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Mchenryleemon1992.Pdf WHITEHEAD AND BRADLEY SUNY Series in Systematic Philosophy Roben Cummings Neville FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY ALFRED NoRTH WHITEHEAD WHITEHEAD AND BRADLEY A Comparative Analysis LEEMON B. MC HENRY State University ofNewYork Press Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1992 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y. 12246 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McHenry, Leemon B., 1956- Whitehead and Bradley : a comparative analysis I Leemon B. McHenry. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-0915-5 (alk. paper) : $44.50. - ISBN 0-7914-0916-3 (pbk.: alk. paper): $14.95 1. Whitehead, Alfred North, 1861-1947. 2. Bradley, F. H. (Francis Herbert), 1846-1924. 3. Metaphysics-History-20th century I. Title. B1674.W354M34 1992 91-12725 192-dc20 CIP To Joyce and Leemon CONTENTS Preface and Acknowledgments IX Chapter 1. Introduction 1 The Central Plan of This Essay 1 Idealism and Realism 3 Whitehead's Process Realism and Philosophical Method 5 Bradley's Absolute and the Skeptical Method 11 Chapter 2. The Metaphysics of Experience 21 Historical Perspective 21 Panpsychism 22 Bradley's Finite Centres of Experience 28 Whitehead's Actual Occasions 3 7 Chapter 3. The Analysis of Experience 47 Introduction 4 7 The Specious Present 49 Genetic Analysis and the Component Elements 58 Whitehead's Interpretation of Bradley 68 Chapter 4. Internal and External Relations 73 Bradley on Relation and Contradiction 74 Concrete Relatedness and Prehension 78 Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Relations 87 Extensive Relations and Abstraction 9 3 Chapter 5. Extension and Whole-Part Relations 103 Events versus Substance 103 Cosmological Outlook 111 Transmutation and the Theory of Society 115 Cosmic Epochs and the Absolute 123 Chapter 6. Time 131 Temporal Unity and Direction 131 The Eternalistic Theory of Time 137 Replies to Some Objections to Whitehead 144 Chapter 7. God and the Absolute 155 Universal Absorption 155 The Consequent Nature of God 159 Epilogue 169 Abbreviations 171 Notes 175 Bibliography 195 Index 205 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The present study attempts to examine the affinities and contrasts in the metaphysical systems of A. N. Whitehead and F. H. Brad­ ley. As a comparative analysis, however, the study does not at­ tempt to give equal attention to every aspect of both thinkers; rather, its primary concern is the influence of Bradley on Whitehead and the problems that bind them together under the genre of philosophical idealism. But aside from this historical concern, the book also attempts to work out solutions to metaphysical prob­ lems, especially those that occur where process philosophy and absolute idealism conflict. I generally defend Whitehead's view where conflict does arise, but I am not a follower of the Whiteheadian school that has formed in praise of his thought. Nevertheless, unlike the vast majority of analytic philosophers working in the field today, I do not think that total neglect is the proper approach to appreciating his genius. In my view, Whitehead and Bradley rank among the greatest thinkers in the We stern tradition alongside of Descartes, Kant, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hegel. This work was written in two stages. The most substantial portions were worked out in Edinburgh, Scotland, at the Univer­ sity of Edinburgh-the city and university in which Whitehead himself delivered his Gifford Lectures and which, on an earlier occasion, he referred to as "the capital of British metaphysics, haunted by the shade of Hume." It is no small debt that I owe the Faculty of Arts at the University of Edinburgh for generous support during this time. The second stage of radical revision and restructuring was undertaken in the odd moments stolen from teaching at Davidson College, Central Michigan University, and Wittenberg University. A Faculty Research Grant from Davidson College allowed me to return to Edinburgh and regain my enthu­ siasm for completing the book. ix X WHITEHEAD AND BRADLEY Va rious parts of previously published work are incorporated into this book. Parts of chapters 2, 3, and 5 were published as "Time, Relations and Dependence" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1983. A small section of chapter 1 is taken from "The Axiomatic Matrix of Whitehead's Process and Reality," which appeared in Process Studies in 1986. And an earlier ver­ sion of chapter 4 appears as "Bradley, James and Whitehead on Relations," published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1989. I wish to thank the editors of these journals for permission to republish these articles here. The 1920 photograph of Whitehead is reproduced here cour­ tesy of Mrs. T. North Whitehead. The portrait of Bradley is by R. Grenville Eves, and is reproduced here by permission of the War­ den and Fellows of Merton College, Oxford. My single most important obligation is to Timothy Sprigge for his invaluable criticism of this work in its early stages, which is not to say that he would be entirely satisfied with the result. Much of our discussion of the philosophical issues herein oc­ curred during frequent walks between the David Hume Tower and Edinburgh's West End, many amid gale winds blowing off the Firth of Forth. I owe thanks to two students of Whitehead, Dorothy Emmet and the late Victor Lowe. Charles Hartshorne must also be men­ tioned for faithful correspondence during the Edinburgh days. And in the final review process, I benefited from several critical evaluations provided by the press. The author of one of these is known to me: George R. Lucas, Jr. My thanks are also due to Jim McKenna for his acute eye in copyediting the manuscript. Over the last ten years my views have been undeniably shaped by a philosophic milieu that has included Ronald Burr, Paul Sharkey, Forrest Wood, Errol Bedford, Stanley Eveling, Lewis Ford, William Brenner, Alfred Mele, John Heil, Irwin Goldstein, Gary Fuller, Fred Adams, Don Reed, Bob Levy and Vis Klive. I wish here to express my gratitude to the above-mentioned for providing the context for various types of philosophic sparring as well as the opportunity to keep abreast with contemporary philosophy. Preface and Acknowledgments XI Renee, as always, has been most understanding and support­ ive during my preoccupation with this work. Finally, this book is dedicated to my parents . I ha ve enjoyed their unfailing support during the years that this work has been under way. CHAPTER 1 Introduction THE CENTRAL PLAN OF THIS ESSAY Alfred North Whitehead is widely recognized as having made profound contributions to the shape of thought in the twentieth century. As a professional mathematician trained at Cambridge, his work with Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, gained him a prominent place in the history of logic. His work in the philosophy of physics, particularly his critical evaluation of Einstein and his attempt to advance his own form of relativity theory, made him a central figure in the debate over the emerging scien­ tific hypotheses in the 1920s. And, once he emigrated to America and flourished as a professional philosopher at Harvard, the fruits of many years of philosophic contemplation resulted in a system of metaphysics that radically altered our ordinary thinking about ourselves and our world. His views on science, religion, educa­ tion, history, and civilization have captured the imagination and inspired numerous thinkers in their own specialized areas of learn­ ing. But for all this, Whitehead remains an enigma for most philosophers today and his work has little impact on the main­ stream of philosophical thought in the English-speaking world. By Whitehead's own understanding of the evolution of philo­ sophic trends, historical epochs immerse themselves in specula­ tive construction and are then pruned back by periods of intense analytic rigor and adherence to method. But once the methodolo­ gies exhaust themselves and the discussion of the central prob­ lems becomes fatigued, speculation again becomes crucial to nov­ elty and the advance of knowledge.1 During the period in which Whitehead himself produced his metaphysics, speculative con­ struction was flourishingin physics, but otiose in philosophy. The developments in logical positivism and linguistic analysis set the stage for orthodoxy in this century, and Whitehead's thought was left for a handful of his students or for those unswayed by the dominant trends. To day, however, the situation is much more 1 2 WHITEHEAD AND BRADLEY open to the problems Whitehead attempted to solve and to the subject of metaphysics generally, but still very few thinkers are prepared or willing to master his system. This situation is espe­ cially unfortunate since his philosophy offers profound insight into a number of contemporary problems in ontology, epistemol­ ogy, personal identity, and the philosophy of science. But in what follows it is not my purpose to defend Whitehead's general con­ ception of philosophy against contemporary modes of analysis. Rather I take the endeavor of the speculative philosopher to be an essential undertaking and concentrate my attention on one major influence on Whitehead, namely, nineteenth-century Ox­ ford philosopher, Francis Herbert Bradley. Although Whitehead is generally regarded as a realist, espe­ cially when viewed for his concerns to construct a foundation for twentieth-century physics, the metaphysics put forth in Process and Reality cannot be classified strictly as realist in orientation. On many epistemological issues, he retains his loyalty to the line of thought that reacted against neo-Hegelianism, but at the same time, Whitehead's adherence to the idea that experience is the fundamental basis of reality puts him squarely within the idealist tradition.
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