The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant

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The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 1994 The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant Josefine Charlotte Nauckhoff University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Nauckhoff, Josefine Charlotte, "The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant" (1994). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2142. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2142 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2142 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant Abstract Against common misconceptions of Kant as a philosopher who neglects the emotional aspects of moral life, I show that he actually considers our emotional dispositions to be valuable tools for perfecting ourselves morally. I show not only that it is incumbent on us to cultivate morally beneficial emotions, but also how we can do it. Building on Kant's vague hints about what the process involves, I argue that cultivating a given feeling requires, above all, sharpening one's judgment about it, one's sensitivity to its nature and to the shape it takes in one's own character in order to make responsible decisions about whether to act on the feeling and when one does choose to act on it, to express it in a way which harmonizes with one's sense of moral integrity. I begin with an argument showing that on Kant's mature moral theory, it is our duty to cultivate feelings which help us form a virtuous disposition. I then discuss particular feelings which are especially important in this regard. I begin with the feeling of respect for the moral law and show that it constitutes the motive of duty. Kant's "pure" moral motive--the motive of duty--is thus actually a feeling which is grounded in a rational grasp of the moral law. I then consider feelings associated with our duties toward ourselves (e.g., pride and courage) and with our duties toward others (e.g., love and respect) and raise the question of how cultivated feelings figure in the virtuous character and also in relation to good willing and to morally worthy action. I show that certain "moral" feelings (feelings with a rational basis, e.g., "proper" pride and love of man) can become part of the motive of duty itself and so can serve as motives to morally worthy action. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Philosophy Subject Categories Philosophy This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2142 THE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS IN THE MORAL LIFE ACCORDING TO IMMANUEL KANT Josefine Charlotte Nauckhoff A DISSERTATION in Philosophy Presented to the faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy 1994 fMj) ____________ Supervisor of Dissertation s' S ' ~ / - / 7 (^sU_ c Graduate G'i’ou p Chairperson ABSTRACT When we strive to better ourselves morally, what aspects of our humanity do we bring into play? In my dissertation, I consider Kant's answer to this question. The fact that Kant held moral obligation to be reason-based, moral action to be rational and voluntary, and feelings to be largely irrational and beyond our control does not entail that he denied feelings a role in the moral life. Against common misconceptions of Kant as a philosopher who neglects the emotional aspects of moral life, I show that he actually considers our emotional dispositions to be valuable tools for perfecting ourselves morally, i.e., for fulfilling all our duties and striving to do so from respect for the moral law. Feelings such as love, respect, and pride can help us increase our moral perfection because they make us less prone to act in morally unacceptable ways and more prepared to carry out our various duties. Because such feelings help us carry out our duties, it is our duty to cultivate them. I show not only that it is incumbent on us to cultivate morally beneficial emotions, but also how we can do it. Building on Kant's vague hints about what the process involves, I argue that cultivating a given feeling requires, above all, sharpening one's judgment about it, one's sensitivity to its nature and to the shape it takes in one's own character. This enables one to make responsible decisions about whether to act on the feeling and, when one ii does choose to act on it, to express it in a way which is dignified and which harmonizes with one's sense of moral integrity. Cultivating morally beneficial feelings also involves refining the feelings themselves through participating in society and in culture--shaping emotional bonds through friendship and engaging in art, sports, and the like as creator as well as consumer. I begin with an argument showing that on Kant's mature moral theory, it is our duty to cultivate feelings which help us form a virtuous disposition. I then discuss particular feelings which are especially important in this regard. I begin with the feeling of respect for the moral law and show that it constitutes the motive of duty. Kant's "pure” moral motive— the motive of duty— is thus actually a feeling which is grounded in a rational grasp of the moral law. I then consider feelings associated with our duties toward ourselves (e.g., pride and courage) and with our duties toward others (e.g., love and respect) and raise the question of how cultivated feelings figure in the virtuous character and also in relation to good willing and to morally worthy action. I show that certain "moral" feelings (feelings with a rational basis, e.g., "proper" pride and love of man) can become part of the motive of duty itself and so can serve as motives to morally worthy action. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.................................. 1 Chapter 1: The Moral Relevance of Emotion...................................... 12 Chapter 2: The Feeling of Respect for the Moral Law. ....................... 84 Chapter 3: Feelings Associated with Our Duties Toward Ourselves............................ 134 Chapter 4: Feelings Associated with Our Duties Toward Others............................... 193 Chapter 5: Kant on Personal Attachments...... 244 Bibliography................................ 303 iv INTRODUCTION When we strive to better ourselves morally, what are we doing? What aspects of our humanity do we bring into play? I will here consider Kant's answer to these questions. At first glance, Kant's picture of morally-engaged humanity looks bleak and over-lntellectualized. He seems to admit only our purely rational side into the arena of moral assessment and activity: moral willing and acting are based on our rational grasp of the moral law and its requirements. The emotions seem barred from playing any motivating role in moral life--even from being proper objects of moral assessment--because, as Kant so often says, they are not only irrational (unable to judge the rightness of actions) but also, to a great extent, beyond our control.x Since xIn this work, I use the terms "feeling" and "emotion" (as well as their plurals) interchangeably to refer not only to episodic feelings but also to our dispositions to feel them and to the attitudes and habits of thought which underlie those dispositions, all of which are part of a person's character. These terms, together with the apt but unfortunately outdated term, "sentiment," cover the broad range of feelings I take to be covered by Kant's use of "Gefuhl." That I use the terms interchangeably might strike some readers as misleading given their sometimes disparate meanings. The reader might, for instance, think I'm going to show that strong emotions such as rage and lust play a key part in moral life, for Kant, and might then be disappointed to find that a substantial part of my discussion focuses on a comparatively pallid class of "reason- based" feelings (the "moral" feelings) which might even strike some as mere arid caricatures of natural emotions. To forestall disappointment, I assure the reader that I will show that all our feelings--including those which are nature-based (some of which might even underlie our vices)--can be brought to bear on our moral improvement, but that only the "moral" feelings can motivate us in morally worthy action because they alone stem from 1 moral praise and blame attach only to voluntary actions, and since moral actions must spring from the good will which acts from the reason-based motive of duty, the emotions appear to be neither morally valuable nor morally relevant, on Kant's view. I hope to show that such an intellectualistic rendering of the Kantian virtuous character, while containing a kernel of truth, is incomplete and crude in its conception of feeling. The kernel of truth is that morality JLa. reason- based rather than nature-based, for Kant. Natural feelings, such as the sympathy which might move me to help somebody who has fallen on the street, are neither lasting enough nor evenly enough distributed to provide a universally accessible foundation for morality. In order to be accessible to every human being and safe from the misfortunes of circumstance and the inequity of natural endowments, the moral motive must be grounded in something so essential to humanity that everbody can be expected to have it. That common element is reason. By locating the moral lav in common human reason, Kant gives morality--and in particular, moral motivation--the stable foundation it needs. Since the moral motive (respect for the moral lav, or the motive of duty in its most basic form) is always available for us to act on in virtue of our an awareness of the moral lav or of its specific obligations.
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