“If the growing regional and internal pressures on destabilize the regime, an uncontrolled and potentially very violent transition is possible.”

Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises Te r r e n c e Ly o n s

thiopia in 2008 faces challenges on multiple sion that was established under the Algiers peace fronts. Prime Minister , who process. In Somalia, though has legiti- Ehas been in power since 1991, in the past mate security interests at stake, stability cannot be has demonstrated both resilience and the capacity achieved until Ethiopian troops withdraw. And the to outmaneuver his rivals. This year, however, he marginalization of will only be resolved faces a convergence of internal and regional crises through political processes that incorporate local that could unbalance Ethiopia and exacerbate con- issues and leaders. If these interlinked crises con- flicts across the region. Each of these challenges tinue to escalate, and amplify one another, there is feeds and is in turn fed by the others. An explosive the potential for a highly violent and chaotic tran- escalation is possible. sition in Ethiopia. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary The United States has a particularly important Democratic Front (e p r d f ), though it weathered role to play with regard to these crises. Washington unrest and instability that followed the country’s and Addis Ababa have formed a close strategic part- disputed national elections of 2005, remains with- nership to counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa. out the support of key constituencies in the cities This relationship, however, associates the United and in the large central Oromo region. Meanwhile, States with the regime and its policies in ways that the country shares an extraordinarily tense and are not helpful. Washington’s calls for democrati- militarized border with Eritrea, and the debilitated zation and in Ethiopia are not per- Algiers peace process that brought their 1998–2000 suasive when high-level u s officials also praise the war to an end may now be beyond resuscitation. regime’s cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Ethiopia’s December 2006 intervention into Soma- Ethiopia’s continued obstruction of demarcating the lia in support of that country’s Transitional Fed- border with Eritrea contributes to Eritreans’ percep- eral Government has left the Ethiopian military tion that Washington is hostile to them. bogged down in Mogadishu, facing a violent reac- Moreover, while Addis Ababa and Washington tion but unable to withdraw. Another, interlinked share concerns regarding extremist Islamic groups conflict—within the Ogaden region of eastern in Somalia, their concerns are motivated differently. Ethiopia, which is inhabited by ethnic — Ethiopia worries about the assistance that these has developed into a humanitarian disaster. groups provide to the regime’s enemies in Eritrea To avoid a domestic political crisis, the ruling and among Oromo and Somali insurgent groups. party must reinstate the relative political freedoms The United States is concerned about Somali links in place at the time of the competitive 2005 elec- to Al Qaeda. The challenges that Ethiopia faces— tions. Ethiopia can ill afford noncompetitive local challenges related to growing authoritarianism, elections in 2008 or boycotted national elections escalating tension along the border with Eritrea, in 2010. The crisis along the border with Eritrea is and protracted conflict in Somalia—are further particularly tense now; resolution of that conflict complicated when Washington overlays on them must begin with Ethiopia’s accepting and imple- its global war on terror. menting the 2002 border demarcation decision reached by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commis- Fa i l e d elections In May 1991, the e p r d f defeated the brutal mili- Te r r e n c e Ly o n s is an associate professor at George Mason tary dictator after a pro- University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. longed civil war and began a process of political

154 Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises • 155 transition. The e p r d f -dominated transitional gov- When the new parliament met in October 2005, ernment created new regional states, with every some opposition leaders took their seats, but oth- major ethnic group receiving its own state. (As ers, particularly leading members of the c u d , a consequence, politics has tended to be domi- boycotted the assembly. This decision to opt out nated by ethnically based parties, including the rather than accept their positions as leaders of the e p r d f .) The transitional government then consoli- opposition within existing institutions represented dated its authority by organizing and winning a an enormous miscalculation and a tragic missed series of elections. These elections, however, were opportunity to consolidate and then expand on uncontested because opposition parties boycotted important gains. Violence erupted in the first week the polls after facing harassment from the ruling of November, and most top c u d officials were authorities. The new regime also put in place dis- arrested. Prosecutors formally charged some 131 ciplined, hierarchic party institutions that linked opposition politicians, journalists, and civil society top political leaders in the capital with local offi- leaders with crimes, including genocide and trea- cials at the level of the kebelle (neighborhood asso- son. The e p r d f , by bringing these charges against ciations). Local civil servants were party members its leading critics, effectively criminalized dissent who used their control over land, fertilizer, and and sent an unmistakable message that effective other critical resources to control the countryside. opposition would not be tolerated. The 2005 polit- The May 2005 elections, however, broke this ical opening had closed. pattern of carefully managed politics. These elec- In July 2007 the main c u d leaders were con- tions instead presented the Ethiopian people with victed of treason, a capital crime in Ethiopia, but a remarkable oppor- then were pardoned after tunity to express their they signed documents political views by par- The Ethiopian people have acquiesced admitting responsibility ticipating in a vote that for the 2005 violence. for the first time in to power that they cannot overcome, but The damage, however, the country’s history such compliance might evaporate quickly. had been done. The offered a meaningful c u d was shattered. The choice. In contrast to opposition coalition earlier elections, opposition parties did not boy- was always a quickly assembled and loose amal- cott but instead competed vigorously across the gam of various parties united by opposition to most populous regions. Live televised debates on the ruling party. By 2008 it was further divided: matters of public policy, access for opposition par- between those who took their seats in the parlia- ties to state-owned media, and huge, peaceful ral- ment in 2005 and those who were arrested and lies in the final week of campaigning made it clear then released in 2007, as well as among those with that these elections would represent a decisive links to various bickering factions within the influ- moment in Ethiopia’s political development. The ential Ethiopian diaspora. voters seized this opportunity with a great sense of The members of the opposition who took their hope and turned out in overwhelming numbers to seats in 2005 have found it difficult to play mean- express their choices. ingful roles. Government restrictions on the media A very chaotic vote-counting process, however, have made it difficult for them to communicate with generated controversy, violent protests, and mass their supporters (creating a vigorous rumor mill and arrests. According to official results, the e p r d f fostering a culture in which extreme views posted and allied parties won 367 parliamentary seats (67 on internet sites serve as the main form of politi- percent), while the opposition took 172 seats (31 cal speech). Most fundamentally, the opposition’s percent), with 109 going to the Coalition for Unity supporters in the countryside have faced arrest and and Democracy (c u d ). This outcome represented harassment, leaving the opposition unable to orga- a stunning setback for the incumbent party in rela- nize among its own constituencies. This seems to be tion to previous elections. But important leaders particularly true of Oromo opposition parties such of the opposition refused to accept the outcome, as the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement and despite the fact that the opposition’s seats in the the Oromo National Congress. parliament had increased from 12 to 172. They The 2005 political opening and subsequent claimed to have irrefutable evidence that massive crisis demonstrated the influence of the Ethio- fraud had taken place. pian diaspora, particularly in North America, on 156 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2008 politics within the country. Key leaders of the (o l f ), despite that organization’s inability since diaspora, who had advocated boycotts of elec- 1992 to organize openly within the country. tions in the past, urged the opposition to compete Without a basis for support in the Oromo region in 2005. After the crisis over the vote tabulation or in the urban areas, the e p r d f ’s ability to govern is and the violent demonstrations, however, many in inherently precarious and depends on force, which the diaspora endorsed the strategy of boycotting alienates the population further. Force has reestab- the parliament. Some have articulated a categori- lished order in the short run, but it is not sustain- cal stance defining compromise with the e p r d f able in the long run. There have been early signs as betrayal, thereby reducing room for opposition that dissent is growing in the military and among leaders in Ethiopia to maneuver or to engage in government officials. In August 2006, for example, peaceful political activities. Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu defected, along Local elections and by-elections for seats held with some 100 troops, to join the o l f , claiming that by those who boycotted the parliament in 2005 are the only language the e p r d f understands “is force, scheduled for April 2008, but it remains doubtful and we’re going to challenge them by force.” that the main opposition parties will participate. On one level, Ethiopia is in a process of democ- The opposition in parliament has made its partici- ratization that has transformed the country since pation in future elections conditional on a series of 1991. Elections are held regularly, the parliament demands relating to access to mass media, reform includes multiple political parties, the prime min- of the National Election Board, and participation ister faces questions from lawmakers, and oppo- of domestic and international monitors. Most sition leaders openly meet with foreign diplomats fundamentally, even those opposition parties that and the international media. On a more essential have participated in the parliament argue that local level, however, political space in Ethiopia is an e p r d f officials must be forced to stop practicing illusion. A 2007 poll conducted by Gallup found violence and intimidation against the opposition. that only 13 percent of have confidence in the honesty of their elections, 25 percent have Fr a g i l e r e g i m e confidence in the judiciary, and 28 percent have Civil society groups and the media also have confidence in the national government. These faced harsh restrictions and harassment. Lead- numbers are approximately 30 percentage points ing websites and blogs have been blocked. Dan- lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and iel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie, leaders of two suggest that the population has resigned itself to— prominent nongovernmental organizations, were but not endorsed—the regime’s authority. convicted in December 2007 in a trial that Amnesty The 2005 elections demonstrated high levels of International characterized as “no more than the opposition to the e p r d f , which is in decline after criminalization of free speech” and as having “a 17 years in power, but they failed to initiate an chilling effect on civil society activism.” orderly political transition based on peaceful mul- The opposition has been marginalized, both by tiparty competition. Unless reforms are introduced, decisions it has made and by ruling party repres- it is likely that Ethiopia will face another round of sion. Yet the e p r d f still faces fundamental chal- noncompetitive elections in both the 2008 local lenges regarding two large constituencies—urban elections and the 2010 national elections. The residents and the —that are essential Ethiopian people have acquiesced to power that for any Ethiopian regime that hopes to govern suc- they cannot overcome, but such compliance might cessfully. In the May 2005 elections, the opposi- evaporate quickly if the regime stumbles or is per- tion c u d managed a virtually complete sweep in ceived as weak. Without a strong popular base, Addis Ababa and the other main cities. And the furthermore, the regime is vulnerable to increased e p r d f ’s Oromo wing, the Oromo People’s Demo- pressures from neighboring states. cratic Organization, has failed. After 17 years within the ruling coalition, it has not developed a On t h e b o r d e r l i n e significant base of support among the Oromo, who Ethiopia’s domestic political dilemmas are more represent 40 percent of Ethiopia’s population. The dangerous, and potentially more explosive, because party remains in power in the region only through of escalating tensions along the Ethiopia-Eritrea intimidation and ever more pervasive systems for border—and, increasingly, because of the vio- monitoring the population. Many Oromo remain lent conflict in Somalia. The o l f and the Ogaden loyal to the insurgent Oromo Liberation Front National Liberation Front (o n l f ) operate out of Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises • 157

Asmara (Eritrea’s capital), and Addis Ababa char- deployed. In November 2005 the u n Security acterizes its domestic rivals as agents of regional Council passed Resolution 1640, which threatened “terrorists,” meaning that the Ethiopian regime’s to impose sanctions on Eritrea unless the restric- domestic and foreign threats are linked. In fact, if tions were lifted. Eritrea did not comply. Ethiopia’s regional conflicts with Eritrea and within In November 2007 the Boundary Commission Somalia were resolved, the country’s issues of gave up its efforts to coax the two parties to cooper- domestic political reform could be tackled directly. ate in completing the last stages of border demarca- Ethiopia faces serious insecurity along its north- tion, and instead presented a final map that set the ern border, as its long-running conflict with Eritrea border according to coordinates, a “virtual” demar- remains deadlocked. The e p r d f and the Eritrean cation that Ethiopia did not accept. While Badme People’s Liberation Front, led by Isaias Afewerki was not the underlying cause of the conflict, both (now Eritrea’s president), cooperated in the strug- regimes used it as the marker of who had “won” gle against Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia. By 1998, or “lost” the war, and hence whether the terrible however, relations between the two countries had sacrifices each had made in the conflict were justi- degenerated. Disputes between Addis Ababa and fied or in vain. Control of this small desolate town Asmara arose over, among other things, landlocked therefore became linked directly to the political Ethiopia’s access to Eritrean ports, questions of how fortunes—even the survival—of both regimes. the new Eritrean currency related to the Ethiopian Today the Eritrea-Ethiopia border remains highly currency, and the precise location of their poorly militarized. The Algiers Agreement is unraveling. demarcated border. In The Boundary Commis- May 1998, after a series sion has ceased opera- of military skirmishes, Violence in Mogadishu remains chronic, tions. The u n mission Eritrean armed forces has lost its capacity to attacked the disputed and the u n classifies Somalia as the monitor the border. And border town of Badme. world’s worst humanitarian emergency. Eritrea routinely violates A bitter full-scale war the temporary security quickly developed. The zone. In January 2008, violence generated considerable casualties and huge the u n secretary general warned that the u n mis- costs on both sides. An estimated 70,000 to 100,000 sion would have to withdraw soon unless Eritrea people were killed between 1998 and 2000, 1 mil- allowed fuel shipments to the peacekeeping force. lion were displaced, and a generation’s worth of Eritrea argued that the Boundary Commission’s vir- development opportunities was squandered. tual demarcation had brought an end to the border After a period of military stalemate and unpro- conflict and that the continued presence of the u n ductive negotiations, Ethiopia launched a major was “tantamount to occupation.” offensive in May 2000, breaking through Eritrean Despite these tensions, the stalemate and cease- defenses and forcing Eritrea to pull its troops back fire along the border remain stable. Asmara and to the positions they had held before May 1998. Addis Ababa each believe time is on its side and In December 2000 the parties signed the Algiers that there is no need to act immediately. These Agreement, which created a temporary security strategic calculations—not the u n mission—are zone along the border (to be patrolled by the likely to keep the border frozen. At present, Ethio- mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) as pia retains control of Badme, while the u n mission well as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission and the temporary security zone are on the Eri- (which would delimit and demarcate the border). trean side of the border. Ethiopia is comfortable In April 2002 the Boundary Commission ruled with this status quo and is unlikely to break the that the symbolically important town of Badme stalemate militarily. It believes the Isaias regime is was on the Eritrean side of the border. Ethiopian likely to collapse soon. In any case, a significant leaders strongly objected to the ruling and did Ethiopian intervention across the border would everything short of resuming hostilities to delay generate a severe international reaction. compliance. Eritrea, frustrated both by Ethiopia Eritrea, for its part, remains committed to and by what it considered international appease- the principle that the international community ment of Addis Ababa, placed restrictions on the should—and therefore in the end will—compel u n mission. This led the u n to withdraw its forces Ethiopia to abide by the final, binding Boundary from nearly half the sites where they had been Commission decision. Although Asmara engages in 158 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2008 brinkmanship, harasses the u n , and uses bellicose violent campaign against Ethiopia and its allies in rhetoric, it ultimately looks to the international Mogadishu. The transitional government has not community to implement the border decision. It is been able or willing to reach out to key constituen- nearly inconceivable in any event that Eritrea could cies, most notably the powerful Hawiye clan leaders force Ethiopian troops back from their current entrenched in Mogadishu, as well as many of the positions and hold territory for a significant period moderate leaders within the diverse Islamic Courts of time. And Asmara believes that the e p r d f regime movement. Moreover, the presence in Somalia of is on the verge of collapse. The possibility always troops from Ethiopia, the country’s historic enemy, remains that a skirmish or accidental incursion has provoked a violent, nationalist response. Today might spark a wider conflict. Even a small chance Addis Ababa seems stuck. Ethiopia has called for of a catastrophic (if unintended) war deserves sig- an force to replace it in Somalia but nificant international attention. It appears more only a token force has been deployed, with pros- likely, however, that the stalemate on the border pects for enlargement of that force seeming remote. will continue, while conflict escalates and spreads Violence in Mogadishu remains chronic, instability in Somalia and elsewhere in the region. has spread to the autonomous Puntland region in the northeast, and the u n classifies Somalia as the Ho r n o f p l e n t y o f t r o u b l e world’s worst humanitarian emergency. Conflict in the Horn of Africa erupted in Meanwhile, the of eastern Ethio- December 2006, as a dramatic Ethiopian military pia remains restive. It erupted into brutal conflict intervention in Somalia shook the entire region. in 2007, and intensified attacks by the o n l f and Ethiopian troops supported the Somali Transitional search-and-destroy missions by the Ethiopian Federal Government in its rapid and surprising military and allied militias displaced much of the advance against the Union of Islamic Courts—an region’s population. Ogaden has long been a dis- advance that succeeded in ousting from power the orderly frontier zone, where Addis Ababa’s control Islamists who had controlled Mogadishu since June has been sporadic and politics has been shaped by of 2006 and had received support from Eritrea. ties between Somalis in Ethiopia and the clans to In late 2006 Addis Ababa saw emanating from whom they are related in Somalia. (The o n l f was Somalia dangers linked to Eritrea and to internal part of Ethiopia’s initial transitional government in Ethiopian insurgent groups such as the o l f and 1991 but was soon displaced by rival Somali par- the o n l f . These regional and domestic adversaries ties with closer links to the e p r d f ; the o n l f then had increased their military presence in areas con- initiated a low-level insurgency.) trolled by the Islamic Courts. Key leaders within The conflict between the o n l f and Addis the Islamic Courts sought to provoke Ethiopia into Ababa escalated sharply last year, fueled by Ethio- war by making irredentist claims regarding the eth- pia’s intervention in Somalia and by alleged links nic Somali–inhabited Ogaden region. These threats between the o n l f and Eritrean agents operating were more rhetorical than real, since the Islamic in the areas of Somalia controlled by the Islamic Courts lacked the means to force Ethiopia to with- Courts. Most dramatically, the o n l f attacked a draw from Ogaden. Even so, Addis Ababa felt com- Chinese oil exploration site in the Ethiopian town pelled to act—less because of the Islamic Courts’ of Abole in April 2007, killing 74 civilians (includ- ideology and their ties to Al Qaeda than because ing 9 Chinese workers). The Ethiopian military of the safe haven that Ethiopia’s enemies found in responded with a brutal campaign of violence, col- Somalia, and the risk that the threats represented lective punishment, restrictions on food aid and by Eritrea, the o n l f , and the o l f would increase trade, and forced relocation of civilians into pro- over time. Ethiopia preemptively provided the mil- tected villages. By summer, a major humanitarian itary might needed to drive the Islamic Courts out emergency had developed in Ogaden. of Mogadishu, abolish the Ethiopian insurgents’ Addis Ababa believes it can no longer neglect safe haven, and bring the transitional government Ogaden or tolerate disorder there, and that harsh to power in the Somali capital. military control is imperative. The government Since then, the transitional government and its believes this for two reasons. First, it sees Ogadeni Ethiopian allies have struggled to establish order. insurgents as part of a regional network of threats Remnants of the Islamic Courts have reorganized in which domestic opponents such as the o n l f in Asmara as the Alliance for the Reliberation of and the o l f are linked with Eritrea and the Islamic Somalia, and militia fighters have engaged in a Courts. Firm military control of the region is Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises • 159 needed to prevent this set of enemies—Eritrea In recent years, u s relations with Ethiopia have in particular—from using Ogaden as a base from become very close while relations with Eritrea which to attack the regime. Second, interest in have degenerated. Washington views Addis Ababa international oil and gas exploration in the area as a “key strategic partner” in the Horn of Africa has risen despite the o n l f attack on the Chinese and in the war against terrorism. In late Novem- oil site. In order to protect contracts it has signed ber 2006, as conflict between the Islamic Courts for natural resource exploration, the central gov- and Ethiopia was on the verge of erupting, then- ernment must control the region. Indeed, the o n l f u s Ambassador to the u n John Bolton circulated has warned international oil firms against exploit- a draft resolution authorizing Ethiopia to send ing “our people’s natural resources.” troops into Somalia in support of the transitional Ethiopia’s brutal military campaign in Ogaden government. The final resolution authorized only has forced the o n l f underground. And although non-neighboring states to intervene, but the mes- war in Ogaden will not topple the e p r d f regime, sage from the United States was clear from the first conflict likely will be fueled for many years by draft: Washington had no objections to Ethiopia increased militancy and resentment against Addis intervening in Somalia. Ababa among the Ogadeni. This, taken in combi- In December 2006 Assistant Secretary of State nation with threats emanating from Mogadishu for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer ratcheted up the and Asmara, could cause the smoldering conflict rhetoric and characterized the Islamic Courts lead- in Ogaden to escalate rapidly. ership as “extremist to the core” and “controlled Regional pressures, which are intertwined with by Al Qaeda cell individuals.” Many saw Ethio- Ethiopia’s domestic political crisis, are growing pia’s subsequent intervention in Somalia as an and have the potential to example of the United States explode. Ethiopia’s interven- “subcontracting” its war on tion into Somalia displaced Ethiopia is embedded within a terror to a regional ally, but the Islamic Courts, but Addis Addis Ababa likely would Ababa has not found a way network of conflicts that links have acted with or without to build a stable ruling coali- Somalia, Ogaden, and Eritrea. Washington’s approval. tion in that country—nor The United States, how- has it found an exit strategy. ever, promoted the impres- The violence in Ogaden stems both from the inher- sion that it was working hand in hand with ent political challenges of this historically margin- Ethiopia. In January 2007 the u s military com- alized region and from the spillover of strife in mand received what it believed was “actionable Somalia. Taken together, the conflicts in the region intelligence” that several high-level Al Qaeda clearly fuel—and are in turn fueled by—growing operatives in Somalia were moving in a convoy authoritarianism within Ethiopia. toward the Kenyan border. u s warplanes attacked the convoy (though the intended targets were not Wa s h i n g t o n ’s d i l e m m a killed). Today some u s officials maintain that they Despite these escalating pressures on the e p r d f receive high-value intelligence from Ethiopia; regime, Washington has pursued a high-profile others argue that most of what Washington gets is partnership with Addis Ababa, one that entangles compromised because of Ethiopia’s own security the United States in Ethiopia’s regional conflicts agenda in the region. and in its growing authoritarianism. The United America’s strategic linkage and intelligence- States maintained close relations with both Ethi- sharing with Ethiopia, in any case, complicate opia and Eritrea in the mid-1990s. The Clinton engagement and cooperation with Eritrea, the administration saw Prime Minister Meles and o n l f , and supporters of the Islamic Courts (as President Isaias as exemplars of a new generation well as others in Somalia who object to Ethiopia’s of African leaders committed to political, social, presence in their country). The United States relies and economic development. More substantively, too much on a single source of local intelligence in both leaders shared the administration’s hostility the Horn of Africa, and this hampers Washington’s to the National Islamic Front regime in Sudan. ability to track developments in the region. The status of both men declined in Washington While the Bush administration has developed when war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea closer links to the regime in Addis Ababa, key in 1998. members of the u s Congress have advanced a very 160 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2008 different policy agenda. Effective lobbying by the most non-humanitarian economic ties with the Ethiopian diaspora contributed to the legislative country. Nonetheless, the designation would be progress, albeit not the enactment, of the Ethiopian deeply offensive to Asmara. Eritrea regards itself Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007. This as the first country to have engaged in war against legislation would have placed limits on u s secu- terrorism sponsored by Al Qaeda (it battled the rity assistance to Ethiopia, restricted visas for any Eritrean Islamic Jihad in the early 1990s). Ethiopians involved in killing demonstrators, and Washington feels it needs a close relationship authorized $20 million in spending over two years with Ethiopia to pursue its strategic interests in to provide assistance to political prisoners and the Horn of Africa. The relationship, however, human rights organizations and for programs to comes with costs. As with other pivotal states in strengthen the rule of law. Critics of the Ethiopian difficult regions that receive u s support for secu- regime, many of them mobilized by the violent rity reasons (Pakistan and Egypt are examples), aftermath of the 2005 elections, found effective Ethiopia makes an awkward bedfellow that often entry points into the u s policy making process pursues its own brutal agenda regardless of pres- by forming alliances with human rights advocacy sure from Washington. If the growing regional groups and by reaching out to members of Con- and internal pressures on Addis Ababa destabilize gress who represent large diaspora communities. the regime, an uncontrolled and potentially very The legislation seemed to be losing steam over violent transition is possible. Such disorder would the summer of 2007 as c u d leaders were released make pursuit of u s security interests in the region from prison, but rising concerns about human much more difficult. rights abuses in Ogaden then reenergized the While the United States has paid high-level bill’s supporters. The measure was passed by the attention to Sudan and to issues of counterter- House of Representatives in late 2007—much rorism in the Horn of Africa, policies toward the to the public annoyance of authorities in Addis Ethiopia-Eritrea border stalemate and toward Ababa and officials at the u s Department of State. authoritarianism within Ethiopia have been reac- However, the bill’s slim prospects in the Senate— tive, episodic, and largely unsuccessful. Washing- and the fact that, even if it became law, the White ton needs a new diplomatic strategy in the region, House could waive its provisions for national one that recognizes these growing risks, as well as security reasons—make the legislation more sym- the links among the border stalemate, fragile and bolic than substantive. authoritarian regimes, and escalating proxy clashes Washington is pressing Ethiopia on implemen- in Somalia. tation of the Algiers Agreement and on improv- ing human rights, while simultaneously asking Mo r e v i o l e n c e a h e a d ? for cooperation with America’s counterterrorism Ethiopia is the critical state in the Horn of Africa. agenda. In December 2007 Secretary of State Con- But it is also embedded within a network of con- doleezza Rice traveled to Addis Ababa and urged flicts that links Somalia, Ogaden, and Eritrea. Today, Meles to “take concrete steps to lessen tensions” regional pressures are increasing as the Algiers peace along the Eritrean border. She communicated process continues to teeter, as the u n mission is on the administration’s objections to the legislation the verge of withdrawing from the Ethiopia-Eritrea in Congress but noted that Ethiopia’s policies in border, and as Addis Ababa seems unable to end its Ogaden made it harder to manage these concerns. military engagement in Somalia. Within Ethiopia, Meanwhile, relations between Washington political liberties continue to be constricted by the and Asmara plummeted to new lows in 2007. aftermath of the dramatic 2005 election, as are pros- A state department official characterized Eritrea pects for meaningful electoral processes in future as a country that “openly abuses its population rounds of voting. In Ogaden, conflict has gener- and serves as a destabilizing force in the region.” ated a humanitarian catastrophe and hostility from In August, Assistant Secretary Frazer said that a generation of Ogadenis that will engender more Washington was “looking into” whether Eritrea violence in the long run. Ethiopia may be on a path should be added to the u s list of state sponsors that cannot be sustained. If these multiple sources of terrorism. This designation triggers economic of pressures converge and amplify each other, insta- sanctions; in Eritrea’s case it would be largely bility is likely. Even greater levels of violence and symbolic because Washington has already cut human suffering might be the result. ■