3346_10_CH10.qxp 11/1/10 12:10 PM Page 228

1 CHAPTER 10 2 3x 4 5 THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND 6 7 ’S SECURITY: IS 8 9 AN AESOPIAN 10 1 TRAVELER’S OVERCOAT OR KING 2 3 SOLOMON’S SHIELD? 4 5 (First published 2004) 6 7 8 9  20 1 2 The fault is not in our stars, But in ourselves. 3 4 —SHAKESPEARE— 5 6 7 n the film “The King and I,” there is a scene where the heroine 8 Anna sings to her son Louis “Whenever I am afraid, I hold my 9 I head erect and whistle a happy tune, so no one will suspect I am 30 afraid.” This is what came across my mind when I saw how Kim Jong 1 Il was acting during the inter-Korean Summit in in 2000. 2 Diverse aspects of Kim Jong Il’s behavior seemed as if he was 3 whistling a pleasant tune so that people around him would not 4 notice that he was in fact feeling fearful inside. 5 Such an attitude towards the Republic of Korea is quite different 36 from what he used to be like in the past. This unexpected change 37 was no doubt related to the Yonpyong sea battle which occurred on 38 15 June 1999. It was the first naval gun battle between the Koreas 39 since the . It might be suspected that Kim Jong Il, who 40 had been overwhelmed by the fear of South Korean naval power, 41 decided to show up at the inter-Korean Summit exactly one year 42 after the incident, thus effectively depriving South Koreans of the 43 opportunity to properly celebrate the victory and even made them 44 completely forget the events of just a year previously. 45 46R 3346_10_CH10.qxp 11/1/10 12:10 PM Page 229

The Sunshine Policy and South Korea’s Security 229

There is no denying that the inter-Korean Summit was the result of 1 the Sunshine Policy consistently pursued by the Kim Dae Jung gov- 2 ernment. However, it rather resembles “King Solomon’s strategy” in 3 the Old Testament, in that the warm sunshine which was expected to 4 be shed on North Korea, was subsequently reflected back to South 5 Korea after hitting a North Korean mirror-like shield. What Kim Jong 6 Il gave back to South Korea in return was strong tear gas of a kind. 7 South Koreans could not but cry out of joy because of the tear gas of 8 the tearful family reunions. With this reconciliatory atmosphere 9 created by the inter-Korean Summit and family reunions, it is hard 10 not to be worried that South Koreans might considerably loosen their 1 vigilance, growing insensitive to security issues. The inter-Korean 2 Summit was indeed dramatic. But, whether the Summit will be 3 recorded as having historic importance after Korea is unified or 4 merely as clever media fabrication, pure propaganda, or a passing 5 episode, remains to be seen. Only history will be able to tell us. 6 7 8 THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES 9 ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 20 It is obvious that a mood of reconciliation and thaw has been over- 1 flowing on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the historic inter- 2 Korea Summit. But, there have been no substantial changes in the 3 strategic military situation between the two Koreas. Maybe, North- 4 South exchange and cooperation, North Korea’s increased visibility 5 in the international community, and international assistance for 6 and investment into North Korea, all following from the inter- 7 Korean Summit, can be said to be what South Korea is inadvertently 8 contributing to North Korea in its efforts to build a mighty military 9 power, benefiting a very powerful enemy. Also, given the peculiarity 30 of Kim Jong Il’s one-man rule in North Korea, the status of inter- 1 Korean relations can at any moment deteriorate back into con- 2 frontation and animosity depending on Kim Jong Il’s temper. Until 3 now, such danger has been overlooked amid enthusiasm for peace- 4 ful unification of the Korean nation. 5 However, as time goes by, and with waning enthusiasm, it is likely 36 that people will suffer from disillusionment with North-South rela- 37 tions. That is because the sea battle at Yonpyong could be a prelude 38 to upcoming small and big crises South Korea will have to face, 39 rather than the last such incident that will happen on the tense 40 Korean peninsula. As much as the contacts and exchanges between 41 North and South Korea can contribute to the possibility and depth 42 of reconciliation, they can also trigger more factors leading to 43 conflicts. 44 Long ago, Rousseau foresaw situations such as this. That is why 45 when the Abbé Saint-Pierre, an enlightenment philosopher and 46R