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An Ecological Conception of Human Nature AN ECOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE AN ECOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE By JORDAN T. BURKS, B.A., M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright by Jordan T. Burks, June 2013 Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2013), Department of Philosophy (Philosophy of Science), McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: An Ecological Conception of Human Nature AUTHOR: Jordan T. Burks, M.A. (McMaster University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Mark Vorobej NUMBER OF PAGES: ix, 330 ii Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy Abstract Currently, there is significant divergence in scholarly opinion as to whether or not human nature exists. In my PhD thesis, I argue for the existence of human nature. In so doing, I critique rival views on human nature and orthodox entry points into the issue. I also offer a partial explanation as to why such a strong divergence of expert opinion may exist, and argue that accuracy on the issue is important with respect to individual and collective problem solving. The view of human nature I defend is what I call ‘ecological.’ This construct aligns with the fact that biological systems exist at multiple levels of organization and relative to varying ecologies, developmental stages, frames of reference, and viable systems of orientation. Given this, I contend human nature is not something that ‘inheres’ and projects out from the organism; rather, human nature is diffuse and exists at simultaneous levels of biological organization, and at the intersection of genetic and epigenetic factors, past and present, and scientific truth and pragmatism. iii Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy Acknowledgements When it came to choosing a PhD topic, I knew what I wanted to write about. For me, human nature has been a topic of near-obsession for a very long time. However, there were many obstacles to moving ahead with this. First, the topic is radically multi-disciplinary, which is risky to take on as a PhD student. Second, scholars have written about human nature for millennia, and thus, this topic does not easily lend itself to a refined critique, even at the maximum length of a PhD thesis. Third, it is difficult to find current philosophers (and thus, supervisors) who are not hostile to the concept. Given these obstacles, I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to write on human nature for my PhD and to have found supervisors who, not only allowed me to try my hand at it, but who were superb mentors. I would especially like to thank my primary supervisors, Mark Vorobej and Edouard Machery. From the outset, synthesis of the relevant material was difficult and I encountered many twists and turns, and dead ends. Mark, especially, was an anchor point in the early stages, and later, at my most deflated. Both Mark and Edouard read many chapters and paragraphs that had to be scrapped, in addition to the ones that needed significant refinement. Edouard was a fortuitous balance of criticism and tolerance; his diverse, up-to-date, and detailed knowledge made him a great resource. Rama Singh came into my thesis in the later stages, and his comments were timely for carrying the project through to the end. I am also deeply grateful for the encouragement of Jerome Barkow. Jerome was one of my supervisors for my master’s thesis and, from that point on, his guidance has been invaluable. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the thesis, I needed the help of scholars who were more knowledgeable and specialized. I feel fortunate to have found scholars who not only helped me, but more amazing, helped me as a total stranger. The following scholars critiqued preliminary outlines, full chapters of my thesis, or substantial portions of chapters: David Hull, Don Dedrick, Stefan Linquist, John Dupré, Peter Loptson, Polly Winsor, Michael Devitt, Gordon McOuat, Alan C. Love, and Richard Lewontin. Other scholars tolerated numerous office visits and emails asking for advice. Foremost of these are Paul Andrews, Martin Daly, and Michal Arciszewski. Other scholars were kind enough to offer guidance on answers to specific questions or direct me to related material: David Hitchcock, Roy Baumeister, Randy Thornhill, David Feinberg, Tim Lewens, Joeri Witteveen, John Paul Minda, Joseph Heath, and Nancy Cartwright. I would like to thank mentors and scholars who helped me prior to my PhD: Richmond Campbell, Steven Burns, Jason Robert, Cam Teskey, Michael Ruse, Alan iv Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy Drengson, Angus Taylor, Rennie Warburton, Doug Purkis, and my long-term friend, Cary Mullen. I am grateful to my family, and extended family, for their good nature and support as I indulged a very extended life as a university student. My mother Jan Burks, in particular, and my sister and stepfather, have been true sources of inspiration. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Carrie Burks. Anyone who knew even half of what you endured to see this PhD to the end, and compared this to your constancy, optimism, thoughtfulness, generosity, kindness, vast sense of humor, vibrancy, patience and cheerfulness, would be awestruck. You are a ‘concentrated force’ of love and joyfulness that is so far beyond anything I could ever have thought possible. I love you. I dedicate whatever quality there is in this thesis to you, and our newborn son, Boon. v Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy Table of Contents Chapter 1: Human Nature ……..………………………………………………………………………...…. 1 1.1 PhD Thesis Outline …....……..………………………………………………...…… 6 1.2 Preliminary Qualification: Relativism versus Integrationism ...… 10 Chapter 2: Foundational Frames...………………………………………………………………...…… 12 Part I: The Denial of Human Nature …………………………………………………….…. 18 2.1 Preliminary Overview ………..…………...…………………………………….. 19 2.2 Human Universals and Exclusive Human Features …………......…... 23 Part II: Evolutionary Processes ………...…...…………………………………………….…. 29 2.3 Evolutionary Processes as Change and Diversity ……….....……...…. 30 Part III: Gracile Conceptions of Human Nature ……….....………………………….... 31 2.4 Triangulated Generalization versus Isolated Generalization ....… 35 2.5 Interesting or Banal in Relation to Frames ………..…...…………….… 38 Part IV: Socio-Agentic Conceptions of Human Nature ………...……..…………….. 39 2.6 Transcendence: Local and Global ………...……..…...……………………... 42 2.7 Natural versus Social Selection; Adaptation Execution versus Fitness Maximization; Behavioral By-products; and Social Selection ………………………….………………...…………………………………. 45 2.8 Genes and Human Nature ………..…...……………………………………….. 56 Part V: Human Natures ………..………………………………………………………………… 64 2.9 Ehrlich’s Conception of Human Nature ………..……………...…………. 65 2.10 General Comments on Human Nature ………...……………..…………. 70 Part VI: Summative Conceptions of Human Nature ……..……...…………………... 72 vi Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy 2.11 Overview: Definitions, Conceptions, and Empirical Specifications ………. 73 2.12 Summative Conceptions of Human Nature: Examples and Critique ………...…………………………………………………………………….. 77 Part VII: An Ecological Conception of Human Nature ………..…………………….. 82 2.13 Preliminary Comments ………...……………………………………………... 82 2.14 Conceptual Frame for an Ecological Conception of Human Nature ………. 87 2.15 Definitional Frame for an Ecological Conception of Human Nature ………………………………………...………………………………………. 93 2.16 Final Qualifications ………………...…………………………………………… 94 Chapter 3: Typology, Essentialism, Species Fixity, and Being Human ...……………….. 98 3.1 Overview ………………………………...………………………………………….. 101 3.2 Mayr and Typology ……………….…………………………………………….. 103 3.3 Hull on Essentialism/Typology ……………………………………………. 111 3.4 Correctives on Classical Essentialism …………………………………… 122 3.5 Preliminary Orientation to other Correctives ……………………….. 129 3.6 Cluster Concepts and Homeostatic Property Clusters …………… 131 3.7 Correctives on Correctives …………………………………………………... 136 3.8 Preliminary Orientation to the Issue of Essentialism or Typology ………. 144 3.9 Essentialism and Causes ……………………………………………………… 146 3.10 Essentialism versus Typology, and Love’s Perspective …….….. 150 3.11 Devitt: Essentialism Redux? ……………………………………………… 159 vii Ph.D. Thesis - J. T. Burks; McMaster University - Philosophy 3.12 Essentialism, Ecological Imperatives, and Heuristics ...……...… 167 3.13 Outline of Ecological Imperatives ………………………………………. 175 3.14 Conclusion ………....……………………………………………………………... 181 Chapter 4: Innate, Acquired, Socially Acquired, Natural, and Ecological ……………. 184 4.1 Innateness: The Ongoing Critique ………………………………………... 187 4.2 Foundational Criticism of the Critics ……………………………………. 193 4.3 Line-drawing, Language, and Ambiguity ……….……………………... 196 4.4 Framing Amendments ………………………………………………………… 203 4.5 Fixity, Teleology, Typicality, and Framing …………………………….. 208 4.6 Toward an Appropriate Construct for Innateness ………………… 214 4.7 Innateness ………………………………………………………………………….. 219 4.8 The Constructs Nature and Natural ……………………………………… 221 4.9 Sober and Ereshefsky: Natural and Unnatural as Anti-biology ………. 226 4.10 Critique of the Natural State Model Linked to Biological Essentialism …………………………………………………………….……….. 231 4.11 Critique of Genetic Norms of Reaction Used Against Natural States ………………………………………………………………………..……… 236 4.12 Critique of Ereshefsky on Natural and Unnatural Environments ………. 242 4.13 Dimensions of Naturalness …………………………………………………
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