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Philosophy, Epistemology and History of Science I+II SHS Course Philosophy, Epistemology and History of Science I+II Prof. Michael Esfeld ∗ Academic Year 2015–16 Website: http://goo.gl/ErohU0 Manual Version: October 7, 2015 The goal of this one-year master level course is to work on philosophical issues in the exact sciences. – What is a law of nature? – What does physics say about space and time? – What is matter according to quantum mechanics? – Do numbers really exist? – Why can mathematics be used in so many areas? This is only a sample of questions we’re going to address in this course. After the introductory lectures, you work in small groups on a particular project and present your intermediate results to the whole group by the end of the first term. You then write an essay by the end of the second term. You’re free to choose the project that you like the most, and we encourage you to work on philosophical issues in the area you graduate from EPFL. We propose several interdisciplinary projects in the philosophy of physics in cooperation with professors from the physics department. ∗. B [email protected]. Contents I. Organization1 1. Assistant and Collaborators1 2. The Program1 3. What You Are Expected to Do2 4. Schedule3 5. How to Write an Essay?4 6. Online Resources5 II. The Projects6 7. Metaphysics of Physics6 7.1. What Is a Law of Nature?...........................6 7.2. Primitive Ontology...............................6 8. Philosophy and History of Classical Physics8 8.1. Aristotle on Space, Time, and Motion.....................8 8.2. Newton and Leibniz on Space, Time, and Motion...............8 8.3. Neo-Newtonian or Galilean Space-Time....................8 8.4. Does the Electromagnetic Field Exist?....................8 8.5. The Self-Interaction Problem in Classical Electrodynamics..........8 8.6. Statistical Physics: Entropy and Typicality..................9 9. Philosophy of Relativistic Physics 11 9.1. The Twin Paradox............................... 11 9.2. Mass and Energy in Special Relativity..................... 11 9.3. Space-Time in General Relativity....................... 11 10.Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics 13 10.1. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument.................... 13 10.2. Bell’s Theorem and Quantum Non-Locality.................. 13 10.3. The Measurement Problem.......................... 13 10.4. Collapse Theories............................... 14 10.5. The deBroglie-Bohm Quantum Theory.................... 14 10.6. The Many-Worlds Interpretation........................ 14 10.7. Decoherence Theory: The Formalism and Its Interpretation......... 14 10.8. Quantum Information and QBism....................... 15 11.Philosophy of Mathematics 18 11.1. Do Mathematical Objects Exist?....................... 18 11.2. Zeno’s Paradox................................. 18 11.3. The Application of Mathematics in Science.................. 18 11.4. The Use of Computers in Proving Theorems................. 19 11.5. Finitism and Incompleteness.......................... 19 11.6. Intuitionistic Logic............................... 19 11.7. Infinitesimals.................................. 19 11.8. New Maths: The Theory of Linear Structures................. 20 Part I. Organization 1. Assistant and Collaborators The assistant for this course is Mario Hubert1. Further collaborators involved in the super- vision of projects are: – Andrea Oldofredi2, – Davide Romano3, – Dr. Antonio Vassallo4, – Dr. Dustin Lazarovici. Either the assistant or one of the collaborators will be assigned to your project, and he will support you for the whole year in preparing your essay. 2. The Program The goal of this master program is to work on philosophical issues related to physics or mathematics. You choose a project and work in small groups of 1–3 students. By the end of the autumn term you prepare an essay plan and give a presentation. During the spring term, you write an essay based on your previous work. You can freely choose among the projects that you find in Part II of this manual. And you are welcome to choose a project that discusses philosophical issues in the area you graduate from EPFL. We propose projects in the following five fields: – Metaphysics of Physics, – Philosophy and History of Classical Physics, – Philosophy of Relativistic Physics, – Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, – Philosophy of Mathematics. If you wish to work on a topic that is not listed in this manual, please contact Mario Hubert. 1. B [email protected] 2. B [email protected] 3. B [email protected] 4. B [email protected] 1 3. What You Are Expected to Do 1. Follow the introductory lectures starting on 15 September 2015. 2. Find a group and a project by 14 October 2015. 3. Submit an essay plan at least one week before your presentation. 4. Present your plan at the end of the autumn term. 5. Work out the essay by 2 May 2016. The Essay Plan The essay plan is intended to help you prepare your final essay. It should comprise around 2–3 pages written in whole sentences. And it should include 1. an introduction, 2. your research question, 3. how you’re going to address that question, and 4. a list of references. Send your essay plan to your supervisor at least one week before your presentation. We only accept PDF. You can write the essay plan in English, French, Italian, or German. The Presentation On the basis of your essay plan, you work out a presentation that you give at the end of the autumn term. You should present your essay plan in 15 minutes, followed by a 15 minutes discussion session. The language is English. The presentation (in conjunction with your essay plan) will be graded. The Essay Length An essay written by one student should contain 4000–5000 words; an essay by a group of two students, 6000–7000 words; and three students should write between 8000 and 9000 words. The word limits comprise everything in the main text, including headings, citations, and footnotes. The bibliography is excluded from the word count. Language You can write your essay in English, French, Italian, or German. 2 Citations Please use an author-year citation format as we use it in this manual below. When you refer to the literature, make sure that you always indicate the source as precise as possible. We’ll give you more guidelines on how to cite properly in the last lecture. Submission Please send the final version of your essay by 2 May 2016 to your supervisor. We only accept PDF. Please make sure to use the official cover page that you can download from the website. 4. Schedule Autumn Term ’15 The autumn term is divided into three parts: 1. Lectures Location: Room INR 219. 16 September 16h15-17h30: Introduction to the Programme. (M. Esfeld) 17h45-18h45: Natural Philosophy: Newton on Physics and Philosophy. (M. Esfeld) 23 September 16h15-17h30: What Is a Law of Nature? (M. Esfeld) 17h45-18h45: The Explanatory Role of Mathematics. (A. Oldofredi) 30 September 16h15-17h30: Philosophy of Space and Time: The Classical Positions. (M. Esfeld) 17h45-18h45: Philosophy of Space and Time After General Relativity Theory. (A. Vassallo) 7 October 16h15-17h30: Quantum Physics: Non-Locality and the Measurement Problem. (M. Esfeld) 17h45-18h45: The Ontology of Quantum Physics. (M. Esfeld) 14 October 16h15-17h30: Philosophy of Mathematics. (M. Hubert) 17h45-18h45: How to Write an Essay. (M. Hubert) 3 2. Preparation of the Essay Plan – No lectures until the presentations. – Definite fixing of the groups and essay subjects by 14 October. – One required meeting with your supervisor. – Submit the essay plan to your supervisor at least one week before your presentation. 3. Presentations Location: Room INR 219. Four sessions: 18 Nov., 25 Nov., 2 Dec., and 9 Dec., from 16:15 to 19:15. Spring Term ’16 During the spring term you write your essay. There are no lectures. Please meet your supervisor in February or March to discuss intermediate progress. Further meetings can be scheduled during the semester according to your needs. Submit your essay by 2 May 2016. After that you meet your supervisor again to discuss results. If your essay needs improvement, you can submit a revised version by 3 June, 2016. 5. How to Write an Essay? Writing is a skill that you can only achieve through regular practice and proper teaching. Before preparing your essay, please read the guidelines on writing a paper by the the philoso- pher Jim Pryor. If you’re interested in improving your writing skills in general, Strunk Jr. and White (1999) is a classic; the book is very brief and concise. Furthermore, the English language comprises its own rules and guidelines for proper punc- tuation, which are often ignored. Good punctuation gives a clear structure to your text and may even help the reader to grasp the correct meaning of a sentence. Trask (1997) is a primer on English punctuation; an online version is freely accessible on the website of the University of Sussex. Some important rules are also included in Strunk Jr. and White (1999, Sec. 1.2–1.8) There are certain tools that every writer is supposed to use in order to facilitate the writing process. First, a proper dictionary is indispensable. We recommend the Oxford Dictionary of English (ODE) or the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (OALD). The OALD uses easier explanations of the words and contains simpler sample sentences. Second, in order to enlarge your vocabulary and increase your flow of writing, a thesaurus is extremely helpful. The ODE contains a huge database of synonyms, which you can search online. 4 References Strunk Jr., William, and E. B. White. 1999. The Elements of Syle. 4th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Trask, Robert Lawrence. 1997. The Penguin Guide to Punctuation. London: Penguin. http: //www.sussex.ac.uk/informatics/punctuation. 6. Online Resources Open peer-reviewed sources on the internet are: – The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP). – The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP). The SEP is a comprehensive and widely-used encyclopedia.
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