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Home , Catalan State (1873), Luis Carrero Blanco, Statute of autonomy, Traditionalism (Spain)

The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later: , AND PLURALISM

Francisco Colom | Spanish National Research Council May 2017

I. INTRODUCTION , the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy involved more than the of Spain’s transition to democracy after General standard political liberties and the rule of law. The ’s death in 1975 is widely new democratic system also had to facilitate the considered a success story and is sometimes cohabitation of multiple ethno-territorial identities presented as a model for other transitions from within a single political framework, while also authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin secularizing the state and implementing some form America. Four decades after the transition the of transitional justice for the victims of the Civil War 1 main leaders of the process are now deceased or and the dictatorship. retired from politics, and within Spain, there is growing public demand for a fresh assessment of The territorial model that was finally devised—a its merits. In Spain, as a way out of authoritarian system of regional autonomy with some degree of rule, the Spanish experience is still overwhelmingly asymmetry—was somewhat improvised and was the perceived as a positive example; however, when result of brisk negotiations among heterogeneous the stability of its territorial system and the type political groups. Framed in very flexible terms, the of societal values upon which a pluralist political resulting model was nonetheless able to drive a culture can be sustained are considered the views political cycle that has lasted for over three decades. become more critical. On the negative side, the very same elements that distinguished this territorial model—that is, In its simplest version, pluralism implies valuing inter-regional competition and the dynamics of social diversity as a democratic asset, and not nationalist politics—have prevented its eventual as a hindrance to be managed or tackled. In stabilization. The ambiguity on the limits of the devolution process, together with its procedural

This paper is part of a new publication series from the Global Centre for Pluralism called Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies. Focused on six world regions, each “change case” examines a speci ic moment in time when a country altered its approach to diversity, either expanding or eroding the foundations of inclusive citizenship. The aim of the series – which also features thematic overviews by leading global scholars – is to build global understanding of the sources of inclusion and exclusion in diverse societies and the pathways to pluralism. The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

openness—which were at one point praised as signs This overall erosion of legitimacy has resulted of institutional resilience and political capacity to in growing concerns about the capacity of compromise—are now often perceived as structural the institutional system to respond to such handicaps. The same can be said about other combinations of economic, social and political decisions made during the transition—for instance, pressures. This changing social mindset has entrenching the privileges of the Catholic Church also begun to alter the received narrative of the or avoiding the politics of memory. The option transition, as well as the political consensus upon of closure and forgiveness for the crimes of the which it was based. There are now an increasing Civil War and the dictatorship made it easier for number of voices questioning the legacy of this the new political elites to start with a clean slate, consensus and blaming its original limitations but historical oblivion has taken a heavy toll on for current social ailments such as the lack of Spanish civic culture. Without effective normative recognition of the former regime’s victims, the references, counteracting the existing hegemony of non-accountability and self-reproductive tendencies traditionalist Catholic values, social clientelism and of political elites, or the inability to stabilize the political corruption has proven difficult. territorial model. According to these critical voices, such shortcomings reveal the incapacity of the The reasons for these choices and the subsequent Spanish democracy to break with the ingrained loss of political functionality are various. Political interests and values inherited from Francoism realism offers one explanation: the transition which were incorporated into the political culture rendered the best political result it could achieve of the country. As a result of these forces and without risking an authoritarian backlash reflections, forty years later, Spain is experiencing a considering the balance of forces in the 1970s, when critical reassessment of the drivers of its democracy the apparatus of the dictatorship was still intact and with increasing talk about the need for a “second the opposition was weak. The dynamics of social transition”. change suggests another explanation: younger generations severely hit by the 2008 recession are This change case identifies the original challenges less inclined to accept as legitimate some of the faced by the Spanish transition to democracy, the accommodations made before they were born. The factors that favoured pluralist responses to them— social reverberations of the economic downturn— with a particular emphasis on their territorial including staggering cases of corruption and dimension—and the long-term or unintended increased protest and mobilization—have produced consequences of some of the options chosen. On the a generalized sense of malaise which, in turn, has whole, the Spanish transition has been a success undermined the basic pillars of the country, that story, but only in a limited or provisional sense. is, the territorial structure, the welfare-state social On the one hand, compared to the four civil wars model and the perceived roles of political parties, and countless uprisings, coups and mutinies that the judiciary and the . the country experienced during the preceding two centuries, the democratic system installed

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since 1977 has produced the longest period of equality and reproductive rights were integral parts political freedom and the rule of law in Spain’s of the political agenda of the transition. However, modern history. Up to 2008, decentralization the institutional privileges of the Catholic Church also resulted in a more even distribution of the were maintained, thereby allowing it to assume a benefits of sustained economic growth, as well as role as a main interlocutor with the government the cultural recovery and institutionalization of on educational and moral issues, such as in recent regional vernaculars. On the other hand, some debates on abortion, same-sex marriage and of the country’s old territorial tensions have not the introduction of civic education in the school been resolved. The years of transition witnessed a syllabus. Similarly, voters often exhibit tolerance ruthless increase in terrorist violence originating for the pervasive corruption that has seized the in the Basque Country that was only curbed thirty political system (and for which devolution offered a years later. While the situation in this region seems fertile ground), regularly re-electing politicians who to have settled, a more powerful independence are under suspicion—although this mindset seems movement has emerged in as the to have receded with the current economic crisis. result of a failed and profoundly controversial Nonetheless, many socially-ingrained obstacles still territorial reform and bitterly felt socio-economic thwart the struggle against political corruption. deterioration. Catalan portrays the regional consequences of the 2008 economic crisis as Spanish “fiscal plundering.” Although economic hardship and the social frustrations attached to it II. ORIGINS AND RESPONSES have fed centrifugal pressures in the regions, within Spain as a whole further devolution does not enjoy TO DIVERSITY IN MODERN the same degree of support it had forty years ago. SPAIN

The decision not to look backward at the crimes Although part of Southern Europe’s “third wave” of the past, or to effect some form of symbolic of democratization in the mid-1970s,2 the Spanish reparation for the victims of the Civil War and transition had its own tempo and characteristics. the dictatorship, has also blurred the historical Although it took place after a bloody civil war and credentials of Spanish democracy, in part by giving almost forty years of dictatorship, it was not the leeway to regressive theories about the “beneficial” result of a political revolution or the collapse of effects of Franco’s regime for having allegedly an authoritarian regime, as in Portugal or Greece. created the pre-conditions of a successful transition. Instead, it was carried out through a process of This lack of collective memory is reflected in negotiated political reform with the opposition. the recurrent “cultural wars” that emerge in the The transitional process faced a combination of political arena. The secularization of the state, the challenges, among them drafting a democratic extension of the public educational system and the constitution; resolving Spain’s membership in the recognition of civil rights such as divorce, women’s Western structure of international relations, mainly

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the European Community and NATO; creating a which comprises the current Basque Country and modern welfare state and a more equitable society; in Spain and the department of the Atlantic and instituting a territorial model that met the Pyrenees in , or of Països (“Catalan expectations of Catalan and Basque nationalists Countries”), which would include Catalonia, without triggering the reaction of conservative Valencia and the in Spain and the forces such as the army. Some related issues, department of the Eastern Pyrenees in France. such as the separation of church and state and the What we find instead is a changing variety of wider secularization of the educational and civil rights political structures originally based on dynastic system, had been simmering since the nineteenth kinship and feudal rights. Variants of the Catalan century due to the historical weakness of the liberal language are spoken in Valencia, the Balearic state against the combined influence of the social Islands and southern France, but they have never oligarchy and the Catholic Church. Intense class inspired an effective pan-Catalanist movement. The conflict and territorial tensions with Catalonia same is true for the , which is also and the Basque region were by-products of both spoken in the north of Navarre and on the French Spain’s late and unequal industrialization and the side of the border. Galician has its linguistic nest imbalance created by a weak political centre and an in the northwest of the Peninsula, with its cultural economically stronger periphery. These cleavages affinity to Portugal, but its brand of nationalism has were exacerbated in the twentieth century by the been slower and more diluted than the others. The crisis of the monarchy, the instability of the Second Islamic heritage of Andalusia persists more as an Republic (1931–39), the Civil War (1936–39) and architectural patrimony than a living culture. Franco’s long dictatorship (1939–75). In addition to these pressures, the restoration of democracy in Spain emerged as a modern nation-state out of a the 1970s was challenged by an escalating terrorist multi-ethnic empire legitimized by Catholicism and offensive led by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a dynastic kinship without the implied institutional movement for Basque independence, and by the separation of secular and religious spheres, or need for urgent economic reforms precipitated by the cultural and political homogenization of the the 1973 international oil crisis. country. The liberal state was never strong enough to impose a uniform, French-styled national culture. By itself, the variety of languages in Spain does not Nineteenth-century political elites distrusted explain the existence or character of the country’s the masses and displayed little interest in public regional or territorial tensions. Cultural differences education; at the same time, the fiscal base of the have to be considered in combination with the state was too weak and the influence of the Catholic political transformations and the social makeup of Church too strong to organize an efficient and the different regions. Historically, Basque, Catalan secular public school system. Besides, centrifugal or Galician polities have never existed that replicate tensions were not always synonymous with ethnic the imagined nationalist territories of Euskal cleavages. The federal system attempted by the Herria (literally “the land of the Basque people”), short-lived First Republic (1873–74), for example,

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rapidly disintegrated into a general swirl of came to wield the banner of regional nationalism cantonal movements led by radical republicans. in the Basque Country and Catalonia: the Basque The fiercest resistance to the establishment of a Nationalist Party and the Regionalist League, liberal constitutional system came from the regions founded in 1895 and 1901 respectively. Whereas the but for different reasons. Some had either lost or first aimed at independence from Spain, the second preserved some degree of autonomy from the Old sought the restoration of lost Catalan institutions. Regime. Others had experienced the social shock Eventually, some groups united around the Estat of industrialization first. Two—Catalonia and the Catalá () party after concluding that Basque provinces—had had retained a distinctive the cultural, social and economic plenitude of language. Catalonia would never be achieved as long as the region remained a part of Spain. The successful Modern Basque and Catalan struggle of Ireland for independence in 1921 became emerged shortly after the military defeat of a mirror for both nationalist movements. In both Carlism, a clerical, movement against cases, the liquidation of the oligarchic system— liberalism, in 1876. Although internally complex established after the restoration of the Bourbon and dissimilar in their ideological articulation and dynasty in 1874—was considered a prerequisite for political objectives—the linguistic brand of political any solution to the “national question” in Spain. Catalanism contrasts with the racialist bias of early —both shared some common The Second Republic (1931–39) was the first serious features, such as a rural social base, a connection to pluralist response to the territorial articulation of traditional Catholic values, a romantic longing for the country in the twentieth century. This republic a lost “golden age” and the defence of their cultural was not inspired by federalist principles, but and political heritage. Originally, Catalanism was by the idea of creating a “comprehensive state” part of a broader “regenerationist” movement that (Estado integral) with autonomous municipalities seized the shaken self-confidence of Spanish elites and regions. Public intellectuals who entered the after the Spanish-American War in 1898, which political arena, such as José Ortega y Gasset and resulted in the loss of Spain’s last colonies in the Manuel Azaña, helped to disseminate the idea of Caribbean and the Pacific. This soul-searching regional autonomy as a way to pull the country was more intellectual than political and produced out of its historical stagnation. The Catalan widely different diagnoses of the nation’s ailments, Statute of Autonomy—the only such statute to be but a revival of and demands for passed before the Civil War—was adopted by the decentralization were an integral part of it. Some Spanish parliament in 1932. The Basque Statute elites from the periphery of the country, particularly was proclaimed in October 1936, by which time in Catalonia, concluded that Spain’s prospect for the the war was already underway. In contrast, the regeneration was better if the process was led from Statute of Autonomy for Galicia, was presented the most developed and ambitious regions, rather to the Parliament in July 1936 but it was never than from its decadent core. Two main parties processed as Galacia fell on the insurrectional

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side. Aided by and Italy and Within the context created by the Cold War, sanctioned by the Catholic Church, a coalition of Franco’s Spain gained new geostrategic value for the the military and an array of conservative forces won and its Western allies. Agreements the Civil War, resulting in the suppression of the for economic and military cooperation signed by autonomy projects and the imposition of a strongly Spain and the United States in 1953, and the visit centralized, authoritarian and nationalistic regime. of President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in 1959, In 1947, Spain was again proclaimed a monarchy marked a new era of comparative openness for the with General Franco appointed as regent for life regime. Indeed, beginning in the 1960s, Franco’s until the Spanish throne was occupied. dictatorship began to define itself as an “organic democracy”, that is, as a corporatist system built upon the institutional pillars of family, municipality and state-controlled trade unions. This innovation III. THE SPANISH led some social scientists to typify Spain as an example of an “authoritarian regime” rather than TRANSITION FROM a totalitarian state.3 Although incorporation into AUTHORITARIAN RULE the European Common Market was blocked until the democratic period, the last phase of Franco’s Banned from the new international order that long dictatorship was accompanied by swift issued from the Second World War, Franco’s economic development. Domestically, shifting dictatorship initially survived through economic balances between the regime’s different “political autarky amidst general impoverishment and families” also defined this period. On one side frenzied political repression. On the external scene, were the intransigent Francoists, to be found it developed a substitute diplomacy based on a mainly in the military, war veterans’ organizations strategic alliance with the Vatican and some key and the security apparatus. The philo-fascist and Latin American countries. The regime granted nationalistic Falange, the only party officially the Catholic Church the type of autonomy and permitted, was another recognizable group, but by political protection that it had been seeking for the 1960s it had lost much of its original clout and over a century, handing over to it the educational had become instead a large, stagnant bureaucracy system, part of the mass media and the control controlling the official trade unions system. There of censorship. In exchange, the regime obtained was also a small, languishing monarchical lobby that international support and a convenient design advocated Don Juan de Borbón, the son of the last of the Spanish Church from the Vatican. This Spanish king, as Franco’s successor. Another group peculiar combination of militarism, authoritarian of technocratic modernizers, under the umbrella of nationalism and Catholic traditionalism is usually the Catholic organization Opus Dei, lead the process referred to as “National-Catholicism” and gave of economic modernization under the protection Franco’s regime its particular brand. of Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s second in command. However, the economic modernization of

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the regime did not produce political liberalization. Cultural and political activism with a nationalist On the contrary, the technocrats of the Opus Dei tinge also made a comeback in Catalonia and the sought institutional perpetuation. Only some rival Basque Country in the 1960s. Whereas Catalanism groups, stemming from the Falangist bureaucracy, generally followed a peaceful strategy, political encouraged a limited opening of popular political violence broke out in the Basque region. In 1960, participation, but under strict state control. a bomb at the train station in San Sebastian produced the first victim of the new terrorist The prosperity of the 1960s created a new urban group ETA (the acronym for “Basque Homeland middle class in Spain that valued social stability and Freedom”). In 1967, a policeman was killed above everything and provided a diffuse base of and a year later the organization committed its support for the regime, which some social scientists first targeted assassination, killing an agent of have called “sociological Francoism.”4 At the same Franco’s secret police. The reaction of the regime time, industrial development created a new working was fierce. The recurrent declaration of the state of class, while massive emigration and a growing emergency reduced the regime’s already feeble legal inflow of tourists offered Spaniards opportunities guarantees, hardened repression and paralyzed to compare their country’s standing with the rest of the possibility of widened political openings. Western Europe. Economic growth, social change ETA initiated an offensive based on an escalating and cultural openings brought some turbulence, “action-reaction” principle that was supposed including the first miners’ strikes in northern Spain, to climax in a massive insurrection by Basque the infiltration of the official trade unions system society. In December 1973, ETA killed Admiral by left-wing organizers, the radicalization of the Carrero Blanco, the head of government, in an student movement and the erosion of the alliance elaborate bomb attack in , thus leaving between the Catholic Church and the regime. In this the ultraconservative sector of Francoism without context, the proclamation in 1969 of Juan Carlos a leader. This same year, a new radical left-wing de Borbón y Borbón as Prince of Spain and the group, the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic future successor of Franco as head of the state and Front (FRAP), joined the violent front against the as a king, was viewed as a triumph of the regime’s dictatorship. In response, the government arrested most conservative sectors. Franco and Don Juan de scores of opposition militants, court-martialed a Borbón, the exiled father of Juan Carlos who lived in dozen of them and, on 27 September 1975, executed Portugal, agreed in 1948 that the son would be sent three members of FRAP and two of ETA. These to Spain to receive an education under the regime’s actions resulted in international condemnation, tutelage, but at the time no further details were ranging from the withdrawal of many ambassadors decided about his future. Franco’s decision to name from Spain to censure at the United Nations as Juan Carlos his successor caused a breach in the well as demonstrations in many foreign cities, legitimate Bourbon dynasty’s chain of succession calls for economic boycott, and the burning of the that resulted in a rift between father and son. Spanish embassy in Lisbon. The regime reacted by orchestrating a massive demonstration in support of

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a senile-looking Franco on 1 October, the very same recognition of the “right to self-determination for day that a new and obscure terrorist group, the First the Iberian nationalities,” so that each of them could of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), “freely determine its relations with the other peoples killed four policemen in Madrid. This was the last that constitute the Spanish state.”5 time that Franco was seen in public. A few days later he fell into a coma and, after much agony, died on During the last years of the Franco regime, social 20 November 1975 at age 82. unrest and opposition to the regime mounted. Countless demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, After the Republican defeat in the Civil War and occupations of public buildings, terrorist attacks, the crushing of the last remaining guerrilla activity police repression and right-wing vigilantism created in the 1950s, internal political opposition to a politically-charged atmosphere. Communist Franco’s dictatorship was very weak. Clandestine groups were particularly active in the grassroots anarchist, communist and socialist cells were movements and in the working-class districts of repeatedly infiltrated and dismantled by the police the big cities. In the industrial northern region, the and their leaders often executed. In the 1960s, Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), a new clandestine some internal dissidents made tenuous contact union pushed by Catholic and Communist militants, with external liberal, Christian-democratic and enjoyed considerable support. In the Basque monarchical groups. The Spanish Communist Party, Country and in Catalonia, nationalist mobilization which distanced itself from the Soviet orthodoxy, gained a prominent role. The Catholic Church also advocated a program of “national reconciliation” took a more critical stance towards the regime. and was quite successful in penetrating the official Catholic sympathy for Basque nationalism led to a union movement and making its influence felt in serious diplomatic incident with the Vatican in 1974. the student movement. By the time of Franco’s The great unknown was how the bulk of Spanish death in 1975, it was by far the best organized and society would react after the death of the dictator. disciplined political organization inside the country. Prolonging Francoism without Franco—as Marcelo By contrast, the Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) Caetano had done with the authoritarian Estado suffered a split between internal clandestine groups Novo in Portugal after dictator Antonio Salazar and the party’s exiled leadership that would only retired—seemed an option without much future. be overcome at the party congress in Suresnes, The main political actors faced a political dilemma France, in 1974. At this meeting, a new group from after the death of the dictator: either a political inside the country—which included future Prime break with the regime or a negotiated reform Minister Felipe González—took control and the process. newly mended party issued a political declaration favouring “democratic rupture” with the Franco A few months after his accession to the throne, regime and the creation of a federal republic. King appointed a new head of Decentralization and democratic transition went government, Adolfo Suárez—until then, a rather hand in hand, with the resolution also supporting unremarkable bureaucrat within the Falangist

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state apparatus and the so-called “National IV. THE STRUGGLES Movement” and a former director of the public broadcasting system. This was an unexpected move FOR PLURALISM: THE by the King, since no great reform initiative was TERRITORIAL QUESTION expected from Suárez considering his background. In the meanwhile, the main opposition forces The constituent assembly elections of 1977 produced had coalesced into a self-declared “Platform of the first political mapping of Spanish society in Democratic Organizations” in order to negotiate almost forty years. The Centre party of Premier the preconditions for a democratic process with Suárez was the winning force followed by the the new government. Their conditions included Socialist Workers Party, with the Communist Party political amnesty, legalization of all political parties, and the right-wing People’s Alliance lagging far dissolution of the political police and abrogation of behind. The Basque and Catalan nationalist parties their emergency powers, trade union freedom, the obtained good results in their respective regions. return of the exiles, a new constituent assembly, The main purpose of the elections was to produce and recognition of the right to self-government by a constitution that could enjoy the widest possible the country’s different nationalities and regions. In consensus. The parliamentary commission in charge less than a year, Premier Suárez steered the Law for of its drafting was made up of representatives from Political Reform through the Francoist legislature the main political forces, including the Catalanist, before its dissolution and held a referendum on but it excluded the Basque Nationalist Party, an it. He legalized all political parties, including the absence that would have long-lasting consequences, Communist Party, organized an electoral coalition since it called for abstention in the subsequent for his own political purposes (the Union of the referendum on the Constitution. Democratic Centre) and called for constituent assembly elections. The opposition, with its many The Preliminary Part of the Constitution of 1978 and divergent interests, was unable to maintain a proclaims that it is “based on the indissoluble united front and ended up bargaining separately unity of the Spanish nation, the common and with the government. In the end, there was no indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes “democratic rupture” with the past, but a negotiated and guarantees the right to autonomy of the process of gradual reforms, during which appeals to nationalities and regions of which it is composed, “consensus” and to “learning from the past” became and the solidarity amongst them all.” Territorial mottos that dominated the political discourse. self-government was to be articulated in the form of “autonomous communities”. Responding to the political longings of Catalonia and the Basque Country was the original purpose, but during the constitutional negotiations new territorial ambitions emerged. One possibility was to grant statutory self-government to Catalonia, the Basque

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Country and Galicia, while allowing some degree Delaying or uncoupling decentralization from the of decentralization for the rest of the provinces. democratization process was never an option, as The ambitions of the most populated region in the regional actors immediately used political liberties country, Andalusia, derailed this option. The final to demand territorial rights. The level of violence solution was “coffee for everyone”—that is, the created by ETA as well as leftist and right-wing generalization of autonomy—as the Minister for the paramilitary groups continued to increase during Regions famously described it. these transitional years. Although the counting differs depending on the sources, around 600 In this way, the differential features of the Catalan persons were killed for political reasons in Spain and Basque regions would be toned down against between 1975 and 1983, well over half of them the background of general devolution, while by Basque terrorism.6 By harassing the army attending to the legitimate territorial claims of and the police, ETA tried to instigate a coup that other regions. The Constitution did not detail the would derail the transition and, allegedly, pave number or names of such territorial units. Instead, the way for a revolutionary process. The new it opened two procedural options for becoming territorial outline devised in the Constitution was an autonomous community: a “fast track” with not popular with the military either, which had higher administrative powers for those regions been entrusted by Franco with the safeguarding with a “historic” status as an autonomous region, of national unity. Sabre rattling was perceptible. such as those that had achieved or planned a Several military conspiracies were dismantled by statute of autonomy during the Second Republic the secret services, but the legal consequences were (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, plus remarkably lenient. Finally, on 23 February 1981, the last-minute addition of Andalusia); and a a detachment of the militarized police headed by “slow track” with an initially lower standard of a well-known conspirator stormed the Parliament self-government for the rest of the provinces. In as a new prime minister was voted in. At the same the end, 17 communities were created, but over time, General Milans del Bosch occupied Valencia, time, the political effect of these initial procedural the third largest city in the country, aided by an distinctions was blurred, as the Constitution armoured division. Lacking the prior support of included additional routes for the devolution of the army’s key commanders, the coup was not well power from the central government to the regions. planned; instead, it relied on the chain effect such a Accordingly, the slow track communities have spectacular raid might have upon the discontented systematically tried to match the competencies military ranks. Many officers waited to see how obtained by the historic ones. events would develop. The King’s speech, broadcast on television that same night, blocked the spread The territorial structuring of the country proved of the rebellion. The main conspirators were tried to be one of the democratic transition’s main and jailed. In spite of this, the political atmosphere destabilizing issues and it has resurfaced once remained disturbed. again as a major challenge in the recent years.

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A collateral result of the failed coup was an regional language policies and, most remarkably, agreement by the Centre and Socialist parties to the fiscal autonomy of the Basque Country and roll back the autonomy process partially by means Navarre, a status which is now sought by Catalonia. of a “Law of Harmonization”, which the Basque and Catalan regional governments successfully However, the seams split when reform of the challenged in the Constitutional Court. In the long- Catalan statute of autonomy was thwarted in term, the devolution process in Spain has depended 2006. In an attempt to displace the main Catalan more on political tempo than on constitutional nationalist party (Democratic Convergence of regulations. Devolution has resulted from random Catalonia) from over two decades of regional office, negotiations between the central government and in 2003, the Catalan branch of the PSOE forged the main Catalan and Basque nationalist parties a tripartite coalition with a minority sovereignist whenever a parliamentary majority was needed party (Republican Left of Catalonia) and the in Madrid. These parties, favoured by an electoral regional ex-communist party. Since 1979, the system that grants them some degree of over- reform and expansion of the old statute had been representation, have traditionally functioned as the main feature of their electoral program. Then hinge parties in the central government. Their in the opposition, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, political cooperation was regularly rewarded by the the leader of the PSOE, welcomed this coalition, central government with a new turn of the screw in declaring that if he won the seat of prime minister the devolution process. in the upcoming national elections he would respect the statute passed by the Even if there is no canonical definition of within a new “plural Spain”. In March 2004, he in Spain, the Spanish regime is a federal one in did win following a swift electoral shift provoked almost everything but name. The autonomous by the Madrid train attacks and the discrediting of communities enjoy a higher degree of self- the conservative government for initially trying to government than the units of many nominally conceal the jihadist connection and its presumed federal systems. An absolute majority of the relation to the highly unpopular invasion of Iraq. national Parliament must approve regional statutes The party formerly holding office in Catalonia, the of autonomy, which, in turn, must comply with DCC, then joined the efforts of the new tripartite constitutional norms. In general, autonomous government to amend the old statute of autonomy, communities have a pragmatic character, with thus initiating such a swelling process of regional no closed assignment of competencies and no inter-party competition, swinging alliances and entitlement to assume residual powers; however, in escalating demands that the central government some areas, they have functional priority over the feared it was running out of control. The competencies of the national government. In this conservative opposition charged it was an attempt sense, the territorial system has been open-ended toward “breaking up Spain.” and prone to both hosting and generating a wide range of asymmetrical features, such as different After a difficult negotiation, the Catalan parliament

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voted on the new statute of autonomy in 2005 and aspirations in respect to fiscal and judicial submitted it to the Constitutional Commission in autonomy.8 However, the blow was political: a court the Spanish parliament, which trimmed its most whose reputation by then was seriously damaged debatable sections. In March 2006, the Parliament had revised a charter that had been successively finally voted on the revised draft of the statute. endorsed in the regional and the national It was opposed only by the conservative People’s parliaments and in a referendum. The decision Party (PP) and the Republican Left of Catalonia, created enormous discontent in Catalonia, with a whose members, though in support of the statute, massive demonstration organized in the objected to its last-minute trimming-down. day after its announcement under a defiant banner On 18 June, Catalonia voted on the statute in a that read, “We are a nation. We decide.” The Catalan referendum which produced a modest turnout with impasse has taken a dramatic turn lately, with an high support. Scarcely one month later, the Peoples unprecedented upsurge of sovereignism and the Party submitted a complaint to the Constitutional election in 2015 of a regional coalition government Court touching on 114 out of 223 sections of the new that has promised a swift, but utterly uncertain, Catalan statute. During the four years the Court accession to independence. took to make its decision, the PP attempted several backstage manoeuvers to alter the composition and With the outbreak of the deepest economic crisis in internal balance of the tribunal. When the decision the history of contemporary Spain, combined with was issued, it declared 14 sections of the statute massive cutbacks in public spending, a cold wind unconstitutional and revised 27 more, pronouncing blows in Madrid nowadays, chilling any further the designation of Catalonia as a “nation” as “having efforts toward devolution. The public administration no juridical consequences.”7 The sections deemed system, with its regional arms, is widely viewed as unconstitutional dealt with the preferential status oversized, overlapping, financially irresponsible and of the (judged as a source of patronage-ridden. In conservative circles especially, inequality); the shielding of the decisions taken it is believed that instead of stabilizing the territorial by the Catalan Council of Statutory Guarantees (a tensions, the autonomies within the system have quasi-judicial body for statutory interpretation); been used by peripheral nationalisms to carry out the creation of an independent regional branch of their own nation-building processes, feeding a the judiciary; the exclusive legislative competence historical narrative of victimization and blurring of the regional government in matters shared with any sense of belonging to a common, centuries-old the state; and the unilateral limitation of Catalonia’s polity among the younger generations. Recent state contribution to state expenses. legislation on municipal and regional finances, and on the content of the educational programs, has fed Although public opinion was divided along political what is perceived as a backlash from the centre. lines, the main national media concluded the decision had left the basic structure of the statute untouched, while limiting its most ambitious

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V. THE DRIVERS OF penetrated and dismantled its organizational structure. Second, in a long-term strategy, the PLURALISM IN THE judiciary enforced new laws that exposed and SPANISH TRANSITION TO outlawed the terrorist organization’s money laundering schemes, social collusion and political DEMOCRACY figureheads. Third, in an international scene that has come to know the devastating effects of Islamic Civil Society terrorism, the phenomenon of Basque terrorism ceased to be seen as a residual conflict pushed by During Spain’s democratic transition, the ethnic “freedom fighters” in a remote corner of fundamental issue regarding civil society was the the Iberian Peninsula. The last and most effective consolidation of its autonomy and vitality vis-à- reason for ETA’s decline was the growing strength of vis the nascent party system. The transition to grassroots peace movements in the Basque Country democracy was to a substantial extent the result since the 1990s, together with the slow evolution of civic mobilization against the dictatorship, of the radical nationalistic world—with Northern which then became institutionalized in the Ireland providing a model—towards institutional political parties and the constitutional system. strategies. After the consolidation of democracy, the political character of citizens’ movements diminished with The Catalan experience has been very different. associational energies redirected towards other Catalan civil society has always been engaged in types of issues, such as the social economy and the defence of the cultural and linguistic patrimony development aid. Thirty years later, however, civil of the region. Sport and cultural associations are society again played a fundamental role in causes traditional bearers of Catalan collective pride. The such as the ending of terrorism in the Basque most successful and internationally known example Country, the Catalan sovereignist process, the is the Barcelona Football Club, which is “more than movement for historical memory, and the protest a club” according to its motto. Nationalistic violence against corruption and the deterioration of the was fleeting in the 1980s and, until very recently, democratic system. In this sense, Spanish civil independence was a marginal political option. The society has very often forged ahead of the political derailment of the reform of the statute of autonomy system and stood against its inertial tendencies. changed all of this. The National Day of Catalonia, a traditional civic celebration in Barcelona every The upsurge of the Catalan independence 11 September, for years usually gathered only movement overlapped with the end of Basque political authorities and some small nationalistic terrorism. ETA announced a definitive ceasefire groups. In 2012, it turned into a massive rally in in 2011, with its last lethal attack one year before. favour of independence due to the efforts of two The reasons for ETA’s decline are multiple. First, cultural and grassroots nationalist organizations, the Spanish police repeatedly and ever more swiftly Òmnium Cultural and the so-called Catalan

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 13 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

National Assembly. This political turn encouraged peddling, kickback schemes, and illegal donations the new regional premier, Artur Mas, to support related to urban zoning and the subcontracting of the movement openly and take the lead, with the public works. Some of the main political parties, regional broadcasting system and the administrative regionally and nationwide, have been heavily apparatus thrown behind the cause. From this implicated in such practices. Even two member moment on, the Catalan government co-opted the of the Royal Family have ended up in the dock, mobilization for independence, following the paths charged with illegal collection of commissions. of Québec and Scotland by attempting to organize a referendum on self-determination. Within Spain, the current pervasive feeling that the political system is dysfunctional, the political The economic and financial meltdown of 2008 had class parasitical and institutional checks ineffective other notable effects on Spanish politics and the therefore comes as no surprise. The “indignado” social mobilization of civil society. The absolute movement that occupied downtown Madrid in May majority won by conservative Prime Minister 2011 was the first sign of growing political malaise. in 2011 allowed him to apply a Within three years this diffuse social movement tough program of economic reforms and social against inequality and corruption grew into an anti- spending cutbacks, as demanded by the European establishment political party, Podemos, which its Union and international creditors. The downsizing opponents accuse of being populist. Leaving aside of the Spanish economy, shrinking social and this ideological squabble, the success of Podemos welfare rights, the curtailment of collective labour in the 2015 elections has made it the third force in agreements with a consequent drop in salaries, Parliament and given it control of two main cities. and the staggering rise of unemployment and This result can be seen as a sign of generational evictions coincided with the uncovering of massive change in Spanish politics but it also signals a cases of political corruption at all territorial and deeper transformation. The traditional socialist/ administrative levels. In 2013, according to the conservative bipolar system, with the mainstream General Council of the Judiciary, over 1,600 cases Basque and Catalan nationalist parties acting as of corruption with political undertones were being a hinge for the formation of political majorities in investigated in Spain, which suggests the endemic Madrid, seems to have come to an end. Not only nature of the problem.9 The position of Spain has the political spectrum become wider and more in the Corruption Perception Index produced varied, the sovereignist drift of the Catalan pole of by Transparency International, which ranks the old system has removed it from country-wide perceptions of countries from less to more corrupt, alliances. These shifts will undoubtedly affect the fell from 28 in 2008 to 40 in 2013.10 The range way territorial processes are addressed in the future. of the scams exposed is very wide, but many are perceptibly related to the speculative bubble created by 20 years of unremitting increases in property prices. This bulge fuelled all types of influence

14 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

Religion term or its institutional consequences. In 1979, the Spanish government, then headed by centrist Together with the territorial question, the public Premier Adolfo Suárez, signed a new Concordat with status of the Catholic Church has been a matter the Vatican.12 In it, the Catholic Church accepted of discord in the history of modern Spain. The the need to become financially self-sufficient within Republican Constitution of 1931 declared the a foreseeable future. In 1987, the socialist cabinet separation of state and church, put an end to of Felipe González concluded another agreement public subsidies to the Church, unified the school that provisionally assigned the Church a percentage system, regulated or dissolved the religious of the personal income tax of Catholic taxpayers orders and limited the right of the clergy to teach within Spain, with the proviso that the state would without proper academic qualifications. The public supplement this amount if it did not reach the school—a matter of concern for social and political expected total sum. In 2007, Premier Rodríguez reformers since the late 19th century—became the Zapatero increased the percentage and made the tax cultural bastion of the Republic, with local priests permanent, while suppressing the state supplement. and schoolteachers replicating the rivalry between Nonetheless, the Church still indirectly receives the Catholic Church and the state as agents of an additional and substantial amount of public socialization. In a milieu marked by social unrest money through funds for Catholic schools, religion and deep political divisions, anti-clericalism was a teachers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) catalyst for the conflicts that eventually led to the and the restoration of artistic patrimony.13 Civil War, with priests and teachers among the most victimized groups during it. While being historically and culturally hegemonic, Catholicism is not the only confession in an With the Constitution of 1977, Spain again ceased increasingly multi-ethnic Spain. After a long period to be a confessional state. Article 16.3 of the of resistance, Franco’s regime accepted a limited Constitution declares that, “There shall be no state degree of religious freedom, but only during the religion.” However, that same section goes on to democratic period has this issue been addressed state that, “The public authorities shall take the in a more comprehensive way. The status of non- religious beliefs of Spanish society into account Catholic denominations is specifically regulated by and shall consequently maintain appropriate a law on religious liberty.14 This law opened the way cooperation relations with the Catholic Church for cooperation agreements between the state and and the other confessions.”11 With Spain’s history those religions recognized as being “significantly of violent religious conflict in mind, the purpose of rooted” in Spanish society. So far, this status has this clause was to achieve a new compromise. The been granted to seven denominations, including current regime of religious governance is sometimes Muslims, Jews and Evangelicals in 1992, Mormons branded “non-confessional” to distinguish it from in 2003, Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2006, Buddhists a purely secular model, but there is no general in 2007 and the Orthodox Church in 2010. Of agreement on the constitutional meaning of this these, only the first three groups have signed

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 15 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

collaboration accords with the state, although the be guaranteed by the state through educational development of these agreements has not been subsidies to Catholic schools. The Concordat of completed. Since Spanish law compels the different 1979 similarly established that public education branches of every denomination to federate in order should be “respectful” of Christian values and that to negotiate with the state, occasional frictions the teaching of Catholic religion should be made have arisen concerning the representativeness of available in public schools. Catholic instructors the resulting organizations. The legal standing of are thus paid by the state, but their appointment such agreements is, in any case, very different from or dismissal is decided exclusively by the bishops. those signed with the Vatican. The Concordats The Church has also opposed the introduction of have the status of international treaties while the “civic education” in the curriculum, which it judges agreements with the Muslim, Jewish and Protestant as an attempt by the state to snatch the moral communities are ordinary laws issued by the upbringing of the children from their parents. The Spanish parliament. education law passed by the conservative cabinet of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy in 2013 has not Education and Language only suppressed civic education and entrenched the presence of religion in the syllabus, it has also The organization of education is closely related to granted academic value to the marks obtained in the religious issue. In fact, education has become the subject of religion.15 Given the wide contestation a testing ground for the political interaction of that this decision provoked, it seemed unlikely that the Catholic Church with the state. Since 1985 the the law would survive a change of government. Spanish educational system has been organized in two big sectors: a public school system and a The use of vernaculars as languages of instruction network of private schools subsidized by the state. in education has also been a recurrent source of The latter is overwhelmingly composed of Catholic political disagreement, particularly in Catalonia. schools, which nowadays comprise about one third Catalan, Galician and the Basque languages have of the primary education in the country. Loyal to a co-official status in their respective regions. its historical tradition, the Church operates as a This is also true for the variety of Catalan spoken powerful lobby that mobilizes a web of associations, in Valencia and the Balearic Islands, but only in media and political connections to pressure the Catalonia is the vernacular exclusively used for government whenever it feels its material or language immersion. That the Catalan language ideological interests are threatened. Catholic groups is not a “problem” but a tool for integration is have thus systematically opposed the legal definition a truism among the nationalist circles, which of education as a “public service”. They have view any complaint in this field as mere political instead framed education as a “right” connected to instrumentalization. In contrast to Ireland or religious liberty and more concretely as the right Scotland, and to a lesser extent than in the Basque of parents to procure a Catholic education for their Country, language has traditionally been at the core children. Accordingly, they believe this right should of Catalonian nationalist ideology. Catalan entered a

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situation of diglossia—a distinction between “high” political initiatives like “truth commissions”, and “low” usage—during Franco’s dictatorship. normative categories like “transitional justice” and Although Catalan was the language of the upper legal principles like the “universal jurisdiction” for classes and Spanish was the language of immigrants crimes against humanity. The beneficiaries of these from the south, in this period Catalan was banned kinds of actions and policies have been the victims from schools, nor was it used by the administration of past abuses, their relatives and descendants, or the media. The transition to democracy became but the ultimate field of contestation is the moral an occasion to “normalize” the status of Catalan as conscience of the societies in which such violations the region’s native tongue. Still, Spanish is the first were committed. A standard to evaluate the language of almost 60% of the region’s inhabitants. dignity of a society is the way in which it treats its Throughout the democratic period, the Catalan victims. This is how the demands for justice and government has systematically rejected the creation symbolic restoration have entered the dimension of of two language-differentiated school systems. With “historical memory.” the recent sovereignist upsurge, the imposition of Catalan unilingualism has found its way onto Unlike other transitional experiences in the world, the nationalist agenda, creating uneasiness within in Spain there was no “truth commission” after the the governing coalition as well as Catalan public end of the Franco dictatorship, no reports on its opinion.16 In addition, several decisions of the crimes, and no symbolic reparations were paid to Supreme Court have endorsed the right of Spanish- its victims. The Amnesty Law passed by the Spanish speaking children to receive at least 25% of their parliament at the beginning of the transition tried to education in their mother language, if their parents cancel—from both legal and political perspectives— so decide. In any case, the political and cultural the consequences of the Civil War and the hegemony surrounding the issue of unilingualism subsequent dictatorship.17 This law protected not is so strong that it is difficult to know if the lack of only those who had clandestinely resisted Franco demand for it is real or merely pre-empted. or committed terrorist acts but also those officials of the regime responsible for violations of human Memory rights.

The politics of memory has erupted with force in Unlike the contested laws of amnesty in Chile the international political arena. Its consequences and Argentina, in Spain, the cancellation of penal can be felt across a broad spectrum of issues, from responsibility for past crimes was met with a international law to public ethics. Since the figure considerable degree of social consensus. No one of the desaparecido (missing person) became took responsibility for the crimes of the past, and no internationally known in the 1970s through the one demanded it either. Economic compensation military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, a for those who had suffered imprisonment or some new repertoire of public tools exist to address type of reprisal under Franco was delivered with the reparation of human rights abuses, including considerable discretion. The fear of a political

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 17 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

entanglement prevented the inclusion of a transition to democracy was legitimized prevented restorative or therapeutic process for the victims the reconciliation of Spanish society with its in the democratization process. The generational own past. Rather than an amnesty, the Spanish gap between those who fought in the Civil War and transition is now often viewed as a “pact of oblivion” the political actors who guided the transition to or as a “silencing of the past.” The originators democracy also affected the outcome. Opposition of the amnesty—conservative and progressive— groups were eager to consolidate the institutional continue to stand side by side in efforts to preserve changes that would permit their accession to the established template and resist revisions of power. They were also aware of the social support the transition narrative, but the new generations that Franco’s regime had developed over time. In have lost the fears that menaced their forebears this context, achieving vindication and justice for and thus have developed an interest in those victims of the past were seen as less urgent than issues which their parents did not wish to revive. strengthening a political alternative for the future. It is the grandchildren of the victims, rather than Since both sides in the Civil War were responsible their children, who are now seeking vindication for committing atrocities, they concluded nothing for their memory and dignity. This new generation would be won by digging up the past other than has opened a public debate that can no longer be bringing old family demons to life. The alleged postponed. The proclamation of a Law of Historical symmetry of guilt—that is, the proposition that all Memory in 2007 has been the most conspicuous Spaniards were equally responsible for the outbreak result of this process.18 This law contains different of the war—helped reformist elements in Franco’s types of measures: it recognizes the individual regime move toward democracy. The proposition “right to memory;” it denies the legitimacy of the also enabled the opposition to pursue reform, Francoist courts that violated fundamental rights, rather than the break up of the institutions of the therefore repealing the validity of their norms and dictatorship. However, the conflation of amnesty resolutions; it offers economic support for those with amnesia produced a political transition excluded from former compensation programs; and without the kind of transitional justice that later it sets a series of rules both for the exhumation of proliferated all over the world. There was no healing mass graves and for the eradication of every form of of the historical wounds of the Civil War and the apology of the Civil War and the dictatorship from dictatorship; instead the past was at once closed and the public space. As expected, the movement for redeemed by throwing it into oblivion. the recovery of Spain’s historical memory has met strong opposition from conservative sectors. After The consequences of this decision have become the 2011 election, the cabinet of Prime Minister less and less tenable. The circumstances that Rajoy did not revoke the Law of Historical Memory, conditioned the transition—mainly the fear of an but it has been left without financing. One of the authoritarian backlash—are nonexistent today. main ideological drivers of some emerging political The stakes are therefore much higher now that the parties is criticism of the new narrative of the politics of memory have erupted in the political democratic transition. arena. The consensual urge with which the

18 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

As in the case of the victims of the Civil War and the cheap labour from less wealthy areas of the country. dictatorship, the reconstruction of the democratic This privileged role helps to explain the reticence memory of Spanish society is once more on the of some regions to accept any sort of federal table in the Basque region, where the debate over asymmetry that might bestow a further economic the recognition due to the victims of terrorism or fiscal advantage on Catalonia. In response, has settled. Acknowledging the harm done is a Catalonia criticizes the low economic performance prerequisite for any pardon of imprisoned terrorists and endemic dependence of Spain’s poorer regions or offer of a Church-authored penitentiary benefit, on state subsidies. Unfortunately, there is no easy as well as an integral part of the peace process. exit from the circular reasoning of nationalistic and populist rhetoric. Some political groups have proposed a referendum on self-determination as a possible resolution to the current impasse and as a VI. SPAIN’S TRANSITION TO deterrent for lukewarm sovereignists, but to have any effect a referendum must present an attractive DEMOCRACY: EMERGING proposal. Opponents of Catalan self-determination LESSONS FOR PLURALISM warn of the potential domino effect on other regions and the risk of Spain’s “Balkanization”. In any Of all the challenges confronting the Spanish case, solving the Catalan puzzle will require some transition to democracy, the territorial articulation kind of constitutional reform as well as popular of the country has proven the most difficult consultation. and longstanding. As the miscarried reform of the Catalan statute of autonomy has shown, Constitutional reform that recognizes a deeper level decentralization remains an unresolved issue. If of differentiation between “historic” communities not for the decision of the Constitutional Court, and the other regions as well as a more generous the new statute might well have opened a new financial deal for Catalonia might present an political cycle for the next generation. Instead, the alternative escape route from the present standoff. fact remains that there are two regional societies For many, such as former Prime Minister Rodríguez in Spain—Catalonia and the Basque Country—with Zapatero, this option would require going back to their own political centre of gravity that perceive square one of the Catalan statute to reformulate themselves as “nations”. Aside from linguistic its original terms. For others, the solution is to differences, the political ambitions fuelled by this reorganize Spain as a “multinational state”. This perception cannot be explained without reference option would not deter the pro-independence to the economic standing and urban character forces, but it would absorb a sizeable part of of both regions. Despite a deficit of political the Catalan constituency that does not wish to recognition, both regions enjoyed a privileged role follow the independence path. A “multinational” in the industrialization of Spain, benefitting from Spain is not a readily acceptable option; however, an internally protected market and an influx of for the rest of the country, which tends to see

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 19 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

Spain as a political nation, not as a patchwork of “Multiculturalism” became a buzzword in the 1990s, ethnicities. The multinational option will certainly when the first large wave of foreign immigration not be accepted if it entails recognizing different arrived in the country, principally from other parts sovereign constituent powers for each “nationality”. of Europe, North Africa and Latin America. The The Castilian-speaking regions are far from handicaps posed by some of the compromises homogeneous, with some—such as Andalusia or made during the transition—such as the incomplete the Canary Islands—also making ample use of secularization of some public institutions—then the “national” and “differential” rhetoric. Local became obvious. Apart from some modules for interests are deeply entrenched in the political and compensatory education in primary school, no institutional history of the country. The problem is specific pluralist policies were devised for the thus not self-government as such, but which type integration of immigrants. The possibility of and for what purpose. discrimination was a source of concern, but no legislation or affirmative action programs were Despite its lack of popularity in the rest of the encouraged. The labour market, the legal system country, all political parties in the Spanish and the welfare state—mainly public health and Parliament voted for the new Catalan statute, except educational services, both provided on a regional for the two parties more clearly identified with basis—were deemed sufficient. In the regions with Spanish and Catalan nationalism—the People’s vernacular and militant identities, the integration of Party and the Republican Left of Catalonia—for foreign immigrants became an additional challenge. which the statute offered either too much or This challenge was particularly felt in Catalonia, too little. Reluctance to embrace pluralism is where, together with Madrid and the Mediterranean not exclusive to the “majority” nationality. The regions, the largest percentage of the immigrant “minority” nationalities have also been torn apart population resides. The “emergent nationalism” of by rigid definitions of their collective identity. Catalonia has therefore struggled simultaneously Nationalism bitterly divided Basque society in the to integrate newcomers into the local society while 1970s and 1980s, and it has now separated Catalan also attempting to loosen the region’s links with society into two unstable and fluctuating opinion the central government. These challenges apply blocs whose preferences are difficult to process two very different normative frames: internal politically. One problem seems to lie with the integration versus external autonomy. The dynamics of nationalist politics in general, not just inevitable political tensions are reflected in the with the collective self-perception of the different legal battles that citizens and governments (both regions. The “nation” is a powerful concept when central and regional) have waged in the courts used to influence mindsets, but of little help and during the last decades for individual rights and flexibility when it comes to defining it in a juridical administrative competence. This kind of political and political frame. This challenge is particularly contention is to some extent a usual characteristic evident in complex and heterogeneous societies of federal states, but a substantial part of Spain’s such as Spain. recent experiences also derives from the dynamics

20 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

of nationalist politics. Even if the normative frame without legitimate court authority, particularly of nationalism is not cast in iron, the principles of when the country’s territorial balance depends individual and collective self-determination display upon these adjudicative functions. The preservation conflicting interfaces that are not resolved by the of judicial independence therefore emerges as an grand narratives of “nation building”, “sovereignty”, obvious but nonetheless relevant lesson from the “emancipation” and the like. Nationalist identity Spanish experience for pluralism. A legitimized politics cannot be reconciled with pluralist system of neutral rules and independent arbiters is principles in the absence of a deep-rooted political crucial to appease possible perceptions of regional culture that accepts and promotes multiple disloyalty or majoritarian hegemony. The role of affiliations. intellectuals, academics and the media as creators of public opinion cannot be disregarded in this matter. To a certain extent, Spain’s institutional system has Collective identity is to a large extent a narrative helped channel nationalistic politics in pluralist- process whose normative underpinnings need to be friendly ways, but its overall success has been publicly examined and evaluated. eroded with the years. The electorate has learned to cast different votes in the local, regional and For many Spaniards, the secularization of the national elections, thus indirectly fostering a state is pending since the transition to democracy. territorial system of political checks and balances, According to this view, the privileges granted to but regional self-government did not stem the the Catholic Church by the current Concordat mounting terrorist campaign launched by ETA in contradict the principles of equal respect, separation the 1970s—although the situation could have been between political power and religious communities, considerably worse without it. In spite of some and the religious neutrality of the state that obvious abuses by the police forces during the early should inspire a pluralist democracy.19 The formal years of the transition, many political leaders in banner of religious liberty conceals the fact that, the Basque region adopted an equidistant stance in many aspects, being a Catholic continues to for too long, describing nationalist violence as the be significantly easier in Spain than holding a undesirable result of an arcane conflict between the different confession or none. This is not merely a “state” and the “Basque people”. In Catalonia, court matter of cultural hegemony or social tradition but decisions concerning linguistic rights have been of state intervention as well. The public status of strategically accepted or ignored by the Catalan the Catholic Church and the political debate over government depending on vested interests. And its status reflect the internal cleavages of Spanish at the national level some political groups have society and the diminishing weight of organized manifestly attempted to stack the Constitutional religion within a general context of secularization. Court for partisan purposes, particularly during Over three-quarters of Spaniards declare themselves the reform of the Catalan statute, a strategy that Catholic believers, although they do not necessarily proved fatal to the reform. A political system of such share the patrimonial attitude of the high ranks complexity as the Spanish system cannot operate of the Church towards the state or their social

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 21 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

morals.20 Although Catholicism is still a prevailing perspective than one-sided demands for reparation cultural force in the country, it has lost much of its or the political expediency of strategic forgetfulness. former clout as a political lever. The mobilization of The result of this deficit of memory has been the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state—combined the confusing impression that Spain’s current with the inertia of its historical hegemony— democratic institutions owe their political pedigree compensates for this diminished social grip and as much to the “pacifying” effects of late Francoism reveals the deep-rooted reliance of the Spanish as to the efforts of opponents to it. The conventional Church on public resources and state cooperation. narrative thus portrays the Spanish democracy as a Attempts to placate Church belligerence against primeval act, divorced from history, rather than as groundbreaking initiatives, such as gay marriage the restoration of an interrupted political tradition. or abortion, with fiscal gifts have been in vain, Memory, not forgetfulness, enhances the moral and as socialist Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero political quality of collective life. To have sympathy experienced firsthand. From a democratic for victims, to restore their dignity symbolically and perspective, outreach to the majority religious to place them in our memory, these are tasks whose sectors of society with a sensibility for these new rightful resolution determines the civic health and civil rights would have made more sense. vitality of a democratic and pluralist community that is able to balance competing aspirations. Finally, the tacit agreement to bury the past during the transition to democracy has not been without consequences. The amnesia of the Spanish democracy has deprived it of a solid reference point. Historical memory is not about criminal responsibility. It makes no sense to demand this type of accountability for crimes that were committed over half a century ago. The criminals and their victims are long dead. Acknowledging memory nevertheless has therapeutic, political and didactic qualities. The collective identity of a society and the meaning attributed to its institutions are ingrained in the perception of historical time. Narratives of collective identity provide a reference for the individuals with the past of their country. A connection with the past is the main way in which citizens come to accept responsibility for the actions of former generations. Spanish society has yet to deal with the long-term consequences of the Civil War and the dictatorship from a fuller

22 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

NOTES 6 Mariano Sánchez Soler (2010), La transición sangrienta: Una historia violenta del proceso 1 Transitional justice is commonly defined as “a set democrático en España, 1975–83 (Madrid: of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented Península). in order to redress legacies of human rights abuses. 7 Such measures include criminal prosecutions, truth The complete text of the Court decision can be commissions, reparations programs, and various found at http://www.tribunalconstitucional. kinds of institutional reforms.” International es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia. Centre for Transitional Justice, https://www.ictj. aspx?cod=16119. org/about/transitional-justice. 8 See, for instance, the reaction of journals such as: 2 Samuel P. Huntington (1991), The Third Wave: El País (http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/06/28/ Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century actualidad/1277713023_850215.html); La (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press). Vanguardia (http://www.lavanguardia.com/ politica/20100628/53954687453/el-tc-avala-la- 3 In general terms, such differentiation tried mayor-parte-del-estatut-pero-recorta-14-articulos. to distinguish those non-democratic systems html); ABC (http://www.abc.es/20100628/ which permit a limited degree of institutional espana/estatut-sentencia-201006281915. representation in the form of corporate or html); and (http://www.elmundo.es/ bureaucratic bodies, from those which depend elmundo/2010/06/28/barcelona/1277745460. on a monopoly of power and rely on intense html). mass mobilization. See Juan Linz (1964), “An 9  Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Cleavages, Poder Judicial de España, Estudio sobre las Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to necesidades de los juzgados y tribunales en Comparative Political Sociology, edited by E. casos de especial complejidad, http://www. Allardt and Y. Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/En- Society), 291–341. Portada/Estudio-sobre-las-necesidades-de-los- juzgados-y-tribunales-en-casos-de-especial- 4 See Amando de Miguel (1975), Sociología del complejidad. franquismo (Barcelona: Euros) and Antonio López 10 Pina and Eduardo L. Aranguren (1976), La cultura Transparency International (2013), Corruption política de la España de Franco (Madrid: Taurus). Perceptions Index, 2013, http://www. transparency.org/cpi2013/results. 5 The decisions taken at the 26th Congress of the 11 PSOE can be found in Andrés de Blas Guerrero The Spanish Constitution, passed by the (1978), “El problema nacional-regional español in Plenary Meetings of the en los programas del PSOE y PCE,” Revista de Congress of Deputies and the Senate, held on Estudios Políticos 4 (julio–agosto): 155–70. 31 October 1978. Section I: Fundamental Rights

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 23 The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

and Public Liberties, Article 16.3, http://www. 18 Ley de la Memoria Histórica (Ley 52/2007 de tribunalconstitucional.es/es/constitucion/ 26 de diciembre), http://leymemoria.mjusticia. Paginas/ConstitucionIngles.aspx. gob.es/cs/Satellite/LeyMemoria/es/memoria- historica-522007. 12 Curia Romana, Secretaría de Estado (1979), Conventiones Inter Apostolicam Sedem et 19 On the normative base of political secularism, Nationem Hispanam, http://www.vatican. see Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (2011), va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/ Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Harvard, documents/rc_seg-st_19790103_santa-sede- MA: Harvard University Press). spagna_sp.html. 20 Fundación BBVA (2010), European Mindset, 13 Informe de la Fundación 1º de Mayo (2012), Fundación BBVA, Departamento de Estudios Finaciación de la Iglesia Católica y Gasto Público, Sociales y Opinión Pública. April.

14 Ley Orgánica 7/1980, de 5 de julio, de Libertad Religiosa, https://www.boe.es/boe/ dias/1980/07/24/pdfs/A16804-16805.pdf.

15 Ley Orgánica 8/2013, de 9 de diciembre, para la mejora de la calidad educativa (LOMCE), https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt. php?id=BOE-A-2013-12886.

16 This debate was opened in 2015, when a group of nationalist intellectuals and academics (called Koiné) made public a manifesto in favour of unilingualism as the only option for a “true” normalization of Catalan in an independent Catalonia, http://www.ara.cat/2016/03/29/ Manifest_Koine.pdf?hash=fa6b3faff6dcdd06e79b da60116563e14a26b7dc.

17 Ley 46/1977, de 15 de octubre, de Amnistía, http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id= BOE-A-1977-249.

24 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later

CASE AUTHOR

Francisco Colom is a research professor at the Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). His work deals with the normative relations between culture, political identity and social change; he is a member of the Research Networking Program RECODE (Responding to Complex Diversity in Europe and Canada).

Acknowledgements The Centre gratefully acknowledges the collaboration of Will Kymlicka, of Queen’s University, and the other members of our international research advisory group. The Change Case Series was developed with generous support from the International Development Research Centre.

This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.

The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of IDRC or its Board of Governors.

This analysis was commissioned by the Global Centre for Pluralism to generate global dialogue about the drivers of pluralism. The specific views expressed herein are those of the author.

The Global Centre for Pluralism is an applied knowledge organization that facilitates dialogue, analysis and exchange about the building blocks of inclusive societies in which human differences are respected. Based in Ottawa, the Centre is inspired by Canadian pluralism, which demonstrates what governments and citizens can achieve when human diversity is valued and recognized as a foundation for shared citizenship. Please visit us at pluralism.ca

Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 25