Review Essay

Materialism, Emergence, and Life: TheInteraction of Gene,Organism, and Environment *

BRETT CLARK (Departmentof Sociology,University ofOregon)

Throughcritically engaging the workof natural scientists, social scientists candevelop a richerunderstanding of the naturalworld (including human life), leadingto a greatercomprehension of the complexset ofinteractions whichmakes life anything butmechanistic. Given the steady owof newsreports on genetic cloning, genetically modiŽed organisms, and patentson genes, socialscientists have an obligationto grapple with the debatescurrently taking place within the naturalsciences. Through thisencounter, sociologists can enhance ourunderstanding of natural andsocial relationships. Lewontin’ s ItAin’ t Necessarily So ,acollectionof essays originallypublished in The New YorkReview ofBooks , provides a searingcritique of scientiŽ c knowledgewhile tackling issues as diverse as heredity,intelligence, cloning,gender, evolution, and genetic engineering. Lewontin’s essays arelucid and insightful, addressing the paramount debatesof our time. Both Lewontin’ s The Triple Helix and Oyama’s The Ontogenyof Information critiquedominant conceptions within evolutionary, biological,and developmental sciences,while illustrating the importanceof

* The main worksunder considerationin thisreview essay are It Ain’t Necessarily So: TheDream of theHuman Genome and Other Illusions , 2nd edition,by Richard Lewontin(New York:New York ReviewBooks, 2001); TheTriple Helix: Gene,Organism, and Environment , byRichard Lewontin(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,2000); and, TheOntogeny of Information: DevelopmentalSystems andEvolution , 2nd edition,by Susan Oyama (Durham: Duke University Press,2000). I wishto express my gratitudeto John Bellamy Foster,Jason W. Moore,Thembisa Waetjen, and Denis Wall for their helpfulcomments andsuggestions.

Critical Sociology, Volume 28,issue 3 also availableonline Ó 2002Koninklijke Brill NV,Leiden www.brill.nl 418 Clark ² amaterialistand dialectical approach toward understanding the internal andexternal processesoperating throughout nature. Given thathumans areliving creatures,dependent upon and part of nature, this discussion speaks directlyto us. Sociologymoves beyondthe ideologyof bourgeois society, which places the individual“ ontologicallyprior to the social,”by understanding society asmore than “ the outcomeof the individualactivities of individual humanbeings” (Levins andLewontin 1985:1). Nevertheless, sociologyoften neglects toaccount for the internalstructure of individuals (as organisms) aswell asthe external environment(nature) in analyses ofsociety, life, andhistory. Part of this is due to an aversionto positivism, but it is alsolinked toa retreatfrom materialism in the socialsciences. While teleologicaland mechanistic explanations must be avoided, a materialist conceptionof nature, which is bothontological and epistemological, allows foran approachthat is realist and relational (Foster 2000:6-7). The social isdependent upon the physical-biologicalworld. In fact,society is part of natureand it emerges inrelationto the latter.At the same time,each realm has an independentexistence, whiletransforming the otherthrough their interactions.The developmentof thisrelationship is notpredetermined; the futureremains contingent. With thismaterialist approach, we may reject the breachbetween the naturaland social sciences (Bhaskar 1998).Each realmmust be studiedon its own terms as well asin relationto the other. Socialscientists, with the exceptionof sociobiologistssuch as EdwardO. Wilson,generally, standagainst biological and genetic determinism.The inuences ofsocial structures on life chances andpersonal development areasserted in opposition to the argumentsrepresented in The Bell Curve (Fischeret al.1996). Inequalities are grounded in social-historical dynamics, ratherthan in inherent characteristics.Such a critiquedemonstrates the strengthsof sociological inquiry. Unfortunately, the scientiŽc studies themselves arenot often subjected to close scrutiny when refutingtheir claims.Fortunately, scientists such as Stephen Jay Gould(1981), with hisdevastating critique of the inheritanceof intelligence andits basis for socialranking, and Lewontin, in his dismantling of biological explanations forwhy humansact as they do(Lewontin et al.1984), investigate the speculation,fabricated data, and ideological agenda behind the proponentsof genetic andbiological explanations for social hierarchies and organization.At the same time,Gould and Lewontin make the natural sciences,especially topicssuch as genes andevolution, accessible to the general population,allowing the publicto be informed when encountering scientiŽc claims. ReviewEssay 419 ² Materialism andCoevolution In The Triple Helix ,Lewontininsists that the relationshipsand interactions betweengene, organism,and environment are central to understanding evolution.In the past,these realmshave been separated,allowing for ourknowledge of naturalselection to advance.But in order to continue to move forwardthe relationships,between the internaland external processes oflife, must be conceptualized as a whole.Failing to do so neglects the complexityof biologicalprocesses and the dynamiccharacter of life. Scienceuses metaphors, such as Descartes’ s characterizationof the worldas machine, to help explain the workingsof the world,especially thosephenomena that are not directly seen orexperienced by humans (Triple Helix ,p.3). While metaphorsare useful, too often science conŽnes researchto such efforts that only reinforceand reify the principlesof the metaphor,overlooking information that lies outsideof the metaphorical approximation(ibid: 4). Developmental biologyis caught within the blindersof metaphor. “ Development isa metaphor,”Lewontin notes, “thatcarries with it a priorcommitment to the natureof the process. Development : : : isliterally an unfoldingor unrolling of something that isalready present and in some way preformed” (ibid: 5). To illustrate thispoint, in the eighteenth centurypreformationists contended that the adultorganism was already formed and contained in the spermand that developmentwas the continuationof thisbeing into life. In opposition,the theoryof epigenesis proposed that an organismwas not “ formedin the fertilizedegg, but that it arose as a consequenceof profound changes in shapeand form during the courseof embryogenesis” (ibid: 5-6). While the pictureof a miniaturehuman organism in a spermnow seems ridiculous, developmental biologyhas embraceda similarposition, contending that there isalready a Žnishedblueprint of the organism,along with all the necessary andrequired information to specify it, within the genes. Development assumesthat the organism‘ developsitself.’ The environment becomesbackground, or simply a basis,for enabling the genes to‘ express themselves.’Living beings become ‘ only outwardmanifestations’ of internal forces.Developmental biologistsfocus on the similaritiesbetween individual organismswhile ignoring or dismissing variation. Common characteristics arereduced to mechanistic operations of genes. Changeis predetermined, followingan ascribedpath until death. Priorto WorldWar II, biological determinism ascribed social, cognitive, andpsychological differences to genes. Butwith the riseof Hitler and the applicationof theories of race towards extermination, environmental theoriesof variation became more popular as a wayof countering biologicalreductionism. Despite this, however, scientists (both social and natural)failed to provide a comprehensiveexplanation for social and 420 Clark ² biologicalchanges. So now, along with a shiftto the rightin politics, genetic explanationsreign. Working from within assumptions, developmental biologistsee the developmentof an individualas an unfoldingof the genetic blueprint,while any variationthat exists betweenindividuals is explained asthe resultof variations within the programspeciŽ ed by the genes (ibid:17). Thus, differences in social position, school performances, sexual preferences,and intelligence areseen asthe consequencesof genetic variationsbetween individuals, rather than being consequences of factors outsidethe model. Lewontincharacterizes this type ofreasoning and science asbad biology.While notingthat it is true that “ lionslook different from lambs andchimps from humans because they have differentgenes,” Lewontin asserts,“ ifwewantto knowwhy twolambs are different from one another, adescriptionof their genetic differencesis insufŽcient and for some of their characteristicsmay even beirrelevant”(ibid: 17). Arguing that an organism doesnot compute itself from genes, Lewontinexplains “thatthe ontogeny ofan organismis the consequenceof a uniqueinteraction between the genes itcarries, the temporalsequence of external environmentsthrough whichit passesduring its life, and random events ofmolecular interactions withinindividual cells. Itis these interactionsthat must be incorporated intoany properaccount of howan organismis formed” (ibid: 17-18). The organismbecomes a siteof interaction between the environment andgenes. SpeciŽc historicalconditions in uence the conditionsof an organism’s emergence. Adialecticalin uence isconstantly associated withchanges throughoutlife. Lewontin notes that while “ internally Žxed successivedevelopmental stages area commonfeature of development, they arenot universal” (ibid: 18). For example, the morphologyof the tropicalvine Syngonium variesdepending upon incidences of light conditions.The shapesof its leaves, aswell astheir spacing, changes alongwith the environmental conditions.Furthermore, taking a plant such as Achillea millefolium andcutting it into separate pieces can show the importanceof environmental inuences onthe physicalmanifestations ofan organism.The pieces will each growinto new individual plants, regardlessof whether each pieceis placed in different environments, includingdifferences in elevation. Theplant growth, shape, and size drasticallyvary betweenenvironmental conditions(ibid: 20). While the plantswere genetically identical,there was“ nocorrelation of growth patternfrom one environment to another” (ibid: 22). What suchstudies illustrateis that “ the organismis notspeciŽ ed by its genes, butis aunique outcomeof an ontogeneticprocess that is contingent on the sequenceof environmentsin which it occurs” (ibid: 20). ReviewEssay 421 ²

With regardto the increasingawareness of an environmental crisisand the importanceof the environmentto human society, Barry Commoner onceremarked that “ [t]heenvironment has justbeen rediscoveredby the peoplewho live init” (1971:5). In asimilarfashion, Lewontin ischallenging the naturalsciences, including evolutionary and genetic sciences,to reconceptualize the importanceand role of the environment inthe emergence oforganisms. The same objectiveis being undertaken withinsociology, speciŽ cally environmental sociology. Darwintook an importantstep in evolutionary science “byalienating the insidefrom the outside:by makingan absoluteseparation between the internalprocesses that generate the organismand the external processes, the environment,in which the organismmust operate” ( Triple Helix , p. 42). He hadto make thisdistinction to free science fromthe “obscurantist holismthat merged the organicand the inorganicinto an unanalyzable whole”(ibid: 47). As a result,Darwin was capable of recognizing that variationis an internalprocess, causally independent of nature. From this point,diversity was seen asa consequenceof diverse environments “ to whichdifferent species have becomeŽ ttedby natural selection. The process ofthat Ž ttingis the processof adaptation”(ibid:41-42). The interactionof the organismand the environmenttook place through a selective process, wherean organismŽ tintoan ecologicalniche. The notionof a niche impliesa predetermination,a hole innature, which is Ž lled byan organism, ratherthan atransformationon the partof either the environmentor the organism(ibid: 43-44). Lewontinargues that while it is true that the internalprocess of heritablevariation is not casually dependent on the environmentin which organismslive, “the claimthat the environmentof anorganismis casually independentof the organism,and that changes inthe environmentare autonomousand independent of changes inthe speciesitself, is clearly wrong”(ibid: 48). Rather than adaptation,the processof evolution is best describedas a processof construction. Organisms actively transformthe environmentthrough living, although the conditionsof the environment arenot wholly of their own choosing, given thatpreviously living agents historicallyshaped nature. Niches comeinto being as aresult“ ofthe nature ofthe organismsthemselves” (ibid: 51). The dialecticalinterchange between the environmentand the organism becomesa centraltenant ofthe coevolutionaryposition being proposed. Lewontinasserts, “ [j]ustas there canbe no organism without an environment,so there canbe no environment without an organism”(ibid: 48).Independent forces and processes operate in nature. Glacial ages andvolcanic eruptions can occur independently, but these arephysical conditions.“ An environment ,”notesLewontin, “ issomethingthat surrounds 422 Clark ² orencircles, but for there tobe a surroundingthere mustbe something atthe centerto be surrounded” (ibid: 48). The life activitiesof organisms will“ determinewhich elements ofthe external worldare put together to make theirenvironments and what the relationsare among the elements thatare relevant tothem” (ibid: 51). The metabolism,sense organs,shape ofthe organism,and nervous system, bothwithin a speciesand between species,in uences the “spatialand temporal juxtaposition of bits and pieces ofthe worldthat produces a surroundingfor the organismthat is relevant toit” (ibid: 52). Organisms are in a constantstate of interaction with the naturalworld, thus they areconstantly altering the worldaround them (ibid:55). Alfred North Whitehead emphasizedthat the bodyis partof the external world,as it processes food and takes inairfor its survival (1968:21). Lewontinframes this relationship in more detail noting that organisms are constantlytaking in the worldaround them throughtheir consumption, but inthis process, consumption is also production, as the physicalconditions arechanged in meeting the needs oforganisms. Given thatliving beings musttransform nature for existence, all organisms“ alternot only their ownenvironments but also the environmentsof other species” ( The Triple Helix, p. 55). Recognizingthat the environmentcan change independently oforgan- isms,Lewontin incorporates a discussionof organisms’responsive abilities, suchas the ratesand forms of reproduction, which vary ininvertebrate animals,according to changes inspace and time (including temperature, weather,etc.) of the worldsurrounding them (ibid:62-64). He explains, “[w]hateverthe autonomousprocesses of the outerworld may be,they cannotbe perceivedby the organism.Its life isdetermined by the shadows onthe wall,passed through a transformingmedium of its own creation” (ibid:64). Furthermore, “ life asa wholeis evolving inexternal conditions thatare the consequenceof the biologicalactivities of that life” as well as all life precedingit (ibid:66). Changeis the ruleof life.Organic processes are historically contingent, defyinguniversal explanations (ibid: 76). Lewontin rejects teleological conceptionsof evolution:

All species that exist arethe result ofa uniquehistorical process fromthe originsof life,a process that mighthave taken many paths otherthan the one itactually took.Evolution is notan unfoldingbut an historically contingent wanderingpathway through the space ofpossibilities. Part of the historical contingency arises because the physical conditionsin which lifehas evolved alsohave acontingent history,but much ofthe uncertainty ofevolutionarises fromthe existence ofmultiplepossible pathways even when external conditions areŽ xed.(Ibid: 88) ReviewEssay 423 ²

Ratherthan conceptualizing the naturalworld in rigid relationships, a dynamicapproach is needed toembody the dialecticalrelationship of coevolution:

The relationsof genes, organisms,and environments arereciprocal relations in which all three elements areboth causes andeffects. Genes andenvironment areboth causes oforganisms, which are,in turn,causes ofenvironments, so that genes becomecauses ofenvironments as mediatedby the organisms.(Ibid: 100-101)

Organismsare emergent, involving bothinternal and external dynamics. Solongas genes, organisms,and environments are studied separately, our knowledgeof the living worldwill not advance. Thereis no evidence thatorganisms are becoming more adapted to the environment.Evolution does not entail adrivetowards perfection. Allelements inthe triplehelix (gene, organism,and environment) are changing.Around 99.99% of all speciesthat ever existed areextinct (ibid: 68).Likewise, there isno evidence forclaims of harmony and balance withthe external world.Environmental change willcontinue. Natural and socialhistory is in constant motion. Chance is always present. “ What we cando,” Lewontin emphasizes, “ isto try to affect the rateof extinction anddirection of environmental change insucha wayas tomake adecent life forhuman beings possible. What wecannot do is to keep thingsas they are”(ibid: 68). Informed social action, which includes knowledge of the interactionbetween the naturaland social worlds, is necessary inorder toproperlynavigate historyin the making. Oyama’s The Ontogenyof Information undertakesa projectsimilar to Lewontin’s byanalyzing complexinteractions in multileveled developmen- talsystems bothwithin organisms and between organisms and their envi- ronment.Oyama contendsthat development inorganisms and information doesoccur, in so far as the priorstructure is transformed through interac- tion (Ontogeny,p.4).In thisposition, she moves awayfrom the developmen- talbiologists’ belief that development is an unfoldingprocess. One ofthe goalsof Oyama’ s workis tostep outside the conŽnes ofthe nature-nurture debatein order to illustrate that nature and nurture are developmental productsand developmental processesthat produce human development. Notionsof predeterminancy are not useful regardless of whether they uti- lize internalor external explanations.An understanding of life mustbe foundedupon a relationalmodel of inquiry. Oyama views ontogenesisas an inquiryinto the stateof becoming, or the emergence ofan organism(ibid: 3). The organismis the nexus between internaland external worlds.In the processof emerging, an organism usesand organizes information, which is already organized by previous 424 Clark ² interactionsof organisms with the external world.Oyama insiststhat a conceptionof information must entail avariety ofmeanings, given that itcan exist inthe environment,tissues, genes, etc.Information is not preordained,but it isorderly,due to the conditionsof life.Like Lewontin’s characterizationof the environmentand organism as dependent and interactingrealms, Oyama contendsthat information comes into existence only inthe processof ontogeny. Ratherthan proposingthat ontogeny is the resultof genetic information unfolding,Oyama arguesthat the organismand environment are creations ofan interactionbetween them. Organisms hold a centralrole in creating theirenvironment; they arethe pointof organization. Both DNA and the external worldonly have meaning andcausation so long as they interact simultaneouslythrough the nexus ofthe organism.Oyama notesthat the transformationsand developments thatoccur are the resultof the existing informationin genes, cells, tissues,and the environment,as well asthe alternatives thatare possible at that point in time, given the existing historicalconditions. She links thisapproach to Lewontin’ s relational, materialistcoevolution (ibid: 18). Oyama arguesagainst prescriptive theories for ontogeny. History is an importantand necessary considerationfor all analyses, butOyama emphasizesthat many scientistsfail to consider the importanceof the presentin the immediateconstruction of information. Historical considerationsare essential forunderstanding the presentconditions and information,but as an organismcontinues to develop it is processing the historicalin termsof the present(ibid: 13). There is immediacy in the state ofbecoming. By wayof heredity, Oyama arguesthat genes donot create traitsaccording to a planwritten in their very structure, even byoperating on conveniently available“ raw materials,”if phenotypic characteristics ariseonly when sufŽcient interactants arepresent inthe proper place andat the propertime, and if all these factors aretherefore given comparablecausal andformative signiŽ cance, then deŽning heredityas thepassing on ofall developmental conditions, in whatever manner ,is preferableto deŽ ning itby genetic information.(Ibid: 43) In addition,she indicatesthat “ [w]hatinduces variation, and how muchvariation results, depends on what the characteris and what the conditionsare” (ibid: 44). With Lewontin,Oyama holdsto the viewthat organismstransform and create niches and“ the evolutionof the organism itselfchanges thosecircumstances” (ibid: 45). Evolution is an interactive processwhose “ constraintsand causes emerge asit functions, as they doin a developmental process”(ibid: 45). Organisms are in a stateof transformation,emerging under historical and structural constraints. ReviewEssay 425 ²

The theorythat ontogeny is genetically directeddevelopment must be abandoned.Genes thatdo notexist cannotbe transcribed, but even genes thatexist may notbe transcribed,given the historyof a cell, environmental inuences, and mutations. The genetic informationproduced depends uponthe restof the developmental process,on effective stimuli,and effective informationthroughout an organism(ibid: 80). The developmental processof information is acomplexseries of interactions. Many stimulimay call outfor a variety ofresponses from an organism,but what is produced, created,and acted upon varies. Thus the developmentof an organismis nota predeterminedand predicable process. It is dynamic. It is emergent. Oyama arguesthis position in opposition to teleological notions, such as the handof god, as well ashuman interjections of purpose, in regards to the developmentof life:

There areno ghosts inmachines, only persons inthe world,thinking, feeling, intuitingand sensing, deciding,acting, and creating. And there aretherefore noghosts in these ghosts, noprograms in the operatorsof the machines, makingthem feel as their ancestors felt,making them act orwant toact as gorillasor chimps act. Butthere are many ghosts inthe psychological,social, andcultural machines that create andre-create the body-machine,the ghost in it,and the ghostin it.(Ibid:128)

Like Lewontin,Oyama insiststhat a dialecticalapproach is needed for understandingliving organisms,as well asthe interactionsbetween living thingsand the environment:

The pointof interactionism is notthat everything interacts with everything else orthat the organismor genome interacts with everything. Noris itthat everything is subjectto alteration. It is rather that inuences andconstraints onresponsiveness area functionof both the presenting stimuliand the results ofpast selections, responses, andintegrations, and that organismsorganize their surroundingseven as they areorganized by them. This beingthe case, developmentalpathways arenot set in any substantive way either bygenome orby environment, regardless ofthe normalityor relative probabilityof the pathwayitself. (Ibid:169)

The naturaland social sciences cannotbe separatedany longer(ibid: 125). They need toinformeach otherso that a betterpicture of the worldmight begained. A materialistapproach provides the basisfor understanding the foundationfrom which life isbased, the sourceof such information, andthe realmof interaction. “ Natureis not an apriorimold in which reality iscast,” Oyama recollects,“ [w]hatexists isnature, and living natureexists byvirtue of its nurture, both constant and variable, both internaland external” (ibid: 148). Oyama’ s goalis to enrich and broaden ourideas of causality by locating information in the contextof processes 426 Clark ² thatproduce and reveal it,while placing ourselves in the middleof the tangledbank of life (ibid:192). In thiseffort, both Lewontin’ s The Triple Helix and Oyama’s The Ontogenyof Information illuminatethe importanceof a coevolutionaryperspective for understanding the complexbiological world inwhichhuman society and all life isimmersed.

Fromthe Human Genome toGenetically ModiŽed Foods ItAin’ t Necessarily So collectsLewontin’ s essays ongenetics, evolution, and science thatoriginally appeared in The New YorkReview ofBooks . Drawing uponhis knowledge as an evolutionarybiologist and geneticist, Lewontin providesa lucidanalysis ofthe debatesand politics surrounding genetics andevolution. He renderssubjects such as heredity, human cloning, the HumanGenome Project,and genetic engineered foodto a criticalanalysis, bothconŽ rming what we know about life andourselves and debunking the false premisesand exaggeration of our biological knowledge. Moving fromevolution to the HumanGenome Projectto genetic engineered food, Lewontin’s materialistanalysis providesa thoroughexamination of the workingsof genes andthe socialrelationships surrounding this science. His dialecticalapproach challenges the genetic andbiological determinism that isall toocommon these days. Lewontinargues that everything inthe materialworld is notknowable. Thereis not enough time and, besides, the many forcesoperating, such asselective forceson genes, areso weak thatthey cannotbe measured. Therewill always be the unknownwithin the physicalworld. As a result, scientiststend to ask questionsthey cananswer. Science is asocialactivity, commonlyre ecting the reigningideology of society and the ambitions ofthe politicalsphere ( Ain’t Necessarily So, pp.xxvii, 10-11).Biological determinismis apoliticalnecessity arisingafter the bourgeoisrevolution to reconcilethe ideologyof equality in the socialcontext of mass inequality instatus, wealth, and power. A naturalexplanation, based on artiŽ cial attributes,such as intelligence orgood genes, providesnew paint for the wallsof empire. As aresult,equality is reducedto equality of opportunity. Failureto succeedis dueto intrinsic qualities, not social organization (ibid: 17-18).Rooting social inequalities in the conditionsof society, Lewontin standsat the forefrontof the struggleto dismantle the biologicaldeterminist position.In the process,he illustrateshow biological processes work and howsocial relations in uence changes inthe biologicalworld. Lewontinpoints to two post-Renaissance revolutions in biology. First, Descartesproposed mechanistic biology. Second, Darwin’ s materialist explanationfor evolution, which removed the handof god, explained changes inspecies through natural selection (ibid: 44-45). Lewontin continuesin this materialist tradition, while proposing further progress ReviewEssay 427 ² inour understanding of life, arguing that organisms are “ the unique consequenceof a developmental historythat results from the interactionof anddetermination by internal and external forces”(ibid: 147). Given the constantbarrage of geneticclaims for almost every character traitimaginable, Lewontin’ s discussionof genes andthe HumanGenome Projectprove to be enlightening, whileshattering the fetishismof DNA. Commonerstates that with the discoveryof DNA, geneticscientists view itsmolecular structure as the agent responsiblefor the inheritancein all living things,making the DNAgene the “absolutemonarch” (2002:39). Lewontinnotes that the mythologysurrounding the DNAmolecule entails the notionthat it isself-reproducing,allowing for its own duplication since the Žrstcombination of sperm and egg, as well asself-acting, imposing a speciŽc formdictated by its own internal structure on an undifferentiated fertilizedegg ( Ain’t Necessarily So ,p.139). In explaining the relationship betweenDNA andgenes, itiscommonly stated that DNAis composedof basic units,the nucleotides ,ofwhich there arefour kinds, adenine,cystosine, guanine,and thymine (A, C,G,andT) andthese arestrung oneafter another in alonglinear sequence which makes aDNAmolecule. Soone bit of DNA mighthave the sequence ofunits : : : CAAATTGC : : : andanother the sequence : : : TATCGCTA : : : andso on. A typical gene mightconsist of10,000basic units : : : The DNAmessages specify the organism byspecifying the makeupof the proteinsof which organismsare made. A particularDNA sequence makes aparticularprotein according to a set of decodingrules andmanufacturing processes. (Ibid:139-140) Furthermore,DNA isdepicted as though it recreates itself through the unwindingof the doublehelix, whilenucleotides match up to complement the adjacentnucleotides on the strand,until a newstrand of DNA is created(ibid: 141). Lewontin states that this story is correct in detailed moleculardescription, but it is “ wrongin what it claims to explain.” First,“ DNAisa deadmolecule;” it cannotself-reproduce. “ Itis produced outof elementary materialsby a complexcellular machinery of proteins. While itis often said that DNA producesproteins, in fact proteins (enzymes) produceDNA,” Lewontin continues, “ [n]oliving moleculeis self-reproducing.Only wholecells may containall the necessary machinery for‘ self ’-reproductionand even they, inthe processof development, lose thatcapacity” (ibid: 141-142). Additionally, DNA is incapable of making anything,including itself. The sequenceof nucleotides in DNA is used by the machineryin “ the cell todetermine what sequence of amino acids is tobe built into a protein,and to determine when andwhere the protein isto be made. But the proteinsof the cell aremade by other proteins, andwithout that protein-forming machinery nothing canbe made” (ibid: 143).DNA only holdsinformation that is utilized by the cell machinery 428 Clark ² inits own productive process. Both DNA and cell machinery,composed ofproteins, are inherited. And as emphasized earlier, an “organismdoes notcompute itself from its DNA,” rather it emerges “fromthe interaction ofand determination by internal and external forces”(ibid: 147). Plus, the environment,which is the external force,is partly “ aconsequence ofthe activitiesof the organismitself as it produces and consumes the conditionsof its own existence.” Organisms are also subject to random cellularmovements andchance molecularevents. Variationis central tocellular reproduction. Even withthe same genes andenvironmental conditions,one side of a ydiffersfrom its other side, just as Ž ngerprints betweena person’s left andright hand vary. Tocomplicate matters further, code sequences (i.e. TATCGCTA) may beexactly the same,but the codecan have morethan onemeaning. For example, acodecould be an instructionto insertthe aminoacid valine in aprotein,but it could also be aspacerin a sequence.It is not known how the cell “decidesamong the possibleinterpretations” (ibid: 152-153). As a result,the HumanGenome Projectwill never becapable of deŽ nitively knowingwhat each DNAsequencemeans, given thatthe meaningcan change andvary. Commoner(2002) re ects that the HumanGenome Projectcollapsed under the weightof its own discovery. It was asserted thatgenes madeproteins, but it wasdiscovered that “ there arefar too few humangenes toaccount for the complexityof our inherited traits or for the vast inheriteddifferences between plants, say, andpeople” (Commoner 2002:40).Humans are estimated to have around32,000 genes, whilea mustardweed has 26,000genes. The gene countis too low to match the numberof proteins and the inheritedtraits they engender.Thus genes cannotprovide the ultimatedescription of life (ibid:42). Molecularbiology and genetics isbig business. The net ofgenetics has been castwide under its deŽ nitive claimto explain life.The Human Genome Projectcosts billions of dollars to operate,so the projectis always framedas if itswork serves the publicgood and helps make abettersociety. Claimshave been madethat genetic researchwill help discoverthe genetic impairmentsof the homeless ( Ain’t Necessarily So, p.165). Lewontin takes specialnotice of how this ideological veil ignoresthe powerstructure within society,where groups compete for proŽ ts, where pharmaceuticals Ž le patentson medicines to control distribution and accumulation of capital, andwhere the operationof the economicsystem createsunemployment (ibid:162-166). Molecular biologists are entrepreneurs. Genes areisolated andpatented. While patentlaw prohibits the patentingof anything that is‘ natural,’scientists claim that isolated genes arenot natural, despite the factthat the organismthat they aretaken fromare. Through this sleight ofhand, corporations have been ableto patent genes, controlling ReviewEssay 429 ² the manufactureand distribution of pharmaceuticals. Private interests dominatethis research in opposition to the publicgood. Facedwith the knowledgethat “ genes only specifythe sequenceof aminoacids that are linked togetherin the manufactureof a molecule calleda polypeptide,which must then foldup to make aprotein,”a call fora massive proteomeproject has been proposed(ibid: 191-192). Polypeptidescan fold, resulting in different proteins. The foldingcan take placein many differentways in differentcells ofvarious organisms. It may alsobe dependent upon small moleculeslike sugarand other proteins. Any projectto unravel thismatter will be much more expensive andit will take muchlonger than the HumanGenome Project.The spiralof research feedsupon itself and the notionthat life willbe revealed inthese isolated studiescontinues to permeate through the public,as biologicalexplanations attemptto justify existing socialinequalities. Genetic researchon plants has been even moreintrusive given the directmanipulation of organisms. Through genetically modiŽed organisms (GMOs) andpatented seeds, capital, via biotechnology,continues to transformand extend theircontrol over the organizationof agricultural production(Lewontin 2000:93, 100; Kloppenburg 1990). Much debate has arisenover the useof GMOs, yet clarityhas notbeen astrong pointin these arguments.Fortunately, Lewontin cuts through the muckof ethicalissues to articulate a clearand concise critique of GMOs fromhis understandingof genetics.He beginsby insisting“ humanbeings have been genetically modifyingorganisms since the Žrstdomestication of plants and animals” (Ain’t Necessarily So ,p.345).Through continuous seed selection,the organismsof today are very differentfrom their wild ancestors. Corn has becomea cropthat cannot survive independent of human care, because the compactear with large kernels packedtightly tothe cobdoes not allow forseed dispersal.But it does provide an abundanceof food, which can be gatheredand stored for long periods of time. Seedselection, in the past,involved asearchfor desirable variants, suchas drought resistant, and the propagationof those selected seeds (ibid:346). Furthermore, under conditions of domestication,closely related species,which do not interbreed in nature, were interbred to produce newvariations. Human beings constantly transform nature in the process offood production, changing the evolutionarydevelopment of plants throughoutthe world.This process is a requirementfor the continuation oflife, but the waythis interaction is organized is attributable to social relationships. Capitalistinterests have largely dictatedthe developments ingenetic engineering.DNA is extracted from a donororganism and then inserted intothe cells ofa recipient,so this DNA becomespart of the genome 430 Clark ²

(ibid:347). This process creates a transgenicorganism; now, generally knownas a GMO. The primaryuse of transgenic DNA transfers,in agriculturalresearch, has involved makingcrops resistant to insect pests and/orherbicides used to control weeds. Given thatall the majorseed companiesare owned or tied to chemical companies illuminates the interestsin creating organisms resistant to herbicides (Middendorf et al. 2000:110).As far as resistance, Lewontin explains that“ genes codingfor powerfultoxins, the Bt proteins,from a bacterium, Bascillus thuringensis ” areintroduced into an organism( Ain’t Necessarily So ,p.348). The plants manufacturethese proteinsinternally, sowhen bugsnibble on the plants, they ingestthe toxinand die. Transgenictransfer opened the doorto transferring any gene inany speciesto any otherspecies. Of course, some transfers will be harmful or lethal tothe recipient,“ butthere areno general rulesto tell uswhat will work”(ibid: 348-349). The popularconcerns regarding GMOs arethreats tohuman health, disruptionof the naturalenvironment, and threats to agricultureproduction from the evolutionof resistant pests and weeds (ibid:351-352). But critiques often fail to acknowledge that conventionally bredorganisms have producedadverse effectson otherspecies in nature in additionto causing risks to human health, including“ foodslike peanutsor milk towhichsome people are naturally allergic” (ibid: 353). Furthermore, invasive speciesfrom distant geographical regions have createdproblems foragriculture independently ofGMOs. Ifa crossbetween GMOs and weedsoccurs, the offspringwill be hybrids which, like cultivatedvarieties, are“ soill-adapted to survival in nature” that they willbe dependent uponcontemporary agricultural practices (e.g. unnaturally high levels of nitrogen)for their survival (ibid: 357). Lewontinraises these pointsto clarify the risksthat are truly unique tothe developmentof GMOs. Ratherthan focusing on the physiological effectof the genes introducedto the recipient,Lewontin insists that it is where genes areinserted in arecipient’s genome thatposes a seriousdanger:

Genes consist oftwo functionally differentadjacent stretches ofDNA. One, the so-called structural gene,has informationon the chemical compositionof the proteinthat the cell will manufacturewhen itreads the gene.The other, the so- called regulatoryelement, is partof a complex signalingsystem that concerns where andwhen andhow much proteinwill beproduced. When DNAis inserted intothe genomeof a recipient byengineering methods it may popinto the recipient’s DNAanywhere, includingin the middleof some othergene’ s regulatoryelement. The result will beagene whose readingis no longerunder normal control. (Ibid: 354) ReviewEssay 431 ²

The consequencesare unknown. Either the gene isnever readat all, serving nopurpose as an agriculturalvariety, or the cell may readthe gene, causingit to

producevast amountsof a proteinthat ordinarilyis producedin very low amount,and this high concentration couldbe toxic orbe involved in the biochemical productionof a toxin.Yet anotherpossibility is that atoxic substance that usedto be produced only in onepart of a plant,not ordinary eaten,could now bemanufactured in another part. (Ibid: 354-355)

Forexample, tomatoplants, which contain toxins in the leaves andstem, couldthrough genetic engineering, start producing toxins unintentionally inthe fruititself. Thus “ geneticengineering itselfhas auniqueability to producedeleterious effects,” which justiŽ es thatall GMO varietiesneed to be“ specially scrutinizedand tested for such effects” (ibid: 355). But how togoaboutthis is notknown, given “the unknownnature of the danger.” Itcannot be controlled given the natureof genes andthe developmentof anorganism.While capital,in its intrusion into agriculture, tries to control plantsfor the accumulationof wealth via the sale ofseeds, herbicides, pesticides,and food, it creates new uncertainty, which could potentially have devastatingconsequences for human health. Over the last hundredyears, industrial capital has transformedfarming. Farmerswere pulled into the marketthrough specialization, which increasedtheir purchases of other food and household necessities onthe market.Seeds, feed, fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery are all purchased frommonopoly capital. Initially, withthe introductionof newtechnologies, farmers’yields increased,but this drove the pricesdown (ibid: 366). At the same time,the costsof productionincreased. Debt and bankruptcies plague farmers.Ties to monopoly capital have turned“ the independentfarmer intoan industrialemployee” (ibid: 367). Lewontin notes, “ the creationand adoptionof genetically modiŽed organisms are the latest stepsin thislong historicaldevelopment of capital-intensive industrial agriculture.” Given thathumans are structurally and historically organized and are part of the environment,we remain an external force,in uencing the evolution ofotherorganisms and transforming the worldin whichwe live, including ourselves. In 1864,George Perkins Marsh remarked that humans had transformed the earth,often in devastating ways, in the processof obtaining their livelihood(Marsh 1864:11;Clark and Foster 2002:167-169). Social- historicalforces in uence humaninteractions with nature, both positively andnegatively. AsLewontin sees it,capitalist intrusion into agriculture isradically transforming the evolutionof plants. The value ofeach of these three booksis that they demonstratethe socialand natural reality 432 Clark ² asit is given inthe materialworld. Lewontin and Oyama confrontthe currentlyprevalent biologicaland genetic determinist claims. Both of them directlyengage issuesrelated to the interactionsbetween genes, the organism,and the environment(which includes society). In the process, they refuteteleological and mechanistic approaches to nature and life. Amaterialistand dialectical approach provides the groundingfor these authorsto grapple with the complexbiological and social processes of the naturalworld. Life becomes an emergent processand variation holds possibility.A coevolutionaryposition is developed such that organisms areboth the subjectand object of evolution adapting and creating their environments.Life is in constant  ux,making change the norm.In 1926, VladimirVernadsky (1998)proposed that life wasa transformingagent, throughits interchange with the existing environment,in the creationof the biosphere.The centralityof life inthe creationof the worldcannot be eclipsedby the reductionisticnotion that DNA isthe secretto life. As Barry Commonerwrites, “ DNAdid not create life; life createdDNA” (2002:47). Humansremain active agents withthe potentialto change the social andnatural conditions of the world.An informed position, with regard tothe dominatingsocial forces of society and the dynamiccharacteristics ofevolving life,is needed toregulate human interactions with nature to whateverdegree is possible. As Lewontin remarks, in The Triple Helix , we must“ tryto affect the rateof extinction and direction of environmental change insuch a wayas to make adecentlife forhuman beings possible. What wecannotdo is to keep thingsas they are”(p. 68).

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