Grassroots and Rebellion: a Study on the Future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines

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Citation for published version (APA): Podder, S., & Ozerdem, A. (2012). Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines. Civil Wars, 14(4), 521. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.740202

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Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines

Alpaslan Özerdem & Sukanya Podder

To cite this article: Alpaslan Özerdem & Sukanya Podder (2012) Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines, Civil Wars, 14:4, 521-545, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2012.740202 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.740202

Published online: 04 Jan 2013.

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ALPASLAN O¨ ZERDEM AND SUKANYA PODDER

An important aspect in the resolution of civil conflict pertains to the political transition of rebel groups, dissipation of their command structures and reintegration of former combatants. In this paper, we draw on empirical data collected in select communities of Lanao, Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces of Mindanao, Philippines during June 2010 to explore future trends in civilian support for the main separatist rebel outfit in Mindanao – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). We test variance in the existence of recruitment pools among the two main Muslim ethnic groups – the Maranao and the Maguindanao. Our findings suggest that recruitment into MILF is not simply about religion or ideology, this is a simplification of its underlying support base. Several factors such as geographic location, especially proximity to Armed Forces of the Philippines camps, and conflict-related impacts of displacement, together with disparity in governance delivery levels, have resulted in divergence in levels of support for the Bangsamoro struggle between the two main ethnic groups. These variables will have an impact on the future existence of the MILF as a rebel movement.

INTRODUCTION Community-combatant relations in civil conﬂict is today evolving as an important area of research; it draws on the trends in rebel group behaviour towards civilian communities that is well documented in recent research on insurgent and political violence.1 Rebel group–community interaction is a principal and agent relationship that can be mutually reinforcing, predatory, and protective or even symbiotic.2 Rebels rely on civilians to provide them sanctuary, provisions, information and other resources.3 Yet, for a positive support relationship, rebel groups need to transcend from being roving bandits to stationary providers of social services, prominently governance, justice, law enforcement and security.4 Key trends in current research highlight the nature of rebellion as being the primary determinant of rebel behaviour. Opportunistic rebellions permit indiscipline in their ranks to maintain membership and retain recruits. Predation is closely tied with limited access and heightened competition for resources and recruitment pools.5 Insurgent violence offers a strategic tool for controlling local population and

Civil Wars, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2012), pp. 521–545 ISSN 1369-8249 print/ISSN 1743-968X online http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.740202 q 2012 Taylor & Francis 522 CIVIL WARS resources critical for group sustenance. Another strand of research investigates presence or lack of group competition and active rivalry as the defining variable of rebel behaviour.6 Civilians are at the centre of competing incentives from the rebel and government forces for loyalty, support and local resources. Selective incentives in the arena of public services, wages or security by either side may make affiliation fluid and contingent on who offers better benefits. Legal power wielded by the state may compensate for weak capacity by adding the leverage of imprisonment, and reprisal by the military.7 Targeted violence on civilians may seek to offset or undermine the government’s primary role of protection, making it imperative to rely on stronger rebels for security in areas controlled by them. Credible security guarantees from rebels can incentivise civilian support for them.8 Changes in rebel–civilian relations are relative to rebel capability and dynamic of insurgent-government contest. Hence, sympathy for and collaboration with rebels is contingent on the latter’s ability to protect in the long term.9 Conversely, indiscriminate violence may render civilians indifferent in their support to either side or simply lead them to evacuate.10 Organisational weakness can translate into violence directed towards civilians since governance provision and related benefits are less likely to be offered making it difficult to secure loyalty through peaceful means.11 Strong rebel groups often present a mix of selective incentives and selective repression to entice support. Counterinsurgency strategies by the government that is premised on indiscriminate regime violence can also undermine local support and result in turning rebels into preferred security providers. Today, rebel group and civilian interaction during conflict is of theoretical interest, also because of a growing interrogation into the dynamics of rebel group transition. How rebel groups transform in the post-conflict period can be related to their relationship with civilians and their pool of civilian support in war time. Roots of legitimacy, civilian support base and structures of governance, comprising prototypical state functions, germinate during conflict itself. These may prove to be enduring and can consolidate into legitimate political power when rebellions successfully transform into elected government. An important issue here is rebel governance. Effectiveness of rebel governance is embedded in an evolution of territorial control and relies on political legitimacy and support from the local population. In establishing hegemony or control, sustainability of rebel governance relies on consent as opposed to coercion.12 Trends in pre-conflict relations between state and society, together with ethnic composition and ideological motivation of rebel groups, impinge on design and conduct of rebel- led civil administration. Rebel groups need to transform into stationary bandits, hence the emphasis is on sustainability of rebel governance through civilian consent rather than coercive subjugation or conformity. This ‘stationary bandit thesis’ views rebel behaviour towards civilian communities and governance provisions as precursors to a new state apparatus.13 Despite current focus on these related themes, the community’s role in conflict continues to be an understudied element in civil war research. This paper seeks to FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 523 address this gap by exploring strong versus waning support in the context of long-duration civil conflicts using the case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, Philippines. Focus of the analysis will be to understand how conflict dynamics have shifted over time, and what that means for the role of communities in the recruitment of combatants into the MILF. To undertake such an exploration, the next section will first present an overview of the Mindanao conflict. Having presented the field research methodology and general findings from the questionnaire survey that was conducted with 229 households in Mindanao in June 2010, the paper will then present its analysis in the following section. Finally, the conclusions will focus around the question of future trends in civilian support for the MILF and whether the group is nearing its demise in light of a crumbling power base.

BACKGROUND TO THE MINDANAO CONFLICT The history and root cause of the Mindanao conflict, together with the evolution of the Moro resistance, have been well documented in recent literature on the subject.14 The important themes pertain to successive colonial policies of exclusion, land dispossession, resettlement and organisation of indigenous ethnic groups under an overarching Islamic identity. Revivalist responses among the 13 Islamised ethno- linguistic groups or the Bangsamoro15 people transformed in time from the Muslim Independence Movement to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).16 Factionalism and splits in this movement matched by a progressive dilution of objectives from separation to autonomy on part of the MNLF resulted in the formation of the more radical group – the MILF, which continued to demand independence.17 Peace negotiations and a policy of accommodation on part of the central government over time resulted in the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) that is planned to include 15 provinces and their component cities. It seeks to offer a democratic palliative for Muslim aspirations under the Tripoli Agreement (1976) (see Figure 1). The 1996 Jakarta Peace Agreement launched a demobilisation and reintegration process for the MNLF, yet the MILF continues with the broader separatist vision of a Muslim homeland (Bangsamoro).18 The three provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato that were selected to examine civilian support for the MILF provide important inroads into understanding the complexity of conflict in Mindanao.19 Maguindanao has been the main operating base of the MILF. It figures as one of the 10 poorest provinces of the Philippines, and has low educational attainment with only 42 per cent of its population having completed elementary education.20 Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte were created from the united province of Lanao in 1959, with Marawi city and Iligan city as designated capitals. Under the Marcos administration, Lanao del Sur was incorporated into Region XII along with five other provinces following successful negotiations with the MNLF and later became part of the ARMM following referendum in 1997. Lanao del Sur borders Maguindanao and 524 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 1 MAP OF MINDANAO REGIONS AND ARMM

North Cotabato to its south and lies at the centre of Islamic political and judicial decision-making in Mindanao. Political decisions such as the ‘Taritib’ and the ‘Ijma’ govern legal institutions, public order and regulate sociocultural life of the people in the ARMM.21 In the 1970s, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte were the political turfs of two strong clans and dynasties – the Dimaporo clan in Lanao del Sur and the Quibranza clan in Lanao del Norte. Through years of violent feuds, the two clans agreed to settle their differences through intermarriage. Local politics dominated by these powerful clans adds a distinct layer to the conflict, with candidates offering to protect Christians against MILF attacks, or aligning with either the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police as well as the MILF to serve their own political interests. Successive migration and resettlement has changed the configuration of the Lanao provinces and today nearly 60 per cent of Lanao del Norte is Christian, while nearly 100 per cent of Lanao del Sur remains Maranao. Moro territorial claims over six municipalities of Lanao del Norte and some barangays of Iligan City also informed the 2008 clashes with attacks on municipalities of Kauswagan and Kolambugan and the Iligan City bombings in August 2008 as reflective of the public FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 525 debate on the ‘Ancestral Domain’ question,22 particularly the rejection of the MILF territorial claims and expansion of the present ARMM. The Lanao provinces are among the most heavily militarised provinces of the country. In Lanao del Norte, the AFP has deployed four infantry battalions (IBs)23 from the 4th and 1st infantry divisions (IDs), namely 8th IB and 10th IB of the 4th ID and 32nd IB and 35th IB of the 1st ID. These units are reinforced by the 42nd Special Army Mobile Company and all are poised against the 102nd Base Command of the MILF under Commander Abdullah Makapaar alias Kumander Bravo.24 In Lanao del Sur, the AFP has four IBs, namely 33rd IB of the 1st ID (based in Marawi City), 5th IB of the 1st ID (based in Malabang), 65th IB of the 9th ID (based in Balindong) and 69th IB of the 9th ID (based in Marawi City). These are poised against the 103rd and 116th base commands of the MILF. The 103rd base command is under Commander Aleem Pangalian and operates in the Lanao del Sur–Lanao del Norte boundary, while the 116th Command operates in the coastal areas connecting Zamboanga del Sur and Maguindanao. Deployment of these battalions by the Philippine Army seems to have an impact on the community–recruitment nexus. The AFP units are advised by American soldiers based in Lanao by virtue of the Visiting Forces Agreement (pre 9/11) and subsequently as a consequence of military and intelligence cooperation under the counter-terrorism campaign of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’25 The MILF’s military capability has waned in recent years, due to defection and split in its ranks. Conservative estimates have suggested its military unit, the Bangsamoro Islamic Army (BIAF), to consist of 8,000–11,000 men.26 Previously, it was organised in camp structures that became pockets of autonomous existence outside of government control and duplicated as self-sustainable communities.27 These were destroyed in 2000 under the Joseph Estrada administration’s ‘all out war’ policy. The MILF political structure is headed by a central committee that presides over all important policy decisions. There is an Executive Council that governs administration, and prior to its destruction in 2000 Camp Abu Bakar was home to the general headquarters and National Guard Divisions of the MILF. These have now been reorganised and streamlined into compact units spread across MILF strongholds in North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte. Pre-empting on quasi-state governance functions, the MILF runs Islamic courts for dispute settlement based on Sharia law, and has appointed a Barangay28 Chairman in each municipality in consultation with municipal structures and contingent on the Central Committee’s approval. The Islamic Salvation Force (ISF) provides military oversight to activities at the barangay level for enforcement and defence-related matters. Every barangay has an ISF platoon that conducts community policing and ensures contiguity with broader principles of Islamic administration.29 The MILF has attempted to create such grass-roots structures to embed its presence in governance at the different levels of barangay, municipality and district administrative units. The MILF has pursued a deliberate political strategy of institutionalising task-oriented, community-friendly ‘political committee setups’ to perform a range of socio- economic, cultural and political functions to replicate the model of a microstate. The MILF administrative structure has named these units ‘Political Committee setups.’30 526 CIVIL WARS

This has resulted in the creation of a parallel system of governance that works in the background and shadows the presence of elected officials with its own set of functionaries. Given the grass-roots character of this group, the AFP traditionally has found it difficult to gather information on movement and loci of MILF members, due to the close camaraderie, support and protective attitude of community members towards the group. The Army in response has created civil defences militias at the barangay level called Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) since 1987.31 These replaced the Integrated Civilian Home Defence Force structures prevalent under the Marcos regime and function in the nature of a citizen’s armed force under the control of the AFP. Each CAFGU member is assigned to a particular AFP commander and attached to a manoeuvre battalion in that geographic area. In 2006, there were 52,748 active CAFGU auxiliaries.32 They are well remunerated with a subsistence pay of 900 pesos, roughly 25–30 USD per month (2010 figures), in addition to other allowances.33 There are also civilian voluntary organisations (CVOs) or Barangay Tanod (village watch) that are sanctioned and organised by the national state authorities. These are responsible for village community policing in the areas of crime prevention, monitoring and coordination with the local Peace and Order Council office. They mainly engage in intelligence and information gathering, neighbourhood watch and with medical, traffic or emergency assistance. Some CVO units are armed and function in coordination with AFP commanders.34 Private armies maintained by local business elites and politicians complicate the matrix of armed auxiliary groups in Mindanao further. Despite competition between the main rebel groups and the government forces, at a local level, there appears to be a high level of camaraderie between communities and rebel group members. Loyalties are strongly aligned along MNLF/MILF areas of control, especially areas close to their active or latent camps. However, with growing AFP presence in the form of battalion units, CAFGU and CVO personnel, an interesting balancing act among competing security providers at the community level is noticeable. Apart from creating a grass-roots presence, the MILF has also engaged with the international community to secure legitimacy and recognition for its struggle. Diplomatically, it has sought active third-party involvement in talks to create pressure on the government for implementing agreed points of action as part of the ongoing peace negotiations.35 Stalled talks resumed in August 2008; however, attacks by MILF commanders Bravo and Umra Kato against Christian villages in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the memorandum of agreement on Ancestral Domain spurred a strong military response. In August 2009, the government unilaterally announced suspension of military attacks, which was reciprocated by the MILF. The ancestral domain question remains a tricky issue in any future peace pact, since it proposes to secure a territory of self-governance. There are minority tribal communities such as the Subanen ethnic groups of the Zamboanga peninsula and the Kolibugan community who wish to opt out of this future Moro homeland as defined by the MILF peace panel negotiators.36 With a change in leadership and advent of President Aquino to power in July 2010, greater international involvement has been FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 527 introduced. An international contact group that includes four third-party governments (UK, Turkey, Japan and Saudi Arabia) and four international non-governmental organisations (Asia Foundation, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources and Muhammadiyah) is now in place. Following a brief lull, parties returned to talks in early 2011. Meetings were held in February and later in June; the February negotiations saw the MILF panel handing in a revised comprehensive draft package (updating on the January 2010 draft) that articulated an asymmetrical state or a Moro sub-state solution. The underlying objective is to secure expanded autonomy rather than separation.37

FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND GENERAL SURVEY FINDINGS In June 2010, a household survey was administered to grasp nuances of the MILF and community interaction better. The survey was written in English and later translated into Maranao and Maguindanao dialects. It comprised 13 sections, it started by coding general demographic information, followed by entries on specifics of an individual household, with respect to age, gender, marital status and educational attainment of household members, followed by a section on socio-economic profile, income, assets, food security, health access, water, sanitation, education, political mobilisation and involvement in communal organisations. Recruitment dynamics were coded under sections on role of family and community in recruitment and youth involvement in MILF. Issues of MNLF reintegration, socio-economic disparity, inter-tribal rivalry and the future of the Bangsamoro struggle were also explored. Our field research partners were Mindanao Tulong Bakwet (MTB) Inc. in Maguindanao and North Cotabato, and Birth-Dev Inc. in Lanao del Norte. Both agencies provided support in the recruitment of university graduates/researchers to administer the survey. Selection of the communities combined conflict-affectedness variables with representativeness of the Maranao and Maguindanao communities vis- a`-vis population distribution in selected provinces. A total of 229 household surveys were enumerated. Each survey interview took 45 minutes–1 hour and was administered by a research team debriefed on ethics and methods. Before administering the survey, we trained the local researchers and undertook a brief pilot in the Kauswagan area. At the end of each day, surveys were reviewed, team meetings were held, reports circulated and the team members shared their reflections on the process so that discrepancies could be noted. Table 1 provides a list of barangays (villages) in which the household survey was administered. Out of 229 household surveys, 148 (65 per cent) questionnaires were completed in Lanao del Norte, 49 of them (21 per cent) in North Cotabato and 32 of them (14 per cent) in Maguindanao. In terms of the municipality of residence, majority of our household sample was from Munai, followed by Pikit and Iligan city38 (see Figure 2). With respect to tribal affiliation in the survey sample, 65 per cent of respondents belonged to the Maranao group while 35 per cent belonged to the Maguindanao ethnic group. 528 CIVIL WARS

TABLE 1 RESEARCH SITES

Lanao del Norte Maguindanao North Cotabato

Mahayahay Buayan Nalapan Upper Hinaplanon–Cabaro Magaslung Batulawan Tambacan Kintangu Dalingaoen Cadulawan Dapiawan – Panggao Simuay – Tambo Muti – Dilabayan Bagan – Indukan Tanuel – Poona Piagapo Taviran – Munai – –

The research process involved challenges of limited time, long distance travel to remote communities and physical/road access issues, especially in Lanao del Sur that was initially part of our sampling plan. This issue of inaccessibility was balanced by interviewing elite leaders and residents displaced from Lanao del Sur who were resident in Iligan or in Maguindanao – areas where we could freely administer the survey. As the subject matter researched is highly sensitive, a number of biases in the responses received were considered by the research methodology. We are aware of these potential biases and they have been addressed in our analysis to the greatest extent possible. To mitigate biases during data collection, other

FIGURE 2 MUNICIPALITY OF RESIDENCE FOR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SAMPLE

40 30.13% Count 69

20.52% 19.65% 20 47 45 13.97% 32 9.61% 22 4.37% 10 1.75% 0 4 Illigan city Munai Kauswagan Datu saudi Guindulungan Pikit Cotabato city Respondent's municipality FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 529 participatory research methods were employed as a means of triangulation if and when needed. Selection of local researchers from organisations with a long history of working with local communities was another way of dealing with the potential challenge of biased responses. A range of qualitative methods including elite interviews, key informant interviews39 and community-based timeline exercises with leaders, women and youth helped incorporate elements of rapid rural appraisal techniques. These contributed to a deeper understanding of community-level perceptions, which is reflected in our analysis. Two main limitations with results remain. Random selection of houses for administering the survey has contributed to a partially representative sample of total population in the barangays selected. Another source of limitation is translation bias, due to a problem of double translation in some instances from Maranao to Tagalog. The household survey exercise in these communities produced mixed results. While in some barangays, we met civilian families who openly admitted to being proud members of MILF, in other cases there was fear, hesitance and even refusal to take part in the exercise. Support for the MILF movement is premised on a strong ideological basis for support. In our earlier study centred on a small caseload of Maranao child soldiers part of the rebel group in Lanao del Norte, we found a strong religious basis for support and explored the critical role of family in recruitment.40 However, is religion the only motivation for participation? We sought to test the robustness of this relationship further by broadening our caseload and focusing on the families and communities to understand what explains the decision to enlist and the rationale for participation, especially what accounts for variant participation in the MILF movement from among the two main ethnic groups – the Maranao and Maguindanao. First of all, we questioned the respondents’ support according to different provinces, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows a breakdown of family members who had joined the MILF movement over the last 20 years in the households we surveyed. Furthermore, we probed support according to different types of family and community members joining the MILF, as shown in Figure 5. Overall, looking at inter-group variance, it was evident that despite a smaller representation from the Maguindanao tribe among our respondents, they displayed greater propensity towards having a relative in the MILF. As Figure 5 delineates, greater number of households among the Maranao tribe reported not having any family member in the MILF. In our bivariate analysis, we found that there is strong relation between family support for the decision to join disaggregated by province and municipality. Among the three provinces, Maguindanao exhibited 93.8 per cent support (see Figure 6). Disaggregation by province on youth joining the MILF as part of intra-factional conflict (2008–2009) produced mixed responses. Among the three provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato, Maguindanao households testified to have witnessed a greater proportion of willing young recruits as part of fresh appeals for recruitment, followed closely by North Cotabato. In Lanao del Norte, there was a higher incidence of youth willingness in some pockets, such as 530 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 3 SUPPORT FOR DECISION TO JOIN MILF ACCORDING TO PROVINCES

100 Province with most conflct Maguindanao North cotabato 80 Lanao del Norte Lanao del Sur

Count (%) 40

0 No Yes Support for decision

FIGURE 4 FAMILY MEMBER JOINING MILF (1990–2010)

150

100 (%)

127

Count 55.46% 50

66 28.82%

29 12.66% 3 4 0 1.31% 1.75% None Father Mother Son Daughter Relative FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 531

FIGURE 5 TRENDS ON SUPPORT FOR DECISION TO JOIN BY TRIBE

100

Respondent's tribe Maranoao 80 Maguindanao

(%) 60

Count 40

0 None Father Son Daughter Relative Family member joining MILF

FIGURE 6 SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION OF JOINING MILF ACCORDING TO CASE STUDY PROVINCES

100 Province of residence Maguindanao Lanao del norte 80 North cotabato

60 (%)

Count 40

0 No Yes Support for decision 532 CIVIL WARS

Cadulawan, and less fresh recruitment in Panggao and Poona Piagapo, which have been important support bases for the MILF historically.41

PUSH AND PULL FACTORS FOR JOINING MILF Cumulative responses from our sample suggest three main reasons for youth participation in the MILF. The survey indicated that poverty (54 per cent) rather than religion (31 per cent) ranked as the main reason for participation in the MILF. This was followed by bravery (12 per cent); ‘other factors’ included mixed responses citing revenge, rido42 and the excitement surrounding the notion of being a future commander as motivational variables. However, it has to be emphasised that recruitment in rebel ranks in Mindanao is unlike most contexts in Africa. While poverty, displacement, homelessness and familial separation are generic push factors for recruitment across conflict contexts, in Mindanao, there are certain outlier variables that figure prominently in encouraging participation. Having a family member in the MILF was the main push factor for voluntary recruitment. Although coercion was not cited as relevant to the recruitment process, there is an abiding element of fear among civilian respondents. Fear of AFP among civilians has an impact on recruitment dynamics. Pre-recruitment characteristics of political and ideological sympathies reinforce Islamist narratives of exclusion, cultural markers of commitment and sacrifice drawing on faith-based motivations of participation. Culturally being a soldier appeared to be traditionally coveted, and joining the Bangsamoro struggle a much respected decision, which was sanctioned by family and community support. However, these factors are not universal and revisionist trends in support were evident across the three provinces where the survey was administered. Maximum and evenly distributed support was evident in Maguindanao, where socio-economic status was also better compared to Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato provinces. In some instances, respondents admitted that a family member had volunteered to avenge the death of a close family member or to defend their community. Coercion was absent and ideological, cultural and sociological issues of low education, lack of opportunities and poverty appeared to be more robust reasons for joining in support of the Bangsamoro political objectives. In some respects, Moro society has traditionally created a cultural norm by expecting youth to join the struggle for their homeland. Families and communities, in this context, serve as key agents who support youth participation in the movement, creating an indirect push factor. Muslim families are also more conservative and have historically avoided secular education, opting to send children for training in MILF ranks, where they receive instruction in military drills on how to fight, how to survive without food, madrassah education and regular Koran classes. There are religious seminars to ensure that prayer and religion are imbibed as protection,43 and training in self-defence, skills that are critical for survival in this environment. Hence, youth’s learning trajectory is often responsible for willing enrolment in the MILF. Yet, their FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 533 education is often abrupt or truncated, since this form of learning is different from regular schooling. Among family members joining the MILF and in light of the household’s support for this decision in the past, most respondents cited some form of support for the MILF. Some admitted to having a relative as part of the group, this response was followed closely by that of ‘having their father in the MILF or MNLF’. Few cited current participation by their own children. This lack of transparency and hesitation towards sharing information is closely linked with overarching suspicion regarding MILF-related research or enquiries. As Muslim families become more exposed to developments in the outside world, fear of secular schooling is decreasing; this can help explain an incipient shift in the participation rationale for youth in MILF ranks. Some youth today choose not to join, as one respondent suggested, ‘We have experience of conflict, young people have experience of conflict – we can refuse to be part, we simply evacuate, and yet be supporters.’44 In other words, there was little association between level of education and support for the decision to join the MILF. Similarly, there was greater support from respondents in active employment, undermining the common assumption of low education and unemployment being triggers for rebel recruitment. Majority of our respondents reported completing secular primary education (71.18 per cent) although in most cases this was complemented by madrassah education during weekends. As can be seen in Figure 7, the survey also questioned the significance of type of education in influencing community support for joining the MILF.

FIGURE 7 TYPE OF EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR JOINING MILF.

100 Type of education Religious 80 Secular Other

60 (%)

Count 40

0 No Ye s Support for decision 534 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 8 DIFFERENT HOUSEHOLD GOODS OWNED BY HOUSEHOLDS

120

100

(%) 80

60 125

Frequency Frequency 40

50 20

20 16 17 1 0 No asset Radio Tv Refrigerator Mobile Multiple Household asset phone assets

Drawing on our ﬁeld observation, we felt that the Maguindanaon families had better socio-economic status, and chose to support the MILF monetarily rather than sending in their children to ﬁght. We probed the issue further by coding household assets (see Figure 8). In this exercise, greater number of Maranao households (30/50) reported a complete lack of basic household assets compared to their Maguindanaon counterparts. Finally, there are some key inter-faith issues that we explored through the survey. Inter-group cooperation was the predominant trend in Muslim–Christian relations, especially in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte. Preliminary correlations suggest that respondents who felt that Christians were good neighbours also exhibited strong faith that a negotiated peace can be secured for the Moro struggle. In Lanao del Norte, maximum respondents felt that Christians were good neighbours (Figure 9).45

ANALYSIS: MILF AND CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT Near MILF camps, the population is closely related to MILF commanders, and the area is controlled by them, with inhabitants constituting immediate and extended family. As distance from the camps increases, area control is mixed with presence of MNLF commanders in pockets, while other barangays are having a strong CAFGU presence due to AFP influence. In the total respondent sample, non-disaggregated by province, 56.77 per cent respondents admitted to having an MILF commander from their village, while 43.23 per cent reported no such affiliational link. MILF commanders enjoy respect and control cadres locally, enhancing their influence and standing in the communities. Tribal affiliation as a variable influencing loyalty of communities is restricted to elite-level competition within the organisation, and does not impact on community FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 535

FIGURE 9 FEELINGS TOWARDS CHRISTIANS IN THE COMMUNITIES

250

200

(%) 150

Count 218 100 95.20%

10 1 0 4.37% 0.44% Good/ Occupy Have Should Other neighbourly our land better jobs go back

Feeling about Christians support/behaviour for participation into the MILF ranks. The Moro struggle attracts overarching support from all Muslim groups – in responding to the call of Islam, issues of organisational or tribal loyalty are often viewed as secondary. This view undermines the nuances of community support. Many pious Muslims in the Southern Philippines remain loyal to their subgroups in the first instance. Similarly, a considerable number of Muslim communities do not feel compelled to take up arms against the state. These nuances help undermine stereotypes about community support for the MILF. Today it is personalities within the groups who are fighting for prominence, especially with a new crop of radical commanders such as Bravo and Umra Kato leaving the fold; weakness in the MILF is a result of intra-organisational power struggle rather than inter-tribal rivalry between Maranao and Maguindanao communities at a grass-roots level. At the same time, there is war weariness in the voices of residents in Lanao del Norte in particular. Field observations indicate important differences between Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte. In the former community, residents are proud, fearless, and less hesitant in admitting participation, and support for the MILF. In Lanao del Norte, reverse variables of fear, secrecy, hesitance and denial are operative. Local researchers administering the survey reported greater level of transparency in admitting support and participation in the MILF movement among residents of Munai, Tambo Dilabayan, Panggao and Cadulawan. They recorded least support and disenchantment with the movement in Mahayahay, Upper Hilapanon and Tambacan. In our analysis, the main reason for waning support seems to be poverty and economic difficulty. Given that the MILF does not pay salary to its recruits, respondents admitted that they had to pay their own expenses during camp training, which made 536 CIVIL WARS things difficult. Another issue cited was difficulty of access to the fighters. Repeated AFP attacks as aerial bombardment on camps and communities adjacent to them, have also resulted in large-scale displacement. Today MILF fighters are based in remotely located forest areas of Tanclao, Gorain and Butig forests.46 Despite these factors, civilians remain sympathetic to the cause in selective pockets. In Maguindanao, community members in Muti, for instance, admitted that at times MILF commanders request boys from the village to go to the camp for training or labour support functions, and most boys are sent voluntarily, since these commanders may be relatives. In case of appeal for donations, residents also give willingly and without coercion. One youth we interviewed in Muti had served as a messenger for the MILF. He expressed interest in sending his boys for MILF training once they had completed schooling and 18 years old. ‘They will be supporters of MILF we are the same bloodline ...eventually they will support.’47 However, there was divergence of views on the content of this ‘giving’ and the ‘willingness’ of support. ‘The rich give money, while the poor give their lives.’48 Community residents in Maguindanao admitted to giving ‘zakat’ and especially among the wealthier Muslim families. A barangay official in Cadulawan admitted, ‘the people will give support in secret – food, money and even our sons. Now children are being sent to school, good if Mujahideen will be educated.’49 In Lanao del Norte, poverty in the rural communities was higher, and disenchantment with the future of the movement greater. In urban pockets such as Iligan city, a greater interest in secular education among youth has resulted in less willingness to join rebel ranks; youth wanted a better future for themselves and felt rebel life was hard. This variance in the provincial support trends reflects a deeper anathema – that of the MILF losing ground, and direction, gradually cornered by the government’s military machine. Other issues pertain to divergent socio-economic well-being levels between provinces. A proximity to AFP base camps, distance from MILF positions and competing political sympathies of provincial governors were also important variables.50 The difficulties created by the presence of AFP and CAFGU were elaborated by an inactive member of the BIAF in Cadulawan, which is five barangays away from Camp Munai. He elaborated that, all people here are MILF supporters, nobody is active fighter with MILF – mainly because times are difficult ...if the men leave the house there are no funds to support the family. All Muslims are MILF, those in the forest are active, we are their friends and relatives in Cadulawan, however they are not visiting us often because of AFP presence. The AFP through CAFGU is getting information about MILF in these communities...51 Among internally displaced people (IDPs) from Tangclao who had evacuated to Pantawan, the village schoolmaster shared how loss of territory to the AFP has reduced MILF’s influence in the communities: all Muslims support MILF, however military presence makes it difficult for MILF to live amongst us. The MILF was here in Pantawan before, there were FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 537

families of MILF before, they grew in number, but in 2008 government took over Tangclao in a game of shifting dynamics...52 On the issue of donations to support the MILF, a school principal we interviewed in Poona Piagapo suggested that while youth of his generation went to the camp willingly, younger children today are not really interested. presently no more support from people for MILF, no MILF donations, MILF gets support from rich families and people from abroad, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in particular ...the popular support in Lanao del Norte is especially weak.53 On the whole, the voices from Lanao Norte were reverberating with disappointment, civilians who had been displaced and impoverished by repeated crossfires between the AFP and MILF felt they had nothing to support the MILF with. They felt both unable and seemed unwilling to participate or send their children for training with the MILF in the future. Most are overwhelmed by their daily fight for livelihood and suffer from a lack of basic social welfare. ‘Our life is difficult, other families (rich) can support MILF...they get money from external sources, not us, we always have to evacuate...’.54 They were openly unhappy with their lot, especially with the need to evacuate every time there were AFP–MILF clashes in the area. In Panggao, a Bravo strong hold at one time, and hometown for his brother James Bond, there were similar revelations. Residents exhibited a distinctive war weariness and disappointment especially with the leadership in the MILF. In a focus group discussion at the barangay meeting hall, residents of this all-Maranao settlement voiced their concerns. They admitted that today their support for the MILF is less because ‘we are tired of evacuation, for last ten years, only we in Lanao del Norte have to leave and become homeless, Lanao del Sur does not have this problem...’.55 In our interaction with residents of Cablacan, where several of Commander Bravo’s relatives live, and where he reportedly took refuge in 2008, residents admitted to facing challenges after the recent clashes (2008). As one resident whose father and brother are in the MILF shared ‘earlier the people were free in their livelihood choices, now we live in fear...we may be caught in the crossfire.’.56 This area is particularly sensitive because Barangay Tangclao is close to an MILF camp. The residents of Nunungan, Pantawan and Cablacan reported suffering grenade attacks and aerial bombardment during the military offensive on the MILF camp in 2008. Yet, the support for MILF is greater than that for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and government presence in the area is still weak. Similarly, in Dapiawan, residents cited a major problem with IDPs who put additional pressure on already poor amenities in the village. ‘Each time there are clashes, Dapiawan becomes host to IDPs who flee from areas under attack, or to escape the crossfire.’57 This variable of conflict impact also influenced civilian views on future support for the MILF. 538 CIVIL WARS

ACRUMBLINGPOWERBASE? Inter-ethnic competition in the MILF is elite based and disconnected from the organisations’ efforts to garner a mass support base outlined above. Under the initial leadershipofHashim Salamat, the MILF had made ideology and identityissuesflexible, tailoring both territorial and group objectives to meet exigency and advocating incorporation of non-Muslim indigenous Lumad population as part of its Bangsamoro homeland ideal.58 According to analysts of the region, following Chief Salamat Hashim’s demise in 2003, inter-ethnic factionalism was a prominent feature of power succession in the MILF. The two main Moro groups – the Maranao and Maguindanao – vied for influence, with the eventual triumph of the Maguindanaon clique59 with support from the Yakan, Kalagan and Tausug ethnic groups and also on account of stronger MILF-cadre loyalties towards Al Haj Murad’s disposal.60 For example, compared to initial support for a family member joining the MILF (approximately 80 per cent) among Maranao families, future support dipped to 60 per cent while among Maguindanao families remained consistent at 45 per cent (see Figure 10). However, there is an element of contiguity in membership, since both organisations draw from the same recruitment pool. We explored ethnic group affiliation as a variable influencing loyalty of communities. Our results suggest that there is no such indicator of inter-ethnic competition, which impact on community support/behaviour for participation in the MILF. Inter-ethnic group rivalry for political leadership was more evident at the elite level and between competing clans. The Maranao and Maguindanaon communities did not view support for the Moro cause through a competitive support lens. The Moro struggle receives overarching support from all ethnic groups who respond to the call of Islam and transcends issues of organisational or tribal loyalty. For instance, remnant pockets of MNLF control suggest that local strongholds remain mired in structures of community leadership and loyalty. The MNLF–GRP peace accord has had important implications for the future trajectory of the Bangsamoro or separate homeland project. MNLF’s coalescence with the demand for autonomy rather than statehood has triggered the rise of more extremist voices within the movement to represent the call for independence under the separatist agenda of the MILF. However, it was interesting to explore how reintegration of the former MNLF has operated in the communities. We coded reintegration benefits for former MNLF, noting variance in terms of tribe and province (Figure 11). This helped gauge whether receipt of reintegration benefits impacted on support for the Moro movement. Our results on reintegration assistance for the MNLF were as follows. Lanao del Norte recorded highest recipients and non-recipient of reintegration support for former MNLF cadres. Among the municipalities, Datu Saudi and Kauswagan exhibited good reintegration support for former MNLF, and alluded to the presence of more former MNLF cadres in these communities. There is existence of remnant MNLF structures in these areas. In terms of the peace dividend, experience with ARMM and the way it has been a major disappointment for the local population due to its problems with corruption, nepotism and other issues of FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 539

FIGURE 10 GRASS-ROOTS SUPPORT FOR THE MILF

(a) 100 Respondent's tribe Maranao 80 Maguindanao

Count (%) 40

0 No Yes Support for decision

(b) 100 Respondent's tribe Maranao 80 Maguindanao

Count (%) 40

0 No Yes Whether still support decision bad governance were widely recognised among intellectuals, but at a local level, respondents did not voice. At an organisational level, there have been efforts to harmonise the differences in their political positions – by signing periodic Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) – and working mechanisms (1999), and later in 2001 and 2010 at Kuala Lumpur and recently at Dushanbe.61 The difference in position between autonomy versus separation or independence, which has been a key divergence in the political rhetoric of the two armed groups, at the same time there is the issue of mode of future governance in Mindanao within this autonomous entity. While the MNLF stands for 540 CIVIL WARS

FIGURE 11 MNLF REINTEGRATION BENEFITS ACCORDING TO MUNICIPALITIES

50 Respondent's municipality lligan City Munai 40 Kauswagan Datu Saudi Guindulungan Pikit 30 Cotabato City

Count (%) 20

0 No Ye s Reintegration assistance secular administration, the MILF stands for full and rigorous implementation of the Sharia, although Muslim personal law is already implemented by the GRP. Relationship between the MILF and MNLF has also changed over time. The 1980s were marked by stiff competition and armed clashes between the two sides, they fought for area control in the period following MILF’s formation in 1985.62 At the community level, families and their siblings came to be divided by MNLF– MILF ridos.63 Insiders from the group suggested that despite the official demobilisation of the MNLF in 1996, in select pockets, MNLF camps and remnant structures are still armed, their military structures in place and ready for enemy attack.64 Despite the growing ground presence of the GRP, and attempt to play each group against another, there is some level of organisational solidarity between MNLF and MILF. Personalities within these groups, especially local commanders, engage in occasional contests for influence and competition over local resources rather than any significant inter-group rivalry at grass-roots level. For instance, during our community visits, we realised that in Maguindanao communities, the MNLF had little influence. By contrast, in Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato, they were dominant and entrenched in decision-making roles. One informant suggested that if in a particular area the MILF decides to carry out active military operations and the local MNLF commander considers the same unnecessary, there is likely to be an armed confrontation or some form of negotiation between low-level commanders. Active rivalry between the MILF and MNLF was reported in North Cotabato in the boundary of Datu-uddin, and in Talayan. This local MILF–MNLF competition was cited as a deliberate ‘divide and FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 541 rule’ policy instigated by the AFP. This appears to be valid in light of recent displacement of families in the Carmen area of North Cotabato following clashes between MNLF Commander Theo and MILF Commander Karim (110th Base Command) in March 2012.65 In our interaction with leaders from the two groups, there was a clear indication of top-level cooperation.66 On the MNLF side, representatives suggested that the organisation supports a ‘solidarity compact’ with the MILF, although there is no paper agreement. In 2010, during the OIC meeting in Russia, Professor Misuari and Haji Murad were reported to have carried on discussions along these lines.67 The Mayor of Cotabato and former MNLF Chairman reiterated that ‘We used to be one organisation, and we share the same aspirations, the Moro problem is one individual problem of one individual people, we live in same territory, we may be divided but we will work towards the point of being one.’68 Significantly, as an organisation, the MILF today is facing important internal cleavages and in-group competition. Following Commander Bravo’s demotion to legal aide status by the MILF Superior Court in 2010, Umra Kato, the other break away commander, has forged a new puritanical Islamist outfit called the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. Formed early in 2011, it draws primarily on the manpower of the 105th Base Command to which he formerly belonged. These developments together with the reported demise of the MILF Chairman Murad in February have weakened the main organisation considerably. Murad had been losing control over the three main Base commands – the 105th, 103rd and 102nd since 2008, and today the BIAF remains a weak shadow of its former capacity. Efforts to replace the pro-MILF Malaysian facilitator Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak have also destabilised the trust and comity necessary for fruitful negotiations. The MILF is concerned about the opposition meted out to its goal of establishing a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity that will redefine the ARMM in terms of the MILF’s Islamist vision.69 Following talks in April, the two-day meeting in June was cut short and rescheduled to commence in August. The government is yet to respond to the revised comprehensive compact submitted by the MILF. These signal a lack of true commitment towards a comprehensive solution on both sides.70

CONCLUSIONS In our preliminary conclusions from this research, the main finding is the influence of geographic location on support for MILF. Provinces that had greater Philippines Army presence, and support from the government, as well as mixed populations (Christian settlements) were less supportive of the MILF compared to the more remote and socio-economically backward areas. Between the different provinces where field research was conducted, in Maguindanao, the communities are more proud, fearless and less hesitant about acknowledging participation in MILF, compared to Lanao del Norte, which embodied more displacement, with hesitance, fear and war weariness prominent among its populace. Another observation pertains to the greater presence of mixed populations and AFP camps in Lanao del Norte, 542 CIVIL WARS which could be the underlying reason for discouraging respondents from revealing their support and participation in the MILF. Field results indicate a dwindling support base and drop in the number of willing recruits in Lanao del Norte in particular. Greater conflict affectedness and the repeated evacuation, displacement and destruction experienced by residents in Lanao del Norte communities have created a bitterness towards the MILF–GRP clashes. This variance in conflict impact has influenced the local population’s support for the MILF over the years. Poor governance delivery and related socio-political failures and incapacity by the Government of Philippines have historically acted as a primary underlying variable for support and hope with the Moro cause. However, the variables for civilian support seem to be overridden by realities of a dwindling MILF power base. Other reasons for declining support lie in the fact that there are few economic incentives for participation. The cost of training youth in the camp is often borne by the families themselves. This creates additional burden in impoverished households and results in resistance and disinterest in sending children to the camp for training in future. There is less support for separation, and the goal of Bangsamoro is internalised by the populace as unrealistic and unattainable in most pockets. Finally, there is an overarching positive feeling towards a peacefully negotiated settlement as the way forward. This trend could be a significant indication of the possible dissolution and disbandment of the group and a resolution either through successful peace negotiations or a possible military defeat similar to the fortunes of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; nonetheless, which track will unfold remains unclear at present.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The field research for this study was funded by the British Academy. We would like to thank our field research partners and Mr E. L. Quitoriano for providing insights into the local conflict dynamics.

NOTES

1. C. Clapham, (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Curry 1998); P. Collier, ‘Rebellion as a Quasi- Criminal Activity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/6 (2000) pp.839–53; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Research Paper 2355, World Bank, Washington, DC (2001); M. Duffield, ‘Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Postadjustment States and Private Protection’, Civil Wars 1/1 (1998) pp.65–102; M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books 2001); J. Fearon and D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90; P.N. Gleditsch and B. Lacina ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population 21/2–3 (2005) pp.145–66; M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999); S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 2006); S.N. Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria’, Rationality and Society 11/3 (1999) pp.243–85; D. Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 1998); T. Mkandawire, ‘The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial “Insurgent Movements” inAfrica: Towards anExplanation of the Violence Against the Peasantry’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40/2 (2002) pp.181–215; W. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1998); J.M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006). 2. W. Reno, ‘Patronage Politics and the Behaviour of Armed Groups’, Civil Wars 9/4 (2006) pp.324–42. 3. T.D. Mason, ‘Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant’, Public Choice 86/1–2 (1996) pp.63–83; J. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1974). FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 543

4. C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European State, AD 990–1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell 1990); Z. Mampilly, Stationary Bandits: Understanding Rebel Governance, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles (2007). 5. Weinstein (note 1). 6. C.M. Metelits, ‘The Consequences of Rivalry: Explaining Insurgent Violence Using Fuzzy Sets’, Political Research Quarterly 62 (2009) pp.673–84. 7. Ibid. 8. Kalyvas (note 1) p.167. 9. Metelits (note 6). 10. W.H. Moore, ‘Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem’, Political Research Quarterly 48/2 (1995) pp.417–34. 11. R.M. Wood, ‘Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians’, Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010) pp.601–14. 12. Mampilly (note 4). 13. Ibid. Tilly (note 4); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1986); M. Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, American Political Science Review 87/3 (1993) pp.567–76. 14. S.K. Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: Centre for Integrative and Development Struggle, University of Philippines, 1995); J.A. Kamlian, Bangsamoro Society and Culture: A Book of Readings on Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (Iligan City: Iligan Center for Peace Education and Research/MSU-IIT Press 1995); P.N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation–State (Manila: Ateneo De Manila UP 2000). J. Carino and E. Christian (eds) Indigenous Peoples and Local Government: Experiences from Malaysia and the Philippines (Manila: IWGIA 2005); A.S. Tuminez, Ancestral Domain in Comparative Perspective, USIP Special Report 151, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC (Sept. 2008); A. O¨ zerdem and S. Podder ‘How Voluntary? The Role of Community in Youth Participation in Muslim Mindanao’ in A. O¨ zerdem and S. Podder (eds) Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2011) pp.122–40. 15. Bangsamoro means ‘Muslim homeland’. 16. E.L. Quitoriano and F.M. Theofelize, Their War, Our Struggle: Stories of Children in Central Mindanao (Quezon City: Save the Children UK 2004). 17. For an historical background and detailed discussion on emergence of the Bangsamoro identity and split within the MNLF, see M. Caballero-Anthony, ‘Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle: Contested Identities and Elusive Peace’, Asian Security 3/2 (2007) pp.141–61; R.G. Buendia, The Politics of Ethnicity and Moro Secessionism in the Philippines, Working Paper No. 146 (Nov. 2007), online at ,http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp146.pdf., accessed 17 Feb. 2012, p.9; E. Gutierrez, A. Ahmad, F.L. Gonzales, E.R. Mercado Jr., OMI, J. Rocamora, M. Danguilan-Vitug and A. Guialal, Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy 2000). 18. For an in-depth discussion on the peace process, see P.N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press 2000) pp.187–88; S.M. Santos, Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, East West Centre Washington Working Papers 3 (Jan. 2005), online at ,www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ EWCWwp003.pdf., accessed 19 May 2011. 19. Lanao del Sur was part of the initial sampling and research design; however, the household survey could not be conducted in the planned communities due to problems of access and security fears on part of research assistants in light of renewed local violence and reported kidnappings in the capital Marawi city in July 2010. 20. A.Z.V. Camacho, M.P. Puzon, and Y.P. Ortiga, Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence in the Philippines: Contextualisation, Personal Histories and Policy Options, Psychosocial Trauma and Human Rights Program, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines (2005), online at ,http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/Report%20Filipinas.pdf., accessed 15 May 2011. 21. Quitoriano and Theofelize (note 16); The local dynamics of the conflict presented here draws on interviews with local researchers who choose to remain anonymous and an unpublished risk assessment report on the Lanao provinces (2009) prepared by Mr E.L. Quitoriano of Risk Asia Consulting for the Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) Mindanao office. 544 CIVIL WARS

22. In October 2008, the Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect (MOA-AD) of the GRP–MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 as ‘contrary to law and the Constitution’ and in excess of the legal authority’; further see T. Williams, ‘The MoA-AD Debacle – An Analysis of Individuals’ Voices, Provincial Propaganda and National Disinterest’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29/1(2010) pp.121–44. 23. An infantry battalion consists of four companies. The structure is similar to the US Army – each unit consists of four subunits. The battalion would have three front line companies and one Headquarter Company as reserve and on camp duty. 24. Kumander Bravo and Commander Pangalian (including Kumander Umbra Kato in Cotabato) are in the US Government list of wanted terrorists. An MILF Base Command is a mix of MILF regulars and local militias. The community near this base command normally endorses authority of the Commander leading the camp. The commander may make autonomous decisions regarding military targets and troop mobilisation for horizontal conflicts such as clan conflicts over land. The MILF central command allows this relative autonomy of the base commanders to maintain a loose military alliance system in place of vertical imposition of its authority. 25. Other American military advisers are also based in Tacurong City (Sultan Kudarat) and Jolo (Sulu). 26. Z. Abuza, ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28/6 (2005) pp.453–79. 27. Tuminez (note 14) p.83. 28. Barangay means village in Tagalog. 29. The BIAF is made up of two parallel armies: (1) the regular infantry and (2) the special unit called Internal Security Force (ISF). The ISF is considered an elite unit responsible for intelligence gathering and adherence to the Koran. Every municipality under the control of the MILF has one ISF company, while every barangay has one platoon. At present, the BIAF is divided into nine ‘Base Commands’, which in turn comprise ‘Unit Brigades’. Each base command has various numbers of unit brigades comprising from 1,200 to over 3,000 fighters. There is no fixed standard for what constitutes a unit brigade. A unit brigade may roughly include 50–100 fighters, each unit brigade in turn comprises several platoons, hence these are smaller outfits of 10–15 fighters each (see Abuza, note 26). 30. S.L. Taya, ‘The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines’, Intellectual Discourse 15/1 (2007) pp.59–84. 31. The CAFGUs were established pursuant to Executive Order 264 dated 25 Jul 1987. See, J.S.H. Kraft, ‘The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines (Overview)’ in D. Rodriguez (ed.) Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Quezon City: South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement 2010) pp.185–215. 32. Area commanders of the AFP screen possible candidates in consultation with local executives, civic and business leaders who constitute the Peace and Order Council in that cluster of barangays. 33. Kraft (note 31). Input from E.L. Quitoriano, Consultant, Quezon City, Philippines. 34. Kraft (note 31), pp.196–97. 35. S.M. Santos, Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, East West Centre Washington Working Papers 3 (Jan. 2005), online at ,www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/EWCWwp003.pdf., accessed 19 May 2011. 36. R.D. Rosauro, Bangsamoro Sub-state not averse to Subanen Ancestral Domain Claims (11 May 2011) online at ,http://malindangheraldonline.blogspot.com/2011/05/bangsamoro-sub-state-not-adverse- to.html., accessed 19 Jun. 2011. 37. Ibid. 38. At the same time, geographic distribution in the sample is limited and does not represent entire household population in Lanao del Norte, Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces. Lanao del Sur was part of our initial sample but had to be eliminated at the time of research implementation due to local violence reports in Piagapo and Butig, which were initially part of the survey sampling design. 39. Some of the notable experts and insider voices on the peace process that we could access included Mr Giame Alim, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Chairperson Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Professor Abhoud Linga, Research Director of the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), Chairman of the MILF Political Affairs Committee, Mr Ghazali Jafar, Head of the United Youth for Peace and Development in Mindanao, Mr Rahib Kudpo and Ms Nuraida Abu, the women’s wing head of the United Youth of Philippines. FUTURE OF THE MORO STRUGGLE IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES 545

40. A. O¨ zerdem, S. Podder, and E. L. Quitoriano, ‘Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict: A Study on the MILF, Mindanao, Philippines’, Civil Wars 12/3 (Sept. 2010) pp.304–25. 41. This conclusion is based on our qualitative research in the communities. 42. Rido means blood feud. In Mindanao, these clan feuds tend to define relations between the various Islamic and non-Islamic tribes. They perpetuate a cycle of vengeance and retaliation with frequent civilian killings, political rivalry, land disputes and crimes such as theft, non-payments of debts and elopement. This source of conflict perpetuation and escalation is disruptive for civilians since with the initiation of a rido conflict, the members of the kin group or the community are often immobilised, on account of them being potential targets for retaliation (see, O¨ zerdem et al. (note 40), p.311. 43. Interview with Aisa Bangsabai, trained as MILF to help the wounded. She was not active in 2008, but was active earlier in 2000. She lives near Dilabayan, where her husband is an MILF commander, Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010. 44. Barangay Captain Fatima Itada, Panggao, Lanao del Norte, 21 Jun. 2010. 45. We use the blank categories ‘occupy our land’ and ‘should go back’ to incorporate the multiple- choice options included in the survey. 46. Interview with Aisa Bangsabai, Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010. 47. Civilian Interview 2, Muti, Maguindanao, 23 Jun. 2010. 48. Civilian Interview 1, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010. 49. Interview with Mansawi Arbi, Barangay Treasurer, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010. 50. In our interview with the school principal in Tambo, Lanao del Norte, she noted that the provincial Governor Dimaporo was pro-establishment, while the Governor of Maguindanao Datu Ismael ‘Toto’ Mangudadatu was pro-MILF. 51. Civilian Interview 2, Cadulawan, 22 Jun. 2010. 52. Interview with schoolmaster, Pantawan, Lanao del Norte, 23 Jun. 2010. 53. Interview with resident male 46-year-old Imam (Principal of Arabic School appointed him as a teacher), Poonga Piagapo, Lanao del Norte, 24 Jun. 2010. 54. Civilian Interview 5, Panggao, 21 Jun. 2010. 55. Ibid. 56. Civilian Interview 8, Cablacan, 26 Jun. 2010. 57. Civilian Interview 2, Dapiawan, 27 Jun. 2010. 58. Abuza (note 26). 59. The Maguindanaon presence is dominant in the MILF’s Central Committee and the Jihad Executive Council, i.e. the main decision-making units of the group. 60. S.L. Taya, The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines, Intellectual Discourse 15/1 (2007) pp.59–84. 61. In 2010, Nur Misuari and Murad admitted that efforts at an incipient unification process are ongoing, and there may be a possibility of achieving the same in future, with acknowledgement of an initial understanding to work together. 62. Interview with Japal J. Guani, Jr, Mayor of Cotabato and MNLF Chairman, 10 Jun 2011. 63. Ibid. 64. Mr Butch Gilson, Former MNLF Commander. 65. Online at ,http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId¼791242&publicationSubCategory Id ¼ 200.. 66. Mr Butch Gilson, Former MNLF Commander, Camp Darapanan, near Simuay, which is adjacent to MILF camps. 67. Interview with the Mayor of Cotabato, MNLF Chairman, 10 Jun. 2011. 68. Ibid. 69. Under the MoA signed with the MILF, the government has pledged to recognise the Bangsamoro people as distinct from the rest of the national communities. It seeks to grant the Bangsamoro people their own distinct territory and their own government, and to concede international recognition to the Bangsamoro people. Towards this end, 712 barangays in five provinces will be added to the territory covered by ARMM as homeland for the Muslims, to be called the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. It will become one of the states in a federal government being envisioned in a revised Constitution. See J.S. Alvarez, ‘Philippine Territory at the Negotiating Table – The Price Tag for Peace?’ (n.d.) online at ,http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/vol.LIII/Bangsamoro_Juridical_Entity.pdf., accessed 11 Feb. 2012). 70. Rosauro (note 36).