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Winter 1982 Unregenerate Doings: Selflessness and Selfishness in New Divinity Theology William Breitenbach University of Puget Sound, [email protected]

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Citation Breitenbach, William. "Unregenerate Doings: Selflessness and Selfishness in New Divinity Theology." American Quarterly. 34.5 (1982): 479-502. Print.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Sound Ideas. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Sound Ideas. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Unregenerate Doings: Selflessness and Selfishness in New Divinity Theology Author(s): William Breitenbach Source: American Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Winter, 1982), pp. 479-502 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

. UNREGENERATE DOINGS: SELFLESSNESS AND SELFISHNESS IN NEW DIVINITY THEOLOGY

WILLIAM BREITENBACH Universityof Puget Sound

ELIJAH PARISH WAS PLAYING POLONIUS. THE CONGREGATIONAL MINISTER OF Byfield,Massachusetts, admonished his son to consider the "vast impor- tance"of sound preaching when he chose hisplace ofresidence. For his part, the elder Parish solemnlydeclared, he "would rathersit under the most ordinarypreacher, than attend a ministerof wrong principles, possessing the most profoundgenius and the most powerfuleloquence."' His fatherlyadvice seems unobjectionableenough. Yet ReverendParish was a Hopkinsian,a proponentof thetheological system set forthby Samuel Hopkins,the disciple of Jonathan Edwards. The Hopkinsian(or New Divin- ity)theologians, who flourishedin duringthe second halfof the eighteenthcentury and the firsthalf of the nineteenthcentury, were infamousfor their belief that sinners could performno acceptable duty,not even in such actions as prayingor Bible reading.Why then should Parish concernhimself about the qualityof thepreaching that people heard,when he and his fellowNew Divinityministers claimed thatthe unconverteddid nothingbut sin when theyheard it? To theircritics, the Hopkinsians' proposition seemed to encouragesinners to "neglector abuse ... the prescribedmeans of grace."2To Ezra Stiles,the "uncouth,venemous & blasphemous"idea impliedthat an "Unconverted Man had betterbe killinghis father& motherthan praying for convertlinig

'WilliamB. Sprague,comp. and ed., Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of DistinguishedAmerican Clergymenof VariousDenominations, from the Early Settlementof the Countryto the Close of the YearEighteen hundred andfifty-five (: Robert Carterand Brothers,1859), II, 271. 2Moses Hemmenway,Seven Sermons, on the Obligation and Encouragement of the Unregenerate,to Labour for the Meat whichEndureth to EverlastingLife (Boston: Kneeland and Adams, 1767), 196. 480 American Quarterly

Grace."3Luckily, opponents noted, New Divinitypreachers like Parish had a wayof ignoringthe obnoxiousdoctrine in theirown lives.They compelled theirwicked childrento prayand rejoiced when theirdissolute neighbors flockedto public worship.Yet even thoughthe Hopkinsianspartially re- deemed theirimperfect principles by their inconsistent practice, their adver- saries warnedthat they professed an offensivedoctrine: it seemed unevan- gelical at best and anarchical at worstto deny the value of sinners'best efforts. The New Divinityposition on unregeneratedoings has been much criti- cized and littleunderstood. The doctrineemerged during the mid-eighteenth centuryin responseto thechallenges facing New EnglandCalvinism. By the 1740sand 1750sArminians, both Anglican and Congregational,were attack- ing the "arbitrary"tenets of ,in particularthe idea that God bestowedsaving grace withoutany reference to the endeavorsof theuncon- verted.Accusing Calvinistsof preachinga creed thatdebilitated morality, Arminiancritics maintained that God gavegrace to sinnerswho strovefor it. Calvinistsresponded with explanationsof how God administeredhis conditionalcovenant with men. They agreed withthe Arminiansthat the Scripturescontained promises, that it was theduty of sinners to seek gracein theuse ofmeans, that saving grace was ordinarilydispensed through means, thatsinners had encouragementsin theirstrivings, and thatthese encourage- mentsincreased in proportionto the sinners'diligence. Yet the Calvinists parted ways with the Arminianson the question of whetherthere were promisesof special grace made upon conditionof unregenerateendeavors. True, God's covenantof grace was a conditionalone, but the promisewas thatGod would save thosewho had faithin Christ,and thatfaith was a free and graciousgift of God, not a rewardfor human effort. Sinners could not earn justificationby theirown righteousness,for there was no moralexcel- lency in theirworks. Still, because they did not want cutthroatsand fornicatorsdefending wickedness by spouting the doctrine of free grace, Calvinistscarefully explainedthat their theology did not "cut theSinew" of sinners'efforts. For one thing,duties like prayerwere "materiallygood" thoughthey had no "formalGoodness" or "trueMorality." For anotherthing, the encourage- mentsunder which the unregeneratelabored providedstrong motives for exertion.Nudging the idea ofencouragement until it teetered on thebrink of becoming a promise,Calvinists persuaded themselves"that not a single Instance will be foundof any Sinnerin the Day of Judgmentable to stand

3Ezra Stiles, The LiteraryDiary of Ezra Stiles,D.D., LL.D., ed. FranklinBowditch Dexter (New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1901), II, 505, 115. Selflessnessand Selfishness 481 forth,and plead in Truth,Lord, I did mybest Endeavour to the verylast ... but afterall was deny'd."4 The ticklishproblem facing the Calvinistswas to preach freegrace with- out provokingimmorality. They foundtheir task complicated by the injudi- cious zeal of some of theirCalvinist brethren. In New England,the Great Awakeningwas generallyinterpreted by its supporters as a divinevindication of thosewho preachedthe doctrine of by faith in itsCalvinistic purity.Yet theGreat Awakening had also hatchedsome extremeNew Lights, bellicose sectarianslike AndrewCroswell and JamesDavenport, who so exaltedChrist's imputed righteousness and so vilifiedman's polluted works that they seemed intentupon resurrectingthe antinomianismof 'sday. These New Englandextremists were part of a broaderreactionary move- mentwithin eighteenth-century Calvinism, which responded to theEnlight- enmentby proclaiming increasingly antinomian positions on thedoctrine of justification.Participants in this movementshared a convictionthat the preservationof Calvinismrested on a repudiationof any hint of works righteousness.They complained that manyof the orthodoxdid not ade- quatelyemphasize the sufficiencyof Christ.They warnedagainst substitut- ing a relianceon human activityor the forfaith in Christ. Thus, the extremeNew Lights of New England could draw upon (and reprint)the works of intellectuallyrespectable British theologians of an "antinomian"cast: WalterMarshall, Thomas Boston,Ralph Erskine,Ebene- zer Erskine,Robert Sandeman,William Cudworth, and JamesHervey. By the early 1760s New England mainstreamor "Old" Calvinistswere doublybeleaguered. On the one flankwere the Arminians,attacking them formaking too littleof moralityand forpromoting fatalism and licentious- ness. On theother flank, antinomian enthusiasts assailed them for mongreliz- ingdoctrine and formaking too manyconcessions to humanworks. The Old Calvinists'problems were just beginning,for in 1765 Samuel Hopkins publishedhis Enquiry concerning the Promises of the Gospel; Whetherany of themare made to theexercises and doingsof persons in an Unregenerate State.5Thereafter the Old Calvinistswere triplybeleaguered. Hopkin's point was simple enough. He respondedto the Arminiansby statingflatly that before everything done bya sinnerwas totally

4JedidiahMills, A Vindicationof Gospel-Truth,and Refutationof some dangerousErrors, In Relationto thatimportant Question, Whether there be Promisesof theBestowment of special Grace, made in Scriptureto the Unregenerate,on Conditionof anyEndeavours, Strivings, or Doings of theirswhatsoever? (Boston: Rogersand Fowle, 1747), 75, 45, 77. 'Hopkins'sEnquiry may be foundin his Worksof Samuel Hopkins,D.D. (Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society,1852), III. 482 American Quarterly wickedand unacceptableto God. Moreover,while the sinnerremained unregenerate,the more he usedthe means of grace, the more he aggravated hisguilt. Yet Hopkins was not just another antinomian reactionary. In fact, his argumentscontained an implicitattack on antinomianpassivity. He claimedthat sinners had an abilityto performGod's commands.Accord- ingly,the unconverted were to be exhortedto immediaterepentance. Hopkin'sformulation managed to offendjust abouteveryone who had previouslyconsidered the matter. The immediateconsequence of his publi- cationwas a paperwar-fiercest in the 1760s and 1770s,but warmly pressed wellinto the nineteenth century-that created and consolidatedthe New Divinityparty. The ultimateconsequence was the transformation ofCalvin- isttheology and religiousexperience in NewEngland.

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The inspirationfor Hopkins's New Divinitycame fromJonathan Ed- wards'streatise on thewill. Edwards's aim in that work had been to demon- strate"that God's moralgovernment over mankind, his treatingthem as moralagents ... isnot inconsistent with a determiningdisposal of all events." He setout to prove,in short,that one couldbe voluntaryand accountable, eventhough acting under necessity. Edwardsbegan by stating that every volition of thewill (which he also calledthe heart) expressed an inclination,preference, ordesire of the person doingthe choosing. A personnever willed contrary to the prevailing inclina- tionof his soul: he neverchose what he didnot prefer, and he preferredand chosethat which appeared to be thegreatest good. Thus the will could be said to be determinedby the strongest motive, the strength of which arose froma combinationof subjectiveand objectivecircumstances. Edwardsthen analyzed the meaning of liberty, which he characterized as a person'spower to do as he pleased.A man was freeif he was underno physical"hindrance or impediment inthe way of doing, or conducting in any respect,as he wills."Accordingly, all voluntaryacts wereby definition unquestionablyfree. Nor was a person'sliberty affected by any consideration ofwhat caused him to choose to do as he did.It wasenough that the choice was voluntary. To thisexplanation of the workings of the will, Edwards applied a distinc- tionbetween two kinds of necessity-natural necessity and moral necessity. Naturalnecessity referred to "suchnecessity as menare under through the forceof natural causes." An eventnaturally necessary would occur in spite of the choicesor preferencesof a person'swill. Natural necessity thus involvedsome physicalhindrance to voluntaryaction. Since something extrinsicto thewill deprived the individual of liberty to act voluntarily,he was excusedfrom accountability for that event. Selflessnessand Selfishness 483

But therewas anotherkind of necessitythat did not excuse. Edwards definedmoral necessityas the certaintythat arose fromthe potencyof "moral causes, such as habits and dispositionsof the heart, and moral motivesand inducements."Whereas naturalnecessity connected natural, involuntarycauses and effects,moral necessity connected moral, voluntary ones. Nevertheless,Edwards insisted, moral necessity could be everybit as absolute as naturalnecessity. Unlikenatural necessity, however, moral necessity did not overpowerthe will.Edwards observed that no "opposition,or contrarywill and endeavor,is supposable in the case of moral necessity; which is a certaintyof the inclinationand willitself; which does notadmit of the supposition of a willto oppose and resistit."6 One Edwardseandrew the distinction between the two necessitiesin thismanner: "If I should put you out of myhouse in spiteof everyeffort you could maketo oppose me,because I was thestrongest man, I shouldsay you wentout bya naturalnecessity; - butif you wentout ofyour own freechoice, the eventwould prove there was a moralnecessity, though you acted with an entire freedom;and in this case, there is no natural necessity."7 As the example indicates,moral necessitywas in no way incompatible withliberty as Edwardshad definedit. Under natural necessity, a personhad a physicalinability to act as he pleased, but under moral necessity,his inabilitywas nothingmore than his disinclinationto do something.Moral inabilitywas a "willnot" so strongthat it became a "cannot."Of course,such unwillingnessneither deprived the individualof his freedomto act voluntar- ily nor nullifiedhis accountable moral agency. Edwards'sargument allowed himto preservenecessity without impairing liberty.Since theFall, man had a habitualpreference for sin. He had a moral inabilityto be holybecause he lacked anyinclination to choose thegood. Yet despitethis morally necessary depravity, he was a freeagent, possessed of all the libertyhe could possiblyenjoy. After all, he was voluntaryin his sinful- ness: he loved it, preferredit, and chose it. Edwards gave Calvinistsgrounds for exhorting sinners and groundsfor blamingthem. Sinners were naturally able to do theirduty, if only they were willingto do it.The problem,of course, was thatthey always preferred to sin. Still, the moral necessityof theirsin did not excuse sinnersfrom blame. Since theirinability was unwillingness,the greatertheir inability-that is, the strongertheir disinclination-the more culpable theywere. Yet their voluntaryunwillingness to be holywas so fixed,so intransigent,so obdurate,

6JonathanEdwards, Freedom of the Will,ed. Paul Ramsey(1754; rpt.New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957), 431, 163, 156, 156-57, 159. 'ConnecticutEvangelical Magazine, 4 (1803-1804), 285. 484 American Quarterly

thatonly God's freegrace was powerfulenough to changeit. By showing that humanbehavior could be voluntarybut stillnecessary, Edwards was able to prove that sinnerswere at once accountable moral agents and depraved creaturesdesperately in need of God's sovereigngrace. Samuel Hopkins and the otherNew Divinitypreachers made Edwards's distinctionbetween moral and naturalnecessity the shibboleth of theirtribe. Yet theyalso slightlymodified his interpretationof freeagency. Instead of describingthe libertyrequisite to accountable agency as being a person's powerto do as he pleased, theHopkinsians represented it as a person'spower to be voluntaryin his willing.By "internalizing"Edwards's definitionof liberty,they more firmly secured freeagency. "Every exercise of the willin choosingor refusingis the exerciseof freedom,"asserted Samuel Hopkins, "and it is impossiblefor a man to will and choose withoutexercising moral liberty."8Yet the internalizationalso meantthat Edwards's disciples had to abandon his relativelyunified model of psychology.Rather than saying that man was free,they said thatthe willor heartwas free.In effect,they moved the battlegroundbetween moral and naturalnecessity from the frontier wherethe mindtouched the physicalworld into the interiorof the mindor soul itself.No longerjust a borderstruggle with the corporeal,the problem of freeagency also became a civil war betweenthe facultiesof the mind. Since thewill was wherethe voluntarypreferences and choices occurred, it was the onlyvoluntary and thereforethe onlymoral faculty in the human soul. Seatingmoral qualities exclusively in thewill meant, of course,that all otherpowers and capacities of the soul, includingunderstanding and con- science, were naturalrather than moral in character.It followedthat the damage resultingfrom the Fall touchedonly the heart. If any other power or capacity of the soul had sustainedinjury, the sinner'sinability to be holy would be excusable because it would be naturaland not exclusivelyvolun- tary.New Divinityministers would not admitthat "human depravity lies in the least degree, in any real or imaginarydestruction" of the intellect because theyheld depravityto be a "moral,and not a natural,disorder."9 Hence, theyconfined depravity to thewill and affirmedthat "the Undstdg. of Adam afterhis Fall was as good, & equal to what it was in a State of Innocency."'0 In this matter,the Hopkinsians clashed with the Old Calvinists,who maintainedthat depravity afflicted not just theheart or willbut all faculties,

8FrankHugh Foster,"The Eschatologyof the New EnglandDivines," Bibliotheca Sacra, 43 (1886), 717. 9EbenezerBradford, Strictures on the Remarks of Dr Samuel Langdon, on the Leading Sentimentsin theRev. Dr. Hopkins'Systemof Doctrines (Boston: I. Thomas and E. T. Andrews, 1794), 18. '0The quote is a criticalcomment by Ezra Stiles,taken from his Extracts from the Itineraries and OtherMiscellanies of Ezra Stiles,D.D., LL.D., 1755-1794,ed. FranklinBowditch Dexter (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1916), 364, 412. Selflessnessand Selfishness 485

includingthe understanding. As intellectualists,the Old Calvinistscriticized theiropponents for inflatingthe importanceof the will by makingit the governingand onlymoral faculty. It seemed to themthat if the will were not under "the directionand governmentof the understanding,"man was no longera "rationaland moralagent."" Old Calvinistsbelieved that man was a moralagent because he was a cause bycounsel whose understandingjudged thegood accordingto themotives presented to itand whosewill then moved the soul to embrace thatgood. Hence Old Calvinistshad twoobjections to theNew Divinityscheme. First, in denyingthat moral concerns had anything to do with the understanding,the scheme subvertedman's agency as a rationalcreature, in effectreducing men to animals and makingGod the authorof sin. Fromthis perspective, the Hopkinsiansappeared to be hyper- Calvinists.Second, in assertingthat sin was nothingmore than voluntary disinclinationor unwillingness,the scheme impliedthat a graciouschange was not needed for salvation. From this perspective,the New Divinity ministersappeared to be Arminians.2 For theirpart, the Hopkinsiansargued that the Old Calvinistsplaced the sinnerunder an excusable,natural inability to performhis duty.By denying thatsin was disinclinationand bymaintaining that the natural faculty of the understandingwas depraved,the Old Calvinistsburdened the sinner with "a cannot, independentof a will not."'3 Yet it was impossible,said Samuel Hopkins,to makea personfeel blameworthy or accountablefor a "cannot." The consequence of the Old Calvinistdoctrine was to cast all theblame for sin back on Adam, which was a notion "most sweet to many a corrupt heart."'14The New Divinitypreachers warned that this kind of Calvinism would drive the religiousfolk to Arminianismand leave only the vicious behind to fillthe churches. Since theyhad differentexplanations of depravity,New Divinityand Old Calvinistministers naturally had differentexplanations of how God went about savingsinners. Because theOld Calvinistsassumed that sinfulness was not simplythe totaldepravity of theheart but rather the universaldepravity of all thefaculties, they contended that there had to be a divineoperation on boththe intellect and thewill. First the Spirit illuminated the understanding witha divinelight, which enabled the personto see Christas a suitableand all-sufficientSavior. This enlightenmentwas not by mere moral suasion.

"Samuel Langdon,Remarks on theLeading Sentimentsin theRev 'd Dr Hopkins'System of Doctrines (Exeter,N.H.: HenryRanlet, 1794), 24. My argumenthere has been greatlyinflu- enced byNorman S. Fiering's"Will and Intellectin theNew EnglandMind," Williamand Mary Quarterly,29 (1972), 515-58, which suggeststhat the divisionsamong Calvinistsduring the Great Awakeningcontinued earlier divisions between Puritan intellectualists and voluntarists. 12Moses Hemmenway,Remarks on the Rev. Mr Hopkins's Answer to a TractIntitled 'A Vindicationof the Power,Obligation and Encouragementof the Unregenerateto Attendthe Means of Grace," &c. (Boston: J. Kneeland, 1774), 137. 13Hopkins, Works,I, 509. 14Ibid., III, 299. 486 American Quarterly

Sinnersdid notregenerate themselves simply by listening to ministerspreach theWord. The Spirithad to workinternally with the truth, quickening it with an efficaciousinfluence. After presenting the Savior in a properlight to the understanding,the Spiritrenovated the will by incliningit to "desire and embrace thatwhich the Understandingjudgeth to be good."'5 Instead of the term"regeneration," Old Calvinistspreferred "effectual calling," the phrase sanctioned by the WestminsterConfession. Calling implied"inviting, and effectuallypersuading the sinners," so it leftroom for the play of the human understandingin the great change.16 Because Old Calvinistsexplained effectual calling as bothan enlightenmentof theunder- standingand a renovationof the will,they placed greatimportance on the meansof grace. Since theSpirit used themeans when it quickened the truth, the sinner'shope lay in attendingupon them.There was furtherencourage- mentfor sinners in thefact that the understanding, unlike the will, was not a disjunctivefaculty. True, there was no real faithuntil the Spiritinvigorated the Word, but on the other hand, the knowledgeof truthmight grow so graduallythat it would be difficultto determine"at whatpoint of timethe principleof spirituallife was firstinfused."'17 Moreover, there was abundant reason to conclude thatthose who strovewould "receivefurther influences and assistances... wherebythey may become more and moreprepared for the reception and exercise of the divine life, and so advance gradually towardsthe kingdomof God."'8 Since therewas a higherprobability of mercyfor the diligent,reformed sinnerthan forthe indifferent,secure sinner,it was obviouslya dutyto be diligentand reformed.Sinners had theoption to use or abuse theadvantages presentedthem by common grace. They could attendpublic worshipor guzzle in thetavern. Who could doubtwhich was better?Old Calvinistsused the distinctionbetween reformed and profligatesinners to argue thatthere were commanded duties that the unregeneratecould performacceptably beforethey received savinggrace. Even thoughsuch unregenerateduties werenot holy,even thoughthey were selfish and misguidedattempts to buy salvation,there was "a less degree of true moral evil in the conscientious performanceof them,than in the contemptuousneglect of them."'19 The best actionsof the unregeneratewere good in some respects,though

'5ThomasFoxcroft, Like precious Faith obtained, through the Righteousness of our God and Saviour,by all the trueServants of Christ(Boston: Green and Russell, 1756), 31. '6EzraStiles Ely,A Contrastbetween Calvinism and Hopkinsianism(New York: S. Whiting, 1811), 128. '7Hemmenway,Seven Sermons,162. '8Ibid.,106. '9JedidiahMills, An Inquiryconcerning the State of the Unregenerateunder the Gospel (New Haven: B. Mecom, 1767), 101. Selflessnessand Selfishness 487 notas good as theyshould be. A reformedsinner was likea childwho sullenly obeyedhis father's order to go to school. The fatherhad notcommanded the sulking-indeed,he hatedit-but thechild did betterto go in a snitthan not at all. Besides, the child who wentcrankily might eventually go cheerfully, butonly if he continuedto go. To a certainextent, the Old Calvinistposition on unregeneratedoings blurredthe line between sinnersand saints by declaringthat the formercould performsome acceptable duties.Although not Arminians,the Old Calvinistsflirted with preparationism because they fearedthat if sinnerswere told thatthey could do no duty,they would do nothingat all. Old Calvinistssought to insurethat the unregenerate,instead of being as bad as theymight be, mightbe as good as theycould be while awaitingGod's grace.20 The New Divinityministers demanded not only thatGod's disobedient childrengo to school but thatthey go withsmiles on theirfaces. Samuel Hopkins and company had a verydifferent explanation of regeneration. Assumingthat the heart or will was the only seat of depravity,they con- cluded thatthat faculty alone needed renovation.According to them,regen- erationwas a divineoperation that turned the heart so thatit loved and chose holiness.The will was a disjunctivefaculty: it chose eithersinfulness or holiness.Before regenerationit chose the former;after regeneration, the latter.Thus, there was an essentialdifference between the regenerate and the unregenerate.Hopkinsians had no room in their systemfor any vague, neutralstatus that was betterthan profanity but not quite so good as piety. Sinnersperformed no partial good or acceptable dutywhen theybusied themselveswith the means of grace.True, they enlightened their understand- ingswith doctrinal truths, but theunderstanding was a naturalfaculty, not a moralone, so no amountof intellectuallight could make a sinnerholy. So long as he remainedunconverted, an enlightened,Bible-reading sinner was no betterthan an ax-murderer.2"

201tis importantto stressthat preaching "preparationism" did not make the Old Calvinists Arminians,or even crypto-Arminians.If anything,the aim of theirdoctrine was to guarantee moral behaviorwithout succumbing to the Arminianerror. Old Calvinistssaw themselvesas mediatingbetween the Arminians,who made "too muchof thesinner's seeking to God, in the diligentuse of themeans, as thoughthere was in itsomething that is holyand spiritual,"and the hyper-Calvinists,who made "too littleof it,as tho' because it was not holy,or connectedwith promises;therefore it was quite nothingat all." See Mills, Inquiry,73n. 2The NewDivinity position is setforth in thefollowing places: Hopkins,Works, 1, 367-69; III, 217; Bradford,Strictures on the Remarks,25; Nathan Strong,Sermons on VariousSubjects, Doctrinal,Experimental and Practical (Hartford:Oliver D. and I. Cooke, 1798-1800),I, 130; CharlesBackus, The ScriptureDoctrine of Regeneration Considered, in Six Discourses (Hartford: Hudson and Goodwin, 1800),21-22; JosephBellamy. The Worksof Joseph Bellamy D.D., ed. TryonEdwards (Boston: DoctrinalTract and Book Society,1850), I, 49; JonathanEdwards, Jr., The Worksof Jonathan Edwards, D.D., ed. TryonEdwards (Andover, Mass.: Allen,Morrill and Wardwell,1842), I, 481-92. 488 American Quarterly

In the opinion of the New Divinityministers, the Old Calvinistposition was untenable.Hopkinsians alleged thatthe Old Calvinistemphasis on the illuminationof the understandingwas a thinlydisguised . If truthturned a personfrom sin to holiness,depravity was onlymisunderstand- ing or intellectualerror, for which the remedywas not divineregeneration but betterinformation. On this supposition,Hopkins observed,the most depravedsinner needed nothingfor conversion "but thatlight and convic- tionof conscience which shall bring these things into clear view."22Nor need thislight necessarily come fromGod, whose only advantageover an elo- quent ministeror a naggingspouse was thathe could "use argumentswith moredexterity."23 Ifregeneration was illumination,conversion was, as admit- ted Arminiansprofessed it to be, a matterof moral suasion and self-improve- ment. Of course,when irritated Old Calvinistspointed out thata divineillumina- tioninvolved more than just persuasivearguments, the Hopkinsiansreviled themas antinomians.If the notionof some kindof special divineillumina- tion meant anythingat all, it had to mean thatthe understandingneeded some alterationbefore the sinnercould become holy.Yet that implied a naturalinability-an implicationthat "men by naturehave not sufficient capacityor facultyof understandingto know theirduty."24 As regeneration would then be equivalent to giving an idiot his reason by a miracle, Hopkinsianschallenged those "that hold to regenerationby light ... to show how men are whollyto blame forcontinuing in a stateof unregeneracy,or thatthis is any crime at all."25 Similarlyindefensible was the Old Calvinistposition on unregenerate doings. If the Old Calvinistsasserted that sinnerswho used the means of gracedid some acceptable dutythat earned them salvation, they slid into the Arminianditch. In effect,they compounded with sinners by conceding that the unconverteddiffered only in degree fromthe converted.On the other hand,if Old Calvinistsinsisted on thegap betweenpreparatory activity and effectualcalling, they seemed guiltyof encouraging an antinomianpassivity. In effect,they told sinnersthat theycould only come to the side of the healingpool and lie aroundwaiting in thehope ofdrowning in a flashflood of divinegrace-waiting, thatis, untilthe Spiritoperated with power on the means of grace. The grave danger that the Hopkinsiansdetected in the Old Calvinist theologywas itsunevangelical tendency. Telling a sinnerthat he could and

22Hopkins,Works, III, 103. 23NathanaelWhitaker, Two Sermons: On the Doctrine of Reconciliation (Salem, Mass.: Samuel Hall, 1770), 71-72. 24Edwards,Jr., Works, II, 111. 2'Hopkins,Works, III, 107. Selflessnessand Selfishness 489 shouldperform some partialduties while still remaining a sinnerimplied that he lay under"an inabilityto repentand embracethe gospel, which does, in some degreeat least,excuse himfrom not repenting immediately."26 The Old Calvinistnotion of unregenerate duties encouraged complacency in sinners. It gave themease shortof Christ.It permittedthem to remainsinners, while theyattended the means of grace and pretendedto wait forGod's time. New Divinityministers demolished this cozy refugeby denying that unre- generatedoings were in any way acceptable. Indeed, these theologians sometimesargued that the sinnergrew worse under means because he sinned against greaterlight: his heart continued impenitenteven as his intellectwas stockedwith more knowledge and truth.27By disclaimingthe value of the best actions of the unregenerate,Hopkinsians exposed them- selves to the charge of being hyper-Calvinists,a charge thathas tarnished theirreputation from the eighteenthto the twentiethcentury. Of course, New Divinityministers did not confiscatethe Bibles of theirunconverted parishioners.The Hopkinsianpreachers did not tell sinnersnot to use the means of grace,but neitherdid theytell them that it was all rightto use the means sinfully.Sinners who sowed taresshould not expect to harvestany- thingbut tares.Nor shouldthey presume that sowing tares relieved them of the obligationto sow wheat. The Hopkinsianscould deny the value of unregeneratedoings because theyhad so fullyestablished the naturalability of sinnersto repentand be holy.Since the unregeneratewere under no naturalnecessity to sin, and since the only obstacle to theiracceptable obedience was theirvoluntary unwillingnessto obey,they should be pressedto immediaterepentance. No unregeneratedoings could possiblybe acceptable because none came up to the truegospel duty,which God commandedand whichthe sinnerhad the naturalability to perform. The problemwith Old Calvinismwas thatit soothed and settledpeople in theirstatus as sinnersby givingthem the idea that"the use of means is the whole dutyto whichthey are now obligated."28The New Divinityrenuncia- tion of unregeneratedoings was (and stillis) criticizedfor pulling the rug fromunder human activityin the process of conversion,but in fact the intentionwas quite the opposite. Hopkinsiansalleged thatit was the Old Calvinistswho impugnedhuman ability: that was whyOld Calvinistpreach- ers permittedthe sinnerto piddle his life away in an unavailinground of externalduties. The Hopkinsians,on theother hand, could urgesinners "to commence Christiansimmediately, and withoutdelay" preciselybecause

26Ibid.,I, 502; JosephWashburn, Sermons on Practical Subjects (Hartford:Lincoln and Gleason, 1807), 309. 27Hopkins,Works, III, 263. 28Edwards,Jr., Works, II, 113-14. 490 American Quarterly theybelieved that sinners had the naturalability to cease sinningwhenever theychose to do so.29New Divinitypreaching was vigorouslyevangelical; its constantrefrain was the demand forimmediate repentance.

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New Divinitytheology was a responseto thecomplaints of Arminiansthat Calvinismsubverted people's sense of moral accountability.Hopkinsians soughtto fashiona moredefensible Calvinism, one thatsecurely established moralagency without surrendering the characteristicCalvinist doctrines of divinesovereignty. Their solutionto the problemenabled themto assume extremepositions on both freedomand necessity.They came into conflict withthe Old Calvinistsbecause thelatter's doctrines seemed to leave Calvin- ismtoo vulnerableto theArminian attack: Old Calvinism,when it remained Calvinistic,seemed dangerouslyantinomian. Hopkinsiansperceived this tendencyas particularlyevident in the Old Calvinistexplanation of justifyingfaith. Justification was the divineaction by whichGod ceased to considera believeras beingunder the condemna- tionof thelaw. According to Calvinisttheology, a personwho was unitedto Christby faithhad the benefitsof Christ'srighteousness imputed to him. It was for this imputed righteousnessthat God justifiedhim. Then, after justificationchanged the person'slegal status, changed the person himself.30 The rootof thedifference between the Old Calvinists'and theHopkinsians' interpretationsof justificationlay in their dissimilartheories of human psychology.Old Calvinistsdefined a moral agent as a creaturewhose will moved'himaccording to thedictates of his understanding.Hence, whenOld Calvinistsdescribed the act of justifyingfaith, they characterized it as a powerfulbelief in the mercyof God promisedthrough Christ, a beliefthat moved the will to embrace thatpromise as the greatestgood. To Hopkinsians,this definition of savingfaith seemed to implya selfish kind of religion.First the understandingperceived the value of Christas a mediatorfor sinners, and onlythen did the will choose to accept Christas Savior.Hopkinsians feared that if the Old Calvinistsmade savingfaith into a decision to come to Christfor life, they were not farfrom the antinomians' notionof "faithof assurance,"which was an individual'sunswerving belief

29MassachusettsMissionary Magazine, 1 (1803-1804), 260. This periodical was strongly Hopkinsian. 30Thebest account of the Puritanexplanation of conversionis in WilliamK. B. Stoever,'A Faire and Easie Wayto Heaven". Covenant Theologyand Antinomianismin Early Massachu- setts(Middletown, Conn.: WesleyanUniv. Press, 1978). Selflessnessand Selfishness 491 that Christwould save him. AlthoughNew Divinityministers considered selfishnessto be the essence of sin, Old Calvinistssaw no reason to set holinessat odds witha desirefor salvation. Old Calvinistsassumed that since faithwas a beliefin God's mercyto sinners,there was no particularcause to rebukepeople's naturalself-love as sinfulor selfish.Once the understanding was enlightenedin effectualcalling, it was entirelyappropriate that self-love directthe believerback to God.31 As Hopkinsiansbegan to thinkabout it, theyconcluded that the Old Calvinists'morphology of conversionwas wrong.The notionthat faith (or intellectualbelief) preceded, and was the ground of, holy love of God resultedin an unacceptablyselfish and antinomiantype of religion.Such a notion supposed that "a sinneris pardoned, and has a covenant title to eternallife, while unrenewed, as wellas whileimpenitent."32 There was then no need fora change of heart;the unregeneratedid not have to stop loving sin to be saved. Afterall, it requiredno changeof heartin a sinnerto love a God who proposedto save himfrom hell. The greatestenemy to God could do as much,just as a murderer,without ever repenting his crime,could love the judge who set him free. The Old Calvinists'doctrine of saving faith seemed unavoidablyto weaken the authorityof the moral law. The New Divinityministers, who believedthat the will was theonly moral faculty,could offera descriptionof justification that did not underminethe law.They began withthe assumption that regeneration changed the heart or will froma love of sinfulnessto a love of holiness. Since regeneration precededjustification, this meant that some holyvolition or love preceded pardon. In sayingthis, the Hopkinsians began to move beyond Puritan standards,for they were assertingnot merelythat people performeda conditionor qualificationfor justification (i.e., an act of faith)but thatthat performancewas an act of personal,inherent holiness. The logic of their theoryof the will eventuallyled the New Divinitytheologians to alterthe 'normal order or morphologyof conversion. Only after the regener- ated heartexercised love of God could a personunselfishly believe in Christ untosalvation. Hence, the Hopkinsiansrearranged the stagesof conversion intothe following order: regeneration, love of God, evangelicalrepentance, faith,justification, adoption, sanctification,and glorification.In this way theyinsured that saints would love God forwhat he was ratherthan out of gratitudefor pardon.

3"SeeWilliam Hart, Brief Remarks on a Numberof False Propositions,and DangerousErrors, whichare Spreadingin theCountry (New London,Conn.: TimothyGreen, 1769), 58; and Ely,A Contrast,219-20. 32JohnSmalley, Sermons, on VariousSubjects, Doctrinal and Practical (Middletown,Conn.: Hart and Lincoln, 1814), 377. 492 American Quarterly

The Old Calvinists,who believed thatjustifying faith must precede holy exercises,protested this new ordering."If a man maybe regenerate& holy some Minutesand hoursbefore the Exercise of Faith,"they reasoned, why mighthe not "be months&c. and even regeneratedand go to hell at last?"33 The Hopkinsiansignored this possibilitybecause theirprincipal concern was to demonstratethat therehad to be inherentholiness before pardon. Nathanael Emmons,the most unflinchingof the theologicalschool, even wentso faras to proclaimthat "sanctification is beforejustification and the only properevidence of it."34 The pointwas to eliminateany vestiges of antinomianismfrom Calvinism byshowing that holiness was as muchrequired under the gospel as underthe law. The Old Calvinistorder of conversionseemed to cheapen the law by implyingthat Christ came to relievesinners from its demands. If people were justifiedwithout holiness, they were justified as sinners;but to justify sinners was to voidthe law. By requiringan inherentholiness before justification, the New Divinitytheologians established the honor of the law and theaccounta- bilityof sinnersunder it, whereas "those who place faithbefore love and repentance,make all religionselfish."35 The Hopkinsianswere carefulto stipulatethat people were not justified fortheir inherent holiness. For one thing,personal holiness could not atone foran individual'spast sins. Holiness of heart did notmerit but only received a salvationmerited by Christ.These theologianswere not Arminians.Still, they were able to repel many of the Arminianattacks on Calvinismby showingthat love came beforejustification, holy acts beforethe title to salvation,and the law beforethe gospel. The phrase "willingto be damned" has hauntedNew Divinitytheology fromthe beginning.Critics have alwayspointed to it as the mostpreposter- ous article of an exceedinglypreposterous creed. The idea makes sense, though,when seen in termsof the Hopkinsianexplanation of conversion. The Old Calvinists,who placed holy love afterfaith and justification,im- plied thatGod pardonedsinners who did notlove him.New Divinitytheolo- gians,who saw regenerationas a changeof heartand who believedthat love preceded justification,assumed that sinnersmust love God before he pardonedthem. Nathanael Emmons drew the conclusion:"If God does not love sinnersbefore they love him,then they must love him,while they know

33Stiles,Literary Diary, 1, 139; Stiles,Itineraries, 472-73. 34NathanaelEmmons, The Worksof Nathanael Emmons, D.D., ed. Jacob Ide (Boston: Crockerand Brewster,1842), V, 163. 35Ibid.;also see Bellamy,Works, II, 209n, 222; JohnSmalley, Sermons, on a Number of ConnectedSubjects (Hartford, Conn.: Lincolnand Gleason, 1803),344-45; and JacobCatlin,A Compendiumof the Systemof Divine Truth,2nd ed. (Middletown,Conn.: E. and H. Clark, 1826), 152-53. Selflessnessand Selfishness 493 thathe hatesthem, and is disposedto punishthem for ever."36 In short,they mustlove a damningGod. Hopkinsiansdeclared that the regeneratemust love God and the law beforethey could exercise faith,which was love of Christand the gospel. The love of the law,known as evangelicalrepentance and experiencedas unconditionalsubmission, was the veryopposite of the selfishconcern for personalsalvation permitted by the doctrinesof the Old Calvinistsand the antinomians.The regenerateheart loved the law because the law punished sin. Since a regenerateperson delightedin the application of the law to others,he perforcedelighted in the applicationof it to himself.The New Divinityconvert would not cease to approveof the law even ifhe believed "thatGod designed,for his own gloryand thegeneral good, to cast himinto endless destruction."37 The idea of unconditionalsubmission carried with it a fundamentalirony thatrelieved it of much of its apparent harshness. As thislove ofthe law was a regenerateexercise, those who performedit would never feel the torments of hell. A willingnessto be damned was not a habitual exercise of the saint; rather,it was a misapprehensionarising out of an initialfailure to realizethat regenerationhad occurred.Since a person"cannot know that he loves God tillhe has thisdisposition, which is necessarilyimplied in love to God, he does not knowthat it is notnecessary for the glory of God thathe shouldbe damned."38 The intentionwas to repudiateantinomianism by affirmingthat pardon followedholiness. More fundamentally,itwas to demonstratethat the under- standinglagged behindrather than dictatedto the will. Consequently,the apprehensionof the meaningof the change could onlyoccur in the subse- quent intellectualreflection upon the change. The antinomianfaith of assurance,a selfishpersuasion of one's own salvation,could neverbe the germof trueholiness. The convert'sinnocent and cordial resignationto the divinewill proved thathis heartwas fixedon God and not on his own desire forheaven. An un-self-conscioussubmission demonstrated that the convert was not"bribed intoacquiescence."39 Yet mostimportant, unconditional submission repre- senteda commitmentto theauthority of the moral law duringthe experience of conversion."The true believer,"said Samuel Hopkins,"prizes holiness morethan assurance, and is moreconcerned to obtainthe formerthan the

36Emmons,Works, VI, 465. 37Hopkins,Works, I, 389. 38Ibid.,III, 148. 39GardinerSpring, Memoir of Samuel JohnMills, 2nd ed. (New York: Saxton and Miles, 1842), 8. 494 American Quarterly latter.... Indeed, the trueChristian ... is seekingmore importantobjects and eventsthan his own salvation."40 Hopkinsiansrecognized that selfishreligion overthrew the authorityof the law. Selfishreligion did not requireholiness or obedience, eitherbefore or afterjustification. It set gospel againstlaw and declared thatChrist came intothe worldto mitigatethe rigorof the requirementsplaced on sinners. Both Arminiansand antinomianswere guiltyof preachingselfish religion. Bothpandered to thesinner's desire to be savedwithout having to changehis sinfulheart. Both blurred the sharpness of the distinctions between saint and sinner,holiness and sinfulness,and good and evil. New Divinityministers wanted to preservethe authorityof the law. They insistedthat conversion not abate itby allowing sinners to be pardonedwhile theirhearts remained wicked. Hopkinsians recognized that it was impossible to speak ofan absolutedifference between good and evilif human beings out of theirown sinfulnatures were able to attainholiness, for that would mean thatgood was notthe contradiction of evil but only an improvedversion of it. Only the necessityof a divine act transformingman fromsin to holiness could insurethe strictopposition of good and evil thatmoral order seemed to require.On the otherhand, if sinners had no abilityof theirown to attain holiness,it was unfairto requireit of them,and theywere not accountable fortheir sin. If sinnerslacked ability,the absolutedistinction between good and evil was fundamentallyirrelevant to theirlives, for mankind did not live in a stateof probation. In thiscase, as muchas theother, moral order seemed impossible.The New Divinitytheology allowed ministersto threada path betweenthese unacceptable alternatives.A graciousconversion sustained the absolute distinctionbetween good and evil, but in a way thatdid not excuse sinnersfrom responsibility for their sins. Thus, New Divinitytheol- ogy provideda guaranteeof the possibilityof moral order in a societyof sinners.

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In the past two decades historiansof eighteenth-centuryNew England have told us much about whatlife was like in a societyof sinners.Many of thesehistorians have told a tale of disintegrationand fragmentation.41They

4OHopkins,Works, I, 533. 41Some of therelevant studies are thefollowing: Paul Boyerand StephenNissenbaum, Salem Possessed: The Social Originsof Witchcraft(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974); Richard D. Brown,Modernization: The Transformationof American Life, 1600-1865(New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Richard L. Bushman,From Puritanto Yankee: Characterand the Social Order in Connecticut,1690-1795 (New York: W. W. Norton,1970); Edward Cook, "Social Behavior and ChangingValues in Dedham, Massachusetts,1700-1775," Williamand Mary Selflessnessand Selfishness 495 have describedhomogeneous, organic, cohesive communities which, though not collectivisticin organization,displayed a premodern,communal spirit. People who livedin thesetowns subordinated their individual self-interest to the good of the group, and roughparity of circumstancesand prospects contributedto social harmony.Self-denial rested on a sense of sharedfate. Consensualauthority was possiblebecause thecommunity, through its town government,dispensed benefits to all as needed. The people farmedfor a living,but theyaimed no higherthan a competence for themselvesand securityfor theirfamilies. They valued goods according to standardsof usefulness,as measured by the customaryjust price, and theytraded for these goods in kind. They had littlecontact withthe world outside their town,so theirdealings were withpeople whom theyknew well in all their social roles.There was a continuityto theirexperience, and theirchildren's lives were like theirown. Then, historianshave reported,came disruptivechange. Population grew and towns found themselveswithout enough land for the rising generation.Once the common land had been distributed,children had to endure longerperiods of dependency,at the end of which theyreceived smallerbenefits. Land shortageand soil depletionforced some youthsinto tradesand othersout of town.Control of theavailable land bysome families cut off the avenue of opportunityfor others. The result was social stratification-fixeddistinctions within the communitybetween rich and poor. These distinctionsrevealed themselvesnot only in the ownershipof land butalso in such thingsas thepossession of luxurygoods and theseating assignmentsin the church. These changesbegan to corrodethe townsfolk's sense of commonpurpose. Communitiestasted the sournessof contentionas townmeetings became occasions of stridentcompetition for access to privileges and limited resources.The fragmentationtook literalform as townsdivided into pre- cincts and parishes to accommodate the needs and desires of particular groups.Instead of self-denial,people began to exhibitthe more "modern' qualities of self-interestand individualism. Farmersshifted from subsistence to commercialagriculture, but raising cattle and crops to sell forprofit meant the end of customaryprices and

Quarterly,27 (1970), 546-80; Bruce C. Daniels, The Connecticut Town: Growth and Development,1635-1790 (Middletown, Conn.: WesleyanUniv. Press, 1979); Charles S. Grant, Democracyin theConnecticut Frontier Town of Kent (New York:Columbia Univ. Press, 1961); Philip J. Greven,Jr., Four Generations:Population, Land, and Familyin Colonial Andover, Massachusetts(Ithaca: CornellUniv. Press, 1970); RobertA. Gross, The Minutemenand their World(New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); KennethA. Lockridge,A New England Town,The FirstHundred Years:Dedham, Massachusetts,1636-1736 (New York:W. W. Norton, 1970); and Patricia J. Tracy,Jonathan Edwards, Pastor: Religion and Society in Eighteenth-Century Northampton(New York: Hill and Wang, 1980). 496 American Quarterly barterexchange. Entrance into a marketeconomy required that the value of goods be set in money,for money was divisibleand thuscapable of adjusting to changes in supply and demand. The commercialsystem replaced use valuationwith exchange valuation, thus substituting flexible prices forjust ones. Flexible prices meant competitionand competitionmeant social atomization,as individualspursued their own interests.Seeking prosperity insteadof merelya competence,people tookrisks to maximizetheir profits, forthey no longerhad any standardof objective value except money. The competitionstimulated by the marketeconomy subverted the basis forconsensual authority. Individuals brooked no restraintsof theirpursuit of self-interest.They insistedon the importanceof personal liberty,and the legalsystem obliged them by changing from standards of prescription to ones of proscription,from enjoining duties to prohibitingcrimes. As people grew independentof communalvalues, theirrelations with others became con- tractual and impersonal,shaped by competition,calculation, and self- assertion.The individualstood isolated,sharply defined against others. These historianshave not told a cheerystory. Recently, however, other historianshave begun to reexaminethe process of social change in New England.42They have notedthat modernization involves not just a changein the economic structureof society but also a cultural change to a new mentalitythat values calculation and self-interest.They have argued that people had to learn to be individualistic.New Englanderswho did not possess thismodern mentality felt the market economy and itscompetitive, entrepreneurialbehavior to be an alien and dislocatingintrusion into their lives.This second groupof historiansaccordingly has stressedthe resistance thatNew Englandersoffered to change: theirreluctance to enterthe com- mercialsystem, their continued commitment to consensus,their disinclina- tionto exploitopportunities to the fullest.These historianshave pointedto the culturalcontinuities in architecture,agriculture, crafts, folk tales, and songs.They have remarkedon thelengths to whichNew Englanderswent to preservetheir stable, conservative, rural communities. They have noted,for example,that when land grewshort, people triedto keep the community's

42Someof the relevantstudies are the following:Christopher Clark, "Household Economy, MarketExchange and the Rise of Capitalismin the ConnecticutValley, 1800-1860," Journal of Social History,13 (1979), 169-89; James A. Henretta,"Families and Farms: Mentalitein Pre-IndustrialAmerica," Williamand Mary Quarterly,35 (1978), 3-32; ChristopherM. Jedrey, The Worldof JohnCleveland: Familyand Communityin Eighteenth-CenturyNew England (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979); JohnJ. Waters,Jr., "Patrimony, Succession, and Social Stability:Guilford, Connecticut in theEighteenth Century," Perspectives in American History, 10 (1976), 131-60; and Michael Zuckerman,Peaceable Kingdoms:New England Townsin the EighteenthCentury (New York:Knopf, 1970). An importantwork that studies New Yorkrather thanNew Englandis WilliamJ. McLaughlin, "Dutch Rural New York: Community,Economy, and Familyin Colonial Flatbush,"Diss. Columbia Univ. 1981. Selflessnessand Selfishness 497 distributionof wealth relatively stable by leaving their farms to one childand establishingthe others in new townson thefrontier. As longas a premodern mentalityremained strong, social change met resistance. These two interpretationsof New Englandsocial historymight not be as far apart as theyat firstseem. Both recognize that beforeNew England society could become fullymodern there had to be a restructuringof consciousnessand culturalvalues. The second interpretationstresses the resistanceto change and the persistenceof the older attitudes.Yet the first interpretationimplies much the same thingin itsfrequent references to the tension between individualisticbehavior and communitarianvalues, an anxiety-inducingtension that is seen as eruptingin such diversetherapeutic explosionsas witchhunts, ministerial dismissions, revivals, and even revolu- tionarywars. Both interpretationsimply that people change theirvalues only reluc- tantlyand at some cost. Both propose that fromthe perspectiveof older values,individualism seemed anarchical.They also suggestthat changes in behaviorrequired a changein people's knowledgeabout moralexistence -a change,that is, in people's understandingof whatwas properand improper, virtuousand vicious,good and evil. New Englandersneeded a new set of values, a new ethic,a new theology,to fitthem for a new kindof behavior. The problemthey faced was to convincethemselves that self-interest and individualismwould not inevitablyproduce a chaotic and lawless society. Only a confidence in the idea of self-interestcould make it possible to conceptualize behaviorin a new way.Consider, for example, the kind of impersonalrelations arising out of thedesire to turna profit.In contractual transactions,people tookrisks by dealing with strangers. Yet thecompetitive natureof the marketmade these exchangesseem hostilerather than mutu- allybeneficial. For thesetransactions to proceed withconfidence, there had to be some certaintythat individualswould keep theirselfishness within limitsand thatthey would honortheir contracts even whenit was no longer to theiradvantage to do so. In short,individualism required certain generally accepted restraintson self-interest.Before rural New Englanderscould experimentwith individual- istic behavior,they needed to believe that all self-interestedindividuals subscribedto universalrules about rightand wrong,according to which competitioncould proceed in an orderlyand predictableway. Those who were just enteringa marketeconomy wanted to know that there were absolutestandards of right and wrong,and thatthe strangers with whom they dealt recognizedthose standards. If New Englandersencountered the marketeconomy withanxiety and trepidation,it is hardlysurprising. There could be no guaranteesthat self- interestedindividuals might not retail their rectitude as theydid theircattle: hold it untilthe marketwas high,then dump it. Afterpeople grewaccus- 498 American Quarterly tomedto the waysof the market,they might relax their vigilance and admit thatself-interest policed itself.Initially, however, only an explicitaffirmation of the existenceof absolute standardsof virtuecould emboldenpeople to behave in new and rashways. The new mentalityof commercialismhad to emergeout of the old mentalityof communalism.New Englandershad to transforma sense of common purpose in a communityinto a sense of commonallegiance to absoluteand universalmoral principles. Their ability to accomplish this feat helps explain why the region with the strongest communaltradition was to become renownedfor its commercial sharpness.43

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Theology is not peripheralto social experience.44Taking the word in its largestsense, theology is theknowledge that people haveof the universe they inhabit.By assigningmeaning and value, theologydelineates the kindsof experienceavailable or possibleto a people ina givensociety. It setsforth the assumptionsand rules underwhich an activityis consideredto have been done properlyor improperly;that is, to be rightor wrong.Thus, theologyis one of the thingsthat makes it possible for people to live togetherin societies. Social experiencemust have meaningconferred upon it. Theologymedi- ates betweenexperience in the worldand the understandingof thatexperi- ence in the mind.The relationbetween theology and social experienceis, however,neither simple nor unilinear;rather, it is reciprocal,allowing for a continuing,mutually influential dialogue. Theology and social experience strivefor equilibrium, each movingto accommodatechanges in theother, so that experience remains meaningfuland the realityconfronting people makes sense.

43Mythinking on these mattershas been greatlyinfluenced by the followingworks: Joyce Appleby,"Ideology and Theory: The Tension betweenPolitical and Economic Liberalismin Seventeenth-CenturyEngland," American Historical Review, 81 (1976), 499-15; Appleby, "Locke, Liberalismand theNatural Law ofMoney," Past and Present,no.71 (May 1976),43-69; Thomas Bender,Community and Social Change in America (New Brunswick:Rutgers Univ. Press, 1978); Sacvan Bercovitch,The PuritanOrigins of theAmerican Self (New Haven: Yale Univ.Press, 1975); J.E. Crowley,This Sheba, Self: The ConceptualizationpfEconomic Lifein Eighteenth-CenturyAmerica (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974); Joseph R. Gusfield, Community:A CriticalResponse (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Karen Lee Halttunen, "ConfidenceMen and PaintedWomen: The Problemof Hypocrisyin SentimentalAmerica, 1830-1870," Diss. Yale Univ. 1979; Albert 0. Hirschman,The Passions and the Interests: PoliticalArguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977); and RichardI. Rabinowitz,"Soul, Character,and Personality:The Transformationof Personal ReligiousExperience in New England, 1790-1860,"Diss. HarvardUniv. 1977. 44Thefollowing four paragraphs summarize the interpretationfound in PeterL. Bergerand Thomas Luckmann, The Social Constructionof Reality: A Treatisein the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). Selflessnessand Selfishness 499

From one perspective,theology is an independentlyexisting body of theorythat proceeds according to itsown logicalinner dynamic of argument and counterargument.The resultingchanges in theology,by revisingthe explanationof reality,open new possibilitiesfor behavior in the world.A personencounters a worldwith the lines of meaningand value redrawn,and so he can act in differentways. When thishappens, theological change has alteredsocial experience.From another perspective, changes in social expe- rience compel adjustmentsin theology.If theologyfailed to come to terms withsocial change, it would abrogate its responsibilityto explain reality. People would feel anxietyas theirbehavior came to seem meaninglessand anarchicalinstead of meaningful,predictable, and proper.Therefore, theol- ogy mustchange in responseto alterationsin social experience. The questionof which change comes firstis perhapsunanswerable, for we alwaysencounter the world in medias res. It is worthnoting, though, that in itsadjustments a theologyalways attempts to retainits integrity as a system- atic bodyof theory. In otherwords, theologies try to remainconsistent. What thismeans is thatas muchas possiblepeople use theold and familiarto make sense of the new and unfamiliar.In one sense, thistheological conservatism restrainsor limitschange, but in anothersense itmakes change tolerable and thereforepossible. Historianswho have consideredthe social implicationsof New Divinity theologyhave generallyconcluded thatit was a conservative,rural insurrec- tion againsttransformations in the New Englandsocial order.45An archaic theologyof austereCalvinism, we have been told,appealed to the agricul- turaltemperament. Hopkinsian ministers, many of them farm boys uprooted bydemographic and economic changes,turned their resentment against an emergingacquisitive, individualisticstyle of behavior. The rural folk who filledtheir churches were receptive to a gospeldedicated to preserving the traditionalsocial values of self-restraintand generalconcord. To advance theirsocial goals,the Hopkinsian ministers preached energeti- cally on the need forsacrificing self-interest to thegreater general good. By

45Thisinterpretation is mostfully set forthin JosephAnthony Conforti, Samuel Hopkinsand the New DivinityMovement: Calvinism,the CongregationalMinistry, and Reformin New England betweenthe Great Awakenings(Grand Rapids, Mich.: WilliamB. Eerdmans,1981). See also StephenE. Berk, Calvinismversus Democracy: TimothyDwight and the Originsof AmericanEvangelical Orthodoxy (Hamden, Conn.: ArchonBooks, 1974); RichardD. Birdsall, "Ezra Stiles versusthe New DivinityMen," American Quarterly,17 (1965), 248-58; Birdsall, "The Second GreatAwakening and theNew EnglandSocial Order,"Church History, 39 (1970), 345-64; JosephA. Conforti,"Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity:Theology, Ethics, and Social Reformin Eighteenth-CenturyNew England," Williamand Mary Quarterly,34 (1977), 572-89; RobertL. Ferm,A Colonial Pastor:Jonathan Edwards the Younger,1745-1801 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: WilliamB. Eerdmans,1976); and EdmundS. Morgan,"The AmericanRevolu- tionconsidered as an IntellectualMovement," in ArthurM. Schlesinger,Jr. and MortonWhite, eds., Paths of American Thought(Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1963). 500 American Quarterly definingsin as selfishnessand holiness as universaldisinterested benevo- lence, theNew Divinitypreachers denied thatthere could be anyacceptable self-loveshort of universallove. By refusingto draw a distinctionbetween legitimateself-love and illegitimateselfishness, they rebuked all individualis- tic behavioras sinful.The demandthat converts willingly submit to damna- tion for the gloryof God is pointed to as the ultimateexpression of the Hopkinsians'commitment to selflessness.Given this insistencethat the individualsubordinate his own interest to thegeneral good, theNew Divinity theologyshould be viewedas a resistancemovement, retarding the arrival of an atomistic,egoistical commercial order. The usual interpretationis not entirelycorrect. Hopkinsian theology was more thanjust a reactionarydefense of the traditionalsocial ethic against the threatof individualisticbehavior. Instead, it contributedto the creation of a new mentality,one that permittedNew Englandersto ventureinto marketrelations with something approaching confidence. This confidence requiredthree things initially. First, there had to be an affirmationthat there wereuniversal and absolutestandards of right and wrong.Second, therehad to be a renunciationof all formsof self-interestthat threatened to reduce the social order to anarchy.Third, therehad to be a new way to conceive of self-interestso that it would seem legitimate,limited, and orderly.New Divinitytheology met all threeof these demands. First,New Divinitytheology upheld the absolute distinction between good and evil.Indeed, theprincipal goal ofthe Hopkinsians was thedefense of the law againstcritics like the Arminianswho chargedthat it was unfair.The New Divinitydemonstrated that sinners were justly accountable underthe law,even though they were necessarily and totallydepraved. Devotion to the law led the Hopkinsiansto deny the value of even the best actions of the unregenerate.The same devotionled themto propoundan explanationof justificationthat guarded against .The willingnessto be damned,which was an integralpart of every New Divinityconversion, was an overt,explicit, personal commitmentto the authorityof the divine law. Throughtheir unconditional submission, converts internalized absolute and unqualifiedcriteria of virtueand vice. The legalismof the New Divinity guaranteedthat there would be no compromiseswith sinners before regenera- tion and no cheaper termsfor saints after it. The beliefin the existenceof universalmoral principles made it possiblefor rural New Englandersto take theirfirst tentative steps into the marketeconomy. Second, the New Divinitytheology condemned those varietiesof self- interestthat threatened to produce anarchyby weakeningthe authorityof the law. Hopkinsians exposed the antinomianimplications of the Old Calvinisticexplanation of justification.New Divinitytheologians showed thata mercenaryfaith, which selfishly sought salvation and passivelyrelied Selflessnessand Selfishness 501

on Christ'simputed righteousness, threatened to cloud the differencebe- tween holiness and sin. In addition,Hopkinsians rebuked as dangerously antinomianthe Old Calvinistnotion that the unregeneratewere able to performsome acceptable duties. Old Calvinistsdisliked the stark distinctionbetween regeneracyand unregeneracybecause theyfeared that it would discouragemoral behavior. They insistedthat the sinner had some dutiesto dischargeeven thoughGod had notyet converted him. Their concern was to showthat there was a range ofmoral positions, and thatit was betterto havesinners behaving themselves for bad reasons than not to have them behaving themselvesat all. Old Calvinistsmaintained that there could be a kindof secondaryvirtue arising froma self-interesteduse of the means whichwas, ifnot trulyholy, at least useful for civic morality.This idea made eminent sense in traditional communities,where familiarity gave people a prettygood idea whichof their neighborswere trulyand inwardlyvirtuous and whichwere not. The idea made sense in urban, commercialcenters as well, where more extensive experiencewith self-interested behavior made people less apprehensiveof its anarchicalpotential and where,accordingly, they were less fussyabout internalholiness so longas externalmorality was observed.Yet forrural folk just enteringinto impersonal,contractual market relations with strangers, the question of whetherto trusta self-interestedsinner might seem more problematic.What theNew Divinitygave thesepeople was a guaranteethat the distinctionbetween virtue and vice was not blurredbut sharp.It prom- ised themthat there was no fuzzinessin moralmatters; there was no neutral or legitimateself-love standing somewhere between holiness and sin. Finally,New Divinitytheology made individualismpossible by offeringa nonantinomianconcept of self-interest.The famousHopkinsian definition of holiness as universaldisinterested benevolence was more than just a protestagainst selfish behavior. New Divinityministers demanded thatbe- nevolencebe impartialand disinterested,not uninterested.Hence theydid not condemn benevolence directedtoward oneself. Samuel Hopkins ob- served that a "person who exercises disinterestedgood will to being in general must have a proper and proportionableregard to himself,as he belongsto beingin general,and is includedin it as a necessarypart of it." In fact,a personhad an obligationto exercisehis benevolencewhere it would do the most good, especially towardthose whose wantswere most in his sight.Since everyperson knew his own needs best,"his disinterested, univer- sal benevolence,will attend more to his own interest,and he willhave more and strongerexercises of it,respecting his own circumstancesand happiness, than those of others,all otherthings being equal."46

46Hopkins,Works, I, 240-41, 377-78. 502 American Quarterly

Thus, the doctrineof disinterestedbenevolence made it possible foran individualto treathis own interestabstractly. It allowed a personto pursue hisself-interest by redefining it as a formof disinterested benevolence. In this way,Hopkinsianism offered a theoreticaljustification of self-interestto a people who wantedsome reassurancethat it would not lead to antinomianism and social anarchy. The idea of disinterestedbenevolence permitted individualism,but only after categorizing it as dutyand afteraffirming that it did notoverthrow the absolute distinction between virtue and vice. Behavior thatin thepast could onlyhave been seen as selfishand sinfulnow could be viewed as acceptable and even holy. New Divinitytheology offered a kindof religiousversion of Adam Smith's idea thatan InvisibleHand shapedthe greatest general good outof individuals' seekingtheir own interests. Both Samuel Hopkinsand Adam Smithprovided a theoreticallegitimation of individualismthrough the promisethat limits and laws lurkedbehind (or within)the pursuitof self-interest.New Divinity theologyreassured anxious New Englandersthat there was a catch in the whirlingratchet of selfishnessthat would stop it fromspinning inexorably into anarchy. New Divinityministers helped create a mentalityfitting New Englanders forparticipation as individualisticentrepreneurs in a marketeconomy. Their theologyset forththe limitsand boundariesthat people needed when they began to look beyondtheir familiar surroundings. It helped transformNew England froma clusterof covenantedcommunities to a conglomerationof convertedindividuals. It made individualismassimilable by squaring it with an absolutisticlaw. It smoothed the way for acquisitive and egocentric behavior,not throughthe cynicalconclusion that society could survivethe activitiesof sinfulmen, but through the optimistic promise that saints would respect limits.In sum, it gave ruralNew Englandersthat "perfectlaw of liberty"which they might follow, secure in theApostle's promise that if they did theywould be blessed in theirdeeds.47*

47James1:25. *Versionsof thispaper were presentedat a colloquium sponsoredby the Instituteof Early AmericanHistory and Culture,and at theDecember 1980meeting of theAmerican Society of ChurchHistory. I wouldlike to thankthe Institute of EarlyAmerican History and Culturefor its generoussupport.