Navigating Networks in the Napoleonic Era: a Close Study of Three British Naval Officers and Their Deliberate Use of Networking ______

NAVIGATING NETWORKS IN THE NAPOLEONIC ERA: A CLOSE STUDY OF THREE BRITISH NAVAL OFFICERS AND THEIR DELIBERATE USE OF NETWORKING ______

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, Fullerton ______

In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

History ______

Timothy Knight

Thesis Committee Approval:

Professor Robert McLain, Chair Professor Gayle Brunelle, Department of History Professor Stephen O’Connor, Department of History

Spring, 2016

ABSTRACT

The hierarchy of Britain’s social system in the 18th and early 19th centuries was rigidly stratified and patriarchal, with a limited noble class, or peerage, a small but burgeoning middling class, and a substantial lower class of either peasants or urban workers. Those from the middle class frequently found their options for social and economic growth to be limited in the absence of patronal connections. As such, social networking, or interactions between an individual and an array of contacts, though often considered a relatively recent phenomenon, was integral to those who intended to ascend to a higher social or economic status, even in an era that lacked modern communications technologies.

This study focuses on the network interactions, specifically deconstructing examples of patronage, deference, and information-brokering, in an attempt to characterize the career construction historical legacy of three British Royal Navy Admirals, Edward Hawke, Horatio

Nelson, and Cuthbert Collingwood, as a product of meticulous communications via letter-writing and cultivating connections. While their own deliberate historical agency was important, this study contends that a reciprocal binary interaction between each man and a number of others of different spheres of social contacts, both above and below their own social standing, greatly influenced their ability to ascend to the highest ranks of both social and military standing in

Britain during the Age of Napoleon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Significance of Patronage and Deference ...... 5 Methodology ...... 8 Historical Context: Introducing the Three Admirals ...... 16 Nelson ...... 16 Hawke ...... 17 Collingwood ...... 22

2. CLIENTAGE AND INFORMATION BROKERING ...... 27

Horatio Nelson – The Deferent Client ...... 27 Nelson as a Client of Politicians and Nobility ...... 38 Edward Hawke – The Dutiful Client ...... 43 Promotion to Rear Admiral of the White ...... 48 The Second Battle of Cape Finisterre ...... 51 Collingwood – Client and Information Broker ...... 55 A Short Visit Home ...... 58 A Victory Despoiled ...... 59 Missions in the Mediterranean ...... 62

3. PATRONAGE ...... 66

Nelson as a Patron...... 66 Hawke as a Patron...... 77 Collingwood as a Patron ...... 87

4. CONNECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS...... 102

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 111

APPENDIX A: NETWORK MAP ...... 124

APPENDIX B: NELSON LETTER GRID...... 125

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to specifically thank the entire thesis committee for helping me on my journey to formulate, write, and defend my thesis. Without the guidance of particularly Dr.

Brunelle and Dr. McLain throughout my entire three-year journey in the Master’s program, this project would not have been possible for me to complete. Naturally, I thank my family for all of the encouragement they continue to provide. I also must thank, though she may never know,

Amber for being so supportive during such a prolonged period of stress and heavy workloads.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For most living in the early modern era, there scarcely existed a need for any of the tools we view as integral to communicating with the people in our modern social networks. In an era before the advent of railroads, a sizable number of people never went beyond a few dozen miles from their birthplace and only regularly interacted with those who lived nearby. In the event someone was compelled to migrate to a new place, their ability to stay active in the network they left behind was surely limited as the only means of distant communication for centuries before the invention of the telegraph was by way of letter. However, throughout the early modern era, a handful of careers necessitated extensive use of correspondence, particularly those professions where people were separated by long distances. Out of the countless people who worked in professions where written communication was imperative, few reached the zenith of historical recognition achieved by capable military commanders. This study aims to deconstruct the correspondence of a few of these men, specifically British Royal Navy admirals whose unlanded, middling backgrounds left them with relatively weak connections early-on in their careers to potential political and military patrons. As brilliant as each of these leaders may have been individually, it was their ability to operate alongside others in a vast network that enabled them to advance their careers. This study will analyze how Horatio Nelson, Cuthbert Collingwood, and Edward Hawke cultivated relationships and maneuvered within their respective, yet intricately connected social networks, while using individual agency to construct their decorated

2 careers. Unlike some previous studies of their careers, which are limited to the historical narrative they provide, this one reveals purpose and meaning behind their correspondence. Not only did they use their networking abilities to advance in Great Britain's highly stratified social system, they also, as their career's advanced, began to write with an eye toward building their personal legacy.

Networking, or cultivating relationships with a wide array of people, has served as a defining aspect of human interactions for the better part of recorded history. In the most basic sense, networking is a term that has the prospect to be applied in a sizable number of ways both in and outside the field of history. Historians who have used this term as a crucial part of their own theses have nuanced definitions that most directly fit the scope of their arguments.1 This study contends that networking comprises the interactions between an individual and an array of contacts, some who can be grouped into various spheres (e.g. family, friends, professional, etc.), involving a formal exchange of information (and/or services), for the deliberate purpose of career advancement. It is not uncommon for people to ignore the influence of networking in favor of more readily measurable, individually-attributed evidence. Networks lie outside the realm of what one may describe as tangible assets of land and title, which makes them especially difficult for historians to track and document. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, networking extended beyond these tangible assets, representing a functional mode in which personal contacts with friends, family, and the politically connected supplanted the advantages of an aristocratic birth. In a milieu where primogeniture and entitlement protected caste and

1 Kristin Elizabeth Gager, for example, was particularly interested in the notion of kinship and the bonds created between blood and adoptive relatives. In her book Blood Ties and Fictive Ties: Adoption and Family Life in Early Modern France, Gager argued elements outside of a formal familial tie, such as spirituality, apprenticeship, and guardianship could often form stronger "families" than those people to whom people were formally related. The relationships to which she refers may, to another historian, be considered quite similar to the kinds of bonds created in a vast network of contacts. Nelson may even be considered an ideal candidate for the examination of "fictive ties," as his lack of any blood-related sons likely created a void whereby he saw a need to find a network of competent young men to carry on his legacy.

3 prevented the breakup of estates, the language of social deference, along with the guile and bravery in the face of a common French adversary, provided a unique opportunity for advancement, and in particularly Nelson's case, historical immortality.

The connection between two people carries an array of subtle features—such as the nature of their acquaintance, the formality of their communication, structures of dominance and submission, and the likelihood of making new connections with other individuals in either person's greater network. In this respect, one might readily argue that the perceived fame or infamy, success or failure, significance or disinterest of any historical figure came as much from individuality and agency as from social positioning and interacting with others. One might question the degree to which the accolades of any single individual came as a product of that person's own agency or, conversely, came from his or her position in an intangible, external social network and how those who surrounded the individual created his or her historical relevance. Another function of networks, yet to be mentioned, is the threshold, or liminality, that divides individual agency from social reactivity. This addresses the extent to which one exerts agency to position oneself amongst others in a network and, perhaps, control how far one's network extends.2

Terms such as partiality, cronyism, gathering social capital, favoritism, and nepotism each describe conditions by which a person benefits from network position and sees others, less favorably positioned but sometimes equally or better qualified, deprived.3 Here again, each connection in the network is comprised of elusive features such as conflicting personalities and

2 The methodology informing the content of this and the next three paragraphs came from: J.M. Bourne, Patronage and Society in Nineteenth Century England (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1986); Alison Games, The Web of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth- Century France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Lindsay O’Neill, The Opened Letter: Networking in the Early Modern British World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 3 See: John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Knopf, 1989).

4 opinions, egotism, and sycophancy — each having a potentially monumental impact upon one's dynamic position within their network. Aside from certain limited resources, historians often can only speculate about the influence of such matters. So many social interactions take place privately and face-to-face, in the absence of written record, where content, flattery, conflict, and tone are immediately lost to all who were not witness to the conversation. Historians, meanwhile, must work with resources on record, where they may be better able to discern these themes. The abundant written correspondence of Admirals Hawke, Collingwood and Nelson, for instance, provide unique historical utility as they offer scholars with the means to derive individual historical narratives and place those individuals in the greater context of his or her social network. Meanwhile, for these men in particular, the letters themselves were a primary means of communication and were thus carefully crafted to achieve each man's desired outcome while adhering to the social nuances hereto mentioned.

Naturally, even in spite of their obvious similarities in career choice, ethnic background, and socio-economic standing, these men each had their own individual traits that distinguished them from one another. By carefully analyzing the variations in their correspondence with contacts of diverse backgrounds (specifically fellow officers, foreign and domestic political dignitaries, and even their own friends and family) one can anticipate idiosyncrasies of their personalities and attitudes to emerge. While their personalities were distinctly different, with

Collingwood more often giving into cynicism and melancholy, Nelson as an almost unremitting optimist, and the ever-pragmatic and scrupulous Hawke, the common thread of their conduct that tied them together was their cognizance and utility of patronage, deference, and information

5 brokering. Each of these elements was crucial in navigating their social circles and climbing the ranks of the British Royal Navy.4

The Significance of Patronage and Deference

Patronage and deference were critical facets of any man's career in the British Royal

Navy and a number of other patriarchal structures in the early modern era. According to Oxford

English Dictionary, "patronage is the action of a patron in giving services of influential support, favor, encouragement, or countenance, to a person, [or] institution, work, art, [p]rotection, defence, protectorship...[and]the right of control of appointments to offices, privileges, etc. in the public service."5 Patronage in 19th century Britain was a well-established custom, unmistakably influential in politics for centuries. Obvious as its presence was to almost everyone in England, uncovering historical proof of patron-client relationships is often met with fleeting success because such interactions were intentionally discreet and indicative of corruption. Official government documents and court papers rarely draw attention to such illegitimate matters. It is for this reason J.M. Bourne, in his book Patronage and Society in Nineteenth-Century England, wrote, "the tendency of patronage to form extended systems also generated correspondence, a tendency reinforced by the difficulty and expense of travel before the railways, the improvement of postal services...and not much counteracted by telephones before 1914."6 Each of these admirals' correspondence provides ample evidence of the commonplace practice of patronage.

But their use of patronage, which includes both their ability to provide services to others while properly showing deference to their own patrons, while subtly making themselves invaluable to

4 Information on this page and in future paragraphs on the comparison of characters of the naval officers were informed by the following resources: Oliver Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Tom Pocock, Horatio Nelson (New York: Knopf, 1988); and Ruddock Mackay, Admiral Hawke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 5 Bourne, Patronage and Society, 3. 6 Ibid., 9.

6 those with whom they interacted, makes Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood truly intriguing men to study. J.M. Bourne cautions those examining such correspondence arguing, "Patronage provided rich opportunities for the dishonest, the deluded, and the insincere."7 Interestingly, though the act of patronage itself is incredibly dishonest and subjective, each of these men tended to provide opportunities for those they saw as carrying out their own vision of the British

Royal Navy. Being that nearly a century divides the beginning of Hawke's career and the end of

Collingwood's, the web of connections these men wove have considerable generational overlap.

Thus, perhaps in critique of Bourne's view, if the opportunities provided to those who knew

Hawke, Collingwood, and Nelson brought even a single dishonest, deluded, or insincere person into the fold — surely, so was each and every other of them. The three factors of which one must be aware in analyzing such interactions are, first, the extent to which each man utilized patronage; second, the moral integrity of both the benefactors and beneficiaries of those interactions, including the predilection toward legacy-building; and finally, the degree to which patronage influenced generational overlap, or more specifically, that pre-existing networks predisposed people of certain proximity and personal character to be drawn into those evolving networks, even in the face of generational gaps.

To assess the extent to which these men did, in fact, employ a highly political system of patronage, at times either acting as patrons, clients, or brokers, two questions must be addressed.

First, "with whom did they interact?" For the purposes of this study, the interactions can be grouped into three major categories, or network spheres. The first is politicians or public servants, which could be members of parliament or people of nobility serving in a public committee or capacity of some sort. It may also include diplomats, either foreign or domestic, and, at times, even the foreign leaders themselves. The second is naval personnel, which may

7 Ibid., 11.

7 include anyone serving in the Royal Navy (either superiors or subordinates) as well as the

Admiralty Board. The third is family, relatives, or near relatives — such as in-laws. The second major question to be addressed is "what information or services might these men have been obliged to offer (as a patron) or request (as a client)?" The answer to this question is slightly more complicated. Often, especially late in their careers, a naval officer's power to connect people is, in itself, a service to both his patrons and clients. Generally speaking, as a patron,

Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood each had the ability to offer recommendations, promotions, information, and appointments of positions to his subordinates — particularly those they deemed worthy of promotion and who were mostly familiar to them. They often used these appointments to either foster relationships with loyal cronies, or build connections with those who may have served some purpose to them in the future. This was commonly, albeit unfairly, practiced in the

Royal Navy. Even NAM Rodger, author of The Wooden World, concedes, "because Admiralty authority rested largely on its power to reward, it found itself in the position of...putting within reach of temptation those officers who it hoped would be least likely to succumb [to dereliction or temptation]."8

On the other hand, as a client, each of these eventual admirals' roles is particularly interesting. Both Hawke and Nelson, for instance, were capable of being fiery, manipulative, and cunning subordinates — while thinly guising their intentions and desires with venerable adoration. Nelson's patrons eventually enabled him to secure his own landed assets, earn titles and promotions, and acquire goods and services for himself and his crews — further improving his reputation with them. By contrast, Collingwood, whose career progressed at a slower pace and outside of the limelight shone upon the younger Nelson, clearly benefited from his

8 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1986), 314.

8 connection to Nelson and others, but became increasingly disenchanted with the entire system the further he progressed in it. Even considering the varying experiences of these men it remains easy to fall victim to reification when evaluating each man's relative success. That is to say, we mistakenly view success as a tangible, achievable object that was, in some way, manipulated or acquired by an historical subject. Rather, it is likely that Hawke, Collingwood and Nelson, during their own lifetimes, lacked the perspective to establish a firm conclusion of ever having entirely "achieved" or "obtained" success — and even if they did hold this opinion, it is unlikely they attributed their perception of success to be a product solely of their own creation. The success to which I refer in this study, or one measure of it, is the attainment of the highest ranks in the British Royal Navy. Their attainment of these promotions was certainly a product of their own behaviors and mental processes, but also largely dependent on the opinions of, and their interactions with, numerous others. Thus, I am most concerned with analyzing how, through careful use of correspondence and network-building, these men relayed their achievements, brokered information, showed appropriate deference, and took part in patron-client relations in their lengthy careers in the navy. The significance of this research is to expose the function of social networking in the British Royal Navy via interactions of patronage, deference, and information brokering while giving due credit to individual agency in advancing one’s career in a professional, bureaucratic system.9

Methodology

Networking (and more specifically studies in patronage, deference, and information brokering) in the Royal Navy is a somewhat untouched field in the historiography of the navy.

Until recently, questioning the relative successes or failures of the navy (and those who served in

9 For a precedence on historical contributions related to letter-writing and networking, see: O’Neill, The Opened Letter.

9 it) seemed appropriate only to the extent that those who under-performed or even abjectly failed in their duty were tried, suitably punished, and left to be castigated by historians. In that sense, networking remained a crucially important field to provide a counterweight to balance out the tendencies of elder naval historians whose works were traditionally informed by a British identity, and valued vague notions of nationalism, dominance, inevitability, and, above all, greatness.10 On a grander scale, however, networking has been a rich area for historical study in recent years and is at the center of numerous monographs in systems other than the British Royal

Navy. The methodologies by which historians have conducted their research will be borrowed and replicated in this study. In much the same way that Allison Games, in her book The Web of

Empire, redefined her approach to imperial history by focusing "on how places and people far from Europe defined how the English experienced the world and the empire that emerged," I intend to show that the network in which Hawke, Collingwood, and Nelson operated influenced both them and their interactions with others.11 For lack of better terms, these reciprocal interactions between historical actor and network might best be compared to a positive feedback loop, where each interaction in either direction further promulgated the next interaction. After addressing which methodological approaches I have used to analyze the various sets of letters and the language used in each, the remainder of the paper is thus organized in three major sections: a brief biographical narrative for each of the men to establish the context for their decorated careers; how each of the admirals operated as clients and brokers throughout their careers, demonstrating their interactions with each aforementioned spheres, and evidence to support how each man took advantage of the services they provided to others; and with their

10 See: Fred T. Jane, The British Battle Fleet: Its Inception and Growth Throughout the Centuries to Present Day (London: The Library Press, Ltd., 1915); and Peter Hore, The Habit of Victory (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2005). 11 Alison Games, The Web of Empire, 11.

10 ascendance in rank, each man's role as emerging patrons, their interactions with individuals in each sphere, and evidence to support individual services they rendered to each.

The methodological approach used in this research to analyze and interpret these correspondences while formulating conclusions about their career-construction and social maneuvering is not without precedent. At least four major works were released in recent years whose authors have used similar methodologies, though each book focuses on different historical eras. Although none of the books are about the British Royal Navy, a few pertain to the early modern and modern era and use close literary analysis of letters and dispatches. Jacob Soll's monograph on Louis XIV's finance minister Jean Baptiste Colbert, The Information Master, is one such example. In it, he argues that the centralized, absolutist state the French monarch is credited with establishing was due, in no small part, to Colbert's purposeful collection and dissemination, indeed his monopolization, of information. Information brokering is absolutely crucial to understanding the development of the careers of Nelson, Hawke, and Collingwood, as all three used sensitive information to position and portray themselves as indispensable. Notably important to Soll's thesis is not only Colbert's harnessing of information for the purposes of bureaucratizing and centralizing the French monarchy but also his use of information to consolidate the importance of his own position relative to Louis XIV. Such deliberate, purposeful motivations are exactly what I intend to reveal about these Vice Admirals of the

British Royal Navy in the era just following Louis XIV's reign in France.12

Sharon Kettering's Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France focuses more broadly on the modus operandi of a number of power brokers of various French provinces during the early modern era. Her study revised our understanding of French absolutism and

12 The perspective and methodology utilized in this paragraph came from Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean- Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

11 revealed the motives of secret narratives in surveys, diaries, memoirs, and correspondences between French parliamentarians, dignitaries, and ministers. As such, the relationship between patrons and their clientele involves material benefits, protection, loyalty, service and a bond between not only the patrons and clients, but the greater administration in which they interacted: the French Royal Court. She also concludes that as the governmental functioning of France became more bureaucratic, the complex and corruptive relationships between brokers and clients were, at times, both a hindrance to, and impetus for, the advancement of the absolutist state.

With respect to my own research, many similar interactions took place in the British Royal

Navy. I aim to uncover the secret motives of the Vice Admirals and those with whom they interacted, which strengthened the bond between patrons and clients, while also advancing the systemic conformity (and adherence to) the practical functions of the Royal Navy, the Board of

Admiralty, and Parliament as powerful administrative bureaucracies of their own.13

Another important book using a similar methodology, though its content focused on an earlier time period in the Renaissance, is Paul McLean's The Art of the Network: Strategic

Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence. One of my main interests in uncovering the techniques the Vice Admirals used to advance their careers is the extent to which they used patronage (either as a patron themselves, or a benefactor). Whereas Soll does utilize some correspondence in his research, McLean's book more heavily analyzes correspondence practices of the social system in Florence.14 His examination of the letters obscures what some may call more objective, quantifiable data as it takes into consideration culture, sociology, and interpersonal relationships in understanding the political transformation Florence underwent in the early renaissance. Early in his book, McLean refers to the term "social capital," or "a web of

13 Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 14 See: Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System.

12 cooperative and trusting social relationships."15 While I might agree that trust is crucial in understanding the complex nature of human relationships, I would also suggest that the Vice

Admirals used trust as a tool in gaining social capital and advancing their position in the navy.

One thread that links my research with that of McLean is the problem of distinguishing oneself among a sea of other qualified people. McLean mentions the Medici family as purposefully pitting potential benefactors against each other for the same positions in the Florentine state, while examining their qualifications by traits less definite than simple legal or economic terms

— instead favoring social elements such as benevolence and humanity. The Vice Admirals, and their own patrons and benefactors in the British Royal Navy centuries later, abundantly promulgated similar traits, such as virtue, loyalty, devotion, duty and honor.16

A fourth resource employing the same methodological approach is J.M. Bourne's

Patronage and Society in Nineteenth-Century England. As the title indicates, this study focuses on the era following that of my own research. While Bourne emphasizes the political function of patronage and its corruptive influence, he also contends that the nature of patronage changed during the mid-nineteenth century from a rigidly vertical class system of patron dependence to a more horizontal honors-based system that required the client to validate their position through competence. Bourne effectively argues that, although patronage can be revealed in almost every culture and society throughout history, the nature of patronage changes based upon the value system in which it is employed. The British Royal Navy of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century existed right at the cusp of the era during which Bourne's research is focused.

The nineteenth century (particularly the first half) brought an era of unprecedented nationalism and conservatism in British society (conservative statesmen served as Prime Minister nineteen

15 Paul McLean, The Art of the Network: Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 16 See: Paul McLean, The Art of the Network: Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence.

13 times in the nineteenth century). It is my belief that the British Royal Navy ushered in the very kind of patronage and value systems that Bourne presents in his monograph due to the nature of the British, throughout the nineteenth century, to draw upon the memory of the navy's achievements harkening back to the Nelsonian era. The roots of the type of political patronage

Bourne analyzed, which became increasingly motivated by the burgeoning industrial economy, can be found in the Royal Navy in the century prior to Bourne's study.17

Though they were men of the Navy, each of these Admirals were subject to the same characteristics manifested in the dynamics of Parliamentary politicians. The Navy, not unlike the government, was (and still is) an institution that is rigidly hierarchical through which one's ascendance was intrinsically tied to their conduct, relationships to others, and general political acumen. Perhaps the most notable work accentuating the importance of accumulating political capital in highly systemic, patriarchal institutions is John Brewer's The Sinews of Power. He argues the Navy, and various other political organizations, benefited dramatically from organizing and managing public information. Additionally, information was remarkably valuable to whomever privately held it because it could be used for lobbying, propaganda, and commercial purposes.18 Beyond that, Peter J. Jupp argues in his article "The Landed Elite and

Political Authority in Britain, ca. 1760-1850," that Britain underwent a major transformation — stressing information access for which demand had steadily rose during Nelson's lifetime. It was also during this time that un-landed men, such as Nelson, had greater opportunities to become

17 See: Bourne, Patronage and Society. 18 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Knopf, 1989), 222-249.

"self-made." Jupp explains, "the number of members who possessed personal interests other than in land — and often, in this difficult period, conflicting with it — drifted upward."19

Taking a similar approach to the aforementioned authors, the aim of this study will be to use the volumes of correspondence from each of the Vice Admirals to derive their use of patronage, deference, and information brokering in understanding how they positioned themselves in the structure of the Royal Navy. The social connections they made will be analyzed in three major networking arenas: political, military, and personal ties. Between those connections, I will reference the letter, nature of the patron-client relationship, and how it played a role in the advancement of the Vice Admiral's career. Once each figure has been analyzed individually in three chapters, the final chapter will be a cumulative analysis of the similarities and differences among them regarding the process and success of their political maneuvering.

Historical Context, Introducing the Three Admirals

Nelson

Of the three admirals upon which this study is focused, Horatio Nelson is undoubtedly the best known. Amongst many historians, his name alone is tantamount to naval leadership, wartime expertise, and heroism. His short life, and even shorter admiralty, seems hardly enough time to accumulate the renown and achievement so often accorded to the First Viscount. Indeed,

Nelson's contribution to the British Royal Navy's (and her allies') successes against Napoleon and the French Navy in the latter part of the 18th century, and first few years of the 19th century, personify the history of the Royal Navy as one of triumph, victory, dominance, and unquestioned resilience. More so than his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, including esteemed

Admirals such as James Steuart, George Anson, Samuel Hood, Richard Howe, and John Jervis,

19 Peter J. Jupp, "The Landed Elite and Political Authority in Britain, ca.1760-1850," Journal of British Studies 29 (1990): 72.

15 the British canonize Lord Nelson as the quintessential figure of national pride and naval historiography. His historical memory is so pivotal that, today, many affectionately refer to the era in which he served as the "Age of Nelson." British naval historian Christopher Lloyd captured the essence of Nelson's importance in his book The Nation and the Navy when he said,

"The fame Nelson achieved by his death and victories, and his commemoration by the largest public monument in the heart of London, shows how the old navy...became the symbol of

Britain's power."20 While many works bestow varying levels of esteem and adoration upon

Nelson in both his personal and professional pursuits, to truly uncover the roots of Nelson's brilliance, one must look beyond his naval successes, as he not only was he an expert seaman, but an expert in social interaction.21

Over the course of his career, the Vice Admiral wrote countless letters to his superiors, his subordinates, and personal friends and family. Nelson's missives reveal a tapestry of intricate political and economic ties, delicate diplomatic negotiations, and an internal compass whose true north always pointed to amassing political capital. Setting aside the more dramatic naval anecdotes for which Nelson is known (such the amputation of his arm after being struck by a musket shot while attempting to take the port of Santa Cruz in Tenerife22), the majority of

Nelson's letters attend to the daily business of commanding a ship and operating not only within the Royal Navy, but on an international platform as well. As historian Andrew Lambert describes, "his unique abilities enabled him to render the complex business of naval battle simple

20 Christopher Lloyd, The Nation and the Navy (London: The Cresset Press, 1954), 155. 21 For more biographical background on the life and career of Horatio Nelson, see: Tom Pocock, Horatio Nelson (New York: Knopf, 1988).; Brian Lavery, Horatio Lord Nelson (New York: New York University Press, 2003).; Edgar Vincent, Nelson: Love and Fame (London: Yale University Press, 2003).; and John Sugden, Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 1758-1797 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004). 22 Colin White, ed. and Horatio Nelson, Nelson - New Letters (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2005), 189.

16 for his followers."23 This term "business" is perhaps the best word to use because of the nature of Nelson's performance in his duties so closely resembling those of a mid-level manager at a successful company, which required him to negotiate with any number of people in different roles both in and outside of the navy.

Nelson's legacy, survived by his vast correspondence, indicates he was not simply a man who happened upon fortuitous circumstances, or whose fate bestowed greatness upon him.

Rather, his letters reveal a methodically crafted career. David Howarth, author of British Sea

Power, summed up Nelson's success, acknowledging "his innumerable acts of thoughtfulness and kindness, great and small; however busy he was, tired, weighed down by responsibility, worry and ill-health, he never neglected old friendships or failed...to make new ones."24 Kind as he may have appeared, for the middle-born Nelson no good deed was to go unnoticed — or unremunerated. A careful analysis of the wealth of correspondence reveals the techniques he used, including patronage and brokering of intelligence, to meticulously maintain his relationships. Without his accumulation of vast political and social capital, the man and the memory may never have materialized.25 To be sure, it was not merely his presence during

England's long wars with France that secured his purchase in history, but an acute awareness of the importance of social exchanges.

Nelson's career can be separated into three general eras. The first of these was from his entry into the navy on New Year's Day in 1771, at the age of twelve, until he paid off his command of HMS Boreas and went on half-pay reserve in 1788. Regrettably, of the available

23 Andrew Lambert, "'The Glory of England': Nelson, Trafalgar and the Meaning of Victory," The Great Circle 28 (2006): 3. 24 David A. Howarth, British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 330. 25 For more on the importance of intelligence in this era, see: Steven Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

17 catalogs of Nelson's letters, only a fraction are from this period. Certainly, were more available

(particularly from his first decade in the navy), historians could point to many more explicit examples of his deliberate attempt to forge relationships with his superiors. Of those that do remain from the period from 1771 to 1788, a good number are addressed to four of the most important patrons in Nelson's life: William Locker, Maurice Suckling, Peter Parker, and His

Royal Highness Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence. The second major era in Nelson's career is marked by the start of the French Revolution in 1789, which was the same year Nelson almost left the navy entirely, and 1797, which saw two of the most pivotal events of his career: the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, in February, and the Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, in August.

The correspondence from this era is greater in number than the previous, and is useful for characterizing Nelson's growing influence, the fostering of connections to contacts from all walks of life, as well as his persona and some of his private affairs. The final era, from 1798 to

1805, marked Nelson's ascendency to the pinnacle of his career. The Battle of the Nile, in 1798, was the climax of Nelson's military achievements and by the time of his assassination at the

Battle of Trafalgar, Nelson had established a considerable network of clients comprised of many of his own protégés. The majority of his surviving letters are from this period of his life and are most useful for understanding how Nelson became a patron in his own right. Interestingly, he shared a number of connections with a predecessor he never formally met, whose own clients were instrumental throughout Nelson's entire career.26

Hawke

Fifty-three years before the birth of Horatio Nelson, Edward Hawke was born. His name is nowhere near as recognizable, except perhaps to naval historians, but his contribution to

26 See Pocock, Horatio Nelson; John Sugden, Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 1758-1797 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004).

Britain's successes on the high seas in the 18th century were, arguably, just as great as those of

Nelson. Hawke's rise through the ranks in the British Royal Navy served as a precursor to the superstardom Nelson achieved. The son of a barrister at Lincoln's Inn, Hawke's father died when he was only thirteen. His uncle on his mother's side, Colonel Martin Bladen, however, served as his first connection to politics and his career in the navy. Bladen, a Member of Parliament, took an interest in the young Hawke and utilized his connection to Sir Robert Walpole to establish colonial interests abroad. It was Bladen that placed Hawke in the West Indies, where his assets lied, for the majority of his early career. This was both a service to Hawke, who got his foot in the door of an overstaffed navy, and Bladen himself, who trusted Hawke in securing his ties to overseas colonies. The start of Hawke's career was strangely similar to Nelson's, whose exposure to the navy came from the influence of extended family, namely his uncle Maurice

Suckling, and an ambiguous tie to Lord Walpole, to whom his mother was distantly related.

At first glance, the similarities between these men appear greater in number than their differences. Both came from families who were on the outskirts of real political or social influence, both attained meteoric promotions to the highest positions in the navy, and both cultivated invaluable connections in naval and political realms through correspondence. But the men, apart from their naval careers and backgrounds, differed in temperament both mentally and behaviorally. And although, in hindsight, it is clear each achieved the goal of constructing their decorated careers, the methods and definitions by which they approached this goal, ultimately making themselves an asset to their respective surrounding social networks, were quite different.

Whereas Horatio Nelson's exuberance, eloquence, and extraversion, coupled with an unrelenting sense of vanity and confidence, made him an almost magnetic figure, Lord Hawke refrained from the kinds of flowery overtures demonstrated in Nelson's letter writing. Direct and

19 disciplined, Hawke's approach to communication and career-building was one that was thorough, decisive, and intentional, but not romantic. The use of self-aggrandizement was necessarily present in his letters, but only to the extent it accurately reflected his achievement and intent. If, for Lord Nelson the proof of his importance was in his personality, then comparatively, for Lord

Hawke the proof was in his performance. This isn't to say, of course, that Nelson wasn't deserving of the accolades and promotions bestowed upon him. Rather, it is to suggest that

Nelson's approach to career building indicated he was invaluable to those he served, whereas reading the letters of Lord Hawke, one gets the impression it was his duty that was invaluable.

Because Hawke lived in the early eighteenth century, an era before peerage titles were frequently granted to middling-sorts, perhaps his proclivity towards a sort of noblesse oblige can be considered appropriate and predictable. In one of the earliest sources of Hawke's career, The Life of Lord Hawke, author Montagu Burrows wrote, "Nothing could be further from his character than to flatter the mob, or show any care for its praise or censure. He was to do his duty, and praise must follow him."27 Hawke's career, in many ways, served as a lesson to Nelson on how to successfully command a ship and build adequate connections with fellow officers to climb the ranks.

Two other major contrasts should be noted between Hawke and Nelson regarding the lengths of their careers and the eras in which they served Britain's navy. The pinnacle of

Nelson's career came at the Battle of the Nile in 1798, when he dealt a severe blow to Napoleon's navy in the east Mediterranean. Nelson was 40 years old, and would be dead inside of seven years. His short career was almost entirely encompassed by an era of war and international instability. Lord Hawke, however, began his career in 1720 — an era of relative peace for

Britain. He came into a navy that had more sailors than it had places to put them, and as

27 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke (London: W.H. Allen, 1896), 7.

Ruddock Mackay points out, "it is indicative of the strength of his backing 'interest' that he

[passed the essential lieutenant's examination in 1725] at the prescribed minimum age, whereas those favoured by exceptional patronage often undercut it by a year or two."28 Indeed, early in his career, Hawke was forced on several occasions to serve unemployed at half pay. The first and lengthiest of these occasions was from December of 1730 to May 1731, after serving aboard

Leopard under Captain Peter Warren, a connection whose importance paid dividends later in

Hawke's career. Then, for several weeks in January, 1732, he was placed at half-pay again - and briefly once more in September of 1735 — after having already earned the rank of captain.29 On each of the ships he was assigned, he performed in a manner admirable enough (particularly in

1743 at the Battle Off Toulon) to avoid the wrath of various courts-martial cases that came about from incidences in joined naval operations of which he was a part. Aside from the War of

Austrian Succession, Britain's first major wartime effort came in 1754 at the start of the Seven

Years' War, when Hawke was already nearly 50 years old. In that sense, with the limited number of opportunities he had available early in his career to demonstrate himself as a capable seaman, it was even more crucial that Hawke utilized discipline and cunning while abroad, maintained regular communication with his superiors, carefully brokered information, and appropriately handled the aforementioned courts-martial incidences.

It was in his 27th year in the navy, in 1747, that he was promoted to the admiralty — three years before the same point in Nelson's career, by comparison. Strangely, Hawke's promotion to the admiralty was anything but a foregone conclusion — despite having served dutifully and maintained close connections to people in high places. Also worth mentioning is that many of the more illustrious achievements of Hawke's career, such as the Second Battle of

28 Ruddock Mackay and Michael Duffy, Hawke, Nelson and British Naval Leadership (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2009), 13. 29 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 11-12.

Cape Finisterre and his role in the Seven Years War, came after his appointment to the admiralty, as opposed to Nelson whose most notable milestone as a vice admiral, the victory at the Battle of Trafalgar, was attenuated by his death at the hands of a French sniper.30 It is for these reasons, the relative banality of his early career and his lengthy post rear admiral appointment, that most of the primary resource documentation surrounding Hawke's career is principally concerned with those years directly preceding his promotion to rear admiral and the drama surrounding a much more eventful era marked by the Seven Years War.

Unlike Nelson, whose plentiful letters comprise eight full volumes of books, letters from

Hawke and Collingwood are fewer in number and scope. For that reason, the analysis of Edward

Lord Hawke's career begins with the events off Toulon in mid-February, 1743, and is less about his successes as a naval commander, and more about how he managed to relay news of his achievements to his superiors and broker information and intelligence to his fellow officers (both ashore and at sea) so to better position himself and his career. Unlike Nelson, the construction of

Hawke's career came much more in the form of maintenance after his promotion to Admiral, rather than the steps he took to achieve such a high rank. Hawke's involvement and resolve in a few precarious Courts Martials early in his career may have ended a less conscientious officer's career. The irony is that, decades later, Hawke served a lengthy tenure in the Board of

Admiralty, in which he was directly involved as an historical actor on the other side of such situations.

30 For more on contextual information, see: Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 53-102.; Hore, The Habit of Victory 43-82.; Lee Bienkowski, Admirals in the Age of Nelson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 1-190.; Ruddock F. Mackay and Michael Duffy, Hawke, Nelson, and British Naval Leadership, 1747-1805, (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2009).; Michael Duffy, ed. Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992).

Collingwood

A year after Edward Lord Hawke was promoted to Rear Admiral of the White, in 1748,

Cuthbert Collingwood was born in Newcastle upon Tyne, northern England — nearly ten years to the day before his most famous contemporary, Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson.31 Not unlike those men, Collingwood came from humble beginnings. One of ten children, seven girls and three boys (though not all survived past childhood), "[h]is father...was a Newcastle trader, respectable but not wealthy."32 The difference that distinguishes Collingwood's beginnings from many other admirals (both before and after him) was virtually a complete absence of ties to political and naval patronage. The person Collingwood pointed to as his sole connection to the navy was "the late Admiral Braithwaite."33 The man to whom he referred was, at the time he entered the service, Captain Richard Braithwaite, his uncle by marriage on his mother's side.34 Although he entered the navy in 1761, at the age of 13, Collingwood's rise through the ranks of the British

Royal Navy lagged by comparison to both Hawke and Nelson. In fact, despite being a full decade older, Collingwood found himself on several occasions filling the void left by Nelson's expeditious promotion to post-Captain in 1779.35 He was first acquainted with Nelson six years earlier in 1773, after accumulating twelve years naval experience, where according to historian

Max Adams, "they immediately struck up a close friendship."36 His assessment is likely based on a letter penned months after Nelson's death by Collingwood himself in January, 1806, in which he wrote:

31 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, xv. 32 Max Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon (Hoboken: Turner Publishing Company, 2005), 35. 33 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 2. 34 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 41. 35 Steven E. Maffeo, Seize, Burn, or Sink: The Thoughts and Words of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), xxiii. 36 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 60.

In 1776, I went to Jamaica as Lieutenant of the Hornet sloop; and soon after, the Lowestoffe, of which Lord Nelson was Lieutenant, came to the same station. We had been long before in habits of great friendship; and it happened here, that as Admiral Sir P[eter] Parker, the Commander-in-Chief, was the friend of both, whenever Lord Nelson got a step in rank, I succeeded him...37

Despite being ten years Nelson's senior, Collingwood found himself benefiting from the latter's ability to act as a patron. Nelson wrote of him early in his career on several occasions. In a letter to Captain William Cornwallis, in 1784, Nelson suggested, "The others are ignormaus', except Collingwood who is a very good Officer and an Amiable Character." His early fondness of Collingwood was clear, and perhaps the reciprocity of their friendship was an early motivator for Nelson to begin cunningly advocating for the advancement of men of which he was fond in an effort to build a social circle of competent and loyal compatriots. In another letter to

Admiralty Secretary Philip Stephens, dating from 1786, Nelson said of Collingwood, "His conduct upon former occasions has not, I am certain, escaped their Lordship's observation; and I am sure such assiduity, alertness, and ability to serve his Country, will not pass unnoticed."38

Always the master wordsmith and manipulator, Nelson acted as a champion for the elder

Collingwood, whom he had quickly surpassed in his own rise to the forefront of naval prominence.

Depending on who you ask, the two may have been either likely or unlikely friends. On one hand, the younger, more exuberant Nelson may quickly have worn on the nerves of a man whose own personality gravitated towards introversion, shyness, and quiet confidence.

Likewise, Collingwood rebuffed the ostentation and publicity in which Nelson basked. He would likely have had more in common with his predecessor, Edward Hawke, who valued notions of duty and service, coupled with a parsimonious approach to glory and the prize money

37 Cuthbert Collingwood and Newnham Collingwood Esq., ed. A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 9. 38 Maffeo, Seize, Burn, or Sink: The Thoughts and Words of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, 56.

24 it offered. On the other hand, sometimes opposites attract in friendship, and Nelson may have been the perfect counterbalance to Collingwood's less impulsive approach to sea command. It may have been that Nelson offered in Collingwood an outlet through which to live vicariously, or perhaps Collingwood humored himself with the peculiarities of Nelson's magnetism. In any case, the two men, however different, established a friendship that lasted the remainder of each of their lives — both of which were cut short before expected. Collingwood may have sailed to success in the tremendous wake left by Nelson's blistering ascent to the height of his acclaimed, but ephemeral naval career. But Collingwood was a very cerebral man, and his writing shows he possessed a high degree of intelligence, political savvy, and even wry humor. Despite his closeness with Nelson, whose public persona could be perceived as shallowly ostentatious and boastful, Collingwood had a very different personality. He was private and complex, prone to melancholy and sulking, and for these reasons, historians often (though perhaps in err) fail to hold Collingwood to the same degree of reverence or naval mastery as they do Horatio Nelson.

The available primary resources on Collingwood are limited, the bulk of which are almost exclusively found in two resources. The first, dating back to 1837, was written by

George Lewes Newnham Collingwood in two volumes titled A Selection from the Public and

Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood. It contains a selection of many letters written by Collingwood, as well as a few other entries addressed to him. The second, slightly more modern publication, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, was written by Oliver Warner in 1968. The most obvious obstacle inherent in these works is a gaping void of correspondence much before the year 1780, and only scant entries from 1780 to 1790.

As with the limitations of early correspondence with both Hawke and Nelson, the preponderance

25 of Collingwood's surviving documentation is dated 1795 and later, long after he had already achieved the rank of post-Captain.

Initially this absence of documentation relating to Collingwood's early years may appear discouraging to the researcher attempting to dissect how he went about constructing his career.

However, two factors must be considered before dismissing the topic as unanswerable. The first is that much of the "career construction" of an officer below the rank of captain surrounds those duties concerned with the command and maintenance of the ship to which they were assigned.

That is to say, fewer letters were written by lower ranking officers, as communication of their duties principally involved those who were his immediate superiors and were also aboard the ship. Objectively, outside of letters written about a lower-ranking officer by his commanding officer or formal investigations or promotions of a young officer's service, many of the actions they took to advance their careers are lost to history. The second factor to be considered is that the rank of post-Captain is possibly the most crucial time for an officer of the British Royal Navy in securing their future careers. So many officers faced being "yellowed" at this point in their career.39 A yellow captain was more likely to be lacking in both patronage and opportunities to have shown courage, valor, or even partake in naval victories at large. Ultimately, most of these men retired in that capacity, after years of being continuously passed up for promotions to the admiralty by younger, more capable, and more connected officers. Thus, it is in the years from

1793 onward that Collingwood's naval abilities were thoroughly tested, perhaps more so than at any point in his career beforehand.

Ever cunning, Collingwood, even without the kinds of attributes Nelson possessed, was keenly aware of his position in the navy and how to advance it. Evidence of this comes from a

39 Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy, 299.

26 letter Collingwood wrote in 1787, where he explained to his friend and subordinate officer, one

Mr. Lane,

You may depend on it, that it is more in your power than in any one else's to promote both your comfort and advancement. A strict and unwearied attention to your duty, and a complaisant and respectful behaviour, not only to your superiors, but to every body, will ensure you their regard; and the reward will surely come, and I hope soon, in the shape of preferment...Guard carefully against letting discontent appear in you; it is sorrow to your friends, and triumph to your competitors, and cannot be productive of any good. Conduct yourself so as to deserve the best that can come to you; and the consciousness of your own proper behaviour will keep you in spirits...Do not be a nice observer of turns, but for ever present yourself ready for every thing...I never knew one who was exact not to do more than his share of duty.40

Without question, Collingwood knew that duty preceded influence - but it was how an officer put himself in the position of being assigned those duties that exacted his respect. Thus, for

Collingwood, It was his interaction with those few men he considered friends, insofar as he

"trusted" them, or perhaps knew them well enough to predict their thoughts and behaviors, that he opened enough opportunities for himself to demonstrate his duty and climb the naval ladder

— if only a few rungs behind his friend and competitor Vice-Admiral Nelson.

40 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 20-21.

CHAPTER 2

CLIENTAGE AND INFORMATION BROKERING

Horatio Nelson – The Deferent Client

Examples of Horatio Nelson as a client to his patrons in social, political, and naval positions are abundant throughout his career, but most readily apparent in the first decade of his existing letters. In these letters he was necessarily deferent, that is, the tone of his letters show his willingness to cajole, impress, and please the men who directly influenced his career path.

The four most important patrons early in Nelson's career were William Locker, Maurice

Suckling, Peter Parker, and His Royal Highness Duke of Clarence (Prince William Henry).

Surely, others played a role in his career construction as well, however, Nelson's connection with specifically these four paid dividends for his future in the British Royal Navy. Though Maurice

Suckling, an uncle by marriage, died in 1778 while Nelson was still relatively young, he remained close and deferent with his surviving extended family — particularly Maurice's brother

William Suckling, and William's son Maurice William Suckling, for whom Nelson became a patron.1 As for the others, Nelson remained in close contact with them for the duration of their lives.

1 For example, on 29 November, 1796, Nelson wrote a highly deferent letter to William Suckling to maintain that client/patron tie. In it he said, "It would, you may believe, have given me no small satisfaction to have received a letter from your own hand, and to have conveyed to me that you enjoy that good health which I most sincerely wish, as well as a continuance of every family felicity: it is not in my nature to forget, for an instant, the many acts of kindness you have shewn me during the whole course of my life. I can only endeavour to give you the satisfaction of knowing that it has not been thrown away on an unworthy object. My professional reputation is the only riches I am likely to acquire in this war; what profit that will bring me time can only determine, however, it is satisfactory to myself and I believe will be so to you...How is Mrs. Suckling, Mr. Rumsey, Miss Suckling, and every part your family? I am interested that all should be happy, and contribute to make you so." Horatio Nelson and Nicholas

Horatio Nelson was one of several young lieutenants who served under Captain William

Locker aboard HMS Lowestoffe in the Caribbean during the late 1770s. In addition to the lengthy friendship they established, as well as the naval experience and expertise Locker offered to Nelson, he also served as the closest connection Nelson had to Edward Hawke. Nearly twenty years earlier, Locker served aboard Admiral Hawke's flagship, the HMS Royal George.

William Locker had even named his own son after Hawke, Edward Hawke Locker.2 Nelson wrote no less than 59 letters to Locker in the period from 1777 to 1788.3 The deference and adulation with which Nelson carefully wrote to his patron was clear even early on in his correspondence. Locker was the recipient of one of the earliest known letters still in existence that Nelson wrote. "My most worthy Friend," he began, "I am exceedingly obliged to you for the good opinion you entertain of me, and will do my utmost that you may have no occasion to change it."4 Through the entire letter, Nelson bestows the utmost respect upon Locker and his family. He frequently drew attention to the desire to "serve" his best friends, using variations of the word three times in the final three sentences of the letter.

Nelson continued to act as a client of Locker, long after the two were no longer situated aboard the same ship. Five years after their acquaintance, in 1782, Nelson wrote to Locker with diligent frequency to keep him apprised of his own career path. For instance, in a letter written

April 2nd of that year, he wrote an extremely cunning letter to Locker to inform him of an unpleasant set of orders that would see Nelson put aboard HMS Daedalus, under Captain Pringle

(who ultimately became a friend of Nelson) to go with a convoy to Quebec during the winter

Harris Nicolas, ed. The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 2 (London: H. Colburn, 1844), 306. 2 J. K. Laughton, ‘Locker, William (1731–1800)’, rev. A. W. H. Pearsall, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2015 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16895, accessed 19 Sept 2015] 3 See letter grid included in appendices, data taken directly from the volumes of Nelson's letters offered by both Nicolas and White. 4 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 1, 23.

29 time. He began the letter with the self-deprecating phrase, "I ought to be scolded for not having wrote to you for this long time past."5 He continued,

I want much to get off from this damned voyage, and believe, if I had time to look a little about me, I could get another Ship. Mr. Adair, who attends on Mr. Keppel6, might tell him, that in such a Country I shall be laid up: for he has told me, that if I was sent to a cold damp climate it would make me worse than ever. Many of my Navy friends have advised me to represent my situation to Admiral Keppel, and they have no doubt but he would give me other orders, or remove me: but as I received my orders from Lord Sandwich, I can't help thinking it wrong to ask Mr. Keppel to alter them.7

One might easily misconstrue this letter as Nelson simply informing Locker of a set of unfortunate circumstances and that out of some bizarre loyalty to duty, he refused to ask his orders to be changed and was set on forging through a rough winter in Quebec. This letter was not about duty, it was about asking for a favor without needing to formally ask. By making quite clear his health and happiness were in jeopardy, while keeping up the ruse that he was actually committed to following through with his orders, Nelson was hoping beyond measure that Locker could tap the proper connections with his old pal Keppel and get a change of orders without embarrassingly having to ask for one. Indeed, the very next letter Nelson wrote began with, "I am very much obliged to you for the great trouble you have given yourself, in trying to alter my destination."8 Even when Nelson eventually outranked Locker, he still used gentler, respectful, and elegantly phrased language when writing to him. In February of 1799, just a year before

Locker's death, Nelson wrote,

5 This eye-roll inducing remark is exactly the kind of language Nelson was renowned for using with those from which he drew favors. To be clear, the last letter he wrote was a mere three weeks earlier on the 10th of March, and after analyzing countless correspondences with hundreds of people, I can say with certainty he owed apologies to far and away more people for letting months (or even years) pass without responding to them. Though perhaps such an accusation is a bit unfair, as nowhere close to every letter that Nelson ever wrote is either published, still existing, or even available to researchers. 6 Referring to Admiral Keppel, who incidentally served years earlier as one of Hawke's most important captains in the late 1750s. 7 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson Vol. 1, 61. 8 Ibid., 62.

...you, my old friend, after twenty-seven years acquaintance know that nothing can alter my attachment and gratitude to you: I have been your scholar; it is you who taught me to board a Frenchman, by your conduct when in the Experiment... and my only merit in my profession is being a good scholar; our friendship will never end but with my life.9

Indeed, using Kristin Elizabeth Gager’s logic, author of Blood Ties and Fictive Ties, the fictive tie created between Locker and Nelson established an adoptive father-son relationship between the two men that lasted the rest of the former's life.

Sir Peter Parker, a long-time admiral and man of exceptional naval experience, was another important patron of Horatio Nelson. Parker's career spanned five decades, and his early years in the navy share much in common with Admiral Hawke, who was a mere 15 years older than Parker — though no letters exist to substantiate a connection of any personal degree between the two men. Parker was already a Rear Admiral and commander-in-chief at Jamaica by the time Nelson met him in 1777.10 Due to his advanced age and rank, he began as a somewhat unlikely patron for Nelson as he was a step removed from having an immediate interaction with Parker. But because both Captains John Locker and Maurice Suckling were in

Parker's close circle, thankfully Nelson had two important men to link him to the Admiral and advocate on his behalf. The degree to which Nelson benefited from his clientage to Parker is one to carefully weigh, considering the scarcity of direct correspondence between the two men. This is a powerful indicator that the number of letters available for study does not always directly correlate to the strength of either the patron/client connection itself or the overall importance of that connection to the historiography. Indeed, Nelson's first major position after becoming acquainted with Parker was as his first lieutenant aboard his flagship HMS Bristol. To further substantiate this connection, Nelson's early career biographer John Sugden provided the best

9 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 3, 260. 10 Sugden, Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 128-9.

31 explanation of Sir Peter Parker's importance to Nelson when he wrote, "[T]he Parkers acted out of a genuine friendship for Captain Suckling, and quickly developed their own bonds with a likeable youngster. They called him 'a son.'"11 Deliberate use of the word 'son' conjures Gager's argument on fictive ties once again, substantiating the importance of non-blood relation family building. The benefits Nelson collected from his inclusion in Parker's family was paid back years later when he helped place younger generations of Parker's blood-related kin into naval positions. Without question, serving in close proximity to a man of Parker's standing was essential to Nelson's career and also taught him how to properly groom able seamen and build a fictive family of his own — skills he put into execution when he began taking aboard his favorite protégés later in his career.

While the roles Locker and Parker played as a naval patrons in Horatio Nelson's career was more prominent in his early years in the navy, Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence, filled a peculiar patronage role in Nelson's career. Just as Locker was Captain to Nelson, Nelson was actually Captain to Prince William Henry in 1785 — meaning, strictly in a naval capacity,

Nelson was his superior. But because of the fact that the eventual Duke of Clarence, and later

King William IV, was royalty, and Nelson's own background was of the middling sort, one might argue Nelson was very much a social subordinate. Indeed, by the time they met,

"[William Henry] had seen more action than Nelson and participated in Rodney's victory over the Spaniards at Cape St. Vincent in 1780."12 In any case, the two developed a fascinating relationship of mutual respect for perhaps different reasons. The first record of their surviving correspondence is from 1787, by which point Prince William Henry had become a captain himself. The subject matter of the letter pertained to the perceived insubordination of Mr. Isaac

11 Sugden, Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 128. 12 Ibid., 215.

Schomberg, a lieutenant serving under the Prince. Nelson, a staunch loyalist, politely deferred to the Prince by using a valediction slightly different than his standard "I am, etc," instead using, "I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Royal Highness's Most obedient humble Servant."13 But this letter came years after the two had originally met, as Nelson wrote in a letter to Locker in 1783 where his school-girl giddiness could hardly be contained,

My situation in Lord Hood's Fleet must be in the highest degree flattering to any young man. He treats me as if I was his son, and will, I am convinced, give me anything I can ask of him: nor is my situation with Prince William less flattering. Lord Hood was so kind as to tell him (indeed I cannot make use of expressions strong enough to describe what I felt), that if he wished to ask questions relative to Naval Tactics, I could give him as much information as any Officer in the Fleet.14

While Nelson may have been enamored with the prospects of flying so close to the likes of royalty, Prince William Henry's first impression of Nelson did not convey the same level of enthusiasm. In a footnote of Nicolas, he included an excerpt from Minutes of a Conversation with the Duke of Clarence at Bushey Park, where the Duke was quoted as saying,

[Nelson] appeared to be the merest boy of a Captain I ever beheld: and his dress was worthy of attention. He had on a full-laced uniform: his lank unpowered hair was tied in a stiff Hessian tail, of an extraordinary length; the old-fashioned flaps of his waistcoat added to the general quaintness of his figure, and produced an appearance which particularly attracted my notice, for I had never seen anything like it before, nor could I imagine who he was nor what he came about...My doubts were, however, removed, when Lord Hood introduced me to him. There was something irresistibly pleasing his address and conversation; and an enthusiasm, when speaking on professional subjects, that showed he was no common being.15

This particular description is fascinating for a couple reasons. First, it shows that clearly Nelson was much more excited to meet and make a good impression upon His Royal Highness than the other way around. But perhaps more importantly, it also gives us an outsider's perspective —

13 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 1, 209. 14 Ibid., 72. 15 Ibid., 70.

33 specifically someone who was intimately familiar with Nelson and his character. Nelson eagerly attempted to set himself apart from the crowd in both his appearance (his hair, the full-laced uniform, and coat flaps) and in his manner of speaking (enthusiasm, warmth). Based on this recollection, it is likely he often left a considerable impression with others, even if at first they

(like Prince William Henry) thought Nelson might be a bit unorthodox, or outright strange.

However, getting the attention of both naval and social superiors, particularly in a navy with a considerable number of men looking for glory, was something Nelson was extremely good at doing and it likely helped him to ascend the ranks at the pace he achieved.

Perhaps because of the complicated nature of their relationship, or simply because Nelson was an overly-ambitious social subordinate, he had a tendency to broker extensive information to the Duke of Clarence over the course of his career. Indeed, when examining the wealth of letters published in both Nicolas's and White's compilations, Prince William Henry is one of only a few to whom Nelson wrote a sizable number of letters nearly every single year of their acquaintance.

Obviously, not every single letter Nelson ever wrote was published, or even still survives, but the choice of both historians to include such a large sample from which to draw evidence speaks to the importance of their connection. The second volume of Nicolas's collection, alone, provides two dozen letters — most of which simply iterate Nelson's movements, latest affairs, and intentions for his future course of action. One particular interaction in 1797, however, establishes further context for the fact that Nelson, despite being his naval superior, was conclusively deferent toward the Prince. The Prince congratulated Nelson on 13 March, 1797, on his achievements while serving under Jervis at the Battle of St. Vincent. He wrote,

Dear Nelson, I am, believe me, very happy to own myself in the wrong, and in future to acknowledge that the British Fleet when well disciplined, well Officered, and nobly commanded, can beat any number of Spaniards. I rejoice, my good friend, with all my heart, at the splendid Victory Jervis and his fine fellows have

gained over the Dons. Your conduct has been, as usual, meritorious, and you really need not to have been wounded to complete your fame; for amongst all ranks of people your character has long been established. I am happy to inform you that his Majesty has expressed himself in the most gracious manner about you.16

He also wrote a follow-up letter on 30 April of the same year in which he said "I feel proud of your friendship and regard, and believe me, whatever trust his Majesty may honour me with, it will be both my duty and inclination to fill with care and attention."17 It is obvious from both the tone and the manner of informality (for instance, making a joke about the injury Nelson incurred as being for fame) that the Prince was comfortable enough with his position and his friendship with Nelson to be subtly haughty. Nelson, on the other hand, responded with, "Sir, I beg leave to return you my most sincere acknowledgements for the three letters I have received from your

Royal Highness. Whatever confidence you are pleased to repose in me, will not, I trust, be misplaced; but my conduct and not my words must prove this."18 Comparing the letters, of note is the fact that the salutation in the Duke's letter was "Dear Nelson," while the salutation in

Nelson's letter was "Sir." While it wasn't uncommon for Nelson to address subordinate captains with whom he had no previous correspondence as "Sir," he often warmly opened letters with

"Dear...," when writing to his close friends — such as Davison, Ball, and Berry. However, he did not do this with His Royal Highness. Nelson's letter is written with the same level of seriousness and formality that he offered to his immediate naval superiors, such as Admiral

Jervis, and some of his other patrons.

As his career advanced, Nelson often used his position to act as a liaison — communicating with superiors as a client, but simultaneously acting on behalf of others to offer promotions and recommendations. Nelson's continued correspondence with the Duke of

16 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 2, 386. 17 Ibid., 387. 18 Ibid., 386-7.

Clarence is a prime example of such connections. He generously kept the Duke apprised as to his own intentions and actions, drawing due attention to himself, while advocating on behalf of other officers — especially his own protégés, such as Sir Charles Thompson.19 In 1803, for instance, upon hearing of his appointment to Commander of the Mediterranean, Nelson went about repaying the favor to the Duke of Clarence by guaranteeing to receive and promote two gentlemen as requested by the Prince and disclosed his gratitude when he wrote, "I am truly impressed with all Your...goodness to me and I assure you that I shall endeavour to merit the continuance of that friendship which you have been pleased to honor me with."20 Though

Nelson may have come a long way from his modest upbringing, rising to international fame, he was quite careful not to trivialize his relationships to men that were his clear political, financial, and social superiors.

Lord Nelson frequently communicated with a handful of landed politicians and nobles.

These men, even amidst a transformational socioeconomic hierarchy in Great Britain, were still considered 'above' Nelson by traditional standards. But his adroitness in cajoling men in these positions enabled Nelson to acquire a few powerful allies in Parliament. One such example is that of William Windham, who "[b]ecame a Secretary at War, with a seat in the cabinet, under

Pitt's ministry, in 1794."21 Although Pitt and Windham (who were hawkishly opposed to

Napoleon22) resigned from those positions in 1801, Windham remained an MP and political contact of Nelson's for several years after. In a letter addressed to Windham in November, 1802,

Nelson expressed the difficulty he had in finding positions for men to fill in the Navy. "It is a

19 White, Nelson - New Letters, 192-3. 20 Ibid., 312. 21 Ibid., 497. 22 For more on William Pitt and his approach to France see: Christopher Lloyd, Nation and the Navy: History of Naval Life and Policy (London: Cresset Press, 1954), 130-200.; Michael Duffy, Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), 93-116.

36 fact although I can hardly believe it that I am unable to send a Lad to Sea." At the time the letter was written, Britain had established the Treaty of Amiens with Napoleon which meant fewer men were needed at sea.23 But, in spite of a saturated labor market, Nelson accommodated

Windham and wrote, "The present occasion is the only one which has offered for my being able to situate your friend Mr Coleman's son and the offer as I have it is at your service for him and any other lad that you chuse to recommend."24 A month later, he followed up his correspondence with Windham by ensuring him that Captain Page was to take aboard Mr.

Coleman (whom Windham had wanted nominated as a midshipman) saying, "I shall write to

Capt: Page to beg him to receive Mr. Coleman...In this triffle I can only shew you my readiness to oblige you was my power great enough to do anything worthy of serving any friend of yours."25 In reality, no "begging" was necessary. At this point, Horatio Nelson was already Vice

Admiral and could quite easily dictate commands to a lesser captain. Nonetheless, he made his exerted effort known to Windham as well as his usefulness.

Another example of Nelson advocating for his clients was demonstrated in a letter written to another of Nelson's patrons, former Prime Minister William Pitt, on 11 September, 1805 — less than two months before Nelson's death. With a dark twist of irony, the letter pertained to Sir

Thomas (T.B.) Thompson and the pension that Pitt had the authority to approve upon

Thompson's death. In the letter he strongly supported his client — going out of his way to mention the wounds he (like Nelson) incurred at Tenerife. He wrote, "I know that Sir Thomas has scarcely anything but what dies with him...he is anxious not to leave his Wife and Children

23 "After 1797, the fleet was progressively reduced as most of the important enemy possessions were captured. By 1801, it had fallen to twenty-six ships and vessels, including one of the line, nine frigates, and seven sloops and post ships." Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793-1815 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 250. 24 White, Nelson - New Letters, 83. 25 Ibid., 84.

37 in Distress...I am sure from your liberal manner of acting that you will do what is proper for Sir

Thomas."26 It was in this capacity that Nelson was most effective as an information broker, appealing to his superiors as a loyal servant while acting as a patron for his clients. Nelson knew better than anyone of his time the importance of deference when communicating with the landed elite, as demonstrated here, he deferred to authority while masterfully weaving in his own inclinations and brokering information on behalf of his trusted subordinates.

26 Ibid., 118.

Nelson as a Client of Politicians and Nobility

Nowhere is Admiral Nelson's clientage clearer than in his letters to various British politicians, even including the Prime Minister and Royal Family, ensuring them of his dedication and usefulness, especially in wartime. By late 1802, the brief respite following Nelson's success in Copenhagen and Boulogne in 1801 had come to a close and, shortly thereafter, he began positioning himself for further glory at sea.27 The degree to which this happened was likely a combination of his own political maneuvering, waning excitement (at least in the public's view) of his love affair with Lady Hamilton, who had recently been widowed by the death of Sir

William Hamilton, and increasing hostility with both France and Spain — causing the Treaty of

Amiens to fall through.28 In two letters to Prime Minister Henry Addington, each dated 25

October, 1802, Nelson provided a step-by-step course of action he planned to take if put into the position of directing the navy during war. This particular letter is interesting when considering

Nelson's public standpoint was ostensibly to keep the peace.29 In it, however, Nelson's private, cunning, and unyielding strategy was the "speedy outfitting of the fleet," meaning the use of impressment, which he knew would be met with dire criticism from the Whigs. He assured

Addington that by going along with his plan, success would be nothing more than an afterthought, "Do this and the fleet of England will be at Sea Well Manned in a much shorter time than ever was known."30 In a similar vein as his correspondence with Lord Melville in offering intelligence collected from captured Spanish vessels, Nelson offered spoils collected

27 Mackay, Hawke, Nelson, and British Naval Leadership, 205-207.; Upon his return from Copenhagen in 1801, "Nelson was now moving beyond his need for recognition from King, government, and profession into dependency on the love of the masses." It is reasonable to assume that after a year or so stay at home, as public approbation began to die down and tensions with France ramped up, he felt the need to return to sea to further advance his career and fame. Edgar Vincent, Nelson: Love and Fame (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 480. 28 Pocock, Horatio Nelson, 290-92.; Geoffrey Marcus, The Age of Nelson: The Royal Navy 1793-1815 (New York: Viking Books, 1971), 215-16. 29 White, Nelson - New Letters, 308. 30 White, Nelson - New Letters., 309-11.

39 from an Arab French Corvette he captured on 13 July, 1803, off the coast of Toulon. He made clear his usefulness when he wrote, "I have taken upon Me to Order them [statues and busts] to be sent to England consigned to Sir Joseph Banks...for if our Government chuse to buy these

Articles of Antiquity...They would sell well in this Country."31

In addition to the relationships he maintained with both politicians and naval officers,

Nelson extended his service to diplomats and foreign leaders. Arguably the most notable of these relationships was his ongoing interaction with the King and Queen of Naples and the diplomat Sir William Hamilton. The Neapolitan Royalty's adoration for Nelson came out of his ability to offer them the navy's protection against the French while re-establishing the Kingdom of Naples in 1799.32 In a letter to Sir Hamilton dated 1 October, 1796, Nelson wrote, "I wish any mode could be adopted that I Individually as an Officer (I may I hope without vanity say of some

Merit) I could serve the King of Naples, it is the French fleet that I dread appearing before

Naples."33 But to the ever-mindful Nelson, protection came at a price.34 His negotiations with foreign leaders were, at least in part, ultimately contingent upon him being recognized or rewarded for his efforts. Nelson was nothing if not calculating in his appearances — upholding his image through ribbons, titles, medals, and awards.35 The Vice Admiral was known to be vain in acquiring such assets and unabashedly used them project himself as a man of importance and high regard.36 At the end of the Campaign of the Nile in 1798 (a major British victory against the French), Lord Nelson found himself preoccupied with two parties more than willing to shower him with the affection he so coveted. One was the royal family of Naples and greater

31 Ibid., 333. 32 For more information on the Neapolitan Revolution see Robertson, John. "Enlightenment and Revolution: Naples 1799," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 10 (2000): 17-44. 33 White, Nelson - New Letters, 184. 34 Ibid., 477. 35 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 186.; Vincent, Nelson: Love and Fame, 471. 36 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 186.

Sicilian court; the other was Lady Emma Hamilton, who thereafter became his mistress and confidante. She was the wife of aged Sir William Hamilton, who by then was a close friend of

Nelson and trusted scholar.37

After having stayed with both the Royal family and the Hamiltons for an extended period of time in Palermo, Nelson wrote a letter to his brother Maurice explaining the "fete given at the palace" to honor his efforts in assisting them.38 The letter, dated 7 September, 1799, was written just weeks after "King Ferdinand of Naples had created Nelson Duke of Bronte... with an estate of that name on the foothills of Mount Etna in Sicily."39 Although it was a foreign title, Nelson used it to close nearly every letter dated after it was bestowed upon him — most often signing

'Nelson & Bronte.' Nelson received some degree of scrutiny back in England, not only due to his scandalous and bizarre love triangle with the Hamiltons, but from his increased willingness to extend his stay in Sicily at the behest of King Ferdinand and Queen Carolina. He vigorously defended his connection to them in a letter to the Prime Minister of Naples, Sir John Acton on 9

May, 1800, when he said:

As I hear the Queen will not be ready to quit Palermo so soon as was expected we shall lengthen our stay here till the 18th...That Scoundrel Mr Fox has thought it Right to attack my conduct when at Naples & calls loudly for an enquiry to wipe off the foul Stain on our Nations honor...It is a Justice to His Sicilian Majesty and I should consider myself a beast was I to permit any insinuation agst: his honor to pass unnoticed.40

The Mr. Fox to whom Nelson referred was His Majesty's Loyal Opposition, Charles James Fox, who had articulated his "resolutions against the war with France" several years earlier when, in

1793, he stated to Parliament, "[t]hat it is not for the honour or interest of Great Britain to make

37 Marcus, The Age of Nelson, 146-149. 38 White, Nelson - New Letters, 72. 39 Ibid., 72. 40 Ibid., 238-9.

41 war upon France on account of the internal circumstances of that country."41 Having allied himself with the likes of Pitt and Windham, whose dogged opinions on France laid in direct contrast to Fox's, and with his devoted efforts against the French in the Mediterranean, Nelson had no reason to consider Fox a man with whom he had any foreseeable agreements.

It is in a letter to The Queen of Naples, written on Christmas Eve of 1801, that the tide of

Lord Nelson's treasured connection with Her Majesty shifts from loyal patron to humbled client.

In defending his actions in Palermo and Naples in Parliament, the Queen had written Nelson to express her concern that he had insulted the Neapolitan cause. Nelson opened his letter with a markedly different tone than in his previous writings:

Expression in Your Majestys letter that I had said in Parliament something that you could not approve has forcibly struck my feelings. As I can assure Your Majesty that neither in Parliament or out of it (and I defy and person to assert it) have I ever mentioned your Name but in a Manner I know it deserves as one of the Greatest Monarchs in Europe in point of abilities and as a person of the greatest honor, and when I cease for you to speak of Your Majestys greatness & goodness may the Cure of God light upon Me...Lord Grenville Lord Spencer Mr: Pitt and all the late Minister can bear testimony to them all have I stood forth for the honor of the King and for the benefit of his Dominions.42

Backpedaling on the heels of scrutiny from both Parliament and the royal family of Naples,

Nelson's masterful approach to mitigating any fallout from either side is demonstrated by this fawning response. The Vice Admiral's position relative to the Queen was of clear subordination, and he was particularly useful to her in the years restoring the monarchy in Naples. But in 1801, his duty to the Queen would have continued to be of utmost importance to her in her struggles against the increasingly powerful Napoleon.

The King and Queen of Naples were not the only foreign leaders with which Nelson communicated while navigating the murky waters of mutually-beneficial diplomatic relations.

41 David Charles Douglas, English Historical Documents (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1969), 885. 42 White, Nelson - New Letters, 240.

England's increasingly hostile interactions with Spain necessitated a gentle-handed approach to effectively negotiate with the enemy — offering due respect, while remaining firm. In a letter to the Conde de la Clara, Captain-General of Catalonia, Nelson extended his political capital by offering the crew from a captured vessel to return to Spain. Naturally, this was done with the expected treatment in return as he notes, "I rely that if any English Seamen are returned in

Catalonia or Valencia that Your Excellency will take the proper measures for their being sent to

Me."43 In a similar letter to a different Spanish politician, the Marquis de Solana (Governor

General of Andalucia), he wrote to humbly offer his gratitude for the kind treatment of one of

Nelson's protégés, William Layman. Again, Nelson's vision for the future is remarkable as he does all he can to maintain an image of a modest, self-effacing Admiral who simply wants to keep relations between their two nations (and more specifically him and Spain) tolerant and civilized. "I rely that should unhappily the War be prolonged and bring us to a nearer communication that nothing will be found in my conduct which the generous and noble heart of

Your Excellency will not approve."44 He also communicated at length with the English diplomat to Spain, Hookham Frere, during this time. In one letter, he asks Frere for the favor of

"obtain[ing] an Order from the Court of Spain to direct their Governors & Officers to deliver up all our deserters and on no account to permit the encouragement of desertion."45 Although

Nelson's direct clientage in these particular letters may be slightly obscure, it was not for nothing that Nelson went out of his way to preserve his reciprocally-beneficial connection to Spain. At that time, the threat from Napoleonic France reached its zenith and Nelson's victory at the Battle of the Nile had only temporarily assuaged the concerns of a looming invasion.46 Meanwhile, a

43 White, Nelson - New Letters, 122-3. 44 Ibid., 123. 45 Ibid., 356. 46 By 1803 war was most certainly in the air. Marcus, The Age of Nelson, 215.

43 battle between politicians had been occurring via a press scandal that debased the navy for its age-old use of impressment (or press gangs) to dubiously persuade unassuming young men into its ranks — making recruitment of able men more difficult.47 Nelson's affectionate letters to

Spanish dignitaries, thus, provide a logical means to reclaim experienced crewmen by securing their release from Spanish capture and transferring them back under his command. It also conveniently put him in the position (though his death prevented him from ever taking advantage) of performing further favors for foreign politicians in return for, perhaps, another landed estate or various other commendations.

Edward Hawke – The Dutiful Client

The wealth of correspondence readily available from Hawke pales in comparison to that of Nelson and thus historians are left with little evidence of Hawke's earliest connections to patrons in the navy. What is known, however, is his limited connection to (and the omnipresent force of) patronage means he most assuredly wrestled with the issue. While the textual evidence of his own letters may be scant, the historiography of his rise through the ranks and his satisfactory performance in a limited series of events early in his career indicate he was an expert of information flow. Particularly early on, the parallels between his career and Nelson's are unique, as each spent time in North America and the West Indies, specifically Jamaica, both had distant and tenuous connections to Sir Robert Walpole via an uncle on the mother's side, they each suffered tremendously from various ailments throughout their careers, and both deftly navigated their respective social circles to climb the officer ranks with haste. Without question,

Hawke's earliest patron was his uncle, Colonel Martin Bladen. But the first twenty-one years of

Hawke's career, which began in 1720 when he was placed as a midshipman aboard HMS

47 Margarette Lincoln, Representing the Royal Navy (Aldershot, Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2002), 63-66.; Brewer, Sinews of Power, 50-51.; Lavery, Nelson's Navy, 117-122.; Harold W. Hodges and Edward A. Hughes, Select Naval Documents (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1922), 201-2.

Seahorse, made for a difficult era to become known as a capable military leader as, during this time, Britain was at peace. As such, Hawke's early years were spent toiling away in the

Caribbean, weathering occasional hurricanes and Spanish privateer attacks on various frigates while protecting his uncle's growing colonial assets and providing British trade escorts. The mere fact he didn't die after his first year (unlike some of his predecessors) as a lieutenant on

HMS Kingston operating around Jamaica, may have been the deciding factor in Hawke being named master and commander of HMS Wolf in 1734. Shortly after he was then promoted to post- captain in the Flamborough, and the most action he saw was when a storm broke the masts and bowsprit of his ship, but he managed hobble back to Jamaica and save her from sinking.48

The first true test of his wartime ability came in the War of Austrian Succession in the

Battle off Toulon. For historians of the British Royal Navy, the Battle Off Toulon is arguably one of the greatest debacles the British Fleet ever faced. At the time, Edward Hawke was still only a captain of the Berwick. Months prior to the battle, he wrote a letter to his superior,

Thomas Corbett, Secretary of the Admiralty, about the sad state of his crew, which had been viciously pressed into duty only weeks earlier:

I beg their Lordships' permission to acquaint them that among the pressed men sent me down by the regulating captains there are several of them very little, puny, weakly fellows that have never been at sea, and I think any officer must allow, can be of little or no service...there being several of them poor little sickly fellows that are of no service, and are more properly to be termed boys than men; and though a few of these lads are serviceable aboard of ship, a great number of them distress a large ship like this greatly, and what is worse, most these poor creatures are now sick; but I shall not presume to put them on shore unless their Lordships will be so good as to give me leave, though there are several of them that, should they stay on board, will breed a sickness in the ship...I beg their Lordships' pardon for mentioning this affair, but I thought it

48 Mackay, Hawke, Nelson and British Naval Leadership, 13-16.

my duty to do it, for when a ship is very badly manned she can be but of little or no service.49

In one of the first letters available, it is evident Hawke's intonation greatly differs from Nelson's.

It is direct, undecorated language, not particularly ingratiating, however respectful, and tinged with irony — as it is likely the Board perceived his bemoaning over the pathetic crew as, itself, indicative of a weak and untried captain. But the greater message to be appraised is the final sentence of the passage in which Hawke recommits himself to his duty — a theme recurrent in much of his future correspondence. Naturally, his request was all but ignored, and Berwick was placed in a division of eight others under the command of Rear-Admiral Rowley. He along with two others, Adm. Thomas Mathews and Vice-Adm. Richard Lestock, were the three admirals responsible for engaging a combined fleet of French and Spanish ships. It was Hawke's good fortune to be placed under the direction of Rowley, as Mathews and Lestock were bitterly opposed to one another's egotism — ultimately resulting in blunderous mismanagement in battle.50 Thus, when Mathews had given the signal to engage, but mistakenly flew the flag indicating "the line of battle" many ships, including all of Lestock's division in the far distance and others not particularly eager for a fight, failed to engage. One ship that did was Berwick, in spite of the disarray and danger.

The battle itself ended poorly for Britain's navy, resulting in the sinking of Marlborough

(a 90-gun behemoth), the taking of only one ship as prize, Poder, which ultimately fell into the hands of the French, and finally the enemy's escape nearly unscathed — all in spite of a clear advantage in numbers and position from the start. Hawke's ship crippled the Poder, but it was

49 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 23-24; Hawke, Edward and Ruddock F. Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 1743-1771 (Aldershot: Scolar Press for the Naval Records Society, 1990), 8-9. 50 Richard Harding and Peter Le Fevre, ed. Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century (London: Chatham, 2000), 202-204. Another excellent source on the difficulty of combined naval forces is Harding's essay on the topic, "Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional and Technical Problems Concerning the Conduct of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century," as listed in the bibliography.

46 plundered by Captain Norris of the Essex and subsequently lost before Hawke had been given formal permission to take her. This was a point of resentment for Hawke who, in late February, wrote a letter to Adm. Mathews, under whose division Norris fell, to suggest he was the rightful owner:

I intreat the liberty of intruding a little upon your time to acquaint you that I sent one of my officers to Captain Norris to demand the colours and things which he and his officers have taken out of the "Poder," the Spanish man-of-war we took; and his answer was that he could not deliver them unless it was by your orders. I beg leave to say, sir, that it is not a little hard upon myself and my officers that we should be deprived these things who had the justest right and title to them. And I was not conscious to myself that I had done anything to offend you, at least I am sure not designedly, I flattered myself with the hopes that I should have had the honour to have burnt her, as well as to have taken her, but the hurry you was in might very possibly not give you time to think of it. I am therefore to beg you will do me the justice to order Captain Norris and his officers to restore the things that they have taken, and the colours which he has in his possession, which I am convinced he cannot lay the least claim to. However, sir, I submit this to your will and pleasure, as I shall be glad to do everything which relates to me while I have the honour to be under your command.51

This letter is very interesting considering its timing and content. On one hand, Mathews is his clear superior and owed due respect. Yet on the other, Hawke was acutely aware of the flaws in the command during the battle, which contrasted starkly against the personal victory Hawke managed to pull off amid the chaos. He was determined to take back what was rightfully his.

Using precise linguistic clarity in his dispatch, Hawke effectively argued his conscience in an effort to manipulate his commanding officer. Not unlike his other letters, sentiments of justice, duty, and honor run strong throughout, each serving to vindicate his cause. Hawke is polite in his approach, so as not to offend Mathews, but nears the boundary of what might be considered overly assertive in his rationale to impose his will upon him. It was Hawke's success in battle,

51 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 51.

47 the silver lining of an otherwise calamitous affair, that spared him from the backlash that followed.

The resulting court martial investigation of numerous officers, including Adm. Mathews, was the first time Hawke's career came under a high level of scrutiny, and his performance was found to be virtually the only saving grace at Toulon. These trials were brought about by

Parliament, rather than the admiralty itself, two years after the debacle. Hawke, unlike several other captains, avoided being court-martialed but the actions of Berwick (as one of the few ships to engage under Mathews's pseudo-order to do so), were of great interest to the Board of

Admiralty. During the trial of Captain Robert Pett of the Princessa, James Moore, master of the

Norfolk, testified, "The Berwick was not above an hour engaged with the Poder, if so much. She engaged nearer than the Princessa and Somerset had done, for she engaged her so close that a stone might be thrown on board from one to the other."52 It was revealed that because Berwick was one of the last ships in the line under Rear-Adm. Rowley's division, by the time it engaged

Poder, Poder had already been fired heavily upon by other ships. When Captain Hawke was called in to testify, he was asked about Berwick's engagement with Poder, to which he responded:

We engaged the Poder about two hours. We had her fire half an hour before we bore down close to her. We began to engage her close about 2 o'clock or a little after, and continued to engage her till about 1/4 after 4 before she struck. When she first fired at us, she was upon our quarter. I don't know whether she engaged nearer than the Princessa and Somerset had done. The Princessa appeared to me to engage her very near, but whether as near as us, I can't say. We engaged her very close at last.53

Shortly thereafter, he was asked if Berwick engaged any other ship but the Poder to which he testified,

52 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 15-16. 53 Ibid., 16.

Yes, we engaged with the Neptune ahead of her and had part of the fire of a French ship ahead of her. When we first brought up, we had the Neptune abreast of us and the French ships ahead of us upon our bow, and as they shot ahead the Poder came up.54

The testimony further revealed that even though his actions broke with the line, which was the

"technical" order that had been flown, the spirit of Mathews's division was, indeed, to engage.

Having followed a brave moral course of action as to the intent of Mathews to engage, and resulting, against odds, in the taking of Poder and limited damage taken on by other ships,

Hawke had managed with his weak, sickly crew (and even weaker orders from above) to deliver in his duty to the best anyone could expect. His conduct at sea and gallantry at bearing in closer to Poder than any other had tried, along with his directness, unwillingness to comment upon events he did not witness, and impartiality in whose hands the fault lay, particularly during the trial, communicated to his superiors that he was a man of integrity and dutifully obeyed orders.

As for Mathews, he was subsequently dismissed from service; and Lestock, though likely more to blame for the catastrophe due to his inaction, was acquitted because of political ties.55 He was then promoted to Admiral of the Blue, and ordered to carry out an operation in North America, but died shortly thereafter.56

Promotion to Rear-Admiral of the White

After the events in Toulon, no promotions were handed down from the Board of

Admiralty for three years, until July 1747, when a cavalcade of events took place that found

Hawke's name on the list to be named rear-admiral of the white. To understand how this happened requires a necessarily brief aberration that takes our focus off Hawke, and considers a

54 Ibid., 17. 55 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 46. 56 Daniel A. Bough, "Lestock, Richard (1679–1746)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press (2004); Online Edition, Jan 2008. [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16506 accessed November 18, 2014]

49 swirl of events and people surrounding him in the months just before his promotion in mid-July.

Beginning in April of 1747, George Anson, an officer 8 years Hawke's senior, who had risen the naval and political ranks before him as well, engaged in a battle with the French off the coast of

Ushant in what became known as the First Battle of Cape Finesterre. Anson had been made an

MP and Junior Lord of the Admiralty in the years preceding the battle, which was a resounding success that saw each of the French ships captured. The second in command to this operation was Peter Warren, a captain under whom Hawke had, for a short time, served early in his career

— despite their separation of only two years in age. In the years prior to this battle, Warren had distinguished himself on numerous occasions as a fine and able officer. Meanwhile, he cultivated a close friendship with Anson, who suggested Warren as his replacement upon his elevation to peerage when the First Battle of Cape Finisterre concluded.

Anson's closeness with the Board of Admiralty meant he played an integral role in a specific reform in the system of promotion that took place at the exact time Hawke received his.

"Up to this time the method of selection, necessary in some form for the higher commands, had worked most unjustly. The captains who had been passed over never moved up to any high rank; and the greatest inequalities and hardships had consequently prevailed."57 The change Anson helped make (allowing for more than a single man to be promoted to various admiral positions, excepting Admiral of the Red58) could not have come at a better time for Hawke, as his only fragile tie to political patronage was severed upon the death of his uncle, Colonel Martin Bladen, the previous year.59 Even still, Hawke's promotion was anything but guaranteed. At the same time Anson and Warren were dealing their devastating blow to the French, Hawke "had been left

57 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 61. 58 Rodger, The Wooden World, 299. 59 Harding, Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century, 204.

50 behind at port...to command the Mars, then in dock, and was employed in the tedious task of superintending her repairs."60

Without opportunity to demonstrate valor and lacking connections to political cronies,

Hawke nearly found himself in the same position as so many "yellowed" admirals before him — that is, men who never made it past senior captain and retired in that capacity. Thus when the list was presented to King George II, recommending the three vacant admiral positions to be filled by Captains Knowles, Forbes, and Boscawen, it took intervention on behalf of the King himself, perhaps the ultimate patron, to include Hawke's name alongside Knowles on those men being named Rear-Admiral of the White. Even after his initial promotion, which can be concluded came almost solely on behalf of the King who had called him "my own captain" in acknowledgement of Hawke's devotion to duty in Toulon, "there is no sign or likelihood that the

Admiralty saw in Hawke a future commander of the Western Squadron."61 That responsibility was entrusted to Hawke's former captain, now Sir Peter Warren after his recent promotion to

Vice-Admiral of the White. However, Warren fell ill with scurvy in early August and it was he who suggested to the Admiralty that Hawke act as his replacement. To this end, once again, scholars lack any primary resources to conclusively determine the extent of Hawke and Warren's closeness, except to show that the men had known each other in some capacity since serving together in 1730. One can reasonably conclude, however, that if Hawke had been a truly miserable, incorrigible, disrespectful, or incompetent soul, a man like Warren, whose acclaim preceded him and who flew so close to the likes of Anson and the rest of the Admiralty Board, would not have placed his own reputation on the line in recommending Hawke for such an esteemed position. The onus now laid in Hawke's hands to perform, as before in Toulon, with

60 Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 60. 61 Ibid., 61; Harding, Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century, 204.

51 courage and gallantry (while subsequently brokering the information of his achievements to his superiors) in the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre.

The Second Battle of Cape Finisterre

The events leading to the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre require an exiguous understanding of the correspondence between Sir Peter Warren and his replacement, Hawke. On

August 8, 1747, directly after his promotion, Hawke received a letter from Warren that stated:

"You are hereby required and directed accordingly to put yourself under my command, and follow all such orders as you shall from time to time receive from me for His Majesty's service, sending me weekly accounts of the state and condition of the Squadron, and acquainting me with your proceeding, as often as opportunity offers, for their Lordships' information."62 This explicit command put Warren as a middleman between Hawke and the Board of Admiralty. It was the brokering of information with his superior, Warren, that helped Hawke strategize how best to approach the incidences leading up to October, 1747. The men communicated at length through

August and September regarding the intentions of the French to "collect warships at Brest which were to ensure a safe passage for the merchantmen at La Rochelle and Bordeaux."63 In this same letter, dated August 20, 1747, Hawke gently suggests, "I believe you will think it necessary that I should have some clean ships sent out to me with the utmost expedition."64

On the first of September, Warren, though not fully recovered, was determined to put out to sea. Hawke was expecting him, but Warren was met with terrible weather that prevented him from a rendezvous with Hawke — putting Hawke, unbeknownst to him, in the position of acting alone and using his best discretion. By the eighth of September, the Lords of the Admiralty wrote an ill-fated letter to Hawke notifying him of their decision to "give leave to Sir Peter

62 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 27. 63 Mackay, Admiral Hawke, 59.; Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 34. 64 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 35.

Warren to resign the command of the Western Squadron for the recovery of his health and have thereupon judged fitting to put the ships and vessels named in the enclosed list under your command."65 That day, two sets of instructions were dispatched to Hawke (via Warren) but only one had reached him as, for reasons unknown, his future correspondence indicates he was entirely unaware of the more limiting directions of the aforementioned dispatch that "would have been most unlikely to bring about an interception."66 Thus, Hawke went about, more or less, as he had previously — assuming Warren was still on his way to meet him and that his primary orders were to be received and reported to Warren, rather than the Admiralty.

As luck would have it, his failure to receive these orders proved to be exactly what allowed Hawke to shine in the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre, the events of which are somewhat superfluous to the context of this essay.67 That said, it was Hawke's willingness to break from the line in favor of raising the order to give chase (contradictory to the orders iterated to him in the dispatch he failed to receive prior to the battle on the 14th of October) that ensured his victory. In spite of an advantage in number of ships, it was nonetheless a risky decision as the fresh French escort ships far outsized and outgunned Hawke's own squadron — which had been at sea for some two months.68 By calling off the general order of the line, his captains made a free-for-all of the engagement, swarming the rear ships of the French line

65 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 37. 66 Mackay, Admiral Hawke, 62. 67 As eloquently summed up by Mackay in his biography, "In some naval campaigns, supply or health have in retrospect appeared to be decisive factors. In some naval battles, the efficiency and morale of the men on one side and the lack of those qualities on the other - both conditions resulting largely from the long-term policies of the respective governments - may appear to determine the result almost irrespectively of the merits of the victorious admiral. If ever there was a good example of victory depending on the deliberations and tactical leadship of one man, this Second Finisterre campaign was one. No particular innovations on the supply or medical side were involved. The fighting spirit of the French service was about equal to that of the British, as was seen in Anson's battle and would be seen in that which was at hand. Success or failure depended primarily on the interplay of the decisions of the British and French commanders," Ibid., 65. 68 Mackay, Admiral Hawke, 69-72.

53 indiscriminately. His methods, however unorthodox, required Hawke to provide a detailed account to the Board of Admiralty in which he highlights some key outcomes of the battle.

I immediately made the signal for all the fleet to chase. About 8, saw a great number of ships, but so crowded together that we could not count them. At 10, made the signal for a line of battle ahead...Half an hour after, Captain Fox in the Kent hailed us and said they counted twelve very large ships. Soon after, I perceived the enemy's convoy to crowd away with all the sail they could set, while their ships of war were endeavouring to form in a line astern of them...Finding we lost time in forming our line while the enemy was standing from us, at 11 made the signal for the whole squadron to chase. Half an hour after...I made the signal to engage which was immediately obeyed.69

The letter, which is verbose to the extent it gives a clear recollection of events, also alludes to the valor and general success with which his orders were executed. It also calls to attention the poor discretion of Captain Fox of the Kent, as Hawke later states in the letter "Only I am sorry to acquaint their Lordships that I must except Captain Fox [of being recognized for behaving with the very greatest spirit and resolution] whose conduct on that day I beg they would give directions for inquiring into at a court martial."70 It was the second major battle inside four years of which Hawke subsequently testified at a court martial as to why a number of the French ships managed to escape. By most accounts, the young Rear Admiral's actions were a resounding success as he wrote,

As the enemy's ships were large, except the Severne, they took a great deal of drubbing and lost all their masts...This has obliged me to lie by these two days past in order to put them in a condition to be brought into port...We have taken: Le Monarque 74 guns, Le Terrible 74 guns, Neptune 70 guns, Le Trident 64 guns, Le Fougueux 64 guns, Severne 50 guns.71

Unlike Toulon though, Hawke was the one to recommend the board's investigation into Captain

Fox's impropriety, and as such, he effectively drew any misconception of failure (referring to those French ships of the line and the remaining convoy that escaped) away from his own orders.

69 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 54. 70 Ibid., 55. 71 Ibid., 55.

In the weeks leading up to the trial, Hawke corresponded frequently with Secretary of the

Admiralty Thomas Corbett, and various others, regarding the court martial proceedings.72 As for

Captain Fox's alleged neglect of duty, Hawke called upon numerous captains who served beneath him that day and, as Montagu Burrows described, it was determined "that [Fox] had only erred in 'conduct' and was only guilty of part of the offences charged...It is thus clear that Hawke had taken exactly the right line on this difficult question of bringing an officer to a court- martial."73

While the examples of Hawke as a deferent client to his patrons do not present in the same manner as those of Nelson, historians are nonetheless left with the impression that Hawke was a man who steadfastly devoted himself to his duty and was adroit in his relaying of events to his superiors. While Nelson's early years had many similarities to Hawke's own career, the major difference is that Nelson came to the British Royal Navy during a time rife with opportunities because of the wars surrounding the American and French Revolutions. Hawke's capitalizing upon a limited number of opportunities, his unwavering clarity in decision-making, and his direct manner of written communication and brokering of his achievements, were each assets to his rapid succession through the officer ranks. He was a capable and competent client and, minimally, instilled enough confidence in the patrons who acted on his behalf (particularly

Martin Bladen, Peter Warren, George Anson, and King George II) to provide further opportunities for advancement.

72 In one of these letters from Corbett, he says "...their Lordships order me to observe to you the inconvenience of calling more captains from Plymouth than are absolutely necessary, which puts them to great expense and trouble, as well as delays the trial. But the Lords leave it to your discretion." Hawke's response, "I could not avoid desiring their attendance in order to give their reasons for refusing to rank with him. It is doing justice to both His Majesty and to Mr. Fox." Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 60. 73 Burrows, The Life of Edward Lord Hawke, 81.

Collingwood – Client and Information Broker

Cuthbert Collingwood's primary connection to the navy came through his cousin, Captain

Richard Braithwaite. Interestingly, both Braithwaite and Collingwood, each who later became admirals, were de facto descendents of Admiral Hawke's patronage. "Brathwaite had entered the naval service in 1743 under the patronage of his relative, Sir Chaloner Ogle, and on the recommendation of Sir Edward Hawke was made lieutenant in 1755."74 Not unlike Hawke, the surviving documents substantiating his use of deference and information brokering to his patrons are scant. Those documents that more directly substantiate a connection between Collingwood and his patrons come from sources written later in the lives of the men while they reflected upon their careers. Aside from Braithwaite, other patrons who helped to advance Collingwood's career were Admiral Samuel Graves, Sir George Bowyer, 5th Baronet, Captain (later Admiral)

Robert Roddam, and, like Nelson, Admiral Peter Parker.

Lacking in opportunities to prove his abilities as a seaman, Collingwood spent a considerable amount of time, fourteen years, as a midshipman. While Braithwaite may have secured him aboard a ship, he was unable to advocate on Collingwood's behalf when no situation had ever warranted his promotion. But on the eve of the American Revolution, in 1774, in

Collingwood's own words, "I went to Boston with Admiral Graves, and in 1775 was made a lieutenant by him, on the day that the battle was fought at Bunker's Hill."75 Collingwood's role in the battle, incidentally, was not even aboard a ship. Rather, he commanded a party on shore and kept the seamen and soldiers supplied with ammunition during the ordeal. After demonstrating his leadership abilities, Collingwood, now a lieutenant, began to establish confidence, both in himself and his superiors, by brokering news of his achievements and finding

74 W. Clark Russell, Collingwood (London: Methuen and Co., 1891), 7. 75 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 7.

56 more avenues to demonstrate his abilities after being reassigned to the Hornet sloop in Jamaica in 1776.76 It was also during the time he served under Admiral Graves that

Collingwood became better acquainted with Admiral Roddam who, years earlier, in 1772, served as Captain of HMS Lenox aboard which both Collingwood and his brother met the man. The connection between Roddam and Collingwood is lengthy and complicated, but significant, as one product of their association was Collingwood's future wife. In June, 1791, Collingwood married Ms. Sarah Blackett, whose mother, Sarah Roddam, was a distant aunt of Admiral Robert

Roddam.77 Roddam devoted his entire career to the navy, and became Rear-Admiral of the

White in 1778, then later Vice-Admiral of the White in 1787, finally retiring in the capacity of

Admiral of the Blue in 1793, at the age of 73. Under the guidance of both Roddam and Graves' command, and in no small part due to fostering a relationship with Sir Peter Parker, Collingwood was named Commander of the 28-gun frigate HMS Hinchinbroke in 1779 in place of a Captain

Hooper.78

The duties to which Collingwood attended as a frigate captain in the Caribbean during the early 1780s was under Admiral Hughes, whose personal interests and ties to colonial governors meant he tolerated illegal trade between the Americans and British-held colonial islands. Though lucrative, these exchanges were against the law in Britain and put Collingwood in the fragile position of carrying out his duties against the orders of a high ranking naval officer.

When, in mid-December, 1784, he inquired into the actions of an American ship headed to dock in St. Johns, they explained their necessity to dock for mast repairs. As Warner explains, "this was a regular excuse for entry and discharge of cargo."79 Collingwood saw to it that their

76 Orde, In the Shadow of Nelson: The Life of Admiral Collingwood, 20-1. 77 Ibid., 50-2. 78 Ibid., 21. 79 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 19.

57 repairs, which were far less serious than described, were attended to at sea, the ship continued to port anyway and informed vested authorities about the irregularity of such an action. Naturally, it was only a matter of time before word reached both the local governor and Collingwood's direct superior, Hughes. In response to a letter that questioned Collingwood on his behavior, his direct response made clear his devotion to carrying out the law of Britain,

I refer your Excellency to the Statutes (12 Chas: 2 and the 7th and 8th of William and Mary) excluding Aliens from Commerce with the British Colonies, which Statutes I am ordered to put in full force and execution. I shall take this opportunity of informing Your Excellency I have reason to believe Foreigners (that is Americans) do find means to impose on the Custom House, proofs, which will not stand the test of inquiry, to procure papers authorising them to trade hither.80

Even as a relatively untested captain, Collingwood was not a man to be challenged — particularly when he knew the law was on his side. Though referring to him as "Your

Excellency," it is clear in his dispatch Collingwood clearly believed he had the upper hand in the exchange. In his second sentence he raised the stakes when he suggested that if further provocation of his actions followed, and an inquiry or formal investigation took place, it would surely result in finding that the governor, named Thomas Shirley, had procured papers authorizing the trade to take place.

Undoubtedly, due the local trade being stymied by Collingwood's policing of the seas, he could hardly have been the most well-liked man in the West Indies. Both Collingwood and

Nelson served in this region at the time, as they each had before on several occasions. Perhaps the only people who approved of their service were the Moutrays, a family that included John

Moutray (Commissioner for the Navy Board in Antigua) and his much-younger wife, Mary.81

Mrs. Moutray found herself widowed not long after the two captains returned to England and

80 Ibid., 20. 81 Ibid., 21; Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 86-7.

58 each of the men continued to correspond with her on occasion for years to come. The other person, indeed patron, with whom Collingwood and Nelson became ingratiated during this time was Sir Peter Parker. He wrote, "And soon after [being aboard HMS Sloop, was assigned to] the

Lowestoffe, of which Lord Nelson was Lieutenant. We had been long before in habits of great friendship; and it happened here, that as Admiral Sir P. Parker, the Commander-in-Chief, was the fried of both, whenever Lord Nelson got a step in rank, I succeeded him."82 Ultimately Nelson and Parker's longitudinal effect upon Collingwood's career proved far more impactful than did

Admiral Hughes, which was likely why Collingwood chose not to appeal to his good humor.

Rather, Collingwood wrote to his sister, "Of this man here [Hughes] nothing but nonsense can be expected. Because our diligence reflects on his neglect, he dislikes us."83 One might believe that had Collingwood wanted to ascend the ranks more quickly he would have ingratiated himself to

Hughes. In spite of the short-term gain it might have offered, instead Collingwood wisely chose to uphold his zeal for British law, foster his connections with both Parker and Nelson, and avoid any potential repercussions handed down by the Board of Admiralty back home.

A Short Visit Home

Collingwood correctly assumed his tenure in the West Indies would be temporary, and was sent home for a period of time from 1786-92. In the time he was home, few letters were written (except a few to his sister Mary) and he focused his attention upon Sarah Blackett. By the time he was put back out to sea, in 1792, he married her and had his first daughter, Sarah.84

Aside from the unexpected news of the death of his brother, Wilfred Collingwood, who served with Cuthbert under Roddam, this period of Collingwood's life was the calm before the eventual storm — a prolonged engagement with revolutionary France and, eventually, the Napoleonic

82 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 7. 83 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 91. 84 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 23-4.

Wars. In these last 18 years of his career, engulfed in international conflict and only scarcely to return home, he was given countless opportunities, more than he had ever before encountered, to broker information and establish himself as an elite leader worthy of the highest ranks in the navy.

A Victory Despoiled

Sometime in early 1793, Collingwood was put to sea as "flag captain to Rear-Admiral Sir

George Bowyer" aboard Prince.85 This, in itself, as Adams argues, was an indication of

Collingwood's competence. As a captain of a flagship, Admiral Bowyer oversaw all of

Collingwood's command as was likely to lay claim to whatever prizes were won. Nonetheless, it was a pivotal opportunity for Collingwood to show his leadership abilities and his opportunity came within a year of being put under Bowyer. The letters he wrote to his father-in-law, mayor of Newcastle Sir Edward Blackett, while aboard Prince (and later after being transferred along with Adm. Bowyer to the Barfleur) indicate the peculiarity of the present and ensuing conflict with France.

This war is certainly unlike any former, both in its object and execution. The object is a great and serious one, to resist the machinations of a mad people who, under the mask of freedom, wou'd stamp their tyranny in every country in Europe, and support and defend the happiest constitution that ever wisdom formed for the preserving order in civil society. The execution is quite mysterious.86

In addition to his somewhat accurate appraisal of events in the French Revolution, the letter shows Collingwood was acutely aware of the political climate, highly intelligent, and attempted to make sense of what had been, to that point, something of a wild goose chase for Britain's navy. Admiral Hood, who in 1793 was nearly 70 years old, had to this point ineffectively attempted to chase down the French fleet and been lambasted by the press back in England for

85 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 115-6. 86 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 39.

60 failing to secure an undisputed victory. Beyond that, Britain's navy had been embarrassed (once again) at Toulon, as Napoleon "persuaded his senior officers to allow him to conduct the crucial attack on British positions."87 As time passed in the early months of 1794, preparations were made for a major naval encounter. On June 1st, 1794, Collingwood fought in a battle that became known as "The Glorious First of June." The name, though designated by the King, was something of a misnomer, as Warner recounts, "the main action was the culmination of a whole series of operations, some successful, some not."88 Even still, it was Collingwood's account of the battles as recollected in his letter to Sir Blackett that helped to ensure word spread of his own success.

It is a narration full of incident, and I feel myself very unequal to describe a battle unlike anything that perhaps ever happened before, for we had three days' hard fighting before we were crowned with victory, by the total defeat and flight of a fleet superior to our own, and sent out for the express purpose of destroying us...During the whole action the most exact order was preserved, and no accident happened but what was inevitable, and the consequence of the enemy's shot. In ten minutes the Admiral was wounded; I caught him in my arms before he fell...We have not obtained this victory without losses that must long be lamented. Admiral Bowyer and Admiral Pasley have each lost a leg; Admiral Graves is severely wounded in the arm, and as he is seventy years of age, or nearly, it is hard to say what will be the consequence... Several other Lieutenants are killed and wounded: and this, altogether, has been the severest action that has been fought in our time, or perhaps ever.89

Brokering this kind of information to the proper authorities back home meant that news of

Britain's victory, even at so great a cost as described in the letter, would ingratiate Collingwood to those who heard of it. Unfortunately, the news of his success in battle, after having taken full control of Barfleur upon Bowyer's leg injury, did not spread to the likes of the Admiralty Board.

Admiral Howe wrote a letter that curiously left several captains' contributions to the victory unmentioned. One of those captains was Collingwood, and his contribution was omitted from

87 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 125. 88 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 39. 89 Ibid., 43-46.

61 the report even though Barfleur was one of the ships most closely engaged in battle.

Collingwood severely resented this, not only because he lost out on the political capital he expected to gain, but he also lost out on the formal medals the King awarded to every other captain mentioned in Howe's letter.

With regards to his lack of proper recognition, many knew about Collingwood's contribution on the First of June, and spoke to his defense. It didn't get him a medal, but instead a promise that he was to be assigned his own ship. Even this, however, went poorly. The silver lining was that his temporary unemployment gave him a brief amount of time to spend with his family.90 By August, Collingwood appeared to be ready to bury the hatchet with Howe after the two met and the former wrote yet another letter to Sir Edward Blackett describing the experience,

I went yesterday to visit Lord Howe, who received me very graciously, lamented that the Admiralty had put nice officers into the fleet who were unacquainted with his signals and general discipline, and hoped my ship would soon be in a condition to join him. I told him how much I had been disappointed and hurt, after all the exertion I was capable of, not having obtained that testimony of his approbation which he had given to others, and which I hoped for...He steer[ed] clear of any explanation which related particularly to me. I believe he heartily wishes his letter had never been wrote.91

No doubt, the entire incident was upsetting, for the flag captain's first successful assignment was partially lost to the political bureaucracy that had become so prominent in the British Royal

Navy. But, as Collingwood previously recommended to the young lieutenant Mr. Lane, spending too much time wallowing in one's despair was counterintuitive and unbecoming of a man of high caliber. It was Collingwood's good fortune to be the long-time acquaintance and client of the most important patron of his time, Horatio Nelson.

90 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 55. 91 Ibid., 57.

Missions in the Mediterranean

The next time Collingwood was put to sea was in late 1795 aboard the 74-gun Excellent in a mission to the Mediterranean, where his old friend Nelson had been stationed for some time.

The war between France and Austria was going poorly for the latter, as Napoleon's army continued conquering territories to the south and east of France across the Alps. Italy was at great threat of being taken next and it was the British Royal Navy's job to protect Italy to the extent it could. By the end of 1796, Collingwood wrote a letter indicating the precarious developments brewing in the Mediterranean.

Our situation has been rather critical; the forces of France and Spain are very superior to ours and after the evacuation of Corsica, we were left without a port, except Porto Ferraio, which was, of all places in the world, the most dangerous for us to be in...But Sir John Jervis has excellent judgment at this game, and I never had an apprehension that he would offer them a check-mate...We hear a great deal of promotion in the Navy, but I confess I have no anxiety about being an Admiral till the war is over. It would be impossible for me to get employed, and I should be very sorry to be idle at such a time as this.92

As explicitly stated in his letter, though Collingwood was not immediately itching to become an admiral, the thought was unquestionably floating around in his mind. The actions that took place in the next few years in the Mediterranean campaign against Napoleon's forces provided

Collingwood with the opportunities he needed to show his naval expertise. Afterwards, he shifted his focus onto his own campaign, as these things were so often political, for promotion to vice-admiral.

On Valentine's Day of 1797, Collingwood got his next major opportunity to demonstrate his valor in command. Admiral Jervis, whose naval expertise Collingwood alluded to in his letter, was given the lion's share of credit for a victory that took place off Cape St. Vincent. The mere fact that he became known as the Earl of St. Vincent ever afterwards is evidence of this.

92 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 33.

But both Captain Collingwood and Nelson, at the time a Commodore, played a role in the victory. Nelson was serving aboard the Captain, which had been fired heavily upon through the course of battle. It was Collingwood, commanding the Excellent, who came to his aid when he began firing on the giant Spanish man-of-war Santissima Trinidada. This ship far outsized his own, nearly twice as many guns and four decks, as Collingwood described in a letter to his wife three days later, "such a ship as I never saw before."93 Directly after battle, the two old friends

Nelson and Collingwood sent quick letters back and forth to one another. In his letter to Nelson,

Collingwood wrote with a flattering sense of deference:

First let me congratulate you on the success of yesterday — on the brilliancy it attached to the British Navy, and the humility it must cause to its enemies — then let me congratulate my dear Commodore on the distinguished part which he ever takes when the honour and interests of his Country are at stake. It added very much to the satisfaction I felt in thumping the Spaniards, that I released you a little. The highest rewards are due to you and Culloden: you formed the plan of attack, we were only accessories to the Dons ruin.

Two facts are worth mentioning with respect to this particular letter. The first is that, although

Nelson had built some degree of acclaim by this point, the Battle off St. Vincent was before what most regard as the pinnacle of his career, the Battle of the Nile in 1798. Although Nelson was a

Commodore, he was not yet promoted to the admiralty. It was almost as though Collingwood knew, perhaps in light of Nelson's character and accelerated path to the upper ranks of the navy, that he had more years of greatness ahead of him. This leads to the second mentionable fact, that few people garnered the kind of deference and reverence that Collingwood paid to Nelson on this occasion. No doubt some of this was due to their long acquaintance with one another, but

Collingwood was aware that few people were more important to his own career at this point than

Nelson. Likewise, Nelson was predisposed to these romantic overtures in his own personal style of communication, but Collingwood was not. Knowing how receptive Nelson was to the kind of

93 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 69.

64 aggrandizement and cajoling he so often used himself, Collingwood purposely plays to Nelson's preference while subtly acknowledging his own role in the event.

The result at the Battle off Cape St. Vincent was followed, as typical protocol suggested, with a letter from the Commander-In-Chief (Adm. Jervis) detailing the event. But unlike Howe, in what no doubt Collingwood considered the "In-glorious" First of June, Jervis mentioned only two names in his dispatch to the admiralty and all men who took part in the day's events were to receive a medal. But the disappointment Collingwood felt in being passed up in the previous engagement may have taught him to embrace his modest side. As Warner recounts, "When

Collingwood was told by Jervis that he was to receive his gold medal with the rest, he replied, with great firmness, that he could not consent to receive it while that for the 'First of June' was withheld. 'I feel,' he said, 'that I was then improperly passed over; and to receive such a distinction now would be to acknowledge the propriety of that injustice.'"94 Incredibly, the

Admiralty was ready to set the record straight with Collingwood. They offered him two medals, one for each event. Though he was thankful, in a letter to Dr. Carlyle Collingwood conceded, "it has too much the appearance of trumpeting, which I detest."95 This marks a departure from the pursuit for public ostentation, or rather, the deprivation of glory over which he had spent the past three years sulking. Content, but not satisfied, Collingwood's current business was to remain focused on his duty, while nurturing those utilitarian relationships with the potential to advance his career.

The events off the Cape of St. Vincent resulted in Horatio Nelson's promotion to Rear

Admiral of the Blue on 20 February, 1796.96 As the two had only recently written to one

94 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 46; Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 75. 95 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 76. 96 Maffeo, Seize, Burn, or Sink, xxiii.

65 another, Collingwood waited to write a lengthier, thoughtful letter with full intention of stroking

Nelson's ego and planting the seed for his own intentions to flourish. "My dear friend," he opened with, followed by a brief apology for not having come aboard Captain to formally meet him, "...generally our movements are so sudden and uncertain that I have got a habit of staying on board, perhaps more than is required of me." This was a not-so-subtle insinuation of his own commitment to duty aboard Excellent while blockading Spain. He continued,

I am satisfied that you know my heart, that there are none in the fleet, few in the world that I meet with more pleasure than yourself...I have a great desire that our Admiral should be a marquis this summer, both because his bright honours will reflect on all of us, and I should delight to see him Lord Howe's superior and become so from naval achievement.

This letter, though much longer in full text, was meant to incite feelings of pride, reminiscence, and glory in Nelson, which it no doubt did. It showers Nelson with approbation for commitment to duty, praising that such an honorable promotion was well-deserved. Also included in the letter was an overt jab at Lord Howe, for which neither Nelson nor Collingwood had positive regards. Their mutual network proximity to John Jervis meant that their own ambitions could better be put to use if network outliers like Howe were subjugated to Earl St. Vincent's authority.

But more directly important to Collingwood's personal ambitions, this letter was crafted with the recognition that Nelson was a man who appreciated men committed to their naval duties, and as such, Nelson was also most likely to reciprocate that honor.

CHAPTER 3

PATRONAGE

Nelson as a Patron

Horatio Nelson frequently offered his services as a patron for members of the Navy.

Interestingly, when one position opened, particularly a relatively high-ranking one, it allowed for a sequential process of filling lesser and lesser spots all the way down the chain. It was in this scenario Nelson was of the most use to his clients — many of which were his own protégés.

Naturally, Nelson’s ability to put his subordinates into positions increased the further along he progressed in his own career. When he reached the rank of Rear Admiral of the Blue in 1797, he had considerably more influence as a patron. Some of Nelson's closest friends were captains who served with or under him during his famous Battle of the Nile in 1798. This included men such as Edward Berry, James Saumarez, Thomas Troubridge, Alexander Davison, Ralph Willet

Miller, TB Thompson, Samuel Hood, Alexander John Ball, and others. Nelson made sure to take care of those he felt were competent and loyal, and his services sometimes extended to their friends and families as well. Surely, the men whose careers Nelson directly assisted number into the dozens.

A technique Nelson used to improve both his own reputation as well as those of his subordinates was to thoroughly praise their efforts to his superiors. The reason doing this improved Nelson’s own lot was to project his own persona of being humble, thorough, and communicative, while subtly calling attention to men whose careers he could say he helped

67 construct. Over time, merely being so frequently mentioned to admiralty, these men became known quantities to Nelson’s superiors and thus the most obvious candidates to fill open positions. One such example of this longitudinal approach to patronage was with Edward Berry.

As early as May of 1796, while Berry was still a lieutenant, Nelson wrote a letter to Admiral

John Jervis regarding his service.

Lieutenant Berry joined me in the Comet, and I have, as far as I have seen, every reason to be satisfied with him, both as a gentleman and an officer. I had a few days ago a plan for taking the French Brig of War out of Vado, and entrusted the execution of it to him: it miscarried from an unforeseen and improbable event, but I was much pleased by Mr. Berry’s strict attention to my instructions.1

Even when things didn’t go exactly to plan, if a man proved to follow Nelson’s instructions to a tee, while carrying himself with dignity and competence, Nelson was willing to advocate on his behalf. These were exactly the men with whom Nelson became surrounded, as their devotion had the potential to continue to bolster his own achievements and success. Then, in another letter to Admiral Jervis, just two months later, in July, Nelson again brought attention to Berry when he wrote,

I cannot conclude without expressing my fullest approbation of the zeal and good conduct of every Captain, Officer, and Man in the Squadron, and also…that my First Lieutenant Edward Berry, commanded the Ship, and placed her opposite the grand bastion, within half-pistol shot, in such a manner as could not have failed, had we opened our fire, to produce the greatest effect.2

And again, in September, Nelson wrote yet another to Jervis after taking two French privateers and sinking two others, “I cannot conclude without assuring you of my most sincere approbation of the conduct of Captain Cockburn of La Minerve, Captain Dixon of the Gorgon, and

Lieutenant Berry, who had the temporary command of the Captain.” Before long, Berry was

1 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 2, 175. 2 Ibid., 209.

68 promoted to the rank of Flag Captain, and served directly under Nelson in 1798 during the Battle of the Nile.

In a similar fashion, Nelson advocated on behalf of another of his protégés. Thomas

Troubridge was a longtime acquaintance with whom Nelson sailed aboard HMS Seahorse back in the East Indies, but their paths had temporarily split until they were reunited shortly after the

Battle of Cape St. Vincent, in 1797. Troubridge was an educated man and well-liked by Nelson, but numerous instances late in his career leaves little question that Nelson was a far better naval officer. For example, one ship he commanded, the Castor, briefly fell into the hands of the

French in 1794, and thus Troubridge's action in the Glorious First of June was spent as a prisoner on an enemy ship. Then, just over a year later, as commander of the Culloden, he was forced to quell a mutiny which resulted in the hanging of eight of the crew.3 Two years later, despite his short success at leading the line aboard Culloden during the victory at the Battle of Cape St.

Vincent, where ten were killed and another forty-seven wounded, it was followed by the shared embarrassment bungling the assault at the Battle of Santa Tenerife under Nelson's leadership.

His participation in the Battle of the Nile also leaves in question his naval competence, as he ran his ship aground on a sandbar — though, according to NAM Rodger, the conditions were not desirable at the outset of the battle, with "the wind blowing into the bay...in shoal water and gathering darkness."4 Nonetheless, Nelson fiercely defended Troubridge in a letter to Admiral

St. Vincent (formerly Jervis), in 1798, when he wrote:

I should have been glad you had received my letter: on the [subject of our dear friend Troubridge], it was authorizing you to add a paragraph to my Public letter, if you thought more to the advantage of Troubridge, but I thought it better to make no mention of his disaster; for I consider Captain Troubridge's conduct as fully entitled to praise as any one Officer in the Squadron, and as highly deserving

3 Sugden, Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 554-6. 4 N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 460.

reward...He commanded a Division equally with Sir James Saumarez, by my order of June; and I should feel distressed if any honour is granted to one, that is not granted to the other.5

While Nelson’s advocacy was certainly important to the advancement of both Troubridge's and

Berry's careers, in the interest of balance and scrutiny, it must be mentioned that even Rodger is skeptical of the degree of praise that should be heaped onto this coterie of famous British naval officers. In referencing a disaster while serving aboard HMS Vanguard, where the mast of the ship blew apart in strong winds, he flippantly chalks up the incident to poor seamanship, "either by Nelson himself (who was not the outstanding seaman of his generation), or his young flag- captain Edward Berry (whose subsequent career was a catalogue of gallant bungling interspersed with longer and longer periods of unemployment)."6 Regardless of their actual naval efficacy, however, this perhaps only further substantiates the importance of utilizing their respective positions in the social network being that (if left to their actual skills, accolades, or successes on the high seas) precious few instances of their advancement can be attributed to such factors.

Ultimately, Troubridge perished (along with his entire crew) in a cyclone off the eastern coast of

Africa in 1807 — but not before being named Rear-Admiral of the Fleet and first in command of the Eastern half of the East Indies station.7 Arguably it was Nelson's devoted advocacy of the younger Troubridge, even in spite of his misfortunes at inopportune moments, which allowed his career to continue to prosper.

Another form of Nelson's patronage came in the form of paying his respects to those who directly assisted in his own advancement. This is clearly demonstrated in the cases of both

Lieutenant-Colonel William Suckling, nephew of Maurice Suckling (and technically Nelson's cousin by marriage), and Sir Peter Parker (2nd Baronet), grandson of the elder Peter Parker. In a

5 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 3, 149. 6 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 458. 7 Ibid., 547.

70 letter dated April 15th, 1802, Nelson wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Suckling, "I yesterday saw

Colonel Yorke, and he has promised to me that he will take the first opportunity of removing you into a permanent and better situation. I left a memorandum with him...but he really seemed disposed to do everything which we can desire."8 Of note is the fact that Nelson's sphere of influence extended beyond the confines of the navy into the political realm, as the Colonel Yorke he referred to was Secretary at War Charles Yorke. This letter is strikingly similar to the aforementioned letter Nelson received from William Locker, who earlier acted as Nelson's patron and helped to improve Nelson's undesirable "situation." Almost exactly three years later,

Nelson's influence extended even further when he advocated on behalf of William Suckling's son, naturally named William. In a letter to Colonel Suckling, he wrote:

Your Son I have had on board this morning and he is fixt at present in the Ambuscade which although certainly not so eligible a situation as that in the Narcissus is the best I can place him in. Capt: Durban as a great favor has consented to keep him and I hope by his attention that he will merit the esteem of Capt: Dn, Capt. Hardy has been so good as to rate him.9

Not unlike his father, or even Nelson himself, the younger William Suckling hoped to be placed in a position where he was visible to those who had the potential to advance his career. Nelson, respecting the closeness of Suckling to his own career and familial relations, was committed to doing what he could to be of assistance.

The same principles factored into the career of the younger Peter Parker, who came to

Nelson in early October of 1803 with a letter from Nelson's patron, the elder Parker. In a letter to the aging admiral, Nelson wrote, "nothing could be more grateful to my feelings than receiving him. I have kept him as Lieutenant of the Victory, and shall not part with him until I can make him a Post Captain; which you may be assured I shall lose no time in doing. It is the

8 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 10. 9 White, Nelson - New Letters, 21.

71 only opportunity ever offered me, of showing that my feelings of gratitude to you are as warm and alive as when you first took me by the hand: I owe all my Honours to you, and I am proud to acknowledge it to all the world."10 This particular letter serves as evidence of both patronage and deference in Nelson's career. Naturally, it refers to the placement of the young Peter Parker.

It is, in fact, one of the few scant examples of Nelson's sycophancy very late in his career. Far more common in the years subsequent to the Battle of the Nile, are correspondences written with an air of superiority regarding the placement of young men on behalf of his clients. While

Nelson's apparent willingness to help the younger Suckling and Parker find their proper situations in the Royal Navy, so as to show their potential and realize their growth, the extension of his courtesy was not for every person who hoped to receive preferment.

The higher Nelson climbed in the ranks, the more frequently he received letters asking for his assistance in putting young men aboard ships. His inclination towards helping out his clients depended upon three factors — his closeness to (or familiarity with) the person asking for his patronage, the number of available positions, and the number of young men already queued ahead of whomever was requesting placement. Assessing the first of these factors might seem an easy task in light of how many letters he wrote, but Nelson's emotional connection to others is not always indicated by the raw number of recipients to whom he wrote letters. For instance, one might believe he was not particularly close with Captain Thomas Foley due to the availability of only a solitary letter amongst thousands. However, the content of the letter reflects a level of intimacy Nelson only shared with those closest to him. The letter was sent a few short months after Captain Foley lost his brother. Nelson wrote,

How little, my dear Foley, do we know who is to go first: gracious God, I am sure, to all appearance he was more likely to see us pass away, than we him! My dear Foley, I only desire that you will always charge yourself in reminding me of

10 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 245.

your nephew: in whatever station I may be, I should be most ungrateful, if I could for a moment forget your public support of me in the day of Battle, or your private friendship, which I esteemed most highly; therefore, as far as relates to you, your nephew, and myself, let this letter stand against me.11

Nelson's use of the words "My dear" were typically reserved for his closest protégés — and in this letter he referred to Captain Foley with the affectionate title twice. This takes the term patronage to a different level, as it is a fatherly-like sentiment Nelson rarely used with his own social or naval superiors. As shown in this example, his auspicious praise leaves few wondering why he said it at all. Nelson, if not brazenly vain, was most certainly not one to ignore when people publicly acknowledged his successes. Nelson surrounded himself with men like Foley, who both publicly and privately liked and glorified him. A certain degree of pompous, self- congratulatory behavior befits the entire system of patronage, which is nauseatingly obvious in this particular example. One might believe Nelson charged Foley with the task of "reminding" him of Foley's nephew, whose father had recently passed, should he have needed future placement. But perhaps Nelson's true intent was to make sure he kept his clear subordinates close enough to fill his insatiable appetite for the aggrandizement of his own gracious conduct.

This notion of keeping certain men, particularly those Nelson knew and liked, is counterbalanced by those men for which he had no placement. Not every man of high rank in the naval was met with a top position on Nelson's list of favors. One such example was a letter addressed to Admiral Sir Thomas Pasley that Nelson composed in October of 1803 — the exact same time he went out of his way to help the young Peter Parker. It reads,

I was not favoured with any letter from you, previous or since my leaving England. The conversation I had with you respecting Mr. Tailour [who is seeking promotion], was at your house in Welbeck Street; and there his name stands on my list, I am sorry to say, beyond what I can form any hopes of reaching by the limited promotions allowed by the present Admiralty...My list is full for such vacancies, and is daily adding; therefore, I only look for deaths, unless as a favour

11 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 242.

from the Admiralty...I can only say that I have all the inclination to be useful to any friend of yours.12

Was Nelson avoiding responding to Admiral Pasley? It seems possible this letter was a reluctant reply to a nagging officer attempting to advocate for an unknown in Mr. Tailour. Naturally, no one can be sure. However, his immediate proclamation of never having received a letter means that several letters must have been sent by the Admiral and that they were conveniently lost, which perhaps bought Nelson enough time to pay favors to others he preferred over Pasley.

Though the circumstances surrounding his growing list of clients was likely entirely true, it is without question the emotional content of the letter is distinctly cooler than those previously referenced to Admiral Parker or Captain Foley. The same sentiments were conveyed in a similarly disappointing letter to John Palmer regarding his son, Edmund.

My time here has been so very short, and you will conceive that I came out well loaded, that in truth I do not see my way for even clearing the Victory once; and I have upon my list twenty to be made Captains. Mr. Palmer is the third recommended to me by the Duke of Clarence, and I sincerely wish it may be in my power to promote them all...You may rely, my dear Sir, that I will not miss an opportunity, when I am at liberty, to be useful to your son.13

In this letter, Nelson drew attention to the growing list of men who wished to be made captains.

With so many candidates, and so few positions, he was no doubt highly selective in his approach to offering services to his many clients. This particular letter also serves as an indicator of his growing influence. His widespread renown, much of which was garnered due to his own manufacture, had reached a point where countless men struggled for a position as close to Nelson as possible. Especially in light of the fact that Nelson's life was cut short, the ability for an officer to say that Nelson had directly sponsored his promotion likely became a coveted privilege as years passed.

12 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 244. 13 Ibid., 246.

Nelson's patronage selectivity continued into what was to be the final year of his life. Yet another example came in his assistance of Lieutenant Henry Duncan, whose father Admiral

Duncan died in 1804. On October 4th of the same year, Nelson wrote:

There is no man who more sincerely laments the heavy loss you have sustained than myself...I am sorry not to have a good Sloop to give you, but still an opening offers which I think will ensure your confirmation as a Commandr: it is occasioned by the very ill state of health of Capt: Corbett of the Bittern who has requested a few Weeks leave to reside on shore at the Hospital. You will be confirmed before he resumes his Command.14

The appointment of Duncan opened an opportunity for Nelson to accommodate the "long list of recommendations" set forth by Lord Melville.15 Melville, a powerful politician, held many titles over his career. He was a long-serving member of Parliament, Secretary of War, Keeper of the

Privy Seal for Scotland, First Lord of the Admiralty, and later became a Privy Counsellor.16 It is clear Robert Dundas, 2nd Viscount of Melville, was an ideal candidate for Nelson to befriend.

In a letter dated just six days after his correspondence to Lt. Duncan, Nelson wrote to Lord

Melville saying

You may rely that every attention in my power shall be paid to your long list of recommendations...I have put Duncan acting into the Bittern it will afford Your Lordship an opportunity of confirming him and Curtis...what can be done shall be done to serve your friends.17

Further accommodating his colleagues, Nelson revealed the assistance he gave to his own second-in-command in the war with France, Sir Richard Bickerton, in a letter written to

Midshipman Charles Yonge on 12 October, 1804.18 In it, he describes relocating "Lieutentant

George Mowbray of the Seahorse into the Royal Sovereign at Sir Richard Bickerton's request."19

14 White, Nelson - New Letters, 89. 15 Ibid., 90. 16 Ibid., 472. 17 Ibid., 90. 18 Ibid., 463. 19 Ibid., 91.

Naturally, the more direct intent of the letter to Yonge was to inform him that he was to fill

Mowbray's vacant capacity aboard Seahorse as acting Lieutenant. But who did this particular move benefit? Quite simply, Nelson. Yonge had been one of Nelson's well-to-do protégés, or as he describes in the closing lines of the letter, "a young man of great merit and a Elevi [elevé] of

Admiral Lord Viscount Nelsons."20 Like many aspiring young officers, Yonge owed his blossoming career in no small part to Nelson. His willingness to assign competent, or perhaps compliant, men in these positions afforded the Vice Admiral the ability to call upon their obedient services at a later date.

In this sense, Nelson was the ultimate broker of connections. A similar situation presented itself years earlier, in 1802, when Nelson wrote to his client Captain Benjamin William

Page (who himself went on to become an Admiral of the Blue). In the letter, Nelson insisted

Page took on a young man named Mr. Coleman, who was recommended to Nelson by William

Wyndham — one of his own political patrons.21 Once again, Nelson played a vital role in making connections and lending simultaneous assistance to both his patrons and clients. One final example of his insistence on promoting men who he felt were capable (both as seaman and as loyal benefactors) was John Pasco. One of Nelson's late protégés, Pasco came from humble beginnings and, originally serving as a lieutenant under Nelson, eventually went on to become a rear-admiral.22 As explained in the article "Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain," by Douglas W. Allen, "Under patronage an appointment was made to an office based on the desires of the patron, and the appointee was

20 White, Nelson - New Letters, 92. 21 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 35. 22 "John Pasco, Nelson's signal lieutenant at Trafalgar, who died a rear-admiral, was the son of a caulker who entered Plymouth Yard in 1760." Rodger, The Wooden World, 267.

76 expected to act in the interests of the patron."23 Each of these men was a small part of a much larger social network that was both built and sustained, in part, by Horatio Nelson.

When Nelson found a potential connection in his network was at risk, he was willing to strengthen it through the use of brokering valuable information in an attempt to reassure the contact of his devotion. Following his interaction with Lord Melville, for example, regarding the appointment of Duncan and Curtis to their respective positions, Nelson became entangled in a complicated engagement with Spain. This, along with restrictions from the Admiralty Board, had meant his efforts in appointing men of Melville's list had been met with difficulty. In a letter dated 20 November, 1804, he wrote:

I fear that you will think me unmindful of your list of recommendations but believe me that this is by no means the case, I know that you are tormented with recommendations and so am I, and so much pressed...that in my small opportunitys of promotion I cannot select without hurting the feelings of many.24

Immediately following his submission of apology, he elaborated in great detail upon intelligence he has acquired while aboard Victory, which had been (along with the rest of the Mediterranean fleet) off the eastern coast of Spain and southern coast of France. His ships had intercepted mail from "several Merchant vessels and a Schooner belonging to the Spanish Government," the contents of which he urgently passed along to Lord Melville just three days after he previous correspondence.25 In the letter, he poignantly states:

I can only My Dear Lord assure you and His Majestys Ministers that My whole conduct is guided in the Line I think they wish me to follow, and that no desire of Riches, honor, or fame could influence my conduct at the risk of involving our Country in a War.26

23 Douglas W. Allen, “Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre- Modern Britain,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161 (Mar, 2005): 60. 24 White, Nelson - New Letters, 376. 25 Ibid., 377. 26 Ibid., 377.

Taken along with his difficulty in fully meeting the demands of Lord Melville, Nelson's seemingly affectionate display of candor, tractability, and patronage in the form of intelligence dissemination can hardly be taken at face value. As a powerful member of Parliament, and First

Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Melville was man who commanded Nelson's utmost respect and obedience. As such, he was an important man with whom to cultivate a working relationship.

Unfortunately, the opportunity to take advantage of not only this relationship, but the entire web of connections he continued to build, was put to rest with Nelson's death at Trafalgar in 1805.

Hawke as a Patron

Long before Nelson ever became a patron of his own right, indeed before he even became a node on the social network of which he was integrally important, Edward Hawke began his own tenure as a long-time patron of naval officers in the British Royal Navy. The patronage system of which Nelson became masterfully adept at maneuvering was solidly established during

Hawke's time as well. The very same techniques Hawke used as a patron were adopted, though perhaps unintentionally, by Nelson decades later.

Within days of his victory at the Battle of Cape Finisterre, Hawke began to appeal to various men throughout the admiralty and government on behalf of a few men who served under him. The first incidence comes from a letter dated 17 October, 1747, when he wrote to Lord

Anson who, until very recently, had operated well outside Hawke's political and naval sphere. In the letter he says,

My Lord, I take this opportunity of paying my regards to your Lordship by Captain Moore of the Devonshire, whom I have sent express in the Hector to the Lords of the Admiralty with the account of the action we had with the French on the 14th...The many obligations that I lie under to your Lordship will always make me glad of every occasion to acknowledge them. I esteem myself very lucky in having had so gallant and active an officer with me as Captain Moore, who merits everything that is handsome to be said of him.27

27 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 56-7.

This particular letter, more than most, rings true to the kind of deference to authority later utilized by Hawke's quasi-protégé — Nelson. Hawke, though not known for over-ingratiating himself, knew Anson to be a figure with whom he would frequently interact as his career in the navy progressed. Indeed, Anson was named First Lord of the Admiralty in 1751, the same year the Secretary of the Admiralty, Thomas Corbett, passed away.28 Captain Moore, the distinguished subject of the letter, would later go on to be known as Sir John Moore, being promoted to rear-admiral in 1762, vice-admiral in 1770, and full admiral in 1778.29 Thomas

Corbett was more familiar with Hawke, a man with whom he had frequently communicated over the years until Corbett's death in 1751. In a letter dated October 30, 1747, Corbett expressed his favor of Hawke, writing:

Their Lordships direct me to congratulate you in their name for the great service you have done your country in defeating so great a force of the enemy and taking so many of their capital ships, wherein you have shown a conduct that has very much distinguished your character...You will know from other hands what great satisfaction have given, not only to the King and his ministry, but to the trading interest in the City, and indeed to all His Majesty's good subjects.30

This letter indicates the kind of praise that followed Hawke's devotion to duty and success. His admirable performance in the line of duty, and the recognition he received for such actions, were invaluable forms of political capital that Hawke only occasionally redeemed throughout his extensive career.31 Upon being showered with approbation by yet others in the navy, such as

Rear Admiral William Chambers, Hawke received a letter at the end of October from Lieutenant

James Hobbs, which read:

28 Evelyn Cruickshanks, "Corbett, Thomas (c.1697-1751), of Nash, Pemb." The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1715-1754. 29 J. K. Laughton, ‘Moore, Sir John, baronet (1718–1779)’, rev. Ruddock Mackay, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19129, accessed 22 Nov 2014] 30 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 58. 31 "Patrons therefore needed to be careful how they gave recommendations, les their credit suffer by an injudicious choice." No one was this statement more true than for Admiral Hawke. His patronage was extremely selective, as laid out in subsequent paragraphs. Rodger, The Wooden World, 277.

I heartily congratulate you on your late success over the French and am glad to hear you are in good health and, I hope, safe arrived at Spithead with all your prizes. I am very sorry I had not the honour of being with you, notwithstanding which, Sir, I hope you'll please to think of me having no friends to rely on but yourself; and if this glorious affair has given you an opportunity of providing for the few friends which was out with you, I hope you'll be kind enough to apply to their Lordships for me in time before they shall put any more upon you, for Lord Anson has a great many hanging on him.

Indeed, Hawke kept the lieutenant in mind for years to come and, as Montagu Burrows confirms in an earlier, previously uncondensed version of his book The Life of Edward Lord Hawke, he wrote a letter "from Spithead on June 23rd, [1755], in which he begs that his First Lieutenant,

James Hobbs, may be made Commander into a small vessel — 'a very diligent officer, who has served with me long. It is the first favour of the kind that I have ever asked, and shall be very much obliged to their Lordships.'"32 In Rodger's The Wooden World, he notes "as a patron himself, Hawke was especially the friend of men who had no other friends...It was typical of him, too, to concern himself not only with the advancement but also the personal well-being of his followers."33 As the second half of Hawke's career progressed, his importance and expertise in naval operations became even more essential to his superiors in the navy and the government.

The colonies abroad had only become more profitable throughout the 18th century and his command and credibility were about to be tested to their fullest extent. It was during this era that

Hawke ensured he had ample influence upon those carrying out naval operations — both above and below him.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle put an end to British and French hostilities for the foreseeable future and upon its signing, in 1748, Hawke was instructed by the Commissioners to

32 Rodger, The Wooden World, 279; Burrows, The Life of Edward Lord Hawke, 244. It should be noted this citation from Burrows, though the same author and title as listed in the bibliography, came from an earlier edition of the same work. 33 Rodger, The Wooden World, 279.

80 take over Warren's position at Portsmouth.34 While at harbor, Hawke's duty was to maintain order and discipline among the various subordinate officers and work crews while the ships were repaired and refitted. One such incident requiring Hawke's attendance was of an attempted mutiny in 1749 aboard Chesterfield by Lieutenant Samuel Couchman and Lieutenant John

Morgan of the marines. The attempt was thwarted by the boatswain, Roger Gastril, who assembled a counter-action and retook control.35 Hawke convened a court martial, suggested that Couchman and Morgan be executed for treason, and less than a week later, on July 11th, wrote this letter of patronage on behalf of Gastril and one Thomas Gilliam:

Agreeable to their Lordships' directions, I have this day ordered Roger Gastril...to repair to the Admiralty Office, it having appeared in the course of the trials that he behaved with prudence and resolution in recovering His Majesty's ship from the mutineers and with great candour and honesty as an evidence. At the same time, I cannot with justice pass over the behaviour of Thomas Gilliam, the mate, in silence, as it appeared to the court that the boatswain could not have succeeded without his aid and assistance.36

In a short response from the Admiralty it was communicated to Hawke that "their Lordships who will pay due regard to Mr. Gilliam's behaviour...will inquire into his time of service in the Navy, and if it be such as qualifies him for a lieutenant, send him hither that he may...pass his examination."37 As before, Hawke had gone out of his way to make mention of a man whose name could easily have been disregarded. But owing to his dutiful dedication to recognize those who serve admirably, he helped to advance both Gastril and Gilliam's careers. Interestingly, too, during this affair Hawke found himself, because of his own political reputation as an MP of

Portsmouth, asking for marine Lieutenant Morgan's death sentence be commuted, arguing, "He was but little acquainted with the sea service, is extremely weak and ignorant. Besides, he has a

34 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 90. 35 Ibid., 98-99. 36 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 1743-1771, 100. 37 Ibid., 100.

81 wife and several small children whose bread depends solely on him...I would fain hope that the above considerations might induce their Lordships...to spare his life."38 Once word had spread about the pathetic nature of Morgan's affair, the least Hawke could do to appear compassionate in the public eye was to intercede to the extent he could on Morgan's behalf — regardless of the board's final decision. The remaining six years of tenuous peace with France, while Hawke was primarily stationed at Portsmouth, were of little consequence — if only to mention the banalities of bouts of illness, the deaths of various family members and friends, and the testing of various new naval inventions.39

Hostilities between the two countries resumed in 1755 at the outset of the Seven Years'

War. Throughout the war, the person with whom Hawke was most closely in contact was longtime MP of Saltash and Secretary to the Admiralty (1751 to 1763) John Clevland. From

February, 1755, to December, 1759, the two exchanged correspondences on well over a hundred different occasions, and several dozens more each year from 1760 to 1763. Of note in their abundant communication is both the subject and intonation of the letters. While one might believe the men wrote each other with enough frequency to become friends, reading the letters one does not get the impression that their relationship extended beyond business. What is clear is that they had mutual professional respect for each other. As with so many other aspects of his career, Hawke's devotion to his duty is, once again, present in his thorough correspondence with the Secretary of the Admiralty — not as a cajoling sycophant, but an assiduous patriot striving to carry-out orders and relay information with as much transparency as possible. Interestingly,

Hawke's confidence and forthrightness comes through as well. One might describe his tone as courteously blunt when calling attention to the state of his crew, their victualling, and the

38 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 1743-1771, 100. 39 Mackay, Admiral Hawke, 100-113.

82 tendency for the board's comfortable distance from war preventing them from fully respecting the difficulties of long being at sea.40 It is clear from these numerous examples that Hawke was keenly aware of the deference owed to his superiors in the navy, and often bated his genuine frustration with them. The Admiralty, posed with the prospect of treating Hawke severely and forcing him to resign, only to be replaced by a clearly less competent officer, much rather would've opted to respect his naval expertise — even if it meant overlooking his somewhat brusque tone. But the political acumen Hawke possessed, both in the form of unwavering commitment and expertise in performing his duties, made him an invaluable asset, especially during a time of war.

The Seven Years' War afforded Hawke the opportunity to make most use of his high- ranking position in the British Royal Navy. It may not appear as though "career construction" would take place after one has already achieved so much. But for Hawke, whose humble beginnings rarely afforded him the opportunity to act as either patron or client, it was the maintenance of his position in the navy, imbued by his unwavering commitment to duty, that allowed him to flex his naval and political clout during this time. Of particular importance to

40 In a letter dated 8 March, 1755, Hawke wrote to Clevland, "I hope their Lordships will consider my situation with regard to fitting the ships at this port. It is but few men I can procure from the tenders under my orders, as most of the hands are pressed from merchant ships coming into the Channel by the cruisers and tenders to the westward...I have but very few seamen to assist the landmen in fitting the ships in the Harbour. It would be some help to me if their Lordships would give me directions for returning me the volunteers sent from this port in the Speedwell, since they have thought proper to order her to another station..."; In another on 27 April, "The sugar is extremely black, coarse and ready to run into molasses, and the fruit in general mouldy and so masked and clotted that it is scarce possible to determine the species it was of...The cinnamon very coarse and having neither spicy taste nor flavour. The sheets so patched and darned that it is impossible to make a roller of a yarn long out of them...I must therefore request that their Lordships would give directs to inquire into the same..."; And in yet another, dated 1 October, 1755, "I...am extremely sorry to find that their Lordships think any of the ships of my squadron could have stayed out longer. I hope they will be of another opinion when they reflect that most of the men had been pressed after long voyages, cooped up in tenders and ships at Spithead for many months, and the water in general long kept in new casks, which occasioned great sickness, beside the number of French prisoners and the men spare to navigate them into port...Upon the whole I am conscious of having used my utmost endeavours to answer the end of my being sent out and of never having once lost sight of the principal object of my cruise. If their Lordships should be of another opinion, I am ready and willing to resign my command to anyone else whose abilities they may have more confidence. Ibid., 116, 120, 129.

Hawke during the Seven Years' War was strengthening his connection to Lord Anson, and starting in 1756 the two began communicating more frequently.41 By March of 1758, Hawke grew increasingly concerned the Admiralty Board would pass him up and took it upon himself to draft a letter to Anson, stating:

I hope your Lordship will excuse my taking the freedom to remind you of the commission for the command of the Western Squadron which you was so kind as to say should be sent down to me. Forgive me, my Lord, if I tell you that I shall not have it unless your Lordship will be so good as to order it to be done in time for me and to take the trouble to see that it is right. I am persuaded if your Lordship will but consider the propriety of it, you will easily discern that my request is founded on reason and justice, as it could never be His Majesty's nor the Privy Council's intention that the flag officers at home should be deprived of the same benefits from serving as those who serve abroad, and this advantage no officer can have by commanding a few great ships who are soon discovered and avoided...Pardon me, my Lord for tell you my sentiments thus freely. As a flag officer, I have only myself to plead my cause to your Lordship.42

Unknown to Hawke as he penned the letter, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the rest of the board had already sent instructions to him two days earlier indicating he would take on the prestigious and lucrative role of commander-in-chief of the Western Squadron. In this unsent excerpt of his original draft, Hawke all but begs for Anson's consideration in appointing him commander-in-chief. He knew, as did Anson, that the job was in high demand for its abundant prize money. Yet again, his argument is not saturated with shallow, thinly-guised ardor and affection, but put forth with polite conviction that favors notions of "reason and justice." The tone is markedly different from the less formal and more frequent correspondence exchanged with Secretary Clevland, with whom Hawke continued to epistolize. These exchanges from

1758 to 1760, during the blockade of Brest and the Battle of Quiberon Bay, encapsulate what many might consider the pinnacle of Hawke's career.

41 For more on Britain's military leaders in the Seven Years' War, see: Kent W. Hackmann, "William Pitt and the Generals: Three Case Studies in the Seven Years' War." Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 3, no. 3 (1971): 128-37. 42 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 194.

The Battle of Quiberon Bay was the culmination of a months-long operation to prevent an impending French invasion from reaching the shores of the British Isles. As the commander- in-chief, Hawke led the battle which took place on November 20th, 1759, about 300 miles, sailing distance, from the shores of Britain. It was a resounding victory for the British.43 Typical of much of Hawke's career, the calculated risks he took in the battle served only to further solidify his already near impeccable track record. But the battle and its outcome are of lesser consequence to the context of this essay than the growing sphere of influence Hawke had upon both the Admiralty Board and the lives of men who served beneath him leading up to it. To be sure, much of the patronage and information brokering exhibited in Hawke's career came at a time surrounding what became the hallmark defining moment of his life's work — the victory at

Quiberon Bay.

The previous May, for example, Hawke wrote a letter to Clevland, "There are two lieutenants wanting on board the Ramillies, whose room I hope their Lordships will be kind enough to supply with Lieutenant Lee of the Royal Ann, to be fifth, and Lieutenant Archibald

Darroch, who is in town, to be sixth."44 Just a month later, on June 8, he wrote again, "I have appointed Captain Campbell of the Essex to act as Captain of the Royal George, Captain Johnson of the Pluto to command the Essex, and Lieutenant Robert Taylor, first of the Ramillies, to command the Pluto till farther order. Lieutenant Taylor, if I am not mistaken, is the oldest

43 As described by Montagu Burrows, "It will at once be seen that the place of this battle in history must not be measured by the number of ships captured in actual battle, but by the ultimate fate of the enemy's ships, by the unparalleled circumstances of the engagement, and by the effect it had upon the maritime power of France. With the little daylight left when the ten ships that were near enough the enemy to engage entered the Bay, Hawke could not reckon on more than a partial victory at the moment; what he did reckon upon, and with justice, was that the Frenchmen would act as they did in the previous year, and destroy themselves in their frantic efforts to fly to a place of safety." Burrows, The Life of Lord Hawke, 229. 44 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 210.

85 lieutenant now employed, a sober, diligent, good officer, and as such I beg leave to recommend him to their Lordships."45 And yet again, a week later, Hawke wrote to Clevland about his own son — whom Hawke assured he would groom to the best of his ability,

If he [Cpt. Archibald Clevland] serves with me, you may rest assured I shall take every opportunity to do him all the good offices in my power. He appears to me to be good natured and very alert in his duty, and I dare say will acquit himself as an officer upon all occasions as well as any young man in the service. There is an openness and frankness in him which please me much and have induced me, now and then, to give him some little hints that I thought might be useful to him.46

These three letters are but a few short examples of Edward Lord Hawke acting as a patron on behalf of men he likely felt best represented his own ideals of service and duty. The last in particular, with respect to John Clevland's son, comes off as strikingly sincere and forward.

Keeping with the tone of professionalism seen in the bulk of their correspondences, Hawke goes out of his way to praise Clevland's son — especially in the third sentence, which to the untrained reader might appear obligatory, but in fact is an additional afterthought to what was already considered an ample enough compliment. It is this genuineness, only sparingly offered by

Hawke, which is harder to discern in Nelson's letters which are known to be unctuous.

During this time, Hawke took increasingly more control over the course of action of the navy than the Admiralty Board may have first intended. This was done, at least in part, with a degree of pellucidity of his location, actions, and intentions. It might be argued that had a less organized, punctual, and precise commander attempted to exert the same will as did Hawke, it would have been met with more resistance and vitriol from the board. When he was first put to sea, for instance, the board wrote two letters dictating his orders,

45 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 228. 46 Ibid., 233.

...you are hereby required and directed to take [ the fourteen ships listed] under your command accordingly and employ them as shall be hereafter directed; [from the second letter] in addition...you are hereby required and directed to lose no time in proceeding to Torbay with such of the ships thereby put under your command as you shall find at Spithead ready for service and remain there until further order...47

As time passed, however, the orders from the board diminish in number, whereas Hawke's outgoing letters containing information about his own position and activities, intended objectives, and enemy movements, seem to dramatically increase in number. One excellent example of this was an exchange between Hawke and Clevland in late July, 1759, shortly after

Hawke had taken a number of Swedish vessels and sent them on to Portsmouth. On the 29th,

Hawke wrote,

Since my last of the 24th nothing material has happened nor is the appearance of the enemy changed. On the morning of the 22nd they certainly were 22 sail of the line. Ever since the 24th they make only 21, with her...The master of a Dutch vessel from Morlaix acquaints me that there are in that port four transports waiting an opportunity to slip to Brest, for which place he saw 5000 troops march through. Two Dutchmen came out of Brest yesterday and say the French fleet is manned and all the soldiers on board...The 27th in the afternoon I sent the Anson in for ten days refreshment, with eighteen victuallers under her convoy.

The brief response from Clevland is indicative of a board that seemed content to allow Hawke to do what he felt best, as opposed to micromanaging him. On the 30th, Clevland wrote, "Sir, I have received and read to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letters...giving an account of your proceedings, all which their Lordships very well approve." Their decision to allow Hawke to perform in his own manner paid off with the victory at Quiberon Bay. Many might have thought pursuing the French ships so late in the afternoon of November 20 could easily have resulted in failure. To Hawke, it was an opportunity he was willing to risk. Shortly after his victory Quiberon Bay, Hawke wrote a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Baron

47 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 209.

George Anson, to offer his own narrative of the events of the 20th and offer historians yet another example of acts of patronage on his behalf:

I thought it would be a satisfaction to you that some person should be sent home with my express on whom your Lordship might rely for a faithful and impartial account of our action with the French fleet on the 20th instant. I therefore made a choice of Captain Campbell who proved himself to me an honest, brave, good officer in all respects and fully answered the good opinion I had ever conceived of him...I took the freedom to desire Captain Campbell to request two favours of your Lordship for me. The one was that Lieutenant Stuart, whom I had appointed to act as captain of the Fortune sloop who unfortunately lost his life in her, might be confirmed in humanity to his widow, who he has left starving with three or four children. The other was to make Lieutenant Ogle of the Ramillies, a captain for me. He has been a long while an officer and is truly deserving of promotion, being a sober, sensible, diligent, good young man.48

The remainder of the lengthy dispatch recounts Hawke's own opinion of the major successes of the battle and makes detailed "suggestions" as to what the Board might consider to be its next orders of him and the rest of the line since his "principal service [was] at an end" and he fully intended to return to shore. He finished his letter, "In regard to the whole I can truly say that I have in all respects, strictly and faithfully complied with my duty, and that I have nothing more sincerely at heart, at all times, than to use my utmost endeavours to merit your Lordship's approbation."49 Not unlike Vice Admiral Nelson, who years later found himself in a similar situation, Hawke had put himself in the pivotal position of having tremendous influence upon the network of officers serving beneath him in the British Royal Navy at a time when international relations dictated heavy naval presence.

Collingwood as a Patron

While Admiral Jervis and Commodore Nelson were important patrons to Collingwood, the earliest, longest-lasting, and most important client of Collingwood was Lieutenant John

Clavell, whom Jervis had put under his command aboard Excellent. According to Newnham

48 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 209. 49 Ibid., 352.

Collingwood, who compiled the original bulk of letters written by his distant relative, Lord St.

Vincent said to Clavell, "I have given you, Sir, a commission...into the Excellent, but remember that you are going to a man who will take it away from you to-morrow if you behave ill."50 For years, Clavell continued to serve alongside Collingwood who, though considered a strict disciplinarian, early-on in his career decided to do away with the use of the cat-o-nine tails in reprimanding his crew in favor of more effective and less physical punishments. Eventually,

Collingwood promoted Clavell to Post-Captain in one of several acts of patronage throughout his career. However, Collingwood did not fully flourish in the role of patron as early as Nelson.

Becoming a valid patron in a navy stacked with capable officers, especially while Nelson was serving, was not an easy task. From the years 1798 to 1805, Collingwood was perpetually stymied by the system of patronage. His career advancement was principally hinged upon taking advantage of his intimate connection to Nelson and continuing to broker information to the appropriate outlets. Thus, while Collingwood was promoted to rear-admiral in 1799, truly it was not until after the death of Horatio Nelson that Collingwood became a much more viable patron.

In mid-1797, the Excellent was instructed to blockade the Spanish ports at Cadiz. They remained stationed at this post for nearly two years, as Collingwood wrote, "We are lying here blockading this port, as we have done all the summer, very effectually, and thereby totally ruin the Spanish trade."51 Months later, in a follow up letter, he wrote in detail about the situation with Spain, again alluding to his great foresight on worldly affairs well outside of what many would believe him to be aware, "She [Spain] is no longer an independent nation. The hearts of the people are well disposed towards England; but their Government is imbecile, and their Court

50 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 55. 51 Ibid., 60.

89 subject to the imperious control of France."52 It was in this letter, too, that Collingwood reveals his recent, but brief, promotion to Commodore, saying, "[m]y appointment as Commodore was only during the absence of the established number of Admirals; and now Sir John Orde and

Admiral Frederick make the number again."53

Months at Cadiz wore Collingwood's patience paper thin. A brief respite was long overdue and no action meant both he and the crew were forced to go to great lengths to alleviate sheer boredom.54 Making matters worse was that, in 1798, Nelson and a lesser capable officer than Collingwood were assigned to the Mediterranean "to counter 'the execution of a plan which has long been in contemplation in France."55 This was likely to be less of a grievance to

Collingwood if Nelson and others hadn't managed to pin down Napoleon's navy at the Battle of the Nile in August. Instead, Collingwood perceived it as yet another lost opportunity to show his skill and further appeal to the rising stock he held in Nelson. Much as Collingwood liked Jervis, his frustration was expressed in a private letter home,

The only great mortification I suffered was not going with Adm Nelson. He [St Vincent] knew our friendship; for many, many years we had served together, lived together, and all that ever happened to us strengthened the bond of our amity, but my going would have interfered with the aggrandisement of a favourite to whom I was a senior, and so he sent me out of the way when the detachment was to be made.56

Collingwood knew, as well as any, that promotion was a matter of opportunities from which valor and commendation were to be derived. By the end of 1798, he was entirely jaded by the political game of public adoration that Nelson seemed to play so well. This is particularly

52 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 62. 53 Ibid., 64. 54 Adams explains how, in a letter home, he wrote that his "wits are ever at work to keep my people employed, both for health's sake, and to save them from mischief. We have lately been making musical instruments, and have now a very good band." Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 159. 55 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 85. 56 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 160.

90 evident in a letter he wrote to Captain Alexander Ball, a client and close protégé of Nelson's, in

October of that year.

Oh my dear Ball, how I have lamented that I was not one of you [at the Battle of the Nile]! ... I have been almost broken-hearted all the summer. My ship was in as perfect order for any service as those which were sent; in seal I will yield to none; and my friendship - my love for your admirable Admiral gave me a particular interest in serving with him ... but our good Chief found employment for me...to intercept the market-boats, the poor cabbage carriers. Oh! Humiliation... Remember me most kindly to Sir H. Nelson, to whom I wrote not long since; to Foley, Troubridge, and all my friends.57

Though it is clearly evident that Collingwood flew close to the inside circle of Nelson's band of brothers, he was once again found absent of a pivotal opportunity. When he was eventually promoted to Rear-Admiral of the White on February, 1799, his bridled reaction was tempered by the cognizance that he'd have to give up the Excellent to a flag captain, and may not be put back out to sea at all.58 Collingwood was 51 years of age, and it appeared as though regardless of where he was in life, he was bound to be discontent about his situation for one reason or another.

The Long Path to Grandeur

The next several years of Collingwood's life, from 1799 to 1802, were spent in and around England attempting to find ways to be put back to sea on a more permanent basis. He was eventually put aboard HMS Triumph, a more aged and inferior vessel than the one to which he had grown accustomed. As Warner explained, "The strangely depressed, bitter, and even cynical tone of his letters during the cruise of 1799 may partly be accounted for by the fact that

Collingwood was in one of the least satisfactory situations the Navy offered - that of a Rear-

Admiral, subordinate to seniors in the Fleet, accommodated in a slow, two-decked ship, with a captain whose ways he did not consider were up to the mark."59 I think Warner's argument,

57 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 72-4. 58 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 163. 59 Warner, Oliver. The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 93.

91 however, can be extended beyond the bounds of his duty. Collingwood, weary of politicking for his glory, had spent years on missions that didn't afford him opportunities (or at least as many opportunities as he may have felt he deserved) to demonstrate traits he felt he possessed: courage, honor, seamanship, zeal, clever strategy, and leadership. Those opportunities of which he had been a part were, to some degree, undermined by the very hollow superficiality and spuriousness of naval aegis he came to loathe. On top of that, he spent many years away from his family, which was a necessary setback if one devoted his life to the navy, but a far more tolerable one under the guise of achievement and fame.

On a national level, the situation with France was still tenuous and unsettling. His voyage in the summer of 1799, despite serving at the highest rank he had ever achieved, resulted

(as he put it) in "a horrible bungling," not due to any fault of his, but because of the diffidence of

Commander-in-Chief Admiral Lord Keith who essentially allowed the Spanish and French ships to operate as they pleased. After returning to shore, the next assignment of notable length saw him reunited with the ship he had served on during the First of June, Barfleur. By 1801, his depression had set back in as he wrote,

God knows how much I suffer from them [weak nerves], what hours of sadness and depression of spirit I pass heavily away. I endeavor to correct it by exercise and cheerful company, but this requires an effort, for languor and indisposition to any thing gay is part of [the] disease...I have been very poorly lately, weak in the greatest degree, and I never sleep at nights. The only time I am free of this weight, this oppressive something, as if I bore a mountain on my shoulders, is the few hours that I am dispatching my business, and at that time I know no ill, all is brisk with me then.60

At that same time, England was becoming increasingly concerned of a French invasion at the hands of Napoleon. But Collingwood's constitution was already under siege by long-lasting clinical depression. He did return to England on several brief occasions, either spending a night

60 Warner, Oliver. The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 99.

92 at port or going back to Morpeth, where he and his wife recently purchased a home. Sometimes he had the opportunity to see his family for a night or two, other times he dined with Nelson. By mid-1801, "just as Collingwood was preparing to say goodbye to his wife and daughter in

October" the Treaty of Amiens was signed and England and France were finally met with a short-lived peacetime.61 When hostilities resumed three years later, in 1804, Collingwood was finally given the opportunity for which he had waited so many years.

After putting to sea in 1803, and being named vice-admiral in 1804, Collingwood spent time off the shores of Cadiz, first aboard Prince and later, in August of that year, being transferred to the Dreadnaught. Meanwhile, Nelson had been stationed in the Mediterranean.62

In a letter in early 1805, Collingwood expressed his trepidation in regards to the growing threat

Napoleon posed. "I really think he is making a progress more alarming now, than at any former period," he wrote, "His fleet is become numerous and increase like mushrooms...and for all the purposes of carrying an army, they are enough."63 Indeed, Napoleon had been planning an attack on Britain and was ready to execute it by mid-1805. Had it not been Napoleon who conceived of it, one might consider the grandiose plan to be a product of impossible absurdity.64 Napoleon's top admiral, Pierre-Charles Villeneuve, the same man whose ship was destroyed at the Battle of the Nile years earlier, was trusted to carry out the first part of the plan. Naturally, the rest never came to fruition, but Villeneuve's evasion of Nelson was, by most accounts, a success. Nelson wrote from aboard Victory in Gibraltar about his disappointment, "I am, as you may imagine,

61 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 176. 62 Ibid., 195. 63 Warner, The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 134. 64 The plan, according to Warner, was comprised of four main assumptions. One was that all the main fleets would be able to evade the British blockaders. Another was that Villeneuve would be pursued outside Toulon. The third was that Cornwallis's fleet would be defeated. The last was that the invasion flotillas would overwhelm the British forces and secure a safe landing spot for his grand army. The rest was a foregone conclusion in Napoleon's mind. Ibid., 132.

93 miserable at not having fallen in with the enemy's fleet; but for false information, the battle would have been fought where Rodney fought his, on June the 6th [1805]."65

One of Villeneuve's ships, carrying cavalry, sailed toward the West Indies followed by

Nelson. Collingwood, in both an explanation of his reluctance to immediately follow his order to quickly accompany him in support and broker information, explained to Secretary of the

Admiralty William Marsden, "Cavalry is a species of force not calculated for the West Indies service, and which raises in my mind, a doubt of that being their destination."66 As it turns out,

Collingwood's judgment and intelligence served him well. He wrote later, "I have always had an idea was their plan [to sail for Ireland], for this Bonaparte has as many tricks as a monkey. I believe their object in the West Indies to be...to draw our force from home."67 Collingwood, convinced an engagement was nigh, managed to make a tactical maneuver that set the stage for a major battle months later. Still off Cadiz in late August, 1805, Collingwood had four ships in his detachment, "when, through the haze in the west, came Villeneuve's combined fleet of twenty- six sail of the line."68 Outnumbered, outgunned, and outpaced, the quick-witted Collingwood provoked them by sailing only slowly to the east, as though unintimidated. When Villeneuve's ships gave chase, Collingwood puffed his chest, ordering his four-ship squadron to stand against, and even ordering one of the ships, Colossus, to pursue.69 He then signaled to a non-existent fleet further to the east. Collingwood allowed Villeneuve and his elusive fleet to enter Cadiz, exactly where he wanted them so to plan a future attack, but had prevented an onslaught that

65 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 105. 66 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 196. 67 Ibid., 196.; Note: His sentiments were echoed in a letter he wrote to Nelson on July 25, 1805, when he said, "I have always have an idea that Ireland alone was the object they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant, perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more." Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 107. 68 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 199. 69 The entire affair was regaled via a letter to Mrs. Collingwood on August 21, 1805 and outlined in his memoirs. Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 109-11.

94 could easily have brought about his own death. As Max Adams wrote of the event, "If he did not possess Nelson's impetuous genius in attack, he had proven himself a defensive virtuoso."70

In early October, Nelson sailed to join Collingwood and a number of other ships who had been vigorously blockading Cadiz. As he approached, he wrote to Collingwood requesting that no salute be made nor flags be hoisted so as not to let the French know every time a ship joined the fleet.71 On the 9th, he again wrote Collingwood to inform him of his plan of attack.

They surely cannot escape us. I wish we could get a fine day. I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in: but my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.72

Collingwood, whose best friend happened to be one of the most influential men in the British

Royal Navy, finally had his opportunity to show, without question, that Nelson had invested his confidence in the right man. In his reply, Collingwood made mention of one last favor to be requested of his friend, saying,

I have had a little distress about two Lieutenants being senior to my First Lieutenant, Clavell, who is indeed my right arm [perhaps an odd thing to mention to a man who had, since 1797, been missing his right arm], and the spirit that puts everything in motion; but I hope your Lordship will appoint them to this ship, and then I will take my Signal Lieutenant also, whose name is Brice Gilliland.73

Just weeks before the Battle of Trafalgar took place, Collingwood used his closeness with

Nelson to act as a patron for these young men, but even more importantly, ensure he was surrounded by men who would perform beyond expectation during his moment of opportunity.

The last thing he wanted was to be undermined by inexperienced, incompetent officers in the event of a pivotal battle. Nelson, having already expressed his supreme confidence in

70 Adams, Max. Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 199. 71 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 113. 72 Ibid., 115 73 Ibid., 116.

Collingwood, was happy to oblige. On October 10th, he replied, "You will receive the commissions and order as you desired."74 Beyond his crew, Nelson had only recently transferred

Collingwood to take command of the Royal Sovereign, which though an older ship, had just been renovated and recoppered — making her "the fastest ship in the fleet."75 Collingwood now had his crew, his ship, and his opportunity. Now all he needed was a victory.

As the October days drifted by, each becoming shorter than the next, the fleet patiently waited, just as Collingwood had his entire career, for the opportune moment to strike. In the last letter Nelson ever wrote to Collingwood, on October 19th, 1805, he relayed information he obtained from a French officer from Magnanimous they had taken aboard. In almost poetic form, he closed his letter with the following: "What a beautiful day! Will you be tempted out of your ship? If you will, hoist the Assent and Victory's pendants."76 With historical prescience,

Collingwood attached an addendum to the letter, explaining, "Before the answer to this letter had got to the Victory, the signal was made that the enemy's fleet was coming out of Cadiz, and we chased immediately."77

During the course of the Battle of Trafalgar, outlined in thorough detail in a letter to

Secretary of the Admiralty Marsden, Vice-Admiral Nelson was gunned down by a French sniper.

This letter has become one of the most valuable surviving primary resource documents in British

Naval history. It is decidedly bittersweet. On one hand, it outlines the first of many defeats faced by perhaps the greatest military commander of all time, and dashed any hopes the French had of invading Britain. It was a hard-fought victory for Britain, her navy, and especially for

Collingwood. The victory, not unlike others in Collingwood's career, was tarnished by factors

74 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 116. 75 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 201. 76 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 118. 77 Ibid., 118.

96 outside his command. This time though, he lost much more than his own personal acclaim. He lost his closest patron, his most trusted colleague, and his most intimate friend.

I have not only to lament, in common with the British Navy and the British Nation, in the fall of the Commander-in-chief, the loss of a hero, whose name will be immortal, and his memory ever dear to his Country; but my heart is rent witht he most poignant grief for the death of a friend, to whom, by many years of intimacy, and a perfect knowledge of the virtues of his mind, which inspired ideas superior to the common race of men, I was bound by the strongest ties of affection, — a grief, to which even the glorious occasion in which he fell does not bring consolation which, perhaps, it ought.78

Even after securing of one of the greatest, if not the greatest victory the British Navy ever achieved , Collingwood was once again stripped of his own personal victory with the death of his friend. Nonetheless, in the victory of Trafalgar, Collingwood served as second-in-command only behind Nelson and fully expected to play a pivotal role in the ongoing war against

Napoleonic France. Perhaps more importantly for Collingwood was that for the first time, very late in his career in a post-Nelsonian era, his own social stature swelled to new heights. He hoped his ability to advance the careers of young officers, thereby increasing his network influence, would reflect his newfound prominence.

Though perhaps not a surprise since Collingwood had so often filled vacancies Nelson left open, one of the earliest indicators that Admiral Collingwood's position advanced after

Nelson's death came in a letter from one of Nelson's closest patrons, the Duke of Clarence. In it he expressed his heart-felt remorse over the loss of their friend and his congratulations on his essential role in the victory at Trafalgar. "Earl St. Vincent and Lord Nelson, both, in the hour of victory, accepted from me a sword, and I hope you will now confer on me the same pleasure. I have accordingly sent a sword, with which I trust you will accept my sincere wishes for your

78 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 122.

97 future welfare."79 After this letter Collingwood was made Baron Collingwood of Calburne and

Hethpoole. Collingwood's landed title was a greater title than Nelson, who so desperately coveted such gestures, had ever held. It also assured him a substantial pension from Parliament of £2000 per year for the rest of his life, and upon his death, another £1000 for his wife and £500 for each of his daughters, each year, for the remainder of theirs. The responses Collingwood sent, both to the Duke of Clarence and to Lord Barham, are invariably humble, modest, and polite — acknowledging his deference and sincere gratitude for raising him to peerage. He wrote to Lord Barham, "I cannot sufficiently express the gratitude which I feel to my King for this distinguished mark of his royal approbation of my conduct," and echoed to the Duke of

Clarence, "how great my gratitude is to your Royal Highness, for the high honour which you have done me by your letter."80 The merits and accolades were surely everything he could have hoped to receive, but one wonders if the outcome would have been so generous if Nelson had survived the ordeal. In the ensuing years, the Baron Collingwood once again found himself filling the void of his friend, not in an attempt to take over his legacy, but rather use careful politicking to chart his own course in commanding the fleet against Napoleon, and to subtly influence the network of men around him to see his goals met.

In February of 1806, Collingwood began connecting with esteemed figures from Nelson's foreign social circle, Minister of State to the King of Naples Sir John Acton and the King of

Naples and Queen of the Two Sicilies. His commitment to carrying out the protection of these

Mediterranean territories in Nelson's absence was unambiguous. In a letter to British diplomat

Hugh Elliott, younger brother of Lord Minto, one of Nelson's close political patrons,

Collingwood brokered information of their tenuous position.

79 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 158. 80 Ibid., 161-2.

The critical state to which the kingdom of Naples is reduced by the misfortunes which have befallen the armies...requires the utmost vigilance," he wrote, "I delayed sending [home several battle-weary ships] from the information...that the enemy's squadrons, amounting to more than twenty sail, are expected to arrive at Cadiz soon...my opinion is that their object is Sicily...Should this armament pass into the Mediterranean without being encountered, the difficulty of subduing them would daily increase.81

With Nelson around, Collingwood may never have written these kinds of letters. Even as a

Rear-Admiral while Nelson was still alive, Collingwood had few instances of playing such a vital role in the protection of Naples or any other territories. His apprehension of taking such a critical role was articulated to his father in-law, JE Blackett, shortly thereafter, "I have a most arduous time of it, and affairs are growing so critical all around me that I scarce know which to take up first."82 One part of his solution to these tensions was to reach out to some of his own superiors, Lord Radstock and Lord Barham, to begin fighting harder to place men into positions after months of frustration with the Admiralty preventing him from doing so. "I have a plan for

Mr. Waldegrave [referring to George Waldegrave, Lord Radstock's son]. Captain Mundy gives the highest character of him, and says that, in all respects he is worthy of command, and that his intelligence in every part of his duty is superior to that of most young men." As an aside, the young man otherwise may have been a client of Nelson's as three years earlier, in 1803, Nelson wrote to Lord Radstock about the as yet unproven Waldegrave, "You may rely that I shall not omit anything in my power to be useful to your son, when he has served his time he shall come directly into the Victory."83 But taking matters into Collingwood's own hands to get the placements of young men he preferred did not come without some degree of confrontation. In late march of 1806, Collingwood wrote a very assertive letter to Lord Barham outlining his discontent.

81 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 188-9. 82 Ibid., 192. 83 Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 5, 77.

On the subject of the appointments I hope your Lordship will excuse my expressing my great disappointment that the only officer for him I was particularly anxious, or whom I recommended to your Lordship to be promoted, has been passed over unnoticed; and I can now say, what will scarcely be credited, and what I am willing to believe your Lordship is not aware of, that I am the only Commander in that fleet who has not had, by the courtesy of the Admiralty, an opportunity to advance one officer of any description...Lieutenant Landless, the only person I recommended to your Lordship, is an old and a valuable officer; he has followed me from ship to ship all the war.84

Collingwood was at a point in his career that minimally, he felt, constituted more influence over who the Admiralty considered for promotion. While Nelson's peculiar disposition had a charming effect upon those around him from the time he was a young officer, Collingwood was not inclined so early on to believe he could have the same influence. By 1806, his age, experience, rank, connection to the fallen Nelson, landed title, and precarious position in the heart of conflict in the Mediterranean were owed due respect.

Indeed, Lieutenant Landless was made a Captain on short order, but the flood gates were not yet opened for Collingwood placing lieutenants. The problem was no longer because of his being overlooked, but due to a hindrance so frequently faced by Nelson in his final year of service — a lack of openings. Collingwood iterated the issue to his wife in December of the same year,

The vacancies which happen are in no proportion to the applications for them. I have not made Captain, except Landless, since this time twelvemonth, nor has a Lieutenant been removed from my ship, except one who, seeing very little prospect of succeeding here, applied to go home, and try his fortune elsewhere.85

Quite simply, at this time, the best way for new openings to be filled by promising young

Lieutenants was upon the deaths of other officers. But from 1806 to 1809, very few deaths occurred, and thus, very few promotions. In April 1807, Collingwood appealed to the Admiralty

Board with marginal success on behalf of Captain Hallowell for the promotion of his First

84 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 192. 85 Ibid., 257.

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Lieutenant on the Tigre, getting him a Post-Captaincy by way of death vacancy.86 Generally, his requests simply couldn't be met due to the longevity (a term rarely used in describing the lives of sailors in the early modern era) of men in these coveted positions. The absurdity of the circumstances was a topic Collingwood broached, albeit with a touch of dark humor, in a letter to

Rear Admiral Sotheby regarding the promotion of his nephew in late June, 1809.

It would be a great pleasure to me to serve your nephew, and to have an opportunity of obliging you; but the truth is, that I have no opportunity to promote anyone, from year to year. The chances are as rare as the appearance of comets...All vacancies [are] those made by death...and people are loath to die...though I shall myself make a vacancy soon, for I am worn threadbare of constitution.87

Collingwood's grim premonition was closer to accurate than he may have known. Collingwood put to shore in February of 1810. His career was long and illustrious, but it seemed that with each event he could control in his rise to naval importance, Collingwood faced more disappointment than did either Hawke or Nelson. As Adams wrote in his biography, "He had survived the battle of Trafalgar and two smaller fleet actions. He had kept the French fleet bottled up in Toulon, apart from two failed excursions, for four years. He had conducted a diplomatic and political plate-spinning exercise that is breathtaking in its scope and achievement."88 As with many others in the navy, life at sea weathered Collingwood beyond his years. By the time he wrote the letter to Sotheby, he was dying, as Napoleon did years later, of a stomach tumor. He relinquished his coveted position to Rear-Admiral Martin on March 3rd,

1810, and died four days later.89

In spite of his lack of early connections to men of higher authority and having to weather the stormy seas of his own personal misfortunes, Collingwood managed to make a career

86 Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, 280. 87 Ibid., 532. 88 Adams, Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon, 270. 89 Ibid., 272-3.

101 deserving of praise and historical gravity. Particularly after Nelson's passing, Collingwood's actions represented the characteristics that made the men good friends in the first place — brokering political ties with foreign royalty, cunningly persuading the Admiralty board, and, to the extent he was able, administering his network of subordinates. Above all, he ensured

Britain's position on the seas remained stalwartly effective against the French. His approach to building his career and his surrounding network was distinctly different from Nelson's, but that

Admiral Lord Collingwood constructed his career alongside the limelight Nelson attracted should be revered as a success that very few men could have achieved.

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CHAPTER 4

CONNECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It may appear as though Nelson, Hawke, and Collingwood each operated equally and individually upon their respective social circles, using patronage, deference, and information brokering to better position themselves — and, to a certain degree, this is true. However, the truly remarkable part about analyzing their networks is the extent to which all three of their contacts, even across the generations, overlap. The meta-narrative most easily observed by deconstructing their social sphere is that, while building their careers, each man already had an advantage simply by being within varying proximities to certain nodes — or people of importance within the network. For clarity, however, their connectivity to these nodes merely predisposed each man to becoming better connected, but their cultivation of those relationships was still a necessity. Meanwhile, the number of degrees of separation that existed between a man entering the navy and a node with more gravity, meant some came into the navy better predisposed to act upon the network than others.

Two ways that most readily uncover these nodal connections are, first, determining the frequency with which Nelson, Hawke, and Collingwood wrote to their contacts, and second, via the content of the letters, or specifically, what the men wrote about their connections to others.

For example, Horatio Nelson wrote upwards of 250 letters to Admiral John Jervis (Earl St.

Vincent) which is one indicator of the strength of his connection to that node. However other contacts, including some who were equally close to Nelson as was St. Vincent, may only be substantiated by a single letter. Not all letters these men wrote still exist, and thus, a low "letter

103 count" does not automatically dictate a weak connection. In many cases, connection strength must then be inferred by what each man says about their relationships to others within the network — even when the letters are addressed to other recipients. As such, a number of overlapping links exist between Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood that may be initially, and incorrectly, perceived as inchoate or coincidental. But because each was so deliberate in how they operated upon others in the network, order can be derived from these seemingly distant connection overlaps.

That each of these men so purposefully interacted with those around them suggests the existence of a reciprocal network interaction that echoed through the generations and, later, brought others together. While it may seem chaotic, the conclusion that one must entertain when discussing the binary interaction between individual and network, is that an orderly relation forms when one influences others in the network. Not unlike the law of physics that states for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, the actions of Hawke, Collingwood, and

Nelson (what we may call their individual agency in using patronage, deference or information brokering) upon the network sees two predictable reactions. The first reaction is that their own individual "mass" or "gravity" as a network node tends to grow. The second reaction is that any contacts with whom they become acquainted, in turn, have an increased predisposition to being pulled into the network itself. Just as celestial bodies of greater mass have greater gravity, and thus more pull upon other bodies, particularly those in close proximity, the network of the British

Royal Navy, in this era, worked very similarly. A number of important connections between

Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood substantiate these metaphors. To better convey these associations I have inserted several network diagrams. The first is a larger picture that puts the three men, (Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood) on a single network map along with several nodes, both of more and less importance, positioned relative to their proximity to Hawke,

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Nelson, and Collingwood. I will then discuss, individually, the nature of several cases where network overlap exists. In each of these cases, I will establish each person's relationship to the other, whether they were patron or client, how each became acquainted with the other, and discuss the binary interaction between individual and network.

The simplest, and arguably most important connection on the large diagram draws

Edward Hawke to William Locker, who was the most important patron of Horatio Nelson. The connection between Hawke and Locker was that the latter served as Flag Captain under Hawke and they fought alongside each other at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759. The two were close, as evidenced by the fact that, in 1777, William Locker named his first born son, Edward Hawke

Locker, after his old patron.1 William Locker may not have climbed the ranks in the way that either Hawke or Nelson did, but he is the most direct link between the two. Simply by being introduced to Locker and being only one step removed from a major node in Edward Hawke,

Horatio Nelson was predisposed to maneuver into a pivotal place in the network, the same way that Locker was, by fostering his connection to strong, high-ranking nodes. Locker saw the same fictive tie form between himself and Nelson that Hawke developed when he promoted Locker to

Flag Captain. There was an individual action, Hawke's patronage of Locker, and a network reaction, Nelson's induction into the network years later, by Locker, on account of network ties that preceded Nelson's entry into the network. Comparatively, Collingwood did not have nearly as close of a proximity to a node like Hawke. As was discussed, it was not until later in their careers that Nelson became a large enough node in his own right that Collingwood began to see his own stock climb. While the ties between Hawke, Locker, and Nelson are significant, the overlap is not limited to this sole example.

1 Mackay, Hawke, Nelson, and British Naval Leadership, 189.

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Another example of network overlap is through Edward Hawke's own patron, Colonel

Martin Bladen. Bladen, to remind you, was one of two brothers of Hawke's mother, Elizabeth.

The other brother, William, had a son named Thomas who was a cousin of Hawke's. Thomas, not unlike his uncle, became an MP and also served in Britain's military — but he never had sons, only two daughters — one of whom married William Capell, a member of the House of

Lords. They had four children, one of whom, named Thomas Bladen Capel, became a Royal

Navy officer and served directly under Horatio Nelson. In fact, Thomas Bladen Capel eventually became one of Nelson's band of brothers, because of his participation at the Battle of the Nile.

Put simply, the grandson of Hawke's cousin became one of Nelson's inner circle. While it may seem coincidental, it is not entirely unpredictable. Each person was close enough to a node of high gravity, (e.g. Colonel Bladen, Edward Hawke, Horatio Nelson) that they were already predisposed to become a part of the network. Once again, it must be stressed that this does not absolve or deny them of individual agency — it simply puts them in very close proximity to each other in the network. As distant as the physical relation between Thomas Bladen Capel and

Hawke may be, gravitational nodes like Hawke and Nelson were already well within Capel's proximity, even prior to his birth, and thus their eventual acquaintance is not a matter of chaos or coincidence, but order and predisposition.

Yet another case of network overlap between Nelson and Hawke is that of Mr. Philip

Stephens. The start of Stephens's career was largely initiated by Lord George Anson, an Admiral in the British Royal Navy who predates even Hawke — though the two did know and communicate with each other. Hawke was a subordinate of Anson, as evidenced by a letter in

1747 where Hawke appeals to Anson for the promotion of his client Captain Moore.2 Admiral

Anson put Stephens, one of the earliest naval contacts of Horatio Nelson and latest contacts of

2 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 56-7.

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Edward Hawke, into an important position, Secretary to the Admiralty. After having become familiar with Philip Stevens, Anson was directly responsible for his being risen to the Admiralty in 1763.3 Based upon the number of letters published in both Nicolas and White, Horatio Nelson and Stephens exchanged upwards of 60 correspondences with each another. While their relationship was of a professional nature, the two are no less a part of the same network than were Anson and Hawke, each of whom were familiar with Mr. Stephens in that capacity. The

Secretary to the Admiralty was a distinctive position within the navy as he acted as the gatekeeper to the Admiralty Board. Stephens surely did not owe Nelson any favors, especially when he was still a young and untested captain. As such, keeping the Secretary happy was essential to getting Nelson's own ends met. His letters, and any matters discussed therein, were dictated by Stephens to the rest of the Admiralty board. Whether these requests were iterated in a manner that was conducive to the Board's granting his request was likely dependent on the clarity and deference of his correspondence to Philip Stephens, and later, Stephens's successor

Evan Nepean. Examining the lengthy correspondence from Nelson to Stephens, he is indeed meticulous to a fault and makes known his scrutiny for proper naval protocol.4 Once again,

Nelson acted as an individual upon the network, via information brokering, that ingratiated him to his most influential superiors. The network reaction came in form of a predisposition for countless young men to receive preference under Nelson's patronage because of his greater pull upon an Admiralty who favored him. But each of these interactions could not have taken place

3 Sir Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol.54 (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1898), 179. 4 Countless examples of this statement are backed up by letters, particularly in Nicolas's first volume, outlining the actions and intent of various characters serving in the same regions as Nelson. But one example is of the numerous letters written in regards to corrupt governors in the West Indies who prevented Nelson and other captains of the navy from doing their proper duty to enforce the navigation laws. Nelson was, if nothing else, an ardent follower of the regulations of the navy. But his zealous and descriptive accounts of such conduct cleverly placed him in the good graces of both Stephens and the Board. Nicolas, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 1, 199-202.

107 without the placement of Stephens, by one of Hawke's patrons, Lord Anson, years before Nelson became acquainted with him.

Perhaps the most incredible and far-reaching case of network overlap is elucidated by the case of Evan Nepean, successor to Philip Stephens as Secretary to the Admiralty. Nepean ultimately became one of the best connected men in the British Royal Navy — but, as shown with previous examples, this was not a product of happenstance. Hawke and Nepean as existed, at least peripherally, within the same social sphere, particularly since Hawke was already retired before the time Nepean joined the navy as a clerk in 1773. But after tracing each man's proximity to high gravity nodal connections, the two can be likened to planets orbiting around a common star. Nepean, not unlike Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood, came from a modest upbringing. As such, it must be noted that his individual agency, in the absence of being born into naval nobility, did play a factor in his eventual introduction to major nodes. In particular, early in his career,

Nepean served as a purser to John Jervis, later Earl St. Vincent. While it might appear insignificant, Jervis's closeness to figures like William Pitt (the Younger), Henry Dundas (later

Lord Melville), and even King George III, meant that by the time Nepean was twenty-eight, in just his fifth year in the navy, he was only one step removed (via Jervis) from a panoply of very high-gravity nodes.5 By the mid 1790s, Nepean considered both Lord Melville and William Pitt close, personal friends. Both men were also key political patrons to both Nelson, and to a lesser extent, Collingwood. This only further substantiates the deep political interest both Collingwood and Nelson had in cultivating their relationship with Nepean. But then, how does Hawke connect to Nepean? William Pitt the Younger was the son of William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham, a significant political patron of Hawke who often brokered information between Hawke and King

5 Elizabeth Sparrow, ed. "Evan Nepean," Oxford Biographical Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), [Online edn accessed Nov 23, 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19894]

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George II, the man who personally intervened on Hawke's behalf for an admiralty position.6

Thus, even in spite of their generational gaps, each of these men very much operated alongside one another in a vast network of patrons and clients.

What adds even more intrigue to this set of network overlap is that, many years before

Nepean entered the navy, the person most directly responsible for John Jervis's own entry was

Lady Jane Hamilton, mother of Sir William Hamilton. The name should appear familiar as

William Hamilton was the late husband of Lady Emma Hamilton, Horatio Nelson's mistress.

That Nepean became Secretary of the Admiralty almost necessitated his eventual acquaintance with Horatio Nelson, but it appears Nelson's eventual acquaintance with Sir William Hamilton, and Emma, was almost as predictable. Dually as significant in their network tie, from a political patronage standpoint, is that William Hamilton was extremely close with King George III, and that he acted as a diplomat in Naples at the very time Nelson was stationed there.7 By 1798, each of them were well within the same network sphere, and in close proximity to common nodes, such as Admiral St. Vincent and the King and Queen of Naples. Taken along with the level of agency Nelson exerted upon the network, and his interest in constructing his career, their eventual convergence occurred because of ever-increasing odds favoring an encounter between the three.

Individual historical figures are almost always recognized and remembered singularly for their strengths, flaws, victories, defeats, renown, or notoriety. While their individual traits and achievements are historically relevant, they cannot be fully appreciated or realized without consideration of the network of countless others with which the individual perennially interacted.

6 Mackay, The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 169. 7 Geoffrey V. Morson, "Sir William Hamilton," Oxford Biographical Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), [Online edn accessed Nov 23, 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12142]

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Horatio Nelson, Edward Hawke, and Cuthbert Collingwood were not men who, simply by way of chance, fortuitously became celebrated naval figures. Each man came from a unique social and economic position in rigid, patriarchal, and well-established network. The social system in

Britain, particularly at this time, was not one that was conducive to rapid change in socioeconomic status. But in the case of Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood, none were born into wealthy, landed, nobility — and yet all three died after having been granted titles and pensions.

What allowed them to flourish in this limiting system was their relative proximity to certain dominant and influential figures within their social network. Their purposeful cultivation of their connections to these patrons, either in the British Royal Navy, Parliament, or both, had a reciprocal effect upon their own status, effectively making them viable patrons of their own by the time they reached the upper ranks of the navy. Indeed, over time, perhaps the most important connection that each shared, particularly for Nelson and Collingwood, was to each other. Each man's individual personal characteristics were colorfully distinctive: the dutiful and serious demeanor of Hawke, the charismatic and peculiar Nelson, and the somber and somewhat caliginous Collingwood. These idiosyncrasies, their personal characteristics, were not alone responsible for the creation of their historical memory. Rather, what allowed all three to reach the pinnacle of their careers and establish a long-lasting legacy was their masterful use of patronage, deference, and information brokering upon specific patrons with whom each was acquainted in a largely overlapping network that spanned across many generations and included dozens of people. The individual agency each man exacted upon the network was reciprocated by a network reaction, generating a type of positive feedback loop. This repeating, reciprocal interaction resulted in their growth and influence as individual nodes. It put each man in progressively closer proximity with their own patrons, and eventually, culminated in positioning

110 themselves as viable patrons for the succeeding generation, while inexorably crafting a personal legacy by which each is remembered.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Burrows, Montagu. The Life of Edward Lord Hawke: Admiral of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral ofGreat Britain, and First Lord of the Admiralty from 1766 to 1771. London: W.H. Allen, 1883.

An old but thorough collection of letters and commentary on Edward Lord Hawke, this text is perhaps the most valuable and readily available primary resource on Hawke. The letters span well past the point at which he becomes admiral, and thus could be even further used to analyze his character and relationships beyond the point in his career my paper focused upon. Although it is available digitally online, I actually used a physical copy of the book.

Collingwood, Cuthbert, and George Lewis Newnham Collingwood. A Selection From the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood: Interspersed with Memoirs of His Life. New York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1829.

More than one edition exists of this lengthy collection of correspondence from Cuthert Collingwood. I used both a newer, revised physical copy and a lengthier, older copy that was digitized and available free of charge on the internet. It is partially written and compiled by Collingwood's son-in-law George Newnham, who took on Collingwood's last name. Later historians have argued that, while the resource is valuable, it was likely only a partial glimpse into the full picture of Collingwood's correspondence, as Newnham likely suppressed and edited some of the original documentation.

Douglas, David Charles, A. Aspinall, and E. Anthony Smith, eds. English Historical Documents. 1959. Reprint, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1969.

This is a collection of primary resource documents organized into a number of different categories. It includes “Wars and Foreign Policy” with numerous letters pertaining to the navy, Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the army, and so on. But it also contains various letters pertaining to the settlements in Australia, slave trade, the West Indies, and so on. It has value in terms of primary resource documentation.

Hawke, Edward and Ruddock Mackay, ed. The Hawke Papers: A Selection, 1743-1771. Aldershot, Hants: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1990.

This was the second primary resource I used in deconstructing Hawke's letters. It is a number of his memoirs and correspondence from 1743 to 1771, and offers readers a brief narrative of most of the more prominent aspects of Hawke's career. Most of the sources are still kept in their original form at the Public Record Office at Kew Gardens, the National Maritime Museum, and the British Library. Edited by Ruddock Mackay, it stands as a valuable and respectable resource as Mackay is one of the contemporary major players in British Naval scholarship.

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Hodges, Harold Winter, and Edward Arthur Hughes. Select Naval Documents, Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1922.

This small, old book is, itself, as much a historical relic as the information in its pages. Although it covers an inordinately long span of time, it is a neat collection of some of the more noteworthy letters written from the time of Henry VIII all the way up to the 19th century. The distinction about this volume is that each of the letters pertains to the navy. It also happens to include some letters from Nelson.

Nelson, Horatio Nelson, and Nicholas Harris Nicolas. The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Vol. 1-7. London: H. Colburn, 1844.

This is the most extensive and rich collection of letters by Horatio Nelson from throughout his entire career. Notably, far more letters accompany his later years than his early career. That is not necessarily a fault, but does offer a bit of imbalance in terms of what can be derived from early patronage connections outside of using secondary sources. Also noteworthy is its publishing date of 1844, meaning nearly two centuries of historians have used this collection to analyze the life and career of Horatio Nelson

Warner, Oliver. The Life and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood. London: Oxford U.P., 1968.

Written well past the other primary source I used on Collingwood, this book offers a number of letters left out of Newnham's account of his father-in-laws career. Although the book contains far more secondary-styled commentary of the letters and Collingwood's career than the former, it still gives a more complete picture of the relationships and career Collingwood forged in his correspondence than if I was to only use Newnham Collingwood's account.

White, Colin, ed. and Horatio Nelson. Nelson, The New Letters. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press in association with the National Maritime Museum and the Royal Navy Museum, 2005.

This was the primary source I used most, along with Nicolas, in my research paper. It is a collection of letters written primarily by Horatio Nelson gathered from various sources. The difference about this book is that, unlike the other major collection of letters released by Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas in The Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson in 1846, this collection was only released in 2005 and is a relatively untouched batch of correspondence. The downfall to Nicolas's collection, on the other hand, is that nearly two centuries worth of historians have had them at their disposal, leaving relatively few new insights left to be extracted.

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Secondary Sources - Book

Adams, Max. Trafalgar's Lost Hero: Admiral Lord Collingwood and the Defeat of Napoleon. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005.

What makes Adams's work particularly valuable in researching Collingwood is that his writing is both highly accessible, and it was perfectly clear he paid very close attention to giving as objective of a portrayal of the extensively used primary resource documentation as one could expect. Beyond that, Adams included a number of actual letters written by Collingwood in his monograph that were not in the two major primary resource collections I used most. It reads like a research biography, but falls victim at times to trying to cover too much in too few pages.

Bienkowski, Lee. Admirals in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

The concept of this book is slightly different from most of the others. In fact, organizationally it is unlike all others in that Bienkowski brings together the biographies of eleven different Admirals — each having fought in the American Revolutionary War and served in naval conflicts against France during their revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. I used it primarily to get a better understanding of some of the contemporaries of Nelson and Collingwood, specifically the essays on John Jervis, Alexander Hood, and Richard Howe.

Black, Jeremy. British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions, 1783-1793. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

This book has a lot of very valuable information on British foreign policy leading up to the era in which I did the majority of my research (late 1700s). Particularly it contains a lot of wonderful info on William Pitt and George III. It does not have virtually anything on Horatio Nelson, per say, but its excellent to provide context on the era of hostility that developed between England and other European nations.

Bourne, J. M. Patronage and Society in Nineteenth-Century England. London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1986.

A wonderful analytical view of the use of patronage in political arenas during the 19th century. It is especially useful for contextualizing how to search for patronage in correspondence and should be considered a "must-read" for anyone interested in dissecting primary resource correspondence for patronage relations.

Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783. New York: Knopf, 1989.

This book really helped to contextualize the structure and subtleties of the British state. It helps readers make sense of not so much who holds power in Britain but how the power flows through government, money, and various other institutions - for instance, the

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military. It also provides detail on the centralization and bureaucracy of these systems. Definitely an interesting and worthwhile read, but also a valuable resource.

Brunelle, Gayle K. The New World Merchants of Rouen 1559-1630. Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1991.

Dr. Brunelle's analysis of merchant connections in this dissertation inspired me to create a similarly crafted network map. Her meticulous deconstruction of data and organization of information into tables and charts served as a methodological and technical model for organizing the seemingly infinite number of Horatio Nelson's letters into a comprehensible chart for further analysis.

Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

A wonderful text to introduce the influence Britain began to have over other areas of the world, especially after the American Revolution. Although it talks very little about Nelson, it does use him as an example of the peculiar changes occurring in class relations during the time. It also discusses the nature of Britain's relation to France during the revolutionary and Napoleonic era.

Duffy, Michael, ed. Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850. Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1992.

This is a collection of essays from prominent naval historians. Its focus is on the development of an imperial navy force and how the navy operated within an international domain. Some of the essays include those written by N.A.M. Rodger, Jeremy Black, and Duffy himself. The most pertinent section for my essay came in the sixth section, entitled "Naval Power, Strategy and Foreign Policy, 1775-1791."

Gager, Kristin Elizabeth. Blood Ties and Fictive Ties: Adoption and Family Life in Early Modern France. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

This was an extremely useful methodological addition used in the final phase of writing my thesis to help contextualize the nature of relationships built between people who may not have biological ties, but nonetheless tend to build even stronger ones through alternative methods. Gager's analysis is a recurring theme in the thesis, and helped me in formulating a critical and thorough evaluation of the nature of patronage, deference, and information brokering in building fictive ties between Hawke, Nelson, and Collingwood and dozens of others in their social network.

Games, Alison. The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560- 1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008

Games's book provides insight not only from a historiographical standpoint, as it sets the stage for the rigidity of the social and political atmosphere of England in the era just before my own study, but also a methodological insight. Games's analysis proved useful,

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as she deals with the network connections that developed between some of the same spheres as those in my own research, such as military, diplomats, governors, and politicians. Likewise, the scope of her work is geographically extensive, as is my own. The historical agents in her work extend well beyond the scope of Britain to the furthest reaches of the empire.

Harding, Richard and Peter Le Fevre. Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century. London: Chatham, 2000.

Co-authored by Harding and Le Fevre, and over a dozen others (many of whom have other texts in this very biography), this book masterfully combines a number of works to provide readers with an understanding of the conditions in the Royal Navy in the century preceding Nelson's rise to fame, specifically focusing on changes to the professional administration of the navy itself and the changes in tactics, pioneered especially by Hawke, that Nelson used in his own career. It is a useful complement to the works of Rodger, listed later.

Hore, Peter. The Habit of Victory: The Story of the Royal Navy, 1545 to 1945. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2005.

Captain Peter Hore's book reads less as an argumentative historical anthology and more like a narrative. Some, like myself, might be quick to criticize its portrayal of the Royal Navy as the protaganist and how Hore essentially allows the reader to make a value judgment on its content validity. That said, there is a straightforwardness about the book that must be admired. It does show off a number of the National Maritime Museums wide array of historical manuscripts and gives wide, generally accepted narrative of the Royal Navy. Admittedly, it is nonetheless one of the weaker sources in this bibliography.

Howarth, David Armine. British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003.

This is something of a "long durée" approach to the British Royal Navy. It starts as far back as 1500 years ago and manages to make it up to the modern era in a shade under 500 pages. Naturally, some areas are better covered than others, considering the increasing wealth of resources as the years get closer to present. Nonetheless, Howarth is quite a masterful narrative historian and the book is exceptionally interesting even if not always the most even- handed.

Jane, Fred T. The British Battle Fleet: Its Inception and Growth Throughout the Centuries to Present Day. London: The Library Press, Ltd., 1915.

Used only contextually as a comparison as to how a modern historical conceptualization of the development of the various officers’ success in the British Royal Navy has changed from a century ago. Highly nationalistic, traditionalist, and Anglo-centric.

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Kettering, Sharon. Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Although slightly out of context in comparison to 18th century naval history, Kettering's book is about the political structure in France. It argues that French government centralized its national power by institutionalizing the process of patronage in the provinces. Again, this alludes to the essentiality of creating new relationships between ministers, local elites, and various political machines that would eventually see a much more bureaucratic state. Methodologically this book is useful for better understanding these complex ties and the importance of patronage.

Lavery, Brian. Horatio Lord Nelson. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

This is a very concise history of Nelson's life and is nowhere near enough to be considered a complete biography. It is good as a quick read and an avenue towards rapidly charting Nelson's career. It does have several maps, paintings, and letters, however, and provides some degree of analysis into his heroic accomplishments.

Lavery, Brian. Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793-1815. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

This book contains a different type of information related to the Royal Navy of Horatio Nelson's time. Its subsections include types of ships and design, officer duties, naval recruitment, seamen and landmen, techniques and tactics used by the navy, and various other information surrounding the navy of Nelson's time. It is excellent for causal reference on any of these topics.

Lincoln, Margarette. Representing the Royal Navy: British Sea Power, 1750-1815. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002.

This volume offers a cultural context of the British Royal Navy during the 18th century. It explains how the Navy affected public opinion in relation to war, nation building, as well as gender and race. It focuses on aspects not often covered about the navy because most books are more concerned with figures such as Nelson and the "business" of the navy. It was a useful source to bring insight through a not so traditional lens.

Lloyd, Christopher. The Nation and the Navy: A History of Naval Life and Policy. London: Cresset Press, 1954.

Perhaps slightly dated, it is nevertheless a well-researched account of the Royal Navy from the Tudor Era through the Dutch Wars, Stuart Navy, all the way through the Georgian Navy, French Revolution, and Napoleonic Era. Lloyd's writing is accessible, although biased, himself being British and of a particular era prone to reminiscing of better times when Britain was the cornerstone of what most thought of as modernity, democracy, and freedom.

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Mackay, Ruddock F. Admiral Hawke. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Although Mackay's name pops up a number of times in this annotated bibliography, he is the eminent expert on the career of Edward Hawke. As such, this was used as a supplementary resource to substantiate and crosscheck the information in both the Burrows primary resource and Mackay's other monograph, which is the primary resource collection of a selection of Hawke's papers.

Mackay, Ruddock F., and Michael Duffy. Hawke, Nelson, and British Naval Leadership, 1747- 1805. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2009.

This book asks the question "what qualities made for successful naval leadership?" The answer to the question is identified by twelve characteristics and assesses the extent to which men like Hawke and Nelson carried and used these abilities. Unsurprisingly, it paints both men as exceptionally gifted naval commanders. It does give Hawke more credit than has previously been bestowed upon him.

Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Maffeo offers a detailed account of the methods naval commanders used to collect intelligence, disseminate it, and use it to their advantage in the 18th century. It does not focus exclusively on Nelson's use of intelligence, bringing both French and American participation into the fold. It does however, primarily examine the years 1793-1815, which fits well into the topic of this paper.

Marcus, Geoffrey Jules. A Naval History of England: Vol. 2 The Age of Nelson. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1971.

Appropriately titled The Age of Nelson, this book is a thorough account of not only Horatio Nelson but gives a very fair, sometimes critical analysis of his actions and ability. It gives Nelson credit where due, but also presents a man who was not without faults. More than anything his descriptions of the ongoing interactions with the French as well as the Campaign of the Nile (in many ways the defining point of Nelson's naval career) are both very gripping.

McLean, Paul. The Art of the Network: Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

A book about the importance of patronage in Renaissance Italy. In it, McLean argues that writing letters, winning favor, and garnering rewards, was essential for anyone who sought social mobility, security, or recognition. Another wonderful resource for anyone interested in the study of not only patronage, but career-building and individual agency in "making it" during a time when rigid social structures could stifle one's success.

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O’Neill, Lindsay. The Opened Letter: Networking in the Early Modern British World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.

Used for methodological perspective on how to use close literary analysis in the examination of networking as a function of social interaction and mobility in the early modern era of Britain, this recently released text offered me the ability to apply similar techniques in my own research. Of particular emphasis in O’Neill’s text is the importance of letter-writing among the social elite in England.

Orde, Denis A. In the Shadow of Nelson: The Life of Admiral Lord Collingwood. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2008.

This offering by Orde, a former British Army Officer and Oxford trained Crown Court Judge, provides insight to the complex friendship between Collingwood and Nelson. Not unlike the Padfield book below, it offers specific attention to the major naval engagements in which the two men participated (Glorious First of June, Cape St. Vincent, and Trafalgar. It also reveals the ins and outs of their personality differences and how that translated to their difference in command style.

Padfield, Peter. Maritime Power & the Struggle for Freedom: Naval Campaigns That Shaped the Modern World, 1788-1851. London: John Murray, 2003.

As a maritime historian and author of numerous books on the subject, Padfield asserts the entire Western world can be somehow directly linked to the rise of naval supremacy and exertion of power. It covers a number of specific incidences in the period from 1788 to 1851, with particular devotion to The Glorious First of June, St. Vincent, the Battle of the Nile, and Trafalgar. In all, it is a wonderful secondary resource, offering maps, diagrams, and a substantial bibliography.

Pocock, Tom. Horatio Nelson. New York: Knopf, 1988.

This is probably the single best biography on Horatio Nelson. It is even-handed, analytical, informative, and uses well-documented sources. It would be essential for anyone writing about Nelson to use this as a resource to build context on the man, his endeavors, and his legend.

Rodger, N. A. M. The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986.

This book is singlehandedly the most valuable book a person can pick up to better understand the Navy within which Nelson operated. It is accessible but at the same time scholarly. No other book better captures the life, culture, and society of the British Royal Navy in the 18th century.

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Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004.

Nicholas Andrew Martin Rodger is an Oxford trained historian and expert of British/English naval history. In “The Cmmand of the Ocean,” one of Rodger's more recent published works, he once again describes how the British Royal Navy rose to greatness and its place in Britain's national, political, and cultural memory. Not only does it offer a narrative on major figures, wars, and technological advancements but it also provides thorough information on the inner-workings of the navy, how it operated, how it was financed, organized and, of course, commanded.

Russell, William Clark. Collingwood. London: Methuen and Co., 1891.

Another early source, but this time on the career of Cuthbert Collingwood. This book contained mostly repeated information from the collection of primary resource documentation compiled by Newnham Collingwood Esq. However, it does provide additional historiographical context and offers some degree of even-handedness in its criticism of Newnham-Collingwood's tendency to offer and select analysis that is favorable to Collingwood's historical legacy.

Scott, David. Leviathan: The Rise of Britain as a World Power. London: Harper Press, 2013.

This book is marginally helpful for building an understanding about the rise of what Scott refers to as Leviathan, or an authoritarian fiscal-military state by the end of the early modern era. As it pertains to my research, the eighth and final chapter entitled "New World Order" relates most closely to the era involving the Seven Years' War and beyond. It is functional for grasping the international relations narrative, but does not directly pertain to any of the Vice Admirals I researched.

Soll, Jacob. The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009.

A wonderful account of the methods utilized by Jean-Baptiste Colbert who was an expert of collecting information and became a powerful figure in the French government. He was given the task of building Versailles, overseeing the navy and Paris police force, and harnessed his political power in the process. It provides a great methodological approach and very erudite research.

Sugden, John. Nelson: A Dream of Glory, 1758-1797. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004.

This is an outstanding and thorough secondary recount supported with excellent primary resource documentation of the majority of Nelson's early career until being made Vice Admiral. It was particularly important for filling in historiographical gaps in the letters in both the White and Nicolas volumes. Likewise, it helped in making inferences as to the patron/client relationships established by Nelson and others in his network.

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Vincent, Edgar. Nelson: Love and Fame. London: Yale University Press, 2003.

A thorough and comprehensive view of Nelson's career. It is divided into six primary areas of Nelson's life—the early years, the years during which he had not accomplished enough to become famous, his iconic years, the years during which he finds love, the years he has become famous, and finally, the road to Trafalgar. It focuses more on Nelson as he relates to others, which makes it a valuable resource to conceptualize the idea of career-construction.

Secondary Sources - Journal

Allen, Douglas W. "Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Vol. 161, No. 1 (2005): 57-79.

A thorough analysis of the use of patronage in Britain. It focuses slightly more on the political side and more on the early modern era than the beginning of the modern era. Nonetheless, it is well written and provides compelling arguments on the impact of patronage upon politics.

Baugh, Daniel A. "Lestock, Richard (1679–1746)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; Online Edition, Jan 2008 http://www.oxforddnb.com/ view/article/16506, (accessed November 18, 2014).

In one of my primary resources, Richard Lestock was mentioned. Without any more information. I began to scour the internet for something that would allow me to place the reference to this man. Fortunately I came across an encyclopedic type resource via Fullerton's library database website in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, which provides a brief but valuable bit of information on countless British historical public figures. I used this same source again later for Sir John Moore.

Black, Jeremy. “Britain as Military Power, 1688-1815,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jan., 2000): 159-177. http://www.jstor.org/stable/120791 (accessed March 17, 2014).

This is a historiographical essay on British military influence in the years above stated. It utilizes, critiques, and evaluates the works of John Brewer and his “Sinews of Power” volume. It fits nicely as a complimentary journal resource to the preponderance of other sources I will be using.

Conway, S. "The Politics of British Military and Naval Mobilization, 1775-83," The English Historical Review Vol. 112, No. 449 (Nov., 1997): 1179-1201. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/577103 (accessed March 17, 2014).

This article is about the political divisions and rivalries that emerged in reaction to the uprisings in the American colonies as well as the general atmosphere of international relations with France after the Seven Years’ War. As it pertains to my topic, the idea of

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Parliamentary influence upon naval and military action is put into a specific context and assists in characterizing interactions between figures in these arenas.

Cruickshanks, Evelyn and Romney Sedgwick, ed. "Corbett, Thomas (c.1697-1751), of Nash, Pemb." The House of Commons, 1715-1754; the History of Parliament. New York: Published for the History of Parliament Trust, by Oxford University Press, 1970. Available Online: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1715-1754/member/corbett-thomas- 1687-1751 (accessed November 22, 2014).

This biographical entry explains who Thomas Corbett was and how he fits into the puzzle of the vast amount of correspondence I have available to me. The source is an organization dedicated to providing a wealth of knowledge on the history of British Parliament.

Hackmann, W. Kent. "William Pitt and the Generals: Three Case Studies in the Seven Years' War." Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1971): 128-37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4048194 (accessed November 20, 2014).

Though this scholarly entry is more concerned with the Army than the Navy, it does offer an explanation of William Pitt's political and patron connectivity with high ranking officers.

Harding, Richard. "Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade: Some Professional and Technical Problems Concerning the Conduct of Combined Operations in the Eighteenth Century." The Historical Journal. Vol. 32, No. 1 (1989): 35-55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639816. (accessed November 18, 2014).

This article explains why some of the navy's tactics changed during the eighteenth century and how Lord Hawke was directly responsible for laying the foundation for what, during his time, were unorthodox maneuvers, but became widely used practices just a few decades later. The bureaucratization of the Royal Navy is a major theme that runs throughout each of these men's lives.

Jupp, Peter J. "The Landed Elite and Political Authority in Britain, ca. 1760-1850," Journal of British Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1990): 53-79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/175485 (accessed March 17, 2014).

This article outlines the changing nature of the authority of landed nobility, gentry, and their role in the political sphere in Britain. It takes into account the changing nature of monarchical rule during the 18th century at the hands of the Enlightenment, which was a way for the previously middling classes, who had accumulated massive wealth via merchant and capitalist ventures, to question the authority of the landed elite. Nelson being of this somewhat modest background is an example of why Jupp's article is important to consider.

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Lambert, Andrew. "'The Glory of England': Nelson, Trafalgar and the Meaning of Victory," The Great Circle. Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006): 3-12. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41563204 (accessed April 7, 2014).

A nationalistic, yet inspiring article that assesses Nelson as both a hero and figure of national pride. It explains some of the more esoteric traits Nelson possessed. His vision, his command, his tactics, his strategic genius, and his utilization of morale building are all topics addressed in this short ten page essay. It is also somewhat historiographical, recounting the year leading up to the battle of Trafalgar.

Laughton, J.K. "Moore, Sir John, baronet (1718–1779)," rev. Ruddock Mackay, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; Online Edition, Jan 2008 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19129 (accessed November 22, 2014).

Every so often I come across names of folks that I simply don't have any references with information on so as to put them into the proper historical context. That's where Oxfords National Biography comes in. This site has countless biographical entries on any number of historical folks, but especially those who might be relatively obscure or difficult to find information on. I have used the information here to find out more on Sir John Moore, and being that it was revised by Ruddock Mackay, who compiled one of the major primary resource collections I used, I felt it was a reliable and valid source to include in my research.

Morson, Geoffrey V. "Sir William Hamilton," Oxford Biographical Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2004; Online Edition, Jan 2008. http://www.oxforddnb.com/ view/article/12142 (accessed November 23, 2015).

While William Hamilton certainly played an important role in Horatio Nelson's life, he was not intimately involved in Nelson's career advancement. That said, my discovery of personal connections between Hamilton and a number of more important historical figures in the social network, such as John Jervis and Lord Palmerston were initiated by looking at this journal resource.

Robertson, John. "Enlightenment and Revolution: Naples 1799," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Vol. 10 (2000): 17-44.

I used this source as a way to better understand the nature of Naples in 1799. It helped to clarify exactly what was going on with King Ferdinand and Queen Maria Carolina of Naples. Until using this source had only been given the Nelsonian side of the story. This gave a much different and more useful perspective than my other sources.

Rodger, N.A.M., "Recent Books on the Royal Navy of the Eighteenth Century," The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul., 1999): 683-703. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 120501 (accessed March 17, 2014).

I used this source to help guide my research and find the kinds of material that may be useful in contextualizing the navy during the century leading up to the rule of George III.

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Rodger is one of the best British naval historians out there. Amongst many others, his book The Wooden World is probably the quintessential volume on the Georgian navy.

Sparrow, Elizabeth, ed. "Evan Nepean," Oxford Biographical Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; Online Edition, Jan 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ article/19894 (accessed November 23, 2015).

Sparrow's article on Evan Nepean was purely used to contextualize his appearance in the social network. Being that he was Secretary of the Admiralty, he played a substantial role in both the careers of Horatio Nelson and Cuthbert Collingwood. Both men exchanged a considerable number of letters with him and Sparrow's miniature biography allowed me to delve into my other resources for more context.

Stephen, Sir Leslie and Sidney Lee, eds. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 54. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1898, 179.

This was the only available source to supplement some information regarding the connectivity between Philip Stephens, Horatio Nelson, and Evan Nepean. It provided substantiation for an invaluable link involving Admiral Anson that helped in the creation of my visual network appendix.

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APPENDIX A

NETWORK MAP

APPENDIX B

NELSON LETTER GRID

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Nelson, William 2 6 4 4 7 5 5 6 1 2 8 4 6 3 6 2 4 1 1 1 78 Locker, William 1 3 6 1 11 9 6 8 3 3 6 2 2 6 3 5 4 2 1 2 84 Suckling, Maurice 1 1 Nelson, Edmund 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 11 Polson, John 1 1 Parker, Peter 2 1 1 1 5 Ross, Hercules 1 1 1 1 3 4 11 Stephens, Philip 6 2 3 6 2 7 26 3 3 1 59 Hughes, Richard 2 1 4 7 Worth, James 1 1 Haldimand, Frederick 1 1 Digby, Robert 1 1 Hood, Samuel 1 1 63 65 Keppel, Augustus 1 1 Cunningham, Lieut. 1 1 Suckling, William 1 2 2 3 7 9 3 2 1 1 1 32 Cornwallis, William 1 1 1 1 4 Sandys, Charles 1 1 Moutray, John 1 1 Nisbet, Mrs. 1 9 5 15 Townshend, Thomas (Lord Sydney) 3 1 4 Collingwood, Cuthbert 1 1 1 5 1 1 10 Senhouse, William 1 1 HRH Duke of Clarence (Prince William Henry) 7 2 2 2 3 3 7 6 9 2 7 8 12 1 71 Schomberg, Isaac 2 2 Middleton, Charles 2 2 Howe, William 1 1 1 3 125

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Rose, George (Sec Admlty) 1 1 1 2 1 6 Gardner, Alan (Lord Adml 1803) 2 1 3 Boyle, Edmund (Earl of Cork) 2 2 Nelson, Fanny (Mrs., Lady) 1 19 24 18 13 9 11 3 3 101 Wilkinson, Robert and Higgins (Antigua) 1 3 4 Commissioners of Victualling 2 2 Pitt, William (Earl of Chatham) 1 1 2 Graham, Thomas (surgeon) 1 1 Bolton, Thomas (Nelson's bro-in-law) 1 1 2 Gaskin, George 1 1 1 1 4 Long, Charles 1 1 2 Nelson, Maurice 1 3 1 5 Linzee, Robert 1 1 2 Pollard, Thomas 6 7 3 1 1 18 Hoste, Dixon (Rev.) 3 3 1 3 10 Paget, William 1 1 Hamilton, William 2 2 17 2 7 30 Hanwell, William 1 1 Davis, Evan 1 1 Elliot, Gilbert (Lord Minto) 7 7 37 2 1 4 6 1 2 1 68 Stuart, Charles 3 3 1 7 Sainthill, Lieutenant 7 7 Hotham, William 1 7 8 McArthur, John 1 1 5 4 11 Udney, John 1 1 2 Brame, John Wm. (Consul @ Genoa) 1 5 6 Williams, Daniel 2 2 Goodall, Samuel Cranston 2 1 1 4 Windham, William 1 2 3 Drake, Francis (Minister @ Genoa) 17 11 28 Spencer, George (Earl Spencer, 1st Lord Admlty) 1 3 13 20 3 1 41

Cockburn, George 3 1 1 3 8 126 Harriman, J. (Clerk to Udney) 1 1

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL de Vins, Joseph Nikolaus (Baron, Gen. Austrian Army) 5 5 Wallis, Olivier (Count, Gen. Austrian Army) 1 1 Nepean, Evan (Sec. Admlty) 2 4 4 29 5 58 1 59 19 181 Parker, Hyde 2 3 5 Wyndham, William (Lord Grenville) 1 3 4 12 20 Jervis, John (Earl St. Vincent) 2 57 28 43 36 1 54 23 9 253 Trevor, John (Minister @ Turin) 3 3 Beaulieu, Johann Peter (C-in-C Austrian Army) 1 1 Heatly, David 1 1 de Silva, Marquis (Naples) 1 1 de Burgh, Lieut. Gen. (Earl Clanricarde) 2 1 1 4 Pollard, Mrs. 1 1 Harman, Edward (Sec. to Gilbert Elliot) 1 1 Windham, Wadham 1 1 Mayor of Norwich (re: present sword of Spanish rear-adm Winthuysen) 1 1 Saumarez, James 5 5 10 Waldegrave, William (later Lord Radstock) 1 3 2 6 Miller, Ralph Willet 2 1 3 Inglefield, John Nicholson 1 4 5 Troubridge, Thomas 1 4 43 13 1 1 2 1 66 Naylor, George 1 1 2 Baynes, Lieut. 1 1 Oldfield, Thomas 1 1 Knight, Capt. 1 1 Berry, Edward 2 2 3 7 11 4 2 31 Parker, William 1 2 5 8 Hammond, Andrew Snape (Hamond) 1 1 1 3 Halkett, John (Sec. to Lord Chancellor) 1 1 Wedderburn, Alexander (Lord Chanceller, 1793-1801. Lord Loughborough) 1 1 2 Bertie, Albemarle 1 1 2 Morris, Mr. (Rev.) 1 1

Crowe, Henry (Rev.) 1 1 2 127 Weatherhead, Mr. (Rev.) 1 1 2

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Manley, Mr. 1 1 Thompson, Charles 1 1 Fellowes, Thomas (Nelson's pursur in the Boreas) 1 1 Huddlestone, Hannah 1 1 Marsden, William 1 13 14 Lloyd, Thomas 1 1 2 Collier, Lady 2 2 3 7 Collingwood, Mrs. 1 1 2 Thompson, Thomas Boulden (TB) 1 1 2 Baldwin, George 2 2 Hamilton, Emma (Lady) 5 3 4 16 9 4 41 Cuthbert, Robert 1 1 Glyn, Richard (Lord Mayor of London) 1 1 Duncan, Jonathan (Governor of Bombay) 1 1 Duval, Thomas (Lieut. In 1798) 2 2 Dundas, Henry 1 1 Hoste, William (Lieut in 1798, Capt in 1799) 1 2 3 Hood, Samuel (Capt. 1st cousin once removed of Lord Hood) 7 1 8 de Niza, Marquis (Portuguese Rear Adm) 11 30 41 Acton, John 4 11 7 9 4 35 Acton, Joseph (Gen.) 1 1 2 Gage, William Hall 3 1 4 Eden, Morton 3 3 Ball, Alexander John 6 34 5 1 10 2 58 Murray, George 1 4 1 3 9 Barker, Capt. 1 1 Smith, John Spencer 3 12 15 Werry, Francis 1 2 3 Lucas, Simon (Consul-Gen. Tripoli) 1 2 1 4 Louis, Thomas 2 8 10 Stone, Capt. (Commodore) 2 2

Smith, Sydney 1 1 128 Angerstein, John Julius 1 1 2 4

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Nelson, Mary (aunt) 1 1 Campbell, John (Nelson's secretary) 1 1 Curtis, Roger 1 1 2 Mitchell, Sampson 3 3 Duckworth, John 2 22 1 25 Nisbet, Capt. (fails Nelson) 2 2 Hardy, Thomas 4 1 1 6 Campbell, Commodore (Palermo) 4 4 Clare, Earl (Lord Chancellor Ireland) 1 1 Addington, Henry (Spkr House of Commons) 1 17 6 14 38 Forster, John (Sprk House Com. Ireland) 1 1 Leyland, Thomas (Mayor of Liverpool) 1 1 Anderson, William (Mayor of London 1799) 1 1 Parker, Lady (Wife of Peter) 2 1 3 Coffin, Isaac (Commissioner Port Mahon) 3 3 Littledale, Joseph 1 1 Lamb, Philip 3 2 5 Tough, James (Consul-Gen, Sicily) 1 2 1 4 Davison, Alexander 4 5 19 8 10 7 53 Magra, Perkin (Consul @ Tunis) 6 6 Darby, Henry D'esterre 4 4 Smith, William Sidney 14 1 15 Burlton, George 2 2 Hallowell (Carew), Benjamin 1 3 4 Foresti, Spiridion (Consul @ Corfu) 4 1 5 1 11 Grand Vizir 4 1 5 Whitworth, Charles 1 1 Thurn, Count (Sicilian ship la Minerva) 3 3 Elphinstone, George (Lord Keith) 12 24 1 37 Bashaw of Tripoli 2 2 Dixon, Manley 3 1 4

Foote, Edward 10 10 129 Broughton, William Robert 1 1

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Tulloch, Andrew 1 1 Drummond, Adam 3 3 Sargent, Lieut 1 1 Wilsh, Capt. 1 1 Lock, Charles (Consul Gen. Naples) 3 3 Martin, George 2 2 Bentinck, William 2 2 Suwarrow, Field Marshal 1 1 Dacres, Capt. 1 1 Suckling, Mrs. 1 2 1 4 Hope, Capt. 1 1 Erskine, James St.Claire (Lieut. Gen.) 7 7 Grand Signior 1 1 2 Cadir Bey (of Tunis) 10 1 1 12 Ouschakoff (Vice Adm. Russia) 6 6 Italinsky, Chevalier 3 3 Bayley, Capt. 1 1 Blow, Lieut. 1 1 Richards, Capt. 1 1 Bertie, Thomas 1 1 2 Penny, John 1 1 England, Thomas 1 1 Compton, Henry 1 1 Heard, Isaac 1 1 Castells, Joseph 1 1 2 Fox, Henry Edward (Lieut.Gen) 1 3 4 Blackwood, Henry 3 3 Morris, James Nicholl 1 1 Bruce, Thomas (Earl of Elgin) 3 2 5 John Peyton 1 1 Graham, Thomas (Brig.Gen) 7 6 13

Nelson, Horatio (Horace, nephew) 1 1 2 130 Turner, Richard (Rev.) 1 1

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Hadding, John 1 1 Capitan Pacha (Pasha) 4 1 1 6 Tyson, John 1 2 3 Inglis, Charles 1 1 Ormsby, George 1 1 Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies 1 2 2 5 Dey of Algiers 2 2 4 Jackson, Thomas (Minister at Turin) 1 1 5 1 8 Downman, Hugh 1 1 Pope Pius VII 1 1 Cochrane, Thomas (Lord) 1 1 Locker, John (son of Wm) 2 2 Holloway, John 3 3 Nelson, Richard (b.1732 d.1804 Plymouth Dock) 1 1 Yorke, Charles Philip 1 1 Boothby, Brooke 1 1 Lindholm, Hans (Adjutant General Danish Navy) 6 1 7 Barker, Samuel (Mayor Yarmouth) 2 2 Bernstoff, Count 2 2 Crauford, James 2 2 Proby, John (Earl of Carysfort) 1 1 Cockburn, Alexander 1 1 Totty, Thomas 8 8 Garlike, Benjamin 1 1 Fitzherbert, Alleyne (Lord St. Helens) 2 2 Sotheron, Frank (Capt.) 1 4 5 Steward, AH 1 1 Devonshire, John Ferris 1 1 Beckford, William 1 1 Pahlen, Comte (Count) 3 3 Booth, Richard (Purser of the London) 1 1

Sutton, Samuel 9 12 9 4 34 131 Russel, John 3 3

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Lutwidge, Skeffington 13 13 Bedford, William 5 1 6 Owen, Edward 3 3 Owen, William Fitzwilliam (brother of Edward) 1 1 Hamilton, Captain (James?) 1 1 Smith, George 1 1 Hill, Mr. (attempted to blackmail Nelson) 2 2 Scott, John (Lord Eldon) 1 1 Baird, Andrew (doctor) 1 1 2 Harvey, Thomas 9 9 Ferrier, John 2 2 Perry, William (Dr.) 1 1 Eamer, John (Lord Mayor of London) 1 2 3 Baker, Lieut. 1 1 Sinclair, John 1 1 2 Addington, John Hiley 1 1 Matcham, George (bro-in-law, Katherine) 1 1 Nelson, Sarah (wife of Rev. Wm Nelson) 1 1 Hastings, Warren 1 1 Fremantle, Thomas 1 1 2 Tyler, Charles 3 3 Graves, Thomas 4 4 Sneedorff, Hans 1 1 Pelham, Thomas (Lord) 1 1 Carolina, Maria (Queen of Naples) 1 4 5 Digby, Stephen 2 1 3 Rose, Jonas 1 1 Nowell, Capt (HMS Iris) 1 1 Cowan, William (Lieut) 1 1 Layman, William (Lieut to Capt 1802) 1 2 2 5 Fyers, Capt. 1 1

Bolton, Susannah (Nelson's sister) 1 1 1 3 132 Price, Charles (Lord Mayor London) 1 1

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Comyn, Mr. (Rev.) 1 1 Yonge, Mr. (Rev.) 1 1 Mobbs, William 1 1 Ford, Samuel 1 1 Page, Benjamin William 2 1 3 Fittler, James 2 2 Dr. Goodall 1 2 3 Foley, Thomas (Capt) 1 1 Wilson, Robert 1 1 Forsyth, Thomas 1 1 Hobart, Robert (Lord) 1 8 10 19 Bentham, (Gen.) 1 1 Atkinson, Thomas 2 2 Stephens, Alexander 1 1 Mills, George G. 1 1 Scott, William 1 1 Pownall, Edward 1 2 3 Wodehouse, P. 1 1 Moubray, Richard Hussey (Capt) 5 3 8 Drummond, William (Ambassador at Constantinople) 6 6 Cracraft, Wm Edward (Capt) 7 2 9 Elliot, Hugh (Brother of Minto) 29 9 38 Richardson, Henry (Capt.) 2 6 8 Schomberg, Charles Marsh (Capt) 7 5 12 Villettes, William Anne (Maj.Gen.) 9 9 Rawdon-Hastings, Francis (Lord Moira) 1 1 Cutforth, James (Victualler in Gibraltar) 2 2 4 Bickerton, Richard (Rear Adm) 4 6 10 Hillyar, James (Capt) 1 1 Gore, John (Capt) 1 12 13 Staines, Thomas (Capt) 1 4 5

Trigge, Thomas (Lieut.Gen.) 2 2 133 Strachan, Richard (Capt) 4 4

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Donnelly, Ross (Capt) 5 7 12 Wilkie, Patrick (Peter, Victualler Malta) 2 2 4 Haslewood, William 1 1 Gibert, JB (Consul at Barcelona) 8 4 12 Frere, J. Hookham 4 2 6 Shaw, Harding (Lieut) 1 1 Otway, Wm Albany (Commissioner) 6 3 9 Gibbs, Abraham (wrote to him about importance of Bronte title) 3 3 Boyle, Courtenay (Son of Edmund) 2 1 3 Stuart, John 1 1 Pemberton, Wm (Lieut) 5 5 Falcon, John (Consul-Gen at Algiers) 1 1 Taylor, Nathaniel (Naval Storekeeper, Malta) 4 5 9 Ryves, George Frederick 3 3 6 Walsh, D. (Merchant in Barcelona) 1 1 Pasley, Thomas 1 1 Parker, Peter (Grandson of Sir Parker) 0 Palmer, John 1 1 Baynton, Benjamin 1 1 Woronzow, Count 1 1 Jenkinson, Charles (Lord Hawkesbury) 1 1 Nelson-Thomson, Horatia 1 1 2 Mocenigo, Count 1 1 Hunter, John 2 2 Williams, William 1 1 Russell, Macnamara (Rear Adm) 1 1 McNeill, Archibald 2 2 Bromley, Richard 1 1 Snipe, John (Dr.) 1 1 Dalton, J. 1 1 Connor, Charles 1 1

Whitby, John (Capt) 1 2 3 134 Gray, John (surgeon) 1 1 2

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Capel, Thomas Bladen (Capt) 1 1 Longstaff, Thomas 1 1 Warren, John (Adml) 1 1 Townsend, Francis 1 1 Thresher, Mr. 1 1 Macnamara, Japes (Capt) 1 1 Stewart, William (Col.) 1 1 Pettet, Robert (Capt. Pettitt,) 1 2 3 Perceval, Lady 1 1 Hamilton, Charles Powell 2 2 Patterson, Benjamin 1 1 Stuart, Lady 1 1 Clark, Mr. 1 1 Vassal-Fox, Henry (Lord Holland) 1 1 Duff, James 1 1 Maladena Islands, Governor of 1 1 Keats, Richard Goodwin (Capt) 3 3 Vincent, R.B. 1 1 Bend, Dr. William 1 1 Woodhead, John 1 1 Campbell, George (Rear Adm) 2 2 Adair, CW (Capt. Marines) 1 1 Ford, Richard 4 4 Lawson, William 1 1 Marquis of Hertford 1 1 Fotheringham, Thomas 1 1 Magnon, John Wm. 1 1 Bolton, William 4 4 Lowe, Major 1 1 Lloyd, Robert (Lieut) 1 1 Gayner, Edward 2 2

Clarke, Henry 1 1 135 Moseley, Dr. 1 1

RECIPIENT 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1-5,1804 TOTAL Danvers, Capt (Marines) 1 1 Rosenhagen, Philip Lewis (Capt) 1 1 Bligh, Vice-Adm 1 1 Hart, George (Capt.) 1 1 Briggs, Thomas (Capt) 2 2 Woodman, Henry Frederick 1 1 Shepheard, Lewis (Capt.) 1 1 Corner, Robert (Lieut) 1 1 Nelson, Charlotte (Neice, daughter of Rev. Nelson) 1 1 Malcolm, Pulteney (Capt) 1 1 136