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THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR VOLUME 2 SURGE AND WITHDRAWAL 2007-2011 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn Colonel Frank K. Sobchak Editors with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy UNITED STATES Colonel Matthew D. Morton ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS Colonel James S. Powell Carlisle Barracks, PA and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zais TURKEY DAHŪK Dahūk Sinjār Mosul ERBĪL Tall ‘Afar Erbil SYRIA NĪNAWÁ As Sulaymānīyah Kirkūk AS SULAYMĀNĪYAH KIRKŪK Bayjī IRAN ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN Al Qā’im Tikrīt Khānaqīn Sāmarrā’ E u Ḩadīthah p h r a t e s Ba‘qūbah R Ar Ramādī DIYĀLÁ Al Fallūjah BAGHDAD Ar Ruţbah N A BAGHDĀD Al Iskandarīyah D T WĀSIŢ R i AL ANBĀR gr Karbalā’ BĀBIL is O R Al Kūt Al Ḩillah J KARBALĀ MAYSĀN Ad Dīwānīyah Al ‘Amārah An Najaf AL QĀDISĪYAH DHĪ QĀR As Samāwah An Nāşirīyah AN NAJAF Al Başrah International Boundary AL BAŞRAH National Capital AL MUTHANNÁ Umm Qaşr Provincial Boundary Provincial Capital KUWAIT Signicant City Miles 0 150 SAUDI 0 150 Kilometers ARABIA Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. Map 1. Iraq. i Map createdbytheofficialcartographeratU.S. Army CenterofMilitaryHistory,Washington,DC. Administrative District Boundary Hy al Basateen “village” Shaab Neighborhood Boundary R New Sadr City s i r ADHAMIYAH Ur g 5 i Sadr City (8) 0 T Miles Hy Rubi Hy Tunis R Kilometers Sadr City (7) 0 5 a l Beida Sadr City (5) a Al Shanayia y 1 Sadr City (5) i Shamasiya D Kadhimiya Qahira SADR CITY Sadr City (2) Sadr City (4) Nur Zahra’ Oubaidy Waziriya KADHIMIYAH Adhamiyah Idrissi Sadr City (3) Maghrib Sadr City (1) Mustansirya Atiya Kamaliya Harbiya/ Al Ulum Map 2.Baghdad. 14 July Baladiat Huriya Fajr Al Tib Salaam RUSAFA Neel Ghazaliya Rasheed Army Canal9 NISSAN Sheikh Keeylani Marouf Karkh MANSOUR Adl 14 Ramadan Nidal Mashtal Sheikh Muthana Zayuna Andalus Junaid Salhiya Saadoun D 97 Mutanabi i ii y Abu Ghuraib Khadra KARKH Abu Nuwas a Sumer l a Al-Ghedier Tashree R Mansour Zawrar Amin 10 Kindi Wehda Baghdad Al Jadida (New Baghdad) Karada Riyadh Ameriya Hateen Yarmouk Janain Babil RASHEED Qadisiya Kanun BAGHDAD AIRPORT INTERNATIONAL Aamel Jamia AIRPORT Jihad Bayaa Jazeera KARADAH Doura Masafee T Zafaraniya i Shurta g Jaza’ll Renery r Diyala Bridge i s Saydiyah R Sindabad Risalah Hadar RASHEED Karb De Gla Furat Ghartan Zubaida R s i r g i T 8 Proper names may not conform to U.S. Board of Geographic Names standards. Map createdbytheofficialcartographeratU.S. Army CenterofMilitaryHistory,Washington,DC. XX 2 2 Iraqi Police Academy II 2 ERU R igris T Iraqi II Map 3.Mosul,IraqiUnits, 2006-2008. Saddam’s Presidential Palace 5 ERU Iraqi MOSUL UNIVERSITY NINEVEH WOODS NINEVEH RUINS r a 2 w ş hr al Kh a Mosul Hotel Na 1 Saddam Mosque TV Station Sun Gate iii 2 2 Shrine of Nabi Yunis Yarmouk Trac Circle NINEVEH RUINS Yarmouk Customs House Ninewa Government Center X 12 2 1 Iraqi II Fire Department NP Salam Hospital Iraqi Textile Factory X 7 2 FOB Diamondback Iraqi Iraqi Army Infantry School FOB Marez Saddam’s “Special Palace” MOSUL AIRPORT T ig r is XX R 0 3 3 NP Miles 1 Iraqi 0 3 Kilometers Proper names may not conform to U.S. Board of Geographic Names standards. Map createdbytheofficialcartographeratU.S. Army CenterofMilitaryHistory,Washington,DC. Na hr Ka Al Jazirah Basrah Canal rm Al Harithah at Al Jawiyah Ath Thaniyah ‘Alī Nahiyat Al Karmah Al Latif Abu Al Bushayr Harithah Kramah Ali Al Waki As Firuziyah Qaryat ‘Abd Sindibad Al Kibasi Ar Raheem Al ‘Ali Basrah Operations Command Al Kramah Shat’al Arab Hotel U.S. Regional Embassy Oce Basrah BASRAH MAQAL AIRPORT Al MND-SE HQ Al Ablah Ma’Qil Map 4.AlBasrah,2007. Al Hadi Al Mankubin Khamza Meel Al Jubaylah Shuman Al Hayy S h Al MArkazi a BASRAH tt Khazima Al Sadiqa a INTERNATIONAL l A r AIRPORT a Mutiyah Ar Ribat b Kardalan 8 At Tannumah Basra Contingency Operations Base iv At Al Mazlaq Tuwaysah Al Jumhuriyah Camp Breadbasket Kut As Sayyid Al ‘Ashshar Al Asma’i Kut Al Hajjaj As Sa’i Manawi Basha Al Mahraqah Al Hasawiyah Al Fursi Dur Hayy Al Basrah As Saymar Al Hayy Al Mu’AlliminAl Qadimah Al Baradiya Al Khalij Sabkhat Al’Arabi Al ’Arab Al Hayyaniyah Manawi Mitan Al Lajim Basrah Palaces Saad Square Hayy Al Husayn Baab Azubar University Al Uwaysan Abdaliyah Jarriat Police Station Basrah Children’s Hospital Al ‘Utaykah Hayy al Jameat Basrah Canal Balad 8 Majram 0 3 Miles 0 3 Kilometers Hayy al Qiblah Al Mintaqah As Sina’iyah to Camp Bucca–British Detention Facility, Umm Qasr 67 km. to Shaibah Logistics Base, 16 km. TURKEY Mosul Palace Mosul Aireld FOB Marez Kirkuk (FOB Warrior) Camp Diamondback Irbil (Camp Zaytun) Tikrit Palace Tall ‘Afar (FOB Sykes) Camp Speicher/Al Sahra Aireld Hawijah (FOB McHenry) Tuz Khurmatu Aireld Samarra’ (FOB Brasseld Mora) SYRIA Qayyarah (Q West) Khalis (Camp Ashraf) Bayji (FOB Summerall) Al Miqdadiyah (FOB Normandy) Kirkhush (FOB Caldwell) Balad (LSA Anaconda/Balad Air Base) Al Qā’im Al Asad Air Base IRAN Ar Ruţbah (Camp Korean Village) Taqqadam Air Base Ba‘qubah (FOB Warhorse) Camp Ramadi Victory Base Complex N At Taji Camp Liberty A Camp Fallujah Camp Cropper D Sather Air Base R FOB Falcon O Al-Iskandaryah Air Base (FOB Kalsu) Kut Al Hayy Air Base FOB Justice J Camp Chesty Camp Rustamiyah Camp Delta FOB Shield FOB Union III Amarah Air Base Diwaniyah (Camp Echo) Camp Sparrowhawk Camp Abu Naji An Nasiriyah (Camp Cedar II) Tallil Air Base Camp Adder Basra COB Camp Bucca Base Umm Qasr Naval Base KUWAIT 0 150 Miles 0 150 Kilometers SAUDI ARABIA Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. Map 5. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Major Camps, 2003–2011. v Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. Map 6. Ethno-Religious Groups, Iraq. vi TURKEY Dahūk Sinjār Mosul Erbil SYRIA As Sulaymānīyah Karkūk Fort Suse Bayjī 2005–2006 IRAN Al Qā’im At Taji Sāmarrā’ E 2008–2010 u p h r a t e Camp Cropper s Ba‘qūbah R 2003–2010 Ar Ramādī BAGHDAD N A Abu Ghraib D 2003–2006 T R ig ri Karbalā’ s O Al Ḩillah R Al Kūt J Ad Dīwānīyah An Najaf Al ‘Amārah As Samāwah An Nāşirīyah Al Başrah Camp Bucca 2003–2009 Umm Qaşr Detention Facility KUWAIT 0 150 Miles Kilometers 0 150 SAUDI ARABIA Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. Map 7. Detention Facilities, Theater Level, 2003–2011. vii Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR: VOLUME 2 SURGE AND WITHDRAWAL 2007-2011 Colonel Joel D. Rayburn Colonel Frank K. Sobchak Editors with Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne F. Godfroy Colonel Matthew D. Morton Colonel James S. Powell Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Zais January 2019 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ∗∗∗∗∗ This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. ix ∗∗∗∗∗ Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013- 5238. ∗∗∗∗∗ All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carl- isle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/. ∗∗∗∗∗ The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publica- tions, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic com- mentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-777-4 x THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY’S OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STUDY GROUP 2013-2018 Director and General Editor 2013-2016: Colonel Joel Rayburn 2017-2018: Colonel Frank Sobchak Executive Officers/Directors of Research Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Hardman Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Zais Senior Fellows Lieutenant Colonel Jeanne Godfroy Colonel Matthew Morton Colonel James Powell Colonel Frank Sobchak (2013-2016) Research Fellows Colonel Jason Awadi Major Wilson Blythe Major Steven Gribschaw Adjunct Fellows and Contributors Michael Bell, Ph.D., College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University Derek Harvey, University of South Florida Major Kelly Howard, U.S.
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