Notes

Introduction

1. Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure, trans. Jacqueline Kaminski (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981) p. 63. 2. See Martin Staniland, What Is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985) pp. 10-12. 3. For a critical review of the classical and neoclassical economists' views, see Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954). 4. John Kenneth Galbraith, 'Power and the Useful Economist', American Econ• omic Review (March 1973), pp. 1-11. 5. For a good summary of th~ argument, see Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982) pp. 69-73. 6. 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' Review of Politics, January 1974, pp. 85-131. See also Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publi• cations, 1979), and Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1982). 7. For example, see M. G. Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (eds) , Patterns of Corporatist Policy• making, pp. 237-58. 8. See Douglas A. Hibbs, 'Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy', Ameri• can Political Science Review (1977), pp. 1467-87; and Hibbs, 'Economic Outcomes and Political Support for British Governments Among Occupational Classes: a Dynamic Analysis', American Political Science Review, June 1982, pp.259-79. 9. See Edward R. Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Samuel Brittan, 'Inflation and Democ• racy', in Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe (eds), The Political Economy of Inflation (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978), pp. 161-85. For a good critical review of the different models of political business cycle, see James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal. Political Economics (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983) ch. 5. to. John E. Elliott, 'Institutionalism as an Approach to Political Economy', quoted in Martin Staniland, What is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985) p. 17. 11. Quoted by Wilhelm K. Scheuten, 'Der Preis des Neuen', Die politische Mei• nung, 29 (July-August 1984) p. 35. Another article in the same publication traces the growth of the number of economic 'dropouts' (Aussteiger) from a negligible small minority in the mid-1960s to one accounting for 10-15 per cent of the adult population in the 1970s and to a two-thirds majority of the 'I'm all right, Jack' type (Versorgung:;majoritiit) with the maturation of the welfare state. See Werner Kaltefleiter, '1st Pfticht nur Stress?' ibid., pp. 46-53. Ac-

346 Notes 347

cording to the author, who is a University of Kiel political scientist, this leaves only a 15--20 per cent of productively active West Germans, a truly achievement-oriented minority (Leistungsminoritiit) , on whom the country depends for further economic progress. 12. See United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1986, p. 18. 13. Ibid., pp. 112, 120. 14. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 15. The World Bank, The World Development Report 1986 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 180-81, Annex Table 1. 16. See, for example, Robert A. Scalapino, 'Environmental and Foreign Contri• butions', in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, (eds) , Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964) pp. 68, 86-7; and Kenneth B. Pyle, 'Advantages of Followership: German Economies and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890-1925', Journal of Japan• ese Studies, Autumn 1974, pp. 127-64. 17. See Arnulf Baring and Masamori Sase, Zwei zaghafte Riesen? Deutschland und Japan seit 1945 (Stuttgart: Belser, 1977). The two economic chapters contrib• uted by Bernard Grossmann on the German side and Takuji Shimano, who is one of the contributors to the sequel to the present volume, on the Japanese side dealt with the 'economic miracles' of the 1950s and 1960s and problems of the 19708 in the respective countries. In contrast to their general ignorance of and indifference to social, economic, and pulitical developments in Japan, educated Germans have traditionally paid considerable attention to Japanese art and culture. 18. See T. J. Pempel, 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) pp. 139-90; and Michael Kreile, 'West : The Dynamics of Expansion', ibid., pp. 191-224. 19. See, for example, John Whitney Hall, 'The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan', in Ward and Rustow, Political Modernization, pp. 14-41. For more detailed accounts, see Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, Japan: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), and for the evolution of the agricultural economy, Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). 20. See Rudolf Braun, 'Taxation, Socio-political Structure, and State-building: Great Britain and Brandenburg.. Prussia', in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 243-327; and Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen, 'The Recruitment and Training of Administrative and Technical Personnel', ibid, pp. 456-561. 21. Without exception, the great administrative reformers, such as Prince Harden• berg and Baron vom Stein, and the military reformers, such as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were inspired by ideas of the French Revolution, including equality, rationality in government and the economy, security of property and person, individual liberty, and advancement for men of talent. 22. See William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, expanded edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 3-12. There was considerable growth of cities and manufacturing industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some of it under the control of craft guilds as in Europe. There was, however, no real bourgeois revolution that could have given the artisans and traders the freedom and opportunity to pursue their economic interests, even though mercantile pressures were building up for 348 Notes

more than a century, pitting merchants (chanin) against the declining samurai and the peasantry. 23. See especially W. O. Henderson, The Industrialization of Europe 1780-1914 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1969) pp. 69-71. 24. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960) pp. 38-9. For a critical review of Rostow's theory, see Simon Kuznets, 'Notes on the Take-off', in W. W. Rostow (ed.), The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth (New York: St Martin's Press, 1963) pp. 22-43. 25. See Friedrich Zunkel, 'Die Enfesselung des neuen Wirtschaftsgeistes 1850-1875', in Karl Erich Born (ed.), Moderne Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte (KOln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966) pp. 42-51. See also Hans Hausherr, 'Der Zollverein und die Industrialisierung', in ibid., pp. 55-66; and W. O. Hender• son, The Rise of German Industrial Power 1834-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) pp. 44--70, and 178-206. 26. See Yoshitake Oka, Kindai Nihon Seijishi [A political history of modern Japan], Vol. I (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1962) pp. 102-13. 27. Ryoshin Minami, Nihon no Keizai Hatten [Economic development in Japan] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1981) pp. 4--5. See also Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973) pp. 12-18. 28. Minami, Nihon no Keizai Hatten, pp. 6-7. 29. See Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, pp. 12-15 and 38-42. These wars caused a succession of booms which significantly helped to carry the Japanese economy forward for many years after they ended until the great earthquake of 1923 and, eventually, the Great Depression of 1930-31. On the effects of the Great Depression on the German economy and politics, see Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit (: De Gruyter, 1967). 30. Ryuz6 Yamazaki, Gendai Nihon Keizaishi [An economic history of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1985) pp. 28-32. 31. Ibid., pp. 33--5. 32. See Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) pp.l0-28. 33. Ibid., pp. 75-9, 85-7. But see also Gustav Stolper, The German Economy 1870-1940 (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940) pp. 239-40. 34. The population statistics tell the same story: Japan's population grew from about 30 million in 1852 to 73 million in 1940 and, in a more or less continuous fashion, to 112 million in 1976. The population of the German Reich was an estimated 42 million in 1871 (of whom only about 20 million lived in the area which subsequently became the Federal Republic) and 69 million in 1939. In 1950, after the war and the influx of millions of refugees had left their marks, the Federal Republic had a population of 61 million (including the population of West Berlin and some 4 million resident foreigners) in 1978. Thus the West German citizenry was only about half the size of Japan's and also of what it might have been but for the impact of World War II. 35. As Edwin O. Reischauer explains, the Tokugawa prohibition of all contacts between Japanese and foreigners - aside from a few Dutch and Chinese traders in Nagasaki - was motivated mainly by a fear of 'subversive' Christian pros• elytizing and of alliances between local feudal lords and one or another European power against the Tokugawa hegemony. See Reischauer, The Ja• panese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977) pp. 68-70. Prior to the closure ofthe country in the 1630s, however, there had been a considerable Notes 349

amount of trading with foreigners and proselytizing activities by Catholic missionaries in Japan. 36. At the end of World War II, 17 million Germans were living beyond the eastern borders of postwar West and East Germany and Austria. Of these, about ten million eventually arrived as refugees in the Federal Republic. 37. The often-quoted quip of French-speaking King Frederick II of Prussia that 'German is a language fit for horses' is only one of many such expressions of kings and princes throughout the Germanies who preferred Italian and French style and language to what they perceived as the vulgar peasant ways of their own people. 38. For a geopolitical analysis of the development of European states, see Stein Rokkan, 'Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe', in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 562-600. Areas such as the Alsace were bones of contention for a thousand years and have changed hands between Germany and France repeatedly in the last 300 years. 39. See Peter Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West and East (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Press, 1974) pp. 48-59. 40. Ibid., pp. 81-9. See also Koppel Pinson, Modern Germany, 2nd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1966) Ch. 23. 41. See Hideo Otake, Adenauer to Yoshida Shigeru [Adenauer and Shigeru Yoshida] (Tokyo: Chu6k6ronsha, 1986). 42. See Chapter 2 below. 43. See Gerald L. Curtis, 'The Tyumen Oil Development Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making', in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1977) pp. 147-73. 44. After years of withering criticisms of the 'overly generous terms' and giveaways to Poland and other partners of the Ostpolitik of the SPDIFDP coalition government, the Christian Democrats themselves, upon returning to power, arranged credits of over one billion marks for the GDR. 45. But also see Haruhiro Fukui, 'Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977) pp. 22-59. 46. See Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo Sengo Kaikaku Kenkyiikai (ed.), Sengo Kaikaku [Postwar reforms], vol. 3 (Seiji Katei [Political process]) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974) pp. 335-48; and Akira Igarashi, et al., Sengo Ky6iku no Rekishi [A postwar educational history] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1970) pp. 162-212. See also J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy, 2nd edn (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) pp. 68-69. 47. Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Standford: Stanford University Press, 1965) pp. 64-113. But see also Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan (eds), Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) Ch. 12. 48. See Peter Merkl, The Origins of the West German Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 7-19, 22-35. The American occupation greatly favoured the federal solution and the French also preferred substantial decentralization. By way of contrast, the Soviet occupation strongly preferred a highly centralized Germany, presumably with the central ministries under its control in East Berlin. The British occupation was lukewarm about federalism. 49. The bulk of administrative and judicial power is at the Lander level which, 350 Notes

among other things, implies that Land administrators and judges are the ones to apply most federal laws. See Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Donald P. Kommers, The Governments of Germany, 4th edn (New York: Crowell, 1975) pp.213-24. 50. See Chapter 4 of the sequel volume. 5]. See Hansgert Piesert and Gerhild Framheim, Das Hochschulsystem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979) pp. 31-7. 52. Taro Oshima, Kanry6 Kokka to ChihO Jichi [The bureaucratic state and local self-government] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1981) pp. 232-56. 53. See Junnosuke Masumi, Gendai Seiji: 1952-nen 19o [Contemporary politics: after 1955, vol. I (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985) pp. 107-16. 54. On the earliest West German government attitude towards planning, see Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp. 265-79, 290-94; and H. J. Arndt, : The Politics of Non-Planlling (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1966). 55. On the local territorial reform in Bavaria, see Peter Merkl (ed.), New Local Centers in Centralized States (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984) pp. &-10. 56. On another aspect of this kind of budgetary and policy planning - i.e., the compilation of annual Social Budgets - see Chapter 7 below.

1 Macroeconomic Changes

1. For contemporary Japanese Marxists' views of the 1932 Comintem Thesis, see Eitaro Noro et al., Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsushi K6za [Lectures on the developmental history of Japanese capitalism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1932-33). 2. John C. Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics (Berkeley: Univer• sity of California Press, 1977). 3. W. Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945- 1980 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1983) p. 20. 4. Ibid., p. 34. 5. Institut fUr Marxistische Studien und Forschungen, Klassen und Sozialstruktur de .. BRD 195~1970 (Frankfurt: Verlag Marxistische Bliitter, 197>-1975) 3 vols. 6. Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 7. G. Schmaus, 'PersoneUe Einkommensverteilung im Vergleich 1962/63 und 1969', in H. J. Krupp and W. Glatzer (eds) , Umverteilung im Sozialstaat (Frankfurt: Campus, 1978) p. 92. 8. IFO-Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Analyse der strukturellen Entwicklung der deutschen Wirtschaft. Strukturberichterstattung 1980 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981) p. 221. 9. W. Krelle, J. Schunck and J. Siebke, Oberbetriebliche Ertragsbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer. Mit einer Untersuchung uber die Vermogensstruktur der BUlldes• republik Deutschland (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1968). 10. H. Mierheim and L. Wicke, Die personelle Vermogensverteilung in der Bundes• republik Deutschland (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1978). 11. Der Wissenschaftliche Beirat beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, Sammel• band der Gutachten von 1948 bis 1972 (Gottingen: Schwarz, 1973) pp. 479-87. 12. Monopolkommission, Fusionskontrolle bleibt vorrangig. Hauptgutachten 1978/ 1979 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1980). 13. Banken&trukturkommission, Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft. Bericht der Studienkommission (Frankfurt: Knapp, 1979). 14. G. Muhr (ed.), Beschiiftigungspolitik in den achtziger Jahren (KOln: Bund Verlag, 1981). Notes 351

15. Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Abschwiichung der Wachstumsim• pulse. Strukturberichterstattung 1980 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981) p.117. 16. IFO-Institut, Analyse, pp. 22(}'-21.

2 Economic Advisory and Planning Systems

1. These are contained in the Geschiiftsordnung des Bundestages (S 1) and in the Gemeinsame Geschiiftsordnung der Bundesministerien (S 24). 2. This is largely due to the rigid rules which govern public service employment and, especially, the existence of the separate 'Laufbahnen' required of those at the career ranks (Beamte), the highest of which (called 'hOherer Dienst') is open almost exclusively to those with a university degree. 3. OECD, Social Sciences in Policy Making (Paris: OECD, 1979) (OECD Publi• cation, No. 41093). This is less often the case in West Germany than in the US, where competing parties have their own pools of economic advisers to draw on - e.g., the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC and the Hoover Institution, Stanford. 4. Although generalizations are problematical, the most important advisory bodies in West Germany are generally held in high public esteem, and there is not much fear among social scientists that their reputation may suffer if they are appointed to such councils and advise policy-makers, as seems to be the case in Japan. See OECD, Social Sciences Policy: Japan (Paris: OECD, 1977). 5. Jiirgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie (Frankfurt: Suhr• kamp, 1970). 6. Habermas seems to believe this model to represent degeneration of the decisionistic one because the adviser manipulates the decision-maker by stipu• lating these objective constraints. 7. Der Wissentschaftliche Beirat beim Bundesministerium fUr Wirtschaft, Sam• melband der Gutachten von 1948 bis 1972 (Gottingen: Schwartz, 1973). 8. The interested reader may consult the description and evaluation of the five institutes by the Wissenschaftsrat (1982), which, while controversial, contains a fairly accurate description of each. The Wissenschaftsrat (Science Council) is an intergovernmental agency for planning scientific development and was founded in 1957. 9. Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der westdeutschen Wirtschaft. Beurteilung der Wirtschaftslage durch Mitglieder der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Wirt• s(:haftswissenschaftlicher Forschunginstitute e. V., various issues. 10. In addition to the nationwide coverage by televison and radio, the joint analyses receive wide coverage in the print media, too. The analysis of autumn 1982, published in spring 1983, for instance, was reported upon by all import• ant national newspapers and by five foreign newspapers. The German news• papers were: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Frankfurter Rundschau, Hamburger Abendblatt, Handelsblatt, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Suddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, Welt am Sonntag and Wirtschaftswoche. 11. For example, see the Kiel Institute's report by Gerhard Fels, Klaus-Dieter Schmidt et al., Die deutsche Wirtschaft im Strukturwandel. Kieler Studien, 166 (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck), 1980. Next reports were published in 1984. See, for example, Klaus-Dieter Schmitt et al., 1m Anpassungsprozess Zuruckgeworfen. Kieler Studien, 185 (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck), 1984. 12. Der Wissenschaftsrat, Berlin, Stellungnahme zu den Wirtschaftsforschungsin• stituten, Drucksache 5815/82, July, 1982. It is interesting from the point of view 352 Notes

of organizing advice-giving that, unlike the analysis of business cycles, the reporting on structural change is done by the five not jointly but in compe• tition. The differences in the positions taken by the five reports, though not very significant, are carefully noted in the report on the reports compiled by the Ministry of Economics and the press. In terms of quality, there may well be significant differences among them. The similarity of their positions tends to strengthen the collective impact of the work of the five institutes on govern• ment policy. 13. Gesetze liber die Bildung eines SachversUindigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung vom 14. August 1963, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p.685. 14. It is interesting to note that in a well-known case of internal quarrel, the majority accused a member who wrote a minority view of not adhering to the goals prescribed by the law. 15. Olaf Sievert, 'Die wirtschaftspolitische Beratung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Hans K. Schneider (ed.), Grundsatzprobleme wirtschaftspoli• tischer Beratung: Das Beispiel der Stabilisierungspolitik (Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik, Gesellschaft fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 49) (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968). 16. When the federal government criticizes the council's conclusions, it does so very cautiously. The most notable exception to this was the statement the government made in reply to the council's advice to revalue the DM. 17. In Japan there exists no independent source of statistics quite comparable to the German Federal Statistical Office, a fact which tends to weaken the position of· Japanese advisory bodies. 18. It should perhaps not go without mention that there are considerable amounts of communication among the German advisory bodies. The Expert Council, for instance, invites experts from the institutes to its hearings and has also availed itself of their help in drafting parts of its annual report. Another important connection is found in the practice that almost always at least one member of the council is recruited from one of the five institutes. 19. Egon Sohmen, 'Von der Entwicklung bestatigt', in Regina Molitor (ed.), Zehn Jahre Sachverstandigenrat (Frankfurt: Athenaum Verlag, 1973). 20. Several so-called alternative reports have been published, but they are interesting more for political than for professional reasons despite the numerous signa• tures they bear, mainly of economists associated with labour unions and fringe groups. For a discussion of one of these reports, see Roland Vaubel, 'Alterna• tiven der Wirtschaftspolitik?' Das Memorandum der 130: Eine Wider/egung. Kiel Discussion Paper, No. 56, July 1978. 21. Sievert's thoughtful reflections on the Expert Council cited above betray signs of nostalgia for a more political organization and some indications that the sentiment led him to emphasize certain aspects at the expense of others. 22. Helmut Kohn, Zur Vergabe wirtschafts- und sozia/wissenschaftlicher For• schungsauftrage (Erfahrungen mit dem Forschungsprogramm der Kommission fur wirtschaftlichen und sozia/en Wandel) (Gottingen: Schwartz, 1976). 23. Of the seven, three were economists, two were sociologists, one was a pro• fessor of educational planning and economics of education, and one was a professor of mechanical engineering. 24. Without a theory and specific hypotheses derived from it, there is always the danger that empirical research becomes an exercise of the blind. One has to admit, however, that the task set for the commission was of no small order. 25. Jahresgutachten des Sachverstandigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt- Notes 353

schaftlichen Entwicklung (, 1964/65) (hereafter Council Report, with year), Par. 2391240. 26. Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum Gutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates (Bonn), 1964/65, Par. 6. 27. Ibid., Par. 15. 28. Ibid., Par. 9 and 10 29. Council Report, 1965/66, Par. 204. 30. 'Moglichkeiten der wechselkurspolitischen Absicherung oder Absttitzung einer konzertierten Stabilisierungsaktion', Council Report 1966/67, Chapter VI. It may be mentioned in passing that concerted action (of the government and the relevant social groups) to attain stability had been suggested by the council in its report for 1965/6 and later introduced by the government. 31. Mittelfristig garantierter Paritiitstlnstieg, Par. 268-274. 32. Bandbreitenerweiterung mit begrenzter Paritiitsanpassung nach oben, Par. 275-279. 33. Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum Gutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates, 1966/67, Par. 13. 34. Ibid., Par. 11. 35. Geschiiftsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank fur das lahr 1966 (Frankfurt). 36. For a succinct discussion of the economic considerations, see Herbert Giersch, Growth, Cycles, and Exchange Rates: The Experience of West Germany. Wicksell Lecures 1970 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970) pp. 30ff. 37. The council submits additional reports whenever it thinks that developments threaten any of the goals set for the council to report on. See Gesetz tiber die Bildung eines Sachverstiindigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaft• lichen Entwicklung vom 14. August 1963, Bundesgesetzblatt 1, Par. 6.1. 38. Sondergutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirt• schaftlichen Entwicklung (Bonn), March 1967, Par. 15, reprinted in Council Report, 1967/8. 39. Sondergutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirt• schaftlichen Entwicklung, July 1968, Par. 4. 40. Giersch, Growth, Cycles, and Exchange Rates, p. 32. 41. Theo Horstmann, Die Diskussion um die DM-Aufwertung 1968-69. (Unpub• lished doctoral dissertation, History Department, University of Bochum, 13 October 1980), p. 27. 42. Council Report, 1968/69, Par. 230-282. 43. The decision was announced on the eve of 19 November. 44. lahreswirtschaftsbericht der Bundesregierung, 1969, Par. 17. 45. However, a strong current of public opposition to revaluation under pressure would also have to be taken into account. See Horstmann, Die Diskussion, p. 58. 46. Cited from the France Soir, in Horstmann, Die Diskussion, p. 59 and translated by the author. 47. Der Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft, Sammel- band der Gutachten von 1948 bis 1972 (Gottingen: Schwartz, 1973) pp. 509-18. 48. Ibid., pp. 535-44, at 541. 49. Horstmann, Die Diskussion, p. 27. 50. lahreswirtschaftsbericht der Bundesregierung, 1970, p. 5. 51. Ibid., p. 8, Par. 13. 52. Gerhard Fels, et al., Die deutsche Wirtschaft im Strukturwandel (Kieler Studien 166) (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1980), pp. 19-23. 53. See loint Diagnosis, delivered to the federal government on 29 April 1971, and published on 3 May, with DIW presenting a minority view. 354 Notes

54. lahresgutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt• schaftlichen Entwicklung, 1971n2. 55. Hubertus Miiller-Groeling (ed.), Beitriige und Stellungnahmen zu Problemen der Wiihrungspolitik (Kiel Discussion Paper, No. 10), June 1971, p. 11. 56. Sondergutachten des Sachverstiindigenrates zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirt• schaftlichen Entwicklung, 24 May 1971, Par. 14 and 47. 57. For the Kiel Institute, see also Dietmar Gebert and Hubertus Miiller-Groeling, 'Zur konjunkturellen und wahrungspolitischen Lage in den westlichen Industrielandern' ,. Die Weltwirtfchaft, 1972, especially the section entitled 'Auf oem Wege in den Wiihrungsdirigismus'. 58. In arguments presented by the council, European integration has increaslngly become, explicitly or implicitly, an additional goal. 59. See Die Lage, spring 1972, pp. 6, and 13; autumn 1972, pp. 6, and 13. 60. Council Report, 1972173. 61. This was accomplished in a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 11-12 March 1973. 62. lahreswirtschaftsbericht der Bundesregierung, 1973, para 46. 63. Ibid., 1974, p. 312. M. Suffice it to mention here konzertierte Aktion (concerted action) in wages policy, mittelfristig garantierter Paritiitsanstieg (guaranteed medium-term parity rise), and konjunkturneutrale Aufwertung (cyclically neutral revaluation). Such concepts as kostennil'eauneutraler Lohnanstieg (cost level-neutral wage rise), konjunkturneutraler Haushalt (cyclically neutral budget), and many more were developed. 65. One could date the resurgence of planning ideas to 1966, when the Social Democrats entered government in a coalition with the CDU/CSU. 66. The ministries must prepare lists of planned investment projects arranged by priority. 67. Claus Wegner, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Poli• tikberatung durch den Sachverstiindigenrat zur Begutachtung deT Gesamtwirt• schaftlichen Entwicklung (unpublished dissertation, Universitat Aachen, 1974) p.163. 68. Reimut Jochimsen and Peter Treuner, 'Staatliche Planung in der Bundes• republik', in Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zu Das Parlament, Vol. 9 (Bundeszentrale rur Politische Bildung, Bonn, 1974) p. 44. 69. Eberhard Wille, 'Die mehrjahrige Finanzplanung. Chancen und Grenzen einer ausgabeorientierten offentlichen Planung', Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Stadium, Zeitschriftfur Ausbildung und Hochschulkontakt, Vol. 8, No.4 (1979) p. 167. 70. This was created by the Haushaltsgrundsiitzegesetz and organized like the Business Cycle Council (Konjunkturrat). 71. In 1965 there were as many as 277 such advisory councils, and in 1979 212. 72. See R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explain• ing the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Aaron Wil• davsky, The Politics of the Budget Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). For example, most theoretical models of a foreign exchange market greatly over• simplify its property and behavior in order to facilitate analytical exercises. The operations of a real market are affected by numerous government regulations and by complex tax systems. Since most scholars are not interested in such details, their theoretical analysis and advice tend to be far removed from the contingencies of the real world. 73. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Eisuke Sakakibara and Notes 355

Yukio Noguchi, 'Dissecting the Finance Ministry-Bank of Japan Dynasty: End of the Wartime System of Total Economic Mobilization', Japan Echo, Vol. 4, No.4 (1977), pp. 100-2l. 74. This can be verified by comparing the years in which various plans were drafted. If the public investment plan found in an Economic Plan had been used as the basis of the long-term public works investment plans, the latter would logically have been drafted after, not before, the Economic Plan. As it happened, however, most of the Road Construction Plans and Economic Plans were drafted at the same time. 75. In Japanese practice, important budgetary decisions are made between early September and the end of December. The 1978 Economic Plan, however, was announced in February of that year. This suggests that the crucial budgetary decisions had preceded the compilation of the plan. 76. See Yukio Noguchi, 'Decision Rules in the Japanese Budgetary Process', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol. 7 (Summer 1979), pp. 51-75.

3 Monetary Policies

1. Impact loans are foreign currency loans supplied by both foreign and Japanese banks to nonfinancial corporations. Their interest rates follow those of the Eurocurrency involved. It was not until the end of the 1970s that Japanese banks were permitted to offer impact loans. All the restrictions, however, were abolished in December 1980, when the Foreign Exchange Control Law was revised. 2. See, for example, Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, 'Japan and the World Economy', in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds), Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1976) pp. 440-44. 3. Each year, investment and financing schedules for key industries and some large corporations were prepared under MITI's guidance. These schedules were formally subject to examination by the Industrial Finance Subcommittee composed of representatives from various interested groups, but MITI's inten• tion and activity dominated the council's decision-making. On the supply side, as opposed to the demand side, the Council on Financial Institutions and Fund Allocation was responsible for coordination of action. This council, composed of representatives from the MOF, BOJ, and major financial institutions, was in charge of implementing the fund allocation plans supplied by the Industrial Finance Subcommittee through cooperation among private banks. The princi• pal coordinator was the MOF. This mechanism of fund allocation appears to have been kept in place until 1968 when the Council on Financial Institutions and Fund Allocation was abolished. 4. Representative of such advisory bodies were the Round-Table on New Stock' Issues and Coordination (Z6shi to Chosei Kondankai) and the Conference on Bond Issues (Kisai Kai). Both were formed by major financial institutions to enforce voluntary control over the operations of the capital markets. Their antecedents can be found in the similar organizations formed under govern• ment auspices immediately after World War II. The government continued to wield considerable influence over important decisions made by these groups of more recent vintage. 5. In those early years, a well-developed price mechanism existed only in the call money market, which functioned as an interbank money market comparable to the Federal funds market in the United States. The call rates in this market 356 Notes

widely fluctuated in response to the balance of demand and supply, sometimes reaching double-digit levels. The high call rates reflected the strong financial demands generated by the rapidly expanding economy, but the BOJ was often required to hold down the otherwise rising call rates. 6. See Akiyoshi Horiuchi, 'Madoguchi-Shido no Hitsuyosei' (The need for win• dow guidance), in Keimei Kaizuka and Hideo Kanemitsu (eds), Gendai-Nihon no Keizai Seisaku (Economic policies in contemporary Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1981) pp. 70-94. 7. Yoichi Shinkai, 'Is Stabilization Policy Possible in Japan?', Japan Economic Studies, Vol. 5, No.4 (Summer 1977) pp. 71-86. 8. Some economists believed the fixed exchange rate of $1.0 = 360 yen to be an important policy instrument for promoting industrialization in postwar Japan. A direct corollary to this view was the belief that yen revaluation would cause serious problems in the domestic economy. See Miyohei Shinohara, Nihon• Keizai no SeichO to Junkan (Economic growth and business cycles in the Japanese economy) (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1961) Ch. 14. 9. Cases of official intervention in Japan are examined in detail in Ryiitaro Komiya and Miyako Suda, 'Sekiyu-Kiki to Kawase Seisaku' (The oil crisis and foreign exchange policy), Keizaigaku Ron Sha, Vol. 46, No.4 (January 1981) pp.2-27. 10. 'Nihon ni okeru Mane-Sapurai no Jiiyosei ni tsuite' (On the importance of the money supply in Japan), ChOsa Geppo, July 1975, pp. 1-19. 11. The BOJ carefully avoided calling the rate a 'target'. It was called a 'prospect' (mitoshi) instead. By not calling the rate a target, the BOJ probably wanted to avoid being blamed for failing to achieve an officially recognized target. 12. M. D. K. W. Foot, 'Monetary Targets: Their Nature and Record in the Major Economies', in Brian Griffiths and Geoffry E. Wood (eds), Monetary Targets (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 13-40; and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Monetary Targets and Inflation Control (Mon• etary Studies Series) (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1979) pp. 29-61. 13. Window guidance was introduced in the first half of the 1950s. The specific procedures of guidance were modified in the early 1960s. For detail, see Hugh Patrick, Monetary Policy and Central Banking in Contemporarylapan (Bom• bay: University of Bombay, 1962) Ch. 8. It was, however, not until the mid-1960s that the procedures were fully systematized. 14. As we shall explain in the last part of this section, the correlation between the growth rates of the money supply and those of bank loans has gradually become less close. 15. As I have argued elsewhere, window guidance has been neither necessary nor sufficient for purposes of effective monetary control in Japan. See Akiyoshi Horiuchi, 'Effectiveness of "Lending Window Guidance" as a Restrictive Monetary Policy Measure', Japan Economic Studies, Vol. 6, No.2 (Winter 1977-8) pp. 71-92. Window guidance, however, has been effective in control• ling random fluctuations in the money supply. 16. See, for example, Yoshio Suzuki, Money and Banking in Contemporary Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) pp. 5~1. 17. Ryiitaro Komiya and Miyako Suda, 'Kanri Furoto ka no Tanshi Ido' (Short• term capital movements under the managed float), Keizaigaku Ron Shu, Vol. 46, No.1 (April 1980), pp. 11-57. 18. Needless to say, political risk is a very important consideration in international investments. As one author has put it, 'political risk will not only reflect the Notes 357

existing structure of controls but also the markets' perception of future govern• ment actions based on past and current information'. See Ichiro Otani and Siddharth Tiwari, 'Capital Controls and Interest Rate Parity: The Japanese Experience, 1978-81', IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 28, No.4 (December 1981) pp. 793-815. 19. The United States and West Germany were financially much more open than Japan. The ~verage shares of external assets and liabilities in nominal GNP in the period 1971-9 were 31 per cent for the United States and 54 per cent for West Germany. See the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, various issues, and IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 20. See, 'for example, Ralph C. Bryant, Money and Monetary Policy in Interdepen• dent Nations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1980), Ch. 23. 21. Peter J. Quirk, 'Exchange Rate Policy in Japan: Leaning Against the Wind', IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 24, No.3 (November 1977), pp. 642-64, and Akihiro Amano, 'Kanri Furoto-Sei ka no Kawase-Reito to Shihon Ido' (Exchange rates and capital flow under the managed float), Kokumin Keizai Zasshi, Vol. 141, No.6 (June 1980) pp. 20-38. 22. Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981) Chs 6 and 7. 23. Karl-Heinrich Hansmeyer and Rolf Caeser, 'Kriegswirtschaft und Inflation', in Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.), Wiihrung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 1876-1975 (Frankfurt: Knapp, 1976) pp. 419fl. 24. Ibid., p. 422. 25. For an account of the deliberations on and enactment of the money reform, see Hans Moller, 'Die westdeutsche Wiihrungsreform von 1948', in Deutsche Bundesbank, Wiihrung und Wirtschaft, pp. 433ff. 26. The members of the Directorate simultaneously serve as members of the Board. 27. The data refer to the period 1950-58 and, for inflation, 1949-58. 28. See the following sources: Helmut Schlesinger, 'Geldpolitik in der Phase des Wiederaufbaus', in Deutsche Bundesbank, Wiihrung und Wirtschaft, pp. 563ff, and Rudolph Stiicken, Deutsche Geld- und Kreditpolitik 1914-1963 (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1964) pp. 223ff. 29. The actual increase of the monetary base, excluding excess reserves, over that period is used as an indicator of the warranted increase. See Table 3.5. 30. The term reminds one of both the Julius Tower in Berlin-Spandau where the Reich after 1871 hoarded the French war reparations, and of the prudent minister of France in the 1950s, Julius Schaeffer. 31. Excess reserves with the Bundesbank plus assets readily saleable to the Bank at any time - mainly, domestic Treasury bills, other domestic money market paper, and, until the transition to floating exchange rates in 1973, foreign deposits and balances - plus unutilized rediscount lines with the Bundesbank. 32. Cf. Otmar Emminger, 'Deutsche Geld- und Wiihrungspolitik im Spannungs• feld zwischen innerem und iiusserem Gleichgewicht (1948-1975)', in Deutsche Bundesbank, Wiihrung und Wirtschaft, p. 485. 33. The point is strongly emphasized by Helmut Schlesinger in 'Geldpolitik in der Phase des Wiederaufbaus', p. 597. 34. Cf. Emminger, 'Deutsche-Geld', pp. 502ff. 35. Free liquid reserves relative to the volume of bank deposits. 36. Cf. Helmut Schlesinger and Horst Bockelmann, 'Monetary Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Karel Holbik (ed.), Monetary Policy in 358 Notes

Twelve Industrial Countries (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973) p.186. 37. Emminger, 'Deutsche-Geld', p. 502. (The translation is the author's.) 38. Cf. Sachverstiindigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Ent• wick lung (hereafter, SVR) , Jahresgutachten 1964/65 (Stuttgart and Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1965) para. 236ff. 39. SVR, Jahresgutachten 1967 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache Vl231O) (Bonn, 1967) para. 83. 40. The year 1966 was, again, an exception. Cf. Alois Oberhauser, 'Geld- und Kreditpolitik bei weitgehender Vollbeschiiftigung und miissigen Preisanstieg (1958-1968)" in Deutsche Bundesbank, Wiihrung und Wirtschaft, 63~ff. 41. Cf. Ernst Diirr, 'Gelungene Durchkreuzung der restriktiven Geldpolitik', in Dieter Duwendag (ed.), Macht und Ohnmacht der Bundesbank (Frankfurt: Atheniium, 1973) p. 88. 42. Hans E. Biischgen, 'Zeitgeschichtliche Problemfelder des Bankwesens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Institut fur bankhistorische Forschung (ed.), Deutsche Bankengeschichte, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Knapp, 1983), p. 398. 43. Cf. ibid., pp. 399ff. 44. Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschiiftsbericht fur das Jahr 1968, p. 86. 45. Emminger, 'Deutsche Geld- und Wiihrungspolitik', p. 516. 46. Ibid., p. 520. 47. Included among them was the imposition of a special reserve on the growth of the banks' external liabilities, effective on 1 April 1970. 48. Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschiiftsbericht fur das Jahr 1970, p. 15. 49. Ibid., p. 21. 50. -Ibid., p. 47. 51. Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschiiftsbericht fur das Jahr 1971, pp. 32ff. 52. Ibid., p. 95. 53. Ibid., pp. 56ff. 54. This paragraph draws heavily on Armin Gutowski, Hans-Hagen Hartel, and Hans-Eckart Scharrer, 'From Shock Therapy to Gradualism - Anti• Inflationary Policy in Germany from 1973 to 1979', in William Fellner et al., Shock Therapy or Gradualism? A Comparative Approach to Anti-Inflation Policies (New York: Group of Thirty, 1981) pp. 57ff. 55. These ratios are for large banks and those for smaller institutions are somewhat lower. 56. This and the following paragraph draw importantly on Gutowski, Hartel, and Scharrer, 'From Shock Therapy to Gradualism', pp. 61ff. 57. See, for instance, Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht, December 1973, pp. 6ff. 58. This refers to the period between 1973 Q 4 to 1974 Q 4. 59. It should be recalled in this connection that West Germany never had an official income~ policy of the type applied, with limited success, in other European countries. 60. Helmut Schlesinger, 'Problems of Monetary Policy in Germany: Some Basic Issues', in John E. Wadsworth and Francis Leonard de Juvigny (eds), New Approaches to Monetary Policy (Alphen aan de Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979) p. 6. 61. Riidiger Pohl, 'Sollte das Zentralbankgeldziel abgeschafft werden?' Wirt• schaftsdienst, 1983, no. 6, p. 308. 62. These figures are based on quarterly data for the periods 1962 Q 1 to 1972 Q 4, and 1973 Q 1 to 1983 Q 3, respectively. See Manfred Willms, 'Zehn Jahre Notes 359

Geldmengensteuerung', Wirtschaftsdienst, 1983, no. 12, pp. 598ff. 63. Deutsche Bundesbank, Die Deutsche Bundesbank, p. 88. 64. At the end of 1977, 9.1 per cent of the total identified official holdings of foreign exchange were D-Mark, the balance being US dollar (78 per cent) and Japanese yen (2.4 per cent). Of the total external assets and liabilities of banks in industrial countries reporting to the Bank for International Settlements 10.4 per cent were denominated in D-Mark, as compared with 45.5 per cent in dollars and nil in yen. See International Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1985 (Washington, DC), p. 54; and Bank for International Settlements, Inter• national Banking Developments (Basle, April 1985) Table 3. 65. In addition, various administrative disincentives to capital inflows were intro• duced. See SVR, Jahresgutachten 1978179 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 8/2313) (Bonn, 1978) para. 136. 66. My own view was no exception to the prevailing critical mood. See, e.g., Hans-Eckart Scharrer, 'Begrenzter Erfolg?' Wirtschaftsdienst, 1978, no. 12, pp. 582ff, and 'EWS - Gefahrlicher Zeitziinder', Wirtschaftsdienst, 1980, no. 1, pp.8ff. 67. For a summary of the measures, see Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschiiftsbericht fur das Jahr 1978, pp. 14ff. 68. Heinrich Matthes, 'Le Systeme de credit allemand durent les annees soixante• dix', Eurepargne, 1980, no. 11, p. 8. 69. The period is between 1978 Q 4 to 1979 Q 4. 70. The D-Mark reached its all-time high in January 1980 with a dollar exchange rate of DM 1.71. 71. The US current account underwent a shift from a $14 billion deficit in 1978 to a $4 billion surplus in 1980. 72. The deficit then narrowed to DM 13 billion ($6 billion). 73. Cf. inter alia, the joint statement of our leading economic research institutes: Deutsches Institut flir Wirtschaftsforschung et al., Die Lage der Weltwirtschaft und der Westdeutschen Wirtschaft im Fruhjahr 1981 (Essen, 10 April 1981) pp. 17ff. 74. Interview Karl Otto P6he, Handelsblatt, 16 May 1984, reproduced in English in Bank for International Settlements, Press Review, 24 May 1984, p. 2.

4 Anti-inflation Policy

1. See also Yutaka Kosai and Yoshitaro Ogino, The Contemporary Japanese Economy (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp. 124-6. 2. The debate on the dual structure of the Japanese economy was originally triggered by the 1956 Economic White Paper published by the Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Kikakucho). 3. For additional details, see the section below on 'Price Stability as a Policy Objective' . 4. Japanese economists' opinion was divided at the time as to which of two factors was more important, differences in initial conditions or changes in policy posture. 5. For estimates of capital gains on unreproducible tangible assets, see Keizai Kikakucho/Keizai Kenkyiijo, Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nempo, 1985 [Yearbook of National Accounts 1985], p. 304. 6. See Article 1 of the Bank of Japan Law in 'Nihon Ginko Ho', in Roppo Zensho: ShOwa 61-nenban, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yiihikaku, 1986) p. 3194. 7. The behind-the-door negotiations over monetary policy are vividly depicted by 360 Notes

a former vice-governor of the Bank, Koji Nakagawa, in his autobiographical Taiken-teki Kinyu Seisaku Ron [A view of banking policy based on personal experience] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1981). 8. The three groups and their reports are named after their respective chairmen·, Professors Hisao Kumagai, Keinosuke Baba and Mikio Sumiya. 9. See Kosai and Ogino, Contemporary Japanese Economy, pp. 34-7. 10. The 1948---59 period is not paid so much attention in this section partly because of the inadequate amount of available data but mainly because persistent inflationary trends did not exist during that period. 11. Consumer prices decreased by 6.3 per cent in 1950, i.ncreased by 7.8 per cent in 1951, and by 1.8 per cent in 1952, and then fell again, for the last time, in 1953 by 1.8 per cent. 12. The years 1954-62 are excluded because of the inadequacy of available data. 13. M is always measured by M 1 in this section. 14. As noted above, the early 1950s were an exceptional period and are not included in our analysis. 15. For this reason inflation is often regarded as the only tax raised by the government without the approval of the parliament. 16. This formula relates the change rate of pensions to the change rate of wages before tax in the preceding years. 17. Equivalent measures are assigned to other situations of disequilibrium rep• resented by serious unemployment, a recession, and so forth. 18. Aside from this legal question, one might ask whether the federal government would have had the political power to achieve its own wage and price targets against the will of trade unions and employers. Our answer to such a question would be negative. 19. At the time Germany was experiencing simultaneously more than 5 per cent unemployment and more than 5 per cent inflation. Understandably, the chancellor did not want to be reminded of his 1972 view.

5 Labour Markets and Wage Determination

1. Nagahisa Hiraishi, Social Security (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour, 1981); and Haruo Shimada, 'The Japanese Labor Market After the Oil Crisis: A Factual Report', Keio Economic Studies, vol. 14, nos 1 and 2 (1977,1978). 2. Angelika Ernst, Arbeitslosigkeit und Unterbeschiiftigung in Japan (Niirnberg: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, January 1978); and Beschiiftigungsprobleme und Beschiiftigungspolitik in Japan (Niirnberg: Mit• teilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, February 1981). 3. Koji Taira, Economic Development and Labor Market in Japan (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970). 4. James C. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958). 5. Tadashi Hanami, Labour Relations in Japan Today (London: Martin Press, 1980). 6. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Development of Industrial Relations Systems: Some Implications of Japanese Experience (Paris: OECD, 1977). 7. Hanami, Labour Relations. 8. Haruo Shimada, The Japanese Employment System (Tokyo: The Japanese Institute of Labour, 1980). 9. Haruo Shimada and Shunsaku Nishikawa, 'An Analysis of Japanese Employ- Notes 361

ment System and Youth Labor Market', Keio Economic Studies, vol. 16, nos 1--2, 1979. 10. Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Zahlen zur Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Diisseldorf: Institut der Deutschen Wirt• schaft, 1982). 11. Hanami, Labour Relations. 12. J. T. Winkler, Jr, 'Corporatism', Archives Europeenes de Sociologie, vol. 17 (1976), pp. 100-36. 13. Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' Review of Politics, vol. 36, no. 1 (1974), pp. 85-131. 14. Leo Panitch, 'Recent Theorization of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 31, no. 2 (1980), p. 173. 15. Ibid., pp. 171, 173. 16. Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbroch (eds), Trends Toward Corpor• atist Intermediation (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979); Gerhard Lehmbroch and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1982). 17. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Out• look, 27, July 1980 (Paris: OECD, 1980), pp. 142-3. 18. Ibid., p. 83. 19. For representative views stressing differences in initial conditions, see Keizai Kikakucho [Economic Planning Agency: EPA], Sekai Keizai Hakusho: 55-nenban [White paper on the world economy, 1980 edition] (Tokyo: Oku• rasho Insatsukyoku, 1980), pp. 92-3; and Takao Komine, Sekiyu to Nihon Keizai [Oil and the Japanese economy] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1982). 20. Wage equations have been studied by a number of academic economists and policy analysts, the latter often on behalf of government agencies such as the Ministry of Labour, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Bank of Japan. See Haroo Shimada, Earnings Structure and Human Investment: A Compari• son Between the United States and Japan (Tokyo: Kogakusha, 1981), Chapter III; Rodosho [Ministry of Labour], R6d6 Hakusho [Labour white paper], annual; and Keizai Kikakucho, Keizai Hakusho [Economic white paper] (Tokyo: Okurasho, annual). 21. See, for example, Kazutoshi Koshiro, 'Dainiji Sekiyu Kikika no Chingin Kettei' [Wage determination during the second oil crisis], Nihon R6d6 Ky6kai Zasshi, vol. 22, no. 5 (May 1980), pp. 2-13; and Takao Komine, Sekiyu to Nihon Keizai, p. 108. 22. Masanori Hashimoto, 'Bonus Payments, On-the-Job Training and Lifetime Employment in Japan', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87, no. 5, Part I (October 1979), pp. 1086--1104. 23. This view was expounded particularly by Kazutoshi Koshiro in his 'Ryoko na Koyo Kikai no Kishosei to Nihonteki Roshi Kankei' [The scarcity of favour• able employment opportunities and Japanese industrial relations], Nihon R6d6 Ky6kai Zasshi, vol. 24, no. 1 (January 1981). 24. Ibid., pp. 27-31. 25. The following discussion of the 1975 shunt6 relies heavily on Yoshiyasu Matsumura and Jun Fujinaka, 'Tenkanki ni okeru Chingin Kettei Kiko' [The wage determination system in the period of transition] (Bachelor's thesis, Department of Economics, Keio University, 1982). 26. Asahi Shimbun, 16 April 1974. 27. Ibid., 24 May 1974. 362 Notes

28. Sanr6kon (for Sangy6 R6d6 Konwakai) was established in 1970 as an informal advisory group for the Minister of Labor. 29. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 May 1974. 30. Asahi Shimbun, 8 August 1974. 31. Ibid .• 17 August 1974. 32. Ibid., 28 August 1974. 33. Ibid., 6 September 1974. 34. Ibid., 13 September 1974. 35. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 November 1974. 36. Top union negotiators for the steel and shipbuilding industries reportedly confessed at the end of the final negotiating session that they were no longer certain whom they were negotiating with. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 April 1975. This remark suggests that they were under strong cross pressures from different directions during the negotiations. 37. A number of observers have pointed out that the concerted action by metal industry unions proved successful in 1977 but failed in 1978. 38. The decline of public sector unions' influence had been evident since, particu• larly, the eight-day strike staged by members of the National Railway Workers Union in late November to early December 1975. The sensitivity shown by IMF-JC unions to the state of world economic conditions may be attributed partly to the fact that they represented trade-dependent industries. 39. See, in particular, the following works: Helga Grebing, The History of the German Labour Movement (London: Oswald Wolff, 1969); Walter Kendall, The Labour Movement in Europe (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Gerard Braunthal, 'Codetermination in West Germany', in James B. Christoph and Bernard E. Brown (eds), Cases in Comparative Politics, 3rd edn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1976); and Klaus von Beyme, Gewerk• schaften und Arbeitsbeziehungen in Kapitalistischen Uindern (Munich: R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1977). 40. Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. 41. Kendall, The Labour Movement in Europe, p. 116. 42. M. Donald Hancock, Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972) pp. 160-63. 43. von Beyme, Gewerkschaften, pp. 256-7. 44. In 1979 the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the employers' case, thereby upholding the constitutionality of the 1976 bill. 45. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Survey: Germany 1975 (Paris: OECD, 1976) p. 7. 46. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 47. Interview with a private economist in Hamburg, summer 1981. 48. Interview with government and interest group officials, summer 1981. 49. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Survey: Germany 1980 (Paris: OECD, 1981) pp. 16-17. 50. See Gerhard Lehmbruch, 'Liberal Corporatism and Party Government', Com• parative Political Studies, vol. 10 (1977), pp. 91-126; and Lehmbruch and Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. 51. Ulrich von Alemann and Rolf G. Heinze (eds) , Verbiinde und Staat. Yom Pluralism zum Korporatismus, Analysen, Position en, Dokumente (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979). 52. See Lehmbruch, 'Liberal Corporation'; and Lehmbruch, 'Neo-Corporatist Policy Formation in Western Europe: Areas of Inquiry and Theoretical Prob- Notes 363

lems' (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 3--6 September 1981). 53. T. J. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa, 'Corporatism Without Labor? The Japanese Anomaly', in Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation.

6 The Political Management of Agriculture in Japan and West Germany

1. See Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress (London: 1951); Simon Kuznets, The Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Hollis B. Chenery and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 (Oxford: Oxford Univer• sity Press, 1975). 2. M. Bandini et al., Agriculture and Economic Growth (Paris: 1965). 3. Gunther Schmitt, 'Vernachliissigte Aspekte der Anpassungsflexibilitiit der Landwirtschaft und ihre agrarpolitischem Implikationen', Agrarwirtschaft, Vol. 32 (1982). 4. Yasuo Kondo (ed.), Shokkan: BO-nendai ni okeru Sonzai Igi [The food control system: Its raison d'etre in the 1980s] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1980) p.237. 5. Susumu Yamaji, 'Agriculture', in Kozo Yamamura (ed.), Politics and Econ• omics in Contemporary Japan (Tokyo: Japan Culture Institute, 1979) p. 195. 6. Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978) pp. 3-4. 7. Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale Univer• sity Press, 1968). 8. Interview with a former MAFF official, 1 November 1978. 9. Michael W. Donnelly, 'Setting the Price of Rice: A Study in Political Decision• making', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 169-71. 10. Ibid., p. 176. 11. Naraomi Imamura (ed.), Tenkanki ni tatsu Shokkan Seido [The food control system at a crossroads] (Tokyo: Ie no Hikari Kyokai, 1980) p. 43. 12. Aurelia D. George, 'The Strategies of Influence: Japan's Agricultural Cooperatives (Nokyo) As a Pressure Group' (unpublished PhD dissertation: Australian National University, 1980) p. 297. 13. Kondo, Shokkan, p. 239. 14. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 June 1969. 15. George, The Strategies of Influence, pp. 320-1. 16. Kondo, Shokkan, pp. 244--5. 17. George, The Strategies of Influence, p. 326; and Donnelly, 'Setting the Price of Rice', p. 192. 18. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 28 February 1969. 19. Imamura, Tenkanki, p. 239. 20. Fumio Egaitsu, 'Japanese Agricultural Policy: Present Problems and the His• torical Background', in Emery N. Castle and Kenzo Henmi (eds) , U.S.-Japan• ese Agricultural Trade Relations (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1982) p. 156. 21. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1 May 1971. 22. Ibid., 29 June 1971. 23. Ibid., 14 July 1972. 364 Notes

24. J. C. Nagle, Agricultural Trade Policies (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 1976).p. 48. 25. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 February and 16 May 1974. 26. Ibid., 25 April 1974. 27. Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics in Japan', in Castle and Henmi, U.S.-Japan- ese Agricultural Trade Relations, p. 239. 28. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23 May and 27 June 1974. 29. Ibid., 23 July 1974. 30. Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics', p. 238. 31. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 4 September 1974. 32. Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics', p. 241. 33. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 7 July 1976; and Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics', p.240. 34. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 11 July and 20 (evening edn), 1976. 35. Ibid., 2 July (evening edn), 1977. 36. Ibid., 24 May and 31 May 1978. 37. Imamura, Tenkanki, p. 239; and Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics', p. 241. 38. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 11 June (evening edn), 1980; and Henmi, 'Agriculture and Politics', p. 242. 39. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31 July (evening edn), 1980. 40. Yasusuke Murakami, 'The Age of New Middle Mass Politics: The Case of Japan' The Journal of Japanese Studies (Winter 1982), pp. 29-72. 41. Interview with a German federal agriculture ministry official, 19 June 1981. 42. Rosemary Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Com• munity (London: Granada, 1979) p. 53. 43. Helmut Bujard, 'Zum Politikerverhalten in der Westdeutschen Agrarpolitik' (unpublished paper, Fachhochschule K61n, 1980). 44. William F. Averyt, Jr, Agropolitics in the European Community: Interest Groups and the Common Agricultural Policy (New York: Praeger, 1976) p. 8. 45. Ibid., p. 9; and Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy, p. 56. 46. Ibid., p. 84. 47. Ibid., pp. 137-40. 48. EC Background Note (: EC Commission, June 1983), p. 6. 49. Stefan Tangermann, 'Germany's Position on the CAP - Is· It All Germans' Fault?', in M. Tracy and J. Hodac (eds) , Prospects for Agriculture in the European Economic Community (Bruges, Belgium: College of Europe, 1979) p.401. SO. Interviews with a DBV representative, 30 June 1981, and a German agricul- tural economist, 18 June 1981. 51. Averyt, Agropolitics, p. 17. 52. Ibid., p. 9. 53. Interview with a representative of Agrarsoziale Gesellschaft e. V., 4 June 1981. 54. Tangermann, 'Germany's Position on the CAP', p. 397. 55. Ibid., p. 398. 56. Ibid., p. 400.

7 Social Security and Welfare in Japan and West Germany

1. A. T. Peacock and J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 2. 'Gezetz zur Milderung dringender sozialer Notstande (Soforthilfegesetz)', 8 August 1949; and 'Gesetz tiber die Anpassung von Leistungen der Sozial- Notes 365

versicherung an das verandertt;: Lohn und Preisgeflige und iiber ihre finanzielle Sicherstellung (Sozialversicherungsanpassungsgesetz)', 17 June 1949. 3. 'Drittes Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Geldwesens (Umstellungsgesetz)', 20 June 1948. 4. H. Lampert, Sozialpolitik (Berlin, New York, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1980); G. Kleinhenz and H. Lampert, 'Zwei Jahrzehnte Sozialpolitik in der BRD', Ordo, pp. 103-158, Band 22, Verlag H. Kiipper, vorm. Bondi, 1971; H. Lampert, Die Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung del' Bundesrepublik Deutsch• land (Miinchen, Wien: Verlag G. Olzog, 1980); and W. Albers, 'Sozialpolitik, IV: In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Handworterbuch del' Wirtschafts• wissenschaft, vol. 7 (Stuttgart: Verlag G. Fischer, Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1977), pp. 110--30. 5. Der Bundesminister fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Referat Presse- und Offentlichkeitsarbeit (Hrsg.), Obersicht abel' die soziale Sicherung, Stand: 1. April 1977, p. 20. 6. See Sorifu Shakaihosho Seido Shingikai Jimukyoku [Office of the Prime Minister, Secretariat of the Advisory Council on the Social Security System] (ed.), ShakaihoshO Seido Shingikai Sanjunen no Ayumi [Thirty years history of the Advisory Council on the Social Security System] (Tokyo: Shakaihoken Hoki Kenkyukai, 1980). 7. The 'matUl.1ty' of a pension system is defined as the ratio of current pension recipients to the total membership of the system. In the Japanese case, because of the relatively short history of the systems, such ratios were, for example, 16.9 per cent for the Employees' Pension Scheme, and 15.5 per cent on average ·for all the systems in 1978. The ratios for European systems varied between 20 and 30 per cent and the average German ratio was 29 per cent. See Koseisho [Ministry of Health and Welfare], Kosei Tokei Yoran Showa 56-nenban [Hand• book of welfare statistics 1981] (Tokyo: Kosei Tokei Kyokai), 1982, pp. 221, 245. The average amount of pension benefits under the Japanese Employees' Pension Scheme in 1980 was 100812 yen, which was roughly equal to the average of 902.2 DM under the German Workers' Pension Insurance scheme. Ibid., p. 270. 8. Regarding the 'Japanese-style welfare society', see Notes 27,28 and 29. 9. Der Bundesminister flir Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Obersicht abel' die Soziale Sicherung 1977 (Bonn, 1977), p. 381. to. Ibid., p. 359. 11. H. Lamp~rt, 'Sozialpolitik I: staatliche', Handworterbuch del' Wirtschaftswis• senschaft, vol. 7, pp. 60--76, esp. p. 77. 12. Lampert, Sozialpolitik, p. 281. 13. M. Pfaff (ed.), 'Problembereiche der Verteilungs- und Sozialpolitik', Schriften des Internationalen Instituts far Empirische SozialOkonomie (INIFES), vol. 2, 1978. 14. For information on the aid for young people, see Lampert, Sozialpolitik, p.474. 15. Naikaku KambO [Cabinet Secretariat] (ed.), Naikaku Soridaijin Enzetsushu [Collection of prime ministers' speeches] (Tokyo: OkurashO Insatsukyoku, 1966) p. 572. 16. Ibid., p. 599. 17. Ibid., pp. 608-9. 18. Ibid., p. 665. 19. Keizai Kikakucho [Economic Planning Agency], Shotoku Baizo Keikaku [In• come doubling plan] (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku,' 1961) pp. 39-40. 366 Notes

Shakaihosho Seido Shingikai Jimukyoku, Shakaihosho Seido Shingikai, p. 697. 20. Naikaku Kambo, Naikaku S6ridaijin, p. 768. 21. Naikaku S6ridaijin Kamb6 [Office of the Prime Minister, Secretariat] (ed.), Tanaka Naikaku S6ridaijin Enzetsushu [Collection of prime minister Tanaka's speeches] (Tokyo: Nihon Koho Kyokai, 1975) p. 107. 22. Keizai Kikakucho, Keizai Shakai Kihon Keikaku [Economic and social basic plan] (Tokyo: Dkurash6 Insatsukyoku), 1973. 23. Naikaku S6ridaijin Kamb6 (ed.), Miki Naikaku S6ridaijin Enzetsushu [Collec• tion of prime minister Miki's speeches] (Tokyo: Nihon Koho Kyokai, 1977) pp. 42-3. 24. Economic Planning Agency, New Economic and Social Seven-Year Plan (Tokyo: Dkurash6 Insatsukyoku, 1979) p. 12. On the Japanese-style welfare society, see also Katsuhiro Hori, 'Nihongata Fukushi Shakai Ron' [On Japanese-style welfare society], Kikan Shakai Hosho Kenkyu, vol. 17, no. 1 (1981). 25. A University of Tokyo political scientist, Takashi Inoguchi, persuasively advo• cates a 'political surfing' theory of political-economic interactions in Japan. He has written: 'When bureaucratic autonomy is strong and electoral constraints are weak, political surfing is observed. Since the elected government does not have a firm grip on many economic instruments, the elected government tends to use its electoral policy instruments (e.g., the timing of elections) with an eye on changing economic conditions. Because electoral constraints are not very strong, the position of the elected government is analogous to a surfboard on economic waves.' See Takashi Inoguchi, 'Political Surfing over Economic Waves: A Simple Model of the Japanese Political-Economic System in Com• parative Perspective' (Paper presented at the World Congress of the Inter• national Political Science Association, Moscow, 12-18 August 1979). 26. Since 1978 the number of vice-ministers among Council members has declined from ten to four. 27. Shakaihosh6 Seido Shingikai Jimukyoku, ShakaihoshO Seido Shingikai, pp. 420--21. 28. Ibid., p. 75. 29. Ibid., pp. 97-8. 30. See Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai [the National Social Welfare Advisory Council (ed.), Jichitai no Shakai Fukushi Shisaku [Social welfare measures implemented by local governments] (Tokyo: Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai), 1977. 31. Koseish6, Kosei Tokei Yoran ShOwa 56-nendo, p. 186. About two thirds of those non-governmental facilities are run by religious groups, including Prot• estant, Catholic and Buddhist organizations. See Suehiro Muraoka, 'Gendai Fukushi ni okeru Minkan Shakai Fukushi· Jigyo no Ichizuke' [The role of non-governmental social welfare programmes in the contemporary welfare system], Juristo, no. 537 (1973) p. 65. 32. Nihon Seisansei Honbu [Japan Productivity Centre], Katsuyo Rodo Tokei 1982 [Handbook of labour statistics 1982] (Tokyo: Nihon Seisansei Honbu, 1982) p.91. 33. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has been eager to raise the pension benefit eligibility age to 65. In early 1980, the ministry drafted a bill to revise the Employees' Pension Scheme to raise the eligibility age by one year in every four years, so that in twenty years it would have been raised to 65. Owing to the LDP's reluctance to push it, however, the bill was not presented to the Diet. This was a case in which bureaucrats acted prematurely and failed to achieve Notes 367

their goal. See Toru Ashizaki, K6seishO Zankoku_Monogatari [A cruel story of the Ministry of Health and Welfare] (Tokyo: Eru Shuppansha, 1980), pp. 148-52. 34. Social Insurance Agency, Japanese Government, Outline of Social Insurance in Japan, 1981 (Tokyo: Japan International Social Security Association, 1981) pp. 4-7. 35. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Surveys: Japan (Paris: OECD, 1981) p. 56. 36. Somucho [Coordination and Management Agency], R6d6ryoku ChOsa Nemp6 1984 [Annual report on the labour force, 1984] (Tokyo: OkurashO Insatsu• kyoku, 1984). 37. Social Insurance Agency, Outline, p. 7; and Institut deutschen Wirtschaft (ed.), Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch• land (Koln: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag GmbH, 1981). 38. Lampert, Sozialpolitik. 39. International Labour Office (ed.), The Cost of Social Security: Tenth Inter• national Inquiry, 1975-1977, p. 4. 40. H. Winterstein, Das System der sozialen Sicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munchen: Verlag Vahlen, 1980). 41. E. Standfest, Sozialpolitik als Reformpolitik. Aspekte der sozialpolitischen Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, WSI-Studien Nr. 39 (Koln: Bund-Verlag, 1979); H. Winterstein, Das System der sozialen Sicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munchen: Verlag Vahlen, 1980); V. Bethus• yhuc, Das SoziaUeistungs-system der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Tubingen: Verlag J. C. B. Mohr, 1976); Kleinhenz and Lampert, Zwei Jahrzehnte Sozialpolitik in der BRD, Ordo, Band 22, 19'11, pp. 103-158; and H. G. Hockerts, Sozialpolitische Entscheidung im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Stuttgart: Verlag Klett-Cotta, 1980). 42. KoseishO (ed.), Guide to Health and Welfare Services in Japan (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1979) p. 6. 43. E. Standfest (Projektleitung), Sozialpolitik und Selbstverwaltung. Zur Demo• kratisierung des Sozialstaates, WSI-Studie Nr. 35 (Koln: Bund-Verlag, 1977). 44. Der Bundesminister fUr Arbeit und Sozialordnung (ed.), Obersicht aber die Soziale Sicherung (Bonn, 1977). 45. P. R. Kaim-Caudle, Comparative Social Policy. A Ten Country Study (London: Martin Robertson, 1973); W. Ackermann, Soziale Sicherung in der Indus• triegesellschaft - Tendenzen und Konsequenzen (Bern and FrankfurtlM.: Verlag Peter Lang, 1980); B. Rogers et al., The Study of Social Policy: A Comparative Approach (London, 1979); and P. Grottian (ed.), 'Folgen reduzierten Wach• stums fur Politikfelder', Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft, 11/1980. 46. Kaim-Caudle, Comparative Social Policy, p. 35. 47. S. Boye, 'The Cost of Social Security, 1967-71: Some National Economic Aspects', International Labor Review, 1977, p. 307 ff. 48. Ibid., p. 319. 49. Social Insurance Agency (ed.), Outline, p. 15. 50. In the mid-1980s about four million old people in Japan were recipients ofvery low benefits under non-contributory old age welfare pension schemes. Even under the Employees' Pension Insurance, all beneficiaries did not receive full benefits. Moreover, the Japanese yen's domestic purchasing power was gener• ally lower than that of the Deutsche Mark. In light of these circumstances, Koichi Demizu asserts that the average level of old age pensions in Japan was definitely lower than that in Germany. See Koichi Demizu, Nichidoku Keizai 368 Notes

Hikaku Ron [A comparison of the Japanese and German economies] (Tokyo: Yiihikaku, 1981) pp. 224-8. 51. H. Seki, 'Employment problems and policies in an ageing society. The Japan• ese experience', International Labor Review, 1980, no. 3; United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1973, vol. III: International Tables (New York: United Nations, 1975); and International Social Security Associ• ation (lSSA), Social Security and National Economy, Studies and Research, no. 1 (Geneva: ISSA, 1970). 52. Social Insurance Agency, Japanese Government, Outline of Social Insurance in Japan, 1979 (Tokyo: 1979) p. 4; and Ministry of Health and Welfare (ed.), Health and Welfare Services in Japan (Tokyo, 1977). 53. Boye, 'The cost of social security 1960-71', p. 321.

Conclusions

1. On the reform proposals of the American occupation and their fate, see, especially, Edward H. Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press, 1953). In a manner of speaking, division into a communist East and a liberal-democratic, capitalist West was Germany's 'veritable revolution', because the Soviet occupation and the German Commu• nist government carried out a sweeping land reform, including the expropri• ation of East Elbian estates, and a series of other structural reforms. There is large literature on these reforms and their intent to bring the East German bourgeoisie under 'proletarian' domination: for example, J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), or Mike Dennis, German Democratic Republic (Lon• don: Pinter, 1988). 2. On the aims and triumphs of the Marshall Plan, see also Stanley Hoffman and Charles Maier (eds) , The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984) and John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), and the sources cited there. 3. We must distinguish the growth of the production potential of an economy from an increase in GNP in order to take account of cyclical fluctuations. 4. On the nexus between defence dependency and economic relations, see, especially, James C. Sperling, 'The FRG, the US, and the Atlantic Economy', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.), The Federal Republic at Forty (New York: New York University Press, 1989). 5. There were also several less significant plans for social and economic develop• ment. See Table 1.9. 6. See Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984) pp. 398-404. By 1977 American wage levels were at 122 per cent and the West German one at 116 per cent of the Japanese average, and by now the Japanese are no longer at an advantage, at least not in key industries. 7. Ibid., pp. 408-414. This also includes the, hitherto, low public expenditures for social security, but also the low level of taxation. 8. One CDU Minister President, Albrecht of Lower Saxony, presented such a programme in 1983 and encountered determined opposition within his own party. See Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987) pp.120-22. 9. A recent survey by Josef Esser shows that the Kohl administration had not lived up to its promises of deregulation and privatization except for a few Notes 369

symbolic gestures. See 'Symbolic Privatization: The Politics of Privatization in West Germany', West European Politics, October 1988, pp. 61-73. 10. In 1986, labour conflicts cost the US 121 working days per 1000 employees, Britain 89, France 32, Japan 6, and the FRG one. 11. There was some reformist sentiment which surfaced with a new interest in the flexible use of manpower and machines, venture and reinvestment capital, small business and investment in ecological technologies. There is also a controversial plan of Oskar Lafontaine to redistribute work from the full-time employees - by means of an unpaid reduction of the work week to 35 hours - to the unemployed, part-timers, and many women workers. These plans are opposed by powerful trade unions and party groups. 12. T. J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadel• phia: Temple University Press, 1982) p. 13. 13. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany, p. 87. 14. See Stephen Schier and Norman Vig, 'Macro-economic Policies in Britain and the United States', in N. Vig and S. Schier (eds), Political Economy in Western Democracies (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1985) pp. 178-9. 15. As shown in Chapter 7, the social security benefit payments in West Germany accounted for much larger fractions of GNP than those in Japan - about 20 per cent vs. 10 per cent. This was due mainly to the fact that Germany's was the oldest social security system in the world, while Japan's was relatively new, developed essentially since World War II. 16. For obvious reasons, a simple comparison of unemployment statistics would not be sufficient. 17. This was not because of its coal reserves; it could have shut down the coal mines and saved subsidies, or it could have gone on using as much coal as any other country, even importing it if it had had no coal reserves of its own. 18. Deutsche Politik 1966 (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1967) p. 133. See also the Policy Declaration of the incoming Kiesinger government on this subject in ibid., pp. vii-viii. 19. See also the neo-Marxist literature on the alleged 'legitimacy crisis' of contem• porary capitalist democracies, such as the writings of Jorgen Habermas and Claus Offe. 20. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany, pp. 169-175. Also Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Peter Flora (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe altd America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981) pp. 286-7. Both of these sources also include an active labour market policy in their definition of welfare policy. 21. See also Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan, pp. 135-7, who emphasizes the concentration of organized labour on extracting welfare provisions from the corporations that employ the prospective beneficiaries as the other side of the bargain made by a loyal employee. 22. Richardson and Flanagan, Politics in Japan, pp. 16-19,72 speak of the rise of the 'monocentric power' of modernizing oligarchs in spite of quasi-Western constitution. 23. On the postwar 'recasting of bourgeois Europe', see, especially, Charles S. Maier (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary Europe (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), who earlier addressed himself to the same theme regarding the post-World War One era, in Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Alan Milward The Reconstruction of Postwar Europe (London: Methuen, 1984), and John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Index

Abegglen, James c., 200 Brandt, Willy, 316, 342 Adenauer, Konrad, 12, 121,310; social Bundesbank, 52, 116, 117, 118, 171, security policy of, 287 187, 223, 225, 227, 313, 327-8; administrative guidance (Japan), 20 monetary policy of; 120-44, 172, Administrative Reform Council 183-4, 326, 330 (Japan), 89-90, 100, 272, 325, 326 Bundesbank Act, 116-17, 122, 187-8 Advisory Council on Social Insurance Bundesanstalt far Landwirtschaftliche (Japan),295 Marktordnung, 274 Advisory Council on the Social Security Bundesvereinigung der deutschen System (Japan), 283, 290, 291, 294, Arbeitgeberverbande, 220, 223, 225 341 business cycle (Japan), 26-7 Agricultural Cooperative Association Business Cycle Council (Germany), 81 (Japan), see Nokyo Agricultural Land Law (Japan), 254 Campbell, John C., 39 Agricultural Law (Germany), 248 CAP, see European Community, Ahlen Programme, 312 Common Agricultural Policy of All-Japan Federation of Farmers' Carter, Jimmy, 139 Unions, see Zen'nichino CDU, see Christian Democratic Union All Opposition-Parties Joint Struggle on Central Social Insurance Medical Care the Rice Price, see Zen Yato Beika Council, see ChUikyo Kyoto Chingin Bukka Kondankai, see Round Amaike, Seiji, 216 Table on Wages and Prices Anglo-American Joint Export and Christian Democratic Union Import Agency (Germany), 46 (Germany), 6, 222, 279, 285, 288, Anti-Monopoly Law (Japan), 23, 34 312,339 Arai, Hakuseki, 7 Christian Social Union (Germany), 6, ARC, see Administrative Reform 285, 288, 312 Council ChUikyo, 294-5 Ashida, Hitoshi, 290 ChUritsuroren, 213, 221 Association of German Industry, 76 Club of Ten, 78 Austria, 7 codetermination (Germany), 59, 222-3; Law of, 186, 226 Bank deutscher Lander, see Comite des Organisations Professionelles Bundesbank Agricoles, 274 Bank fUr Gemeinwirtschaft, 47 Commerzbank,47 Bank of Japan, 21, 43, 44, 159-60,317, Commission on Economic and Social 327; monetary policy of, 101-15, Change (Germany), 73, 324 160-1,330,331; foreign exchange Commission on the Environment policy of, 110-13 (Germany), 324 Baring, Arnulf, 5 Commission on Monopoly (Germany), Basic Agricultural Law (Japan), 248, 324 256,264 Comprehensive National Development Basic Economic and Social Plan Plan (Japan), 90 (Japan), 95, 96, 325 Concerted Action, 59, 185-6,224-9, Basic Law (Germany), 282 232, 315, 333, 334, 336 BOA, see Bundesvereinigung der Conference of Lander Ministers of deutschen A rbeitgeberverbande Culture and Education (Germany), BDI, see Federation of German 16 Industry Conference of University Rectors Berlin Wall, 332 (Germany), 16 Bismarck, 12 Constitution of Japan, 22 Bismarckian Empire, 7 construction bonds (Japan), 154-5

370 Index 371

Conzertierte Aktion, see Concerted 215, 220, 221, 325; and agricultural Action policy, 157, 262, 272 COPA, see Comite des Organisations Economic Stabilization Board (Japan), Professionelles Agrico/es 40 corporatism, 207-8, 229; in Germany, ECSC, see European Coal and Steel 207-8, 229; in Japan, 2-3, 207-8, Community 229-32; functional, 231, 336 EEC, see European Economic Council for Unification of Unions Community (Japan), 221 Einfuhr- und Vorratstellen, 274, 278 Council of Advisers to the Ministry of Emergency Plan for Rice Production Economics (Germany), 58 Adjustment (Japan), 265 Council of Economic Advisors (US), 71 Emminger, Otmar, 121 Council of Economic Experts, 68, 70-3, Employees' Pension Insurance (Japan), 185,186,224-5,323,324,328,333; 281,283 on exchange-rate policy, 75, 77-9, Employment Insurance Bill (Japan), 123, 129 294 Council of Experts on the Problems of EMS, see European Monetary System the Environment (Germany), 73 Engels' law, 233, 236, 248 Council of Unions for Policy Promotion Enquete commissions (Germany), 316 (Japan),220 EPA, see Economic Planning Agency Council on Financial Institutions and Equalization of Burdens programme Fund Allocation (Japan), 103 (Germany), 57 CSU, see Christian Social Union Erhard, Ludwig, 83, 121,288, 310, 316, CUU, see Council for Unification of 322, 323, 339 Unions Ert!, Josef, 274 European Coal and Steel Community, DAG (Germany), 48 12 Daily Life Protection Law (Japan), 283 European Community, 64; Common DBLN, see Deutscher Bundesverband Agricultural Policy of, 243, 246, der Landwirte im Nebenberuf 273-6,279, 337, 338; Council of DBV, see Deutscher Bauernverband Ministers of, 254, 273, 277; Deutsche Bank, 47, 76 Management Committees of, 273 Deutsche Bundesbank, see Bundesbank European Economic Community, 55 Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 16 European Monetary System, 138-9, 328 Deutscher Bauernverband, 274, 278 European Payments Union, 55 Deutscher Bundesverband der Landwirte European Recovery Programme, see im Nebenberuf, 274, 278 Marshall Plan Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 48, 220, EVSt, see Einfuhr- und Vorratstellen 222-3, 225, 226 Expert Council for Macro-economic Development Bank (Japan), 313 Assessment, see Council of DGB, see Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Economic Experts Diet (Japan), 87 Diet Members' Council on the Fair Trade Commission (Japan), 23 Promotion of Agriculture and Far Eastern International Military Forestry, 271 Tribunal, 21 DIHT, see German Diet of Industry Farmers Pension Scheme (Japan), 254 and Commerce FDP, see Liberal Party Doko, Toshio, 216 Federal Cartel Office (Germany), 47, Dodge, Joseph, 161 323 Domei, 36, 216 Federal Constitutional Court Dresdner Bank, 47 (Germany), 126 Federal-Lander Commission on EAP, see Economic Planning Agency Educational Planning (Germany), EC, see European Community 16 Economic Council (Germany), 77 Federation of Economic Organizations, Economic Council (Japan), 85, 90, 325 see Keidanren Economic Plans (Japan), 90-6 Federation of German Industry, 48 Economic Planning Agency (Japan), 90, Federation of Housewives, see Shufuren 372 Index

Federation of Steel Workers Unions HaUstein Doctrine, 14 (Japan),215-16,220 Harpsund Democracy, 225 Federation of Synthetic Chemical Hasegawa, Takashi, 215 Workers Unions, see Goka roren Hatoyama, Ichiro, 291 Federal Reserve Board (US), 129 HaushaltsgrundsiJtzegesetz, see Law of FEO, see Keidanren Budgeting Principles FEOGA, 251, 274-7 Hayashi, Razan, 7 Financial System Deliberation Council HCLC, see Holding Company (Japan), 264 Liquidation Committee Finanzplanungsrat, see Fiscal Planning Heinze, Rolf G., 229 Council Higaki, Tokutaro, 270 Fiscal Planning Council (Germany), 82, Hirata, Atsutane, 7 324 Hitler, Adolf, 12 Fiscal System Council (Japan), 85 Hocherl programme (Germany), 254 Five-Year Economic Independence Plan Holding Company Liquidation (Japan),95 Committee (Japan), 23 Fonds europ~en d'orientation et de House of Peers (Japan), 39 garantie agricole, see FEOGA Food Control Agency (Japan), 257 Ichimada, Hisato, 33 Food Control Law (Japan), 255, 265 Ikeda, Hayato, 40-1, 114, 260, 310; on Foreign Exchange Control Law (Japan), the welfare state, 291 110,327 IMF-JC, see International Freiburg School, 184 Metalworkers Federation Fukuda, Takeo, 163,215,216,217,266, Import and Stocking Board, see EVSt 269,270 Inayama, Hiroshi, 218 Future Investment Programme Income Doubling Plan, see National (Germany), 62 Income Doubling Plan industrial policy (Japan), 41-3 GARIOA, see Government Account Institut fUr Weltwirtschaft, 78 for Relief in Occupied Areas Fund Interest Rates Adjustment Council GDR, see German Democratic (Japan), 160 Republic International Metalworkers General Council of Japanese Trade Federation-Japan Council, 217, Unions, see Sohyo 219,221 German Confederacy, 7 Ishibashi, Tanzan, 291 German Confederation of Labour, see DGB Japan Chamber of Commerce and German Democratic Republic, 13, 44-5 Industry, 34 German Diet of Industry and Japan Committee for Economic Commerce, 48 Development, 34 German Expert Council, see Council of Japan Communist Party, 258, 337 Economic Experts Japan Council of Economic Research, German Federal Bank, see Bundesbank see NikkeicM German Federal Statistical Office, 72 Japan Development Bank, 42 German Trade Union Federation, see Japan Federation of Employers' DGB Associations, see Nikkeiren Gerstenmaier, Eugen, 288 Japan Medical Association, 295 Giersch, Herbert, 72, 76 Japan Socialist Party, 258, 337; and Giscard d'Estaing, Va16ry, 138 social security policy, 285, 342 Goka roren, 213 Japanese Confederation of Labour, see Government Account for Relief in Domei Occupied Areas Fund, 54 Japanese-style welfare society, 284, 286, Great Depression, 9-10 292, 296, 339 Green Party (Germany), 337, 341 JCCI, see Japan Chamber of Commerce Grundgesetz, see Basic Law and Industry Griiner Plan, 80 JCED, aee Japan Committee for Economic Development Habermas, Jiirgen, 68, 71 JCP, see Japan Communist Party Index 373

JEIA, see Angl()-American Joint agricultural policy, 257, 260, 265, Export and Import Agency 26S-72; Comprehensive Junkers, 8 Agricultural Policy Research Joint Struggle Council for the Spring Council of, 265, 269; and social Offensive (Japan), 213 security policy, 285 JSP, see Japan Socialist Party Liberal Party (Germany), 6, 225 London Debt Settlement, 54 Kankeiren, 216 Long-Term Vision of the Industrial Kansai Keidanren, see Kankeiren Structure (Japan), 90, 94, 325 Katayama, Tetsu, 290 Louis XIV, 11 Katzenstein, Peter J., 5, 6, 323 Katzer, Hans, 288, 338 MAFF, see Ministry of Agriculture, Kawasaki Steel Company, 33 Forestry and Fisheries Keidanren, 34, 216 Marshall, George, 46 Keiretsu, 21, 35, 311 Marshall Plan, 46, 53, 54, 55, 312, 313, Keizai Dantai Rengokai, see Keidanren 314 Keizai Doyukai, see Japan Committee Marx, Karl, 2 for Economic Development Matthofer, Hans, 63 Keizai Keikaku, see Economic Plan Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 16 Keizai Shingikai, see Economic Council Medium-Term Budget Plan (Germany), Kendall, Walter, 223 324 Kishi, Nobusuke, 291 Medium-Term Fiscal Outlook (Japan), Kokugaku, see National Studies 90,93 Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg, 76 Meiji Restoration, 8, 14 Kinyd-kikan Shikin Shingikai, see Miki, Takeo, 217, 269, 292 Council on Financial Institutions Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and and Fund Allocation Fisheries (Japan), 257, 269-70, 272 Konjunkturrat, see Business Cycle Ministry of Defence (Germany), 80 Council Ministry of Economics (Germany), 69 Kono, Ichiro, 262 Ministry of Finance (Japan), 88, 160, 220,221,293-4,317,325; Labour Codetermination Law monetary policy of, 43-4, 10&-10; (Germany),48 and agricultural policy, 257, 262, labour movement (Japan), 23-4 270,272 labour unions (Japan), 163, 164 Ministry of Health and Welfare Lambsdorff, Count Otto, 5 (Japan), 284, 293, 295 land reform: in Germany, 237, 240; in Ministry of International Trade and Japan, 23, 237,240, 311 Industry (Japan), 41, 42, 88, 220, Landeszentralbank, 116 312, 317; Industrial Rationalization Landwirtschaftsgesetz, see Agricultural Council of, 103; Industrial Finance Law Subcommittee of, 103 Law Against Restrictions on Ministry of Labour (Japan), 163, 221 Competition (Germany), 4&-7 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Law for the Elimination of Excessive (Germany), 285, 288 Concentration of Economic Power Ministry of Posts and (Japan),23 Telecommunications (Japan), 160 Law of Budgeting Principles Minobe, Ryokichi, 296 (Germany), 81-2 Mitbestimmung, see codetermination Law ff)r Promoting Economic Stability MITI, see Ministry of International and Growth, see Stability and Trade and Industry Growth Law Miyata, Yoshiji, 215, 220 LOP, see Liberal Democratic Party Miyawaki, Asao, 265 LOP Diet Members' Council on the Mizuta, Mikio, 264 Producer Rice Price, 271 MOF, see Ministry of Finance Lehmbruch, Gerhard, 229-30 monetarism (Japan), 101, 113-14, 166, Liberal Dc.-mocratic Party (Japan), 6, 327,331 39, 266, 271, 329, 339; Policy Monopolkommission, see Monopoly Research Council of, 89; and Commission 374 Index

Monopoly Commission (Germany), 73 Pempel, T.J., 130,323 Motoori, Norinaga, 7 Pohl, Karl Otto, 144 Mutual Security Act (Germany), 54 Policy for Shifting the Use of Rice Fields (Japan), 270 Nakagawa, Ichiro, 270 postwar reforms (Japan), 21-4 Napoleon, 11 Privy Council (Japan), 39 National Centre of Independent Prussia, 7 Unions, see Churitsuroren Public Finance Law (Japan), 154 National Chamber of Agriculture, see Zenkoku N6gy6 Kaigisho Rat der Sachverstiindigen fur National Federation of German Umweltfragen, see Council of Employer Associations, see Experts on the Problems of the Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Environment Arbeitgeberverbiinde Reagan, Ronald, 339 National Health Insurance (Japan), 281, Reconstruction Credit Agency 283-4, 292-3, 294-5, 299 (Germany),53 National Income Doubling Plan Rice Council (Japan), 258, 264 (Japan), 94, 291, 325 Rice Price Deliberation Council, see National Pension System (Japan), Rice Council 283-4,293--6,299 Rinji Gy6sei Ch6sakai, see National Studies (Japan), 7 Administrative Reform Council New Economic Policy, see Nixon Shock Road Construction Five Year Plans New Japan Steel Co., 218 (Japan), 93, 96 New Long-Term Economic Plan Rome Treaty, 253,254,337 (Japan),95 Round Table on Wages and Prices Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei, see (Japan), 215 Nikkeirer. Russo-Japanese War, 9 Nihon Shoko Kaigisho, see Japan Chamber of Commerce and Sachverstiindigenrat, see Council of Industry Economic Experts Nikkeichii, 216 Sangy6 G6rika Shingikai, see Ministry Nikkeiren, 34,215-18 of International Trade and Nishimiya, Yataro, 33 Industry, Industrial Rationalization Nishimura, Naomi, 264 Council of Nixon Shock, 105, 130, 327 Sangy6 Shikin Bukai, see Ministry of N6ky6, 257, 265, 267, 269, 271, 272 International Trade and Industry, Northern Territories (Japan), 13 Council on Financial Institutions and Fund Allocation of Oberfinanzdirektion, 274 Sangy6k6z6 no Chiiki Bijon, see Ohira, Masayoshi, 269-70, 292, 339 Long-Term Vision of the Industrial oil crises: effects on West German Structure economy, 62-3, 64, 65, 134, Sanr6kon, 215, 231 139-40, 171-2, 190,208-10,220--1, Sase, Masanori, 5 226-8, 316, 328; effects on Sato, Eisaku, 260, 264-6, 291-2 Japanese economy, 31, 147-8, 151, SCAP, see Supreme Commander for 152, 164, 190,208-11,316--17,329 Allied Powers OPEC, see Organization of the Schellenberg, Ernst, 287 Petroleum Exporting Countries Schiller, Karl, 77, 131, 225, 226, 316, Organization of the Petroleum 322,323 Exporting Countries, 19,209 Schlesinger, Helmut, 135 Ostpolitik, 14 Schmidt, Helmut, 138, 187,228,310, 0ta, Kaoru, 213, 216 316 Schmidt, Manfred G., 229 Panitch, Leo, 208 Schmitter, Philippe C., 3, 208, 229 Patriotic Industrial Association (Japan), scientific councils (Germany), 67-8 20 Seisaku Suishin R6so Kaigi, see Council Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis on social of Unions for Policy Promotion security systems, 281 SGL, see Stability and Growth Law Index 375

Shimomura, Osamu, 166 agricultural policy, 266-7, 268; and Sh%kubaizo Keikaku, see National social security policy, 292 Income Doubling Plan Tekkororen, see Federation of Steel Shufuren, 258 Workers Unions Shun/o, 36, 204, 208, 213-18, 229, Thirty Years War, 7,11 231-2,334 Tokugawa shogunate, 8 Shunto Joint Struggle Council, 221 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 296 Sin