous country, as we all hope and desire it will be.”12 Tilly‟s speech reveals the unease about the survival of the

Canadian state that prevailed in Ottawa during the late nineteenth century. American politicians spoke repeatedly about the inevitability of American success, expansion, and the fulfillment of

Manifest Destiny, but nowhere in the halls of Congress was expressed any uncertainty that the

United States will prosper, either economically or politically.13 The perpetual dominance of the

American nation, certainly within North America, was taken as established fact.

How these two federal governments viewed the security of their frontiers, in part as a consequence of geography, guided their respective policies of integration. Free from the threat

12 Robert Craig Brown, Canada’s National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 12. 13 Seward, 344-7. See also Hulley, 199, Bolkhovitinov, 156-69, and Haycox, 149.

203 of invasion or forcible annexation, the United States could allow its people to decide when, where, and how quickly to settle its vast Western frontier. With a large population, dominant military and relatively easy access to its periphery, the American government could afford to focus its efforts on promoting a single cultural identity to ensure regional loyalty to the state.

Canada, however, was never able to forge a single national, cultural identity. Opening and populating its prairies required the government to dedicate its energies toward building the necessary economic, transportation, and institutional infrastructure. In the American experience, this process occurred organically as the settler population grew over time; obliged to populate its frontier quickly and to import most of its settlers from abroad, the Canadian state had to accomplish the same process in advance of settlement. Similarly, the low population mandated the Canadian authorities accommodate ethnic groups that their American counterparts would have regarded as culturally incompatible. While immigration authorities in Canada did insist upon a certain degree of acculturation, Canadianization emphasized the practical aspects of prairie life, particularly farming methods and facility with English.14 Cultural practices, provided they did not interfere with public order, were generally treated with official indifference. It should be noted that racism or cultural chauvinism were not absent in Canada, as the repeated anti-Chinese riots of British Columbia attest; rather, the Canadian government simply couldn‟t afford to institutionalize their cultural prejudices with so few settlers available.

The result of these geographic and historical differences was that integrative institutions in the two North American democracies pursued different goals. American territorial governors were charged primarily with catering to the needs of their settlers, to protect them from outside threats and refrain from interfering in their internal affairs, even when such interference might be

14 Macleod, 150.

204 of long-term benefit. The North West Mounted Police, however, were meant to direct the course of settlement and defuse potential crises, even if those duties required them to impose restrictions upon white settlers. With no unifying national identity to rely upon for popular support, the

Mounted Police used their role as a buffer between central Canada and their prairie neighbors to gain acceptance and legitimacy. On both sides of the border, state institutions depended upon popular acceptance to carry out their duties and function effectively, despite pursuing different goals and utilizing different methods.

The American experience in Alaska provides arguably the most important insight into the process of integration because it represents a conflict between geographic constraints and policy requirements. Alaska‟s physical separation, foreign climate, and low population are more reminiscent of the Canadian prairies than the northwest plains of the United States, with the mineral wealth and isolation of the Rocky Mountain regions. It is here that the American method of settlement had to grapple with the natural limitations that faced Canadian lawmakers.

Chronologically, the comparison between Alaska and the prairies is appropriate; the prairies were opened to white settlement in 1885, whereas the Alaska was granted its Organic Act in

1884. Studying Alaska in this context allows us to determine whether natural or institutional factors determine methods of settlement. In short, were American and Canadian institutions and policies defined more by their environment, or by their historical development?

Based upon the Alaskan experience, historical path dependence clearly exerted a stronger influence. Until the discovery of gold in Gastineau Channel, efforts at organic settlement met with failure, culminating in the collapse of the Sitka settlement. Yet even with the American presence in Alaska reduced to virtually nothing, there was no effort by the federal government to

205 promote settlement through state intervention.15 The Army had been distrusted by the first wave of white settlers as well as resentful of its new responsibility, and had lobbied Congress to reassign responsibility for Alaska.16 Instead, the government effectively handed off the territory to private business and religious interests until the population had grown to the level where an

Organic Act could be enacted. Although Alaska was officially the responsibility of the Treasury

Department during much of this period, no state services or assistance was extended to those few settlers who remained.17

The American resistance toward state-directed colonization thus has more to do with institutional memory than the natural conditions of the frontier itself. Canadian institutions, after all, had successfully colonized both the prairies and the distant Yukon under similar conditions and with a much smaller national budget. The United States certainly did not lack the economic, administrative, or technological ability to craft a similar set of policies or institutions. What instead constrained the American government was the established system of territorial integration and maturation, all of which was predicated upon minimal government intervention and popular initiative. The historic memory of the state, then, exerted a strong influence on the nature of its territorial institutions.

A Fluid Core/Frontier Relationship

The role played by those institutions also depended greatly upon how the metropolis viewed its frontier possessions. As agents of the national core yet located in the peripheral

15 U.S. Government Printing Office, 47th Congress, 1st Session, House Report #560, 1882, 2. 16 Letter, Davis to Citizens of Sitka, 16 November 1867, Senate Territorial Papers Related to the Alaska Territory, NARA; New York Times, 13 April 1877. 17 Haycox, 183.

206 frontier, these organizations were responsible for providing information to the state on the political, economic, geographic, and cultural conditions in the peripheral regions. However, as their mandate included assisting in the process of settlement while reproducing the democratic institutions of self-government, a certain level of cooperation with the settler populace was necessary. This was done primarily through the promise and reward of state funds and services.

The net effect was to make these organizations effectively an advocate for the peripheral needs, as the loyalty of the frontier populace was necessary both to carry out their organizational tasks and to bind the region culturally into the metropolis. Thus American territorial governors advocated for their citizens against their nominal political masters in Washington, while

Mounted Police superintendents chose which offenses to prosecute rather than adhering to the letter of the law as crafted in Ottawa.

Out of this set of conflicting loyalties developed a curious and counterintuitive power relationship between the core and periphery. Formally, the core held exclusive control over legal, economic, and military power, while the periphery remained a dependency possessing only limited internal autonomy. In democracies, however, coercing the majority of frontier residents through the threat of force was not a viable strategy. The legal machinery of democratic governance is predicated upon popular participation; therefore, frontier populations must voluntarily subscribe to the state before peripheral territories can become integrated into the metropolis. Cultural loyalty to the nation, then, becomes the most valuable commodity in the political relationship from the perspective of the government. The nature of democratic

207 governance eliminates political coercion as a permanent means to secure loyalty, leaving the state little option but to secure that loyalty through negotiation.18

When this condition is added to the fact that the national government views the frontier through the filter of agents that necessarily advocate for frontier needs and desires, a new power relationship emerges between the two regions. In these situations it is the periphery, which possesses a commodity that the core requires but cannot take by force, which sets the parameters of the political relationship, rather than the core. Every aspect of policy making, from conception to implementation, is dictated by the perception of conditions in the frontier by the metropolis. Subsequent changes or modification to territorial policy are done in reaction to frontier conditions rather than the government‟s shifting priorities or desires. Initiative agency in territorial integration, at least among democracies, exists with the periphery, through the very institutions created by the core, which largely exercises reactive agency.

These factors taken in combination explain why in both Canada and the United States, institutions were perpetuated regardless of their suitability for evolving conditions over time.

For example, the North West Mounted Police were maintained despite having officially outlived their institutional usefulness after 1900, as the role of law enforcement had been absorbed by provincial authorities. The reluctance of the federal government to risk public disapproval by disbanding the Mounted Police was a key factor in retaining the force.19 Similarly, the United

States allowed non-state actors such as the Alaska Commercial Company to assume traditional governmental roles, such as maintaining transportation routes and administering educational services in Alaska. For the government to assume these tasks would have required the creation

18 Political censure and coercion was an effective short-term strategy, however. Montana, with the majority of its population voting for the Democratic Party, was repeatedly denied full membership in the Union during Republican administrations. It was only after the Democratic Party gained control of the government that the territory was given full admission in 1889. 19 Macleod, 82.

208 of new institutions and the investment of significant capital at a time in which the political will for such expenditures was absent.20 The perceived transaction cost was much lower, therefore, in allowing private entities to take over these tasks on a contractual basis, and more congruent with prevailing political opinions regarding the degree of federal control over new territories.

With loyalty to the national identity the ultimate goal of integrative policy, both governments adopted a nuanced policy toward the issue of regional identity. The main objective was to settle frontier regions with populations that would identify with the national identity; to do so, each state sought to populate its periphery with settlers who shared as many cultural traits with that identity as possible. In both countries, this resulted in a basic preference for Protestant, white, Anglophone settlers.21 Those from southern or eastern Europe were considered tolerable, although Catholicism was viewed with varying degrees of suspicion and antipathy.22 Groups considered too alien in either culture or ethnicity to subscribe to the national identity, as in the

Indian reservations of the Dakotas and Montana, were either isolated or had the most objectionable parts of their social practices eliminated through both legal and military means.

Native Americans such as the Cheyenne were forced to abandon their nomadic ways of life, their children placed into agricultural schools with the goal of transforming them into eastern yeoman farmers.23

Regional distinctiveness, however, was tolerated. While national identities of the period placed a far greater emphasis on ethnic characteristics than those of today, a democratic state simply could not afford to alienate too many segments of its own population. Small variations of were acceptable, provided they fell within the boundaries of the national identity, as they allowed

20 Lautaret, 17. 21 Friesen, 164. 22 Ibid, 167. 23 Alexander, 162.

209 the state to absorb more territory at lesser expense. When the western territories of the United

States began granting women the right to vote decades before their eastern sisters, it was within the framework of popular sovereignty and democratic governance, the very principles that the federal government wished to instill in its colonial possessions.24

Similarly, the large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe possessed languages and social customs differed noticeably from those of the dominant, British-derived society that dominated Ottawa. These immigrants, however, brought to the prairies both the desire to create communities in a region where Canada desperately needed residents as well as loyalty to the

Canadian state. Regional identities, so long as they were situated within the larger network of the nation, also provided a social „breathing space‟ that allowed citizens to effect changes in territorial governance without resorting to armed violence.

The case of Montana is particularly illustrative of this phenomenon. On the face of it, permitting large numbers of citizens who either sympathized with or participated in a recent rebellion against the state seems the height of folly. The effect, however, was to deflect the former Confederate identity into a new, Western identity. By allowing these citizens to settle a new region with citizens from other areas of the country, and then giving them a significant voice in the governance of that territory, the government provided a mechanism for citizens to express their dissatisfaction without endangering the integrity of the state. Further, this was no mere illusion of autonomy; the citizens of Montana were able to force the recall of unpopular governors, create their own internal laws, and regulate their commercial livelihood. In exchange,

Montana agreed to remain an integral part of the United States and to give its political loyalty to

Washington.

24 Pomeroy, 17.

210

Vox Populi

Despite these differences in structure, function, and national goals, both North American countries shared a critical common denominator when it came to frontier settlement. In both instances, the success of settlement and state integration depended upon the voluntary subscription of the frontier populace to national loyalty. While the nature of democratic governance by no means precluded the use of force against rebellious citizens (the Southern

Confederates of the United States could attest to that), it does require the majority of the population consent to state policies. This key requirement does much to explain the popularity of ethnic or cultural nationalism during the nineteenth century. By affixing the cultural norms of the ethnic majority to the national identity, states could bind political loyalty to the social bonds that dominated much of their population.25

Interweaving political and ethnic loyalty imbued American territorial policy with an official cultural orthodoxy. Manifest Destiny, as the name implies, became as much about fulfilling an inherent mandate for the American people, and by extension the nation, as it was about territorial expansion and the accumulation of natural wealth. Cultural nationalism conferred tremendous legitimacy upon state policy. When frontier residents protested their treatment by the federal government, they did so primarily to protest specific actions. The actual territorial system itself was not called into question.26 Moreover, hostility fostered by the

25 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 84. 26 The Alaskan, 10 September 1892. This editorial, which protested the paltry funds allocated for social services in Alaska, did not call for the abolition of the District system of governance, but rather for Alaskan interests to lobby Washington for additional funds. Abolishing the structure of the territorial system itself was never seriously suggested.

211 intrusion of non-territorial interests, especially business interests from the East or based in

California, never metastasized into resentment against the state itself. Rather, it was deflected into inter-regional resentment with resolution sought by legal means instead of resorting to insurrection and violence.27

Cultural nationalism exacted a punishing price upon ethnic minorities, however.

Although racism and ethnic chauvinism gradually evolved over the course of the nineteenth century, the conflation of Anglo-Saxon cultural norms with the American political identity left minorities isolated from the national culture. Some groups, such as Jews or Catholics, were included in most aspects of American society and could participate in political intercourse; there were no widespread campaigns to deny these groups employment, property, or voting rights.28

Groups at greater variance from the national identity, however, were required to sacrifice their cultural heritage to be granted even grudging participation in national life. Indians, Mormons, and the Chinese, until the advent of the Progressive era, were systematically isolated from

American society and lived without benefit of most civil rights or liberties.

The Canadian experience proved, however, cultural nationalism was not a prerequisite for the survival of the state. Denied the ability to craft a national orthodoxy, the Canadian nation was never a political extension of the cultural majority. Instead, it became an alliance of distinct regional identities in which political loyalty was exchanged for state support. In this context, the

Mounted Police assumed the dual duties of mediating between the metropolis of central Canada and the peripheries as well as delivering state services.29 Canadian identity thus became a composite of its regions rather than a single unified construct. In the phrase of historian William

27 Shortridge, “Expectations,” 119. 28 Morrow, 25-7. 29 NAC, RG-18, A-1, vol. 1, #6. Letter, French to Minister of Justice, 14 November 1873.

212

G. Robbins, there are no “grand mythologies about the Canadian nation-state.”30 Common experiences united frontier communities and forged regional identities, and common goals united the regions into a state.31

Geography, history, and national imperatives thus shaped the United States and Canada in vastly different directions in spite of their common continental setting and British imperial origins. While the United States incubated regional identities within its borders, these were continually sublimated beneath an overarching national identity. Subscribing to the American state necessarily meant adopting the American cultural identity and conforming to its norms and expectations. This development, however, was not the result of some innate cultural strength in the United States that was absent in Canada. Rather, it was the consequence of favorable geography, a large population, and a political system that granted tremendous freedom of action to individual citizens and the cost of a coherent plan of settlement. Similarly, the relative peace of the Canadian frontier experience was not the result of an existential predilection toward tolerance and reason among Canadians. That peace was result of the presence of a mediating organization that prepared conditions for settlement, combined with the destruction of Native

American resistance to white rule by the American Army.

One common characteristic united the United States and Canada, and that was the need to convince their frontier populations to choose membership in the nation. Membership, as the saying goes, had its privileges, and the frontier settlers of both countries extracted considerable privileges in exchange for their subscription to the state. Despite their legal dependence upon the federal government, territories exercised wide autonomy and considerable leverage within the political structure of the country. The offer of national loyalty brought the tangible benefits of

30 Brown, 302. 31 Ibid., 302.

213 state subsidies for infrastructure and economic development, legal and military protection, and domestic self-governance. What emerges from an examination of continental expansion in the nineteenth century is not a narrative of powerful governments forcing their frontiers into submission, but a robust and intricate process of colonization, negotiation, and assimilation in which the populace exercised tremendous power over their governments.

214

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES

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