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4.7

Georgia

dramatically changed the face of peacekeeping in the southern Caucasus. Five days of fighting saw launch a military offensive on the contested enclave of South Ossetia; Russian forces responded robustly by pushing into and holding Georgian territory; conflict in Georgia’s other secessionist region, ; and wide- spread international concern. While the extant peace operations of the Commonwealth of In- dependent States (CIS), United Nations, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were overtaken by the dynamics of the conflict, a European Union–brokered peace agreement made way for the deployment of a new EU monitoring mission. In the after- math of the confrontation, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states; only Nicaragua joined Russia in this move. Georgia declared the 1994 Moscow UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Agreement, which was the basis of the presence of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UN- • Authorization and 24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858) OMIG) in Abkhazia, null and void. In addition, Start Date Georgia severed diplomatic relations with the • SRSG Johan Verbeke (Belgium) Russian Federation, provided notification of its • Chief Military Observer Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak decision to terminate the peacekeeping opera- (Pakistan) tions of the CIS in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, • Senior Police Advisor Oleksiy Telychkin (Ukraine) and withdrew from the CIS itself. The situation • Budget $34.1 million stabilized in the last months of the year as Russ- (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) ian forces pulled back and the EU’s military ob- • Strength as of Military Observers: 135 servers deployed. Meanwhile, in December the 31 October 2008 Police: 18 OSCE ceased operating in the country when International Civilian Staff: 102 Local Civilian Staff: 189 Russia objected to renewing the mission’s man- UN Volunteer: 1 date. At the start of 2009, Georgia’s security re- For detailed mission information see p. 364 mains fragile, and the future of international en- gagement in the country remains uncertain.

The brief conflict between Georgia and Background Russia that followed the outbreak of hostili- Georgia’s internal conflicts date back to the ties in South Ossetia on 7–8 August 2008 has Soviet period, and the subsequent breakup of

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the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. Violent conflict erupted in the region of South CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) in Abkhazia-Georgia Ossetia in January 1991, after the Georgian government denied a request by Ossetian offi- • Authorization Date 14 May 1994 cials for autonomous status. The war continued • Start Date 21 June 1994 until June 1992 and ended with the Agreement • Force Commander Major-General Sergey Chaban (Russia) on the Principles for Peace Settlement of the • Strength as of Troops: 2,542 Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, between Georgia August 2008 and Russia, which established both a cease-fire and the Joint Control Commission (JCC). This body, composed of representatives from Geor- gia, Russia, and North and South Ossetia, was to monitor the terms of the agreement, imple- CIS–South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) ment settlement measures, coordinate economic reconstruction, and facilitate the return of dis- •Authorization Date 24 June 1992 placed persons. It was also tasked with coordi- • Start Date July 1992 nating the efforts of the CIS–South Ossetia Joint • Force Commander General Marat Kulakhmetov (Russia) Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), a peacekeeping •Strengthasof Troops:1,519 August 2008 battalion of 1,500 troops led by Russia. In December 1992, following the end of fighting in South Ossetia, the OSCE established a mission in Georgia to assist the government in conflict settlement, democratization, human OSCE Mission to Georgia rights protection, and establishment of rule of law. Since its initial deployment, the OSCE’s •Authorization Date 6 November 1992 mandate in Georgia has widened to include con- • Start Date December 1992 fidence building within the Ossetian crisis zone •HeadofMission TerhiHakala(Finland) and providing assistance to UNOMIG as the • Budget $14.6 million latter oversees the peace process in Abkhazia. (September 2007–October 2008) This situation remained stable for more •Strengthasof CivilianStaff:62 than a decade, while the conflict itself was un- 30 September 2008 resolved. In 2004, the newly elected Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, made restora- tion of Georgian territorial integrity a priority for his administration. In the context of an an- EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) tismuggling campaign, Saakashvili closed the Ergneti market outside Tskhinvali and ordered •Authorization Date 15 September 2008 a significant number of Georgian troops to the • Start Date 1 October 2008 region’s border. This move spurred renewed vi- • Head of Mission Hansjörg Haber (Germany) olence and threatened to drive the conflict into • Budget $35.0 million war. While an August 2004 cease-fire agree- (September 2008–August 2009) ment ended the direct military confrontation in •Strengthasof Monitors:234 South Ossetia in the short term, the conflict 1 December 2008 zone remained volatile. Meanwhile, shortly after Georgia gained its independence from the Soviet Union in separation from Georgia. Fighting broke out in 1991, Abkhazia, a region in the northwest of the August 1992 after Georgian forces entered the country on the Black Sea coast, also sought its Abkhaz capital, , and continued, despite CIC_4.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 100

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three cease-fires brokered by Russia, until Ban Ki-moon issued a public statement appeal- September 1993. The United Nations became ing to both sides to show restraint. As he did so, increasingly involved in diplomatic efforts to he supported the call by the UN Security Coun- secure peace and in August 1993 established cil (Resolution 1781) to all parties to consider UNOMIG to verify compliance with a cease-fire and address seriously each other’s legitimate se- reached the month before. In early 1994, the two curity concerns, to refrain from any acts of vio- sides negotiated a cease-fire and separation of lence and provocation, and to comply fully with forces agreement, known as the Moscow Agree- previous agreements regarding cease-fires and ment, which mandated the presence of a CIS the nonuse of violence. These warnings proved Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) in Abkhazia. The sadly prescient for 2008, a year in which esca- CISPKF was to promote the safe return of refu- lating mistrust and the consequent deterioration gees, provide a “security zone,” and supervise of the internal situation took on an increasingly implementation of the agreement. In July 1994, international dimension. the UN Security Council adopted Resolution Following Kosovo’s declaration of inde- 937, expanding UNOMIG’s mandate to include pendence and its recognition by several countries monitoring of the CISPKF, the cease-fire agree- in early 2008, Russia took steps to strengthen its ment, and Georgian troop withdrawal from the ties to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 6 Valley in northeastern Abkhazia. March 2008, it broke with other CIS member A peacemaking role for the UN Secretary- states and lifted economic sanctions that had General and UNOMIG was reinforced from been in place since 1996, enraging Georgian 1997 onward by the engagement of a Group of authorities. Meanwhile, on 6–7 March, South Friends for the Secretary-General for Georgia Ossetia and Abkhazia themselves called for in- (France, Germany, Russia, the United King- ternational recognition, citing the “Kosovo dom, and the United States). But negotiations precedent.” Ties between Russia and Abkhazia to find a political settlement of the conflict and and South Ossetia were further enhanced when, bring about the return of Georgian refugees to on 16 April 2008, outgoing president Vladimir Abkhazia made little progress. Putin issued an instruction authorizing direct From early 2006 onward, the situation of relations between government bodies in Russia both breakaway republics became more deeply and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and entwined with broader concerns rooted in dete- South Ossetia in a number of fields. The Geor- riorating relations between Georgia and Russia, gian government protested strongly at what it and the implications of both developments in considered a blatant violation of its sovereignty Kosovo and Georgia’s pursuit of membership and territorial integrity. in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Frustrated with the lack of progress on government of Georgia made it clear that it took South Ossetia’s status under the JCC negotiat- very seriously the possibility that Russian recog- ing structure, in early 2008 Georgia had sug- nition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might de- gested altering the format to include the EU, pend on the outcome of the debate over the fu- the OSCE, Russia, and both the Georgian and ture status of Kosovo. Russia, meanwhile, made the South Ossetian governments as formal par- its opposition to Georgia’s moves toward mem- ties to the negotiations. Russia rejected the pro- bership in NATO equally plain. posal, prompting Georgia’s withdrawal from the JCC negotiations. In the successive months, the security situation deteriorated, with a series Key Developments of clashes taking place between the Georgian The risks inherent in these rising tensions were army and separatist forces. evident by late 2007 when, concerned by the Events in South Ossetia assumed a new large number of allegations about military deploy- pace and gravity in July 2008 with the shelling ment and buildup on both sides of the Georgian- of the capital, Tskhinvali, by Georgian forces, Abkhaz cease-fire line, UN Secretary-General following an attack on the -backed head CIC_4.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 101

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of the South Ossetian administration (as opposed to the leader of the de facto authorities). Mean- while, Russian fighter jets were reported to have flown over Georgian airspace in response to claims that Georgia was building up its mil- itary forces around South Ossetia in prepara- tion for operations aimed at rescuing captured servicemen. In response, Georgia recalled its ambassador to Moscow for consultations, while the OSCE stepped up its mediation efforts by sending Special Envoy Heikki Talvitie to visit the region. The situation in Abkhazia followed a simi- larly difficult trajectory. The Georgian govern- ment introduced new proposals to resolve the conflict in late March 2008 and emphasized the need to change the negotiating format. Negotia- VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images tions, however, remained suspended, as they Members of EUMM speak with a Russian soldier had since 2006, as a consequence of the Abkhaz as he dismantles a position in Nakreti, some 10km from the insistence on the withdrawal of Georgian forces Gori checkpoint in Georgia, 6 October 2008. introduced into the upper Kodori Valley in Sep- tember 2006 and Georgia’s refusal to sign an agreement on the nonresumption of hostilities. efforts on the political front. In late July and In an increasingly hostile environment ac- early August, tensions continued to rise. cusations and counteraccusations proliferated. The mounting hostility reached a climax on Georgia’s claim that Russia shot down an un- 7 August 2008, when Georgian forces launched manned aerial vehicle over Abkhazia was con- rocket attacks on South Ossetia, which inde- firmed by a UN report. Meanwhile, UNOMIG pendent military observers have deemed both reported that Georgia had on several occasions unprovoked and indiscriminate. In response to violated the cease-fire by flying fighter jets over Georgia’s actions, and voicing its need to pro- the Abkhaz side of the zone of conflict. Incidents tect its peacekeepers and citizens in South Os- of overflight, reportedly by Georgian and Rus- setia, Russia retaliated robustly, deploying sian aircraft, continued throughout the year. ground troops, fighter jets, and tanks into the Georgia and Russia responded to such incidents separatist territory, repulsing the and by mobilizing troops. Citing the possibility of eventually expanding military operations deep an impending deterioration in the security situ- into Georgia and along its territorial waters. ation, in late April 2008 Russia reinforced the The conflict quickly expanded beyond South CISPKF with 525 additional troops. A month Ossetia and the surrounding region as Russian later it also deployed a controversial military forces pushed into Georgia’s northwest from railway unit to rehabilitate Abkhazia’s decrepit Abkhazia and Abkhaz forces moved quickly to railway system. regain control of the upper Kodori Valley. The In an effort to assuage the military buildup fighting lasted a mere five days, but caused and escalating rhetoric between Abkhaz and hundreds of casualties and the displacement, Georgian authorities, Germany, the coordinator according to the UN High Commissioner for of the Group of Friends, proposed a three-phased Refugees (UNHCR), of 30,000 ethnic Ossetians peace initiative in July, aimed at restoring con- and 85,000 ethnic Georgians, as well as the dev- fidence on both sides. With the peace process astation of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, far off track, UNOMIG continued to monitor the and the destruction of several key Georgian mil- situation, but the tense environment impeded its itary installations. CIC_4.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:57 PM Page 102

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Negotiations initiated on 12 August 2008 Meanwhile, by year’s end the consequences by the French presidency of the European Union for the United Nations in Georgia still remained yielded a six-point cease-fire and peace agree- unclear. During the August 2008 hostilities, its ment. Among other things, this called for the role was limited by the restriction of UNOMIG’s withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to mandate to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In their positions prior to the hostilities and the early September, elaborations on the six-point opening of international discussion on the mo- plan of 12 August reaffirmed that UNOMIG dalities of security and stability in Abkhazia would continue to carry out its mandate at the and South Ossetia. In the successive weeks, same personnel levels and deployment pattern Russian forces began to withdraw from undis- as had existed on 7 August, subject to possible puted Georgian territory. Yet it was evident that future adjustments decided on by the Security there could be no return to the status quo ante. Council. In the dramatically changed context The CISPKF had effectively ceased to exist within which UNOMIG found itself operating, once the conflict began. After it ended, Rus- the impact on its operations was not yet known. sia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Osse- It was unclear, for example, which elements, if tia as independent states, and a unanimous res- any, of the 1994 Moscow Agreement, which olution by the Georgian parliament declaring had formed the basis of its observation man- Abkhazia and South Ossetia as territories occu- date, would be retained, or what arrangement pied by the Russian Federation and the Russian would assume a role in the separation of forces peacekeepers, only underlined the depth of the between the two sides hitherto performed by transformation that had taken place. the CISPKF. Changes in the other peacekeeping struc- When the Security Council met in mid- tures in Georgia were quickly initiated but will October 2008, it was consequently unsurpris- take some time to be completed. The OSCE ing that it decided to extend UNOMIG’s man- added another 100 observers to its personnel date for four months, pending greater clarity in already in place in Georgia. This reinforcement the situation on the ground. proved temporary, however, as the OSCE was forced to cease its operation at the end of the year when Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia Conclusion and South Ossetia divided the organization and The dramatic events of August 2008 represented blocked the renewal of the mission’s mandate. an extraordinary setback to peace operations in The European Union deployed the EU Moni- Georgia, but also had a geopolitical impact that toring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) in Septem- struck far beyond the relatively small theater of ber 2008 and began operations on 1 October. Georgia’s separatist conflicts. That the severity Its more than 200 monitors observe the stabi- of the conflict, when it burst into the open, came lization process, centering on full compliance as a surprise to many, is undeniable. But it also with the six-point agreement, the normalization followed a long period of serious deterioration process of civil governance, and the return of in relations between the parties involved, rooted displaced persons, and contribute to reduce ten- in a growing skepticism regarding the possibili- sions through facilitating contacts between par- ties of reaching negotiated settlements. By the ties and undertaking other confidence-building end of 2008, with the dust still settling from the measures. The mission established four field August hostilities, it was still too soon to iden- offices, in Poti, Zugdidi, Gori, and Tbilisi, and tify a clear path forward. However, the prompt deployed patrols to the areas adjacent to Abk- dispatch of the new European Union mission of- hazia and South Ossetia—not within them. On fers a clear demonstration of the importance at- 10 October the EU confirmed that Russian armed tached to peace and security in a region whose forces had completed their planned withdrawal potential for instability, as 2008 demonstrated, is from these areas to Abkhazia and Georgia. unwise to underestimate.