The Case of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review

49 | 2014 Varia

Christian Thibon (dir.)

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/336

Éditeur IFRA - Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 1 septembre 2014 ISSN : 2071-7245

Référence électronique Christian Thibon (dir.), Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 49 | 2014 [En ligne], mis en ligne le 07 mai 2019, consulté le 28 mars 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/336

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review Varia © IFRA, 2014

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review n° 49, April-June 2014

Chief Editor: Christian Thibon Deputy Editor & Editorial Work: Marie-Aude Fouéré Cover Design: Marie-Astrid Lehoux

Avis L’IFRA n’est pas responsable des prises de position des auteurs. L’objectif des Cahiers est de diffuser rapidement des informations sur des travaux de recherche ou documents, sur lesquels le lecteur exercera son esprit critique.

Notice The opinions expressed in the articles are solely the responsibility of the authors. The aim of Les Cahiers is to rapidly disseminate information on research works or documents, on which the reader may pass his own judgment. Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Table des Matieres / Contents

I — Articles...... 5

David Bénazéraf — La Chine au Kenya : enjeu stratégique dans un pays pauvre en ressources naturelles...... 7 Aurélia Ferrari — Evolution of Sheng during the Last Decade...... 29 Fabian S. Kigadye — Architectural Conservation in Rapidly Urbanising Cities: The Case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania...... 55 Lester M. Jao, Christine Abong’o, Nuru K. Kyalo, Clara Bulili — Phonétique et didactique du FLE : Cas de confusion des sons chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans...... 75 Giordano Marmone — Alliances militaires et musicales sur le mont Nyiro: le système d’âge des Samburu à l’épreuve des nouveaux paradigmes du conflit ...... 87 Hanne Sangnæs Dihle — Land, Authority and Power: A Case Study of the Forestry Company Green Resources in Uganda...... 99 Babere Kerata Chacha and Peter Waweru — Ekebete Marriage in the Historiography of Pawnship and Female Abduction in East Africa, 1890-1945...... 123

II — Sources, Archives, et Materiaux...... 141

Olivier Provini — The Political Economy of Makerere Reforms via a Qualitative Approach. An Interview with Professor Ruth Mukama...... 143 Jean-Luc Paul — Les récits oraux luguru comme sources ethnographiques : enlèvement, poignade, meurtre et remplacement dans une population matrilinéaire de Tanzanie.....161 Chloé Josse-Durand — Le « code de conduite » politique du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders : libérer la communauté nandi d’un mauvais sort en réhabilitant les « bon leaders » en temps électoral...... 183

III — RECENSIONS...... 197

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

I. Articles

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

La Chine au Kenya : enjeu stratégique dans un pays pauvre en ressources naturelles

David Bénazéraf1

Résumé : La Chine est devenue en quelques années un partenaire majeur du Kenya. Première source des investissements directs à l’étranger entrants au Kenya et deuxième partenaire commercial, elle est aussi son premier bailleur de fond bilatéral. Sans être un fournisseur majeur de ressources naturelles, le Kenya constitue toutefois un pays clé pour la stratégie chinoise en Afrique de l’Est. Les échanges économiques sino-kenyans ne représentent qu’un volet de la présence chinoise dans le pays. La Chine tente également d’y accroitre son influence culturelle et son pouvoir d’attraction. Elle reçoit un accueil favorable des autorités dans le cadre de la politique d’ouverture aux pays asiatiques.

Introduction

Bien que l’Afrique de l’Est soit encore peu pourvue en richesses naturelles de grande ampleur identifiées et exploitées, la Chine entretient des relations économiques importantes avec les acteurs des pays de la région (Éthiopie, Tanzanie et Kenya principalement). Ces relations couvrent de nombreux secteurs, comme c’est le cas sur l’ensemble du continent africain. La présence des acteurs chinois, ancienne pour les entreprises publiques et plus récente pour les entreprises privées, est en effet en forte croissance sur l’ensemble du continent africain depuis les années 2000, et dans des secteurs très variés. Les relations de l’État chinois avec ses partenaires africains ont été renforcées depuis le premier Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine qui s’est tenu en 2000 (Kernen, 2007 ; Taylor, 2011) et à travers les liens que développent les provinces chinoises avec les États africains. La Chine occupe désormais une place de premier plan dans de nombreux pays d’Afrique. La consolidation de sa présence était régulièrement décrite comme une manière de sécuriser ses approvisionnements en matières premières pour alimenter la demande intérieure. Les ressources naturelles sont considérées comme structurantes dans les relations sino- africaines (Alden & Soares, 2008). La structure des échanges commerciaux demeure ainsi fondamentalement de type Nord-Sud : exportation de ressources naturelles ou

1 Doctorant en géographie, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Laboratoire Prodig CNRS-IRD. 7 Numéro Varia

agricoles par les pays africains qui importent des biens manufacturés, limitant d’autant le développement d’une industrie locale et favorisant les phénomènes de rente (Chaponnière, 2012). L’accélération des relations Chine-Afrique exacerbe la confrontation entre les bailleurs à l’échelle globale (Tan, 2010). La Chine est qualifiée d’acteur extérieur, émergent, venant s’immiscer dans les relations entre anciens colonisés et anciens empires coloniaux (Li, 2006) en dépit de sa politique de coopération pourtant ancienne sur le continent (Chaponnière, 2008). Le concept de ‘Chinafrique’2 perpétue un certain nombre de mythes sur l’importation massive d’une main-d’œuvre chinoise bon marché par exemple. Pourtant, les modalités de la présence chinoise sont diverses et font appel à différents outils et stratégies (aide, commerce, investissements) en fonction des contextes particuliers de chacun des pays (Brautigam, 2009). Les Chinois ne sont pas seulement acheteurs de matières premières ; ils sont de plus en plus en position d’investisseurs (Veron, 2008). En dépit de constantes, leurs interventions varient en fonction des 49 pays africains avec lesquels la Chine entretient des relations diplomatiques.

En-deçà de l’approche générale sur les relations Chine-Afrique, des nuances s’imposent au regard des relations particulières qu’entretiennent l’État chinois et l’ensemble de ses acteurs, publics ou privés, avec chacun des acteurs des pays africains. Nous analyserons dans cet article les spécificités des relations sino-kenyanes en examinant l’ensemble des volets concernés, à l’exception de la coopération militaire3. Si le contenu de ces relations a été passé en revue ces dernières années (Onjala, 2008 ; Mutua Kioko, 2012), la présence chinoise peut être replacée dans le contexte plus large de son engagement en Afrique, et analysée au regard de la diplomatie d’influence de la Chine. La Chine est en effet devenue le premier bailleur bilatéral du Kenya en 2011 et constitue depuis 2013 la première source d’investissement direct à l’étranger (Ambassade de Chine au Kenya). Le Kenya est lui- même le troisième partenaire de la Chine parmi les 24 pays d’Afrique australe et de l’Est. En l’espace d’une décennie, la Chine s’est imposée comme un acteur majeur dans le pays, concurrençant les partenaires et bailleurs historiques du Kenya. Les acteurs chinois sont toutefois en compétition avec d’autres acteurs asiatiques ou émergents, comme le

2 Ce néologisme faisant référence à la ‘Françafrique’ ouvre la voie à une lecture post-coloniale et essentialiste des relations entre la Chine et l’Afrique. Il convient de se départir du contexte historique de la colonisation, et de considérer ‘la Chine’ non pas comme un bloc monolithique, mais comme un ensemble d’acteurs pluriels. 3 La première délégation militaire chinoise se rend au Kenya en décembre 1996, dirigée par le commandeur de la région militaire de Lanzhou. D’autres visites peuvent être relevées comme celle du général Li Jinai, commissaire politique de la direction des équipements de l’armée chinoise en octobre 2000, puis en décembre 2001, celle du général Fu Quanyou, chef de département des ressources humaines. Le Kenya dispose en outre d’un attaché militaire en Chine depuis 1998 (Mutua Kioko, 2012 : 12).

8 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Japon, la Corée ou encore Singapour souvent cité en modèle (Xinhua, 2010). En tant que centre économique de la région avec une situation politique globalement stable, le Kenya constitue une base-arrière pour les acteurs économiques chinois en Afrique de l’Est, comme c’est déjà le cas pour d’autres acteurs internationaux. Les deux pays entretiennent des relations dans des domaines diversifiés : agriculture, santé, tourisme, médias, énergie, infrastructures, etc.

Cet article combine deux approches de la géographie : les études sur le dévelop- pement et la géopolitique. Au sein du cadre général des études sur les relations Chine- Afrique, il mêle une approche macro à l’échelle interétatique (entre deux États, la Chine et le Kenya, et non pas entre la Chine et le continent africain pris dans son ensemble), et une approche micro à travers l’étude des acteurs supports de ces relations (Monson & Rupp, 2013). Le propos est basé sur des sources bibliographiques et sur une enquête de terrain. Par ailleurs, nous distinguons la Chine en tant qu’État et la pluralité des acteurs en provenance de ce pays.

En quoi le Kenya constitue-t-il, malgré l’absence de ressources naturelles majeures, un point d’entrée stratégique pour la Chine en Afrique de l’Est ? Comment les relations sino-kenyanes ont-elles évolués ? Quels sont les différents acteurs et vecteurs de la présence chinoise au Kenya ? Après avoir dressé un état des lieux des relations sino-kenyanes et de la présence chinoise dans le pays, nous verrons en quoi les relations commerciales, de coopération, et d’investissements sont caractérisées par une diversité importante. Enfin, nous analyserons dans quelle mesure le Kenya constitue un point d’entrée du soft power4 chinois en Afrique.

Une intensification progressive des relations sino-kenyanes

Des contacts anciens

Les premiers contacts des Chinois avec l’Afrique ont eu lieu sous la dynastie des Ming pendant une courte phase d’ouverture au XVème siècle, sur les côtes de l’actuel Kenya. Alors que l’histoire chinoise est marquée par une succession de périodes d’ouverture et de repli, le troisième empereur de la dynastie des Ming, Zhu Di (1402- 1424), commandite plusieurs expéditions vers l’océan indien à partir de 1405. A la tête de 200 navires et 27 000 hommes, l’amiral Zheng He mènera sept expéditions pacifiques

4 Le soft power sera ici entendu comme un ensemble d’outils non coercitifs rendant possible une capacité d’attraction en terme d’idées, de culture ou de valeurs (Nye, 2004).

9 Numéro Varia

vers les Indes, l’Arabie, et jusqu’aux côtes d’Afrique orientale. Les navires transportent des soldats mais aussi des traducteurs et des savants. Toutefois, l’Empire chinois ne tente pas d’annexion loin de sa sphère d’influence. Les guerres dans le Nord de la Chine mettent fin aux expéditions et l’ouverture maritime se termine dès 1433 (Bezbakh, 2011), mais les relations se poursuivent entre l’Asie et les côtes d’Afrique de l’Est par le biais des routes commerciales terrestres (ivoire, pierres précieuses) pendant plusieurs siècles. À la fin du XIXème siècle, les Britanniques font venir des ouvriers indiens et chinois pour la construction du chemin de fer reliant la côte kenyane à l’actuel Ouganda. Contrairement à certains ouvriers indiens qui s’établissent dans le pays, les Chinois ne restent pas après les travaux. C’est d’ailleurs encore le cas aujourd’hui : la plupart des ouvriers ou ingénieurs chinois travaillant sur des chantiers en Afrique retournent en Chine après une période d’une à trois années5.

Des relations diplomatiques qui prennent leur essor à partir de 1978

Les relations entre la Chine et le Kenya sont officialisées quelques jours après l’indépendance du pays, avec l’établissement des relations le 14 décembre 1963. Un premier accord commercial est signé dès 1964 mais les relations diplomatiques demeurent au niveau chargé d’affaires (sans ambassadeur) jusqu’aux années 1970. Celles-ci ne connaissent un réel essor qu’à partir de l’accession à la présidence de Daniel Arap Moi en 1978. Cette année marque également le début des réformes d’ouverture de Deng Xiaoping en Chine après l’ère maoïste : l’idéologie n’est plus alors le seul déterminant des relations internationales de la Chine. En 1978, les deux pays signent un accord de coopération économique et technologique, un nouvel accord commercial, ainsi que plusieurs contrats de construction, puis un accord de coopération culturelle en 1980 (Onjala, 2008 : 5). La Chine construit notamment le stade de Kasarani à Nairobi (60 000 places) en 1986 pour les Jeux panafricains, conduisant ainsi une « diplomatie des stades » (Will, 2012 : 151).

L’ère du président Arap Moi (1978-2002) est marquée par des visites mutuelles régulières. Arap Moi se rend en Chine trois fois, en septembre 1980, en octobre 1988, et en mai 1994. Le Kenya est représenté par son Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Bonaya Adhi Godana, pour le premier Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine (Focac) en 2000. Entre 1978 et 2002, le Kenya accueille près de 20 visites chinoises d’importance, dont le Premier Ministre Zhao Ziyang en janvier 1983, le Président Jiang Zemin en mai

5 Entretiens avec des salariés d’entreprises de construction chinoises en Chine, au Kenya et en Angola.

10 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

1996 et le Premier Ministre Zhu Rongji en avril 2002, ainsi que trois visites de ministres chinois des Affaires étrangères en 1991, 1994 et 1999. Un accord sur l’éducation supérieure est signé en 1994 ainsi qu’un accord sur la promotion et la protection des investissements en 2001.

Après l’accession à la présidence de Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013), Le Kenya accorde une importance croissante à la Chine. Un nouvel élan est donné à partir de 2002. La coalition gouvernementale au pouvoir instaure alors une stratégie politique d’ouverture envers les pays asiatiques, dite Look East Policy6. Le Kenya se tourne vers d’autres mo- dèles de développement pour ne plus se limiter au seul modèle occidental. Ce positionnement part du principe selon lequel l’Asie, par son développement récent, peut inspirer le développement du Kenya, à un moindre coût par rapport aux pays occidentaux grâce à des prêts moins couteux : « the East has also something to offer »7, indique le Professeur Peter Kamau de l’Université Kenyatta. Mais on peut y voir également des raisons plus politiques : les pays non-membre de l’OCDE constituent une alternative aux conditions de bonne gouvernance imposées par les pays occidentaux.

Pendant la présidence de Mwai Kibaki, le rythme des échanges diplomatiques s’intensifie, avec trois visites du Président kenyan en Chine en 2005, 2006 pour le troisième Focac, puis en 2010 pour l’inauguration de l’Exposition universelle de Shanghai. Plus de 15 ministres kenyans se sont rendus en Chine depuis 2002 (Ministres des Affaires étrangères, des Finances, des Communications, des Routes et travaux publics, du Tourisme). Côté chinois, plusieurs visites de hauts responsables à Nairobi témoignent de la place accordée au Kenya par la diplomatie chinoise, comme celles de Wu Banguo, Président de l’Assemblée nationale populaire, en 2004, de Jia Qinglin, Président de l’Assemblée consultative, en 2007, ou encore de Li Zhangchun, membre du bureau politique du comité permanent du Parti communiste, en 2011 (Ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères). Le Président Hu Jintao effectue une étape au Kenya lors de sa tournée africaine en avril 2006. Cette visite est marquée par la signature de nombreux contrats, notamment l’octroi d’un prêt pour la construction d’infrastructures et de projets dans le secteur de l’énergie, d’une subvention de 60 millions RMB pour la coopération technique, d’une subvention de 5 millions RMB pour la fourniture par la Chine de traitements contre la malaria, pour le développement des liaisons aériennes entre les deux pays, pour une assistance technique

6 « Politique regarder vers l’Est. » 7 « L’Orient a aussi des choses à offrir. »

11 Numéro Varia

sur les normes industrielles, et pour la modernisation des équipements de la Kenya Broadcasting corporation (Onjala, 2008 : 7 ; Mutua Kioko, 2012 : 6). Plus récemment encore, le Président Uhuru Kenyatta, élu en avril 2013, s’est rendu en août 2013 à Pékin où il cherche en la Chine un allié de taille. Un prêt de cinq milliards US dollars8 a été signé. Il financera notamment l’amélioration des infrastructures dans le cadre de la Vision 2030 : construction d’une ligne de chemin de fer vers l’Ouganda entre Mombassa et Malaba selon les normes ferroviaires chinoises, projets dans le domaine de l’énergie ainsi que la protection de la faune sauvage9 (Reuters, 2013; Xinhua, 2013). Peu de précisions ont été apportées sur les modalités du prêt10. Un projet de création d’une chambre de compensation (clearing house) pour le Yuan à Nairobi a également été annoncé. À moyen terme, Pékin pourrait aussi financer le projet de chemin de fer entre le port de Lamu, le Sud-Soudan et l’Éthiopie dans le cadre du projet LAPSSET11 (Amelot, 2011 : 187-188).

L’héritage de la guerre froide

Depuis 1978, les échanges entre la Chine et le Kenya demeurent soutenus, notamment à travers la fréquence et le niveau élevé des visites mutuelles. Le début des relations est toutefois marqué par l’absence d’affinités politiques particulières, contrairement aux relations de la Chine avec les deux autres grands pays d’Afrique de l’Est, l’Éthiopie et la Tanzanie. En effet, la coopération économique sino-éthiopienne est favorisée par des conceptions politiques communes entre les deux pays (Cabestan, 2012 : 57 sq.). Le président tanzanien Julius Nyerere (1964-1985) entretient des liens étroits avec la Chine où il se rend 13 fois durant son règne. Dominique Decherf, ancien ambassadeur de France dans plusieurs pays africains, rappelle dans son livre les affinités occidentales de Kenyatta, et les enjeux liés aux influences respectives des sphères occidentales et communistes pendant la guerre froide : « La CIA s’en moquait [du Président Nyerere qui expulse plusieurs milliers d’Indiens de Tanzanie en 1972]. Mais beaucoup moins du fait que le dictateur ‘était en train de céder Zanzibar aux Chinois… Car l’île de Zanzibar, véritable porte-avions ancré à vingt kilomètres de la côte tanzanienne, pouvait devenir un Cuba chinois. » (Decherf, 2012 : 72).

8 Tous les montants financiers sont libellés en US dollars dans cet article. 9 Le volet biodiversité fait suite au trafic avec la Chine de défenses d’éléphants et de rhinocéros braconnés. 10 Celui-ci étant libellé en dollars, il s’agit certainement d’un prêt en argent, les dons en nature étant libellés en Yuan (Brautigam, 2009 : 125). 11 Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia. 12 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Le Président Jomo Kenyatta demeure quant à lui proche du bloc occidental. Celui-ci a en effet passé 16 ans à Londres entre 1929 et 1945 et y a conservé ses alliances politiques (Decherf, 2012 : 70-72). Le Kenya ne fait par exemple pas partie de la dizaine de pays visités par Zhou Enlai lors de sa tournée africaine en décembre 1963 et février 1964 (Brautigam, 2009, 32). Le contexte des répercussions de la guerre froide sur le continent africain peut ainsi expliquer pourquoi les relations sino-kenyanes ne se développement véritablement qu’à partir de 1978. Ce lent démarrage n’empêchera pas la Chine et ses acteurs de prendre attache au Kenya.

État des lieux de la présence chinoise au Kenya

Le Kenya occupe aujourd’hui une place importante dans la politique africaine de la Chine. Nairobi accueillerait une des plus importantes ambassades chinoises sur le continent africain (Chaponnière, 2012 : 146), avec une trentaine de diplomates à la chancellerie et six au sein du Bureau du Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale12. Sur le plan des échanges économiques, plusieurs outils et mécanismes contribuent à la facilitation des affaires entre acteurs chinois et kenyans, notamment la chambre de commerce sino-kenyane, basée à Nairobi, sous la tutelle de l’Ambassade de Chine et présidée par un Chinois, M. Gao. Un comité sur les relations économiques et commerciales sino-kenyanes a été mis en place13. Un portail Internet dédié à la coopération économique entre les deux pays a également été créé en 2006 à l’initiative du Ministère chinois du Commerce (Mofcom).

Alors que le Kenya comptait très peu de Chinois sur son territoire avant 2002, on en dénombre aujourd’hui entre 8 000 et 10 00014. Il existerait même à Nairobi une communauté chrétienne chinoise regroupant environ 300 membres15. Le nombre de touristes chinois dans le pays est passé de 20 000 en 2008 à 40 000 en 2012, le Kenya ayant été désigné comme destination touristique autorisée par l’Administration chinoise du tourisme en 2004.

12 Entretien auprès du Bureau du Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi. 13 La troisième réunion de ce comité s’est tenue le 25 avril 2006 lors de la visite du Président Hu Jintao à Nairobi. 14 Une citoyenne chinoise figure d’ailleurs sur la liste des victimes de l’attaque du Westgate Mall de Nairobi à l’automne 2013. 15 Entretien avec un entrepreneur chinois de Nairobi.

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Sur le plan des acteurs économiques, l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi recensait 67 entreprises à capitaux chinois au Kenya fin 2012, tout type d’entreprises confodues (publiques, paraétatiques et privées)16. La répartition par secteurs témoigne d’une diversité importante même si le domaine de la construction demeure prépondérant : construction – BTP (25 entreprises), commerce – import-export (11), immobilier17 (9), industrie (8), tourisme (5), communications et réseaux (4), secteur bancaire (2), santé (2), ressources naturelles (1). Une seule entreprise classée dans le secteur de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles figure dans la liste18. La présence économique chinoise au Kenya ne semble donc pas motivée directement par l’extraction des ressources naturelles, bien qu’elle puisse tirer bénéfice de la part accrue de ce secteur dans l’économie kenyane par l’intermédiaire de son engagement dans d’autres secteurs économiques d’intervention pouvant être associés au secteur des ressources naturelles, comme le bâtiment, l’industrie ou l’import- export. Les entreprises chinoises de construction occupent la première place. Il s’agit principalement de sociétés publiques de rang national ou provincial. Contrairement à de nombreuses entreprises locales, la plupart sont classées ‘A’ dans la typologie kenyane : elles ont la capacité d’honorer des contrats supérieurs à cinq milliards de shillings kenyans (environ 58 millions dollars). Parmi les 25 entreprises répertoriées comme entreprises de construction, dix d’entre elles figurent dans le classement 2013 des 250 premières entreprises mondiales de construction (Engineering News record).

Si les relations sino-kenyanes sont ralenties durant les premières années qui suivent l’indépendance, elles se renforcent progressivement avec un premier essor à partir de 1978 après l’accession d’Arap Moi pouvoir. Elles connaissent un second élan à partir de 2002 : les années 2000 sont à la fois marquées par le renforcement massif de la présence chinoise en Afrique avec la création du Focac, et par la consolidation des coopérations

16 D’autres sources donnent le chiffre de 50 entreprises (Chaponnière, 2012), voire de 200 (site du Ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères). Nous nous baserons ici sur la liste fournie par le bureau du Conseiller de coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine au Kenya. Celle-ci ne tient pas cependant compte des petits entrepreneurs, commerçants, propriétaires de restaurants. Ces derniers échappent aux statis- tiques. Ils sont en outre relativement moins nombreux au Kenya que dans d’autres pays africains, le commerce étant largement tenu par la bourgeoisie locale. En outre, toues les entreprises ne bénéficient pas d’un soutien de l’État chinois (Kernen, 2007 : 178). 17 Certaines entreprises appartenant à la catégorie ‘immobilier’ cumulent les fonctions de promoteur et de constructeur. 18 Il s’agit de la China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) qui s’est vue attribuer un contrat d’exploration pétrolière sur un total de six blocs offshore et le long des frontières avec le Sud-Soudan et la Somalie, soit 45 500 km². La CNOOC avait décroché ce contrat d’exploration face à des concurrents européens (l’Espagnol Cepsa et le Suédois Lundin) en 2004 dans le cadre de la politique « Look East » du gouvernement, mais s’est retirée en 2010 sans être parvenue à une exploitation viable commercialement.

14 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

asiatiques du Kenya dans le cadre de la politique Look East. La présence chinoise au Ken- ya est, depuis cette période, désormais bien établie, et fondée sur des relations diversifiées.

Des relations diversifiées

Les échanges entre la Chine et le Kenya témoignent d’une pluralité en termes de secteurs économiques d’intervention, ainsi que de modalités de coopération réparties entre aide au développement, commerce et investissements.

Aide au développement

L’aide chinoise est délivrée par le biais de plusieurs outils : prêts concessionnels, cré- dits préférentiels acheteurs à l’export, subventions, assistance technique, dons en nature (machines-outils, denrées alimentaires). Elle couvre plusieurs secteurs : construction d’infrastructures, santé, agriculture, énergie. Mais la Chine n’utilise pas les mêmes critères de définition que les pays membres du comité d’aide au développement de l’OCDE et utilise une conception moins restrictive de l’aide à l’étranger. Les comparaisons sont donc rendues difficiles. Il s’agit en outre toujours d’aide liée, c’est-à-dire assujettie à l’achat de biens chinois ou au recours à des entreprises chinoises (Brautigam, 2009 : 152). Celle-ci est délivrée pour des projets déterminés et non comme appui à des politiques sectorielles : il s’agit d’aide projet et non d’aide programme (Charnoz & Severino 2007). En outre, la coopération sino-africaine, de type sud-sud, est le fruit d’articulations complexes au sein d’un faisceau d’acteurs et d’outils différents, combinant les catégories d’analyses traditionnelles de l’aide, du commerce et des investissements (Mawdsley, 2012 : 63-65).

La Chine serait aujourd’hui le premier créancier bilatéral du Kenya, avec 12 % de l’encours de la dette externe publique du Kenya (Chaponnière, 2012). On ne dispose cependant pas de chiffres officiels. En effet, les autorités chinoises ne publient pas de venti- lation des montants de son aide par pays (Brautigam, 2009 : 164 sq.). Selon Mutua Kioko (2012), la part de l’aide chinoise dans le total de l’aide internationale au Kenya serait passée de 0,08 % en 2002 à 13 % en 2005.

Pour le financement des infrastructures routières au Kenya, la Chine demeurerait néanmoins en troisième position, derrière la Banque mondiale (portefeuille de projets d’environ 900 millions dollars) et la Banque africaine de développement (environ 600 millions dollars), mais devant l’Union européenne (200 millions dollars). Le portefeuille de projets chinois se situerait entre 300 et 500 millions dollars19. Cependant, les entreprises

19 Entretien à la Délégation de l’Union européenne, novembre 2012. 15 Numéro Varia

chinoises remportent aussi des appels d’offre de bailleurs internationaux. Les projets réa- lisés par des entreprises chinoises mais financés par l’aide internationale ne font pas partie de l’aide chinoise, même si les entreprises paraétatiques peuvent bénéficier d’un appui de l’État chinois.

La voie rapide Nairobi-Thika a par exemple été financée en trois tronçons respective- ment par l’aide bilatérale chinoise, la Banque mondiale et la Banque africaine, mais réali- sée intégralement par des entreprises de BTP chinoises (China Wuyi, Sinohydro et China Shangli). Sur une longueur de 49 km, cette route relie le centre-ville aux quartiers Nord de la capitale jusqu’à la municipalité de Thika dans le district de Kiambu. Première voie rapide du pays, elle a permis de passer d’une simple route à un axe de quatre voies dans chaque sens. Elle a été inaugurée officiellement en novembre 2012 par l’ancien président kenyan Mwai Kibaki après trois années de travaux pour un coût total de 27 milliards KES (environ 310 millions dollars). La route qui relie la Kenya à l’Éthiopie est également construite par trois entreprises chinoises, mais sur financement de la Banque africaine de développement. L’entreprise China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) aurait construit à elle seule 1 000 km de routes dans le pays (Chaponnière, 2012 : 153). CRBC va également construire la ligne de chemin reliant le port de Mombassa à l’Ouganda (Xinhua, 2013).

A l’échelle du continent, les contrats des entreprises chinoises de BTP représentent 40 milliards dollars en 2012, soit une hausse de 45 % depuis 2009. L’Afrique constitue 35 % des marchés de construction chinois à l’étranger (Office d’information du Conseil pour les Affaires d’État). D’après le bureau du conseiller de coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine, les 25 entreprises chinoises de construction auraient en 2012 un portefeuille de 62 projets dans le pays, pour un montant total de 1,89 milliards dollars (chiffres 2012). Elles réalisent des travaux de construction, de routes, mais aussi de réseaux d’adduction et d’évacuation des eaux, de géothermie. Contrairement aux autres bailleurs intervenant sur le volet infrastructures et développement urbain, les projets chinois sont concentrés sur la dimension opérationnelle et ne contribuent ni à la planification stratégique comme le font par exemple les Japonais à Nairobi ou les Français à Kisumu, ni au renforcement des capacités des institutions locales comme le fait la Banque mondiale. En 2006, l’agence de coopération japonaise (JICA) avait par exemple défini les priorités pour les routes de Nairobi. Les Chinois ont simplement réalisé une étude de faisabilité opérationnelle, suite à la visite de Hu Jintao.

16 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Les entreprises chinoises contribuent donc à l’amélioration des infrastructures du Kenya, avec l’appui de financements bilatéraux ou multilatéraux : amélioration du réseau routier de Nairobi, renforcement du réseau de distribution électrique, construction et gestion d’une unité de production d’électricité à partir de la géothermie (Olkaria), construction de l’hôpital universitaire de l’Université Kenyatta, routes rurales, construction d’un quai d’amarrage dans le port de Mombassa. En décembre 2012, le Ministère kenyan de l’Énergie a par exemple signé un contrat avec CCC Engineering (CCCE) pour l’amélio- ration de la transmission d’électricité à haute tension. Le projet est financé par un prêt concessionnel du gouvernement chinois d’un montant d’environ 100 millions dollars. Celui-ci comprend la construction de 392 km de lignes électriques et de cinq transfor- mateurs, sur une durée de 27 mois (site Internet de CCCE). Les entreprises de construction arrivées dans le pays pour des projets financés par le gouvernement chinois ou des bailleurs internationaux décrochent par la suite des contrats sur une base commerciale pour le secteur privé. La China Wuyi construit par exemple le nouveau siège de la Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) à Nairobi dans le quartier d’Upper Hill, et construit pour des promoteurs immobiliers chinois.

Échanges commerciaux

En 2002, le volume commercial des échanges entre la Chine et le Kenya s’élève à 186 millions dollars après avoir dépassé la barre des 100 millions dollars en 1995. Alors que la Chine était le 11ème fournisseur du pays en 2000, elle passe en première place à partir de 2010. Le commerce bilatéral passe à 1,83 milliards dollars en 2010 et 2,4 milliards dollars en 2011, soit une augmentation de 30 % depuis 2000 en base annuelle (Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi). En 2010, le Kenya a exporté pour 40 millions dollars vers la Chine : fruits frais, poisson, ferraille à recycler, minerai, coton, fibre de sisal, cuir, café, thé. La même année, les importations depuis la Chine ont représenté un montant de 1,79 milliards dollars. La Chine exporte au Kenya des équipements électriques, machines outils et équipements de chantiers, des pièces détachées, des matériaux de construction, des véhicules et deux- roues, des produits textiles, des vêtements et chaussures, des produits pharmaceutiques, des équipements agricoles et des biens de consommation (électroménager). La balance commerciale est donc largement positive pour la Chine, ce qui n’est pas le cas à l’échelle du continent, la Chine important un montant de matières premières supérieur à ses exportations vers l’Afrique20.

20 La balance commerciale des échanges de la Chine avec l’Afrique est structurellement déficitaire depuis 2004, à l’exception des années 2007 et 2009 (Office d’information du Conseil pour les Affaires d’État). 17 Numéro Varia

A l’échelle du continent, la Chine est devenue le premier partenaire commercial de l’Afrique en 2009 avec un volume d’échange en croissance de 19,3 % par an, soit 198 milliards dollars en 2012 (Office d’information du Conseil pour les Affaires d’État). En 2011, le commerce bilatéral sino-kenyan représentait donc environ 1,5 % des échanges commerciaux entre la Chine et l’Afrique. Les exportations de la Chine vers l’Afrique s’élèvent à 85,3 milliards dollars en 2012 (+ 16,7 % par an), tandis que les importations de la Chine depuis l’Afrique représentent 113,2 milliards dollars en 2012 (+ 21,4 % par an). Ainsi, le Kenya pèse environ 3 % des exportations chinoises, et seulement 0,05 % de ses importations depuis l’Afrique. Cette position particulière du Kenya s’explique par sa relative pauvreté en ressources naturelles qui en fait un fournisseur très modeste pour la Chine. Les Chinois mènent toutefois des explorations dans le sous-sol kenyan. Le Kenya dispose en effet de ressources en fluor, sel, calcaire, cuivre, zinc, aluminium, niobium et thorium.

Investissements

Les flux d’investissement direct à l’étranger (IDE) chinois au Kenya sont restés faibles avant les années 2000 et ont connu un essor à partir de 2004-2006. En 2002, on dénombrait seulement 17 investissements chinois dans le pays. Une dizaine de nouvelles entreprises chinoises s’est installée en 2003, la plupart dans le secteur des services, dans l’industrie manufacturière, et dans une moindre mesure dans l’exploration minière. Avec un stock de 474 millions dollars en cumulé en 2013, la Chine est devenue la première source d’IDE du Kenya, en augmentation d’environ 30 % par an21. Sur l’ensemble du continent, le stock d’IDE chinois s’élevait en 2012 à 14,2 milliards dollars en cumulé. Le Kenya représente donc un peu moins de 2,5 % des investissements chinois en Afrique. Ceux-ci couvrent notamment les secteurs de l’automobile, de l’énergie, des matériaux de construction, de l’immobilier, du tourisme (Bureau du Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi). En 2012, 96 projets d’IDE chinois employaient 6 700 Kenyans (Mutua Kioko, 2008 : 7). Les entreprises chinoises opèrent au Kenya en tant qu’entreprises privées bien que la plupart soit détenue partiellement ou en totalité par l’État chinois22.

21 Au Kenya, les IDE sont définis par l’Investment Promotion Act : sont considérés comme investissements directs à l’étranger (IDE) tous les investissements en capitaux étrangers (monnaies étrangères, crédits, droits de propriété), entrepris par une entreprise étrangère dans le but de produire des biens ou services vendus sur le marché intérieur ou exportés. 22 Il s’agit en fait de filiale : une entreprise publique chinoise peut établir des filiales privées à l’étranger.

18 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

On peut citer plusieurs exemples d’investissements productifs : une cimenterie avec unité de production d’électricité (běijīng shūbiàndiàn gōngsī), qui constitue une première en Afrique de l’Est, une unité d’assemblage de téléviseurs par une entreprise de Qingdao (Aucma, àokēmǎ), d’une capacité de 100 000 téléviseurs par an, une ligne de production de papier toilette et de mouchoirs en papier (kāngdēng gāokējì yǒuxiàn gōngsī), une usine de fabrication de batteries de voitures et de panneaux solaires thermiques par une entreprise du Hunan (xiānghuī gōngyè zhìzào yǒuxiàn gōngsī). En matière de santé, le groupe Beijing Holley-Cotec Pharmaceuticals (huáfāngkētài) a ouvert une plateforme logistique à Nairobi pour desservir l’Afrique centrale et de l’Est (Ambassade de Chine au Kenya).

Ces investissements contribuent à la diversification de l’économie kenyane et sont pourvoyeurs d’emploi, notamment sur les chaines de production. Ils permettent aussi de produire localement des produits traditionnellement importés de l’étranger. Si les capitaux peuvent être rapatriés en Chine, les entreprises sont soumises à la fiscalité locale. Ces investissements diffèrent peu des autres acteurs étrangers, mis à part des coûts de production inférieurs et une meilleure maîtrise des délais. Ils ne sont d’ailleurs pas toujours assortis de succès. Contrairement aux idées reçues, ces entreprises emploient principalement des ouvriers locaux, le Kenya disposant d’une main-d’œuvre relativement qualifiée. Le taux d’emploi local est passé de 82 % en 2003 à 97 % en 2004 (Onjala, 2008 : 13). Sur la question du recours à la main-d’œuvre locale, un cadre d’une entreprise de construction occidentale implantée à Nairobi explique qu’un seul niveau hiérarchique supplémentaire est occupé par un expatrié chinois dans les entreprises chinoises : quand une entreprise occidentale disposera sur un chantier d’un directeur de travaux expatrié et d’un conducteur de travaux local, les deux postes sont occupés par un Chinois dans une entreprise chinoise, le niveau d’en-dessous, chef de chantier, étant occupé par un local. L’émergence de la Chine a été globalement favorable aux pays africains (Kernen, 2007 : 170).

Enfin, l’immobilier résidentiel occupe une place particulière. Une dizaine de promoteurs chinois privés construisent des résidences de logements à Nairobi et dans sa péri- phérie. Ils sont positionnés sur le marché intermédiaire de l’accession à la propriété pour les classes moyennes. Parfois présentés par les autorités chinoises comme des projets de coopération sino-kenyane (Brautigam, 2009 : 114), ces réalisations ne sont ni de l’aide au développement telle que définie par les critères de l’OCDE, ni des investissements au sens productif du terme : il s’agit de spéculation immobilière, même si certains projets font intervenir des banques publiques chinoises.

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La présence économique chinoise au Kenya est multiforme. Le volet aide au déve- loppement contribue à renforcer les acteurs commerciaux, les spéculateurs et les investisseurs.

Le Kenya au cœur de la stratégie chinoise en Afrique de l’Est

La Chine exerce également un rôle plus diffus au Kenya en y développant sa capacité d’attractivité. Nous analyserons dans cette partie les outils de l’influence chinoise et la manière dont la Chine et ses acteurs sont perçus localement.

Les outils du soft power chinois au Kenya

En matière d’éducation, la Chine s’est engagée dès 1982 à octroyer dix bourses d’études par an pour des étudiants kenyans. Ce nombre a été augmenté avec le renforcement de la coopération sino-africaine dans les années 2000. En 2002, 58 étudiants ont bénéficié d’une bourse pour étudier dans une université chinoise. Le Kenya comptait 306 étudiants en Chine en 2012. Le programme de formations pour les officiels et techniciens kenyans a été renforcé à la fin des années 2000. Le nombre de bénéficiaires est passé de 158 personnes en 2009 à 398 en 2011 (Bureau du Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi). Environ 500 personnes en bénéficieraient désormais (Onjala, 2008 : 35). Lors du quatrième Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine en 2009, la Chine s’était engagée à former 20 000 professionnels africains et à augmenter le nombre de bourses d’études de 5 500 avant 2012 (Grimm, 2012 : 3). Entre 2010 et 2012, la Chine a permis à 27 318 professionnels, fonctionnaires et techniciens, de suivre une formation et d’effectuer un séjour d’études en Chine (Office d’information du Conseil pour les Affaires d’État), soit environ 3 % de Kenyans. Les autorités chinoises ont également octroyé 18 743 bourses d’études à des étudiants africains sur la même période, soit un peu moins de 5 % d’étudiants kenyans. Si la qualité des formations dispensées, notamment pour les séjours courts, ne semble pas toujours parfaitement adaptée, ces échanges permettent néanmoins à de nombreux Kenyans de découvrir la Chine et son modèle de développement.

Les échanges culturels passent aussi par la diffusion de la langue chinoise. Le mandarin serait appris par 40 millions de personnes dans le monde. Sous le pilotage du Ministère de l’Education et hébergés dans des établissements académiques à l’étranger, les Instituts Confucius ont pour mission de promouvoir la langue et la culture chinoises dans le monde par l’envoi de professeurs chinois. Ces Instituts incarnent une nouvelle figure du soft power chinois et de la volonté des autorités de développer une influence culturelle

20 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

à l’international (Paradise : 647 sq.). En Afrique, on dénombre au moins 32 instituts Confucius dans 22 pays, dont trois au Kenya. Le premier Institut Confucius d’Afrique a été ouvert en 2005 à l’Université de Nairobi, avant l’ouverture d’un second à l’Université Kenyatta en 2008, puis d’un troisième à l’Université Egerton. Un « cours Confucius » de chinois est également diffusé à la radio dans Nairobi.

Nairobi constitue un point d’entrée en Afrique de l’Est pour les médias officiels chinois en anglais. L’agence de presse Xinhua y a ouvert un bureau dès 1985. La radio chinoise, China Radio International, a commencé à émettre en Afrique depuis Nairobi en février 2006, puis à Mombassa à partir de janvier 2011. La chaîne CCTV Afrique de la télévision nationale chinoise diffuse ses émissions à partir de Nairobi depuis janvier 2012. En décembre 2012, l’édition Afrique du quotidien chinois China Daily a ouvert des bureaux dans la capitale kenyane (Ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères). Il est difficile de connaître l’audience des médias chinois au Kenya et en Afrique, maisces derniers témoignent des moyens mis en œuvre par les autorités chinoises pour conforter sa présence dans le domaine de l’information (Francks & Ribet, 2009 : 129 sq.), au même titre que les pays anglo-saxons ou la France. La Chine fait également des dons de matériel informatique à des journalistes kenyans, comme en 2001 auprès du journal Kenya Times ou en 2004 auprès de l’Union des journalistes kenyans.

En plus de cette influence diffuse pour propager une meilleure connaissance de la Chine en Afrique, le gouvernement chinois exporte son savoir-faire au travers d’un programme d’assistance technique d’E-gouvernement pour le gouvernement kenyan. Le projet vise à créer un système informatique de communication intergouvernementale (Government Unified Messaging System). Ce programme est piloté au niveau dela présidence kenyane. Il va dans le sens des objectifs chinois de diffusion de son propre modèle de développement. « We would like to share our experience » , expliquait Han Chunlin, le Conseiller pour la coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine à Nairobi dans un discours en 2012.

La Chine vue du Kenya

Le développement chinois est perçu au Kenya comme une réussite même si son application dans le contexte kenyan paraît difficile. Les Chinois jouissent d’une certaine popularité dans la construction des infrastructures (Mutua Kioko, 2012 : 11). La population a le sentiment que le pays progresse en voyant les projets sortir de terre et la

21 Numéro Varia

circulation devenir plus fluide à Nairobi (Daily Nation, 2013). Leur rapidité est louée par les autorités locales : « They are touching the ground very fast » , explique M. Stanley, le vice-maire de la municipalité de Mavoko en périphérie Sud de Nairobi . En effet, quand la construction d’une route financée par l’Union européenne nécessite une dizaine d’année entre l’identification du projet et sa livraison, seules quatre années suffisent aux opérateurs chinois. Contrairement aux bailleurs du CAD, la présence des Chinois au contact du terrain est souvent mise en avant pour expliquer la capacité de mener à terme les projets en respectant les délais. Un professeur de l’Université Kenyatta explique : « Development aid from China is helping because they have people on the ground to ensure the follow up » .

Les Chinois font toutefois face à des critiques sur la qualité des réalisations, même si le laxisme des sociétés de supervision peut être également en cause (Chaponnière, 2012 : 154). Plusieurs aspects sont critiqués : les machines ne restent pas sur place à l’issue des travaux ; les salaires de la main-d’œuvre locale seraient insuffisants ; les lois ne seraient pas toujours respectées. Certains interlocuteurs soulignent l’absence de prise en compte d’aspects techniques comme le contrôle de la circulation ou la sécurité routière. Au-delà des réalisations elles-mêmes, la planification semble pâtir du manque d’études préalables. De manière plus générale, l’aide chinoise renforcerait les élites politiques au détriment des populations, affaiblirait les standards sociaux et environnementaux, causerait préjudice à la lutte anticorruption (Mutua Kioko, 2012 : 12). Les Chinois demeurent en concurrence avec d’autres acteurs. Les Japonais qui construisent également des routes à Nairobi pâtissent de critiques sur leur lenteur, mais jouissent d’une image positive en termes de qualité des réalisations.

L’attitude des médias chinois témoigne d’un souci d’image. Plusieurs articles de presse soulignent la manière dont les réalisations des acteurs chinois sont appréciées localement. En 2011 à l’issue de la réhabilitation du barrage de Sasamua dans le centre du pays par l’entreprise chinoise Sinohydro, la Ministre kenyane de l’Eau et de l’irrigation, Charity Ngilu, aurait ainsi loué l’expertise des ingénieurs chinois, en expliquant que les ingénieurs locaux avaient beaucoup à apprendre d’eux. Le Ministre kenyan des routes, Franklin Bett, aurait fait de même en 2010 devant des sociétés locales qui s’étaient plaintes de l’octroi de contrats à des entreprises chinoises. L’ancien Premier Ministre Raila Odinga, qui est ingénieur de formation, aurait lui-même encouragé les sociétés locales à améliorer leur efficacité face aux entreprises chinoises (People’s Daily, 2011). Les médias chinois font également appel aux propos d’experts locaux pour donner une image positive de la Chine :

22 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Edward Oyugi, professeur à l’Université de Nairobi a ainsi souligné que l’aide chinoise est fondamentale pour le développement du Kenya et de l’Afrique dans la mesure où elle cible les infrastructures (Xinhua, 2010). La Chine se pose ainsi en partenaire incontournable du développement africain.

Conclusion

Les relations entre la Chine et le Kenya ont pris une importance majeure dans les années 2000, même si la structure des relations ne diffère pas fondamentalement des autres partenaires du Kenya. Vue de Chine, l’Afrique n’est pas seulement un espace pourvoyeur de ressources naturelles : le continent constitue une terre d’occasions économiques, où la Chine ambitionne d’accroitre son influence. Le Kenya en est une singulière illustration. Le pays constitue un partenaire stratégique par sa localisation, sa relative stabilité politique et son poids économique dans la région.

Contrairement à ce que pourrait laisser croire l’anecdote du mariage d’une ancienne Miss Kenya avec le fils d’un riche homme d’affaire du Sichuan en 2010, les différences culturelles et de contextes de développement demeurent. En dépit de son pouvoir d’attraction sur les autorités kenyanes, le modèle de développement chinois ne saurait être applicable au cas du Kenya. La Chine n’en demeure pas moins un partenaire désormais indispensable au développement du pays. Sa présence témoigne de la capacité d’insertion des différents acteurs chinois dans des secteurs variés de l’économie kenyane, en mobilisant et combinant les outils d’aide au développement, les investissements et les échanges commerciaux.

À l’heure où le Président Uhuru Kenyatta et son vice-président William Ruto sont critiqués par les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne suite aux accusations du Tribunal pénal international (TPI) liés aux violences postélectorales de 2007-2008, le Kenya pourrait aspirer à travailler plus étroitement encore avec la Chine, dont les autorités se refusent à toute ingérence, et tout commentaire, dans les affaires intérieures des États.

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Les secteurs de la présence chinoise au Kenya

24 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

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Paradise, James F. « China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power ». Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (2009): 647–669.

Tan-Mullins, May, Giles Mohan & Marcus Power. « Redefinig ‘aid’ in the China-Africa context ». Development and Change 45, no. 5 (2010): 857–881.

Taylor, Ian. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. New-York: Routledge, 2011.

Véron, Jean-Bernard. « Éditorial ». Afrique contemporaine 228 (2008) : 5–9.

Will, Rachel. « China’s Stadium Diplomacy ». World Policy Journal 29, no. 2 (2012): 36-43.

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« Chinese bank-financed housing project kicked off in Kenya ». Xinhua (31/05/2008) [consulté le 08/08/2012] URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/31/ content_8287705.htm « Le Kenya et Singapour s’engagent à renforcer leurs relations ». Xinhua (22/01/2010) [consulté le 08/01/2014] URL : http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/International/6875791. html « Kenyan minister praises Chinese workmanship ». People’s Daily (28/04/2011) « Kenya : projet de la super autoroute de Thika ». cntv.cn (19/07/2012) [consulté le 17/05/2013], URL : http://french.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_fslcsa/ lanmufc/201207/20120708242192.shtml « Thika superhighway becomes model road in rainy season ». Daily Nation (08/04/2013) [consulté le 21/05/2013] URL : http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Thika-superhighway- becomes-model-road-in-rainy-season/-/1056/1742508/-/l3e2hxz/-/index.html « Roads and energy main beneficiaries of Chinese aid to Kenya ». Africa Review (30/04/2013) [consulté le 08/07/2013] URL : http://www.africareview.com/ Business---Finance/Roads-and-energy-main-beneficiaries-of-Chinese-Kenya-aid/- /979184/1762638/-/4eqya2z/-/index.html « Kenya signs infrastructure, energy deals worth $5 billion with China ». Reuters (19/08/2013) [consulté le 21/08/2013] URL : http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/ us-kenya-china-idUSBRE97I0RV20130819 « Kenya official says Chinese funding revives mega-infrastructure projects ». Xinhua (27/11/2013) [consulté le 07/01/2014] URL : http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ xinhua/2013-11-27/content_10684392.html Site du Conseiller de coopération économique et commerciale de l’Ambassade de Chine au Kenya (Mofcom) [consulté le 28/10/2013] URL : http://ke2.mofcom.gov.cn Site du Ministère chinois des affaires étrangères (Waijiaobu) [consulté le 28/10/2013] URL : http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/ fz_605026/1206_605656/ Site Engineering News record [consulté le 28/10/2013] URL: http://enr.construction. com/toplists/Top-International-Contractors/001-100.aspi Site de l’entreprise CCC Engineering (version chinoise) : http://www.ccceng.cn/news_ detail.aspx?NewsCateID=89&NewsID=89&CateID=13 [consulté le 07/01/2014]

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Evolution of Sheng during the Last Decade

Aurélia Ferrari

Introduction

Sheng, popularly defined as an acronym for “Swahili-English slang” (Mazrui, 1995), emerged in the 1960s in the multicultural environment of Nairobi. It is an urban language which combines mainly Kiswahili and English but also other Kenyan languages such as Kikuyu, Luyha, Dholuo and Kikamba. Sheng is characterized by an important linguistic flexibility. It does not have an official status even ifitis widely spoken, especially by the youth. Originally used as a vehicular language between people from different regions, it is becoming a vernacular language, some people born in the 1980s or later having Sheng as their first language. Sheng is not a unique linguistic phenomenon in Africa. In the last fifty years, urbanization and globalization have prompted the emergence of new urban linguistic codes. Such codes are based on multilingual speech and characterized by unstable vocabulary. Many of these varieties derived from a criminal slang to a youth code. Despite constant devaluation by educationalists, traditionalists, language planners and the elites, those youth languages have expanded and transformed into urban varieties that feature highly in popular culture and the media. This is the case for Nouchi (a mixed code made of French and local languages spoken in Abidjan), Tsotsitaal/ Isicamtho (Johannesburg), Hindubill (in Kinshasa, mainly made of Lingala and French), and others. Beck (2010: 12) affirms about African urban languages that:

These “languages,” whose linguistic and language-sociological status is still largely unsettled, initially caused a stir among language guardians and educational politicians who were concerned about cultural decay and language loss in the population. This attitude has left its mark on some of the earlier scholarly literature on the topic. Today, however, linguistics is rather interested in the exceptional acceleration of language change, and in the question of whether language birth can be witnessed in contemporary Africa. After all, linguistic creativity and rapid change, and the resulting ephemeral character of vocabulary, are distinctive features of youth languages as a special type of urban language.

If African urban languages have some common features, they all have their own specificities, as argued by McLaughlin (2009: 2).

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[A]lthough there are some generalizations that can be made about the languages of urban Africa [, …] each city is unique, and the particular linguistic outcome is the result of a complex variety of factors, including the ethnic and linguistic make-up of the city, the history and pattern of urbanization, the legacy of colonial policies, and numerous other factors.

This paper focuses on the evolution of linguistic characteristics of Sheng as well as languages practices and attitudes in Nairobi during the last decade. It is based on a com- parison between data collected in 2002-2003 for my PhD thesis and recent data collected during a fieldwork conducted in 2013.1 It also discusses artistic uses of Sheng in literature, hip-hop music, cinema and mchongwano as Sheng is part of today’s popular culture in Nairobi.

Overview of recent works

Sheng has attracted increasing attention internationally within academia. Whereas before the last decade, research focused on lexical characteristics and categorization of Sheng, new kind of approaches appeared recently consist of sophisticated linguistic descriptions of Sheng. Examples of such new works on Sheng are:

- The PhD thesis by Philip Rudd (2008) describes the morpho-syntax of Sheng. The purpose of the dissertation – to determine whether Sheng is a mixed language – can surely be discussed and challenged given that all language result from language contacts and therefore have a mixed linguistic structure. However, interesting sociological questions are addressed, like the contribution of Sheng to the formation of a new identity among its speakers.

- The PhD thesis by Mokaya Bosire (2009) on the phonology, morphology, and social profile of Sheng provides a well-documented description with recent data.

The attitude of scholars towards Sheng in relation to its categorization and its impact on urban society is also a notable evolution. Sheng used to be blamed to spoil “pure” languages such as English, Swahili and other Kenyan languages and to have negative impacts on Swahili learning in schools. Nowadays, however, Sheng is considered to be part of linguistic national identity and to neutralize ethnicity (Githiora, 2013). It is categorized as a Swahili dialect or youth language. While former research works paid

1 I wish to thank the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA) for their support in conducting fieldwork in summer 2013.

30 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est attention to extreme registers of Sheng, the category of Sheng now encompasses all the mixed codes spoken in Nairobi based on Swahili structure and characterized by common features. New questions also emerged with regard to education. Teachers’ training are about to be organized to enable teachers to deal with Sheng and the possibility to include Sheng in the educational system is under consideration (Githinji, 2013) on the ground that, as scholars have shown, the use of the mother tongue (or first language) is beneficial to any learning process and to obtain improved education basics.

Research is also conducted on specific themes such as the use of Sheng and code switching in advertisements, as discussed by Mutonya (2008):

The adaptations in the language of advertising are driven by social and linguistic realities in the city and largely motivated by the marketers desire to reach a broad audience. More significantly, is the realization that HIV/AIDS awareness ads are acknowledging the sensibilities of local culture, with slang helping society save-face while engaging the youth in public dialogue on ‘taboo’ topics.

However, the myth of pure language is still pervasive among scholars and therefore Sheng continues to be seen as a “dangerous or impure” language in certain research works. Momanyi’s research (2009) about the negative impacts of Sheng on Kenyan learners at schools illustrates such stand. It suggests that the emergence of Sheng may have to do with lack of clarity in Kenya’s language policy. Describing the significance of Kiswahili in national development, the author argues that Sheng is still stigmatized and stigmatizing:

The social stigmatization associated with this code makes most people in Kenya feel uneasy about the code. It has more often than not been associated with touts, drug pushers, hip-hop musicians and school drop outs. In the education circles, the code is gangster slang, a secret code associated with social misfits, is fluid and not easy to understand.

Definition of Sheng used in this paper

I will use the word Sheng to designate a continuum of different mixed language codes spoken in Nairobi and based on Swahili grammatical structure. However, some people still use the word Sheng to identify Nairobi’s slang only and associate the mixed code commonly spoken in Nairobi today to Swahili, also referred to as “Swahili of Nairobi”. From a linguistic point of view, however, and as I will try to prove in this paper, those

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different codes – whether slang or Swahili of Nairobi – have common features and a same linguistic structure which is based on Swahili structure but which is also different from the other existing varieties of Swahili. The most specific characteristics of Sheng are the use of diminutive classes 12/13 (KA/TU), the use of –ang intensive derivative verbs, and noun classes reorganization. Therefore, according to this definition, Sheng has different levels of usages: formal, informal, popular and argotic. The formal level of Sheng is recent and still fragile but there are several examples in political discourses, like for instance during election campaigns.

Evolution of Sheng structure

The main characteristics of Sheng structure as described below have not changed during the last decade.

Phonological characteristics of Sheng

The Sheng phonological system differs slightly from that of Standard Swahili. The sounds of Arabic origin [ʁ] (written gh in Swahili) and [χ] (written kh in Swahili) are replaced by [g] and [k].

The sound [h] tends to disappear. But as it has a distinctive function in Standard Swahili (there are minimal pairs distinguishing the [h] from the absence of sound), then it is replaced either by adding sound [a] to mark verbal negation of the second person singular (a) either with an additional stress (b).

• Adding the prefix [a] to the affirmative subject prefix in thend 2 person singular in order to negate a verbal form: Swahili: affirmative:una “you have” negative: huna “you don’t have” Sheng: affirmative:uko na/ una “you have” negative: auko na / auna “you don’t have”

• Adding a stress to the affirmative subject prefix (replacing the h) in order to -ne gate a verbal form.

Swahili: aff.: atakwenda “he\she will go ” neg.: hatakwenda “he\she will not go ” Sheng: aff.: ata’enda/ataji’toa “he she will go” neg.: ‘ata’enda/’ataji’toa “he\she will not go”

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Table 1: Phonetic system of Sheng consonants

Bilabial labiodental Dental alveolar Post-alveolar Palatal Velar

Occlusive p b t d t∫ dʒ k g Fricative f v ð θ s z ∫ Continue w r l J Nasal m n n

Morpho-syntactical characteristics of Sheng

- Noun classes

Whereas standard Swahili has 16 noun classes as follows: M/WA (1/2) , M/MI (3/4), JI/MA (5/6), KI/VI (7/8), N (9/10), U (11:14), KU (15), and PA/KU/MU (16/17/18) according to the common Bantu classification, Sheng has transformed its noun classes system. It is divided between human beings, non-human beings, places and the diminutive noun classes (KA/TU, 12/13). The diminutive classes do not exist in standard Swahili but are used in Sheng as in other Kenyan Bantu languages such as Kikuyu. Therefore we can see that, on the one hand, a kind of simplification occurred given that the 16 noun classes used in Swahili are not used in Sheng, but on the other hand, there are classes in Sheng that are not used in Standard Swahili. This means that speaking of “simplification” is surely not right to define Sheng, as codes used as a first language express in one way or another all the nuances needed in communication. In other words, simplification of certain linguistic aspects always goes along with the creation of other complex structures.

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Table 2 : Sheng noun classes

Nouns Adjectives subject Object demons- de- Anaphoric Connec- prefix trative mons- demons- tive tra- trative proxi- tive of mity distance

+ hu- S m-, ki- Ø m-, mu-/ ni- -ni- uyu yule/ wa man mu-/ mw-, Ø ule Cl mw- u- -ku-

1 a- m/mw-

Pl wa- vi- Ø wa-/w-, Ø tu- -tu- awa wale ao wa

Cl m- -wa-

2 wa- -wa - hu- S m- m- ki- Ø Ø/ny- i- -i ii ile iyo ya man Cl

9 Pl mi- wa- vi- Ø Ø/ny- zi- -zi- izi zile izo za

10 Place Cl ma-, Ø pa/-p-/ Ø ku- apa pale apo pa/ya

16 i- uku kule uko

17 Dimi- S1 kaka- kaka- aka kale ka nutive P\1 tu- tu- tu- tu- utu tule twa

Example in human beings’ classes (Sheng):2

Awa mavijana wanastragəl. DEM PL-youth SP3P-PRS-struggle Those young boys are struggling.

2 Concerning “wanastragəl”, I used in my PhD thesis the transcription used here, but Sheng speakers do not use it. They alternate between Swahili and English transcription without specific rules.

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Example in non-human beings’ classes (Sheng):

Izi mandizi ulizibay wapi? DEM PL-banana SP2S-PAST-OBJECT-buy where Where did you buy these bananas?

Names of animals in Swahili belong to the same class as human beings class (noun classes 1/2) whereas in Sheng, they are classified with non-human beings.

Sheng: Ii dogi inadoro. DEM dog SP9-PRS-sleep This dog is sleeping.

Swahili: Mbwa uyu amelala. Dog DEM SP3S-PP-sleep This dog is sleeping.

Example in locative classes (Sheng):

Apa ndani kuna moskitoz. Here inside SP17-have mosquitoes There are mosquitoes herein.

Swahili uses the KI/VI classes as a diminutive; as a consequence it does not have any specific noun class for diminutive where Sheng used theka-/tu- prefixes.

Sheng: Tebu cheki aka kandai. EXCL look DEM DIM-car Look at this small car.

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Swahili: Hebu tizama kigari hiki. EXCL look DIM-car DEM Look at this small car.

In Sheng, the prefix ka- also serves to express contempt:

Sheng: Aka kamsee kabambi. DEM DIM-man DIM-be.not.fun This man is not fun.

Ki- is used as an augmentative whereas in Swahili ki- is used as a diminutive.

Sheng: Cheki iki kindai. Look_at DEM AUGM-car Look at this big vehicle.

In Swahili, the augmentative classes are the JI/MA classes (5/6).

jitu/ a big man/ giant; jiji/ a big city.

It is crucial to stress such differences here between Standard Swahili and Sheng as the use of one prefix can express opposite meanings. For instance, the wordkimfuko in Sheng means “a big bag” whereas it means “a small bag” in Standard Swahili.

The marker MA- serves as the generic plural in Sheng.

Madem wamejikata. PL-girl SP3P-RES-go The girls have gone.

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Verbal extensions

Standard Swahili has several verbal extensions (or derivative verbs) such as: prepositional, passive, stative, reciprocal, causative and reversive. In Sheng, all these verbal extensions are used even with verbs borrowed from other languages (English, Gikuyu…). Another verbal extension called intensive, which is not used in Standard Swahili but appears in other Bantu languages, is used in Sheng as the habitual form. It can be used with the different tense markers (present, future, and past tenses markers) and with the prefix u- (from hu- prefix that expresses habitual actions in Swahili).

(a) Ye uendanga ushago. He HAB-go-INT countryside (b) Ye anaendanga ushago. He SP3S-PRS-go.INT countryside He/she is going very often to the countryside.

This verbal extension has also extended uses. According to Rudd (2008), “the aerial feature imperfective suffix–a(n)g is preferred 68% of the time”.

Other observations can be done concerning morpho-syntactical differences between Standard Swahili and Sheng, such as:

- The less often uses of object infixes and locative suffixni -.

Swahili: nipo nyumbani “I’m at home” Sheng: niko hom or niko kwa keja “I’m at home”

- The non-appearance of relative affixes on the verb

- The generalization of “a” as the subject prefix of the 3rd person singular, for example in “he is” (locative): ako in Sheng but yuko in Swahili.

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Lexical characteristics of Sheng

Lexical characteristics of Sheng have been extensively studied. In fact, most researches concerning Sheng focused on lexical creativity. Only few examples are given here.

- Suffix “o” used with English words Sheng word derived from the word : prifo prefect jako jacket filo film steto state chipo chips - Suffix and prefix “o” added to Swahili words Sheng word Swahili word translation obaro barabara road odajo daraja bridge orezo rais president owanjo uwanja field odiro dirisha window oembo embe mango oduko duka shop ojijo kijiji village - Inversion of syllabes as in French slang called “verlan”: “take” chukua > kuachu “in front” mbele > lembe “say” sema > mase “very” sana > nasa “behind” nyuma > manyu “house” nyumba > mbanyu

Other lexical manipulations are used such as idiophones (pumpum for “big, fat”, twa twa for “gun”), extension of meaning (tembe means in Swahili “pills” and in Sheng “drugs”), antonym (mzee means in Swahili “old man” but its variant in Sheng msee means “young man”), vibaya means in Swahili “very bad” but “very well” in Sheng), truncation (skiza, from the Swahili word sikiliza, “listen”) (Bosire, 2009).

From a linguistic point of view, Sheng has not much evolved in ten years’ time. Its linguistic structure and word creation processes are still the same even if new words have appeared such as: memba for “friend”, mbegu for “bullet”, chafi for “to hide”, or gathemba for “father”. In addition, some words such as the verb du for “to do” which were not often used ten years ago are now part of Sheng commonly shared vocabulary.

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Linguistic practices and attitudes in Nairobi

The research on attitudes toward Sheng completed in 2004 for my PhD was done mainly in the areas of South B, Mukuru slums and Dandora in Nairobi. It pointed out that Sheng was seen positively in poor urban areas by almost all generations but not among the middle classes and upper classes. However, to the question, “Do you think that Sheng can be standardized in the next decades and becomes a national language?”, almost all of the interviewees answered “No”, and some young people added that it should not be standardized. Considering the code as a street language, they did not want Sheng to be institutionalized as, through such process, it may be “stolen” from them.

More generally, there are diverse opinions toward Sheng code. The Sheng enthusiasts argue that it is important for youth communication because it breaks down ethnic barriers. Sheng opponents bemoan the loss of pure languages, complain about Sheng unintelligibility by the non-initiated and harshly criticize its negative impacts with school learning.

The contrast between real-life linguistic practices and discourses is, however, very significant. On the one hand, some people devalue this code in their epilinguistic discourses, but on the other hand, they show that they value it through their practice of Sheng in daily life situations, and some even transmit Sheng to their children as a first language, especially in slum areas but not only.

Kenyan radio stations and TV channels have given more space to Sheng during the last decade. Specific programs use it in TV series like Machachari (Citizen TV), Vioja mahakamani (Citizen TV), or Inspekta Mwala (Citizen TV); in comic shows like Churchill show (NTV), Hapa kule news (KTN); and in music or dance programs such as Sakata (Citizen TV), Orange beat ya street (NTV)... Many of these programs switch between English, Sheng, and Swahili. A recently founded radio station called Ghetto Radio (89.5FM or www.ghettoradio.co.ke) advertises itself as the official Sheng station and broadcasts programs in Sheng only.

Nevertheless, even if Sheng is widely used in Kenyan media, it is still restricted to specific programs. For instance, Sheng is not used in official news either on TV radios or on newspapers whereas some African urban languages in other African countries are used for this purpose. For instance in Lubumbashi, news on radio stations and TV channels are broadcast in the mixed code French/Swahili called “Swahili Facile” (Easy Swahili).

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In Kinshasa, the mixed code Lingala/French is used in everyday news. Such level of recognition seems far ahead in the case of Nairobi due to pervasive negative linguistic attitudes and language policies.

In 2006, The Standard newspaper had an issue with the Kenyan Publishers Associa- tion (KPA). Indeed, during one of its book exhibition, KPA declared that it will soon pub- lish books in Sheng (Standard 29/9/2006; Momanyi: 2009: 134). However, up to now, the Well Told Story Company is the only publishing group that publishes a booklet in Sheng called Shujaaz.FM (Shujaaz is a Sheng word derived from the Swahili word shujaa which means ‘hero’, the plural marker [z] has been suffixed to this word; it is a grammatical process used in Sheng which has been borrowed from English) every first Saturday of the month, available in The Nation newspaper. It is one of the very few examples of Sheng publications. Shujaaz.FM is a monthly comic book written in Sheng that was launched in February 2010 and it has reached now 43 editions. Shujaaz.FM is a focused national communication effort, which has the purpose to empower young Kenyans with information, ideas, and motivation to become active participants in community development. The main story is about a boy called Boyie who left school in 2009. Boyie is jobless and does not have a place in higher education. Like most of his friends, he is facing an uncertain future. However, he has a talent for electronics. Therefore, he builds himself a FM pirate radio station in his bedroom. Moreover, from his bedroom he is able to hack into various FM stations and broadcast a radio show every day under his pen name DJ B. His show is called Shujaaz.FM. Boyie uses his show to talk to the youth, notably to implore them to take steps to improve their lives. He invites them to share ideas that have helped them in some way and passes them on around Kenya.3

In addition to stories and comic strips, you can find in the small bookShujaaz.FM : • New Sheng words with their translations: Gathemba “father”; chuste “girl”; jura xana “a very foolish person”; kao “come”… (Shujaaz, 6 July 2013) • Mchongoano (see 3.1 below) • Shujaaz even proposes its readers to send them SMS if they do not understand some Sheng words (“Kama kuna majna za Sheng huelewi, tuma SMS”) • Shujaaz has also educational purpose – see for instance Shujaaz, 6 July 2013 where the importance of composts and processes to make it were explained.

3 Source : http://shujaaz.fm/

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Another example of written uses of Sheng is its uses in adverts. It is now a common phenomenon especially when the product is concerned with youth issues:

Adverts for condoms: Nakufeel “I feel you.” Adverts for mobile operators: Bamba hapa, maliza hapa “top up here” (Safaricom) Adverts for radio stations: Maisha ni kudunda “life is pulsating” (Maisha FM).

But the written use of Sheng is still a minor phenomenon. There is no literature in Sheng, and even the well-known Kwani? book published by Kwani Trust advertised as the book of the Nairobian youth gives little space to Sheng. For instance, in Kwani? 2 (2004), there are around 15 pages on Dandora life in Sheng (“Maisha kule D: in the words, lyrics, poems” by Mashifta, Don Rawzi, and Mc Kah”) among 334 pages in English. In Kwani? 3 (2005), only a short poem (“Zana za vita nashika”) by Kama from Kalamashaka rap band and other poems by authors Mc Kah (“Ukombozi wa ki akili”), Kitu Sewer and G. Wiji. Two pages of SMS also feature as well as an interview and a short story by Mwas written in Sheng. Strangely, or maybe in order to reach a bigger audience, the space given to Sheng has been smaller and smaller. In Kwani? 4 (2007), less than five short poems of mainly Kenyan rap group Ukoo Flani Mau Mau are in Sheng, equivalent to only 4 pages in a book of more than 400 pages. In the last Kwani? 7 (2012) about the Kenyan diaspora, again, only short poems, messages and transcriptions of emails on visa issues are available in Sheng.

Sheng in urban arts

Sheng in literature

Some of the contributions in Kwani like poems and stories are part of urban literature written in Sheng. Here we will have a look at one of the poems written by Lenjo Maza that deals on immigration issues (Kwani?, 2012). It shows that Sheng is not only used in Nairobi but also in the Kenyan diaspora in different parts of the world, though it seems to be used in a code-switching speech usually between Sheng and English (for instance, in this poem, there are several examples of code switching between English and Sheng: “Rumors best paying jobs, kazi za mocha”).

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Ideas za Hollywood Hollywood ideas

Nikiwa primo, Father Richard na silver screens When I was in Primary school, Father Richard and silver screens […] Tukaamini majuu a bed of roses, tunapaint wishes Then we believed that Occident was a bed of roses, we painted/had wishes kwa ma-applications za visa for visa application Believing tutarudi loaded kistyle ya P. Diddy Believing that we will be back loaded as P. Diddy Rumors best paying jobs kazi za mocha Rumors best paying jobs, (in fact) mortuary job Anything hata dead bodies ku-make hizo dead presidents Anything, even dead bodies to make dead presidents (US dollars) Mkwanja kwa head zinamek the world go round Money in head makes the world go round Kujipata ndani ya NYC juu ya akala To find yourself in New York City wearingakala (a sandal made from old car tyres) Huna idea first step inachukuliwa wapi You do not have any idea where to take the first step And by the time umefigure out kusonga lembe And by the time you have figured out how to go in front Inakaa “your paper are not in order” juu juu It seems “your paper are not in order” because Umeland JKIA bado juu ya akala You landed at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport with akala.

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Mchongwano

Mchongoano designates a verbal duel in Sheng somehow comparable to African American ritual insults but slightly less virulent and belonging to a more derisory and comic framework. Githinji (2007: 89) defines it as follows: “Mchongoano is a ritualized genre of verbal duel popular with the Kenya youth where one antagonist insults another or members of his/her family. Though ritualized, the topics involved mark it as a risky discourse that oscillates between verbal play and aggressive slurs depending on the context and social relationship between participants.” According to Githinji, the primary function of Mchongoano is socialization. There are several types of mchongoano: informal, formal, face-to-face, mchongoano addressed to no one (internet) and media transfer (politician, singers).

The origin of the word mchongoano is questionable. This term does not exist in Standard Swahili and it is attributed to Sheng language. If the word mchongoano is not recognized as a Swahili word, it may however be coming from the Swahili verb -chongoa that originally means “to sharpen to form a point”, and which has been used in a reciprocal form –ana: chongoana “to sharpen each other to form a point”.4 Therefore, the word mchongoano could mean literally, “the fact of sharpening one another to form a point”, less literally identifying mockery, scorn, ritual insults or scoff. However, the word is pronounced with a specific tonal scheme. It could let us think that the word is coming from a tonal language and therefore not from Swahili, or that the tonal scheme is a way to give to this word a Sheng connotation.

The origin of Mchongoano is not well known and is definitely complex, as the influences seem to be multiple. Some attribute it to the black American “soundings’. Soundings are formal trading of ritual insults also called the “dozens” or “signifying”. According to Labov (1972: 127), the ways in which sounds are delivered, and the evaluation of them by the group follow a well-established ritual pattern. Sounds are evaluated overtly and immediately by the audience. The mark of winning is laughter. The sounds often rhymed couplets, and they usually involve insults concerning mothers or fathers. If we support the hypothesis that mchongoano comes from dozens then we should not forget that African American culture has African sources and therefore mchongoano is drawn in a circle influence (Africa to America and then back to Africa). A similar example is

4 The formation of a noun with the prefix m- and the suffix -o is common in Swahili.

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given through hip hop (Ferrari, 2007) where, for instance, Kenyan youth following hip hop movement find themselves and assimilate their culture not as a foreign culture but as a global African culture.

The mchongoano has definitely not only outside influences but also local influences. We can see some similes with the taarab lyrics – a Swahili musical genre of the Kenyan and Tanzanian coast (Askew, 2002) – and Kikuyu traditions that make use of some similar games during circumcision rituals (Githinji, 2007: 98).

In taarab lyrics, the insults between different adversaries and singers are common. One illustration of this can be found in the song Kitumbiri by Jinamizi A. S. and Hatibu Akida, Lucky Star Musical Club (Tanga):

Hata nawe kitumbiri, kitumbiri majaliwa, Umejifanya hodari miti kutaka nyanyuwa Hali tawi na tambiri, la kushindwa kupasua Even you, monkey, favored monkey, You thought yourself so great, wanting to uproot trees When you are incapable of breaking branches.

Proverbs in taraab are also used in these ritual insults; hilo ni dua la kuku, juwa ha- limpati mwewe “Know that the prayer of the chicken does not affect the hawk” (Askew, 2002: 298).

The content of mchongoano

The linguistic processes used are wordplay/pun and exaggeration. Some mchongoano can be seen as real insults and mockery because it can refer to some particular physical (ex: 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17) or mental aspects of the person (ex: 9, 19). Other can be considered as a denunciation of social inequalities ( ex: 11, 18) or society problem (Githinji, 2007: 90).

Mchongoano can be linked with hip hop culture which is rising in Nairobi since 1980 as dual spirit of competition, and the idea of transforming negative thought into form of art such examples as hip hop dances or rap battles.

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Some websites, like www.mchongoano.com, give every week the top ten of the best mchongwano. This illustrates another way to compete through languages.

Examples of mchongoano:

1. Una mkono rough hadi ukishika mouse, computer inadai found new hardware. Your hand is so rough, if you touch a mouse, computer even claims “found new hardware”.

2. Ati wewe ni mchafu mpaka ukiingia kwa lake kuswim, fish zinatoka kutema mate. You are so dirty, if you go in a lake to swim, fish even get out of the water to spit.

3. Ati wewe ni mzee hadi ukizaliwa “old testament” ilikuwa inaitwa “testament” You are so old, when you was born, the Old Testament was even called “testament”

4. We ni dentist mpro hadi unang’oa blue tooth ya phone yako. You are so professional dentist; you even pull out blue tooth on your phone

5. Ati wewe mweusi tu sana mpaka hauna bright ideas. You are so black; you do not even have bright ideas.

6. Ati mtoi wenu alizaliwa akiwa mblack mpaka doki akasema, “ Kameungua”. Your child is so black that the doctor said he was burnt.

7. We ni mkonda hadi uki dance helicopter una take off. You are so slim that when you dance, helicopter takes off.

8. Uko na macho kubwa hadi wewe huitwa eyewitness. You have such big eyes; you are even called eyewitness.

9. We ni fala hadi ulidial *144# kucheck balance kwa ATM. You are so foolish that you dial *144# to check your balance in a ATM machine

10. Manzi yako ni mhairy hadi ako na Afro kwa nipples. Your girlfriend is so hairy that she has big hair in her nipples.

11. Ati nyinyi ni wadosi mpaka mnapeleka kuku shule. You are so rich; you even take your chicken to school.

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12. Wee ni mwizi mpaka padlock ikikuona inajifungua You are such a thief, when the padlock sees you, it even unlocks itself.

13. Wee ni mrefu mpaka giraffe zinacomplain You are so tall even the giraffes complain.

14. Fathako ni mrefu mpaka akianza kuvaa trouser inapofika waist ishakwisha fashion Your father is so tall that when he begins wearing a pant, by the time it gets to the waist, it has gone out of fashion.

15. Wewe ni mugly hata hauneed mask kuact movie ya horror. You are so ugly; you do not even need a mask to act in a horror movie.

16. Wee mchafu mpaka mbu ikikuuma, inatema mate kwanza. You are so dirty that when a mosquito bites you, it first spits.

17. Mbuyu wako mnono mpaka akikalia ashu inakuwa kobole mbili! Your father is too fat that if he seat on a coin of ten shilling it becomes two coins of 5 shillings.

18. Boss!!! Umesota mpaka, huwezi ku afford ku pay attention. You are so broke you cannot even afford to pay attention.

19. Wewe ni fala, uligongwa na a parked car. You are so foolish; you even have been knocked by a parked car.

Sheng in hip hop music

Sheng performances like hip-hop music described here as an artistic uses of Sheng constitute also a spreading dynamic of this code. The young Africans in urban areas are caught between the Western way of life led in the big towns and values considered more African. Sheng is a way to combine them.

In the song Angalia saa by Mau Mau, the topic of the song is the Kikuyu struggle for independence and the valorization of Kikuyu heroes (e.g. Shege wa Kifiro, Muthoni Nyanjiru, Kimathi) but the language used is Sheng and not Kikuyu. This proves the importance of Sheng even among the conservative youth often associated to the Mungiki political radical movement.

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Damu jasho machozi Blood, sweat and tears Mau Mau wakashinda war mashabiki wakaenda na trophy It is Mau Mau who won the war, the spectators went with the trophy Matigari hana ata ka-ploti The Mau Mau survivor doesn’t even have a piece of land Serikali inataka imfukuze Nairobi The government wants to evict him from Nairobi Magava wanataka wamangishe jirongi The government wants to shoot him Hawana kopi They don’t have information They don know who we be They don’t know anything about us Haikosi Of course White highlands no more Si siri hawatoshi It’s not a secret, and it’s not enough Hii vita imepita rangi ya ngozi This war has overstepped the color of skin. Na kabila najua ni mbili tu And I know that there are only two tribes Maskini na mdosi The poor and the rich Synchronayzini taym tu o fayv Synchronizing time 2005 Decolonayzini mayndz Decolonizing minds Msiseme mliji-hypnotise na rhyms Don’t say that you was hypnotized with rhymes Visions za Shege wa kifiro Visions of Shege wa Kifiro Bugi mato

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They have bells in their ears Mtu anatusi matiti ya mother alinyonya A man disrespects his mother (literally, a man insults her mother’s chest that he has sucked) Alafu anapigiwa makofi za kilo And people applauded a lot Wa-shoot Muthoni wa Nyanjiru They shoot Muthoni Nyanjiru The same route wa-rape mama yetu Njeri The same thing happen to our mother Njeri who was rapped Ivo ndivo wana-treat ma-hero It’s how they treat heroes Ka Kenya ni matrix nani ndio Neo If Kenya is Matrix, who is Neo? Ka Kimathi hakuwa the one If Kimathi wasn’t the one Then society iko drunk na opium Then the society is drunk with opium

Also, in the song Shuhudia by Kah that speaks about division between African states, the language used to represent the ideology of Pan-Africanism is still Sheng.

Mipaka kila mahali

Boundaries everywhere Mipaka bila maswali Boundaries without questions Tume gawinyika hali Separation of situation [...] Wazee vijana kusikilizana noma sana Young and old coming to a consensus is very difficult Mipaka za kifamilia Family boundaries

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Mipaka za ki jiografia Geographical boundaries Kutudividia dunia, kufikia, Kenya,Tanzania They have divided our world, to reach Kenya, Tanzania Nigeria list inaendelea Nigeria, the list keeps going on Sheria zina letwa na viongozi waking’agania power Laws are being creates by politicians who are after power Nania ya kutojivunia,nchi ya wafalme weusi Without any intent of gaining anything in the land of black kings Ma heathens ma puppet masters wanatumia The heathens and the puppet masters they are using Uchumi kuvutia marionettes inabakia Economy to attract marionettes, it remains Soul ya Africa inauzwa kwa price ya diamonds African soul is being sold for the price of diamonds

Sheng in cinema

Nairobi Half Life is a Kenyan drama film of 2012 mostly in Sheng directed by David Tosh. It is the first movie that fully resorts to this code. The story is about a young aspiring actor named Mwas who moves from his home village to Nairobi to try to make money and realize his dreams in life. As a Kikuyu speaker, he needs to learn Sheng quickly in order to live in Nairobi. But as he tries to adapt to his new life and looks for auditions in a theater, he finds himself integrated into a street gang of young thugs. The story starts in Kikuyu in his native village then switch to Sheng in Nairobi streets and English in auditions and rehearsals of plays.

Mwas: Ah Oti Gota jo mtu wangu Ah Oti give me five, my man ! Oti: We ni job gani unadu? Which kind of job are you doing? Ushabonga na Dingo Did you talk to Dingo? Mwas: Hee na akanirusha hii waks

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Yes and he got me this job. Oti: Hai ni uchokosh, kuja ivi This is like dumpster diving, let’s go. Mwas: Hay na waks? What about the work? Oti: Unaiachanga kimangoto. Leave it like this. Mwas: Unamek do wapi? Where do you make money here? Oti: Pande zote lakini kiujanjaz tu, Everywhere but you have to be smart Unajua gaza ni masper parts In Gaza, the main moneymaker is spare parts

Through the examples given of some artistic uses of Sheng, Sheng seems to assert itself not only in everyday communications but also in the urban artistic landscape.

Conclusion

After comparing the data that I collected ten years ago for my PhD thesis with the set of new data collected in 2013, I can say that, even if urban new languages are known to evolve fast, I have not detected important changes in Sheng, whether on the language structure itself or in its social uses and status. Of course, the ‘deep Sheng’ has seen its vocabulary changed like other slangs due to its function of secret code but what we call here the common Sheng has remained stable. However, it is undeniable that Sheng is still spreading, and such a spread cannot be stopped. It has become so common in Nairobi everyday communication that a Sheng language manual on CDs called Ultimate Sheng (2013: Banential medi) is now sold in supermarkets. This manual targets foreign residents “to make them aware of what is going on around them” as well as parents “to enable them to bond with their children”, corporate marketers “to target the youth better”, and politicians “to connect with the youth”. Sheng is also spreading outside Kenya through an increasing number of Sheng websites and the significant Kenyan diaspora. Therefore, if Sheng has not really changed during the last decade, its expansion throughout Kenyan society is a central aspect of its development, notably showing that it has not been affected by existing negative attitudes toward this language code. And as history has already

50 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est shown in other countries, negative attitudes can even be a step towards the development of language: French was seen as a deformation of Latin some centuries ago; it has been standardized and grammatized and is now the national language of France widely spoken in France and beyond.

This expansion of Sheng in many areas of Kenya does not affect the coastal region of the country, from Mombasa to Lamu. The Coast gathers a majority of Swahili native speakers whose mastering of “proper” Swahili is strongly tied to their specific coastal identity, hence their being very watchful when it comes to Swahili correctness and cor- rection. This was not the case in Nairobi or other parts of Kenya where Swahili was a vehicular language. It may also be one of the reasons why Swahili of Lubumbashi has been stabilized and described before Sheng (Schicho, 1982): there were no Swahili native speakers in Lubumbashi to correct Swahili. The origin of Sheng is still unknown, some papers asserting that it originated from slang, but we can also affirm by looking at data from Whiteley (1974) that it may also come from different types of code switching.

Categorization of Sheng is still not clear. Indeed, categorization of a language can involve many aspects such as linguistic description, language attitudes, language history, language policies and practices. In the particular case of Sheng, which has now become the mother tongue of many children in the slums areas of Nairobi, we have been able to prove that Sheng has developed its own phonetic, morphological and grammatical system (Ferrari, 2005; Bosire, 2009). I think it is important to place Sheng studies among other African urban languages studies. About categorization, I argue that if the linguistic description of such varieties show that the urban code has reached a stable stage and has an independent linguistic system, therefore those languages should just be classified as new languages, because they do not correspond to others classification such as Creole, pidgin, slang, code switching, etc. We could also describe them as mixed languages, but which language is not mixed? French or English are all mixed languages. So the only specificity of these urban languages is to be new.

Sheng can also be categorized as a Swahili dialect despite the fact that the term Swahili dialect usually refers to old dialects (Kilamu, Kipemba,…) that have not really been influenced by European languages. Therefore, when categorizing Sheng as a Swahili dialect we should specify that it is a ‘special’ dialect because it appears recently and it incorporates meaningfully linguistic aspects of English ( Ferrari, 2012: 175-180).

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Finally, when we think of the future of African languages facing globalization and the problem of endangered languages, we should also remember that the death of languages is a natural process. Any language has a limited life expectancy. Of course, it is very important to describe endangered languages before their death for the purpose of history, cultural and linguistic aspects but we should take into consideration new urban languages because the study of new urban languages allows a better understanding of modern societies.

Bibliography

Antoine, Philippe, Jacqueline Billiez, et al. Des langues et des villes (actes du colloque). ACCT Didier Erudition, 1990. Askew, Kelly. Performing the Nation, Swahili Music and Cultural politics in Tanzania. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. Bosire, Mokaya. Sheng: The Phonology, Morphology and Social Profile of an Urban Vernacular. Proquest, Umi Dissertation Publishing, 2011. Bosire, Mokaya. “What Makes a Sheng Word Unique? Lexical Manipulation in Mixed Languages.” In Elected Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference on African Linguistics, ed. Akinloye Ojo & Lioba Moshi, 77–85. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project, 2009. Caubet, Dominique, Jacqueline Billiez, et al. Parlers jeunes ici et là-bas : Pratiques et représentations. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. Chacha, Leonard. “A Sketch of Kiswahili Comic Discourse in Nairobi.” Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est 36 (2007): 1–32. Ferrari, Aurélia. “Hip Hop in Nairobi: Recognition of an International Movement and the Main Means of Expression for the Urban Youth in Poor Residential Areas.” In Songs and Politics in Eastern Africa, Kimani Njogu & Hervé Maupeu (eds.), 107–128. Dar es Salaam/Nairobi: IFRA & Mkuki na Nyoka Publishers, 2007. Ferrari, Aurélia. Emergence d’une langue urbaine: le sheng de Nairobi. Louvain/Paris: Peeters, Collection Afrique et langage, 2012. Githinji, Peter. “Sheng and language pedagogy.” Paper at “Sheng language in Kenya: structure, uses and pedagogy” conference, IFRA, Nairobi, 16th July 2013. Githinji, Peter. 2008, “Ambivalent Attitudes: Perception of Sheng and its Speakers.” Nordic Journal of African Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 113–136.

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Githinji, Peter. 2008, « Sexism and (mis)representation of women in Sheng », Journal of African Cultural Studies », Volume 20, Issue 1, Special Issue: East African Culture, Language And Society, 15-32. Githinji, Peter. Insults and Folk Humor: Verbal Transgression in Sheng’s Mchongoano, ‘The joy of Language’, Proceedings of a symposium https://www.msu.edu/~dwyer/ JOLIndex.htm Githinji, Peter. “Mchongoano, Verbal Duels: Risky Discourse and Sociocultural Commentary.” In Cultural Production and Social Change in Kenya: Building Bridges, Art Culture and Society, ed. Kimani Njogu & Oluoch-Olunya, vol.1. Nairobi: Twaweza communications, 2007. Githinji, Peter. Bazes and Their Shibboleths: Lexical Variation and Sheng Speakers’ Identity in Nairobi, Nordic Journal of African studies, 15, no. 4 (2006): 443–472. Githiora, Chege. “The Rise and Rise of Sheng: Language and Identity in Modern Kenya.” Paper at “Sheng language in Kenya: structure, uses and pedagogy” conference, IFRA, Nairobi, 16th July 2013. Kang’ethe-Iraki, Frederick, Cognitive Efficiency: The Sheng Phenomenon in Kenya, Pragmatics 14, no. 1 (2004): 55–68. Kouadio N’Guessan, J. “Le nouchi abidjanais, naissance d’un argot ou mode linguistique passagère.” In Des langues et des villes (actes du colloque), ed. Philippe Antoine, Jacqueline Billiez, et al, 373–383. ACCT Didier Erudition, 1990. Lafage, S. “Hybridation et ‘français des rues’ à Abidjan.” In Alternances codiques et français parlé en Afrique, ed. Queffelec, 280–291. Publications de l’Université de Provence, 1998. Labov, William. “Rules for ritual insults.” In Studies in Social Interaction, ed. D. Sudnow, 120–169. New York: Free Press, 1972. Mazrui, Ali. “Slang and Code-Switching: the Case of Sheng in Kenya.” In Afrikanistische Arbeitspapiere, ed. Rose Marie Beck, Thomas Geider & Werner Graebner, 168-179. Swahili Forum II, n°42, 1995. Mc Laughin, Fiona. “Introduction to the Languages of Urban Africa.” In The Languages of Urban Africa, ed. Fiona Mc Laughlin, 1–18. London: Continuum, 2009. Momanyi, Clara. “The effects of Sheng in the Teaching of Kiswahili in Kenyan School.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 2, no. 8 (2009): 127–138. Mosoti, Edwin. “Taarab or Songs of Abuse? Verbal Duels in East Africa.” Muziki: Journal of Music Research in Africa 9 (2012): 13–34. Mutiga, Jayne. “Effects of Language Spread on a People’ Phenomenology: The Case of Sheng’ in Kenya.” Journal of Language Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 4, no. 1 (2013).

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Mutonya, M. “Swahili Advertising in Nairobi: Innovation and Language Shift.” Journal of African Cultural Studies 20, no. 1 (2008): 3–14. Njogu, Kimani & G. Oluoch-Olunya. 2007, Cultural Production and Social Change in Kenya: Building Bridges, Art Culture and Society, vol. 1. Nairobi: Twaweza communications, 2007. Ogechi, Nathan Yori. “Sheng as a Youth Identity Marker: Reality or Misconception?” In Culture, performance & Identity: Paths of Communication in Kenya, ed. Kimani Njogu, 75–92. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2008. Rudd, Philip, Sheng: The Mixed Language of Nairobi. Phd Diss., Ball State University, 2008. Schicho, Walter. Syntax des Swahili von Lubumbashi. Wien: Afro-Pub, 1982. Wasike, Chris. “Cali, Genge Rap Music and the Anxieties of Living in the Glocalized City of Nairobi.” Muziki: Journal of Music Research in Africa, Jua vol. 8 (2011): 18–33. Whiteley, Wilfred H. Language in Kenya. Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1974.

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Architectural Conservation in Rapidly Urbanising Cities: The Case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Fabian S. Kigadye1

Abstract: Dar es Salaam city is changing structurally by replacement of old building with new. Thus, the city is facing challenge on conservation of built heritage due to demolition of historic building and the area surrounding historic monument. Historic building are demolished to pave way for construction of new building for housing and office spaces to meet the free market economy demand. According to the existing legislations, buildings are protected as national monuments by listing individual building, group of buildings or conservation of area. Part of historic city centre of Dar es Salaam was declared as Architectural Conservation area with Government Notice No.498 of September 8th, 1995. The aim was to protect historic and architectural values of the area. Eighteen years (18) after declaration of conservation area, it is observed that there is increasing demolition of historic building and construction of new building which does not match with existing historic townscape and context. It is observed that, designation of a consevation area has been ineffective, because there is weakness in legislations and institutional framework for management of the conservation area. It is recommended that, national authorities should harmonize national policies and legislations and strengthen institutional linkages for heritage conservation and management.

Introduction

Like environmental conservation, conservation of historic towns has been effected by command and control policies and regulations that provide for the protection of designated sites and structures. Most countries have national legislation to “list” or designate cultural heritage resources,2 though levels of protection vary greatly (Birabi, 2007). As the field has evolved, it has become clear that, although there may be some inherent value(s) in such places, such approaches must be coupled with integrated strategies for managing the built environment as a whole and with participatory processes that engage communities and stakeholders in decision-making about their heritage. Thus, conservation of historic towns is not simply an end in and of itself, but rather a tool among many to steward cultural resources, to foster a sense of community and identity, to promote sustainability in building and construction, and to improve quality of life.

1 PhD fellow, Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour / Antiquities Division, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Email: [email protected] 2 Heritage conservation is the management of heritage through research, planning, preservation, maintenance, reuse, protection and/or selected development in order to maintain sustainability, harmony, and the capacity to respond to the dynamics of the age to develop a better quality of life (ICOMOS: 2003).

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Many years passed before the Venice Charter and its agenda of conserving monuments was followed by similar guidelines for urban areas in the 1970s. These were preceded by decades of urban destruction caused by both war and modernizations (Areskough & Persson, 1999:60). The towns were rebuilt, or redesigned; it became apparent that the town planning principle of the 20th century was quite different from the urban growth patterns. The protection of town therefore became a necessity and the urban environment was promoted from being the monument’s context to a valuable milieu in its own right (Ibid). According to Gazzola (1978),

‘(t)he assemble of properties that referred to cultural history came to constitute the cultural heritage of a nation. This meant a shift from the criteria related to protection of things of remarkable interest (1931 Athens Charter) to criteria related to conservation of an assemble of things including the single object, the urban environment, and the landscape, which together formed the testimony of culture, of a significant evolutions, of an event. All this was with reference even to modest works that has acquired cultural significance over time.’ (Gazola 1978: 242).

This same policy concept was clearly expressed in the general principle of the 1976 Recommendation of UNESCO concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Area. The recommendation stipulates that:

Every historic area and its surroundings should be considered in their totality as a coherent whole, whose balance and specific nature depend on the fusion of the parts of which it is composed and which include human activities as much as the buildings, the spatial organization and the surroundings. All valid elements, including significance in relation to the whole must not be disregarded (art.3)

The ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Historic Town and Urban areas defines the components that create the characters of a historic town. These components consist of urban patterns such as lots and streets, and the relationship between buildings and green and open spaces. Moreover, individual buildings size, scale, style, colors, decorations and constructions materials – not only exterior but also interior – is important. In a wider context also, the surrounding setting and the functions of the town constitute its essence. The largest difference between the principle of conserving monuments and areas seems clear, conserving monuments aims at preservation while conservation of urban areas aims at and adaptation to contemporary life (Areskough and Person 1999:60).

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In a world of rapid change, visible and tangible evidence of the past may also be valued for the sense of place and continuity it conveys. The presence of historic building is a testimony to the passage of time in a particular locality. Ashworth and Tunbridge (1990), quoting Lynch (1960), argue that:

‘place familiarity is valuable in maintaining the individual psychological stability and an over-abrupt change in the physical environment must be modified by conservational policies, so as that the excitement of the future should be anchored in the security of the past.’

The aesthetic appeal of an historic place may result from the combination or juxtaposition of many buildings rather than the individual merits of any particular building. Most cities are made up of buildings from a range of period in a variety of style and idioms. Thus, the past may be valued because of its juxtaposition with the present. In particular, the older building provides potent contracts to the interminable sterility and monotony of much of modernist architecture. Such diversity is usually viewed positively. Mumford (1938), cited in Tiesdell (1996:13), said that ‘by the diversity of its time structures, the city in the past escapes the tyranny of a single present, and the monotony of a future that consists in repeating only a beat heard in the past.’

New Building in Historic Towns

The issue of new building in historic town was recognized by the ICOMOS, and the concern for historic cities were principally assumed by the International Committee on Historic Cities and Village (CIVVIH) that has since collaborated in a number of such declarations. As a result of meeting in Bruges in 1975, the principles governing the rehabilitation of a historic town recognized that preservation necessitated the adaptation of a historic town to the requirements of contemporary life, but that this should be done without destroying its existing fabric, structure, or historical evidence. The principles also accepted the possibility of new buildings in historic setting; it declared that respect for authenticity implied the integration of modern architecture in old town.

This meant that importance is given to functional continuity as well as maintenance of historic fabric. Following the same lines of thought, the 1987 ICOMOS Charter for the conservation of Historic Towns and Urban areas declared (article 10) that: ‘when it is necessary to construct new building or adopt existing ones, the existing spatial layout should

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be respected, especially in terms of scale and lot size. The introduction of contemporary elements in harmony with the surroundings should not be discouraged since such features can contribute to the enrichment of an area.’ The European Charter for Architectural Heritage (1975) emphasized the need to guarantee a harmonious social balance in historic cities. The Charter also defined the concept of ‘integrated conservation’, and referring to new buildings, it declared:

It should be noted that integrated conservation does not rule out the introduction of modern architecture into areas containing old buildings provided that the existing context, proportions, forms, sizes and scale are fully respected and traditional materials are used.

The same concepts were promoted in the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (Granada 1985), which emphasized that integrated conservation policies should ‘include the protection of architectural heritage as an essential town and country planning objective and ensure that this requirements is taken into account at all stages both in the drawing up of development plans and in the procedures for authorizing work.’

However, in this context, the Management Guidelines for World Cultural Heritage Sites, published by ICCROM, emphasize that the primary objective of Conservation Planning is the conservation of existing historic fabric: ‘The building of new structure should not be an excuse for demolishing old one. New construction may, however, be necessary to re-establish functional and architectural continuity, and in case where empty lots might be hazardous to or further decay surrounding buildings.’

It is possible to identify design criteria related to architectural requirements, but it is equally essential to consider the historical integrity of an historic settlement. This demands identification of the elements that together define the fabric and infrastructure of a city, their mutual connections, and the relationship within the cultural landscape of which the settlement is part. The policies regarding the construction of new buildings should be based on the understanding of these complex relationships (Warren, 1998).

According to David Throsby (2007: 22), ‘historic building is an asset that has financial value as capital (it could be sold off as real estate for commercial developments), and it also has financial value in terms of the flow of services it provides (estimated, for example by the rental value of the office space).’ These aspects of the buildings value could be called its economic value as a piece of purely physical capital. As such, this

58 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est economic value could be provided by any building. But this is not just “ordinary” building; its distinguished feature is that it also has cultural value, delivering from the cultural significance which is essential to its qualification as cultural heritage. Like its economic value, the building’s cultural value is seen both in its worth as capital (the accumulated sense of cultural significance embodied in the building’s very fabric) and in terms of the flow of service it provides (its historic or aesthetic qualities that are enjoyed every day by workers, visitors and passer-by) (Ibid).

Reconciling conservation and development is a prerequisite for achieving improvement of the quality of life in environmentally and culturally sensitive places. By shifting the focus on perception and valuations, conservation becomes a dynamic process involving public participation, dialogue, and consensus, and ultimately better stewardship (Matero, 2011).

Historical Overview of the City of Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam is a coast city in the United Republic of Tanzania situated along the Indian Ocean. It covers an area of 1,393 square kilometer with an estimated population of 4.5 million people. The city is located between latitudes 6.36 degrees and 7.0 degrees to the south of the equator and longitudes 39.0 and 33.33 to the East of Greenwich. Dar es Salaam is one among many cities in the Sub-Saharan Africa that are experiencing rapid urbanizations. The city is relatively a new city that emerged during the German and British colonization of Tanganyika.3 The history of Dar es Salaam commenced with its establishment in the 1860s by Sultan Majid and its growth through Arab, German and British colonial periods and the post colonial period. Likewise, the architectural evolutions of the city centre stretches across: Arab, German British and postcolonial eras (Moshi, 2009:27). The city is well endowed with buildings erected during the first fifty years of its existence. The Swahili houses and colonial buildings added to the beautiful architecture of Indians buildings and early post-independence structure. Historical buildings have great potential for citizens to identify with their city, for cultural tourism and, not least, for the real estate market. The individuality and variety of its architecture are a major contribution to the beauty and unique character of the city.

3 Tanganyika is the former name for Tanzania mainland. In 1964, the Republic of Tanganyika and the Republic of Zanzibar united and formed a country known as the United Republic of Tanzania.

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When German took over Tanganyika in 1891, Dar es Salaam was just a small settlement with a population of about 4,000 inhabitants (Sutton, 1970; Kombe, 1995:10; Lupala 2002:31). In the same year, the Germans shifted the capital from Bagamoyo to Dar es Salaam. Due to increased trade and importance, because of the establishment of port facilities and administrative activities in the city, more migrants were attracted and the populations increased to 10,000 inhabitants by the year 1894. Six years later, the population reached 20,000. Population’s growth slowed down over the war periods (World War I and II) and a steady increase was notable after the 1950s. A faster growth was noted after independence mainly because of the abandonment of the policies that inhibited Africans from migrating to towns. By 1968, the populations were increased to 69,277. The populations of Dar es Salaam reached 782,000 by 1978 (figure 4.1). While in 1992, estimated populations for the city was pegged at 1,550,000 inhabitants and in the year 2002 the city had estimated populations 2,497,940.

Whilst the city spatial expansion has been growing at an average rate of 7.2%, the annual average growth rates of populations for inter censual period has been also high. For example, the average annual growth rate between 1948 and 1957 was established to be 7.1%. This figure increased to 7.8% between 1957 and 1967 and further to 9.7 between 1967 to 1978 (Lupala, 2002:31). The growth rate slowed down to 4.8% between 1978 to 1988, but sharply rose to 9.1% as estimated between 1988 and 1995 (Strategic Plan, 1998:13-14). Recent estimates show a decreased rate to 3.1% for the period between 1995 and 2001 (Lupala, 2001 and 2002:31). These fluctuating trends in growth rates illustrate an observation that, while rural urban migration has been pointed out as one of the major factors of rapid urbanization in Sub Saharan cities, natural populations increase has also played a significant role especially in the decades of 1980s and 1990s (Lupala, 2002:31).

Based on the statistics above, Kironde (2000) said that ‘(a)fter 1948, and particularly since independence, direct control of direction of Dar es Salaam’s development has been less easy on account of the sheer number of people being added to the city per annum, as well as the inappropriateness of the tools in hand to deal with this growth.’

The City has three Municipal Councils,4 namely Ilala, Kinondoni and Temeke. These Municipalities form three districts of Dar es Salaam Region. Dar es Salaam was declared a township in 1920 and in 1949 it was upgraded to municipality. When Tanganyika became independent in 1961, Dar es Salaam was elevated to a city status.

4 In 1999, three district of Dar es Salaam were named as municipalities.

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St Joseph Church Azania Front, Lutheran Church These building depict the German gothic style building in Dar es Salaam of the 19th century. Evidence of the Greco-Roman influence of architecture.

Architectural Conservation Initiatives in Dar es Salaam

Conservation of built heritage in Dar es Salaam was initiated by the Department of Antiquities in the year 1973 when the Minister responsible for Antiquities appointed an ad-hoc committee to study and recommend on the desirability of conserving buildings of historical and architectural significance. Following the recommendation of the Committee, the Minister submitted a paper to the Cabinet and the Cabinet did not agree to all the suggested areas and buildings. It only selected a few building which were to be protected as monuments. By that time, provisions for legal protection on the cultural heritage was based on the principle of listing and scheduling of individual structure or buildings which were deemed of historic or architectural significance as monuments. It was considered inadequate to offer the required legal protection to the whole area of the city. Changing the legal regime for the protection and preservation of cultural heritage resources was given priority in the implementation of the policy decision for the protection of historic centre. This was achieved in 1979, when the Antiquities (Amendment) Act was enacted by Parliament. This, among other things, enabled the Minister responsible for “Antiquities”, in consultation with the Minister responsible for “Lands,” to declare a conservation area or a site which, in his opinion, was a valuable national heritage for its aesthetic value

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or contains a homogenous group of Monuments or contains, structure or other forms of human settlement which in his opinion are valuable national heritage for their historic, architectural, social and cultural value.

The battle to save the Old Boma building5 from demolition in 1979 was important in bringing public attention to the values of historic buildings in the city. On this occasion, the Division of Antiquities was supported by teachers, architects, and even those who had previously been responsible for the demolition of the former New Africa Hotel building. The Division of Antiquities, however, maintained that instead of protecting these buildings one by one, aerial protection should be provided in order to preserve them in their context. However, after long discussions with the central government, building owners and the city council in the year 1995, the Division of Antiquities managed to declare 26 historic building, 5 Monuments and 1 Architectural Conservation Area. The listed historic buildings are still intact and in use. These buildings were declared national monuments with government notice No 498 of September 8th, 1995.

The Old Boma Building on Sokoine Drive

The Architectural Conservation Area: A Case Study

The Architectural Conservation Area of Dar es Salaam is a built heritage site from the late 19th century which occupies the most prime site in the city centre within Ilala Municipality. It exhibits unique cultural and architectural landscape: this heritage values has survived for over 100 years. It was established by the German colonial administration as the administrative and political centre of Dar es Salaam and expanded and consolidated during the British colonial administration. It contains buildings and cultural landscape

5 The Old Boma Building was constructed in the 1860s during the Sultan Majid.

62 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est which are of great architectural, historical and aesthetic values early 19th and 20th century. The planning and designing of this area inform of a large botanical garden that is unique in the context of urban planning and design. It is an outstanding example of architectural ensemble and landscape which illustrates significant stage in the city development. It is because of its historical and architectural value that the Division of Antiquities, in collaboration with the Ministry of Land and Housing Development, declared this part of the city an Architectural Conservation Area with a Government Notice No.498 of September 8th, 1995. The area concerned covers the area between Ocean Road, Chimara Road, Shaaban Robert Street, Sokoine Drive, Azikiwe Street and Kivukoni Front. The total size of the Conservation Area is 0.4642 km2 (URT, 2004).

The Ocean Road Hospital in the Conservation Area, German Built Structure

Source: Author, 2010

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State of Conservation in the City

The historic city centre is facing challenge on conservation of built heritage due to demolition of historic buildings and the area surrounding historic monuments resulting from the booming of construction industry in the city centre. Ambitious rebuilding programs and upgrading of outdated infrastructures are conflicting with retention of a unique sense of place, as Vines (2005) observed, stating that ‘(d)emolition of traditional streetscapes removes a community’s to its own special past’ (Vines, 2005:1). This process in not reversible-once gone, the familiar and intimately scaled locales cannot be reinstated, and bland, modern, sanitized edifices obliterate the patina and unique qualities of the humble historic townscape.

Moreover, according to Matero (2011), ‘unlike the case of natural resources, sustainability for the built environment differs in that historic resources cannot be physically regenerated, only retained, modified or lost.’ About the continuous trend of demolition of historic buildings in Dar es Salaam, Moon notes that “(t)here appeared to be no coordination within the Antiquities Division, the authority responsible for heritage matters. In the city as a whole, in fact, the limited Antiquities legislation that existed was routinely ignored”. Stressing on the issue of management of architectural conservation area, Warren et al (1998:75) reminds that “(t)here is no point in designating an area for its special interest and then allowing its character to be damaged by destroying buildings or other features that make it special, or by allowing new development that is out of place, scale or context with the area.”

The demolition of historic building is against the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Natural and Cultural Heritage. The symposium took place in Vienna Austria 2005 and came up with a Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture- Managing the Historic Urban Landscape as an important outcome of the meeting. The memorandum stresses that “(t)he central challenge of contemporary architecture in the historic urban landscape is to respond to development dynamics in order to facilitate socio-economic changes and growth, on the other hand, while simultaneously respecting the inherited townscape and its landscape setting on the other (UNESCO 2007:95). It also emphasizes the importance of taking into careful consideration the urban context and continuity in planning new development, against ‘iconic’ architecture based on design models not related to the specific tradition of a place.

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Therefore, the designation of Dar es Salaam City center as an Architectural Conservation Area by the mentioned regulations and allowing the developments that can be seen is in complete contradiction with, and is a reflection of, weakness of conservation practice carried out by the responsible authorities.6

Above: the Salamander building before and during demolition works (the public was against the demolition of this building).

Regulatory Frameworks for Conservation of Architectural Heritage

The Antiquities Division is a Government institutions responsible for conservation of cultural heritage resources in the country. The Antiquities Act enacted by the independent government in 1964 and amended in 1979 to replace the Colonial Monuments7 (Preservation) Ordinance promulgated in 1937, is the basic legislation for the protection and preservation of the country cultural built heritage. Conservation of group of historic buildings was archived in 1979 when the Antiquities (Amendment) Act was enacted by Parliament.

Declaration and management of Conservation Area is also stipulated in the Urban Planning Act of 2007. The Act section 58 gives mandate to the Local Planning Authority to designated conservation areas. The Act says that ‘(t)he planning authority8 may compile a list of areas, buildings, or groups of buildings of special architectural or historic interest

6 See also Fielden (2004: 261) who reminds that “(i)t is essential that consideration of the values in cultural property should be assessed objectively and fairly. There is always a danger that the conservation program will only reflect the bureaucratic objectives of the government department that is responsible.” 7 The issues of ‘national monuments’ is often loaded with political values, and can be conceived as a question of national pride. Such values can provoke reconstruction and stylistic restoration of desired features of monument, and the elimination and destruction of others contrary to political goals. 8 The Planning Authority is defined by the Urban Planning No.8 Act of 2007 section 7 as “Every city council, municipal council, town council and township authority shall each become a planning authority in respect of its area of jurisdiction”. 65 Numéro Varia

and may amend any list so compiled such areas may include Buildings, Artifacts, Group of buildings, Areas of unique biodiversity and rare species of trees and special trees’ (Urban Planning Act 2007: 328).

The Dar es Salaam Master Plan (DMP) of 1979 recognizes the importance of architectural conservation. The Master Plan stresses that “(t)hese areas are of significant importance as the buildings and the general character of the area are excellent example of the city’s heritage. The existing structure should be retained and, where necessary improvements and restorations undertaken, new structures associated with the existing facilities will be permitted. They shall be limited to three storeys in height and maintaining the character of the existing structure and the surrounding area”. However, in terms of management of architectural conservation area, DMP of 1979 management policy article 1 (v) says that ‘(i)t shall be the policy of the city council to encourage the preservation of properties of historic, architectural or archeological interest. Guidance in this area should be obtained from the Director of Antiquities”

Research Methodology

This study is based on the survey conducted at the inner city of Dar es Salaam, an area under pressure for redevelopment. To gather useful information on important historic buildings, this study employed interpretative historical research based on literature and case-study approach. Much effort was directed to a comprehensive review of the existing literature, on-site examination of the properties, and photographic, mapping and documentation. A structured questionnaire was also used.

Findings and Analysis

A number of aspects were looked into, notably legal and institutional frameworks for cultural heritage, development and management plans, public awareness, stakeholders and community participation and the administration structure framework.

66 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est a. Legal and Administrative Systems

The study has revealed that the legal and administrative system of cultural heritage in Tanzania is linked to the history of the country. The colonial period has left its marks on the legal systems, but even more on the concepts of protection and identification of cultural heritage. The architectural conservation areas under study portray heritage built during colonial times. The existing legal and administrative systems favor the concept of monumentalism and neglect other types of heritage such as historic landscapes or vernacular architecture. It takes also very little or no cognizance of associated intangible and spiritual values. It is observed that the Division of Antiquities has played a more active role compared to Local Government Authorities conservation of the built heritage, but lacked the capacity to link conservation to public policies to mitigate the impact of the economic development. It enlarged the scope of its policies to include built heritage conservation but restricted the action to the narrow track of preservation control on listed monuments. By doing so, it lost the possibility for a future alliance with the owners of heritage properties and local government authorities.

As pointed earlier, current administrative frameworks are derived from systems imposed during the colonial period. The study reveals that, in the Western world, most heritage conservation activities are the responsibility of municipal and county authorities; the central state plays only a supervisory role in policies enacted and follow-ups. But in Tanzania the administration of heritage is vested in the centralized national government administrations. Usually, centralized administration systems make it difficult for heritage management institutions to be responsible for the needs of the communities and stakeholders. b. Conservation and Management Plan

The study has revealed that there is not any Conservation Plan or management plan for individual building or for the architectural conservation area. The only document that exists for conservation and management of built heritage in Dar es Salaam is the Master Plan of 1979 and the Dar es Salaam Central Area Redevelopment Plan of 2002. These documents were prepared by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development (MLHHSD) to be used by the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC). The DMP (1979) recognizes the importance of conserving the built heritage. The Plan defined

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heritage area as “areas of significance as the buildings and the general character of the area are excellent example of the city’s heritage”. The Master Plan guides that existing structure should be retained and, where necessary improvements and restorations undertaken. New structures associated with the existing facilities will be permitted but limited to three storeys in height and maintaining the characters of the existing structure and surrounding areas (DSMP 1979: 91).

The study has also found that the plan did not zone the building or the conservation areas; therefore it was a general proposal. Tamla (1997:123) expressed his concern that the Master Plans include development conditions which are too general to ensure strict and systematic inventory of new developments. For example there are no dictated development conditions and guidelines. The Master Plan emphasizes only about 8 characters in general but no information about facades, frontage, color, massing or walling materials. Moreover, this Plan is outdated, because it was supposed to be revised in every five years of operations, but it has never been revised since 1979, and it was supposed to operate for 20 only (from 1979-1999).9

In order to cover the vacuum of an adequate Master Plan, the MLHHSD in collaboration with the DCC prepared the Redevelopment Plan for Dar es Salaam Central Area in the year 2002. This plan was due for three years (2002-2005). It was prepared because of the increasing pressure for the city centre business space that has gained momentum recently hence prompted preparation of the Redevelopment Plan. It was noted that, at present, the development activities are taking place on piecemeal basis with high-rise structures gradually replacing the single and double storey structures without regard to consequential infrastructure and service requirements. The Plan recognized the presence of architectural heritage and a need to preserve the rich history of Dar es Salaam city centre through conservation of buildings and other features of architectural and cultural significance. Yet it zoned the area with historic building to be built with building height from 6 up to 10 storeys, or above 10. Within the architectural conservation area the plan zoned for building with height from 3 to 6 storeys. The existing historic buildings have 1 to 2 storeys.

In an interview with the Town Planner of Ilala Municipal, the latter said that “(t) he Central Area Redevelopment Plan is outdated, because it was prepared to control development for three years and after three years it was supposed to revised”. Currently,

9 In 2010/2011 the Government through the Ministry of Land, Housing and Human Settlement Development started to prepare a New Master Plan for the City. To date it is not yet finished.

68 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est physical development taking place in the city is not guided by any document. He added that “conservation of historic building in the city centre is very difficult because every developer want to invest in the city centre because of the availability of social services and infrastructure as well as proximity to other services.” The Town Planner also expressed concerns that the local government is the implementing agency of the central government policies, and that conservation of built heritage in urban areas is not yet a government priority. “There is no any budget set for conservation activities at local government level,” he went further, suggesting that, since conservation for built heritage is within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT)10, the Division of Antiquities (DoA) should give funds for conservation of heritage to LGA’s as they are doing for forestry and wildlife.

Map No 2. Zoning of Building Height in the City c. Lack of Appropriate Institutional Frameworks

There is overlapping jurisdiction between the Division of Antiquities and the Ilala Municipal Council when dealing with any development within the conservation area. The Municipal Council expects their laws to carry more weight in the planning process than the Antiquities Act of 1964. For example, the City Planner said in an interview that the DCC is

10 The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism usually gives LGA’s funds for conservation of forestry and wildlife in their area of jurisdictions.

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in overall in charge for managements and development in the city. Therefore, the Division of Antiquities should first ask the DCC and get approval for any Conservation Projects within the city.1 At present, the only solution at hand is to encourage communication between institutions, since until the laws are revised, they offer little conciliation.

d. Public Awareness and Stakeholder Participation

The study noted that owners were not well informed of the legal, technical and professional requirements for the conservation of the buildings which they own. Besides that, owners were confused on the role of the various government agencies, especially that of the Division of Antiquities and the DCC. They did not understand their role and responsibilities in the conservation of the buildings which they own. However, some owners expressed their willingness, with proper education, sensitization and involvement to fully participate in the conservation process including financial contributions in rehabilitating their building according to the existing regulations. One good example is the field interview with the manager for the Southern Sun Hotel who said that his hotel was located within the Conservation Area, and for this reason, they should have a role to play in conservation. They are also financing the upkeep of the botanical garden which is one of the key features of the Conservation Area. Based on the above arguments, a conservation policy to be successful, it needs to involve all those responsible, from the policy formulators and the implementing agencies to the users. The Head of the Conservation Section in Division of Antiquities said during an interview that ‘the Division has a new policy which was approved in 2008 (and) has taken on board stakeholders and community involvement in conservation of the built heritage’.

e. Administrative Framework

The legal and administrative regime for the management of the conservation and development of the Dar es Salaam Architectural Conservation area is in place. The Antiquities Act of 1964 as amended by the Antiquities Act of 1979 is the principal legal instrument for the protection and preservation of the historic centre. The Antiquities Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism is the central government lead

1 The Antiquities Act requires the Minister responsible for Antiquities to consult the Minister responsible for Lands on issues pertaining to conservation.

70 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est agency for the conservation of the built heritage. Ilala Municipal council is the overall planning and development authority in architectural conservation area. This legal and administrative regime is an opportunity not only for the conservation and development of the conservation area but in the implementation of the Plan. However, there are constraints and issues which need to be addressed and resolved.

• Boundaries: The boundaries of the Conservation Area have not been surveyed, mapped with beacons and a Registered Plan deposited with the Commissioner for Lands. The Plan used as the basis for the declaration of the Conservation Area is not included in the Dar es Salaam Central Area Redevelopment Plan of 2002. The boundaries of the Conservation Area are not clearly marked and have been an issue of dispute.

• Institutional Ownership Problems: The Ministry, when deciding to declare an area a Conservation Area, is legally required to do so in consultation with the Ministries responsible for Land. The sense of these consultation requirements is to ensure the support and agreement of the Ministry responsible for Land and thus giving the area declared to be a conservation area a special status whose main land use is the conservation of heritage resources therein. The Architectural Conservation Area is legally managed and controlled by three institutions: the Ministry responsible for Land, the Ministry responsible for Cultural Heritage and the Ministry responsible for Local Government authorities. Both have laws and regulations which safeguard the priorities of their institutions, but these institutions are always in conflict of interest due to the fact that each of them tends to defend its interests in either development or management issues.

Conclusion

Heritage management demands reconciling interests of the stakeholders. For effective management of the built heritage there is a need to address the competing interests of different stakeholders. It has been revealed that development and conservation are two faces of the same coin. There cannot be conservation without local development because it is an activity that needs the use of social resources that cannot generate financial benefits in the short term. The impact of development on the conservation of the urban built heritage is partially determined by the urban management process and institutional framework. However, there are impacts that are linked to structural development transformation that directly related to the weakness of the style of urban governance and urban management in Dar es Salaam.

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Bibliography

ArchiAfrika Newsletter. “Conservation Special Edition.” May 2009. Batilda, Burian and Alphonce T. Kyariga, Sustainable Development in an Urban Tanzanian Context. Unpublished Paper, Dar es Salaam, not dated. Birabi, Allan K. International Urban Conservation Charters: Catalytic or Passive Tools of Urban Conservation Practices Among Developing Countries. Kampala: Makerere University, 2007. Bixter, A. Journal of Architectural Conservation no. 2 (2001). Casson, W.T. “Architectural Notes on Dar es Salaam Tanzania.” Notes and Records 71 (1970): 181–184. CRATerre-ENSAG/Convention. Cultural Heritage and Local Development, France- UNESCO. 2006. DCC. Strategic Urban Development Plan for the City of Dar es Salaam, Volume I. Dar es Salaam, 2005. English Heritage. Conservation Principles Policies and Guidance. The sustainable Management of the Historic Environment. London: UK, 2008. Fielden, Bernard. Conservation of Historic Buildings. London: Butterworth and Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 1982. Gillman, Clement. “Dar es Salaam, 1860–1940: A Story of Growth and Change.” Tanganyika Notes and Records 20 (1945): 2. Helsing, C. et al. The Central Caravan Route Tanzania. Sweden: Lund Institute of Technology, 2004. ICCROM. Conservation Studies No.5. Legal Frameworks for the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage in Africa. Rome, Italy: ICCROM. ICOMOS. Heritage at Risk. ICOMOS World Report 2001/2002 on Monuments and Sites in Danger. München, Germany: K.G. Saur, 2002. Isaak, C., A Catalogue for the Protected Buildings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: DCC, 2009. Kamamba, Donatius. Conservation of Dar es Salaam. Great Britain: Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies, University of York, 1990.

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Kironde, J. M. The Regulatory Framework, Unplanned Development and Urban Poverty: Findings from Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania, 2006 Kothari, C.R. Research Methodology. New Dehli: New Age International Limited Publishers, 2007. Kyessi, Alphonse G. Community Participation in Urban Infrastructure Provision. Dortmund: Spring Centre, 2002. MLHSD. Dar es Salaam Central Area Redevelopment Plan. Dar es Salaam: The Human Settlements Division, Ministry of Lands Housing and Human Settlement Development. 2002 MLHSD. Government Notices, Orders, Technical Instructions and Circulars Commonly Referred to in Pursuance of Human Settlements Development. Dar es Salaam: The Human Settlements Division, 1999. MLHSD. National Human Development Policy, Government Printer. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania, 2000. Osborne, J. M. “The Berlin Mission.” Tanganyika Notes and Records 54 (1960): 64–68. Patton, M. How to use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation. London: SAGE Publication, 1987. Rodwell, Dennis. Conservation and Development in a Historic City. UK: Donhead Publishing, 2004. Sheuya, Shaaban A. Housing Transformations and Urban Livelihoods in Informal Settlements. Spring Centre, University of Dortmund Germany, 2004. Sutton, John E. “Dar es Salaam: A Sketch of a Hundred Years.” Tanzania Notes and Records 71 (1970): 1–19. Sutton, John E. “Dar es Salaam City, Port and Region.” Tanzania Notes and Records, 71 (1970). Sykes, Laura and Uma Waide. Dar es Salaam: A Dozen Drives around the City. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 1997. Tamla, S. Conservation of Historical Towns along East African Coast (Tanzania), Unpublished PGD Dissertation, UCLAS, Dar es Salaam, 1997 Tiesdell, Steve, Taner Oc and Tim Heath. Revitalizing Historic Urban Quarters. Great Britain: MPG Books,1996.

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UNESCO. Challenges for the Millennium World Heritage. Paris, France: WHC, 2007. URT. Antiquities Legislation of 1964 with its amendment of 1979 No.10. Dar es Salaam. URT. National Environmental Policy. Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 1997. URT. Urban Planning Act of 2007. Dar es Salaam, 2007. US ICOMOS. Managing Change: Sustainable Approaches to the Conservation of the Built Environment. Philadelphia, 2001. Warren John, John Worthington and Sue Taylor. Context: New Building in Historic Settings. Oxford: Architectural Press, 1998. Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. London: SAGE, 1994.

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Phonétique et didactique du FLE : Cas de confusion des sons chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans

Lester M. Jao, Christine Abong’o, Nuru K. Kyalo, Clara Bulili2

Résumé : Cet article a pour objet le rôle joué par la phonétique en classe de français langue étrangère (FLE). Il est unanimement connu et reconnu que les apprenants qui s’adonnent à l’apprentissage d’une langue vivante étrangère se butent à des défis, notamment ceux liés à la prononciation des sons inexistants dans leur langue première. Les apprenants débutants d’une langue étrangère s’écartent souvent de la prononciation dite « bonne ». C’est une erreur qui est, dans des situations extrêmes, non tolérée par certains locuteurs natifs. Cependant, d’après les psychologues et psychopédagogues, un enseignant qui corrige trop l’apprenant risque de le décourager, conduisant ainsi à l’abandon de l’apprentissage de la langue concernée. Cette étude vise à faire connaître et à décrire certaines erreurs de prononciation commises par les apprenants de FLE kenyans. Elle va s’appuyer sur la phonétique pour proposer des remèdes. Nous partons de l’hypothèse selon laquelle les erreurs de prononciation commises par les apprenants trouveraient leur origine dans la langue première de l’apprenant et que ces erreurs pourraient être corrigées grâce à l’intervention de la phonétique.

Introduction

Le français ne cesse de gagner du terrain au Kenya, pays anglophone d’Afrique orientale. Beaucoup de Kenyans s’adonnent à l’apprentissage de cette langue pour différentes raisons, comme l’indique Kazadi (2006 : 14-22). Signalons que la majorité de Kenyans apprenant le français ont déjà appris/acquis et pratiquent au moins trois autres langues : la langue locale (aussi qualifiée, souvent à tort, de « langue maternelle »), le kiswahili (langue nationale du Kenya) et l’anglais (langue officielle du pays). L’anglais et le kiswahili jouissent d’un certain prestige par rapport aux langues locales car ils sont présents à l’école où ils sont enseignés comme matières obligatoires. En plus, l’anglais est la langue d’enseignement de toutes les matières (histoire, géographie, chimie, mathématiques, etc.) sauf le kiswahili et les langues étrangères comme le français et l’allemand. Les langues locales, quant à elles, se pratiquent en famille ou entre membres

2 Les quatre auteurs enseignent la linguistique du français au département de Français et autres langues étrangères de l’Université Maseno au Kenya depuis des années. Lester Mtwana Jao est titulaire d’un doctorat en linguistique, obtenu à l’Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour (France). Christine Abong’o et Nuru Koki Kyalo sont doctorantes dans des universités françaises. Clara Bulili a terminé son Master ès Lettres (mention FLE) en 2010.

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d’une même ethnie et s’acquièrent surtout dans les milieux ruraux du pays. Ces langues, qui sont parlées par des gens venant de différentes régions du pays (Centre, Ouest, Nyanza, Vallée du Rift, Est, etc.) ne sont généralement pas enseignées à l’école. Toutefois, il n’est pas rare de constater, dans quelques milieux ruraux, des enseignements dispensés en langues vernaculaires, notamment dans les premières années du primaire. Nous croyons que la confusion des sons du français par les apprenants de FLE kenyans serait donc due à la pratique de leurs langues premières.

Phonétique et erreurs en classe de FLE

La phonétique, définie comme l’étude scientifique des sons du langage humain articulé (Malmberg 1994 : 2), est indissociable de la didactique des langues en général et la didactique des langues étrangères, comme le FLE, en particulier. Cette dernière insiste sur la « bonne articulation » des sons de la langue étrangère apprise par les apprenants. Ainsi, une articulation inappropriée, en classe de FLE, entre dans la catégorie d’erreurs. Mais il y a erreur et erreurs. L’enseignant ne doit pas réagir à n’importe quelle erreur sur-le-champ. Il est conseillé par des didacticiens des langues étrangères (Champagne- Muzar et Bourdages 1998 : 78–81) de ne pas corriger toutes les erreurs commises par les apprenants au risque de décourager ceux-ci. Les enseignants de langues étrangères feraient bien de corriger uniquement les erreurs qui affectent l’intelligibilité du message transmis, les erreurs qui sont fréquentes et les erreurs qui irritent. Les erreurs qui affectent l’intelligibilité sont celles qui empêchent ou rendent difficile la compréhension du message. Les erreurs les plus fréquentes, quant à elles, sont celles répétées par un même individu, ou encore celles qui présentent une occurrence élevée à l’intérieur d’un groupe d’apprenants. Pour ce qui concerne les erreurs irritantes, il s’agit d’erreurs qui provoquent des réactions négatives chez la plupart des locuteurs natifs si bien que dans des cas extrêmes elles peuvent amener le locuteur natif à refuser (poliment ou impoliment) de poursuivre l’échange dans la langue étrangère de l’apprenant. Notre étude est liée à tous ces types d’erreurs. Nous aborderons plus précisément les « confusions des sons » chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans parlant différentes langues « maternelles ».

Cadre théorique de l’étude

Dans nos enseignements du FLE (français langue étrangère), nous avons constaté des erreurs chez les apprenants, à l’oral, qui seraient attribuables à la pratique journalière de leur langue locale/« maternelle ». La « théorie de l’interférence », aujourd’hui jugée classique, voire dépassée par certains, permet de donner des explications à ce problème. Se situant dans l’optique de cette théorie, Guimbretière (1994 : 17) fait observer qu’« on a longtemps fait appel à la théorie de l’interférence et on continue à le faire pour expliquer les impossibilités à produire certains sons… On parlera d’interférence par exemple lorsqu’un apprenant ne possédant pas le son /y/ dans sa langue, prononcera /u/ à la place de /y/, il

76 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est lui substitue tout naturellement le son qui lui paraît identique, celui qu’il a cru entendre… cela suppose que les deux sons, pour être assimilés, ont des caractéristiques communes, au plan acoustique et/ou articulatoire ». Notre étude s’ancre dans cette théorie dans la mesure où nous avons constaté que les membres d’une ethnie donnée parlant la même langue locale/« maternelle » confondaient les mêmes sons. À titre d’exemple, beaucoup d’apprenants natifs de la région Nyanza ont tendance à substituer le son [s] à [ò] car ce dernier n’existe pas dans leur langue. Ceci est souvent considéré comme une « erreur », surtout par des locuteurs natifs. Il est important d’établir la source de l’erreur pour pouvoir aider l’apprenant.

À notre connaissance, une étude portant sur les confusions de sons chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans n’a jamais été réalisée au Kenya. Notre étude est donc la première à être effectuée dans ce domaine et nous espérons que notre apport sera utile et pertinent.

L’étude repose sur les objectifs ci-après :

1) faire connaître les particularités phonétiques de la langue française et celles des langues parlées au Kenya

2) analyser les difficultés rencontrées dans l’articulation des sons français chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans

3) proposer des solutions aux difficultés constatées chez les apprenants de FLE

Notre étude repose sur l’hypothèse selon laquelle les confusions des sons du français chez les apprenants de FLE kenyans seraient imputables notamment à l’influence de leur langue vernaculaire et pas aux deux langues officielles du Kenya, à savoir l’anglais et le swahili.

Aspects méthodologiques de l’étude

Population et échantillon : Notre étude a concerné les élèves du secondaire apprenant le français dans différentes régions du Kenya. Par souci d’obtenir des résultats fiables, nous avons volontairement travaillé avec les élèves de la quatrième année du secondaire, qui sont supposés avoir une bonne maîtrise de la langue française. Nous avons eu l’occasion de visiter deux écoles, choisies au hasard, dans différentes régions du pays. Au total, nous avons pu travailler avec 64 élèves. Parmi ces élèves, il y avait 32 garçons et 32 filles dont l’âge varie entre 17 ans et 20 ans. Nous avons recouru à l’échantillon randomisé, au sens où nous avons choisi des écoles (qui offrent le français dans leurs programmes) et des élèves au hasard.

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Technique de collecte et d’analyse des données : Pour collecter les données de notre étude, nous avons proposé deux courts textes d’expression française et en français facile aux élèves, à savoir : « À l’école du caméléon » d’Amadou Hampaté Bâ et « Le renard et le corbeau » de Jean de La Fontaine. Nous leur avons demandé de les lire à haute voix et nous les avons enregistrés. Nous nous sommes intéressé aux sons problématiques, que nous avons repérés et classés dans les catégories « voyelles » et « consonnes ». En nous basant sur la fréquence de ces sons problématiques, nous sommes parvenu à nous prononcer sur les différentes confusions des sons du français constatées chez les apprenants de différentes régions du Kenya.

Différents cas de confusion des sons constatés chez les apprenants de FLE au Kenya

L’on entend par « confusion des sons » le fait d’articuler incorrectement et, souvent inconsciemment, un son d’une langue étranger comme un son voisin qui existe dans la langue première de l’apprenant. Ainsi par exemple l’apprenant anglophone qui prononce le mot « mur » : [mjuR] au lieu de [myR] confond les sons [y] et [ju]. Comme nous l’avons précisé précédemment, on a tendance à considérer les confusions des sons comme des écarts de la norme, donc des erreurs, qui dans des cas extrêmes ne sont pas tolérées et pardonnées par des natifs. Or, il existe des solutions à ce problème si son origine est établie. Nous nous proposons à présent d’aborder quelques confusions des sons – consonnes et voyelles – de la part des apprenants kenyans du FLE, ressortissants de différentes régions du Kenya, à savoir : Est, Vallée du Rift, Ouest, Nyanza et Centre. Nous présentons d’abord les consonnes confondues par les apprenants kenyans.

a) Quelques consonnes confondues par les apprenants du FLE kenyans

Ici, nous présentons différentes consonnes du français qui sont souvent articulées incorrectement par des apprenants kenyans. Dans le tableau suivant, nous abordons les consonnes du français confondues par des apprenants du Centre, de l’Ouest, de la Vallée de Rift, de Nyanza et de l’Est.

Tableau 1 : Quelques consonnes confondues par les apprenants kenyans (par région) Consonne [b]/ [t]/ [d]/ [g]/ [∫]/ [ӡ]/ [s]/ [b]/ [R]/ Région [p] [d] [nd] [ng] [t∫] [dӡ] [∫] [mb] [r] Centre - - + + + + - + + Ouest + + ------Nyanza ------+ - + Vallée du + + - - - + - - + Rift Est - - + + - - - + +

78 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Les apprenants venant de la région Centre ont du mal à articuler [ò] et tendent à le confondre avec [tò]. Par exemple, cet apprenant prononcera le mot « tchèque » [tòεk] comme « chèque » [òεk]. L’inverse se constate aussi : au lieu de prononcer « chambre » [òabR], il n’est pas rare d’entendre un apprenant venant du la région Centre dire « tchambre » [tòabR]. Les sons [ʒ] et [dʒ] sont également confondus par ces apprenants, qui disent par exemple : « bondjour » [bõdʒuR] au lieu de « bonjour » [bõʒuR]. Ce qui est curieux chez ces apprenants est qu’ils ont tendance à précéder les consonnes sonores [b], [d] et [g] par des nasales. Le son [b] est précédé par la nasale bilabiale [m] ; par exemple, au lieu de dire « bon », ils diront « mbon » [mbõ]. La nasale dentale [n] se prononce avec l’apico-dentale [d] et la consonne vélaire [g]. Ainsi, « dos » [do] sera prononcé « ndos » [ndo] et « gare » [gaR] comme « ngare » [ngaR]. Il en est de même chez les apprenants venant de la region de l’Est.

Chez les apprenants venant de la région Ouest, les confusions des sons suivantes se constatent : [p]/ [b] et [t]/ [d]. Ces sons ont les mêmes lieux d’articulation (bi-labial pour [b]/ [p] et apico-dental pour [t]/ [d]). Cet apprenant prononcera « bâtiment » [batimã] comme « pâtiment » [patimã] et « don » [dõ] comme « ton » [tõ]. Ces sons sont très voisins les uns des autres d’où les confusions. Nous constatons que les apprenants venant de la région Vallée du Rift confondent également ces deux paires de sons.

Les apprenants de Nyanza, quant à eux, tendent à substituer [s] à [ò]. Le mot « chef » [òεf], par exemple, sera prononcé comme « sef » [sεf] par un apprenant de Nyanza.

En général, le son [R] pose problème à tous les apprenants sauf les apprenants qui viennent de l’Ouest. Ces derniers articulent ce son sans beaucoup de problèmes car, semble- t-il, un son presque similaire existe dans la langue, le luhyia. Beaucoup d’apprenants d’autres régions, par contre, tendent à substituer [r] à [R] ou s’efforcent d’articuler un son voisin du [R] français. Signalons que ce dernier n’existe pas dans la plupart des langues kenyanes.

b) Quelques voyelles confondues par les apprenants du FLE kenyans

Ayant abordé les consonnes confondues par les apprenants kenyans du FLE, penchons-nous à présent sur les voyelles du français qui leur posent problème. Elles sont présentées dans le tableau ci-après :

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Tableau 2 : Quelques voyelles du français confondues par les apprenants kenyans (par région)

Voyelles [a]/ [ã] [e]/ [ε] [ə]/ [ε] [o]/ [ø] [o]/ [õ] [a]/ [œ] [ã]/ [Ế]

Région

Centre + + + + + + + Ouest + - + + + + + Nyanza + - + + + + + Vallée du Rift + - + + + + + Est + - + + + + +

Légende : + = voyelles confondues par apprenants de différentes régions - = voyelles non confondues par apprenants de différentes régions

Si toutes les langues locales parlées par les membres de ces cinq régions disposent de cinq voyelles – ‘a’, ‘é’, ‘i’, ‘o’ et ‘ou’ – ceux de la région Centre disposent d’autres voyelles : ‘ũ’ et ‘ĩ’. La voyelle ‘ũ’ correspondrait à [ว] alors que ‘ĩ’ correspondrait à [ε]. Ceci pourrait être la raison pour laquelle certains apprenants ressortissants de la région Centre confondent le [e] avec le [ε]. Les apprenants venant des autres quatre régions ne semblent pas avoir ce problème. Les voyelles nasales du français comme [ã], [õ] et [Ế], posent problème à tous les apprenants kenyans, quelle que soit leur langue « maternelle ». À notre connaissance, ces voyelles nasales n’existent pas dans presque toutes les langues kenyanes. Remarquons aussi que le ‘e’ muet [ə] est inexistant dans ces langues et les apprenants articulent souvent [ε] à sa place. Une autre voyelle problématique que beaucoup d’apprenants kenyans articulent comme [o] est la voyelle orale combinée [ø]. Une articulation incorrecte de cette voyelle pourrait même conduire à l’incompréhension. À titre d’exemple, les verbes « vouloir » et « valoir » conjugués à la troisième personne du singulier dans les phrases suivantes :

- « Il veut 30,000 dollars. » - « Il vaut 30,000 dollars. »

Beaucoup d’apprenants kenyans prononcent « veut » et « vaut » de la même manière : [vo]. Ceci risque de prêter à confusion.

De tout ce qui précède, il y a lieu de trouver des solutions à ces problèmes. Il existe des exercices qui peuvent aider les apprenants à surmonter leurs difficultés liées à la confusion des sons. Nous en parlons dans les lignes qui suivent.

80 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Propositions des corrections des erreurs liées à la confusion des sons

Il existe une gamme d’exercices qui permettent de corriger les erreurs phonétiques commises par les apprenants en classe de FLE (cf. « Plaisir des sons »). Les trois types d’activités ci-après pourraient aider à résoudre les problèmes dus aux confusions des sons chez les apprenants du FLE:

- Exercices de la discrimination auditive - Association de la structure phonique à la représentation visuelle - La lecture à haute voix - L’atelier chanson - L’atelier poésie

• Exercices de la discrimination auditive

Dans ce type d’exercices, l’enseignant amène l’apprenant à distinguer les faits articulatoires et prosodiques de la langue étrangère. Les deux grands types d’exercices faisant travailler la discrimination auditive sont : la comparaison-choix binaire et le repérage d’un son.

• La comparaison-choix binaire

Cet exercice exige à l’apprenant de dire si les deux mots ou deux énoncés qu’il a écoutés sont semblables ou différents. Pour l’apprenant membre de l’ouest qui confond les sons [t] et [d], par exemple, on pourrait lui proposer les exercices suivants :

Exercice 1. Consigne : Mettez une croix dans la « colonne = » si les deux mots prononcés sont identiques ou dans la « colonne ≠ » s’ils sont différents (il s’agit de sons [t] et [d]).

Les mots sont : dos, taux, dent, teint, doux, toux, ton

= ≠

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Exercice 2. Consigne : Indique si les deux sons [t] et [d] se trouvent dans le même mot. Les mots sont : dentale, tandem, texte, tarder

[t] + [d]

L’on peut substituer éventuellement à ces sons ([t] et [d]) d’autres sons confondus par les apprenants, tels que : [ò]/[tò] ; [b]/[p] ; [s]/[ò] ; [a]/[ã] ; [ə]/[ε], etc.

• Le repérage d’un son

Dans cet exercice, l’apprenant entend un son et doit préciser le nombre de fois qu’il l’entend de nouveau dans l’énoncé qui suit. L’enseignant pourrait aussi demander à l’apprenant de repérer les mots qui contiennent le son en question ou encore d’identifier la syllabe du mot qui le contient.

Exercice 3. Consigne : Combien de fois entendez-vous le son [z] dans les phrases suivantes?

- Il y a beaucoup de choses dans le magasin. (2 fois) - Le vase plein de roses vient de mon cousin. (3 fois) - Ils ont cassé tous les œufs qu’ils avaient apportés. (3 fois)

Même si on reproche à ces types d’exercices « l’absence d’intonation et la décontextualisation des paires présentées » (cf. Cuq et Gruca, 2005 : 180), ils perdurent dans les classes des langues vivantes étrangères. Beaucoup d’enseignants de FLE y recourent.

• Association de la structure phonique à la représentation visuelle

Pour ce type d’exercices, l’enseignant amène l’apprenant non seulement à associer le code oral (phonie) au code écrit (graphème) mais également des profils mélodiques à une représentation visuelle du son étudié. Il y a différentes façons de réaliser ceci :

- L’apprenant peut être invité à choisir la version écrite correspondant au groupe de sons qui forment un mot ou un énoncé qu’il a entendu

- L’apprenant, après avoir entendu un mot-clé suivi de trois énoncés, doit désigner sur la feuille réponse la (les) phrase (s) qui contiennent le mot « entendu »

- L’enseignant peut faire des dictées sous forme de textes lacunaires dans lesquels les lacunes correspondent au son étudié

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• La lecture à haute voix

En classe, cet exercice peut être fait collectivement ou individuellement. Pour se préparer, les apprenants forment des groupes. L’enseignant joue le rôle de « médiateur » et collabore à la formation des groupes hétérogènes, en ce sens que les membres ne devraient pas avoir les mêmes problèmes de prononciation. Les apprenants doivent lire un texte proposé par l’enseignant, à haute voix. L’on devrait mettre l’accent sur une articulation correcte des sons problématiques. Pour les exercices individuels, chaque apprenant pourrait se pratiquer à lire le texte et, enfin, l’enregistrer pour une critique subséquente par ses camarades de classe et le professeur (Champagne-Muzar et Bourdages, Ibid. : 66).

• Atelier chanson

Cette activité paraît la plus intéressante à la plupart de nos étudiants. Nous ne nions pas l’efficacité de la parole, de la musique et de la mélodie que la chanson française apporte au cours d’entraînement de la prononciation. La chanson a l’avantage de motiver les apprenants, d’aider à la perception de sons nouveaux, de lever certaines inhibitions et donc de permettre une production plus aisée, portée par la musique et le rythme. Cependant, apprendre une chanson française exige plus de temps que faire d’autres activités. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvons le faire qu’une fois par semestre. Nous proposons quelques chansons, ci-dessous :

- La ronde des couleurs - La dame de Haute-Savoie (Francis Cabrel) - Gentleman cambrioleur (Jacques Dutronc)

Pour travailler les voyelles nasales spécifiquement, les chansons suivantes peuvent aider :

- Dans la forêt lointaine - Jean de la lune - Marilyn & John (Vanessa Paradis) - Une belle histoire (Michel Fugain)

• Atelier poésie

Un enseignant de FLE pourrait aussi recourir à l’usage des poèmes qui correspondent aux différentes activités d’entraînement de la prononciation.

Prenons l’exemple de ce poème de Fatras :

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Pépé éméché est entré chez Mémé sans frapper Mémé excédée a cassé la télé à coups de pieds Dédé excité a vidé tout le thé dans l’évier Gégé hébété a essayé de filer Mémé l’attrapé en bas de l’escalier Et Pépé l’a fessé, en haut, sur le palier.

Conclusion

Notre étude a porté sur quelques sons du français pris l’un pour l’autre, souvent inconsciemment, par les apprenants de FLE kenyans parlant différentes langues « maternelles ». La liste n’est pas exhaustive. Ces confusions frappent des sons voisins, sur le plan acoustique et/ou articulatoire. Nous avons précisé les problèmes rencontrés par les apprenants kenyans et proposé différents remèdes sous forme d’exercices élaborés par différents didacticiens du FLE. Ce qui vaut pour les apprenants kenyans pourrait valoir également pour d’autres apprenants de FLE dans le monde. Nous espérons que notre apport modeste permette aux apprenants et enseignants de FLE dans d’autres coins du monde de résoudre les problèmes liés aux confusions des sons. Pareille étude pourrait aussi aider les professeurs et stagiaires français qui envisagent d’enseigner le FLE au Kenya. Une langue étrangère comme le FLE devrait s’apprendre correctement en insistant sur une bonne articulation de ses sons. Comme nous l’avons énoncé antérieurement, une articulation inappropriée peut être à la base d’un malentendu voire de l’incompréhension surtout de la part d’un natif.

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Bibliographie

Champagne-Muzar, C., et J.S. Bourdages. Le point sur la phonétique. Paris: Clé International, 1988.

Dérivery, N. La phonétique du français. Paris: Le Seuil, 1997.

Guimbretière, E. Phonétique et enseignement de l’oral. Paris: Les Éditions Didier, 1994.

Kaneman-Pougatch, M. et E. Pedoya-Guimbretière. Plaisir des sons. Paris: Les Éditions Didier, 1994.

Kazadi, I.M. « Raisons conduisant les étudiants kenyans à poursuivre l’apprentissage du français à l’université ». In Research on French Teaching in Eastern Africa: opportunities and challenges, ed. Frederick K. Iraki (éd), 14-22. Nairobi: USIU, 2006.

Léon, P. Phonétisme et prononciations du français. Paris: Nathan U, 1992.

Malmberg, B. La phonétique. Paris: PUF, Coll. « Que sais-je ? », 1994.

Wioland, F. Prononcer les mots du français : des sons et des rythmes. Paris: Hachette, 1991.

Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Alliances militaires et musicales sur le mont Nyiro: le système d’âge des Samburu à l’épreuve des nouveaux paradigmes du conflit

Giordano Marmone3

Introduction

Chez les Samburu du nord Kenya, la production musicale des deux dernières décennies et les nouvelles formes de participation aux danses sont un témoin privilégié des transformations subites et radicales qui ont affecté ces pasteurs du Kenya centre- septentrional. L’apparition de la kalachnikov, de G-3 et de M-16, en provenance des zones en crise de la Corne de l’Afrique, a entraîné un changement dans les modalités de défense du territoire et dans l’organisation des vols de bétail. Anciens, guerriers et membres des communautés proches ont été obligés de créer des alliances stables pour faire face à la capacité de résistance et d’attaque des populations victimes de leurs raids, accrue par l’usage des armes à feu. Ces nouvelles formes d’alliance – intergénérationnelle et territoriale – ont changé si profondément les paradigmes d’interaction entre les individus, les membres des différentes communautés samburu et les groupes d’âge, que même leur culture et leur pratique musicales ont évolué en s’adaptant de façon surprenante aux changements en cours dans la société. La création d’une série d’« alliances musicales » a constitué un des résultats les plus surprenants de ce processus.

Armes à feu en pays Samburu

L’introduction massive des armes à feu dans le district Samburu à partir de 1995, en provenance des zones en crise de la Corne de l’Afrique (Mkutu, 2008), a altéré radicalement les règles du jeu dans la longue histoire de batailles et de vols de bétail réciproques qui mettent aux prises Turkana et Samburu, peuples rivaux de pasteurs tous deux d’origine nilotique. L’utilisation durable de fusils automatiques comme la kalachnikov et le G-3 au cours des razzias a profondément changé les modalités de la pratique traditionnelle, multiséculaire, des raids conduits jusqu’à il y a vingtaine d’années avec l’usage presque exclusif – au moins du côté des Samburu – des lances et des flèches.

3 Doctorant, membre du centre CREM d’ethnomusicologie du LESC (université Paris Ouest UMR 7186).

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Les effets les plus violents de cette nouveauté en matière militaire ont été observés dans le nord du district Samburu – devenu county en 2012 – notamment dans le territoire proche du mont Nyiro où la présence de nombreuses enclaves Turkana en territoire Samburu (comme les villages de Nasura et de Kawap), ou encore de petites villes au sein desquelles les deux communautés résident côte à côte (Baragoi), avait depuis longtemps fait de cette région le lieu privilégié pour l’organisation et la mise en œuvre de raids par les moran (guerriers) des deux tribus.

Les armes à feu sont loin d’être la cause première des tensions entre Turkana et Samburu, mais en transformant la pratique de vol de bétail qui s’apparente de plus en plus à des épisodes de guérilla pouvant causer nombre de morts tant chez les guerriers que chez les femmes et les enfants, leur présence et leur usage prolongés ont créé dans cet espace des conditions d’’insécurité et de peur constantes qui, dans le cas des Samburu, ont eu des répercussions importantes au sein de la société.

« En raid avec mon père »

Dans la partie septentrionale de la région, un des résultats le plus notable de cette situation de « chronic, low-intensity warfare » (Pike, Straight et al. : 2009) consiste en une différenciation de plus en plus marquée entre d’un côté, les communautés samburu du sud et du centre, très rarement ou presque jamais touchées par ces épisodes de violence, et de l’autre celles du nord où la menace constante d’agression avec des armes à feu a obligé les communautés impliquées à se réunir dans de vrais villages semi-permanents. Les rassemblements de ce type n’existaient pas dans le dispositif territorial des Samburu : ils ont été créés, presque exclusivement au nord, à des fins explicites d’auto-défense, les établissements isolés étant devenus des cibles trop faciles pour les attaquants. Guerriers et anciens ont ainsi commencé à travailler de concert pour protéger leurs familles et leurs troupeaux, de façon à pouvoir aligner un nombre suffisant d’hommes prêts à se battre en cas de razzia, alors même que dans un passé très récent les fonctions de protection et de combat étaient la prérogative presque exclusive des moran.

La société des Samburu se fonde sur une structure dite « à statuts d’âge » (moran guerriers / anciens, aînés) dans laquelle, aux séparations générationnelles entre jeunes et aînés correspond une répartition tout aussi nette des obligations sociales et des tâches dans le domaine de l’organisation du travail. Ces divisions structurelles (lesquelles de toute façon sont en train de se défaire partout chez les Samburu pour des motifs qu’il serait hors sujet d’exposer ici) se sont notablement affaiblies dans les communautés du mont Nyiro.

Aux cours de ces dernières années, l’obligation de créer des groupes de feu suffisamment puissants pour contrecarrer les assauts des raids ennemis, a poussé les anciens à changer partiellement leur style de vie : ils continuent à porter des armes au-delà de la période requise de lmurrano (pendant laquelle durant 15 ans tous les hommes doivent

88 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est en quelque sorte faire leur service militaire en tant que moran) et, autre changement, les anciens continuent à mener les raids guerriers non seulement dans les moments de défense du territoire, mais aussi à l’occasion des raids organisés pour récupérer les têtes de bétail volées.

La participation des anciens aux raids des moran ne constitue pas à proprement parler une nouveauté absolue ; elle semble en effet avoir été à l’œuvre au moins depuis les années 1960. Le vrai élément de discontinuité avec le passé, outre l’introduction des fusils, est représenté par la dimension de cette participation. Tous les témoignages recueillis sur le terrain témoignent d’un changement radical et établissent le lien entre l’intensité du phénomène et la diffusion massive, il y a vingt ans, des fusils d’assaut. Un jeune ancien, guerrier dans les années 1990, nous l’a expliqué de façon très claire : « Dans le passé [les anciens qui] allaient [en raid avec nous guerriers] étaient très peu nombreux, alors qu’aujourd’hui les anciens ont les fusils, les moran ont les fusils, et tout le monde y va [en raid] » (« Kopuo apa lobo obo, kore taata keata lpayanì ntioli, keata lmurran ntioli, kopuo pooki »). Un autre ancien, guerrier dans les années 1960-1970, nous a raconté que les anciens qui allaient en raid avec les moran étaient « Un, parfois deux. Les Lkimaniki [nom de la génération des jeunes anciens de l’époque, NDA] ne connaissaient pas la bataille parce que à ce moment-là il y avait l’armée des blancs » (« Lobo, oare. Meyolo Lkimaniki larrabal amu keti apa sirkali ee ltun’gana oibor”).4

Dans les dernières années, la situation a changé de manière radicale. Les luttes au corps à corps ou à la lance, qui requéraient une dose considérable de force physique et étaient pour cette raison réservées aux moran, ont été presque définitivement abandonnées. Avec l’appui d’une kalachnikov, les anciens seniors peuvent désormais continuer de participer aux actions les plus effectives, en se révélant parfois même des combattants meilleurs que les guerriers, car ils ont développé au fil du temps une connaissance plus approfondie du maniement des fusils. Un jeune maître d’école primaire d’un village situé aux flancs du mont Nyiro nous a révélé, à propos d’un grand raid effectué par les Samburu dans la zone de Nasura contre les Turkana en avril 2012 : « Si tu étais venu ici le jour de Nasura, tu n’aurais trouvé que les femmes, les enfants et Mara Narok [l’homme le plus ancien du village, NDA]. Tous les hommes de ce côté du mont Nyiro étaient partis en raid à Nasura. Personne n’était resté ici ».

4 Il se réfère ici à la période coloniale durant laquelle le contrôle exercé par les Anglais sur les activités des Samburu, jusqu’en 1963 – date de l’indépendance – avait réduit drastiquement la pratique des raids.

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Anciens continuant de combattre avec des fusils (Photo: Marmone 2013)

Combattre ensemble, danser ensemble

Une modification dans les dynamiques internes à la société samburu et dans les rôles respectifs endossés par les membres des différents statuts d’âge et des générations ne peut qu’altérer profondément la conception que chaque individu a de son positionnement au sein de la communauté. L’effacement (relatif tout de même) des frontières générationnelles est à la base d’une re-négociation des modèles d’interaction entre jeunes et aînés et d’une transformation conséquente des pratiques coutumières.

Ainsi le patrimoine musical – reflet mais aussi théâtre producteur de la structure sociale des Samburu, avec ses différents répertoires, un pour chaque génération, et ses « chants de statut d’âge » au travers desquels enfants, moran et anciens transforment en mélodie chorale le récit de leur identité d’hommes en transformation – a connu, dans les deux dernières décennies et surtout au nord du county, une évolution inattendue mais intrinsèquement liée aux évènements décrits ci-dessus.

Chez les Samburu, non seulement les répertoires, mais aussi la pratique musicale et la participation aux danses constituent une représentation vivante et explicite des « coupures » –comme les appelle Straight (2005) – qui séparent les groupes d’hommes d’âge et partant de rôles différents. Pour donner un exemple, un observateur attentif resterait sûrement frappé en assistant à la traditionnelle double exécution des danses cérémonielles de l’après-midi, pratique commune à tout le pays Samburu (à l’exception du nord, comme nous allons voir), déjà observée et décrite par Paul Spencer pendant son terrain conduit

90 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est au début des années 19601 : moran et anciens, tout en mobilisant dans ce cas la même trame de chants et de danses, préfèrent se séparer en créant deux groupes de danseurs différenciés par l’appartenance à un des statuts d’âge. Les anciens dansent d’abord avec les femmes mariées et, après seulement et en se déplaçant dans un lieu différent, les moran s’y emploient à leur tour et répètent les mêmes danses, cette fois-ci accompagnés par les filles.

La répétition de la même trame musicale cérémonielle, en deux moments et dans deux lieux différents, a l’effet de rendre encore plus manifeste l’écart générationnel entre les deux groupes d’âge. En « sur-jouant » leur incompatibilité statutaire au niveau musical, anciens et guerriers donnent à voir, à percevoir et reproduisent la distance sociale qui les sépare.

Chez les communautés du nord et en particulier celles du mont Nyiro, la pratique de la double exécution des chants et des danses cérémonielles que nous venons de décrire, n’a aujourd’hui plus cours. La session musicale, devenue unique, réunit anciens et guerriers qui dansent et chantent ensemble, au même moment et dans le même espace. Même les solistes qui se succèdent à la tête du groupe des chanteurs-danseurs appartiennent indistinctement aux deux statuts d’âge. L’expression musicale et chorégraphique des « coupures » générationnelles, si évidentes dans les communautés samburu du sud et du centre, semble disparaître et perdre de sa force symbolique dans la partie septentrionale du county.

Les anciens et les guerriers s’accordent pour l’affirmer que la disparition de la « double exécution des danses cérémonielles », et par conséquent l’expression la plus explicite de la distance musicale entre les deux statuts d’âge, s’est produite au cours des dix-quinze dernières années. « Quand j’étais moran les anciens répétaient les danses » nous a expliqué un jeune ancien, guerrier dans les années 1990. « Nous, les Lmetili, [nom de la génération des moran actuels, NDA] avons été les premiers à danser avec tous les anciens » a ajouté un guerrier, présent pendant la même conversation.

Arrivé à ce point, il faut se poser la question. Pourquoi y-a-t-il une différence si nette dans la pratique musicale au sein de la même population ? Les réponses obtenues à ce propos sur le terrain ne laissent pas de place à la tergiversation. S.L., chef des moran d’un village proche du mont Niyro et soliste parmi les plus appréciés de la zone, à la question « Pourquoi ici anciens et guerriers dansent-ils ensemble, alors qu’ailleurs, au moment de chanter, ils se séparent ? » répond :

[Parce-que] nous on s’aime à cause de la peur. […] Tu sais, dans ces endroits-là [le sud et le centre du county, NDA] les moran et les anciens se détestent [parce qu’] il n’y a pas la

1 « In the afternoon this [une cérémonie de circoncision, NDA] gives way to a general dance in which the elders may dance with the wives; and, later, the moran with the girls » (Spencer1973: 88).

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peur (« Ikishamai tangarake nguriesho. […] Iyolo, inina kop naibaro lmarn o lpayanì meatai nguriesho »).

Les témoignages recueillis au sein des communautés du mont Niyro établissent un lien très net entre l’apparition des armes à feu, source de violence et d’insécurité, et l’altération des structures institutionnelles traditionnelles. Ces changements, comme on a pu le voir, ont eu des conséquences évidentes sur la pratique musicale des Samburu du nord.

L’alliance militaire à laquelle moran et anciens ont été contraints pour faire face au péril constant des attaques ennemies, de plus en plus fréquentes dans les dernières années, a eu un résultat inattendu et, d’une certaine manière, surprenant : une alliance musicale, reflet et conséquence des nouveaux schémas de coopération entre les membres des deux statuts d’âge.

Danses et chants de guerriers (Marmone 2013)

Un « territoire musical » partagé

Mais l’action de défense du bétail et de la communauté ne peut pas s’appuyer uniquement sur la collaboration intergénérationnelle. Il faut, en même temps, créer une alliance territoriale entre guerriers et anciens des villages proches, propre à amplifier l’impact d’une action (ou d’une réaction) militaire.

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Chez les Samburu, chaque village ou tout établissement dispose d’un groupe de guerriers, nés et grandis ensemble, destinés à défendre leur territoire d’origine et ses habitants. Ces groupes (appelés « clubs » par Spencer (1965), et surnommés par les guerriers « keai (sg. kea), de K.A. acronyme de Kenyan Army) sont caractérisés par une structure de commandement qui prévoit la présence d’un ou plusieurs chefs (normalement un maximum de trois ou quatre) appelés Larikok (sg. Larikoni), qui sont aussi les représentants des anciens chez les guerriers. En absence de conflits et de tensions particulières, les rapports entre les différents groupes se fondent surtout sur des collaborations de travail occasionnelles liées aux tâches de l’élevage du bétail et sur la coparticipation aux cérémonies et aux danses cérémonielles organisées dans les territoires proches.

Dans le domaine musical, chaque groupe peut compter sur la présence de plusieurs solistes dont l’autorité est reconnue au sein de ses membres. Il n’est pas rare, cependant, que cette autorité musicale trouve à se mesurer à celle des solistes des autres keai. Dans le sud et le centre du county Samburu, si un groupe de moran décide de se déplacer dans un village proche pour participer à une cérémonie, et donc aux danses et aux chants, les solistes dudit groupe se trouveront en position subalterne par rapport aux solistes du groupe local : ils disposeront d’un temps limité pour chanter, à l’inverse des solistes et des membres de la kea locale qui occuperont l’essentiel du temps.

Chez les moran du nord, on constate au niveau social et musical des dynamiques sensiblement différentes. Les groupes de guerriers du nord sont souvent unis par des alliances territoriales plus solides que celles établies ailleurs dans le territoire Samburu. Ces alliances ont été scellées, rappelons-le, pour des raisons d’auto-défense et rendre plus efficaces leurs actions d’attaque et leurs razzias contre les villages turkana. Les décisions les plus importantes sont prises de façon collégiale, lors de grandes assemblées qui incluent les moran, tous les larikok des keai alliés et les plus influents anciens des villages impliqués.

On va le voir, le réaménagement des solidarités consécutives à l’insécurité a eu ici un autre impact, complémentaire du précédent, non pas seulement vertical au sein de la hiérarchie sociale des âges, mais aussi horizontal, au sein des membres de même statut d’âge, et tout aussi conséquent sur la pratique musicale et ses arrangements structurels caractéristiques.

L’idée de « territoire » chez les moran (et les anciens) du mont Nyiro, a profondément changé en réponse à l’augmentation exponentielle des cas de razzia aux armes à feu à partir des années 1990. Le lieu d’origine est encore reconnu comme le lieu d’appartenance du groupe des guerriers (la kea de Waso Rongai, la kea de Larerok, la kea de Tuum, etc.), mais l’« esprit de clocher », par ailleurs si caractéristique et qui porte les guerriers à s’identifier presque exclusivement à leur lieu de naissance, est ici presque totalement absent. Les

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guerriers des villages du mont Nyiro aiment se définir, en fait, comme «lmurran le manete Nyiro », « les moran de ce côté du Nyiro ». La nécessité d’une alliance contre les Turkana a peu à peu créé un lien entre ces communautés, soumises aux mêmes difficultés et à la même sensation d’insécurité, entraînant une modification du sentiment d’appartenance et de la conception territoriale.

De quelle façon cela se reflète-t-il dans la pratique musicale ? On a déjà dit que chez les Samburu chaque groupe de guerriers dispose de plusieurs solistes (jusqu’à cinq à six, parmi lesquels un ou deux sont considérés comme les plus doués et partant les plus importants) dont l’autorité musicale est fortement conditionnée par le lien solide qui les rattache à la zone ou à leur village d’origine.

L’aire d’influence des solistes des keai du nord est, au contraire, extrêmement plus vaste et s’étend à tous les territoires des groupes alliés. Cela implique que, si le groupe de Tuum doit se trouver à Larerok pour participer à une cérémonie, ses solistes ont le droit de diriger les danses en chantant autant voire parfois davantage que les solistes locaux. Ce genre de dynamique, très commune au nord, est au contraire difficilement observable dans le reste du pays samburu.

Chez les moran samburu, les solistes revêtent le rôle fondamental de représentants, dans le domaine musical, de toute la kea : le poids de leur autorité est, d’une certaine façon, directement proportionnel à l’importance du groupe dans un territoire déterminé. L’alliance militaire entre les keai du Nyiro a fortifié leur rapport de collaboration et leurs interactions jusqu’à un niveau presque inconnu dans le reste du county et cette affinité, entretenue par une condition de péril permanent qui a amené à une nouvelle forme de collaboration entre groupes, a contribué à l’affaiblissement des sentiments d’appartenance locale. Un tel changement de perspective, comme on a vu, a eu des conséquences directes sur la pratique musicale : les solistes des différentes keai du Nyiro, tout en gardant leur statut et leur prestige social, ont perdu, paradoxalement, au moins en partie, leur pouvoir dans le lieu d’origine du groupe auquel ils appartiennent. Dans le même temps, ils ont gagné le droit d’exercer leur autorité dans une zone extrêmement plus ample. Comme dans la configuration précédente, une alliance militaire est à l’origine d’une forme inédite de convergence au niveau musical.

De la lance au fusil : la révolution dans les textes chantés

Le passage soudain des lances aux fusils d’assaut, réalisé chez les communautés du nord dans un laps de temps de dix à quinze ans seulement, a eu des répercussions manifestes au sein de la culture musicale des Samburu. Nous avons apprécié les profondes modifications dans les modalités de participation aux danses et aux chants collectifs, consécutives à l’insécurité et à l’état de guerre permanent à basse intensité caractéristique de cette région frontière.

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De la même façon, les armes à feu sont devenues un véritable objet de culte pour les moran samburu. Dans le nord du territoire, chaque guerrier doit obligatoirement se procurer un fusil, pour le prix de cinq ou six vaches. Les lances « résistent » encore entre les mains de quelques anciens nostalgiques, mais les jeunes les considèrent aujourd’hui comme des objets sans aucune utilité2. Cet élément témoigne d’une progressive et rapide perte de prestige et d’intérêt militaire de ce qui, encore dans un passé récent, étais le symbole par excellence de l’état du guerrier.

Cette transition cruciale a laissé des traces visibles au sein du corpus des chansons et des textes chantés composés par les moran Samburu au cours des derniers vingt ans.

Comparons un chant (I) créé par la génération Lmooli dont les membres, aujourd’hui jeunes anciens, étaient guerriers pendant les années quatre-vingt-dix, avec les textes extraits de deux chants (IIa, b) composés par les membres de la génération Lmetili, les guerriers actuels

(I) Lwampa lan’g soro mperria Loidikò le yeyo, otumo lkaria Kutoporiè ldarancha marti Soro mperria e lmurran Kedorropi sesen e ntoye Oye enne e lkaria Lwampa lan’g oiroshi mperria Nongusià lai, tejo sèere Oye enne e lkaria Lwampa lan’g arrama mperria Notre groupe de raiders aux lances violettes [oxydées] Cher ami, prends l’ocre rouge On a traversé un pont dans le lieu aux pierres noires Les lances des moran sont violettes Et le corps des filles est petit Dans ce lieu d’ocre rouge Les lances de notre groupe de raiders sont lourdes Ma mère, dis « Salut! » Dans ce lieu d’ocre rouge [Se trouvent] Les nombreuses lances de notre groupe de raiders

2 Ils les appellent ironiquement lorisié, comme le petit couteau utilisé par les femmes pour le façonnage du cuir.

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II) a … Nanyore e L…[nom du guerrier] Naitoipoye lmurran Kitidirie nairimuo To lpurkelli ltaleta Kijo mutut kalben Narimuo torua lchomwa Le [fusil] vert de L… 3 Protège les guerriers On a escaladé [le mont] avec celui aux trous4 Dans la plaine aux collines Nous disons qu’il faut que tu aies une carabine Celui aux trous expulse les cartouches

b) … Tonin’go G-3 eyogoki larrabal Naaku nterito kukurto ta Lan’gatuny Nearash Namalit ngorii e nkuma Nodoru nambai e nkuma e kalashnikov Écoute [comme] le G-3 a mugi dans la bataille La poudre commença [à se lever] lorsque on combattait à Lan’gatuny Le son [des coups] de feu laissa des sillons à Namalit Les nombres [incisés] sur les kalachnikovs devinrent rouges de feu

En analysant les textes composés par ces deux générations de guerriers, celle des années 1990 et celle des années 2000, on a le sentiment de se trouver en présence de chants provenant de deux époques bien différentes, très éloignées l’une de l’autre. Un changement si rapide et profond ne peut être expliqué qu’au travers du choc consécutif à l’introduction massive des armes à feu chez les communautés du nord Samburu. Le fusil d’assaut est ainsi devenu non seulement le moyen privilégié de défense et d’attaque, mais aussi une « idole », un « totem » – termes employés ici dans le sens commun – le symbole de la bataille et de la lutte virile. En tant que tel, il est devenu rapidement le protagoniste par excellence des chants des moran.

3 Pour les Samburu le G-3 est vert 4 Encore le G-3.

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Conclusion

Les divisions intrinsèques au domaine musical entre moran et anciens recouvrent des aspects cruciaux pour la compréhension de l’idée d’identité individuelle et de groupe dans la société des Samburu. Si la définition du « soi » social se produit par le truchement de répertoires et de pratiques musicales à haute valeur représentative – qui à la fois séparent et unissent les composants des mêmes générations et des mêmes groupes d’âge – il faut s’interroger sur les conséquences de la disparition en cours de ces modes d’interaction au niveau musical sur la longue période. Le cas des Samburu du mont Nyiro offre un exemple éclairant sur la manière dont des bouleversements dans des modes de vie traditionnels peuvent avoir des effets immédiats non seulement sur les structures au fondement de la société, mais aussi sur un produit direct de ces structures et de cette société, telle que la musique. Il interroge en retour l’effet structurant de la performance musicale. Le nouveau visage d’une vieille guerre tribale a poussé les membres des communautés impliquées vers des formes d’alliance inconnues, qui ont aujourd’hui, comme dans le passé, besoin d’être traduites en musique pour préserver leur force et pour survivre.

Bibliographie

Mkutu, Kennedy A. Guns & Governance in the Rift Valley. Pastoral Conflict & Small Arms. Oxford: James Currey, 2008.

Pike, Ivy L., Bilinda Straight, et al. “Documenting the Health Consequences of Endemic Warfare in three Pastoralist Communities of Northern Kenya: A Conceptual Framework.” Social Science & Medicine 70, no. 1 (2010): 45–52.

Spencer, Paul. The Samburu. A Study of Gerontocracy in a Nomadic Tribe. London: Routledge & Keagan Limited, 1965.

Spencer, Paul. Nomads in Alliance. Symbiosis and Growth among the Rendille and Samburu of Kenya. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Straight, Bilinda. “Cutting Time: Beads, Sex and Songs in the Making of Samburu Memory.” In The Qualities of Time: Temporal Dimensions of Social Form and Human Experience, ed. Wendy James and David Mills, 267–283. Oxford: Berg, 2005

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Présence de fusils d’assauts dès les années 1990 attestée par cette photographie d’archives

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Land, Authority and Power: A Case Study of the Forestry Company Green Resources in Uganda

Hanne Sangnæs Dihle

“Green Resources’ strategy is based on the sustainable development of the areas in which it operates. The company believes that forestation is one of the most efficient ways of improving social and economic conditions for people in rural areas.” (Green Resources, Company report 2012)

“To compensate for the damage caused by our own over consumption, we are financing projects in the global south causing poor people to loose their land. In that way, Green Resources is an instrument of the climate colonialism of the west.” (Professor in Human Geography at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Adresseavisa the 14th of April 2012)

Introduction

In the Norwegian media, the debate concerning the activities of the Norwegian forestry company Green Resources is dominated by two confronting discourses.5 On the one hand, the company itself claims that their tree plantations in East Africa represents a “triple win-win” situation with benefits for investors, the global climate, and finally for the local population living close to these plantations. Through projects of “community development,” the company claims to secure “social and economic development” for the populations living close to, and inside, their plantations. A confronting discourse is held by, among others, environmental non-governmental organisations that points to the negative consequences for the “local population”. Their argument is that the plantation monopolises land that was used for agricultural activities before the arrival of the company, leaving the “local population” landless.

5 This article is written on the basis of two months of field work in Uganda in the beginning of 2013 for my Master thesis in African Studies at the University of Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne. The information was gathered through field observation and interviews with representatives of the national and local government in Uganda, the national agency responsible for the administration of the country’s forest reserves (the National Forestry Authority), as well as Green Resources representatives in Uganda. Special attention is given to the accounts given by the plantation workers as well as the populations living inside and around the company’s plantations.

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The term “land grabbing” is widely used by environmental and human-rights organisations to condemn large-scale land investments in the “global south.” In general, these investments result in the loss of agricultural land for small-scale land owners in the area hosting the investment (Hall, 2011: 143). The attention around these kinds of large-scale land investments have increased in recent years, leaving “land grabbing” to be the new “buzz word” in the world of “developers”, environmentalists and human-rights defenders. For instance, the think tank called the Oakland Institute defines “land grab” in the following way: “the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land by wealthier, food-insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to produce crops for export.” The organisation underlines the international financial institutions as an important factor facilitating these “global land grabs” where the control of food resources shift from public to private sector (The Oakland Institute, 2009). Furthermore, the international non-profit organisation Grain describes the “current scramble for land in Africa as a global struggle for resources” and “land grabbing” as the continuation of colonialism, triggered by the global financial crisis (Grain, 2008 & 2012). Although these organisations also incorporate the role of the host state, the focus of these organisations is on “land grabbing” as a global struggle for land, where the role of the host state is rarely analysed beyond its relationship with the investing company.

Also social scientists have used the term “land grabbing” in academic work to draw attention to, and problematize, these types of large-scale agricultural investments. Amongst others, Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012: 336) use the term to describe how conservation processes in Tanzania lead to the dispossession of land and resources from local small-scale land users, while it leads to capital accumulation by more powerful actors like government officials. The authors stress the role played by the host state actors in these “green grabs” in addition to the role of transnational conservation companies and tourist companies. This use of the word “land grabbing” in academic research has been criticised by researchers, among others Ruth Hall (2011: 193). She states that “the popular term ‘land grabbing’, while effective in activist terminology, obscures vast differences in the legality, structure and outcome of commercial land deals and deflects attention from the roles of domestic elites and governments as partners, intermediaries and beneficiaries.” Like Hall, we argue that the use of the militant, normative and politically charged term of “land grabbing” in academic work needs to be discussed. First of all, the activist idea of “land grabbing” stresses a one-way domination where the foreign company is the dominant and the small-scale land owners the dominated. When a role is given to the host state (in this case Uganda) it is often as a facilitator and beneficiary for the foreign company, and little attention is given to understanding its role beyond its relationship with the foreign company. We argue that in order to understand the logics of these large- scale land investments and the dynamics that they create in the investment zones, it is important to focus also on the more subtile aspects of these land transactions, like the role played by the host state and the local administration, as well as the role played by the local

100 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est populations as an active actor, instead of the dominated, in their relationships with foreign companies. Secondly, the term “land grabbing” is used to describe large-scale investments in many localities with different characteristics, giving the impression that the same logic applies for investments in these different zones. In this way, land grabbing is a “culturalist” term, drawing a passive and sterile picture of the localities hosting the investment.

This article aims to study the stakes of land tenure and access in a context of large- scale land investment in one specific locality, the Bukaleba Forest Reserve administrated by Green Resources in the Mayuge district of Uganda. Our interest lies in understanding the dynamics of land tenure and access by exploring how land is linked to the distribution of power and authority on both the local and the national level. In doing this, all main actors, the company, the central state, the local administration and the local population are included as actors with their own history, internal divisions and interests. We argue that by analysing the plantation of Bukaleba in this way, we will be able to understand the dynamics and consequences of this specific investment in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve beyond the globalising idea of “land grabbing” as it is presented by the activist literature.

The Bukaleba Forest Reserve

The Bukaleba Forest Reserve is located in the district of Mayuge on the shores of lake Victoria about 120 km east of the capital Kampala. The Mayuge district is known for its fertile land, abundant rain and numerous sugar cane plantations. Today, the population growth of Mayuge is among the highest in Uganda, leading to an increased pressure on agricultural land, as the main activity of the population is substance agriculture (NEMA, 2009:164).

In 1932, the forest of Bukaleba was established as a Forest Reserve by the British administration (UFRIC, 1999: 1). At this time the area was populated and these populations continued to use the land for agricultural purposes even after the establishment of the Forest Reserve. Since 1932 the population has been fluctuating. In some periods, tsé-tsé fly epidemics have forced the population to flee the area, while fertile land and fishing opportunities have encouraged populations to settle during other periods. Moreover, the southern part of Uganda has attracted refugees fleeing the war between the Museveni regime and the Lord’s Resistance Army the northern part of the country (see Bøås & Dunn, 2007), as well as from neighbouring countries like Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia since the end of the 1980s (Francois, 2003: 7). Today, the population of the forest of Bukaleba is constituted of people from different parts of the country, identifying as different ethnic groups.

101 In the beginning of the 1970s, when Uganda was under the rule of Idi Amin Dada, a beef farm was established inside the Bukaleba Forest Reserve. Many of the inhabitants that live inside the plantation today were former workers of this farm, which they refer to as the “government farm.” The farm is also an important element in their justification of right to ownership of the land, today occupied by the tree plantation. According to a Ugandan journalist, the farm was closely connected to the regime of Idi Amin Dada, serving as a meat reserve for his soldiers. The farm attracted many workers who settled inside the Forest Reserve to find work for the farm and cultivate the land. During these years there was an important deforestation of the Forest Reserve.

When Uganda’s current President Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, following years of unrest and civil war, he began what many researchers have described as the “reconstruction” of the Ugandan state. This process established the authority of Museveni and his National Resistance Movement through a combination of militarism and political incorporation (Sjö, 2007: 78). The construction of a button-up system of Local Councils (LCs) starting at the village level, assured Museveni a certain democratic legitimacy even within a one party-system.

This “reconstruction” also touched the forestry sector, and a reform in the administration of the state’s Forest Reserves was launched. Between 1989 and 1991, the population living inside the Forest Reserve of Bukaleba was formally evicted by the Forestry Department (FD) as a step in the process of “regaining control” of this rural area and its natural resources. The government soldiers evicting the population also destroyed churches and schools constructed inside the Forest Reserve (UFRIC, 1999: 9). In spite of the eviction process, many people stayed inside the reserve and continued to cultivate the land. For instance, the “government farm” did not close officially until 1993. Additionally, one of its former workers told us that the farm was active until the beginning of 2000. When Green Resources was licensed the right to replant the Bukaleba Forest Reserve in 1996 by the Ugandan state, there where therefore many people living on and cultivating the land on which the company was supposed to plant their trees. As a consequence of the establishment of the tree plantation, these populations have been pushed together and are now living in three main villages inside the Bukaleba plantation: the villages of Bukaleba, Nakalanga and Walumbe. Many of the inhabitants work for Green Resources as casual workers on monthly contracts, while others claim to have a moral and legal right to the plantations land.

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Map of the Bukaleba Forest Reserve: The marked area around the Nakalanga village represents 500 hectares of ‘community land’. The marked area in the north is the area of the Forest Reserve occupied by an American NGO, Arise Africa. The locations of the villages have been added by the author. (Source: National Forestry Authority)

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Green Resources is a private forestry and carbon offset company founded in Norway in 1995 by the Norwegian Mads Asprem. Asprem is today the managing director of the company. According to the company’s web site, Green Resources is the biggest reforestation company in Africa, as well as one of the leading actors in timber production in Eastern Africa. In total, the company hold licences for 26 000 hectares of forest areas in Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda. The company employs more then 3 600 persons and they have invested more then 120 million dollars in their operations since 1995 (Green Resources, 2012). Green Resources produces timber for construction, but also for the bio energy sector. Additionally, since 2010, the company sells “carbon credits” through the Voluntary Carbon Market. On this market, individuals, organisations and governments can purchase “carbon credits” from emission-reducing projects like reforestation to mitigate their own greenhouse gas emissions.

In Uganda, Green Resources holds two fifty-year renewable licences to replant two of the country’s Forest Reserves situated in Bukaleba and Kachung. These licences are given by the National Forestry Authority (NFA), who is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Forest Reserves in the country. Green Resources thus pays rent to the NFA for the right to run a commercial tree plantation in these two areas. According to the NFA and Green Resources, the reserves where seriously degraded with a strong need for replanting at the time that the licences where given in the 1990s (Lyons, f/c). The replantation is done by planting exclusively pine and eucalyptus trees. These tree species are not naturally present in Uganda, but are chosen because they are fast growing. The Bukaleba plantation is administrated by Busega Forestry Company, which is an affiliate of Green Resources in Uganda.

In addition to the Bukaleba plantation, Green Resources also holds a licence to replant the Kachung Forest Reserve in the district of Dokolo, in the northern part of the country. In Kachung, there are no populations living inside the Forest Reserve, but many live on the borders of the plantation. The information we gathered in Kachung during our fieldwork is used to compare and complete the information gathered in Bukaleba. The Kachung plantation is run by the Lango Forestry Company, who is also an affiliate of Green Resources.

Drawing inspiration from work on the relationship between land and power, especially those of C. Lund (Lund & Boone, 2013; Boone, 2013; Sikor & Lund, 2009; Berry, 2009; Njuten, 2009), we see land property not as a relationship between a person and a piece of land, but a relationship between people about a specific piece of land. It is thus a strong indicator of social processes and power relations. In this article we give importance to power struggles at the national and local level in order to understand how land tenure and access are linked to the distribution of power and political authority?

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The stakes of land tenure: the making and unmaking of political authority in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve

One of the most important ways in which states exercise power is through the control and extraction of natural resources from their territory. When the control of the Bukaleba Forest and the right to extract the natural resources from this land is licensed to a foreign owned private company, it is important to reflect upon how this influences the state’s authority in these zones. Instead of seeing the arrival of foreign companies as a “retreat of the state” (Strange, 1997: 387-392), we argue that the presence of Green Resources and the land conflicts in Bukaleba can be seen as steps by which different institutions and powers making up the central state build their authority in this rural area. In this way, land conflicts function as a tool to build political authority at the central level. At the local level, the arrival of Green Resources has led to a power shift from the local government towards actors linked to the company. We therefore argue that the arrival of the company has led to the making of the authority of the central state while the local governments have seen their authority weakened.

Land conflicts: a process leading to the making of political authority?

Drawing upon the works of T. Sikor and C. Lund, we understand the relationship between property and authority as a process of mutual recognition and legitimisation. Asking for the recognition to have property from an institution also gives recognition to the institution that is providing that property (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 1). As the applicant asks an institution for a land title, the applicant at the same time recognises the right of that institution to control the land. In the same way, as the institution gives the land title to the applicant, it recognizes that he is now the rightful owner of that land. The contract between property and authority is therefore an act of mutual reinforcement, where legitimacy travels back and forth between the two. Seen in this way, the struggle for the control of natural resources and land property in institutionally pluralist contexts is a process of every-day state formation as recognition and authority is constructed. We will now illustrate this argument through the example of the conflict between the National Forestry Authority (NFA) and the Local District Land Board of Mayuge regarding land tenure questions in the Bukaleba forest.

Firstly, both the NFA and the centralisation of the control of the Ugandan Forest Reserves are relatively young institutions. In 1998, a forest sector reform put most of the country’s Forest Reserves under the control of the central government. A few years later, in 2003, the NFA was created as a government agency responsible for the administration of these newly established Central Forest Reserves. Around the same time that the NFA was established, the District Land Board of Mayuge gave an American organisation, Arise Africa, the authorisation to construct a school and an orphanage inside the Forest Reserve of Bukaleba. According to the NFA, this authorisation was illegal, as only the NFA had the

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right to give authorisations inside the Forest Reserve. The District Land Board on the other hand claims that in 2003 they had the right to authorise the establishment of the school and to claim land rent from this area on behalf of the district, even though the reserve had been officially under central control since 1998. The conflict between the two institutions is in court today.

We argue that this conflict is a process by which the NFA is seeking to construct their authority over the Ugandan Forest Reserves. By taking the conflict with the District Land Board to court, they look for the recognition for its right to exercise power in these zones, firstly from the court, and eventually from the local actors like the District Land Board and the local population. This process of construction of authority through recognition can be observed through the perception of the population.

“The licence given to Arise Africa is not illegal ‘cause NFA just came in recently, before we were using what was the District Land Board. NFA came in when the licence was already given” (Member of the Local Council of the village of Masaka’B, interviewed on 18th February 2013)

There has thus been a change in the population’s perceptions with regards the authority in land tenure in Bukaleba. The Forest Reserve has been under central control since the forest sector reform in 1998, but the population has only recently recognised the authority of the NFA.

At the same time that the recognition of the authority of the NFA have increased among the local population, we argue that the strongest challenger to this authority today is not the Local District Land Board, but President Museveni. While land conflicts can be analysed as a process leading to the construction of the authority of the NFA, it is also a process by which important tensions between different institutions and powers making up the central state are expressed, in our case between the President, the NFA and the Parliament of Uganda.

Land conflicts: a political resource in the hands of the Museveni regime ?

Land questions have a strong presence in the political sphere in Uganda, especially during the election periods (Gay, 2011). For instance, promises of land were given to squatters in the Forest Reserves of Mont Elgon and Rakai by the President Yoweri Museveni during the 2011 presidential campaign. Analysing the promises given to the inhabitants of these Forest Reserves, Médard and Golaz (2013: 550) argue that land is an important political resource by which the Ugandan President maintains his power. During campaigns, constituents are encouraged to settle in the Forest Reserve creating a system of dependency and a moral obligation to support the regime. But when the elections are

106 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est over, the boundaries are enforced once more as the President’s promises usually have no legal backing or follow-up. This “stop and go” management of Forest Reserves can also be observed in the case of the Bukaleba Forest Reserve.

In 2011, during his election campaign, Museveni came to Bukaleba and promised to “return 500 hectares of community land to the local community”, if he was re-elected. The land he was referring to was set aside in 2000 by Green Resources and the NFA for the use and the benefit of the “local population.” The idea was for this population to engage in tree planting, creating a better understanding among the local population “of the importance of tree planting” and thus a better relationship between the company and the population. But to this day, the distribution of the 500 hectares among the population has not yet occurred. According to one of the members of the Local Council of Nakalanga “no one among the villagers can profit from this land today.” The questions regarding who the morally and legally legitimate users of this land are creates conflicts between and within the villages. Some of these conflicts have even turned violent. A local journalist explained to us that one of the villagers living in Bukaleba could not travel to the other villages at night without risking his life. This was because he was a prominent figure in the fight for the “community land,” and feared being attacked by other inhabitants of the Forest Reserve.

On the night of Museveni’s re-election in 2011 a group of the population of the Forest Reserve entered into the 500 hectares that was promised to them by the President and cut down 40 hectares of trees in order to build houses. The makeshift houses constructed by the population on this night were later destroyed by the company. Green Resources has even sued some of the villagers that participated in these actions for the damage they caused the company. Today, three years later, the belief in the President’s promise is still strong even though it has not yet been fulfilled. Here it is illustrated by one of the members of the Local Council:

“During the elections, he pledged to give back parts of this forest to the community. He said that he would give 500 hectares of land to the people. But he has not done this…how can I term it...? He has not yet fulfilled his promise.” Does he have the power to fulfill his promise? To give the forest back? “The President is the President.” (Male member of the local council, interviewed on 11th February 2013)

Even though the promise of the President has not been fulfilled, the faith in his power is still immense among the inhabitants of Bukaleba. The Local Council’s faith in the President is also observed through the fact that the local leaders are now lobbying the President’s office, and no longer the NFA, in order to get a settlement regarding the 500 hectares.

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“The President is saying that the 500 hectares should be given to the community, so now we are taking steps to allow us to use the land officially. We are now going on to the presidential office. That is what we are now going for.” (Male member of the local council of the village of Bukaleba, interviewed on 18th March 2013)

According to Ugandan law, a “return of the land” to the people living in the forest of Bukaleba is not possible without the action of the National Parliament. The case of the 500 hectares therefore bears witness of the competition between the National Parliament and the nearly omnipotent President Museveni. Knowing that a “return of the land” must officially pass through the National Parliament, the local leaders still choose to lobby the President’s office as they see him as a stronger actor.

According to the Member of Parliament (MP) who represents the district of Mayuge, the process of a ”return of the land” in Bukaleba has yet to start in the Ugandan parliament. He explains this by the important political stakes attached to land questions in Uganda.

“As a politician I can understand why it has not happened. Because it is not only that area that has land issues. There are land issues all over the country. So if you sort that one out, you are opening up others... And besides, it will be hard to deal with it on the floor of the parliament. Because, then other people, other members will say; we have the same issue. Why are you giving Bukaleba priority? There is land that requires to be degazetted here and there.” “And me as a member of parliament, I’m representing that area, but I’m also a national leader. And being a national leader means you can’t afford to be selfish, and also I have to look ahead. If I brought such a motion to the floor, would it be supported? I can guarantee that it will not be supported. There are land problems all over the country. And other members will say, you can not bring this in isolation.” (Member of Parliament representing the district of Mayuge, interviewed 15th March 2013)

The MP explains that a “return of the land” to the population living in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve implies political consequences for the rest of the country where there are countless similar cases. According to the MP, this is why the Parliament stays inactive. At the same time, Museveni takes on a very active role in the conflict, positioning himself as a “protector” of the populations threatened by eviction in Bukaleba, as well as from other Forest Reserves. In Bukaleba, the undetermined status of the 500 hectares of “community land” has left the door open for the President to use it as an instrument to gain votes and supporters at the time of elections. Also during non-election periods, the President gives executive orders that halt the expulsion from the Forest Reserves. By this populist stance in favour of “squatters,” Museveni is able to construct political authority around his person and maintain his powerful position in the country (Médard & Golaz, 2013: 550). The land conflicts in Bukaleba does in this way reveal tensions and power struggles between the President, the NFA and the Parliament, all powers that make up the central government.

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In the following section we ask what role the company plays as an authority in the Forest Reserve. In what way does the arrival of the company and the “commodification” of the forest resources challenge the authority of the central state?

“Commodification” of the Bukaleba forest: the retreat of the state or its redeployment?

The forest resources of the Bukaleba forest have undergone a “commodification” as Green Resources runs the forest as a commercial plantation, transforming natural resources like trees into timber and carbon credits to be sold on the market. In this section we question the effects this “commodification” has had on the authority of the state in the zone of the forest. To what degree is it accurate to say that the company challenges the authority of the state? Our argument is that the arrival of the company strengthens, rather than challenges, the authority of the powers and institutions that make up the central state.

Firstly, the rent paid by Green Resources is centralised through the NFA. This means that little goes back to the district of Mayuge, where the Forest Reserve is localised. Thus, the “commodification” of the forest resources does go hand in hand with a centralisation of the income derived from them. Our argument is that this system guarantees the state a presence in the area and a “piece of the pie” when it comes to the extraction of the forest resources, even as the Forest Reserves are licensed to a private foreign company. Secondly, our fieldwork shows that in land conflicts, the local population seeks to the NFA and President Museveni, as they see them as the responsible authorities in land questions, and not the company itself. The state is therefore the authority in land questions in the eyes of the population.

On the other hand, the company is the object of the grievances that could be identified as “public services” that would “normally” be seen as the responsibility of the state. For example, the local leaders have stressed the company’s responsibility for the construction of health centres, schools and roads in benefit of the inhabitants of the Bukaleba forest. The President of the Local Council of Nakalanga is one example.

“Busoga Forest Company could have facilitated a school. It is far from here to Bukaleba. They have a primary school, but here at Nakalanga, they have no school. And also, at least they should put up the roads.” (President of the Local Council of Nakalanga, interviewed on 11th February 2013)

These kinds of grievances were repeated in the majority of the interviews that we held with the local population. We argue that these grievances are linked to the “community development” and “win-win situation” discourse held by the company. This discourse stresses the social and economic benefits for the population.

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“Green Resources facilitates socio-economic development and poverty alleviation in rural areas through provision of employment, infrastructure development, schools, health and other community development.” (Green Resources web page; title: Community Development: Developing People)

The importance of the “corporate social responsibility” of Green Resources is also stressed by political actors like the MP from the Mayuge district.

“Cause they (Green Resources) are not going to leave Mayuge the other day or tomorrow, they are there for the long run. So you have to find a mechanism. Once you go and work in an area, it becomes your problem. If I go to study in the UK, and I find a street that is dirty, it becomes a part of my problem. Cause I can’t say I’m a foreigner after all, cause I use the same street. So if people are advocating for cleaning off that street, I have to be a part of that. Or better still, I can champion the cleaning of the street.” (Member of Parliament, Mayuge district, interviewed on 15th March 2013)

The metaphor of the “dirty street,” and the responsibility of Green Resources to clean it, is used by the MP to underline that the company has a responsibility towards the social and economic problems of the area in which they operate. The responsibility given to the company for this could be interpreted as the “retreat of the state” in the zone. Many authors have pointed to what they call the “weakening of the authority of the post-colonial state” to the benefit of new economical actors like international companies, such as Green Resources (Strange, 1997: 387–392). We wish to stress the importance of another thesis to understand the dynamics present in the plantation of Bukaleba; the one of “privatisation of states”, advocated by Béatrice Hibou (1999: 11–67). Drawing upon her ideas, we argue that the administration of the plantation of Bukaleba rather represents a new type of “gouvernementalité” of the state, or another way to govern. As we have seen it is the state who is still considered the legitimate owner of the land, and it is towards the state that the population turns in order to air their grievances. Additionally, the state receives land rent paid by Green Resources, it thus assures itself an income from the forest. Finally, the control and the extraction of resources from the Forest Reserve are better implemented with the presence of the company then before its arrival when the boundaries of the Forest Reserve were not protected. Seen in this way, we argue that the presence of the state in rural areas like Bukaleba is assured through companies like Green Resources. At the same time, the state “discharges” (Hibou, 1999) state functions to the company, through “corporate responsibility”, charging Green Resources, among others, to construct a maternity ward and supply the local health centre with medication. We therefore argue that the process that we are seeing in Bukaleba is not an example of the “retreat” or the “weakening” of the state, but rather an example of a process by which the state holds power by other means.

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While we argue that the arrival of the company has led to the making of the authority of the central Ugandan state, the consequences at the local level have been quite the opposite, as members of the local government lose their power and authority to actors closely connected to the company.

Land and authority at the local level: The unmaking of the legitimacy of the local leaders

The Local Council system is an important part of the political regime established by Museveni in 1986. By the creation of Local Councils at five political and administrative levels (from the village to the district), the Museveni regime established a bottom-up system to ensure that “everyone” was heard. This allowed the regime to claim a certain democratic legitimacy even within a one party system. All three of the villages located inside the Bukaleba plantation have Local Councils.

The Local Councils are the authority concerning customary land property at the village level. They function like courts of popular justice, presiding over customary affairs (Khadiagala, 2001:63). Each village elects the members of their Local Council. All the members of the Local Councils that we spoke to were men. In general, they were over forty years old and did not work for the company at the time of the interview. They also often emphasised their long presence in the Bukaleba forest, many of them stated to have worked on the government farm. During the time that the forest was cultivated by the local population, the Local Council played an important role in distributing the land among the villagers. After the arrival of the company, the Local Council lost its power over the local land distribution. Our argument is that this strongly influences their general authority and status in the villages.

The weakening of the Local Council’s authority is expressed by villagers’ distrust of the Council members. During our fieldwork in the villages, most of the Local Council members used the interview as an opportunity to present themselves as leaders in the village’s fight for customary land ownership. During the interview, there was an important aspect of “mise en scène”, as the leader presented us with the grievances of the “community” in the presence of the inhabitants. The members of the Local Council were thus taking a leading role in the population’s grievances and their fight for customary rights. The fact that the grievances are not answered by the company nor by the state representatives, puts the local leaders in a situation with a lot of pressure from the population. For instance, the owner of a kiosk in the Bukaleba village stated that the previous day, the members of the Local Council had tried to collect money in order to pay the NFA to come and distribute the 500 hectares of “community land.” She had refused to contribute to the collection because she did not trust the local leaders.

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“Yesterday evening, they came asking me for 10 000 Ugandan schillings, telling me that they want 250 000 from this village then Nakalanga also, and Walumbe. To make 2 million to pay the surveyors to come and demarcate the land.... So I’m thinking that maybe the delay had been caused by the leaders (…) I asked the leaders that if I give this money and they don’t get the land, will the money be brought back or?” (Female owner of kiosk in Bukaleba village, interviewed on 18th February 2013)

Our source is not sure that the money will be well spent in the hands of the local leaders. She also wonders whether the local leaders themselves had caused the delay in the distribution of the land, in hopes of gaining profit by asking the population for money. It is important to note that the members of the Local Council at the village level are not paid and work on a voluntary basis. This creates a system of “patronage” – a client/patron relationship between the members of the Local Council and the people seeking their help (Khadiagala, 2001). Simply put, in order to receive help from the Local Council, it is necessary to pay them. Stressing the financial interests of the members is thus a register often used to criticise the Local Council.

The mistrust towards the members of the Local Council is also expressed through “conspiracy theories.” While the members of the Local Councils presents themselves as local leaders, the members have been accused by their constituencies of being agents working with “the power” and against the population that they are supposed to be representing. Ever since the beginning of the system of Local Councils in 1986, its members have been seen as agents of the central regime and not neutral representatives of the population, especially in regions where the position of the regime are weak (Sjögren, 2007: 85). The idea of the members of the Local Council as “agents cooperating with the power” resonates in the accounts of the local population in Bukaleba. For instance, in the following testimony given by an inhabitant in the Nakalanga village:

“I’m wondering whether the former chairman is the one that connects with the Busoga Forest Company to refuse us to cultivate in our land, in which we thought were our lands, even given to us by the President.” (Male inhabitant of Nakalanga village, interviewed on 11th February 2013).

The interviewed man is accusing the former chairman of the Local Council of “treason”. Later we learned that the chairman in question had been attacked by two people in his village, causing both him and his attackers to flee the area. Frustration over the 500 hectares of “community land” is supposed to have caused the attack. Also in the village of Walumbe, the chairman of the Local Council expressed a fear of the reactions of the local population.

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“We negotiate with the company.... and now they refuse us to cultivate. As leaders we are elected by votes and selected. Now for us as the leaders, we are worried we can even be assaulted by the local community because they vote for us, they give us their votes. Now we are worried.” (Male President Local Council in Walumble village, interviewed on 11th February 2013)

As intermediates between the company and the population, the legitimacy of the Local Council is in jeopardy. When the populations’ grievances are heard by neither the company nor the state, there are negative consequences for the leaders, as they are held responsible. Additionally, this distrust from the population is doubled by mistrust from the NFA and Green Resources, which considers these leaders as the main motors behind the conflicts between the villagers and the company.

“We normally don’t have problems with the communities; the encroachment is often caused by a leader somewhere.” (Senior Plantation Manager in the Bukaleba plantation, interviewed on 13th February 2013).

The local leaders therefore find themselves in an intermediary position where they are under pressure from two sides: from the inhabitants of the village as well as from the NFA and Green Resources. In conclusion, the arrival of the company has weakened the authority of the Local Council, as they are no longer in control of the customary land tenure in the village. When the members try to regain this authority by presenting themselves as leaders in the village fight for customary land rights, this turns against them, as the fight is unsuccessful and the inhabitants holds them responsible. In the next section of this article we will continue to analyse the role and social position of the Local Council as we examine how land access is distributed, and linked to power, in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve.

Labour, land access and power in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve

The idea of “land grabbing” often signifies the introduction of strong security measures around the area invested in by a foreign company. The land is “grabbed” or “taken” by the foreign company, who refuses the local population’s access to this land, for instance by constructing fences. Although there are no fences around the Bukaleba plantation, a number of security guards patrol the plantation in order to stop the villagers from using the land for grazing and agricultural activities. Therefore, the arrival of the company has resulted in the loss of agricultural land for the people living inside and around the Forest Reserve. At the same time, we will stress that the control of the land is far from total, and that the “local population” is still able to access land within the boundaries of the plantation.

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T. Sikor and C. Lund have analysed the difference between access and property of natural resources. Drawing upon their work, we see access as the possibility to benefit or profit from resources without having to own the land. The opportunity for profit is defined by a broader range of social institutions than property, which is a defined by laws and norms (Sikor & Lund, 2009: 1–22). It is towards these social procedures of land access that we now turn. We argue that the organisation of labour on the plantation is central for understanding the distribution of land access, and thus for the power relations within and among the villages.

“The local population”

The “local population” or “local community” are central terms when discussing the Bukaleba plantation. For instance, Green Resources representatives stress the importance of development projects for the “local community.” We argue that the globalising term “local community” gives the impression that we are talking about a homogeneous group, thus hiding the internal dynamics, groupings and divisions within the population (see Munoz, 2008; Geschiere, 2004). We have thus tried to analyse the social characteristics of the inhabitants living inside the Forest Reserve. This work has resulted in a typology based on the relationship that the villagers have with the company (worker/non worker) as well as to the former beef farm. Our argument is that these two aspects are fundamental for the individual’s social position in the village. Such a typology can help us understand the hierarchies and the power relations within this group as identified by observers as the “local community” or “local population”.

1) Transformed workers: This group consists of people who have formerly worked for the government beef farm and that today work for Green Resources. Our argument is that these two characteristics are both positive, giving these individuals a strong position in the villages. As we will show in the next part of this paper, the workers (especially those on the top of the work hierarchy) control the other villagers’ access to land through both legal and illegal processes. This role as a gatekeeper to land is essential to their social position in the villages. Additionally, having a background as a worker for the “government farm” gives them a strong legitimacy in the village, as it is this narrative that is put forward in order to claim land rights. The former workers of the farm are thus seen as those who really belong (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005) to the area, in contrast to the migrant workers and the new arrivals who have no legitimacy in the customary land claims.

2) The migrant workers: This group consists of people who have settled in the plantation during the last few years in search of a job. Because of their short history within the forest area, they are excluded from the fight for land rights. At the same time, migrants who hold a high position in the work hierarchy are gatekeepers for land access of villagers who have lived longer in the forest. This can create a “violent” power in the village, as the latter is considered as more legitimate than the migrant worker to access land.

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3) The “local leaders”: A third group consists of former workers of the “government farm” that dos not work for Green Resources. These individuals play an important role as leaders in the fight for customary land and as members of the Local Council of the villages. In this fight they stress the narrative of the “government farm,” and the land right of its former workers.

4) The new arrivals: In this last group, we find those who have neither worked for Green Resources nor have had a long history of presence in the Forest Reserve. In the same way that the transformed workers hold two strong positions, this group is marginalised in two ways. They are dependent on the company workers in order to access the land of the plantation, and they are also excluded from the group that the local leaders consider as the ones who really belong (the workers of the government farm).

With this typology of the inhabitants of the Forest Reserve in mind, we now turn to further analyse the organisation of labour and the power relations involved.

The hierarchy of the contractor system and its translation to the villages

Only a very small minority of the field workers in the Bukaleba and Kachung plantations are semi-permanently or permanently employed. Most of the people working on the plantation are casual workers employed through contractors who have an agreement with the company to recruit workers on their behalf. The casual workers are hired by the contractor for a shorter period of time, normally for one month. The workers are then paid through this contractor, and not directly by the company. According to one of the plantation supervisors at the Kachung plantation, hiring workers through contractors is becoming more and more common. Also in Bukaleba, the contractor system is widely used, as this inhabitant of the village of Walumbe explains to us.

“The people who want to work for the company write applications, they apply. Others they work in “contract.” In groups. Someone (a contractor), they go and apply and then I take my group, I become the supervisor for my group. That’s how they recruit people.” (Male inhabitant of the village of Walumbe, interviewed on 11th February 2013)

As this recruitment of workers through contractors is a recent development, we can therefore talk about the introduction of a new professional group in the work hierarchy: the contractor. The contractors have a higher salary than the other supervisors who do not engage in the recruitment. To be a contactor is thus to occupy a high position in the work hierarchy. Our argument is that the strong working hierarchy and the position of power of the contractor is translated to the social space of the village. We will show this by putting forward three arguments.

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Firstly, there is a strong competition among the inhabitants of the plantation for the positions as casual workers. The power of the contractor lies in his function as a gatekeeper to the available jobs, as he can choose who is recruited. One of the contractors we talked with told us how he recruited workers from his own village and not from the neighbouring ones, as he stated, “this village is crowded, somebody has got close to twenty children, and nowhere to go.” The contractor can thus recruit workers according to his/her own justifications and interests, for instance by recruiting those willing to give a part of their salary to the gatekeeper. This role of gatekeeper gives a powerful position in the villages, as well as within the family unit. The strong hierarchical organisation of workers, where a big group of casual workers are dependent on a small group of contractors to access work, creates an asymmetric power relation between the two groups. This asymmetric power relation is present at work, but also in the villages as both contractors and workers live in the same area.

Secondly, before the introduction of the contractor system, the Local Councils played an important part as intermediaries in the recruitment of the workers. The assistant plantation manager in the Kachung plantation explains how recruiting through contractors is more efficient for the company, as they only need to deal with a few contractors instead of going through the Local Councils. “We give work to a contractor that looks for someone to do what? To work. But before we would do some adverts through the church, the Local Councils, calling people to come and work in the plantation. But we abolished that system, cause we now work with a contract system where we work with one person, or 2 or 5. And it’s under them that people get hired.” (Assistant plantation manager, Kachung plantation, interviewed on 15th February 2013). There has been a power shift in the villages from the Local Councils towards the contractors, as the latter are the ones who now control the villagers’ access to work. We have already seen how the Local Councils have lost power in the villages, as they are no longer in control of land distribution. The recruitment process is another example of how power in the villages shifts from the Local Councils towards other actors who are tightly connected to the company, in this case, the contractors.

Thirdly, this work hierarchy and the asymmetric power relation between contractors and casual workers are translated to the social space of the villages through the clothes and equipment of the workers. In the village of Bukaleba, the identities of casual workers, contractors or other types of supervisors are easy to spot because of how the workers are dressed. The contractors and other permanent workers wear uniforms, but many of the casual workers who work under contractors do not have a uniform or any safety clothing or equipment. We argue that this difference in equipment is a strong manifestation of the power relations in the organisation of labour and also an important factor of the translation of these power relations to the social space of the villages, as workers pass through the village wearing these uniforms.

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Land access and power are thus linked to the way Green Resources organises their workers. Only a few inhabitants are given access to the land of the plantation through work, and for this access they are dependent on being recruited by contractors. We will now see that the powerful position that the contractor holds in the village also comes from his or her role as a gatekeeper to transgressive practises of land exploitation.

The contractor/supervisor: a gatekeeper to transgressive practices of land exploitation

Our field study has brought into light the existence of transgressive practices of land exploitation by the populations living inside the Forest Reserve of Bukaleba. This illegal exploitation is not a new phenomenon in the Forest Reserve of Bukaleba. According to one of our sources at the Green Resources office close to the Bukaleba plantation, these practices existed until 2000 in the part of the Forest Reserve that was, at that time, administered by a Dutch company. According to our source, supervisors working for the Dutch company would let people cultivate the land inside the Forest Reserve in exchange for a part of the harvest or money. Our source used the word “system” to describe this exchange between supervisors working for the company and villagers wishing to cultivate within the borders of the reserve. According to our source, Green Resources put a stop to these transgressive practices in 2000 when they took over the control of the entire Forest Reserve. However, we argue that these practices of transgressive exploitation by a system of exchange between contractors/supervisors and villagers, still exists today under various forms.

A woman lets her animals graze inside the Bukaleba plantation. On the left you can see a sign that interdicts grazing. (Photography taken by the author on 12th February 2013)

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A Ugandan journalist who accompanied us on our first field trip to Bukaleba, often talked about transgressive exploitation of the land and practices of exchange between villagers and workers. This leads us to believe that this exchange is a generalised system known to “everyone.” During one of our field trips, we observed a woman letting her animals graze not far from a group of workers. As grazing is one of the practices defined by the NFA as illegal in the Forest Reserve, we asked the local journalist how it was possible for the woman to let her goats graze just next to a group of workers. The explanation given was that by “paying a little bit” to the workers they would not report the transgression. Later the same day, we also observed a woman who let her goats pass through an area with a sign that read “ No grazing” and we tokk a picture of this. This picture is a good illustration of the defiance of the ban by the villagers. It seams that “illegal” and “transgressive activities” are a part of the everyday activities of the population.

Another example of transgressive exploitation is related to wood products. According to one of the members of the Local Council of Bukaleba who does not work for the company, the villagers who wish to “burn charcoal” from wood in the forest can do so by paying the workers.

“Say, if you want to burn charcoal, you just pay something to them. Just like that, that is Uganda. You just pay something.” “You pay to whom?” “Anybody can come and do that. A field assistant, anybody they can send.” “So you pay a little bit to the workers, and then you get to burn charcoal?” “Yes, just like that. That is our forest standing.” (Member of the Local Council in the village of Bukaleba, interviewed on 18th March 2013)

In conclusion, the “exchange system” between the villagers and the supervisors is still present in the plantation today. The high-ranking workers like contractors and supervisors can therefore control the ways in which the villagers access land in the plantation, both through recruitment to work and transgressive exploitation. The system described above is another example of a power shift from local government structures (the Local Council) towards structures linked to the company (the contractors and other supervisors). The high-ranking worker’s role as a gatekeeper to both jobs and land access puts him/her in a powerful position in the villages, where they take over the role of the members of the Local Council.

These practices of transgressive exploitation are not officially recognised by Green Resources, but we argue that they are known and, to a certain degree, tolerated by their daughter company, Busega Forestry Company (BFC), which is running the plantation in Bukaleba.

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When ignoring illegality becomes a condition for economic success

The Busega Forestry Company seems to bee an aware and passive actor in this “system” of transgressive exploitation. Because of the plantation’s vulnerability to fires that could be set by the local population, it is necessary for the company to maintain a good relationship with the local population. To completely stop cultivation and grazing (as it is foreseen by the forestry legislation of Uganda and the NFA) is not in the interest of the company, as this could create severe grievances towards the company and thus prompt acts of violence against the plantation. This already occurred in 2009 when a small part of the plantation was burned down. The fire in 2009 happened after a conflict between the company and the villagers, stemming from the loss of an agricultural area to the forest plantation. A member of the Local Council in Walumbe village explained that maintaining a good relationship between the company and the population is important.

“Even if there is a fire outbreak in the middle of the forest. It is we, the community, who go and rescue the trees. We protect the trees not to be stolen. No other malpractices can attack the forest when we are here (...). Let the company work very hard to see that we work together. Because if we break that good relationship, the company will see that there will be some malpractices on the trees. Maybe they can leave people to steel the trees, maybe they can leave a fire to burn down the forest. Because we will not be working together.” (Member of the Local Council in Walumbe village, interviewed on 11th February 2013)

To construct this “good relationship” with the population, the company permitted a system of intercropping of trees and food crops in their plantations until 2011; however, it is currently illegal to do any kind of cultivation inside the Forest Reserve. Officially, the intercropping system has been prohibited by the NFA ever since 2004. Between 2004 and 2011 BFC has thus allowed a system of cultivation that was not allowed by the NFA. The intercropping system was very important for the coexistence of the company and the populations, as expressed here by a local politician.

“They allowed people to use this place to grow, and cultivate things like maize as their trees where also growing, so there was some sort of intercropping. So that’s how we have managed to convince them. Otherwise, to chase them at once would not have been easy. But now people have accepted, but some still grow crops in the forest.” “But that is not allowed?” “We the local leaders, we told them “don’t chase these people out completely at once, they will go slowly.” So they are growing their crops, when the trees grow automatically, maize cannot grow where trees are. They just go out themselves.” (Local politician Bukaleba forest, interviewed on 11th February 2013).

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We argue that the BFC tolerates these transgressions by the villagers because it assures them a good relationship with the local population and helps protect their investment. Additionally, as the Parish chief described it, as the trees grow bigger, the cultivation will no longer be possible and the population will be forced to move out. To ignore these transgressions thus becomes a condition for the economic success of the company. They can continue their activities, conflict with the villagers is avoided, and they officially respect the conditions of the NFA.

Conclusion

Controlling land tenure and access also means holding power and political authority. In the Forest Reserve of Bukaleba, the arrival of Green Resources has resulted in a shift of power from the local government (Local Councils) towards actors connected to the company (contractors, supervisors) as the control of land access travels from the former to the latter.

At the same time, the transformation of the Bukaleba forest to a commercial forestry plantation has enhanced the central states’ control of this rural area, as rent and control of resource extraction is centralised (through the company), local authorities are weakened, and land conflicts are used as an authority-building resource by the Ugandan President. We therefore argue that the case of the investment of Green Resources in the Bukaleba Forest Reserve is an example of centralisation of power and political authority in the hands of the Museveni regime.

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Ekebete Marriage in the Historiography of Pawnship and Female Abduction in East Africa, 1890-1945

Babere Kerata Chacha and Peter Waweru1

Introduction

In the 1960s Jan Kuhanen, Mary Douglas, and Helge Kjekshus and more recently Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson, PhilipsCurtin, Toyin Falola, and Tiyambe Zeleza have shed light on the institution of debt bondage, pawnship and abduction in Africa. These studies illustrated how in precolonial Africa individuals were held as collateral – usually by members of the same family – in lieu of debts that had been incurred. These studies concluded that such practices exposed dependents to the possibilities of enslavement in the event of default on the loan; they placed individuals in precarious positions which could result in considerable abuse. Whether such institution existed within precolonial East African societies is a hotly contested debate among scholars. Pawnship did exist, but whether it was a form of slavery or not remains a debatable issue. The Kuria case illustrates the intersection between girl abduction and pawnship within trade networks in East African. Girls sold into ekebete marriage2 ended up in Ukerewe, Ukara and Sese in Northern Tanzania.This paper seeks to show the significance of ekebete in the labour and trading processes in East Africa from the late precolonial period to the mid-1900s.

The Kuria

The ethnic group known as the Kuria has had a turbulent history. Generally referred to as ‘reluctant’, ‘backward’ and ‘litigious’ agro-pastoralists, they have often been regarded as victims of international capital after living almost isolated from market for centuries. In a perhaps harsh analysis, the Kenyan historian William Ochieng describes them as follows: ‘In almost every decade in the last century, these people have endured crises of the worst sort – transformed from a rich, haughty and independent-minded pastoralist community into petty commodity producers, cattle rustlers, and famine relief-clients’ (1971: 9).

1 The two authors teach history at Laikipia University in Kenya. 2 Ekebete was a Kuria practice, common at the end of 19th century and referred to as ‘child marriage’, that consisted in giving out girls to neighbouring or distant communities in exchange for food or for safe custody during famine or war.

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But within such a context of flux and turmoil, one striking continuity remained: their long-standing history and complex relations with each other which points to their adaptation to forces of change. Certainly, centuries of geographical isolation had permitted the indigenous growth of a culture and social organisation different in striking aspects from those of nearby communities, and from the general cultural patterns of the East African people. The Kuria place themselves definitely above their neighbouring communities. For many years, their distinctive appearance– the Kuria men are tall, dark brown complexioned and robust, and women are shorter and somewhat lighter –and customs had made them an object of tourist curiosity as well as a subject of historical and anthropological investigation. The study of the Kuria has indeed been a rapidly growing field to which Africa or Africanist scholars have contributed by unveiling the intricate linguistic, ritual, agriculture, and social organisation of the Kuria; it also reflected upon the process of politico-economic transformation that affected Kuria society. Anthropologists identified agricultural development as a ‘problem area’ among the Kuria, pointing to the low levels of crop production and animal husbandry with opposition to land consolidation and registration (Grim, 1974). One writer suggested that economic progress had been slow because the Kuria clung to the value of the ritual system and because their wants were generally limited to cattle and wives.Thus the stereotype of the Kuria peasants as archconservatives has become well established.This section prove otherwise and illustrates that the rate of economic change in the late nineteenth century was greater than any in subsequent period. Kuria traditions and migration patterns in the distant past linked them with the Abagusii with whom they are linguistically closely related. Even so, in much of their culture and social organisation, they may also be compared with the Agikuyu, Embu, and Meru (Ruel, 1973:1-6). The Abagusii, however, lack five of the eight names of the generation cycles which are of fundamental importance to the Kuria. Five of the eight names of the generation cycles are found in cognate form amongst the Nandi and the Kipsigis; and at least two of these common names are also found in the generations of the Agikuyu, Meru and Embu (Mwanzi, 1987; Peristiany, 1939; Sutton, 1966)3. The above and other historical evidence relating to the origin of the Kuria suggest that they were a mixture of Bantu and Highland Nilotic peoples.4 In fact, it would seem that the Kuria were not the original inhabitants of their present territory. Writing in 1950, Cory suggested that the Abakuria were a splinter group of the Maasai who ‘migrated to their present habitat many generations ago’ (Cory, 1952). He stressed that they still had the Maasai‘spirit’ which manifested itself in the love for cattle and great zeal in acquiring them (Sutton, 1969).

3 A section of the Abaluyia use four names which appear also in the Kuria generation cycles, see Levine and Sangree (1962). 4 The Agikuyu, for instance, use cycle names such as ‘Chuma’ and ‘Maina’, which appear in Kuria cycles. SeeLambert (1956).

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The manner of dress and weaponry were perhaps the most tangible assimilations from the Maasai culture. Descriptions of the Kuria warrior of the late nineteenth century reveal the striking similarities with the Maasai. More particularly, their physical location may have exposed them to political influences from the Maasai. They thus developed a politico-military system that was partly desired and partly developed from their own indigenous institutions. The Kuria kept large herds of cattle, not because they suffered from the ‘Cattle Complex’ of anthropological folklore, but because cattle played so many different roles. Not only did livestock serve as a medium of exchange and store of value; it was also important as prestige goods and objects of mystification articulated within a social and ideological system.

The basic value of cattle was reflected in the many roles they played in Kuria social organization. In marriage, for example, they became an issue in formal bride wealth payment; during the isubo (elderhood ceremony), a number of between six and twelve heads of cattle were given to the brothers of the elder’s wives and some cattle required as offerings to the ancestors. In initiation ceremonies (esaro for example), when the girl recovered from the physical operation, the mother’s brother was expected to slaughter an ox for her. If he did so, he would receive four to eight cattle on the day the girl got married. To illustrate how important cattle were to the Abakuria, one may note how many times cattle are mentioned in songs and poems, such as follows:

This Rioba of the Abahirimatara who came from the lineages of the bulls who kept Kimwamu and Kiburuha bulls ...the bulls that who chased Nyansamu while milk dripped from its udders... My father is Rioba of the stocky bulls. Even last night our bull did not sleep, it sniffed the cows till down, trying to find those without calf in the womb.

Therefore, cattle were affectionately looked after, readily identified with, and elaborately discussed. The wealth of an individual was measured in cattle units, and cattle fulfilled crucial ritual functions and obligations. The Kuria increased their stocks mainly by raiding their neighbours. Yet raiding was also a requirement for the Kuria youth to demonstrate courage after initiation. Whether in raiding or warfare, a warrior displayed his courage by capturing cattle or killing an enemy. Raiding was also offered as a means of obtaining bridewealth cattle. This is demonstrated in a popular beer party song, ‘Nyagorio we ‘ngoombu, sobokeraomokari, name nakurusiriaegoorio’. This may be translated as ‘You who long for a woman make more cows, it is women who will remove your desire.’

Cattle were carefully grazed and at the same time guarded from rustlers. Cattle belonging to close lineage members drawn mainly from one eka (homestead) were grazed together by a team of armed boys abarisia. They bore marking distinguishing them from cattle belonging to distant relatives; the making helped establish ownership of stray cattle or those retrieved from raiders. From such description of the cattle centeredness of the Kuria, incentives for the occurrences of ekebete child marriage was extremely high.

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The Anthropology of Ekebete Marriage5

In Kuria there exist different forms of ekebete marriage. One is a kind of pledge made for debt owed and promised for future payment and which can be made of dowry or materials cows, cash and so on. Another one is a kind of marriage made by receiving dowry in instalments or in full awaiting the girl child to grow and attain marriage age. At times the child can be handed over at a tender age waiting to reach a suitable age. In such a situation where trust is not granted, the girl child could be handled to the family but be sleeping with the senior mother who gives her marital instruction. There also existed a form popularly known as the ikinyege. This is a kind of ekebete whereby a man who has attained marriage age but has no dowry pledges to be given a lady who he will pay for through his strength (ikinyege, literally muscles) or hard work by accumulating wealth through any possible means, and thus eventually pays the dowry for the lady. By doing this, a man would be said to be ‘eating the marriage’ (ukunyerwaekebete).At this point there is no ceremony conducted: witness from both sides would be present and during this time there were only ordinary meals which were taken. There was a ceremony called embotora or agreement which was done when the girl child has attained the correct age. A ceremony would be conducted and a he-goat will be slaughtered in ritual. Generally, it was believed that those who were married through this kind of marriage experienced a lot of misfortunes.

This ekebete marriage existed between neighbouring Kuria clans but there were incidents that overlapped to the neighbouring clans, especially during times of trouble such as famine and locust infestation. In such hard times, crops were destroyed and weak families resorted to trade exchange of young girls child with food such as finger millet, potatoes, stems and animals. Much of the ceremony was done in secrecy. The foodstuff would be transported to one’s home with security. It was prepared during the night. The eating was administered during the middle of the night so that the neighbours do not join. No wonder these would often be abused using phrases such as:‘nke oratotebi’, ‘wanyeera omona wao ekebete’ or ‘what are you telling us’ and ‘you have eaten out of selling your child’ as well as ‘go away you ekebete eater’(tagenda nyamorea ekebete).

The period upon which this marriage was practiced falls between 1900 and 1945. This was a turbulent period in Kuria history. It was at the beginning of this period that hunger devastated most Kuria families. For instance, in the 1890s the Kuria, like other East African communities, experienced drought and famine which rendered farming and animal production precarious and hazardous occupation (Chacha, 1999). A decade of natural catastrophe opened when rinderpest entered Western Kenya and Northern Tanganyika. Kuria was struck by the epidemic in unprecedented proportions (Iliffe, 1979:

5 Am greatly indebted to Mzee Kerata Chacha and Taisamu Kerata for collation of the oral information on ekebete in Kuria and their support in obtaining other informants.

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110). Kuria oral traditions commemorate the event clearly. It tells of cattle, sheep and goat skeletons strewn in great quantities.6 During this time, the position of poor woman and young girls was especially precarious. Food became so scarce that people were forced to cut discarded ox hides and the goats skins that they wore for clothing as devastating food. The destruction was so crippling that the children and grandchildren of survivors continued to recount the storm of the famine called gituramahoor “roasted skin”.7 This famine was so harsh that women made certain kind of cry known as ekerarati as they saw their children and die one by one. Marriages were rarely conducted, owing to lack of livestock for bridewealth. Families experiencing famine during this period had no choice but to barter their women and children for food (Wakefield, 1870). While poor men suffered through the mortgage of their futures, female household members were literally pawned to the rich women of the Mbungu and Warutu in Northern Tanganyika (Chacha, 1999: 39). Likewise, the Bukiraclan which was last hit by the 19thc. famines received many women refuges whom they turned into wives. However the number was too high that some women ended up getting into the ubusino marriage.8 These pawned females would be redeemed at a later date with cattle or some other form of wealth. Otherwise, the future of the women or girls lay in the hands of the Bukira women bearing male children for them. As the Kuria were being hit by famine at the close of the 19th c., the Maasai (Kuria neighbours) were also under great hardship since it coincided with the “ilaikipiak war and the rinderpest epizootic” (Bernstein, 1996). The result was a complete disaster for a number of the Maasai. Contemporary observersestimate that the Maasaithen lost 95% of their cattle (Sharpe, 1983; Stuhlmann, 1894). This made their pastoral life impossible for years and many Maasai women took refuge with agricultural neighbours in order to survive. Those who came to Kuria, known as abatebia, came in caravans of between thirty to sixty women. They brought with them beads and other valuables. According to oral narratives, these women never went back to Maasailand. Instead they were married into ubusino or ekebete in Bukira. Men would not normally take these women as wives since this would cause conflicts with Maasai. Kjerland writes about a wealthy widow known as Masoborroa Waitebe who moved from Bukira and settled in Nyabasi with her cattle and ‘married’ the Maasai woman. She later sent a message to the Maasai accusing them of being lazy, and was in turn raided and killed by some Maasai spies (1995: 123).The Abahirimasero clan of Bukira who inhabit present-day Ikerege are thought to have been the offspring of this woman. Many similar incidences took place between the Kuria women and the Maasai especially during the period of drought and famine.

6 For example oral narratives, see Mwita (1989), pp. 4-16 7 A similar case is illustrated by Schmidt (1992), p. 152. 8 For details of women-women marriage, see for example Blackwood (1984), O’Brien (1977), Evans-Prich- ard (1951),Ramet (1990),Gluckman (1970), Uchendu (1965),Krige (1974), and Oboler (1980).

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Precolonial Pawnship among the Kikuyu and their Neighbours

Like in Kuria, where human pawnship and abduction persisted in deferent forms till end of the Second World War and even most recently as found in the rituals of Gold Mines of Northern Tanzania particularly in Nyamomgo and Nyarugusu. Literature on most of the Kenyan communities show that this practice was widespread and mainly involving children and women. Key examples are communities in central and south-western Kenya. It seems therefore, that considerable raiding took place between the Kikuyu and their pastoralist neighbours, but this state of affairs was influenced by other factors which also enhanced mutual understanding. First, their respective modes of life were in some ways complementary. The pastoralist needed some of the agricultural products in the same as the agriculturalists required animal products. Like most pastoralists in East Africa, the Maasai were particularly vulnerable to famine because any natural calamity – such as the vagaries of the weather or any epizootic epidemic – was a threat to their chief source of livelihood, the livestock. On such occasions they were heavily dependent upon their agricultural neighbours with whom they had either to trade or else seek refuge to avert starvation.

If there had been a rupture of relations beforehand, emissaries were dispatched to explore the possibilities of concluding a peace treaty before trading activities were resumed. Regarding Maasai peace negotiations, it is apparent that the initiative was mostly taken by the Maasai. Peace negotiations were not lightly undertaken, as the conclusion of peace treaty (munyoro) involved a protracted and elaborate procedure, culminating in a religious ceremony during which both parties took a solemn and binding oath. (Muriuki, 1976: 23).

According to Muriuki, that the oath was no idle threat is demonstrated by the fate of a warrior from Kiambu, called Wangai, who was handed over to the Maasai after he had broken a peace treaty in the 1980s. Peaceful coexistence, therefore, was duly recognized as being of prime importance to the well-being of the two communities. Indeed, the experience of the Maasai in the 19th c. is a good demonstration of the above observation. The various disasters that affected them – the cattle epidemic, smallpox and their internecine wars – culminated in a large-scale influx of refugees into Kikuyu land. In fact, this phenomenon was not confirmed to the Kikuyu alone; throughout the century Maasai refugees are known to have settled among the Taveta, the Chagga, the Arusha and the Luhyia:

Moreover, an arrangement whereby women and children could be pawned in times of misfortune existed, as it did among the Ashanti and the Dahomey of West Africa. Desperate Maasai families left their children and women in the hands of the Kikuyu in exchange for foodstuff, hoping to ransom them in better times. No stigma was attached to the pawnship and the system was commonly practiced by the Kamba, the Kikuyu and the other Mt. Kenya People’s, but it was only practiced during famine time. In any case, it fulfilled an important function by ensuring that a family did not starve. (Muriuki, 1976: 46).

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Among the Kikuyu, pawnship seems to have not been regarded as slavery. Indeed it was a stage towards full adoption and pawned children became full members of the Kikuyu families which had adopted them, until they were ransomed. It seems unlikely that the Maasai would have sought refuge among the Kikuyu, let alone would have pawned their children, if there had been any possibility of their being seriously ill-treated. Equally, interdependence was mutual. The agriculturalists would also call upon the pastoralists, to some extent, at times of similar adversities.

As a rule, however, people saw ethnic groupings as only one layer of the larger social and cultural system into which they were joined. Most families, lineages, and communities possessed a range of links with counterparts in other sections of the region. The clan affiliations that tied local lineages into ethnic traditions also cut across language boundaries, creating connections, for example, between particular clans in Gikuyuland and in Kamba-speaking areas. Although such links generally had little practical significance (and perhaps little basis in fact), they did provide individuals with networks of putative clan-mates in other parts of the region. Similarly, a system of sectional part of dependent labour within the region, and pawning arrangements were commonplace, particularly when food shortages occurred.9

Typically, a young woman whose family was experiencing hard times was sent to live with people in a different community, in return for a negotiated payment or series of payments of foodstuffs or livestock. But ultimate control over the pawned woman continued to rest with the original parent, husband, or guardian; and most of the men who pawned their dependents apparently intended to redeem them when circumstances improved. Often such women never went back to their homes, but the fact that their relatives could return and claim them provided a measure of protection from exploitation (Dundas, 1921: 290; Bernstein, 1996: 266; Jackson, 1976: 205-206).

In 1880 only the slender thread of the caravan trade linked the central Kenya region to the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa and hence to international economy. Commerce had moved along this route of elephant hunting and ivory trade (Hobley, 1929: 205; Jackson, 1976: 203-29). Merchants may also have hoped that by migrating to Mumoni they could forestall attempts by coastal merchants to consolidate their increasing dominance of trade through the region. Mumoni offered ambitious men the opportunity to amass considerable wealth, limited local agricultural resources and however, recurrent drought meant that basic foods would often be in short supply. Only the establishment of trade connections – and the security of food supplies that their existence implied – permitted men such as Kilungya to amass cattle and ultimately to concentrate wealth and power in their own hands. What

9 The pawning or sale of people during famine was widespread in Africa. See Miller (1982), pp. 28-29. Hopkins pointed to the need for further examination of pawnship (1973: 27) but despite the rapid growth in slave studies the topic has received little attention. See also Lovejoy (1983), p. 13. The most useful discussion of the issue remains Douglas (1964).

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this meant for the masses of Mumoni residents is not clear. Certainly by settling in mbenge villages, people with few resources hoped to gain more. In the meantime, however, they found themselves part of a society in which a small number of men controlled much of the wealth, and many were condemned to periodic hunger (Ambler, 1988: 90).

Trends in the history of long-distance trade emerge a big more clearly after mid-century. Although ivory supplies declined, a growing demand for livestock at the coast fuelled trade in cattle, goats and sheep. This transition from tusks to animals involved more than the replacement of one commodity with another. Ivory was relatively scarce and required a substantial mobilization of people and resources to acquire. Livestock were ubiquitous and already the staple of exchange within the region. Hence, as more and more men began to take stock to the coast for sale, the boundaries of long-distance and regional exchange blurred. According to Ambler (1988: 53):

This extension of external trade into the regional exchange system forced a rapid commercialization of the transfer of female labor. Traders both from communities in central Kenya and the coast manipulated the convention of pawning to obtain women –generally refugees – who it was understood could not be reclaimed. In other words, the buyers were acquiring right over the woman themselves, not simply their labor...few were transported beyond central Kenya.

Contemporary written accounts refer frequently to the existence of slavery and an active slave trade; but histories of the Kenya interior have generally ignored this evidence or dismissed it as either the product of European misperceptions of local institutions or attempts to rationalize conquest (Van Zwanenberg & King, 1975: 178; Wolff, 1974: 43-44). But it stretches credulity to suggest that numerous and sometimes explicit reports of slave purchases can be explained away as either an expansionist conspiracy or alien myopia (Mwaniki, 1973: 54-55). Europeans travelling through central Kenya recorded many cases of young women and girls being offered for purchase, and various private and official records describe a regular movement of slaves from Gikuyu into Ulu and Kitui. These documents are clearly not misrepresenting instances of arranged marriages or pawning agreements, since such transactions were unlikely either to have come to the attention of European observers or to have earned their commendation. Even at mid-century, when Kraft reported that Kitui residents were beginning to buy slave women from Mbeere and from the coast, he was careful to distinguish these sales from the more common practice of acquiring women as captives or pawns.

The reticence of the oral records presumably reflects not only subsequent attitudes toward slavery and the relatively smallscale of slave trading, but also the speed with which slaves were incorporated into local communities. Even as the trade increased at the end of the century, the position of slaves continued to be defined in kinship terms. Slave status was not inherited, and slave women were integrated into households and communities as wives. During the late 1890s a British official in Kitui noted that the large number of

130 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est women from Maasai backgrounds living there were “not slaves in the true sense of the word, for the Wakamba make wives of them, and treat them like their own women” (Lane, 2011: 29). As outsiders cut off from their origins, these women lacked the connections that protected local distinctly inferior positions in their new societies or that they or their children experienced systematic discrimination.10 Whatever their position, alien women – with their distinctive speech and background – inevitably brought different perspectives to the families that they joined and to the children whom they raised. Moreover, the presence of substantial numbers of these ‘foreign’ women in Gikuyuland, Ulu, and Kitui illustrates the pointlessness of discussing central Kenya societies as if they were culturally and biologically static and discrete.

Accordingly, and although no slave castes developed in the societies of central Kenya, slavery was not just another form of dependency. Most enslaved women presumably saw no alternative to their situation, since many had neither home nor family to return to (Lane, Ibid.). But in central Kenya as in other parts of the Africa, when recently enslaved women saw a way out of their status, they often took it. In 1894 the British official in charge of the post in southern Gikuyuland wrote in a letter home that ‘the number of slaves who have run away and come to my Masai kraal is beyond all count; I don’t know whether I have the legal right, but I always refuse to give them up again’.11 As the focus of central Kenya’s external trade shifted away from ivory, stations along the major routes developed as centres of regional trade, and a few local merchants – including Kilungya in Mumoni – began to see their role more as brokers than long-distance traders. By the 1880s this process was only beginning, however. Wide areas continued to be isolated from the currents of international trade, and most contacts with long-distance trade and traders remained ephemeral or superficial. Despite the growth and expansion of long- distance commerce, the patterns of regional exchange predominated and retained their essential structure and autonomy. Many people, especially those who lived away from the major trade routes, had only the vaguest understanding of the external forces that were beginning to reshape their region and their lives. They interpreted distant developments largely through the prophecies of local seers or through widely repeated tales like those in Central Kenya of the mythical Arab merchant who had been pushed into the ocean by a powerful newcomer, and whose name literally, “the person who strikes wood” – evoked the custom of hitting sticks together to signal the beginning of trade.12

10 See Lindblom (1920:203-04). Kraft claimed that by the mid-1800s wealthy Kitui merchants were buying slaves at the coast, but there is no evidence elsewhere of the existence of a distinct slave population in Kitui society (Kraft, 1968:259: Journal, 3 Dec. 1849). 11 Hall, Letter, 12 Feb. 1894. Also note Chanler, Jungle and Desert, pp. 489-90. Lovejoy points to the importance of evidence of slave escape for assessment of slave systems. Transformations in slavery, p. 247. Cited in Ambler 12 The term varied slightly according to locality, see Jackson (1972:265-66).

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Famine, Migration and Children Movement

From oral sources, many people around Kitui region recall that during the famine, ‘Kamba first brought their livestock to exchange for foodstuffs. Later, they brought their wives and children’ (Mwaniki, 1973: 304). As this reminiscence attests, persistent and intense food shortages led destitute families to turn increasingly to the transfer of rights over female labour under their control – the pawning of female dependents. For the fathers, husbands, or guardians of the women and girls involved, pawning represented a practical means of obtaining desperately needed food.

By transferring their rights over dependents, men were able to supply the remaining members of their families while at the same time reducing the number of mouths that had to be fed. Consequently, during the years from 1898 to 1900, thousands of females found themselves thrust into unfamiliar communities in areas separated from their homes not only by many miles but by considerable cultural and linguistic distance as well. The transition could involve considerable trauma, but many scarcely looked back. They were grateful to exchange the insecurity and hunger that famine had forced on them for the material and psychological certainty offered by their new guardians (Jackson, 1972: 205-06).

If pawning was not intrinsically inhumane, the rapid expansion of the practice during the famine years encouraged men to view female labour as a commodity, a trend already evident in the growth of slave trading. As communities weakened and travel became increasingly dangerous, female refugees in general were left extraordinarily vulnerable to exploitation. Some men from highland communities apparently attempted to use ‘gifts’ of food and shelter to young women in order to create obligations and thus extract payments from the families of the girls involved. Women who had intended only to trade or work for brief periods found themselves held in households permanently or at best until they escaped or relatives secured their release. Others became the victims of marauders who captured and detained female migrants.13 Consequently, in Ndia, just west of Embu, the broker and later colonial chief Gutuwa Kibetu enriched himself by assisting coastal traders who were profiting from an active commerce in dependent women.14

In the long run, the transfer of large numbers of women from communities in Ulu and Kitui to the highlands created a simmering resentment over the loss of vital reproductive and labour resources. Once relative prosperity had returned, men from these areas began to feel considerable anger at what they saw as the unwillingness of highland farmers to relinquish their former dependents.As Ambler writes (1988: 1990):

13 Crawshay to Ainsworth, Kitui, 20 Jan. 1899. Also see Wright (1984: 188-89). 14 KNA: Central Province, Embu District Political Record Book.

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As time passed the young women who had been pawned married and had children, the possibility that they would be repatriated became increasingly less likely. In some parts of Kitui and Ulu, men presumably found their marriage opportunities restricted by a shortage of partners. In a few cases, men hired coastal traders to kidnap and return pawns to their families of origin.15

In the years following, the continued presence of daughters and wives in distance highland communities remained a sore point in Ulu and especially in Kitui, an issue that came to be defined in ethnic terms – as the question of ‘Kamba’ women held in ‘Gikuyu’ territory.16

As already mentioned in the case of the Kuria, during the 1890s, as source of food supplies became increasingly remote and travel to and from the highlands more difficult, a steadily growing stream of refugees fled the famine zone. Relocation was a well- established response to drought, but now movement occurred on an unprecedented scale. Some wealthy men were able to keep a part of their family and livestock at home, but most people had no choice but to move with all of their property and dependents. People fled Ulu by the thousands, leaving the countryside ‘practically deserted on account of famine.’17 any areas of Kitui were left virtually unpopulated. An elder from Migwani recalled that ‘by the time the famine was over, all of the Akambawere in Gikuyu or Mwimbe’ (Ambler, 1988: 38).

Refugees-traveling for the most part in small family parties generally had little trouble establishing connection with prospective hosts.Migrants from Kitui communities sometimes made their initial arrangement for resting points or markets located inside the settled areas. Curiously, the highlands farmers who sold their produce in these places of often directed famine victims to homes where refugees would be welcome. For a fee, men from Mbeere occasionally acted as a guide and intermediaries for families from Mumoni who wished to find refugee in Embu. As a rule, however,famine refugees simply travelled directly into the highlands and negotiated their own agreements, often returning to communities where they had already come to buy food or where they had long-standing trade connections. Men frequently drew on established blood-partnership relationship (giciaro) to find places for their families (Ambler, Ibid: 134).

15 PRO: Hardinge to F.O., 7 Jan. 1990, FO 2/284. 16 KNA: Kitui District, Annual Report, 1915, DC/KTI/1/1/1; Minutes of a meeting between the P.C. and Kitui chiefs, 14 June 1912, Kitui District Political Record Book, Miscellaneous Statistics (pre-1914), DC/KTI 7/2. 17 For evidence of migration, see PRO: Ainsworth to Hardinge, 28 Dec. 1899, in Hardinge to F.O., 7 Jan. 1990, FO 2/284. Bangert to Hurburt, Kangundo, 8 April 1899, Hearing and Doing (May 1899), p. 6.

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Pawnship and Trade around Lake Victoria and Western Kenya Region

The works of Hartwing (1970, 1976; see also Tosh, 1970) and those of early travellers show that, in the 19th century, there was considerable trade among the peoples of the shores and islands of Lake Victoria. This of course is true of the trade directly or indirectly inspired by Zanzibaris, but it is also evident that there was trade along the lake in locally scare products which paralleled this externally-oriented trade, and probably before that such a trade began. Hartwing (1976:105 and passim) points to trade in iron, salt and foodstuffs in the south-eastern and southern lake. Roscoe indicates a trade in salt from the eastern lake into Buganda, though he does not state where the salt originated points to a nexus of trade in a number of products between the Ssese Islands, coastal Buganda, and coastal Busoga (Thomson, 1968: 290; Hobley, 1902: 27).Wagner for example identified a regionally important trade in iron in the northeast of the lake based upon smelting activity in the Samia Hills near the Kenya Uganda border(1956, vol. 2: 9; see also Cohen, 1972: 99).

Iron and salt were generally scarce in East Africa and they are therefore natural items of trade regardless of other local conditions. But trade in food is somewhat different since the need for it can be intense but problems of transporting it, under pre-colonial conditions, much greater than with the highly portable iron and salt. Trade in food therefore requires adequate transport and, if it is long-distance trade, presumably also a high return, one which could be attained if traded for iron, salt, or similarly valuable and portable items – such as human beings.

The transport itself was present in the form of the sewn-canoe, possessed by the Kerebe, Ganda, Soga, and the lacustrine Suba – among others. This canoe was the instrument which made bulk trade possible in the broken and insular terrain of western South Nyanza District, facilitated trade of all kinds, and rendered it more secure, since traders could avoid contact with potentially hostile landsmen; as some of my accounts have it – ‘when there is war there cannot be trade.’2 The canoe was of enormous value in its own right through the specialized and labour intensive nature of its construction; hence it had a value enhanced by scarcity, and especially so in the eastern lake where the trees necessary for its construction do not grow (Kenny, 1977).18 These trees may be found in coastal Busoga where improved rainfall favours their growth. According to Michael Kenny:

18 The significance of the sewn-canoe is revealed in the fact that the royal clan of Ukerewe, the Silanga, is believed to have been the one to introduce its use to Ukerewe. In this regard the Silanga may be viewed as culture heroes such as those in other parts of the interlacustrine region who are held to have introduced important cultural items like fire, iron, and domesticated crops. Though it is not impossible that the Silanga are the ones to have actually introduced the canoe, it is often found that much more clearly mythological figures are also said to have been cultural innovators of the same sort. Whatever the answer, it is clear enough that the Karebe valued the canoe highly and associated it with royalty (Hartwing 1976:43).

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Famine is mentioned in a considerable number of oral accounts, and relative to a number of different situations which I take to pertain to different periods of hunger. In one case the famine is reported as having driven people to eat hides... in this same account it is also said that people would give their own children away in order to get food, and this is repeated in other stories in which people would give themselves or their children in order to survive. The economic meaning of such an expedient will be considered below, since here I wish only to emphasize the importance of famine to local trade relations. In fact, one Gwassi did not have the salt deposit.

The oral accounts have it that the iron traded into Kaksingiri came from Ukara, Ukerewe, and Kome Islands, from Uzinza and Buhaya on the southern and western mainland, from ‘Sese’, and to a much lesser degree, from Buganda or Samia.

I am uncertain about the geographical identity of ‘Sese’ in certain cases; some say that ‘Sese and the Ssese islands of the north-western lake are the same, but ‘Sese’ is also the collective name of the ruling clans of Ukerewe (Hartwig, 1976, p. 51), and one account (D43) explicitly identifies Sese with Ukerewe. However, Uzinza and, particularly, Ukara and Ukerewe are dominant in the ac counts. (Kenny, 1988: 350).

Hartwing shows that the central east coast and the Kavirondo area were within the orbit of Kerebe trading activities. The peoples of this shore are interconnected ethnically and historically. The majority of the clans of Kaksingiri know themselves as the ‘Wakune’ and this term was applied to their area by others, before the Luo name ‘Kaksingiri’ was adopted for their present administrative area (Stanley, 1878:166). These clans believe that they stem from a single ancestor who fled from ‘Rienyi’ near the Tanzania-Kenya border, and it is assumed that they are related to those they left behind in that region.19 Relationship of another kind existed in the recent past with Ukara. Women were brought from Ukara and other places in Tanzania as wives and a few of these women were alive into the 1970s. According to Hartwig:

It is said that they were mainly brought in a sewn-canoe of Uganda origin called ‘Nunga’, and to a lesser degree in one called ‘Asembo’ respectively belonging to the Kakrindo clan, one of the Wakunegroup, and to the Kamwangenya, belonging to the Kakrindo clan, one can easily imagine that an in-lawship relation or putative kinship was useful between traders… relation orputative kinship was useful between traders and one account states that people did indeed intermarry with trading partners and used hoes for bridewealth.20

Deeper examination of the question of trade in human beings, a matter closely related to trade in food, is in question. As noted above it is believed that persons, in time of famine, would sell themselves away. How this is viewed depends on who they ‘sold’ themselves to,

19 On March 17, 1875, Stanley passed this way during his circumnavigation, of Lake Victoria. He states that an area called ‘Irieni’ is to be found just south of Mori Bay (1878:163-64), and my oral accounts point to the same area. 20 Hartwig (personal comm.) states, in reference to Ukerewe that “they had a difficult time getting the hoes from Buzinza and placed a high value on them. Hoes, in oral remembrances, were only given up in bridewealth exchange.

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and what the motivations of the buyers were. By the latter part of the 19th century slaves were being sent down to the coast from the Lake Victoria area.However, the accounts from Kaksingiri of transactions in human beings do not seem to directly relate to this kind of commercial slavery. Rather they seem to implicate institutions of domestic slavery and clientage, at least to the extent that the Kaksingiri accounts articulate with those of Hartwig. He points out that there was a considerable ‘servile’ (i.e. client) population on Ukerewe, and that this population mainly consisted of the ‘Ruri’, a group comprised of individuals from a number of places on the mainland, ‘Bururi’ being a general region on the coast north-east of Ukerewe, and these ‘Ruri’ including Suba.21

Accordingly, the servile Ruri were usually children brought to Bukerebe and sold by men “needing food during time of famine” (Hartwig 1976:53).Before 1870, men identified as Ruri brought individuals – almost invariably children – to the chiefdom in exchange for millet – presumably owuwere–“particularly during one of the not infrequent droughts”. Hartwigalso reports that there was a colony of people from ‘Ugaya’ – a Kuria word for Luo –settled on Ukerewe, Bugaya being the former generic name of western South Nyanza.But only one Kaksingiri account has it that children were taken south – in this case to Ukara; there is no specific mention of Ukerewe, though one may surmise, on the basis of Hartwig’s information and the density of trade links to the area, that such exchange did indeed take place.

Conclusion

Debt bondage, bonded labor, or peonage, slavery or even pawnship are terminologies that have beclouded the study African history for long. We have tried to unpack this controversy by using the anthropology of the Kuria form of pawn marriage popularly refered to as ekebete, review literature on pawnship in central, eastern as well as western Kenya to illustrate the deeper meaning of this practice and its place in current historiography of human pawnship in Africa. We have shown that this practice involved the use of people as collateral against debt. Labor was used often to provide the person who owes the debt, or a relative (typically a child or a woman). It was unusual for a bonded laborer to escape their debt, since further costs would accrue during the period of bondage and it was not unknown for the debt to be inherited across several generations. We have argued that this was nota form of slavery, as in other cases, the pawned females or children being redeemed at a later stage when debt was settled. Afrocentric academics claim that this was a much milder form of debt bondage compared to that experienced elsewhere, since it would occur on a family or community basis where social ties existed between debtor and creditor.

21 In Gembe location immediately to the East of Kaksingiri are to be found the ‘RuriHills’. Part of Gembe was settled by groups from the ‘Rienyi’ area in Tanzania who perceive a close kinship to the Wakune group of lineages in Kaksingiri. I do not know if this is significant, but the occurrence of the name ‘Ruri’ in both places may indicate a historical connection as well.

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II - Sources, Archives, et Materiaux

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The Political Economy of Makerere Reforms via a Qualitative Approach. An Interview with Professor Ruth Mukama

Olivier Provini1

Introduction

Compared with the national universities of the neighbouring countries of Tanzania and Kenya, whose recent transformations have not been studied much until now, Makerere University has generated a wide range of scientific research and consultancies in the past decade (Bisaso, 2010; Court, 1999; Kasozi, 2000 & 2009; Kiiza, 1997; Mamdani, 2007; Musisi, 2002; Sicherman, 2005). The famous and historical Ugandan institution of higher education situated in Kampala was the first university in the East African region to reorganize its financial system and governance starting from the 1990s, and scholars have explored what can be called its “success story” as a privately sponsored institution through “the transfer of model” from the North to the South (Darbon, 2009). This “success story” was built in the 1990-2000s when Makerere was established as a “good model” of the achievement of higher education privatization process in Africa by international organizations, especially the World Bank (World Bank, 2001; Court, 1999). This model was to be followed in driving reforms in the region. Thus, at the meso-level (Marchesnay & Morvan, 1979), a regional area was put in place in which the “good practices” built and identified, by donors and international organizations, could spread in East Africa (Maupeu, 2012: 198-199).

Makerere has a notable trajectory in the scientific and consultancy corpus on East African higher education. The transfer of models used in the North to introduce privatization in the system of higher education resulted from collaboration between seven American foundations through the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (PHEA)

1 Olivier Provini is a PhD student in political science under the co-direction of Christian Thibon and Hervé Maupeu (University of Pau, LAM and IFRA). His thesis is about higher education policy transfers in East Africa (Makerere University, the University of Nairobi, the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Burundi). I would like to thank Ruth Mukama for this interview, for her agreement to edit it and her scientific support of my research. I am also thankful to Marie-Aude Fouéré who has provided scientific feedback, constructive comments and advices during the writing process.

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launched in 2000.2 These foundations pledged to invest $100 million in African higher education over five years and to devote their support to the institutional revitalization of selected universities, mostly in East Africa. The PHEA began academic and financial audits to guide the policy-maki ng process. Its results were edited in several case study publications (Musisi, 2003). Undeniably, such a “success story” need to be scrutinized and questioned by scholars in order to unveil how it was built and give insight into the real workings of Makerere University today.

Makerere University, first established as a vocational school in 1922, was principally conceived as an institution for Britain’s East African colonies (Sicherman, 2005: 19-38). The first attempts at reforming this elitist colonial institution took place at the time of independence in 1962. Discussions focused on two main issues: i) the need to Africanise the academic staff and ii) the relevance of teaching curricula. However, major reforms came after the NRM (National Resistance Movement) government came to power in 1986. At that time, debates centred on reforming both university finances and university governance. All transformations from the end of the 1980s until the 2000s were shaped during this first phase (Mamdani, 2007: 1-6), especially the implementation of the cost- sharing policy.3

For this short publication, the reforms and transformations of the historical Ugandan public university of Makerere are approached through the presentation of the excerpt of an interview. The interview took place in November 12th 2012 with Ruth Mukama, in her office at Makerere University. Ruth Mukama is a professor of Linguistics. She obtained her qualifications in English language and history from the University of East Africa and in general linguistics from the University of York in England. She started her career as a lecturer at the University of Zambia. She went on lecturing at the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Botswana before returning home when the Idi Amin Dada regime fell in 1979. Between 1986 and 1991 she was the head of the Languages Department, and between 1991 and 1995 she was the Dean of the Faculty of Arts. She later held various leadership positions as a member of the Senate and Council at the university. She wrote and edited two books about the challenges faced by the social sciences in the twenty- first century, contending that adopting an interdisciplinary approach can be a solution to save humanities from disappearance (Mukama, 2000 & 2005). She is also renowned for her passion to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment. As the first female Dean in Makerere University, she was even a founder member of Action for Development

2 The PHEA gathers Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Kresge Foundation. 3 The cost-sharing in higher education can be defined as “a shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne exclusively or predominantly by government, or taxpayers, to being shared with parents and students” (Johnstone, 2003: 351).

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(ACFODE), one of the Ugandan pioneer developmental women NGOs, founder members of the School of Women and Gender Studies and the Gender-mainstreaming Directorate of Makerere University.

I argue that Ruth Mukama’s point of view on institutional reforms is an original, relevant and valuable angle for the researcher to approach what I call the political economy (Hibou, 2011: 10) of Makerere University’s reform policies. Indeed, the interview brings to light several aspects of these transformations: the implementation of the cost-sharing policy; transfer of private funds between the Central Administration and the academic units; the staff management question (recruitment and regulation between the part-time and full-time lecturers); university research and increase of consultancy projects; and staff generational change. As a former Head of a Department, Dean and member of the Senate and Council, she has a singular position in the Makerere academic space (Bourdieu, 1991). Her critical position on reforms implemented asserted in this interview is the result of her experience in these former academic and administrative positions. She was a witness of the shift in state and university management policies: from a university which was a strategic higher education institution for the new independent Ugandan state with staff training and scholarships for all students, established to train a cohort of loyal cadres serving national goals and committed to the notion of public service in a context of nation building, to a university affected by several financial crises that gradually prompted the leadership of Makerere to break away from total dependency on government funding.

Above all, I contend that the interview reveals the centrality of the struggle over resources between the different elements (Central Administration, Faculties, Department, staff) comprising the university, especially the internally generated funds. How have efforts to control resources become a key element to understand Makerere reforms between the 1980s and the 2000s? Why and how is resource regulation narrowly linked with management reforms? Ruth Mukama gives us comprehensive elements to answer these questions through a political economy perspective on Makerere reforms. She argues that the last management reforms, which were due to bring increasing autonomy to academic units, simply do not work because the budgetary transfer from the central administration to these units is partial. The funds generated by income-generating units, principally through the introduction of private students, are mainly centralised by the top administration. She notices an incomplete transfer of power whereby new university structures, called the Colleges, do not have enough resources to make use of their prerogatives. Such prerogatives essentially concern staff recruitment and academic research, today in a precarious situation. More generally this new configuration fundamentally questions the position of social sciences in a context where the government allocates in priority research grants and student scholarships for science (Republic of Uganda, 1998, 2004 & 2013).

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The interview

Olivier Provini: You have been a lecturer and professor since the 1980s so you have a long experience at Makerere University and you have seen the many transformations that took place therein. For instance, a major transformation is the introduction of private students in the mid-1990s. What can you tell me about the evolution of your teaching conditions since the 1980s, and the impact of the implementation of the policy of private students?

Ruth Mukama: There were very few changes in our conditions. If there is anything, it is worse and worse because the teachers still do not have enough in their hands for their needs. It is always much less, much less. The higher the inflation goes, the less you have with our insufficient salaries. They have always been very inadequate. And yet, working conditions are getting worse also. Because, at first, we had few students and, you know, we could give them better quality education and, for instance, we could even give tutorials. The classes were manageable, we could give some seminars, but when the number of students increases, if you have tutorials, how many [can you have]? Now we started just lecturing. You cannot afford to start giving tutorials because you will be teaching all the time and it still won’t be enough. You do not have any time to go home because students are just too many. So the working conditions are becoming hard, salaries are inadequate, which means you have to get consultancies and other means of getting enough to sustain yourself. This has inevitably affected the quality of teaching because if I am completing a consultancy, it means I am worried about finishing somebody’s work before they pay me, and definitively I will give less to my teaching. I will not mark my assignments in time because I have to do other things to survive, so life is very hard, the conditions are worse, and, yet, the numbers [of students] is increasing (…). The government does not listen to our requests of salary increases, and even the funding of the university becomes much less, you know, the conditions are much harder. Even the teaching facilities are not good, we need modern gadgets like a projector or new computer programmes, but the majority of us do not have a computer. So many of the students do not have access to computer and you cannot even use the computer technology. So all these services, we do not have. And the library is also poorer, they do not have enough money to order new books so even books are not updated, the library cannot order the most current books. So if you go to the library, you will find very old books and many of them have even been stolen! Because students fight for one copy and eventually they tear pages out an, eventually, the whole book vanishes. So the situation is really getting worse. That is why I get surprised when it is said that teachers are in sufficient numbers; I do not know what they are counting! The staffing structure is bottom-heavy; with limited numbers of senior members of staff, especially at professorial ranks. The younger lecturers, who are the majority, are in a state of deprivation: they want to get good things, but the salaries are not enough, they are not paid on time, and many of them are part-time workers. And when they are not paid for a

146 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est whole year, they have to find other places to teach, or other means of getting some money, to be able to continue to be here to teach for nothing. So it is hard and, as a result, when you advise some of them to register for another degree, they do not complete. Some of them can take over ten years to finish their masters, others give up, because they have no time, they cannot even read, they have no access to modern research facilities, because they cannot order scholastic materials. Many of them have no computers so they have to buy their own laptops; that is how they survive. But the university cannot give them students’ facilities.

O.P.: And about salary increase for professors, lecturers or assistant-lecturers, the government said that a means to increase it was the introduction of private students because part of these funds will be used to…

R.M.: It was in fact the university. Because when I was Dean, we had the worst conditions. I would sit in the Dean’s office alone and teachers were in town teaching, or engaged in some other sources of income in different places, because the conditions were very bad. The salaries were very very low. That is when we said “maybe we have to start admitting private students” so that they pay what the government is not paying. And they still do not pay even what they are supposed to pay, even for the buildings. If the donors did not give some money for the buildings, there would be no new buildings in the university.

O.P.: So it was a means to increase the university budget and staff wages?

R.M.: Exactly. So we said that if the government cannot pay the allowances, then we admit private students and get enough money to increase the staff salaries and also to pay for other facilities that the government cannot.4 That is how it started. And as soon as we started getting students, the government completely stopped paying and said: “you are now getting your own money”. So even the so-called “government-sponsored students” are sponsored by private students now. The government does not even support what they call the government-sponsored students. And now again the university is in the same situation; no money. Whatever the private students pay is now financing most services: buying chemicals, buying teaching materials, everything! So the government has just given us up, apart form paying the basic salaries. Even the people who were supposed to be sponsored; for instance, in the halls of the residence, the money that comes from private students buys food for government-sponsored students. So again we are back in the area of the 1990s when there was nothing, because now the money from the private students is doing everything and it is not enough. We are in the same situation we were

4 Appendix A “The Makerere Privatization Process, 1995-2005”.

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in when I was Dean, because there is no money. Now they have created more structures,5 like the colleges, but there is no money to provide for them adequately. Money is not sent to colleges. Colleges are supposed to pay everybody: the part-time staff and full-time and pay allowances. But the Central Administration does not send enough money to enable the colleges to meet their obligations. So conditions are becoming worse and worse. You create structures and you cannot support them and then the Central Administration retains the greater proportion of the money collected because they want to pay themselves more, fly all over, get whatever they want, buy themselves very expensive cars and make themselves generally more comfortable. When the power goes off, they have an automatic generator but ours is manual and has no fuel most of the time; so when the power goes off we often remain in darkness because the money is not sent to us to cater for most of our needs. And yet for the teaching, we depend on part-time staff and we cannot recruit more staff. We have developed very good programmes which are accredited by the National Council for Higher Education,6 but we cannot teach them. They remain programmes on paper because the University is not recruiting staff; they stopped recruiting staff a long time ago because they say “we do not have money to pay them, the new staff”. So if you are not recruiting, you are not increasing teaching space and yet you are increasing students every year, what is the way forward? You are depending on part-timers who you are not paying; so how can one talk of “quality assurance”?7 Because even the Department of the Quality Assurance itself, if you go there you will laugh! Two miserable people there, they cannot work! How can they insure quality? There is no quality assurance even in the quality assurance office itself! So what do expect? Many professors are retained on contract after retirement because there is hardly any recruitment of new staff at that rank. Even staff in mid-career ranks are now retained after retirement and they are even promoted to higher ranks as if they are still in mainstream service!

5 In November 2010, the Makerere University Senate approved a new college structure in which eight colleges were proposed: the college of agriculture and environmental sciences, the college of natural sciences, the college of humanities and social sciences, the college of health sciences, the college of engineering, design, art and technology, the college of computing and information sciences, the college of education and external studies and the college of business and management sciences. 6 The National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) was established by an Act of Parliament in 2001 as a semi-autonomous body to regulate higher education and “guide the establishment of institutions of higher learning as well as ensure the quality and relevant education is delivered”. See the website of the Council http://www.unche.or.ug 7 Makerere University is a good example of the growth of a new agenda. We notice the development of neoliberal procedures, especially via the implementation of quality assurance Departments, in East African universities, both public and private. This quiet and shared revolution has great implications in terms of administrative routine, identities of actors, definition and role of a university and, more generally, boundaries between private and public spheres (Provini, 2012).

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O.P.: And what about the role of the MUASA,8 for instance, in improving the teaching conditions?

R.M.: They have tried. They have gone even to the President many times. But he tells them that he has other priorities! And when they got something, he said he is increasing salaries only for science teachers and science lecturers and technology. So those have a salary increase. And he said “What about humanities and social sciences? Those have…” (She is hesitant). In fact, he does not have any opinion about humanities. As far as he is concerned, they do not exist, what matters are sciences. They have got a better pay, and, for us, there is nothing! And yet they have also better research facilities because many donors also fund sciences and technologies. And our staffs are demoralized because many of them are only just surviving. They cannot even do research. As I told you, our people do not finish their degrees because they have no time. You find that one lecturer is teaching in ten schools, running here and there every minute, just comes to campus when he has a lecture and then runs off soon after, going elsewhere to teach. And you cannot blame them because they have to pay for their accommodation, which is very expensive, and they have to stay in Kampala and sometimes they have to pay their rent six months in advance and if you do not pay, you have nowhere to sleep, you have nowhere to work, where will you go? So they have to work in different places to get money.

O.P.: You said there are some tensions between the Central Administration and the academic units to control the money generated by the private students.9 What do you think of the fact that the top administrators say that they try to implement a decentralisation process, for instance, with the implementation of the new structure of colleges, what do you think about it?

R.M.: They talk about decentralisation but they do not decentralise. Take the example of the case of my colleague, professor O. Ndoleriire,10 who was a member the former Institute of Languages before he was appointed Acting Principal of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences; when he moved to what they called the College Principal’s office, he had to take Institute computer because there was none in his big office. He even took the Institute secretary because there was no secretary in the college office and he took all other supplies from the Institute to start off the theoretically elevated office. And we

8 The MUASA, Makerere University Academic Association, organizes the defence of staff’s interests, especially to increase their wages. For instance, in April 2013, the new MUASA chairperson, Dr. Kiggundu Musoke, explained that the association was seeking a payrise of 100% (Ssenyonga, 2013). 9 Appendix B “Evolution of the Fee Distribution Between the Academic Units and the Central Administra- tion, 1992-2012”. 10 Oswald Ndoleriire is the current principal of the college of humanities (since January 2011) and social sciences and professor of linguistic in Makerere University. He was associate dean and dean of the Faculty of arts (from 1989-2003), Director of the Makerere Institute of languages (2008-2011). He was also country Director of the African Institute for Capacity Development (AICAD, from 2002-2010).

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wondered aloud: “What? You are Principal, you should get these things!” It took almost a year to make provisions for his new office. So colleges were created without planned budgetary provisions for them. There was more lip-service to the creation of the college structures than level-headed and fore-sighted planning. It is hard to tell whether the college arrangement will work. How do you create structures but not facilitate them? If you keep all the money paid by students, how can you say that the colleges should be independent? How? How could you be independent if you are not allowed to share the fees? The fees are centralised. Even the small percentage which is supposed to be sent to them is sent in tiny quantities and very irregularly. So how do you expect these structures to be self- sustaining and to be able to pay all the part-time staff and other college staff, as well as allowances for the full-time staff when you are not sending them the money? Or if you send, it is a very tiny percentage. So while the structures are decentralized the resources are not; it cannot work. On our part, we continue to teach, and there are no allowances or whatever for us. We used to have coordinator allowances, we do not have anymore. We were supposed to get professional allowances, they were never paid, and they all remained on paper. Whatever payments are supposed to be made are never paid. Of recent, the non- payment practice has been extended to salaries; I received no salary for three consecutive months and I am not alone.

O.P.: You mentioned something very interesting, about the development of new practices with the increase of consultancies among lecturers and professors. What can you tell me about the increase of these consultancies and what about the university research? Because it is two different things and the development of consultancies can be a problem for scientific research because lecturers and professors might not have time to do scientific research, or they do not have funds to do scientific research. And what is the situation in your specific School of Languages?

R.M.: First, you see, we do not have enough money for research, university research, from the government,11 when it comes, it is very little. You know it cannot really service a good well-developed project. So many lecturers and professors who are able to get external consultancies which pay well go for them. You know, that has implications: when you are paid by a bi-lateral partner, an international agency or company, or parastatal body, or NGO, they all have their own conditions and priorities of research. So most of these consultancies, which members of staff, do are in fact private consultancies and they are

11 Appendix C “Makerere Research and Development Budget, 2005-2009”.

150 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est not available [for the University]12 (…). And it is also affecting the quality of university teaching. As already noted, those donors give you their own demands and deadlines. And they want you to certify certain conditions and requirements for their research grants. And, for one to attend to all those requirements, one really does not have time for university teaching and research, it is now for one’s own survival. It is a way of supplementing your salary. You have to pay yourself to continue teaching for Makerere, because Makerere is unable to pay you enough. So we look for those consultancies to be able to subsidize Makerere, because Makerere is unable to pay us. If one wants to buy a plot somewhere, Makerere cannot give the requisite financial support. If one wants to build a house for oneself, Makerere cannot help financially. If one wants to buy a car, Makerere cannot help, even by way of giving one a loan. So, what does one do? One gets a consultancy, which will yield some extra income, then one can continue to do work for Makerere and you say that you are a member of staff of Makerere but, actually, you are paying yourself. You have to look for your own supplementary incomes. The consultancies help. But as already mooted, they come with implications; they are just income-generation consultancies. They have nothing to do with improving the quality education. So, really, the quality of education is under threat, great threat! How shall we insure the quality assurance? If you are supposed to teach a new programme but you are alone, what do you do? And for those who spend most of the time in income-generation consultancies, how do they teach? I know some colleagues, at all levels of academic ranks – assistant lecturers to professors - that get other people to teach for them. They continue doing their consultancy work to get money to pay their substitute teachers! The university cannot pay those part-time teachers. So I have to finish my consultancy and pay this person to help me to teach this programme. But the problem is also with the supervision because most of these teachers, they are just graduated, they cannot supervise anybody. So it is the supervision now that we have to maintain because we have Master and PhD students and we are forced to supervise them. But they also suffer as I cannot read their theses because I do not have time to do so! I have to finish that consultancy, I have that deadline! So I cannot start supervision even in postgraduate studies, I am disillusioned because when I do a supervision, then,

12 For instance, Augustus Nuwagaba is an associate professor of social works, population and poverty in the Department of social work and social administration at Makerere University. He also works as the Managing Consultant at REEV Consult International Limited, a private consultancy firm with headquarters at Wande- geya in Kampala. The REEV Consult offers consultancies in the areas of impact assessments, planning, social policy analysis, management services and institutional development services. He was also consultant for the Designing the District Development Programme (DDPIII) supported by the United Nations Capital Develop- ment Fund (UNCDF) and also consultant for the development of national Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (NIMES) for all sectors Ministries in Uganda (http://reevconsult.co.ug/about-professor-nuwagaba-. html). He also served as the Chairpersoon of Makerere University Academic Staff Association (MUASA) after his studies in London in the 2000s. The March 11th 2012, he joined the race for Makerere University’ vice- chancellor job (http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/629545-Nuwagaba-joins-race-for-Makerere-VC.html) and was disqualified the August 6th 2012 (http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/633829-Nuwagaba-disqualified- from-Makerere-VC-race.html).

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they pay me 50,000 Ushs13 when students are graduated, so how do I survive? I mean, it is ridiculous! The government, the university, they are not serious! You expect these persons read volume and volume of these theses for nothing! They even do not pay if you are internal examiner, they do not pay anything. They only pay a supervisor 50,000 Ushs when that person has graduated. You have struggled with this person for ten years. And sometimes they also disappear because they also have to survive and they cannot pay for the tuition if they are not working in different places because, again, the government says no funding for post-graduate studies, so who funds? You know, it is like a big joke! How do you expect to maintain quality assurance? How do you expect to maintain high standard of education? How? It is the same with teachers in schools. They are not paid, they ask for small increases but the government rejects, they go on strike, the police are send to beat them up, how do you expect them to teach? How do you expect them to do a quality work? So, really, the future of education, especially for humanities, is really under great threat. I do not know what we can do. We had a conference in Nairobi for the East African humanities….

O.P.: When?

R.M.: It was in 2010. It was organised by the Inter-University Council for East Africa.14 Last year, we were in Dar es Salaam, for the same conference about humanities. We meet and say: “What shall we do? We should undertake project together. We must find a way of sustaining our discipline but how can we do it?”. Even in the Inter-University Council, they do not have enough funding. If these oversight bodies are not funded, so who will fund humanities? There is an American group, which was being funded by the Carnegie Corporation and they were providing post-doctoral grants and also doctoral grants. But now, Carnegie said last year, they cannot continue funding this project. They were trying to help the humanities with these post-doctoral grants, with publications. They helped the humanities to survive. So I think that our main goal is for international cooperation and we find avenues to facilitate research in the humanities and social sciences, because now, if the government, our own government cannot give us research funding, how will this discipline survive? (…).

O.P.: And one of the means to preserve the humanities was the implementation of new courses, more linked with the market. What do you think of this policy in humanities and social sciences?

13 50,000 Ushs worth about 18 US$. 14 The Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA) is a regional inter-governmental organization established in 1980. It was formerly the Inter-University Committee (IUC), created in 1970, after the dissolution of the University of East Africa. The IUCEA aim is to facilitate contacts between the universities of the East African community, to provide a forum for discussion to maintain high and comparable academic standards. For instance, one of the last forum was held in Arusha on theme of “Linking University to industry for building knowledge-based economics and regional integration in East Africa” (24-26th October 2012). 152 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

R.M.: You see, we are dying and we need to survive (…). Now, we are even going to implement demand-driven courses… we are killing ourselves, ironically. You know I had a colleague, unfortunately she retired last year, and they would not give her a contract. She is a planner in urban planning. When she left, a young person came in and they have these market-driven programmes. Now, they write new programmes: urban planning and management, urban planning and modern things, urban planning and tourism, urban planning and everything, urban planning and…! Then my former colleague was asking: “where is urban planning itself?”, you see, and the same thing has come into linguistics. This young person came and wrote programmes, now we have: language and religion, language and editing, language for mass communication, language and…! Ok, you get it, but where is linguistics? You have killed it!

O.P.: Yes, where are the traditional courses?

R.M.: Exactly! Where is morphology, where is phonology? Now, they have gone in applied things, applied courses, but where is the essence? Because these people, what are they applying? How can we describe the language of religion? We learnt morphology without syntax, we learnt morphology. So, again, our young people say: “We need these attractive courses”. We have to attract students, but you attract them to what? They have killed the essence of the courses because they want to implement so-called popular courses. But now, none of the young can teach syntax, none of them can teach semantics. So how many courses can I teach? When I am supervising postgraduate students, when I am supervising teachers who help me to teach, they know nothing! They have done relevant courses, they cannot go there and teach phonology, they cannot teach morphology, they cannot teach semantics, they cannot teach research methodology. They know nothing!

O.P.: This policy of implementing new curricula was initiated firstly by professor O. Ndoleriire when he was the Dean of the Faculty of arts and it was very criticized by professor M. Mamdani in his book on university reforms in Makerere (Mamdani, 2007). What can you tell me about it?

R.M.: Yes, scholars in the marketplace (laughing). As he said effectively in that book, we went into a privatisation and then, now, people went to other extremes. Now, everything we do, it goes to the Central Administration. But at that time, the Central Administration did not start to take our money. So the Faculty, when the professor O. Ndoleriire was the Dean… there was plenty of money in the Faculty because the Central Administration was honouring, they were sending most of the money back to the Faculty. But, when they became more and more greedy, and then they are sending just a little money here, now they reversed what was professor O. Ndoleriire’s time. They reversed that, instead of giving the Faculty the majority of what the private students pay. Now the Central

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Administration started retaining more and gives us very little money. And then the Faculty had to continue paying extra-teaching, part-time teaching, all workers here, because there are many, even those post-graduate part-time, and the Central Administration does not pay them. They are taking away the money. That is when professor M. Mamdani started writing. Everybody wanted to teach, the lecturers were fighting to get teaching, to teach even five courses, because of that money. And they wanted to get more and more courses because there was money to pay them. But now it is the opposite. You teach… the more you teach, the less you get, because there is no money, they cannot pay you. And if they pay, it is very little. But during the 1990s you were paid, even for examinations we were paid and people worked very happily. But then they worked, still ironically, they could not do research, because they wanted to teach all the time! (laughing). Still research suffers. So, by the way, research has always suffered. When there was a lot of money, they wanted to work to get that money, again less time for research, in fact no time for research, because you want to do more and more work (…). But now nobody wants to work, nobody wants to teach, because they do not pay. In fact professors are now working on their consultancies to get enough money to pay the people who are teaching their courses. But now, there is also no research for improving the teaching. So it is a terrible situation. So M. Mamdani was very correct when he wrote that book. At first, I was very angry with him. But he did his research… he did that research here. You know, in this university, there is no research project, not even in the Faculty of projects, not even in the Department of projects, there were none. People are very busy to get the money of consultancies. That is why M. Mamdani said now this money-racket has killed the essence of scholarship because still people are not working to improve the teaching. So when he wrote, there were a lot of truth in what he said in that book. So it is ironical. When there was enough money, we were not working, and when there is no money, we are still not working! So when shall we work? It is ironical. It is also linked with values. We want to do a good job (…), and want to do a job of quality. But these people do not have that value, the young ones. They do not have our value. We feel concerned that standards are going lower and lower. We are now in the mediocrity. We get worried, we get concerned but the young ones do not care! They get surprised when you are worried about the work they did. For us, there is no substance in their work and they do not understand. So it is a tragedy, I do not know what future, because the young ones do not have any concerns for the future. It is just like survival for today. They do not care about tomorrow. So I really do not know. I cannot tell you, I do not want to imagine the future of humanities. I think that social sciences are going to die completely. I was in this Pan-African university panel

154 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est for the African Union, they have created this new Pan-African University15 but even there I was representing humanities but most of them were scientists and they were just talking about sciences, sciences, sciences! And I said “What about humanities?”. They have to survive. So, they just put one centre for humanities, and this is in Yaoundé. So I do not know, the humanities are under a great threat (…). I am in a dilemma. I wrote a beautiful programme for the Department of African languages. So I wrote a programme for teaching African Masters in African languages, a very beautiful programme. The National Council for Higher Education was so impressed by this programme and they made it as an example and gave it to literature, the literature had written a very poor one. They said: “Please, use it as an example to improve your programme”. But, ironically, I cannot teach that programme alone. You have one person who can teach that programme. How can you teach it? You cannot (…)! I am alone and the university cannot recruit any other person. So who will assist? So you can write a beautiful programme, it can be accredited, but I am alone (…). We are two professors available, with professor O. Ndoleriire. But professor O. Ndoleriire could not teach anymore when he was Principal. You are always in meetings. What is the usefulness of these meetings? But you have to attend them. Until last year, I was a member of the University Senate, I was also a member of the University Council. Every other day, there is a meeting. There is a Council Committee meeting and I have to be there. As a representative of the Senate and Council, you have to be there, but every other day there is a meeting! When do you teach? They put you in the administration. Until two years ago, I was again taken to the gender mainstreaming division to head it, because the head was becoming the vice-chancellor of Kabale University. So we, the few people who can still work, who know what we are doing, they are always putting you go to places, go and represent. I also used to go to Addis Abeba until last year when we were launching this programme about the Pan-African University. I had to go there and write all these programmes. Those scientists could not write the programmes! The scientists could not write! I did all the work alone because I was the only one who could write English. So I was over-worked and I could not teach. So when do you teach? They made you a full-time administrator (…). Even the President, for two years, he made me head of some projects in Bunyoro Commission of inquiry where I had to listen problem of villagers and I was not teaching in Makerere. I was there as a head of one commission. And he just called you and said “you are the chairperson of the committee, go to Bunyoro”. And I was in Bunyoro for two years.

15 The Pan-African University was launched in December 2011 in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the African Union. The first four institutes of the university are: i) the Western Africa PAU institute of life and earth sciences at the University of Ibadan (Nigeria); ii) the Eastern Africa PAU institute of basic sciences, technology and innovation at the Jomo Kenyatta University of agriculture and technology (Kenya); iii) the Central Africa PAU institute of governance, humanities and social sciences at the University of Yaoundé (Cameroon); iv) and the northern Africa PAU institute of water and energy sciences.

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O.P.: And you do not have the choice.

R.M.: And you do not have the choice! It is a presidential directive! You just go. So, what is the future of education? He even does not warn the vice-chancellor of the university that he is taking me as the head of this commission because he is the President. It is his directive. Has he cared about the programme that I was teaching? Has he cared about the quality? Because I put here a teaching assistant who did not know what to do. He was calling me: “Now what do I do? Because there is this…”. I am in the field in Bunyoro but he was calling me because he did not know what to do. So do you think that our government cares about the future of higher education?

Bibliography

Bisaso, Ronald. “Organisational Responses to Public Sector Reforms in Higher Education in Uganda: A Case Study of Makerere University.” Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 32 (2010): 343-351. Bourdieu, Pierre. “Le champ littéraire.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 89 (1991): 3-46. Court, David. Financing Higher Education in Africa: Makerere, the Quiet Revolution. Working paper: The World Bank & The Rockfeller Foundation, 1999. Darbon, Dominique (dir.). La politique des modèles en Afrique. Simulation, dépolitisation et appropriation. Paris: Karthala & MSHEA, 2009. Hibou, Béatrice. Anatomie politique de la domination. Paris: La Découverte, 2011. Johnstone, Bruce D. “Cost-Sharing in Higher Education: Tuition, Financial Assistance, and Accessibility.” Czech Sociological Review 39 (2003): 351-374. Kasozi, A. B. K. University Education in Uganda. Challenges and Opportunities for Reform. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2000. —Financing Uganda’s Public Universities. An obstacle to Serving the Public Good. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2009. Kiiza, Julius. “Liberalisation Policies and University Education in Uganda: An Assessment of the Cost-Sharing Policy.” Makerere Political Science Review 1 (1997): 72-87. Makerere University. Fact Book 2009/2010. Kampala: Makerere University, 2010. Mamdani, Mahmood. Scholars in the Marketplace: The Dilemmas of Neo-Liberal Reform at Makerere University (1989-2005). Saint-Paul: CODESRIA, 2007.

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Marchesnay, Michel & Morvan, Yves. “Micro, macro, meso…” Revue d’économie industrielle 8 (1979): 99-103. Maupeu, Hervé. “Les réformes néolibérales des universités est-africaines: éléments d’analyses à partir du cas kényan.” In Universités, universitaires en Afrique de l’Est, ed. Bugwabari, Nicodèle, Cazenave-Piarrot, Alain, Provini, Olivier & Thibon, Christian, 195- 211. Paris: Karthala, 2012. Mukama, Ruth. Challenges to the Social Sciences in the Twenty-First Century. Proceedings of the International Conference Held at the International Conference Centre, Kampala: 25-27th October 2000. Kampala: Makerere University, 2000. — “The Humanities and Gender Mainstreaming: a Case of Makerere University”, not yet published. Mukama, Ruth & Rutanga, Murindwa (ed.). Confronting Twenty-First Century Challenges Analyses and Re-Dedications by National and International Scholars. Kampala: Makerere University, 2005. Musisi, Nakanyike B. “Embryonic Transformation: Makerere University in the 1990’s and into the 21st century.” In Transformations in Uganda, ed. Musisi, Nakanyike B. & Dodge, Cole P., 241-265. Kampala: MISR, 2002. Musisi, Nakanyike B. & Muwanga, Nansozi K. Makerere University in Transition 1993– 2000: Opportunities and Challenges. Oxford & Kampala: James Currey & Fountain Publishers, 2003. Provini, Olivier. “Croquis du nouveau management public dans l’espace universitaire est- africain.” Mambo! 10(2012). Republic of Uganda. Vision 2025. Kampala: Republic of Uganda, 1998. —Education Sector Strategic Plan 2004-2015. Kampala: Republic of Uganda, 2004. —Science, Technology and Innovation in Uganda. Status Report 2009/2010. Kampala: UNCST, 2011. —Vision 2040 Draft. Kampala: Republic of Uganda, 2013. Sicherman, Carol. Becoming an African University. Makerere 1922-2000. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2005. Ssenyonga, Andrew. “Makerere Staff Want 100% Payrise.” New Vision, 6th April 2013. World Bank. A Chance to Learn. Knowledge and Finance for Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: World Bank, 2001.

157 Appendix A: The Makerere Privatization Process, 1995-2005

Percentage Percentage of the of the Internally internally Government University government generated generated Year funding budget funding funds1 funds (US$) (US$) in the (US$) in the university university budget (%) budget (%) 1995 19,786,481 3,971,286 23,757,767 83 17

1996 19,813,610 7,280,117 27,093,727 73 27

1997 19,612,939 8,201,686 27,814,625 71 29

1998 19,023,730 11,110,096 30,133,826 63 37

1999 17,210,572 10,369,145 27,579,717 62 38

2000 14,336,748 10,743,010 25,079,758 57 43

2001 15,831,974 10,939,046 26,771,020 59 41

2002 15,912,704 17,017,619 32,930,323 48 52

2003 14,449,973 17,344,090 31,794,063 45 55

2004 20,282,740 20,702,567 40,985,307 49 51

2005 19,779,135 30,196,108 49,975,243 40 60

References: Kasozi (2009: 164) ; Court (1999: 5-7) ; Makerere University (2010: 5) Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Appendix B: Evolution of the Fee Distribution between the Academic Units and the Central Administration, 1992-2012

Private Academic units Central Academic year students (%) Administration (%) 1992 Day 70 30 Evening 90 10 1993 Day 70 30 Evening 85 15 1994 Day 70 30 Evening 90 10 1995 Day 70 30 Evening 90 10 1996 Day 65 35 Evening 85 15 1997 Day 55 45 Evening 75 25 1998 Day 46,75 53,25 Evening 63,75 36,25 1999 Day 46 54 Evening 63 37 2000 Day 46 54 Evening 63 37 2001 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2002 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2003 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2004 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2005 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2006 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2007 Day 51 49 Evening 59 41 2008 Day 35 65 Evening 45 55 2009 Day 35 65 Evening 45 55 2010 Day 35 65 Evening 45 55 2011 Day 35 65 Evening 45 55 2012 Day 35 65 Evening 45 55 References: Mamdani (2007: 217) ; Bursar office

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Appendix C: Makerere Research and Development Budget, 2005-2009 (US$)

Engineering Natural Health Year and Humanities Total sciences sciences technology 2005 0 0 736,746 14,410,304 4,310,133 19,457,183 2006 202,154 1,807,557 7 359,473 14,212,214 6,692,527 30,273,925 2007 64,216 2,846,118 11,330,270 29,862,142 4,353,128 48,455,874 2008 39,294 4,649,320 9,340,560 25,297,779 7,900,978 47,227,930 2009 200,467 6,513,881 5,772,139 31,212,526 18,000,570 61,699,583 References: Republic of Uganda (2011: 55)

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Les récits oraux luguru comme sources ethnographiques : enlèvement, poignade, meurtre et remplacement dans une population matrilinéaire de Tanzanie

Jean-Luc Paul1

En 1995, j’ai séjourné huit mois dans les Monts Uluguru (région de Morogoro, Tanzanie), où j’avais déjà vécu de 1984 à 1987, afin de conduire un travail de terrain dans le cadre de ma recherche doctorale. Il s’agissait d’une recherche d’anthropologie historique qui visait à reconstituer l’histoire du peuplement des Monts Uluguru et le fonctionnement social des groupes concernés, pendant la migration et jusqu’au seuil de la colonisation. Ce travail a été publié (Paul 2003). En 2002, je suis retourné durant six semaines dans les Monts Uluguru notamment pour affiner ma compréhension d’une institution, celle du remplacement. Brièvement, au sein de cette population matrilinéaire et matrilocale, lorsqu’un membre d’un lignage est responsable, volontairement ou non, de la mort d’un membre d’un autre lignage, son lignage doit offrir l’un de ses membres en remplacement de la personne défunte. Deux témoignages, collectés en 1995 et en 2002, sont ici proposés. Ils sont structurés de manière identique : décès d’une femme entraîné par son époux, réaction violente de l’un des hommes du lignage de la défunte, intervention des aînés des deux lignages qui jugulent la violence et imposent un règlement pacifique par le remplacement.

Le troisième texte ne porte pas sur le remplacement mais apporte un éclairage complémentaire sur le statut des personnes au sein des lignages occupant les Monts Uluguru. Il s’agit de l’enlèvement d’une jeune femme puis de son rachat et de celui de ses enfants par le doyen de son lignage d’origine. Selon les normes alors en vigueur, bien qu’il s’agisse d’un enlèvement, une compensation s’imposait parce que la femme enlevée avait procréé et que ses enfants étaient considérés comme étant l’actualisation du travail de l’époux qui n’est autre que le kidnappeur.

On pourra prendre connaissance de l’analyse approfondie de ces textes en consultant mon article sur le sujet (Paul 2013a). Pour faciliter la compréhension des témoignages, j’apporte cependant ici les précisions suivantes

1 Anthropologue, UMR 8171 IMAf (Institut de Mondes Africains).

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- Autant les meurtres que l’enlèvement concernent des femmes. Cette situation n’est pas exclusive mais très largement dominante. Les récits concernant les hommes sont rares et peu structurés. Au sein d’une population matrilinéaire et matrilocale, il paraît normal que la mémoire collective préserve avant tout l’histoire de destins singuliers de femmes. D’elles dépend la reproduction démographique et sociale du lignage

- Les récits de remplacement se déroulent au sein d’une aire matrimoniale constituée d’une dizaine de lignages appartenant presqu’exclusivement à une paire de clan. Cette affinité bilatérale est caractéristique de la population des Monts Uluguru ; elle est un élément clé dans le processus de peuplement de la zone, reste quasi-exclusive jusqu’à la veille de la colonisation et continue à dominer les discours à l’époque des enquêtes, c’est-à-dire à un moment où elle est, dans les faits, sensiblement dégradée (Paul 2013b). Ainsi, on comprend mieux l’entrecroisement des relations de parenté de descendance et d’affinité entre les protagonistes de ces récits.

Comme souvent dans ce type de littérature orale, la datation est délicate. Des éléments du récit de Kizingo suggèrent qu’il se déroule au moins deux générations avant l’arrivée effective de l’administration allemande dans les Monts Uluguru à l’orée du XXe siècle. Le second récit, celui de Masesa, est plus avare dans ce domaine. La femme objet du remplacement est désignée en fin de récit comme étant mama yake Karoli. Si le terme mama est traduit par mère, le nom chrétien de Karoli nous suggère un événement survenu au début du XXe siècle, époque de la christianisation des Monts Uluguru (Pels 1999). Cependant cette inférence est sujette à caution. Mama peut désigner une quelconque femme d’une génération alterne à celle de Karoli, de la génération de sa grand-mère par exemple. Je n’ai pas eu, au moment de l’enquête, la présence d’esprit d’approfondir la question. Enfin, le dernier récit, celui de Kubwa, dresse une situation qui s’apparente à celle qui prévaut à la fin du XIXe siècle, au moment où des désordres de divers ordres entraînent la multiplication des rapts et avant l’imposition effective de l’administration allemande.

Les entretiens ont été conduits en kiswahili et enregistrés. J’étais accompagné d’un ami luguru, Ignaci Serafini Mang’ofu, du clan des Wachuma. Il assistait aux entretiens mais n’intervenait jamais. Nous discutions avec lui régulièrement de mon interprétation des entretiens. À partir des bandes magnétiques, j’ai réalisé les transcriptions au fur et à mesure.

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Les entretiens

1. Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Mkubwa Roberti Fidelisi au village de Luale (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie) le 17 mars 1995 (extrait)

2. Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Masesa du clan des Wakalagale au lieu-dit Pasua, village de Msongozi (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie) le 23 août 1995 (extrait)

3. Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Karoli Mkude, Kizingo Mwana Luhango au lieu-dit Kinyovi, village de Bunduki (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie), août 2002 (extrait)

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Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Mkubwa Roberti Fidelisi au village de Luale (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie) le 17 mars 1995 (extrait)

Asili yetu zaidi ni Lusungi katika tarafa hii ya Mgeta. Kwa hiyo asili kabisa ya bibi yangu alitoka na jambazi. Alimfunga, akambeba, akampeleka Lugulu. Alipompeleka Lugulu kule alikaa naye labda miaka saba hivi. Mjomba wetu mzee Mkubwa akafanya binu za kutafuta kila sehemu katika sehemu hii ya Morogoro. Bahati kulikuwa na rafiki yake mmoja alikuwa anakaa sehemu za mlimani, sehemu za Tangeni. Alipokwenda kule, akamwuliza, akamweleza kwamba :

- Ndugu yangu mwenzio nina matatizo. Mpwa wangu mmoja amepotea. - Mpwa wako gani ? - Wa kike. Kama unatembea bwana unisaidie humo unamotembelea.

Yule ndugu akamwambia kwamba :

- Ni ukweli sehemu hizo za Uluguru ninakotembeaga na mimi, kuna mama mmoja hajui kwake. Huyu bwana amemwiba, kwa hiyo anamtumia huko na wamesha- zalia watoto.

Kwa hiyo yule mzee akamwambia kwamba :

- Bwana we kapeleleze tena. Mpwa wangu mimi anaitwa jina lake fulani, kwa hiyo kampeleleze.

Akamwambia huyo na akiwa ukoo wake ni Muyingu.

- Basi nina imani kwamba ni yeye mpwa wangu.

Basi mzee yule akarudi nyumbani. Kurudi nyumbani, mwenyeji wake yule akafunga safari kwenda sehemu ile ya Luguluni. Baada ya kufika Luguluni kwa rafiki yake akamwuliza.

- Huyu, rafiki yangu ulikuwa ukisema kwamba kuna mama mmoja mgeni hapa. Mama huyu mgeni ni ukoo gani ?

Akamwambia kwamba :

- Huyu mama mgeni ni mpwa wangu mimi, Muyingu huyo. Huyu anakuja hapa kuzumgumza. - Huyu anakuja kuzumgumza ? - Huyu anakuja kuzumgumza ! - Ndiyo utaniitia mama huyo ? - Nitamwita kama unamtaka !

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Traduction

Notre origine c’est avant tout Lusungi dans ce canton de Mgeta. Ainsi, la véritable origine de mon aïeule, elle la quitta à cause d’un brigand. Il l’attacha, la porta et l’emmena à Lugulu. Une fois qu’il l’eût emmenée à Lugulu, il resta avec elle peut-être sept ans. Notre oncle*2, Mkubwa l’ancien, fit tout son possible pour la chercher partout dans la région de Morogoro. Par chance, il avait un ami qui résidait dans la montagne, du côté de Tangeni. Quand il se rendit là-bas, il l’interrogea et lui expliqua :

- Mon compère, j’ai des ennuis. Une des personnes de mon lignage est a disparu ! - Quel personne ? - Une femme. Si tu te déplaces, mon cher, aide-moi là où tu iras.

Le compère lui dit :

- Il est vrai que parmi les lieux des Monts Uluguru que je parcours, il y a une femme qui ne sait pas d’où elle vient. L’homme l’a volé et donc il l’emploie là-bas et ils ont déjà eu des enfants.

Notre aîné lui dit donc :

- Compère, renseigne-toi encore. Ma nièce s’appelle une-telle. Donc, interroge-la !

Il lui dit que la femme était une Muyingu. - Je suis certain qu’il s’agit de ma nièce.

L’aîné retourna chez lui. Alors qu’il était rentré chez lui, son hôte se mit en route pour aller à Lugulu. Une fois arrivé à Lugulu chez son ami, il le questionna :

- Mon ami, tu disais qu’il y avait une femme étrangère ici. Cette femme étrangère, de quel clan est-elle ?

Il lui dit :

- Cette femme étrangère, elle est du même clan que moi. C’est une Muyingu. Elle vient ici pour bavarder. - Elle vient ici pour bavarder ? - Oui, elle vient ici pour bavarder ! - Alors, tu pourras la faire venir pour moi ? - Je l’appellerai puisque tu la veux.

2 Les termes de parenté suivis du symbole * sont des termes classificatoires

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Basi mzee yule akamwita, kumwita mama yule akaja mpaka pale, akamwuliza jina lake, jina lake akamweleza.

- Je mama ukoo gani ? - Ukoo wangu mimi Muyingu.

Basi akasema :

- Asante mama, nimeshasikia maneno yako. Lakini kumbuka mjomba wako anakutafuta. - Mjomba wangu ananitafuta ? - Anakutafuta ! - Mjomba wangu unamtambua ni nani ? - Mjomba wako ni Mkubwa. - Ni kweli, Mkubwa mjomba wangu. Sasa yuko wapi ? - Karudi nyuma kwake Mgeta, lakini kakae mama !

Mama yule akarudi, mzee yule akarudi nyumbani kwake, akaanza kutuma ripoti tena, kumwambia mzee Mkubwa :

- Bwana mpwa wako ulikuwa ukimtafuta, nimeshampata. Yuko sehemu za Lugulu.

Kutumia habari hizo naye mzee Mkubwa akatuma habari kwamba :

- Umwambie arudishe wapwa zangu, sivyo nitamletea vita, nitakuja kumpiga.

Mzee huyu ikabidi afunge safari aende tena mpaka Luguluni. Akafika kwa mwenyeji wake pale, akasema ndiyo bwana yule aliyemposa mama yule aliyetoka Mgeta. Kuita bwana yule akaja mpaka pale pa yule mzee.

- Bwana nimetumwa mimi. Mjomba wa mama huyu anamtafuta miaka sasa. Sasa amekwishasikia kwamba mpwa wake yuko huku. Kwa hiyo anaamua kuleta vita huku, aje akupige usiporudisha mpwa wake.

Basi mzee yule akasema :

- Ni ukweli, mimi mama huyu nimekutana naye njiani, nimemwiba. Na sasa kama nimemwiba nimeshazalia watoto wanne. Ilivyo kama anataka, anilipe nguvu zangu nilizowatunza watoto hawa.

Ikabidi yule mzee arudi nyumbani. Kurudi nyumbani akatumia habari mzee mtumwa kwamba :

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L’aîné l’appela et la femme vint jusqu’à eux. Il lui demanda son nom et elle lui expliqua son nom.

- Quel est ton clan ? - Je suis une Muyingu

Il dit :

- Merci commère, j’ai entendu tes paroles. Mais souviens-toi que ton oncle* te cherche. - Mon oncle* me cherche ? - Il te cherche ! - Tu connais donc mon oncle* ? - Ton oncle* c’est Mkubwa. - C’est vrai, Mkubwa est mon oncle*. Où est-il à présent ? - Il est retourné à Mgeta, mais reste tranquille commère !

La femme s’en retourna et l’aîné retourna chez lui. Il envoya des nouvelles pour dire à Mkubwa :

- Mon cher, ta nièce que tu cherchais, je l’ai trouvée. Elle est dans les environs de Lugulu.

Ces nouvelles envoyées, Mkubwa l’ancien envoya aussi un message :

- Dis-lui de renvoyer ma nièce* et ses enfants. S’il ne le fait pas je porterais la guerre chez lui, je viendrais le frapper.

Il fallut que l’aîné prenne la route de nouveau pour Lugulu. Il arriva chez son hôte et lui demanda de faire venir celui qui avait épousé la femme venue de Mgeta. Appelé, l’homme vint chez l’aîné.

- Mon cher, je suis chargé d’une mission. L’oncle* de cette femme la cherche depuis des années maintenant. Maintenant, il sait que sa nièce est ici. Il a décidé de venir porter la guerre, de venir te frapper si tu ne renvoyais pas sa nièce.

L’homme dit :

- C’est vrai. Cette femme je l’ai rencontrée en chemin et je l’ai enlevée. Mais bien que je l’ai enlevée, j’ai déjà eu quatre enfants. Ainsi, s’il veut la récupérer, qu’il paye pour les efforts avec lesquels j’ai pris soin de ces enfants-là.

Le compère dut rentrer chez lui et envoyer des nouvelles à celui qui l’avait chargé de la mission :

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- Bwana ujumbe wako uliotuma umekamilika. Ilivyo tu yule mtu anataka umlipe ndiyo uchukue wapwa zako. - Gharama gani ? - Mbuzi mmoja !

Basi mzee Mkubwa akakamata mbuzi, akafunga safari mpaka Tangeni kwa huyu rafiki yake. Wakachukuzana na mzee yule mpaka huko Luguluni. Baada ya kufika Luguluni kwa yule mwenyeji wake, wakamlalamikia malalamiko hayo. Yule mwenyeji akamwita yule mzee aliyeiba mama yule. Alipofika pale akaanza kuelezwa kwamba :

- Huyo mjomba wa mama huyo uliyekuwa naye.

Na mama yule akafanya muhimu kumsabahi mjomba wake.

- Je mpwa wangu uko huku ? - Niko huku ! - Ulikuja je huku ? - Huyu bwana alinikamata njiani. Baada ya kunikamata njiani alinifunga na kuni- beba. Alipofika mbele kanifungua, kasema tangulia tuende. Sasa mimi nilipotoka sijui, ninapoenda sijui. Hata njia ya kurudi nyumbani mimi nilikuwa ninashindwa. Lakini akanizalia watoto wanne. - Bwana kweli ? - Kweli ! Sasa chidaba nilipwe. Mbuzi mmoja.

Mzee yule anatoa mbuzi. Anakabidhiwa mbele ya mkubwa mwenyeji wa pale. Naye mzee Mkubwa anachukua wapwa zake wale, anarudi nao Lusungi.

Wakati alipokamatwa maziwa yamejaa. Yule mwizi alikuwa anaitwa Mboga.

168 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

- Ton message a été bien reçu. Une chose seulement, il veut que tu le payes pour que tu prennes tes neveux et nièces. - Quel prix ? - Une chèvre.

Alors, Mkubwa l’ancien attrapa une chèvre et se mit en route jusqu’à Tangeni chez son ami. Ils s’encouragèrent sur le chemin de Lugulu. Après être arrivés à Lugulu chez leur hôte, ils présentèrent leurs doléances. Leur hôte appela l’ancien qui avait volé la femme. Quand il arriva là-bas on commença par lui expliquer :

- Celui-là est l’oncle* de la femme avec qui tu étais.

Et la femme se fit un devoir de saluer son oncle* de bon matin.

- Ma nièce tu es ici ! - Je suis ici ! - Mais comment es-tu arrivée jusqu’ici ? - C’est lui qui m’a enlevée sur le chemin. Il m’a attachée et m’a portée. Quand il est arrivé loin devant, il m’a détaché et m’a dit de marcher devant. Moi je ne savais pas d’où je venais ni où j’allais. Le chemin de la maison je ne le trouvais pas. Mais il m’a donné quatre enfants. - Est-ce vrai (s’adressant au voleur) ? - C’est vrai ! Tu dois me payer une compensation : une chèvre.

Notre ancien donna une chèvre. Elle fut reçue devant le doyen du village. Mkubwa prit sa nièce et ses enfants et retourna avec eux jusqu’à Lusungi.

À l’époque où elle fut enlevée, la fillette avait déjà les seins pleins. Le voleur s’appelait Mboga.

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Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Masesa du clan des Wakalagale au lieu-dit Pasua, village de Msongozi (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie) le 23 août 1995 (extrait)

Réalisé en présence de Modesti, ami et voisin de Masesa et membre du même clan Nimeelezwa kusema kuwa sisi Wakalagale, yani ukoo wa Debwe, tumetoka Palaulanga. Na Palaulanga huko ndiyo tulikoanza hasa na wenzetu ukoo wao walivyofuatana wote, Wanya- gatwa. Baada ya kuoa Wanyagatwa hao, wakafikia Mangaye. Halafu kutoka Mangaye wakaja mpaka Mwalazi, sisi ukoo wetu na wale Wanyagatwa. Lakini yule mtu aliyetoka huko, mimi siwezi kumtambua, maana yake sikuelezwa zaidi, yule mjomba aliyekusanya ukoo wake…

Modesti qui assiste à l’entretien glisse : Debwe mwana Nondola Basi natumaini wakawa wakapumzika pale Mwalazi. Wamepumzika kirefu na wameshirikiana, Wakalagale pamoja na Wanyagatwa, wameshirikiana sana. Wameposheana, wamezaliana. Hii ninayotambua mimi… Tuseme hata wazee wetu niliowaona mimi, kuanzia Debwe mwana Keyamba nilimwona mimi. Kufa Debwe mwana Keyamba ametokea Debwe mwana Mitiki. Kufa kwa Debwe mwana Mitiki ametokea Debwe mwengine Alimasi Mpenda. Hawa wote ni mkono wa Debwe mwana Nondola huyo, ndiyo kozi letu, nilikotoka. Debwe wa kumi na nne ni huyu kaka Paolo Mpendaroho. Basi haya ndiyo ninayoyajua, nilivyoelezwa na wazee wangu. Rwambiko nimemsikia lakini sikuelezwa sawa sawa…

Ni kweli bibi amenieleza, kuwa mwana Widi amemchukua mama yake binti Mgoli mdogo, kenda kumwuza. Wakati alikwenda kumwuza kulikuwa na sababu, siyo bure hapana.

L’interview est interrompue par Modesti qui ne veut pas que Masesa poursuive. Masesa en rit et continue… Kulikuwa na sababu, sababu yenyewe. Kulikuwa na bwana mmoja anaitwa Migoha. Migoha huyu ameposha kwa Wanyagatwa. Kuposha kwa Wanyagatwa kazaa. Sasa yupo mtoto mmoja huyu, mdogo. Mama ya mtu… Naye kafunga mama ya mtu.

(Jean-Luc Paul demande : tu veux dire que la femme était enceinte et donc qu’elle avait sevré son jeune enfant ?)

Ndiyo. Baada ya kufunga mama mtu kenda kulima pombe yeye Migoha. Sisi ilikuwa ya nani huyo, sijui pombe ya nani. Basi wakati alipotoka kwenye pombe karudi na kibuyu cha pombe. Kampa bibi kusema kwamba pombe hii uniwekee ndani mimi ninakwenda chun- ga mbuzi wangu. Kaondoka, kachukua mbuzi. Mama yule kachukua pombe, kumbe yule mtoto aliyeacha ziwa analilia....

170 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Traduction

On m’a expliqué que nous, le clan des Wakalagale, c’est-à-dire le lignage de Debwe, nous venons de Palaulanga. C’est du côté de Palaulanga que nous avons vraiment commencé à nous déplacer de concert avec les nôtres du clan des Wanyagatwa. Après avoir épousé ces Wanyagatwa, ils arrivèrent à Mangaye. Puis de Mangaye ils vinrent jusqu’à Mwalazi, nous, notre clan, et eux, les Wanyagatwa. Mais la personne, l’oncle* qui a rassemblé notre lignage, qui est parti de là-bas, je ne peux pas l’identifier parce qu’on ne m’a pas expliqué plus que ça.

(Modesti qui assiste à l’entretien glisse : Debwe mwana Nondola) Quoi qu’il en soit, je sais qu’ils se sont arrêtés à Mwalazi. Ils s’y sont arrêtés longtemps et ils ont coopéré, les Wakalagale et les Wanyagatwa, ils ont beaucoup coopéré. Ils se sont épousés et ils ont engendré. Voilà ce que moi je sais. Disons que même nos aînés je les ai vus, en com- mençant par Debwe mwana Keyamba que j’ai vu. A la mort de Debwe mwana Keyamba vint Deebwe mwana Mikiti. A la mort de Debwe mwana Mikiti vint un autre, Alimasi Mpenda. Eux tous sont le bras (le prolongement) de Debwe mwana Nondola, c’est ainsi qu’on nous l’a enseigné là d’où je viens. Le quatorzième Debwe c’est mon aîné Paolo Mpendaroho. Voilà ce que je sais, ce que m’ont expliqué mes aînés. Rwambiko j’ai entendu ce nom mais on ne m’a pas bien expliqué. C’est vrai que ma grand-mère* m’a expliqué que Mwana Widi prit sa mère*, la fille cadette de Mgoli, pour aller la vendre. Quand il a été la vendre, il y avait une raison, ce n’était pas gratuit. (l’interview est interrompue par Modesti qui ne veut pas que Masesa poursuive. Masesa en rit et continue…)3

Il y avait une raison, la raison elle-même… Il y avait un type appelé Migoha. Ce Migoha avait pris une épouse chez les Wanyagatwa et il avait engendré. Il y avait un petit enfant. La mère* de la personne… Et lui avait fermé la mère* de la personne…

(Jean-Luc Paul demande : tu veux dire que la femme était enceinte et donc qu’elle avait sevré son jeune enfant ?)

C’est ça ! Après avoir fermé la mère* de la personne, lui, Migoha, il a été donner un coup de main (pour aller couper des chaumes pour la couverture d’une case4). Je ne sais pas pour qui, je ne sais pas à qui était la bière5. Bref, il est revenu du coup de main avec une calebasse de bière. Il la donna à son épouse en lui disant : mets ça à l’intérieur pour moi, je vais m’occu- per de mes chèvres. La femme a pris la bière. Or, l’enfant qui venait d’être sevré pleurnichait

3 Modesti considère que cette histoire donne une mauvaise image de son clan. 4 L’information a été obtenue hors enregistrement. 5 La femme au bénéfice de laquelle le coup de main est organisé brasse de la bière pour les participants.

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....ile pombe baada ya kuiona, anywe. Kapunguza ile pombe, kampa. Amekunywa mle mtoto. Baba ya mtu alipotoka huku, kurudi, kafunga mbuzi wake tayari, anataka pombe anywe. Nipe pombe yangu. Kuangalia pombe imepungua, kamwambia : umempa nani, pombe yangu ? Sikumpa mtu, nimempa mtoto huyu, alikuwa akililia. Kasema : hata ! we pombe wangu labda umempa mtu mwengine. Huo ugomvi ! Akampiga kofi moja. Hata kofi ya pili kaanguka. Baa- da ya kuanguka anasema, unaniona mtu hali yangu mbaya, leo hii unanipiga, basi ninakwenda kusema kwa mjomba. Saa ile ainuke, kumbe pale penye nyumba pale walipojenga pana mwi- nuko hivi, sasa anapanda pale yule mama. Sasa kenda kumkamata mgu : unapokwenda wapi wewe ? Wacha, liishie hapa tu ! Kusema hivyo mama yule kaanguka chini, kuanguka chini, habari ya mtu aliyefunga, saa zile nguvu hana kabisa. Ikavuma kuwa amemwua. Na wakati ule hakuinuka tena yule mwanamke. Ilionekana amemwua. Wanyagatwa waliposikia hayo, ndiyo akatoka mkubwa mmoja anaitwa Kinyonyoke. Alitaka kwenda kumwua yule bibi yake mzaa mama yake Migoha. Lakini wakati alipofika, jirani, yeye na kisu, aingie akamchome yule mama aliye ndani mle. Bahati yule mama kuangalia njiani anamwona anakuja na kisu kwa bidii. Yule mama akafungua mlango, karudi huku, hii mbao wa mlango imemfunika hivi. Yule kapita haraka mpaka ndani, kaangaliaangalia. Hakuna. Sasa naye, huyo huyo Chonyo- nyoke, ndiyo aliyeposa mama yule aliyetaka kuuawa, katoka, anakuja. Sasa kidogo anamwona mpwa wake anatoka na kisu. Akamwambia : umefanya nini humu ndani ? Sikufanya kitu hapana. Mimi sikumwona mwenye nyumba. Ah ! Pale hakukubali mwenye nyumba. Kasema hapana, ulichofanya na kisu mle ndani nini ? Na kwa nini uje huku na kisu ? Yule mama kao- gopa, kafikiri hawa watauana wao kwa wao. Saa ile ndiyo akatokeza kusema kwamba : bwana mimi nipo hapa. Nimeogopa, nilianza kumwona akija njiani. Ndiyo anamwachia mpwa wake, anaondoka, anamwambia nenda. Basi shauri lile likatengwa, likaonekana kuwa Wakalagale lazima watoe mtu. Ndiyo wakachukua dada yake binti Mgoli, mama yake Karoli. Wamekwen- da kurudisha kwa Wanyagatwa. Wamempa Mnyagatwa yule kusema kuwa sasa huyu, mpwa wenu kafa sasa huyu ndiyo mpwa wenu. Na mtoto mgongoni. Kalia chimba, kwa kiswahili kalipa chimba. Basi sasa kakaa kule, kakaa, mjomba wetu mwana Widi ndiyo hapo alipofikiri kusema : mpwa wangu anapotea. Ndiyo akaanza kutafuta, kutega wanyama. Anatega anaweka, anatega anaweka, anatega anaweka… Wakati alipoona katimia, kanunua kuku. Kaweka ndani. Anatega wanyama hawa meru, mbuku, ndezi, ngulubi… Halafu anatoka, anakwenda kuuza, kanunua kuku kaweka ndani. Kuku yule kazaa, kuku yule alipozaa, bado anaendelea kutega. Kapata mwengine kamweka ndani. Kuku kazaa… Mwishoni kaenda kununua mbuzi, mbuzi yule ndiyo hapo anakwenda kuwagomboa wapwa zake, wale. Yule mama kaondoka na mtoto mgongoni. Basi akamgomboa, akarudi. Baada ya kurudi, mjomba mtu alifurahi kusema kuwa ukoo wangu umekwisha rudi. Ndiyo nilivyoelezwa mimi, kabisa.

172 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est pour boire la bière qu’il avait vue6. Elle prit de la bière et la lui donna. L’enfant en but. Le père* de la personne, quand il sortit de là-bas, qu’il revint, qu’il eût fini d’attacher ses chèvres, il voulut sa bière pour en boire : Donne-moi ma bière ! Il regarde la bière et voit qu’elle a diminué. Il lui dit : à qui est-ce que tu as donné ma bière ? Je n’en ai donné à personne, je l’ai donné à l’enfant qui pleurnichait pour en avoir. Il dit : non ! Toi, tu as donné de ma bière à quelqu’un ! Eclate une dispute. Il lui donna une gifle, puis une seconde et elle tomba. Après être tombée, elle dit : tu vois que je suis en mauvaise condition (enceinte) et aujourd’hui tu me bats ! Je vais le dire à mon oncle*. Alors elle s’est levée. Mais là où la maison était construite, il y avait une côte et la femme la gravit. Il la saisit par le pied. Où est-ce que tu vas comme ça ? Laisse, réglons ça ici ! Comme il disait ça, la femme est tombée à terre et une fois à terre… les trucs de femme enceinte, elle n’avait plus de force du tout. La nouvelle se répandit qu’il l’avait tuée… Et à ce moment la femme ne se releva plus… Quand les Wanyagatwa entendirent ça, c’est alors que vint un de leurs aînés appelé Kinyonyoke. Il voulut aller tuer la grand-mère* de Migoha qui avait engendré sa mère*. Mais quand il arriva avec son couteau dans le voisinage pour entrer et transpercer cette femme qui était à l’intérieur… Par chance, la femme en regar- dant le chemin le vit venir avec détermination. La femme ouvrit la porte (vers l’intérieur de la case), les planches de la porte étaient comme ça (rabattues contre le mur intérieur). Lui, il est entré précipitamment et a regardé à l’intérieur. Personne. Or lui, Chonyonyoke7, celui qui était marié à la femme qu’on voulait assassiner, était en train de revenir (chez lui). Rapidement il voit son neveu* qui sort avec un couteau. Il lui dit : qu’est-ce que tu as fait là-dedans ? Je n’ai rien fait ! Je n’ai pas vu la maîtresse de maison. Il dit : non ! Qu’est-ce que tu as fait là-dedans avec ton couteau ? Et pourquoi es-tu venu avec un couteau ? La femme prit peur, elle pensa qu’ils allaient s’entretuer. Alors elle sortit et dit : mon cher, me voici ! J’ai eu peur dès que je l’ai vu venir sur le chemin. Il laissa donc partir son neveu*, il lui dit de s’en aller. Le conseil se réunit et il fut décidé que les Wakalagale devaient donner une personne. C’est ainsi qu’ils prirent sa sœur, la fille de Mgoli, la mère* de Karoli. Ils allèrent la rendre aux Wanyagatwa. Ils l’ont donné au Mnyagatwa en disant : votre nièce* est morte, à présent celle-ci est votre nièce*. Avec un enfant sur le dos. Kalia chimba ce qui signifie en swahili, qu’ils ont payé pour le malheur (causé). Ensuite elle est restée là, elle est restée (longtemps), puis notre oncle*, Mwana Widi, il a songé à dire : ma nièce* est perdue. Alors il s’est mis au travail, il a piégé du gibier. Il piège (du gibier) et met de côté, piège et met de côté, piège et met de côté… Quand il vit que c’était prêt, il acheta des poules. Il les mit à l’abri. Il piège des animaux comme le meru, le mbuku, l’agouti, le ngulubi… Ensuite il part, il va les vendre pour acheter des poules et les mettre à l’abri. Les poules se reproduisirent… A la fin, il alla acheter une chèvre et avec cette chèvre il va racheter sa nièce* et son enfant. Cette femme était partie avec un enfant dans le dos. Il la racheta, elle revint. Après être revenue, l’oncle* de la personne se réjouit beaucoup en disant : mon lignage est revenu ! C’est tout à fait ainsi qu’on me l’a expliqué.

6 Les enfants sont habitués à boire le togwa, la bière qui n’a pas encore fermentée. 7 Kinyonyoke est la prononciation swahilie, Chonyonyoke est la prononciation luguru. Ici il y a soit confusion des noms de l’oncle* et du neveu* par le narrateur ou, comme cela arrive souvent, les deux hommes appartenant au même matrilignage, on les désigne par le même nom.

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Entretien de Jean-Luc Paul avec Karoli Mkude, Kizingo Mwana Luhango au lieu-dit Kinyovi, village de Bunduki (Monts Uluguru, Tanzanie), août 2002 (extrait)

Sisi hapa zamani palikuwa na ukorofi naukologi 8 wenyewe mambo bwana yalikuwa wa ajabu. Na katika ukorofi huu utumwa ulikuwepo kati ukoo na ukoo lakini kutokana na vitendo vyao. Kama umemkosea mwenzio katika mauaji, basi inabidi ulipe mtu. Naye vile vile ukoo ule ule akikosea naye atalipa mtu. Basi hapo zamani mjomba wangu Mwana Milandu alikuwa na mpwa wake Binti Milandu. Huyu Binti Milandu yani yeye alikuwa na mwanaume wake anaitwa Mmwenda na yeye mwanamke anaitwa Mmaze. Huyu jamaa kapotelewa na fahamu. Kupotelewa na fahamu kuna jambazi mmoja, tunasema ng’eng’e, mwongo maana yake. Sasa huyu akamwambia nani ? Akamwambia yule mgonjwa :

- Sasa una habari ? Mke wako ana mimba lakini mimba ile siyo ya kwako wewe. Ile mimba ya mtu mwengine, rafiki yangu !

Yule jamaa akakasirika. Akaona : Ka ! Kweli ? Kweli ! Basi akaenda mpaka nyumbani kwa mkewe, Binti Milandu. Akamwuliza :

- Mke wangu, umelala ? - Nimelala - Sasa ufunue kasharti9 lile, temvu10, nami nilale - Sasa haiwezekani na sasa hivi bwana mchana ! Kwa hiyo haiwezekani kulala - Kwa nini ?

Akasema… Yule jamaa kafunua lile temvu. Kufunua lile temvu kumbe ana kisu. Yule bibi, Bin- ti Milandu, hajui. Basi akachukua kile kisu akamtumbua kwenye tumbo. Ile mimba ikatoka. Kutoka yule mtoto anatembea. Yule Binti Milandu akakata roho. Basi wengine wakasema :

- Jamani eeeh ! Kuna mzee hapo kafa ! - Nani ? - Binti Milandu - Akafa vipi ? - Mume wake akamchania, mimba imetoka

Basi ikawa vita sasa. Mwana Milandu alipotoka shambani na mbuzi wake kuangalia kweli Binti Milandu amefariki, akasema :

8 Désordre, néologisme tiré du verbe kukologa, mélanger. 9 Incompréhensible. 10 Temvu synonyme du kiswahili jamvi signifie natte.

174 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Traduction

Chez nous ici, il y avait jadis des conflits et du désordre ; ces affaires, mon cher, elles étaient surprenantes. Parmi ces conflits, il y avait l’esclavage entre deux clans mais selon certaines modalités. Si tu as fait du tort au tien par un meurtre, alors il faut que tu payes avec une personne. Et de même lui, ce même clan (à qui tu as fait du tort), s’il vient à faire du tort, il paiera avec une personne. Donc, jadis mon oncle maternel, Mwana Milandu, avait une nièce*, Binti Milandu11. Cette Binti Milandu elle avait son homme qui s’appelait Mmwenda et elle-même, la femme, s’appelait Mmatze12. Cet homme avait perdu la raison. Ayant perdu la raison, un voyou, nous disons ng’eng’e, ce qui signifie menteur… Donc lui il parla à qui ? Il parla au malade :

- Alors tu connais la nouvelle ? Ton épouse est enceinte mais ce n’est pas de toi. Elle est enceinte d’une autre personne, mon ami ! Le type se mit en colère. Il dit : Quoi ! C’est vrai ? Vrai ! Il alla jusqu’à la maison, chez son épouse, Binti Milandu. Il lui demanda : - Mon épouse, tu es couchée ? - Je suis couchée - Ouvre la natte que je me couche - C’est impossible, nous sommes en pleine journée mon cher ! Donc ce n’est pas possible de se coucher. - Pourquoi ?

Il dit… Lui le type ouvrit la natte. Après l’avoir ouverte, il avait un couteau ! Elle, la femme, Binti Milandu, elle ne le savait pas. Donc il prit le couteau et ouvrit le ventre. L’enfant sortit. En sortant, l’enfant bougeait. Binti Milandu rendit l’âme. D’autres dirent : - La compagnie eeeh ! Quelqu’un est mort ici ! - Qui donc ? - Binti Milandu - Comment est-elle morte ? - Son époux l’a éventrée et l’enfant est sorti

Ainsi ce fut la guerre. Mwana Milandu lorsqu’il revînt des champs avec ses chèvres constata qu’en vérité Binti Milandu était bien morte. Il dit :

11 Mwana signifie enfant et Binti fille. Mwana est un terme bantu. Binti est un terme swahili issu de l’arabe. Milandu est le nom du père. 12 Ici les noms réfèrent à l’appartenance matriclanique. Mmwenda indique que l’homme appartient au matriclan des Wamwenda. Mmatze indique que la femme appartient au clan des Wamatze.

175 Numéro Varia

- Huyu jamaa yuko wapi ? - Akakimbia kwa mama yake

Akachukua mkuki, rungu, aende akamwue. Kufika pale akamkuta yumo ndani. Alimwambia : njo ! Akataa. Kukataa ilibidi afunge mlango kwa nje, achukue moto achome ile nyumba moto. Basi, wakubwa wengine wakasema :

- Ugomvi hauwezekani. Bwana hukumu upo. Kama mtu akafa, akauawa, atalipwa mtu

Basi katokea, wakaweka kikao, Wamwenda na Wamatze. Sasa Wamatze hawa wamekasirika, wanasema :

- Hapana tuanzeni vita ! - Hapana tulipe mtu ! - Je Mwana Milandu, unaona je, tulipe mtu ?

Akasema :

- Sawa, lakini awe mwanamke kama yule dada yangu.

Basi akapewa pale yule mwanamke. Sasa huyu siyo ukoo wa kimwenda tena, ukoo wa kimat- ze. Akachukua yule mwali akampa mwanaume mwengine, halafu akazaa. Baada ya kuzaa, yule mwanamke, ukoo ule umeendelea. Ilibidi siyo ukoo wa Wamwenda tena. Ukoo huu sasa ukoo wa nani ? Ukoo wa Wamatze.

Baada ya kuwa ukoo wa Wamatze, sasa wakati wa vita… Maana yake wote wamejenga sasa, wamejenga. Kila ukoo wana sehemu yao, kila ukoo wana sehemu yao. Wamwenda wana sehemu yao na Wamatze tuna sehemu yetu. Sasa ikatokea Mjerumani anakuja. Huyu Mjerumani anasema :

- Sasa hivi hakuna mtumwa, hakuna mwanamwana. Kama kuna mtu anasema mimi ninaye mwanamwana, tutamwuliza umempata je ? Basi atarudi kule. Kama sivyo, tutamtia viboko au tutamshinja.

Basi Mwana Milandu akasema :

- Ah basi ! Nitarudisha ule ukoo wa Wamwenda

176 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

- Où est le compagnon ? - Il s’est enfui chez sa mère

Il prit une lance et un casse-tête pour aller le tuer. En arrivant là-bas, il le trouva dans la maison. Il lui dit : Viens ! L’autre refusa de sortir. Il dût barricader la porte de l’extérieur et prît du feu pour enflammer la maison. D’autres aîné(e)s1 lui dirent :

- Cette dispute n’est pas possible. Mon cher, il y la loi. Puisque quelqu’une est morte, qu’on l’a tuée, une personne sera payée !

Il advint qu’ils décidèrent de réunir un conseil, les Wamwenda et les Wamatze. Les Wamatze eux étaient en colère et disaient :

- Non, commençons la guerre ! - Non, payons une personne ! Dis, Mwana Milandu, qu’en penses-tu, payons une personne ? Il dit : - D’accord mais que ce soit une femme comme ma sœur*.

Sur le champ, on lui donna la femme. Alors, elle ne faisait plus partie du matriclan des Wamwenda, son matriclan était celui des Wamatze. Il prit cette jeune femme pubère qui n’avait pas encore enfanté et lui donna un autre homme et ensuite elle engendra. Après avoir engendré, son matrilignage se développa. Nécessairement, ce n’était plus un matrilignage des Wamwenda. Ce matrilignage-là, de quel matriclan était-il ? Du matriclan des Wamatze.

Après être devenue du matriclan des Wamatze vînt le temps de la guerre… Cela signifie que tous avaient maintenant construit, ils avaient construit. Chaque lignage a son emplacement, chaque lignage a son emplacement. Les Wamwenda ont leur emplacement et nous les Wamat- ze nous avons notre emplacement. Alors il arriva que vinrent les Allemands. Cet Allemand dit :

- Désormais, il n’y a plus d’esclave, il n’y a plus de wanawana. Si une personne dit : moi j’ai un mwanamwana, on lui demandera comment il l’a obtenu. Et il retournera là-bas (d’où il est venu) sinon nous fouetterons ou nous égorgerons (le propriétaire).

Alors Mwana Milandu dit :

- Ah ! D’accord, je rendrai ce lignage des Wamwenda.

1 Il n’y a pas de féminin/masculin en kiswahili qui permettrait d’attribuer un sexe aux aîné(e)s. Chez les Waluguru le conseil des anciens est mixte.

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Akarudisha ukoo wa Wamwenda. Kurudisha ukoo wa Wamwenda wakashukuru sana kwa sababu ndugu zangu wamerudi. Lakini wengine wale wajukuu wa yule mtu wali- otupa, wale wajukuu kwa jumla wamekufa… Sasa hivi Wamwenda wako sehemu yao na sisi tupo sehemu yetu. Acha ugomvi wa mashamba [vraisemblablement engendrés par le retour d’un lignage déjà installé]. Hivo hivo halisi. Wamwenda wako sehemu yao na sisi Wamatze tupo sehemu yetu. Lakini tunaposana. Wamwenda wanaposa Wamatze na Wamatze wanaposa Wamwenda. Sisi hatuna wanawana, wala Wamwenda hawana wanawana. Iliobakia sasa tunaishi kwa amani, tunaposana, tunazaliana, hakuna fujo tena wala ugomvi. Ndiyo maana wanasema mtu akiwa ng’eng’e auawe au achomwe moto. Maana yake huyu… afadhali ya mchawi kuliko ng’eng’e kwa sababu yule Binti asin- galiuawa kwa sababu ya ung’eng’e ya yule mtu alisema yeye kwa nini mke wako ana mimba. Mpaka sasa hivi sisi tunashika amani.

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Il renvoya le lignage des Wamwenda. Le lignage des Wamwenda rendu, ils furent très reconnaissants parce que mes parents sont revenus. Mais certains des petits-enfants de celui qui nous avait donné (la femme)… Ces petits-enfants en général étaient morts1… A présent, les Wamwenda sont à leur emplacement et nous nous sommes à notre emplacement. Finis les conflits fonciers. C’est vraiment ainsi. Les Wamwenda sont à leur emplacement et nous les Wamatze à notre emplacement. Mais nous nous inter-marrions. Les Wamwenda épousent les Wamatze et les Wamatze épousent les Wamwenda. Nous, nous n’avons pas de wanawana non plus que les Wamwenda n’ont pas de wanawana. Ce qui reste c’est que nous vivons en paix, nous nous épousons les uns les autres, nous engen- drons ensemble, il n’y a plus de désordre ni de dispute. Oui, c’est pourquoi ils disent que si quelqu’un est menteur, qu’il soit tué ou brûlé. Parce qu’elle… mieux vaut un sorcier plutôt qu’un menteur parce qu’elle, la femme, elle n’aurait pas été tuée sans ce menteur, cette personne qui a dit : pourquoi est-ce que ton épouse est enceinte ? Jusqu’à présent nous, nous sommes en paix.

1 Ces deux dernières phrases sont confuses car vraisemblablement Kizingo ne veut pas aborder les problèmes d’accès au foncier que ce retour engendra et/ou qui justifient ce retour.

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Bibliographie (références citées)

Paul, Jean-Luc. Anthropologie Historique des Hautes Terres de Tanzanie Orientale. Peu- plement et stratégies de reproduction sociale chez les Luguru matrilinéaires de Tanzanie. Karthala: Paris, 2003.

Paul, Jean-Luc. “L’improbable continuum parenté-esclavage au sein des populations bantu matrilinéaires est-africaines.” In Traites et esclavages en Afrique orientale et dans l’Océan indien, ed. Henri Médard, Marie-Laure Derat, Thomas Vernet T. et Marie-Pierre Ballarin, 357–370. Paris: Karthala, 2013a.

Paul, Jean-Luc. “De la modernité de la tradition : matrilignage, territoire et matrimoine foncier dans les Monts Uluguru (Tanzanie) XIXe et XXe siècles.” In Effervescence pa- trimoniale au Sud. Enjeux, questions, limites, ed. Dominique Juhé-Beaulaton, Marie- Christine Cormier-Salem, Pascale de Robert et Bernard Roussel, 361–37. Paris: IRD édi- tions, collection Colloques et séminaires, 2013b.

Pels, Peter. A Politics of Presence. Contacts Between Missionaries and Waluguru in Late Colonial Tanganyika. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

Bibliographie complémentaire sur la population des Monts Uluguru2

Ananias, Fr. Sp. Historia ya Morogoro. Dar es Salaam, 1964.

Beidelman, Thomas O. The Matrimonial Peoples of Eastern Tanzania (Zaramo, Luguru, Kaguru, Ngulu, etc.), East Central Africa, Part XVI, Ethnographic Survey of Africa. Lon- don: International African Institute, 1967.

—“Symbolic Rebirth: The Mwali Rite Among the Luguru of Eastern Tanzania.” Africa 48, no. 2 (1978): 176–188.

—“Boys’ Initiation Rites Among the Luguru of Eastern Tanzania.” Anthropos 75 (1980), 369–382.

Christensen, James Boyd. “Utani : Joking, Sexual Licence and Social Obligations among the Luguru.” American Anthropologist 1, no. xv (1963): 1314–27.

— “Luguru Verbal Act.” African Arts, 16, no. 2 (1983).

2 Références ajoutées par Marie-Aude Fouéré à partir de la bibliographie constituée lors de sa thèse (2004).

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Fosbrooke, Henry A. & Young, Roland. Smoke in the Hills: Political Tensions in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960. Autre édition: Land and Politics Among the Luguru. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960.

Fouéré, Marie-Aude. “Essai de reconstitution des relations d’utani dans un espace res- treint : le pays Luguru”. In L’objet ethnologique ‘relations à plaisanteries’ dans l’espace est-africain (Tanzanie). De la construction savante d’une coutume à la restitution des situations sociales de l’utani. Thèse de doctorat. Paris: EHESS, 2004.

Maack, Pamela A. “We don’t want terraces. Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme”. In Custodians of the Land. Ecology and Culture in the History of Tan- zania, ed. Gregory Maddock, James Giblin, J. & Isaria N. Kimambo. London: Eastern African Studies, 1996.

McVicar, Rev. Thomas. “Sibs, Privileged Familiarity and Cross-Cousin Marriage among the Waluguru.” Primitive Man 8 (1935): 57–67.

— “Death Rites among the Waluguru and Wanguru.” Primitive Man 18 (1945): 26–35.

Mluanda, Martin. 1971. “Ancestral Culture among the Luguru.” Review of Ethnology, 3(9).

Mzunda, Father C. J. Historia ya Uluguru, Dar es Salaam: published for the Luguru Na- tive Authority, 1958.

Paul, Jean-Luc. 2009, “Les structures alimentaires de la parenté de Meillassoux.” Journal des Anthropologues 118-119 (2009): 113–129.

Paul, Jean-Luc. 2008, “Au-delà de Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux ; Faire fructifier l’héri- tage de Claude Meillassoux.” Journal des Anthropologues 114-115 (2008) : 223–245.

Paul, Jean-Luc. 1993b, “Avant les paysans : agriculture et écologie dans une société agraire.” Revue Tiers-Monde 34, no. 134 (avril-juin 1993b), Paris.

Scheerder, revérend père, & réverend père Tastevin. “Les Wa lu guru.” Anthropos XLV (1950): 241–286.

Van Donge, Jan Kees. Trapped in Decline: A Sociological Analysis of Economic Life in Mgeta, PhD Diss, University of Leiden, 1993.

— “Legal insecurity and land conflicts in Mgeta.”Africa , 64, no. 2 (1994): 359–372.

Vermunt, Cornelius. “Place names in the Uluguru Mountains.” Africa 18 (1947): 305–306.

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Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est

Le « code de conduite » politique du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders : libérer la communauté nandi d’un mauvais sort en réhabilitant les « bon leaders » en temps électoral

Chloé Josse-Durand

Alors que je menais une mission de recherche3 dans le comté Nandi en mars 2013, la campagne politique pour les élections 2013 battait son plein : les meetings s’enchaînaient sur le petit square central de la ville de Nandi Hills et, non loin de là, les marchands de journaux avaient installé des bancs, invitant les lecteurs à prendre le temps d’ouvrir le Daily Nation, le Standard ou encore le Kass, le magazine régional en langue kalenjin. Quelques militants, employés par les partis politiques pour s’affronter en joutes verbales dans différents endroits passants de la ville, s’étaient accaparé certains de ces bancs et les avaient réorganisés en carré où, arborant t-shirts et casquettes aux couleurs de leur parti, ils affrontaient verbalement les agents du parti adverse. À quelques jours de l’élection de six représentants d’importance (le président, le député, le sénateur, le gouverneur de comté, la représentante des femmes et le conseiller local), tensions et espoirs alimentaient les compétitions politiques alors que le nouveau découpage administratif donnait un rôle plus important aux collectivités territoriales. Cette élection pouvait être l’occasion d’un renouvellement de la classe politique en termes partisans mais également en termes générationnels.

Pourtant, loin de cette effervescence, d’autres acteurs avaient abordé la campagne de façon plus rationnelle, sur la base de stratégies élaborées en amont avec des objectifs bien précis. Le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders,4 une association qui se présente comme un regroupement des anciens et des sages de la communauté nandi, avait en effet entrepris la rédaction d’un code de conduite politique plus d’un an avant la tenue des

3 Cette mission de trois semaines, réalisée avec le soutien financier de l’IFRA-Nairobi, a été effectuée dans le cadre de ma thèse entamée en 2011 sur les enjeux politiques et identitaires qui accompagnent la création d’un musée-mausolée dédié à un héros local, Koitalel Samoei, à Nandi Hills, Nandi County. 4 Kaburwo m’a été traduit par les elders par « the shade of the tree », qui a pour vocation de rappeler les palabres que les anciens tenaient à l’ombre des ficus centenaires, anciens lieux sociaux et religieux respectés par les nandis. Ce terme explique le symbole choisi pour représenter le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders, un arbre aux larges branches que l’on retrouve sur la couverture du NCPCC.

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élections, le Nandi County Political Code of Conduct5 (NCPCC). Destiné aux candidats du comté, à leurs partisans et à leur parti, ce code de conduite énonce un certain nombre de règles censées contribuer à transformer le comté Nandi en un îlot de prospérité, « the island of new politics, free of political madness ».6 Adopté en avril 2012, le NCPCC a été diffusé par le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders avec le soutien du Center for Community Dialogue and Development (CCDD), une ONG promouvant les elders comme vecteurs d’unité au sein de leur communauté d’origine.7 Il est intéressant de noter que ce code de conduite est né en pleine controverse : un certain nombre de polémiques occupaient alors la scène politique régionale. Bethwel Kiplagat, jugé responsable du Wagalla massacre,8 est destitué par la Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) qu’il préside en novembre 2010. Le Kalenjin Council of Elders,9 autorité dont dépend le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders, prend alors sa défense en la personne de Josuah Sang, nominé à la tête du Kalenjin Council of Elders peu après l’adoption du NCPCC. Kethwell Kiplagat est finalement renommé à la tête de la TJRC en avril 2012 grâce à l’influence du Ministre de la Justice Eugene Wamalwa. Au même moment, environ deux semaines avant l’entrée en fonction de Josuah Sang, le Kalenjin Council of Elders refuse de reconnaître William Ruto comme le candidat favori des Kalenjin à la présidentielle, alors jugé par la Cour Pénale

5 C’est Ben, un jeune chanteur nandi qui m’a transmis ce document. Lors de la campagne politique, il a été rémunéré par des politiciens locaux pour écrire une chanson en kalenjin intitulée « Uhuruto », dont le clip a été tourné à Kapsimoto gardens dans les jardins luxuriants de l’une des nombreuses propriétés du Président Moi dans la région. Dans cette chanson de campagne, Ben chante les louanges des leaders de demain et de leur alliance politique, Uhuru Kenyatta et plus particulièrement de William Samoei Ruto, jeune leader de l’United Republican Party (URP), parti dont l’électorat de base est principalement kalenjin et qui a beaucoup de succès dans la région. C’est lors de la campagne, en tant que partisan, qu’il a reçu l’un des exemplaires du NCPCC. 6 Les bases de ce code de conduite ont été arrêtées lors d’une réunion des différentes community based organizations du comté, sous la houlette de Denis Kogo, alors président du Rift Valley Development Trust. Pour plus de détails sur la création de ce code de conduite, voir l’article « NGO Sending Shivers on Political Leaders in Nandi ». Lien: http://lawrencekoech.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/ngo-sending-shivers-on-political- leaders-in nandi/ 7 « Vision and Mission: create a safer future for the world by working with local communities to identify their societal problems. » Source : site officiel de la CCDD. Lien : http://www.ccddkenya.org/ 8 Kethwel Kiplagat est une personnalité kalenjin proche du Président Moi : il a occupé différents postes administratifs et diplomatiques d’importance de 1978 à 1983 et a également acquis une aura internationale en tant que chairman du Africa Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) et membre d’International Crisis Group (ICG). Nommé Chairman de la Kenya’s Truth Justice and Reconciliation Committee en août 2009, il est forcé de démissionner en novembre 2010 en raison d’un rapport qui fait état de son rôle trouble dans l’assassinat de l’ancien Ministre des Affaires étrangères Robert Ouko ainsi que dans le massacre d’environ 3000 kényans musulmans d’origine somalienne perpétré par les forces de sécurité kényanes à Wagalla, North Eastern Province, en 1984. 9 Le Kalenjin Council est basé à Eldoret. Au regard de la loi kényane, qui reconnaît le droit aux communau- tés infra-nationales d’être représentées par un conseil des anciens disposant pour ce faire de la possibilité de se constituer en personne morale, le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders est l’un des dix bororosiek ou sous- groupes du Kalenjin Council of Elders.

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Internationale (CPI) pour crime contre l’humanité.10 Cette double prise de position est vivement critiquée, perçue par certains comme la consolidation des réseaux clientélistes kalenjin, Bethwel Kiplagat étant un ancien de l’administration Moi, et analysée par d’autres comme une trahison, la candidature de William Ruto ainsi que son parti l’United Republican Party (URP) symbolisant l’unité kalenjin. Face à la polémique, Josuah Sang déclare que le conseil des anciens est une institution neutre qui n’a pas à se prononcer en faveur d’un parti plus que d’un autre et s’engage à travailler main dans la main avec la NCIC pour maintenir la paix dans la région pendant la campagne électorale.11

Ainsi, le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders se présente comme une institution neutre, dont la légitimité est suffisante pour participer au vaste effort national pour la tenue d’élections pacifiques et l’avènement d’un ordre politique nouveau. Le code de conduite proposé est alors présenté comme « a set of rules of behavior for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process, to which the parties ideally will voluntarily agree, and which may subsequent to the agreement be incorporated in law ». Les politiciens et leur équipe de campagne doivent signer ce code en tant que garants des droits et libertés des citoyens énoncés par la constitution (I. Art 1 ; 3).12 Un principe central hérité de la séparation des pouvoirs y est rappelé : les candidats doivent mobiliser leurs propres ressources pour faire campagne et ne peuvent faire appel aux pouvoirs de l’État (I. Art 7). Il s’agit ici de définir ce qu’est d’être un « bon leader » ainsi qu’une nouvelle forme de leadership, autour de l’idée que des élections bien conduites seront garantes d’une plus grande démocratisation du pays. La définition du rôle attribué aux représentants élus illustre cette volonté de rupture : le « bon leader » est avant tout défini par la négative. En effet, le code consiste principalement en une succession d’interdictions et la prohibition d’un certain nombre de comportements portant atteinte à la cohésion nationale : interdiction des appels à la violence ou hate speech (I. Art 10 ; 18), de la corruption, de l’achat de voix par la distribution d’argent ou par des fausses promesses faites aux électeurs (I. Art 20), de la consommation d’alcool, des techniques

10 Pour plus de détails, consulter l’article du journal The Star, « Kalenjin Council of Elders replaces Seii as chairman », 28/04/2012 : « Sang takes over just two weeks after the council made a controversial decision to back Eldoret North MP William Ruto as Presidential candidate during the recent Kamatusa meeting in Eldoret. […] Sang said the council had also resolved to restore confidence in the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission following the reinstatement of Ambassador Bethwel Kiplagat as chairman of the truth body. » Lien : http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-20536/kalenjin-council-elders-replaces-seii-chairman 11 Ibid. « […] Yesterday Sang said they will remain politically neutral and work with all political parties especially their presidential candidates. ‘We will recognise and respect all political parties in particular their flag-bearers since the elders council is non-partisan’, said Sang soon after he was elected to head the council which is a key community organ in the Kalenjin community. […] Sang said they had also resolved to work with the NCIC and the provincial administration to ensure that all those seeking elective positions avoid using provocative language during the election campaigns. » 12 Afin de simplifier les références faites aux articles du code de conduite, celui-ci sera divisé en trois parties : je me référerai au Preamble et au Background comme à l’introduction du code. I. Art 1 correspond au premier article de la première partie Regulations and Commitments, et II. Art 1 au premier article de la deuxième partie Compliance and Enforcement.

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d’intimidation (I. Art 27), des violences entre camps partisans (I. Art 11 ; 13 ; 17 ; 20). Enfin, il est clairement rappelé que le jour de l’élection, les candidats ne sont pas autorisés à faire campagne (I. Art 23 ; 25). Bien que la plupart des élus avaient déserté la ville le dernier jour de la campagne, laissant planer un climat d’apparence calme mais très pesant, certains candidats faisaient toujours campagne, distribuant des enveloppes pleines de billets dans les parties les plus reculées du comté, comme ce fut le cas à Kapkangani.13

Au-delà de la redéfinition de ce que doit être un « bon leader » en temps électoral, ce code a pour vocation de consolider la relation qui unit les citoyens à leurs représentants en mettant en place des principes éthiques que les futurs élus locaux et régionaux s’engagent à respecter dès le début de leur campagne et non simplement au début de leur mandat. Cette relation de confiance permettrait de créer un sens du devoir et de l’éthique chez les candidats, ce qui augmenterait par conséquent leur légitimité à gouverner aux yeux de l’ensemble des citoyens kényans, leurs opposants y compris. Cette acceptation des résultats est pensée comme la condition sine qua non pour que le scénario de 2007 et les affrontements qui ont accompagné les accusations de fraude électorale ne se reproduisent pas. Par ailleurs, ce code fonctionne comme une sorte de « bible politique » promue par les anciens et à laquelle les politiciens ont juré allégeance. Ils deviennent ainsi les « prédicateurs de la bonne parole »,14 en s’engageant à diffuser le plus largement possible les préceptes évoqués par le code (II. Art 1) qui doit être présenté comme un élément central de leur campagne (II. Art 2). Le non-respect de ce code est encadré par les autorités kényanes au premier rang desquelles se trouve l’Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commision (IEBC). Toute transgression est passible d’emprisonnement (II. Art. 3) et une série de sanctions graduelles applicables sous l’autorité du responsable régional ou local des élections (Electoral Chief) sont prévues pour le candidat et son parti. Le non- respect de ce code expose également les candidats et leurs partisans aux représailles du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders, dont la fonction est également de punir, par le biais d’ensorcellements, ceux qui vont à l’encontre du bien commun de la communauté nandi.15

13 Je parcourais le comté la veille des élections et ai pu observer à cette occasion la visite d’un candidat à Kapkangani, petite localité située à la frontière nord du comté Nandi, sur la route de Kakamega. 14 La campagne électorale a été marquée par de nombreux discours politiques de type téléologiques. Voir à ce sujet les travaux d’Yvan Droz et d’Hervé Maupeu sur la pentecôtalisation de la politique au Kenya. 15 Les elders ont également pour fonction de jeter des mauvais sorts sur certaines mauvaises personnes désignées par la communauté. Ce fut le cas l’an passé lorsqu’un couple gérant une plantation de thé fut tué par des voleurs. Les elders réalisèrent alors une cérémonie sur le lieu du crime, jetant un sort mortel aux criminels en présence d’une foule importante. Kenya citizen TV, « Nandi Elders perform ceremony to curse family’s killers ». Lien vers la vidéo de la cérémonie : http://youtu.be/ET-5SjiDXmU

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En ce sens, ce code de conduite, s’il rappelle le Electoral Board Code of Conduct diffusé par la commission électorale kényane (IEBC) ou les « goodwill ambassadors »16 désignés pour porter des messages de paix et d’unité par la National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), est une initiative originale. En effet, il est rare que des councils of elders aient mis en place ce type de « directives » dans d’autres comtés du Kenya. Comment se fait-il que le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders ait souhaité la rédaction d’un code de conduite en temps électoral, qui à terme devrait fonctionner comme un véritable « contrat social » entre les électeurs et leurs élus ?

Dès l’introduction, il est précisé que ce code est écrit au nom du peuple nandi, présenté comme une entité rationnelle, consciente des opportunités fournies par le nouveau système administratif décentralisé et de l’impact global des enjeux politiques passés et présents sur le développement du comté. Le développement économique de la communauté, qui a largement été ralenti par les violences post-électorales de 2007-2008 ayant particulièrement touché la région, est un argument redondant du code de conduite. L’industrie du thé y a été ralentie, les ouvriers nandi mais aussi d’origines luo ou kisii ayant dû fuir, tout comme un certain nombre d’investisseurs. Les membres du council of elders ont un certain statut social et économique au sein de la communauté nandi : nombre d’entre eux font partie des entrepreneurs et des investisseurs de la région et occupent des postes clés au sein de l’administration, des médias ou du secteur agro-alimentaire. En ce sens, le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders fonctionne comme un club de notables,17 un groupe d’intérêt fermé dont les portes ne s’ouvrent que par une procédure de cooptation discutée en amont par les pairs. Cette idée se confirme lorsqu’on s’intéresse plus particulièrement à certains préceptes du code de conduite, qui soulignent des intérêts purement économiques : l’introduction mentionne explicitement que ce code s’inspire de la déontologie de secteurs professionnels particuliers (healthcare, finance and legal services), les contribuables y sont présentés comme une faction distincte du corps électoral (Voters and taxpayers) et la mission d’un « bon leader » est également de susciter stabilité et confiance dans la qualité des services et le dynamisme du comté (« instills confidence in the Nandi County’s professional standards and performance »).

16 Ces 25 ambassadeurs de la paix, d’origines ethniques et professionnelles variées (militaires, athlètes, businessmen, intellectuels et artistes), ont été nommés par la NCIC en juillet 2012 dans le cadre de la campagne Kenya Kwanza (« Kenya comes first »). Bien que leur rôle soit avant tout symbolique, ils avaient pour mission de diffuser des discours d’unité et de paix pour que les élections de mars 2013 se déroulent sans heurts. 17 Sur le fonctionnement des groupes de notables locaux et plus particulièrement à Nandi Hills, voir la thèse récemment soutenue par Dominique Connan, La Décolonisation des clubs kényans. Sociabilité exclusive et constitution morale des élites africaines dans le Kenya contemporain, 27 janvier 2014. 187 Numéro Varia

Ainsi, le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders s’exprime moins au nom d’une communauté nandi supposée homogène18 qu’en tant que groupe de notables locaux. Cette idée est renforcée par les modalités selon lesquelles un membre de la communauté acquiert le statut d’elder. Les entretiens que j’ai pu mener auprès de plusieurs elders soulignent que ces derniers s’accordent sur trois points19: le candidat doit être âgé de plus de 55 ans, avoir joué un rôle structurant dans la communauté et être intronisé selon une procédure ritualisée.20 En réalité, les règles pour accéder au statut d’elder apparaissent plus flexibles. Le conservateur du musée de Koitalel Samoei par exemple, âgé d’une trentaine d’année, a rejoint le Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders en 2007 au moment où il a pris ses fonctions au sein du musée. De même, l’un des descendants de Koitalel, journaliste pour le magasine Kass et auteur de la première biographie (très largement romancée) de son aïeul, a également été intronisé à l’unanimité sans respecter la limite d’âge imposée. Pourtant, ce code a un sens particulier pour de nombreux membres de la communauté nandi car il fait écho à une croyance collective, présente dans les conversations quotidiennes et les brochures, les rituels et les discours des membres du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders. Cette croyance se base sur une mémoire collective mise en récit dans le musée de Koitalel Samoei : un imaginaire guerrier qui serait la pierre de touche d’un âge d’or nandi.21 Cet âge d’or aurait pris fin avec un sort lancé il y a plus d’un siècle par leur Oorgoiyot, c’est à dire un chef à la fois politique, militaire et spirituel qui régnait sur les différents sous-groupes nandi, ayant eux-mêmes leurs propres chefs. La communauté aurait été maudite à la suite de la perpétration du meurtre de leur leader de l’époque, Kimnyolei, dont la communauté s’était détournée. Les chefs militaires sous la protection de Kimnyolei avaient refusé d’écouter les oracles de ce dernier, qui empêchaient les différents clans de la communauté de chasser ou de capturer du bétail. Plusieurs chefs désobéirent. En chemin, les guerrier nandi trouvèrent une carcasse de buffle et décidèrent de manger la bête. Tous moururent peu après. Ils décidèrent alors de tuer Kimnyolei, persuadés qu’il avait prononcé un sort mortel à leur encontre, refusant de croire que c’était les Dieux eux-même qui les avaient punis. Omniscient et pouvant prédire l’avenir, Kimnyolei anticipa leur trahison et avant de succomber à leur attaque, il

18 Les Nandi étant bien souvent perçus à l’échelon national comme une communauté essentiellement composée d’employés agricoles peu éduqués de l’industrie du thé, je nuance ici le propos en me référant à la littérature sur l’identité collective et son durcissement lorsqu’elle est envisagée à des fins politiques, et plus particulièrement les travaux de M.-C. Lavabre et de D.-C. Martin. 19 Ces trois points sont formalisés par la constitution du Kalenjin Council of Elders, qui définit le statut de l’association ainsi que son fonctionnement. Voir plus particulièrement l’article 6 de la constitution : Membership of the Council, life-membership, co-optation and entrance fees. 20 Il s’agit d’une cérémonie où l’on offre au nouveau membre un « bâton de pouvoir » (signe distinctif d’une personnalité remarquable) taillé dans de l’olivier sauvage et au cours de laquelle ses mains et ses pieds sont oints de graisse mélangée à du lait caillé. 21 Les Nandi sont régulièrement présentés dans les brochures du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders comme un peuple ayant dominé la région grâce à leur supériorité militaire, leur structure sociale très hiérarchisée et leur unité garantie par l’Orkoiyot, figure type du « bon leader » dévoué à son peuple, omniscient et choisi par les dieux.

188 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est jeta une malédiction sur la communauté tout entière qui ne devrait plus jamais connaître l’harmonie : « He had accursed the Nandi that their leadership will break like a pot ».22 Ce mauvais sort continuerait de hanter tout particulièrement les Nandi et les Kipsigis supposés être les descendants des clans des chefs militaires qui désobéirent à Kimnyolei et planifièrent son assassinat, qui n’ont pas connus de« bon leader » depuis Koitalel Samoei, leur dernier Oorgoiyot qui mena une guerre contre les britanniques pour la possession de l’escarpement Nandi au début du XXème siècle. Cette croyance collective est qualifiée par Gabrielle Lynch de « narratives of communal grievance » qui stipulent que les élites élues s’acharnent à marginaliser la communauté nandi dans la sphère politique.23 L’existence de ce récit s’explique par le rapide turnover des députés issus des communautés Nandi et Kipsigis dans les années 1980, encouragé par le président Moi afin d’éviter qu’une opposition organisée puisse se mettre en place dans la région.24 Ce récit s’explique également par la forte croyance il existait qu’auparavant un lien de confiance transcendantal entre l’Oorgoiyot et sa communauté, qui garantissait permettait aux Nandi le succès de toute entreprise commune et une supériorité sur les autres groupes ou sous-groupes de la région, puissance et harmonie qui auraient été perdues lorsque la communauté se retourna contre son leader. Ainsi, qu’il s’agisse d’une trahison du leader par la communauté ou de la communauté par le leader, la défiance qui lie électeurs et élus constitue le terreau sur lequel des initiatives comme le Nandi Political Code of Conduct voient le jour. Ce code n’est pourtant que partiellement respecté : au-delà des écarts constatés en temps électoral, presqu’un an jour pour jour après l’élection du gouverneur du comté Nandi Cleophas Lagat (URP), une manifestation accusant ce dernier de corruption s’est tenue à Kapsabet le 25 mars 2014.25 Ce code de conduite, loin de se résumer à une simple entreprise d’acteurs nationaux (IEBC), internationaux (l’ONG CCDD) ou locaux (Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders), constitue un formidable outil de compréhension des aspirations politiques d’une communauté dont la marginalité et l’unité sont modelées par des récits et croyances issues d’une mémoire collective en perpétuelle reconstruction. Au vu des enjeux politiques que ce code de conduite représente pour la communauté nandi et de l’importance qu’il aura dans mon travail de thèse, il m’a semblé important de le publier ici en ce qu’il illustre l’articulation complexe des politiques de réconciliation nationale aux enjeux précis portés par les élections locales et régionales pour une communauté ayant sa propre conception en termes de leadership. Plus généralement, ce document original permet de s’interroger sur le rôle joué au Kenya par les councils of elders au niveau local, tant d’un point de vue

22 Cette histoire est explicitée par l’une des brochures du Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders, The Nandi-Talai propiation convention held on 31th December under the auspices of the Nandi Kaburwo Council of Elders. Background on the information of the Talai Clan and the road to propiation, healing and reconciliation. 23 Gabrielle Lynch, I say to you. Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya, 2011, p. 128. 24 Gabrielle Lynch, Ibid, p. 129. 25 Cet événement est relaté par plusieurs blogs nandi (comme le groupe The Nandi County News sur facebook) ou encore l’article du journal The Star, 25/03/2014, « Nandi police stops demo by civil groups ». Lien : http:// www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-160164/nandi-police-stop-demo-civil-groups 189 Numéro Varia

social et identitaire qu’économique et politique.

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III - RECENSIONS / BOOK REVIEWS Tamthilia Mbili za Kifaranza : Michezo À partir d’un corpus de paroles de chansons ya Mfalme (Le Roi s’amuse), Victor Hugo en swahili recueillies à Lubumbashi en na Kanuni kwa Kuishi Maisha ya Kisaa RDC, l’auteur y poursuit son analyse de (Les règles du savoir-vivre dans la société « l’existentialisme implicite » des textes moderne), Jean-Luc Lagarce, Mfasiri romanesques et poétiques africains. Après (traduction) Marcel Kalunga Mwela-Ubi, avoir introduit l’œuvre du musicien auteur- + Utangulizi wa Mchapishaji (préface de compositeur, Sando Marteau, elle s’emploie l’éditeur), Dar-Es-Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota, à en démontrer la dimension philosophique 2013, 132 p. à travers notamment une analyse du temps tel qu’il est traité dans ses textes. L’ouvrage C’est à Marcel Kalunga, professeur de swahili contient de nombreuses paroles de chansons à l’Université de Lubumbashi et de Kalemie traduites du swahili de Lubumbashi au français, en RDC que l’on doit ces deux traductions de un corpus méconnu que seul l’ouvrage dirigé par pièces de Molière et Lagarce, publiées chez Bogumil Jewsiewicki avait contribué à diffuser Mkuki na Nyota. L’ouvrage est flanqué d’une de manière significative (Musique urbaine préface de l’éditeur qui invite le lecteur à ne pas au Katanga. De Malaika à Santu Kimbangu, s’étonner de la variante linguistique particulière Paris, L’Harmattan, 2003). (Maëline Le Lay) employée dans ces traductions : celle de la RDC. Déplorant une position normative à l’égard de la langue utilisée par les écrivains Brennan, James R. Taifa : Making Nation en Tanzanie, l’éditeur fait remarquer qu’à force and Race in Urban Tanzania, Ohio University de chercher une langue locale unificatrice de Press, 2012. la nation, on a certes réussi à supplanter les langues européennes pour l’usage officiel, mais Cet ouvrage de James Brennan, maître de on a aussi, dans le même temps, découragé conférence à l’université d’Illinois après la diversité linguistique. Il est donc urgent, un parcours d’enseignant à la School of insiste-t-il, d’accueillir des traductions en Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), retrace swahili de textes étrangers mais aussi des l’émergence des idées de race et de nation textes écrits dans des variantes différentes du (toutes deux désignées par le même swahili swahili, comme celle du Congo, qu’il appelle de taifa) à Dar es Salaam dans les années le kingwana. Quoique cette appellation ne soit 1940-1960. Rassemblant en partie des articles pas du tout en usage au Congo, ce préambule universitaires déjà publiés à partir sa thèse, a ceci de remarquable qu’il plaide clairement l’auteur montre comment la race, utilisée pour pour une reconnaissance de cette variante penser les différences entre Indiens et Arabes, comme langue littéraire au même titre que est non seulement un produit de l’histoire n’importe quelle autre, ce qui n’a rien d’évident au Congo. (Maëline Le Lay) sociale, économique et légale, mais aussi urbaine, de la capitale du Tanganyika, mais ont aussi été des outils pour penser et agir, divisant Alena Rettová, Chanter l’existence : la les populations spatialement, culturellement et poésie de Sando Marteau et ses horizons politiquement. L’ouvrage prend place dans une philosophiques, Středokluky, Zdeněk Susa, historiographie américaine sur le Tanganyika / la 2013, 239 p. + 23 p. de photographies. Tanzanie qui interroge les causes et les effets de Le dernier ouvrage d’Alena Rettová, la race (voir Jonathon Glassman sur Zanzibar) professeur de littérature swahili à SOAS, en insistant sur les racines locales d’une pensée s’inscrit dans la continuité de son précédent raciale, plutôt que de l’appréhender uniquement ouvrage, Afrophone philosophies. Reality and comme réappropriation de catégories coloniales Challenge (Středokluky, Zdeněk Susa, 2007).. importées. (Marie-Aude Fouéré)

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Oonk, Gijsbert. Settled Strangers : Asian majeures et dans lesquelles la dimension Business Elites in East Africa, 1800-2000, politique est fondamentale (voir le compte- Sage Publication, 2013. rendu de Josias Semujanga dans le n°22 de la revue Etudes Littéraires Africaines - ELA). Après de nombreux travaux sur les (Maëline Le Lay). communautés indo-pakistanaises d’Afrique de l’Est (telle sa biographie de la grande famille John Kiyaya. Photographe tanzanien et les Jivanjee), Gijsbert Oonk, maître de conférence à gens du Lac Tanganyika, Dar es Salaam : l’université Erasmus des Pays Bas, revient dans Mkuki na Nyota, 2013. cet ouvrage sur l’histoire de l’entreprenariat de ces familles venues du sous-continent indien. Settled Strangers reprend des thèmes Un ouvrage unique rassemblant une série de bien connus de tous ceux qui s’intéressent à photographies de John Kiyaya, photographe l’histoire des relations entre anciens occupants tanzanien découvert et soutenu par Jean Rolin. et nouveaux arrivants en situation coloniale, Avec des textes de John Kiyaya, Jean Rolin, et insiste sur l’impossible intégration de ces Alain Ricard, Kapwani Kiwanga, François populations restées en positions intermédiaires Bart, et un entretien entre John Kiyaya et Walter dans les hiérarchies sociales et les Bgoya, directeur de la maison d’édition Mkuki fonctionnements socioéconomiques. (Marie- na Nyota, le tout en français, en anglais et en Aude Fouéré) swahili, ce qui est une très belle performance. Ces photographies, principalement des portraits et des scènes de vie pris sur le vif Garnier (Xavier), The Swahili Novel. ou posés, illustrent le quotidien des villageois Challenging the idea of ‘Minor Literature’, et des pêcheurs du sud du lac Tanganyika, la Woodbridge : James Currey, 2013, 195 région d’origine de Kiyaya. Comme l’indique p. Traduit du français par Rémi Armand François Bart (p.34), « (l)es photographies Tchokhote et Frances Kennett. de John Kiyaya révèlent des hommes et des paysages, des hommes dans des paysages » Premier ouvrage en français sur le roman dans une Tanzanie rurale et laborieuse, tout à swahili, le livre de Xavier Garnier est désormais la fois moderne et traditionnelle. (Marie-Aude accessible aux anglophones, notamment ceux Fouéré) d’Afrique de l’Est pour qui l’ouvrage viendra désormais compléter le champ d’études critiques en anglais portant sur la littérature swahili. Toutefois, par rapport à ces travaux antérieurs, l’essai apporte une dimension supplémentaire en proposant d’envisager ce corpus littéraire par le biais de la notion de « littérature mineure ». Empruntée à Kafka, elle est développée par Gille Deleuze et Félix Guattari dans leur essai Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure (1975) pour désigner des littératures qui font un usage mineur de langues

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