CDPXXX10.1177/0963721415622487Hirst, PhelpsFlashbulb research-article6224872016

Current Directions in Psychological Science Flashbulb Memories 2016, Vol. 25(1) 36­–41 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0963721415622487 cdps.sagepub.com William Hirst1 and Elizabeth A. Phelps2 1Department of Psychology, New School for Social Research, and 2Department of Psychology, New York University

Abstract We review and analyze the key theories, debates, findings, and omissions of the existing literature on flashbulb memories (FBMs), including what factors affect their formation, retention, and degree of confidence. We argue that FBMs do not require special mechanisms and are best characterized as involving both and distortions, despite their being associated with high levels of confidence. Factual memories for FBM-inducing events generally follow a similar pattern. Although no necessary and sufficient factors straightforwardly account for FBM retention, media particularly shapes memory for the events themselves. FBMs are best characterized in terms of repetitions, even of mnemonic distortions, whereas event memories evidence corrections. The bearing of this literature on social identity and is also discussed.

Keywords memory, confidence, flashbulb memory, event memory, traumatic memories, social identity

Where were you when you first learned about the assas- may be misleading, inasmuch as all three types of memo- sination of John F. Kennedy, the Challenger explosion, or ries involve events, memories for the relevant facts are the attack of September 11, 2001? Variants of this ques- often referred to as event memories. tion are often asked, and, usually with great enthusiasm, The events eliciting an FBM are, by definition, public, people reply with vivid, elaborate, and confidently held inasmuch as for people to form a memory of the circum- memories, memories that they claim they will never for- stances of learning of an event, an external source must get. Brown and Kulik (1977) called such autobiographi- have communicated the news to them. FBM-eliciting cal memories flashbulb memories (FBMs) in order to events studied to date include assassinations and other capture their impression that people had taken a photo- politically charged proceedings; major public occasions, graph of themselves while learning of a public, emotion- such as the World Cup; and national disasters, such as ally charged event such as the Kennedy assassination. earthquakes (see Luminet & Curci, 2009, for reviews). The avalanche of research on FBMs that followed their Although most studies have investigated negative events, now-classic article occurred in part because the “flash- positive events can also elicit FBMs (e.g., the fall of the bulb nature” of FBMs seemed distinctly different from the Berlin Wall; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007). The public does not character of other autobiographical memories (see Curci need to be as large as a nation. People can have FBMs of & Luminet, 2009, for a collection of articles on FBMs). an event experienced within a family setting, such as We should be clear about our terminology, which learning of the death of a parent (Rubin & Kozin, 1984). builds on that of Brown and Kulik (1977). The term flash- bulb memories refers only to those autobiographical Unique Memory System? memories that involve the circumstances in which one learned of a public event. They differ from first-hand The seemingly distinctive character of FBMs led Brown memories—that is, memories one might form if one actu- and Kulik (1977) to posit that a separate memory ally experienced the event itself, rather than simply learned about it from someone else (Pillemer, 2009). Corresponding Author: They also differ from memories of the facts concerning William Hirst, Department of Psychology, New School for Social the FBM-eliciting event (e.g., with respect to the attack of Research, 80 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10011 9/11, that four planes were involved). Although the term E-mail: [email protected] Flashbulb Memories 37

mechanism might be involved in their formation and (2003) even showed that, although people may initially retention. By “mechanism,” we mean a set of encapsu- remember FBMs better than “everyday” autobiographical lated mental processes that govern the , reten- memories, the rate of decline was the same for both. tion, and retrieval of FBMs and not other autobiographical Interestingly, once an inconsistency emerges, usually memories—or any other type of memory. Brown and within the first year, it tends to be repeated thereafter Kulik labeled the mechanism Print Now!, thereby under- (Hirst et al., 2009; Hirst et al., 2015). These memory errors scoring the putatively indelible, vivid, and elaborated often involve time-slice confusions (Kvavilashvili et al., nature of FBMs. 2009)—that is, the tendency to confuse the second or A substantial body of research has assessed Brown third time one heard news about the FBM-eliciting event and Kulik’s (1977) claim, contrasting it with the possibil- with the first time. Time-slice confusions apparently ity that the same processes involved in the encoding, become incorporated into the memory and emerge with retention, and retrieval of “everyday” autobiographical each memory report. memories could also account, somewhat paradoxically, On the basis of such results, researchers have con- for the distinctive characteristics of FBMs—what we cluded that “ordinary” memory processes should be suf- might call the “ordinary” memory mechanism hypothesis. ficient to account for the distinctive characteristics of Although Brown and Kulik wrote that FBMs were as FBMs (McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; Talarico & “unchanging as the slumbering Rhinegold” (p. 86), they Rubin, 2009). A caveat is in order, however. The claims could not assess this claim, in that they simply asked about forgetting discussed by Brown and Kulik and by individuals for an FBM. Specifically, they confined their researchers employing the test-retest methodology are queries to possible FBMs formed several years prior to different. Brown and Kulik treated forgetting as a failure their study. In their study, they asked for an open narra- to have a memory, whereas those employing a test-retest tive of the reception event, followed by questions about methodology treat forgetting as a failure to remember the canonical features—for instance, when did you hear the past consistently. When Brown and Kulik stated that news, where were you, what were you doing, and how there is no forgetting, they were right, in the sense that did you find out? They also solicited phenomenological most members of the public report having a memory of characteristics, such as vividness, confidence, and/or the circumstances of learning of the FBM-eliciting event, elaborateness. even after 10 years (Hirst et al., 2015). As the test-retest Other researchers followed up Brown and Kulik’s work indicates, the memory may not be consistent, but it claim that FBMs were unchanged, and hence presumably is long lasting. accurate, by employing a test-retest methodology. They obtained recollections as soon after a major, emotionally charged public event occurred as they could and then Factors Affecting Flashbulb Memories after a substantial delay—usually a few months (e.g., Formation and retention Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Neisser & Harsh, 1992). They then compared the latter recollection with the initial one, Necessary and sufficient factors. If ordinary mem- often focusing on the canonical features assessed by the ory mechanisms are enough to account for the distinctive probes proposed by Brown and Kulik (Kızılöz & Tekcan, nature of FBMs, are there necessary and/or sufficient fac- 2013). If the memory collected a few days after the event tors that could elicit them in such a way that FBMs are were fairly accurate, then the comparison between the formed and retained? Putative factors can be divided into initial and latter recollections could serve as a measure two groups: first, those focusing on the characteristics of of accuracy. However, inasmuch as the accuracy may either the FBM-inducing event or the circumstance in decline as the interval between the reception event itself which one learned of the event (e.g., the emotions felt and the initial testing increases (Winningham, Hyman, & upon hearing the news, the degree of surprise when Dinnel, 2000; but see Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, hearing the news, the consequentiality and significance Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009), most researchers acknowledge of the event, and the event’s distinctiveness), and second, that the test-retest comparison measures consistency, not those focusing on how one processes the event over time accuracy. (e.g., the extent of rehearsal). Although there have been some reports of marked Finkenauer et al. (1998) highlighted three structural- consistency after substantial delays (Conway et al., 1994; equation models that captured in different ways puta- Kvavilashvili et al., 2009), studies using this test-retest tive factors bearing on the formation of FBMs: that of methodology have generally found substantial declines Brown and Kulik (1977), that of Conway et al. (1994), in consistency over time, thereby contradicting Brown and Finkenauer et al.’s own emotional-integrative model and Kulik’s claim (1977). In line with the bulk of the (see also Er, 2003). The models probably differ in part research reporting inconsistencies, Talarico and Rubin because they involved different public events. Moreover, 38 Hirst, Phelps

the models employed different senses of forgetting, with (Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, Conway et al.’s focusing on consistency scores and Brown 2003), but this death clearly had few consequences for and Kulik’s and Finkenauer et al.’s investigating simply their personal lives. On the other hand, consequentiality the report of a FBM. Critically, the emotional-integrative could refer to consequences for the community touched model posits that the effect of emotional feeling state is by the FBM-eliciting event. Several studies have sug- twofold: First, as in the other models, it directly impacts gested that this sense of consequentiality may be critical on the presence of FBMs, and second, in a departure to the formation of an FBM. For instance, French partici- from the other models, it can trigger rehearsal of the pants possessed FBMs for the death of French President memory of the FBM-eliciting event, which, in turn, rein- François Mitterrand, whereas French-speaking Belgian forces the FBM. participants did not (Curci, Luminet, Finkenauer, & Although these models specify which factors might Gisle, 2001), thereby reflecting the consequentiality of have a greater impact on the formation and retention of Mitterand’s death for French citizens but not French- an FBM over other factors, they do not tackle the difficult speaking Belgians. But even here, there is some possibil- problem of specifying necessary and sufficient ones. At a ity for debate. People throughout the world formed FBMs minimum, for a feature (e.g., emotional state, distinctive- of the 9/11 attack (Curci & Luminet, 2006), though the ness, surprise) to be necessary and/or sufficient, test- consequences for their respective communities surely retest studies should consistently find significant differed. The one seemingly unassailable point is that correlations between it and FBM formation. As yet, such consequentiality, no matter what its definition, is not a consistent findings have proved elusive. For instance, sufficient factor. A correlation between measures of con- Talarico and Rubin (2003) and Hirst et al. (2009; Hirst sequentiality and consistency is not always found (e.g., et al., 2015) failed to find any correspondence between Hirst et al., 2015). Moreover, most public, consequential emotional state and consistency in their studies of FBMs events do not elicit FBMs. It is probably the case that few of 9/11. Mahmood, Manier, and Hirst (2004) raised ques- American women remember the circumstances in which tions about distinctiveness by showing that the phenom- they learned of the confirmation of the first female enological quality of FBMs of the deaths of friends and Supreme Court justice of the United States, Sandra Day lovers from AIDS remained the same whether one expe- O’Connor, but that event is surely consequential, espe- rienced multiple deaths or a single death. Surprise also cially for American women. FBMs are the exception does not seem to be a necessary feature (Coluccia, rather than the rule, even for consequential public events. Bianco, & Brandimonte, 2010). Nevertheless, on those rare occasions when FBMs are The possible absence of necessary and sufficient fac- formed, because of their social consequentiality, they tors should not be surprising. There may be a wide range can play a substantial role in shaping social identity of individual differences in how ordinary mechanisms (Berntsen, 2009; Neisser, 1982). They play this role in are brought to bear either when hearing of a public event part because they mark those instances during which or in the time that follows. Some people may rehearse people feel that they are part of the history of their social the event extensively; others may be taken by its distinc- group. As Neisser (1982) wrote, tiveness. Emotional reactions to the event may also differ. The reaction could linger over the long term, be short- [One] recalls an occasion where two narratives that lived, or appear only after the event’s impact is fully we ordinarily keep separate—the course of history appreciated. In most laboratory settings, experimenters and the course of our lives—were momentarily put carefully control how participants respond to stimuli, into alignment. . . . Details are linked between our thereby allowing them to study the effects of a particular own history and History. . . . [FBMs] are the places process on memory. The complex, real-world nature of we line up our lives with the source of history itself learning of a public event does not allow for such control and say “I was there.” (p. 48) (but see, e.g., Lanciano, Curci, & Semin, 2010, for attempts to create FBMs in the laboratory). In this regard, it is interesting that FBMs formed by members of a social group often reflect the attitudes of Consequentiality and social identity. Some resear­ this group. Elderly Danes, for instance, are likely to chers have suggested that consequentiality may be a remember the weather as worse than it was for the day necessary feature of an FBM-inducing event (e.g., Talarico of the German invasion in World War 2 and better than it & Rubin, 2009). Brown and Kulik (1977), however, was for the day of the German withdrawal (Berntsen & defined the term as the consequences for the personal Thomsen, 2005). life of a member of the public. Consequently, is unlikely to be a necessary feature of a public event. British citi- Widespread presence. FBMs can influence social iden- zens formed FBMs of the death of Princess Diana tity in part because they are held not just by a few Flashbulb Memories 39 members of the public but by most members. Why is it also decline over time (Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Hirst that few Americans have trouble recollecting where they et al., 2015). But how they are retained—or forgotten— were when they learned about the attack of 9/11 (Hirst seems to differ (Tinti, Schmidt, Testa, & Levine, 2014). In et al., 2015)? The specifics of the FBMs’ content may dif- particular, at least one common factor shaping the accu- fer, but everyone has a memory. A partial answer might racy of the event memory may play less of a role for again focus on the role of consequentiality, at least in its FBMs: the extent of rehearsal attributed to media atten- “public” sense. One social group forms an FBM because tion. This factor impacts the public as a group because the associated public event is consequential for the the media ensures extensive, widespread exposure and, group, whereas another social group does not because in doing so, may overwhelm any individual differences in the event is inconsequential for them (e.g., Conway et al., the way the event is processed. Not surprisingly, then, we 1994; Curci et al., 2001). From this perspective, even if find strong correlations over time between the extent of consequentiality is not a necessary condition for forming media coverage and declines in the inaccuracies of event FBMs, it may still explain, at least in part, why they are memory. Unlike the repetition of inconsistencies in FBMs widespread in one social group but not another. over time, corrections of inaccuracies characterize event memories (Hirst et al., 2009; Hirst et al., 2015). These cor- Confidence rections can be attributed to the effect of media. For instance, the public’s memory for President George W. One agreed-upon difference between FBMs and “every- Bush’s location at the time of the attack was quite poor day” autobiographical memories, even those that are after 1 year but suddenly improved after 3 years. This rated “important,” is that confidence in FBMs remains improvement probably occurred because of the release high even as consistency declines, whereas confidence in of Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11. It showed Presi- “everyday” autobiographical memories declines along dent Bush hearing the news as he sat in a Florida ele- with consistency (e.g., Talarico & Rubin, 2003). What mentary school classroom, thereby refreshing the explains this difference? Vividness, elaborateness, and memory of the public, especially those members of the ease of retrieval are thought to influence the judgment public who saw the film (Hirst et al., 2009; Hirst et al., that an event occurred (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 2015). 1988). They no doubt also account in part for the confi- dence assigned to an FBM, in that these memories tend FBMs and Trauma to be both vivid and elaborate. judgments may also play a role. For instance, although both Ameri- One reason for an interest in FBMs is that their study may cans and Germans did not use ease of retrieval when help psychologists understand traumatic memories. Their judging their confidence in their FBMs of 9/11 the first 6 relevance can be seen in two different lines of research. months after the attack, Germans began to use it after a First, epidemiological studies after the attack of 9/11 year (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2006), while Americans did not. established that many people in the New York City area Just as a son may feel that any inaccuracies in his mem- who did not directly experience the events at Ground ory of learning of the death of his mother would reflect Zero nevertheless experienced symptoms of posttrau- negatively on the quality of his relationship with her, so matic stress disorder (Galea et al., 2002). Second, brain- also might Americans, but not Germans, believe that any imaging studies showed enhanced activity levels of the inaccuracies in their FBMs would reflect poorly on their after 3 years for those close to, but not at, relationship to their country. As a result, they judge the Ground Zero (Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, & Phelps, memory as accurate regardless of its phenomenological 2007). The amygdala is a brain structure involved in emo- characteristics. Along similar lines, people are more con- tional processing and memory. The linkage between fident in their FBMs if they feel a social bond to the cen- FBMs and trauma suggested by this research needs to be tral figure in the FBM-eliciting event (Day & Ross, 2013). approached cautiously, however. The horror of directly Both of these findings underscore the close connection experiencing a traumatic event may impact the observer between FBMs and social identity. in ways that could not be anticipated by examining those who only learned of the traumatic event. Event Memory With this caveat in mind, we would still underscore that, according to the work on FBMs, the confidence that Although event memories—that is, memories of facts people often have in their traumatic memories may not about FBM-inducing events—are not as thoroughly stud- be fully justified. Moreover, like other autobiographical ied as FBMs, researchers are beginning to appreciate memories, traumatic memories may be replete with how they may be similar or different from FBMs. For errors of omission and commission, even after a relatively instance, event memories are similar to FBMs in that they short delay. Finally, persistence of and confidence in a 40 Hirst, Phelps memory is no guarantee of its accuracy. Errors may begin References to emerge within weeks and certainly within a year, and Berntsen, D. (2009). Flashbulb memories and social identity. once these errors are incorporated into the memory, they In O. Luminet & A. Curci (Eds.), Flashbulb memories: New can persist and be confidently held for many years, per- issues and new perspectives (pp. 197–206). New York, NY: haps a lifetime. Of course, these possible inaccurate Psychology Press. memories can be changed, either by introducing mislead- Berntsen, D., & Thomsen, D. K. (2005). Personal memories for ing information or by correcting the erroneous informa- remote historical events: Accuracy and clarity of flashbulb tion. But, in many cases, inasmuch as a traumatic event is memories related to World War II. Journal of Experimental something experienced by an individual, with few if any Psychology: General, 134, 242–257. other people privy to it, the memory may remain fairly Bohannon, J. N., III, & Symons, V. L. (1992). Flashbulb memo- ries: Confidence, consistency, and quantity. In E. Winograd stable, if inaccurate, for the long term. & U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and accuracy in (pp. 65– 90). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Concluding Remark: A Look Into the Bohn, A., & Berntsen, D. (2007). Pleasantness bias in flashbulb memories: Positive and negative flashbulb memories of Future the fall of the Berlin Wall among East and West Germans. FBMs are those rare instances in which personal history Memory & Cognition, 35, 565–577. and History writ large come into alignment. Conse- Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition, quently, they can influence the social identity of a com- 5, 73–79. Coluccia, E., Bianco, C., & Brandimonte, M. A. (2010). Autobio- munity. The 40 years of research on FBMs and their graphical and event memory for surprising and unsurpris- associated event memories has allowed psychologists to ing events. Applied , 24, 177–199. begin to understand the similarities and differences in Conway, M. A., Anderson, S. J., Larsen, S. F., Donnelly, C. M., how people form both FBMs and event memories. The McDaniel, M. A., McClelland, A. G. R., . . . Logie, R. H. research, however, is skewed heavily toward investigat- (1994). The formation of flashbulb memories. Memory & ing negative public events, a leaning that links FBMs to Cognition, 22, 326–343. traumatic memories. Future research might investigate Curci, A., & Luminet, O. (2006). Follow-up of a cross-national positive eliciting events. Positive public events, such as, comparison on flashbulb and event memory for the for many, the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presi- September 11th attacks. Memory, 14, 329–344. dency, also impact both personal history and History writ Curci, A., & Luminet, O. (Eds.) (2009). Flashbulb memories: New large (Koppel, Brown, Stone, Coman, & Hirst, 2013). An issues and new perspectives. New York, NY: Psychology Press. understanding of their formation and retention, as well as Curci, A., Luminet, O., Finkenauer, C., & Gisle, L. (2001). how they in turn shape social identity, may be as critical Flashbulb memories in social groups: A comparative test- as a similar understanding of negative FBMs. retest study of the memory of French President Mitterand’s death in a French and a Belgian group. Memory, 9, 81–101. Recommended Reading Day, M. V., & Ross, M. (2013). Predicting confidence in flash- bulb memories. Memory, 22, 232–242. Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). (See References). The classic Echterhoff, G., & Hirst, W. (2006). Thinking about memory for study introducing the notion of flashbulb memories. everyday and shocking events: Do people use ease-of- Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Buckner, R. L., Budson, A. E., Cuc, A., retrieval cues in memory judgments? Memory & Cognition, Gabrieli, J. D., . . . Vaidya, C. J. (2009). (See References). A 34, 763–775. thorough, long-term study of memory for 9/11. Er, N. (2003). A new flashbulb memory model applied to the Luminet, O., & Curci, A. (Eds.). (2009). (See References). A col- Marmara earthquake. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, lection of articles on flashbulb memories. A groundbreak- 503–517. ing study on the overconfidence and fallibility of flashbulb Finkenauer, C., Luminet, O., Gisle, L., El-Ahmadi, A., van der memories. Linden, M., & Philippot, P. (1998). Flashbulb memories Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). (See References). and the underlying mechanisms of their formation: Toward an emotional-integrative model. Memory & Cognition, 26, Funding 516–531. Support from the grants from James S. McDonnell Foundation Galea, S., Ahern, J., Resnick, H., Kilpatrick, D., Bucuvalas, M., to the first authors and another grant from the National Insti- Gold, J., & Vlahov, D. (2002). Psychological sequelae of tutes of Health to both authors is gratefully acknowledged. the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City. New England Journal of Medicine, 346, 982–987. Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Buckner, R. L., Budson, A. E., Cuc, A., Declaration of Conflicting Interests Gabrieli, J. D., . . . Vaidya, C. J. (2009). Long-term memory The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memo- respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. ries, event memories, and the factors that influence their Flashbulb Memories 41

retention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, McCloskey, M., Wible, C. G., & Cohen, N. J. (1988). Is there a 138, 161–176. special flashbulb-memory mechanism? Journal of Experi- Hirst, W., Phelps, E. A., Meksin, R., Vaidya, C. J., Johnson, M. K., mental Psychology: General, 117, 171–181. Mitchell, K. J., . . . Olsson, A. (2015). A ten-year follow-up Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks? In U. Neisser of a study of memory for the attack of September 11, 2001: (Ed.), Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts Flashbulb memories and memories for flashbulb events. (pp. 43–48). San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 604–623. Neisser, U., & Harsh, N. (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: False Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. recollections of hearing the news about Challenger. In E. (1988). Phenomenal characteristics of memories for per- Winograd & U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and accuracy in recall ceived and imagined autobiographical events. Journal of (pp. 9–31). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Experimental Psychology: General, 117, 371–376. Press. Kızılöz, B. K., & Tekcan, A. I. (2013). Canonical categories in flash- Pillemer, D. B. (2009). “Hearing the news” versus “being there”: bulb memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27, 352–359. Comparing flashbulb memories and the recall of first-hand Koppel, J., Brown, A., Stone, C. B., Coman, A., & Hirst, W. (2013). experiences. In O. Luminet & A. Curci (Eds.), Flashbulb Remembering President Barack Obama’s inauguration and memories: New issues and new perspectives (pp. 125–140). the landing of US Airways Flight 1529: A comparison of auto- New York, NY: Psychology Press. biographical and event memory. Memory, 21, 798–806. Rubin, D. C., & Kozin, M. (1984). Vivid memories. Cognition, Kvavilashvili, L., Mirani, J., Schlagman, S., Foley, K., & Kornbrot, 16, 81–95. D. E. (2003). Comparing flashbulb memories of September Sharot, T., Martorella, E. A., Delgado, M. R., & Phelps, E. A. 11 and the death of Princes Diana: Effects of time delays and (2007). How personal experience modulates the neural nationality. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 1017–1031. circuitry of memories of September 11. Proceedings of the Kvavilashvili, L., Mirani, J., Schlagman, S., Foley, K., & National Academy of Sciences, USA, 104, 389–394. Kornbrot, D. E. (2009). Consistency of flashbulb memories Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2003). Confidence, not con- of September 11 over long delays: Implications for consoli- sistency, characterizes flashbulb memories. Psychological dation and wrong time slice hypotheses. Journal of Memory Science, 14, 455–461. and Language, 61, 556–572. Talarico, J. M., & Rubin, D. C. (2009). Flashbulb memories Lanciano, T., Curci, A., & Semin, G. R. (2010). The emotional result from ordinary memory processes and extraordinary and reconstructive determinants of emotional memories: event characteristics. In O. Luminet, A. Curci, & M. Conway An experimental approach to flashbulb memory investiga- (Eds.), Flashbulb memories: New issues and new perspec- tion. Memory, 18, 473–485. tives (pp. 79–97). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Luminet, O., & Curci, A. (Eds.). (2009). Flashbulb memories: Tinti, C., Schmidt, S., Testa, S., & Levine, L. J. (2014). Distinct New issues and new perspectives. New York, NY: Psychol- processes shape flashbulb and event memories. Memory & ogy Press. Cognition, 42, 539–551. Mahmood, D., Manier, D., & Hirst, W. (2004). Memory for how Winningham, R. G., Hyman, I. E., & Dinnel, D. L. (2000). one learned of multiple deaths from AIDS: Repeated expo- Flashbulb memories? The effects of when the initial mem- sure and distinctiveness. Memory & Cognition, 32, 125–134. ory report was obtained. Memory, 8, 209–216.