Appendix ELEMENTS for a FORMALISATION of the THEORY of NORMS DEVELOPED in THIS VOLUME

AppendixAPPENDIX 413 ELEMENTS FOR A FORMALISATION OF THE THEORY OF NORMS DEVELOPED IN THIS VOLUME

by Alberto Artosi, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, and Silvia Vida*

1. Preliminaries The aim of this appendix is to sketch a formalisation of some aspects of the theory of norms developed in this volume. In this regard, the appendix does not provide any new logical contribution: The purpose is simply to use some logical tools, standard in the literature, to reconstruct some concepts and definitions proposed, in particular, in Chapters 6 through 10. Let us first define our formal language. Here it suffices that it consist of the language of classical first-order logic with variables x, y, z … and constants a, b, d … to denote agents belonging to a finite set G of agents, the identity symbol, and the following intensional operators and supplementary connectives:

• the obligation operator ‘O’; this operator, as we shall see, will be indexed by agent variables and constants to express directed obligations (cf. Herrestad and Krogh 1995; 1996);

• the action operator ‘Doesx’, such that an expression like ‘Doesx A’ means that the agent x brings about that A (cf. Santos and Carmo 1996);

• the operators ‘Uttersx’ and ‘Procx’ to express agents’ generic actions of utterance and the speech act of institutional proclamation respectively (see Gelati, Governatori, Rotolo, and Sartor 2002a and 2002b; Sartor, Volume 5 of this Treatise, Chapter 23);

• the modal operators ‘Knowx’ and ‘Belx’ for the agent’s knowledge and beliefs respectively (cf. Meyer and van der Hoek 1995); • the binary connective ‘⇒’ to represent normative conditionality (cf. Prakken 1997; Nute 1997); • the binary connective ‘≡>’ to capture the notion of typicality or normal- ity (cf. Delgrande 1987); • the unary temporal operators ‘A’ and ‘E’, which read “for all possible courses of future events” and “for at least one possible course of future events,” respectively, and the binary temporal operator “until” ‘U’, such that

* Thanks are due to Guido Governatori for his comments on an earlier version of this appendix. 414 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT the expression ‘A U B’ means that A will be true until B is true (cf. Emerson and Halpern 1986; Schild 2000).

It is worth noting that we will not commit ourselves to adopting any specific logical characterisations of such notions: A number, and sometimes a plethora, of different axiomatisations are in fact available. The reader is thus recommended to consult at least the literature cited above for further details. It will suffice here to focus on some well-known properties that seem indis- putable and, above all, required for developing the formalisation of the theory of norms proposed in this volume. As is well known, a very minimal characterisation of the obligation operator is that it does not enjoy axiom T

O A → A (1)

Of course, if A is obligatory, this should not imply that A is true. On the contrary, the logic for the action operator ‘Does’ has to be characterised at least by the schema → Doesx A A (2) since such an operator is meant to represent successful actions. In addition, the logic for ‘Does’ as well as that for ‘O’ is normally closed under logical equivalence:

⏐= A ≡ B entails ⏐= X A ≡ X B (3)

where X stands for either O or Doesx. As understood in this volume, obligations, permissions, and prohibitions are interdefinable: ¬ ¬ P A =def O A (4) ¬ F A =def O A (5) Like ‘Does’, the operators ‘Utters’ and ‘Proc’ are action operators. An action of utterance is not in general successful. On the other hand, the notion of pro- claiming is used to cover all those acts by which a subject makes a statement expressing a certain proposition, and this statement has the function of making this proposition true. However, even ‘Proc’ is not necessarily successful:

Procx A is only an attempt to achieve A. Whether it will be successful or not, within a certain institution, linguistic context, or system, depends on whether the institution, the linguistic context, or the system contains (implicitly or ex- plicitly) a rule that guarantees its effectiveness. In addition, the logics for ‘Ut- ters’ and ‘Proc’ are closed under logical equivalence. APPENDIX 415

The main difference between knowledge and belief is often as follows: If the agent x knows that A, then A is true, whereas this does not apply for beliefs. In other words, only ‘Knowx’ enjoys the schema T. Intuitively, it may be said that knowledge implies belief:

→ Knowx A Belx A (6)

As regards normative conditionality, we have different options depending on the approach we want to adopt. For example, we can view ‘⇒’ as either a monotonic or a non-monotonic link. A great part of the recent literature fo- cuses in particular on the second alternative, since it is widely acknowledged that normative reasoning is basically defeasible (cf., e.g., Nute 1997; Prakken 1997). In general, conditional logics for modelling normative reasoning are characterised by different axiomatisations. Most of them do not adopt any explicit or unrestricted form of detachment of the consequent. Here a (re- stricted) form of detachment will be adopted. However, since no explicit reference is made in this volume to the notion of defeasibility (but see Treatise Volume 5)—and there is no requirement here for the essential use of other formal properties of ⇒—the logical behaviour of normative conditionality looks more like that of material implication. Now to the binary connective ‘≡>’. An expression like ‘A ≡> B’ means that, normally, B is true whenever A is true. This exemplifies a typicality- based notion of plausible consequence which is often characterised within the framework of default reasoning. Here, we are not required to provide any axiomatisation for this connective. The same applies to the temporal operators we have introduced above, for which it is sufficient to assume that

¬ ¬ E A =def A A (7)

In addition to that, in both cases it is sufficient to bear in mind the intuitive meaning of these operators. The interested reader may refer to the relevant literature we have previously cited.

2. The Definition of “Norm” According to the view expounded in this volume, the content of a norm can be expressed propositionally. In this regard, it may correspond to the description of one conditioning type of circumstance and one conditioned type of action; this last is qualified deontically as obligatory, permitted, or prohibited. In very abstract terms, a norm can thus be conceived of as a conditional structure stating that a given type of action ought to be performed if a certain type of circumstance occurs. In the present context, we shall confine our analysis 416 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT to the case in which the “ought” of the norm corresponds to the deontic operator ‘O’. Thus, a norm n could be trivially represented as follows:

A ⇒ OB (8) which is simply one of the usual representations of conditional obligation. However, a crucial point of this volume’s approach is that a norm exists qua norm if and only if at least one person believes it to be a norm (doxia): No type of action that no one believes to be objectively binding is a norm, and no norm can exist without belief; therefore, if something is to be a norm it must have at least one believer. Accordingly, the existence (definition) of a norm n as binding is strictly connected with the existence of a norm-believer b:

⇒ Belb (A OB) (9)

Trivially, the notion of adoxia (the nonexistence of a norm n in a subject b who is a nonbeliever) is rendered as follows:

¬ ⇒ Belb (A OB) (10) and, if applied to all agents in the group G, it corresponds to

∧ ¬ ⇒ b ∈G Belb (A OB) (11)

3. Duty-Holder (Deontia) and Right-Holder (Exousia). The Being-in-Force and Not-Being-in-Force of a Norm. Efficaciousness and Inefficaciousness of a Norm As a second step, we will show how to give an account of the concepts of deontia and exousia: The former corresponds to the fact that one or more subjects are actual duty-holders under a norm n; the latter is related to the fact that one or more subjects are actual right-holders under n (Section 6.4). While the notion of deontia can be easily defined via the usual obligation operator (indexed by the agents who bear such an obligation), the same does not apply to the case of exousia. As is well known, the logical representation of normative positions such as rights, duties, etc., is one of the most discussed issues in contemporary logic of norms.1 We will not enter here into a discussion of this problem. The interested reader is referred to Krogh 1997.

1 Since the seminal contributions of Hohfeld are some of the authors who have worked on this issue S. Kanger, L. Lindahl, D. Makinson, I. Pörn, A. Jones and M. Sergot. APPENDIX 417

Following Herrestad and Krogh’s (1995; 1996) approach (developed in particular to deal with the so-called directed obligations in contracts), the representation of normative relations between two subjects corresponding to the right/duty bilaterality requires

1. that the obligation operator be indexed by the subjects/agents who are the holders of such an obligation; 2. a distinction between two kinds of obligation: (a) a bearer-relativised ought-to-do obligation Od on the agent d (duty-holder) to bring about a certain state of affairs B with respect to another agent r (right-holder); (b) a counterparty-relativised ought-to-be statement relative to r that d makes it so that B holds with respect to r.

In the spirit of Kanger-Lindahl-Pörn’s tradition (see, in this Treatise, Sartor, vol. 5), this is the reason why a convincing account of such normative positions requires the introduction of the action operator ‘Does’ so that each subject involved in the right-duty relation also has the status of agent. When combined in a bilateral normative relation between two subjects d and r, deontia and exousia lead to the following formalisation:

⇒ ∧ ⇒ r (A Od Doesd B) (A O Doesd B) (12)

The first conjunct is an ought-to-do statement expressing that d has the obligation to perform B if A is given (deontia); the second conjunct corresponds to an ought-to-be statement saying that r requires d to perform B if the same set of conditions A occur (exousia). In addition, such expressions must be in- tegrated by introducing the belief operator ‘Bel’ (Section 6.2). Notice that this operator may be indexed by subjects other than those involved in the normative relation. Let us consider the following case:

⇒ ∧ ⇒ r Bela ((A Od Doesd B) (A O Doesd B)) (13)

Suppose there exists a subject a such that a = d and consider the conjunct on the left side. This case corresponds to the being-in-force of a norm: If an actual duty-holder d under a norm n (deontia) is a believer (doxia), then the norm n will be in force in d.2 In other words, this means that3

⇒ Beld (A Od Doesd B) (14)

2 Notice that the notions of adeontia and anexousia can be trivially obtained by negating the content of the corresponding obligations. 3 ∧ → ∧ In this perspective, it may be useful to also accept the schema Belx (A B) (Belx A Belx B). 418 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Notice that this intuition may also be applied to right-holders. We can have the case of an agent r who is a believer in a norm as a right-holder:

⇒ r Belr (A O Doesd B) (15) or a situation where both a duty-holder d and a right-holder r, involved in a given normative relation, are believers:

⇒ ∧ ⇒ r ∧ ⇒ ∧ Beld ((A Od Doesd B) (A O Doesd B)) Belr ((A Od Doesd B) ∧ ⇒ r (A O Doesd B)) (16) or, finally, a case where the right-holder is a believer and the ought-to-do obligation is believed in by a subject a who is not the actual duty-holder (or the other way around):

⇒ ∧ ⇒ r ∧ ⇒ ∧ Bela ((A Od Doesd B) (A O Doesd B)) Belr ((A Od Doesd B) ∧ ⇒ r (A O Doesd B)) (17) Notice that this formalism enables us to represent all the subjective positions described in Section 10.2.3. By way of an example, let us consider first the case ∧ of doxia, deontia, and exousia. This may correspond to the formula Belz ( z,d ∈G ⇒ ∧ ⇒ z (A Oz Doesz B) (C O Doesd D)). On the other hand, a case of adoxia, ¬ ∧ ⇒ ∧ deontia, and exousia can be represented as Belz ( z,d ∈G (A Oz Doesz B) ⇒ z ∧ ∧ ⇒ ∧ ⇒ z (C O Doesd D)) Bels ( z,d ∈G (A Oz Doesz B) (C O Doesd D)). The other cases may be trivially formalised according to the same policy. Let us give now some brief suggestions for representing the notions of efficaciousness and inefficaciousness of a norm (Section 6.6). Recall that nomia is a necessary condition for both cases. In particular, a norm n is efficacious when a duty-holder under n practises n because she believes in it. A convincing account of efficaciousness depends here on the possibility of formalising a notion of “mental causality,” since it is maintained that the behaviour of a duty-holder is caused by her normative belief n. This is a very hard task and we will not deal with it here. Let us just show how to represent something similar to the original idea. A norm n is the cause of the behaviour A which is the content of the obligation in n and is related to duty-holders’ usus agendi as a custom; this being so, it can be reasonable to say that A is the normal consequence of the fact that n is believed to be objectively binding by the duty-holders under n. If so, the notion of efficaciousness could be represented as follows: ∧ ⇒ ≡ (Knowx A Belx(A Ox Doesx B)) > (Doesx B) (18) However, this analysis may be seen to be too weak. This holds in particular if the meaning of ‘≡>’ is intended as a strict relation of relevance between the antecedent and the consequent. As is argued, for example, in Delgrande and APPENDIX 419

Pelletier 1998, the notion of relevance can hardly be defined by using a particular conditional (or other dyadic operators; for more details, see ibid.). Thus, a different option is to provide a meta-theoretical account of relevance. Accordingly, given a knowledge base Th, the proposition X is said to be relevant with respect to a conditional Y ≡> Z iff

Th ⏐= Y ≡> Z (19) and

Th ⏐= X ∧ Y ≡> ¬ Z (20)

With good approximation, this approach can be adapted to the definition of efficaciousness. If d’s normative belief is a determinant and a necessary reason for d’s complying with the deontic content of the norm, then we may assume that ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= Knowd A > Doesd B (21) but ∧ ⇒ ≡ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > Doesd B (22) Accordingly, if a custom is interpreted as the consistent and uniform performance within a group of the same type of action, a type set forth in a norm, it may be said to correspond to ∧ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= d ∈G (Knowd A > Doesd B) (23) but ∧ ∧ ⇒ ≡ Th ⏐= d ∈G ((Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > Doesd B) (24) However, a custom is rightly viewed as a law of inertia with regard to the uniform and persistent performance of a certain type of action so long as the acting subject’s motives do not change. This means that “the acting person performs the type of action that he or she usually performs whenever a certain type of circumstance gets instantiated, unless new motives intervene to modify the course of his or her usual behaviour.” If so, given ∧ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= d ∈G (Knowd A > A (Doesd B)) (25) or, alternatively,4

4 In the first case, the occurrence of A has the consequence that, for all possible courses of events, the agent d does not perform a certain model of action. In the second case, such non- performance holds at least for one possible course of future events. 420 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

∧ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= d ∈G (Knowd A > E (Doesd B)) (26) we also have

∧ ∧ ⇒ ≡ Th ⏐= d ∈G ((Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > A ((Doesd B)U ¬ ∨¬ ⇒ ((Knowd A (Beld (A Od Doesd B))))) (27)

Formula (27) means, in conjunction with (25) or (26), that d’s normative belief with regard to a certain type of action will be the motive for performing this action until d has such a normative belief and condition A is true. Notice that, in all these cases the definition of inefficaciousness follows trivially. In addition, it is evident that any agent d characterised by (25)–(26) ⇒ and (27), may be said to be an “abider” with respect to the norm ‘Beld (A

Od Doesd B)’. “Deviants,” on the other hand, though norm-believers, are subjects who do not practise the model of action included in the norm. In this regard, we may have different formalisations. In a first case, given (25)–(26), we can state the falsehood of the conditional in (27), which may amount to saying that there exists at least one future course of events in which the agent d does not perform the type of action:

∧ ⇒ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld(A Od Doesd B)) > E ((Doesd B)U ¬ ∨¬ ⇒ ((Knowd A (Beld(A Od Doesd B)))) (28)

In a different perspective, we can simply state that the normative belief is in general irrelevant, namely, that

∧ ⇒ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > A (Doesd B) (29)

Finally, let us focus on the notions of “white sepulchre,” “conformist” and “Jesuit” (Section 6.6). In the first case, the agent practises a certain type of action, and believes in the bindingness of this type of action, but the motive of this practice is not this belief and amounts to another reason X. This idea can be expressed as follows:5

≡ ¬ Th ⏐= Knowd A > A (Doesd B) (30) ∧ ⇒ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > A (Doesd B) (31)

5 A different formalisation can be provided in which we state the grounds that lead one to distinguish between formulas (25) and (26). For the sake of simplicity, we will analyse only one case. APPENDIX 421 but

∧ ⇒ ≡ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > E ((Doesd B)UX) (32)

Conformism, on the other hand, may be expressed as follows:

≡ Th ⏐= Knowd A > A (Doesd B) (33) and

∧¬ ⇒ ≡ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > A (Doesd B) (34)

Jesuits are nonbelievers who pretend to be believers in practising a certain norm. So, given

∧¬ ⇒ ≡ ¬ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B)) > A (Doesd B) (35) we have

∧¬ ⇒ ∧ ⇒ Th ⏐= (Knowd A Beld (A Od Doesd B) Uttersd Beld (A Od Doesd B)) ≡ > A (Doesd B) (36)

That an agent pretends to be a believer may be rendered by saying that such an agent declares to be one, and this public attitude, which conflicts with the agent’s real belief, is decisive with regard to her practicing B.

4. How Norms Proliferate in Human Minds Let us discuss how to formalise the process of proliferation of norms as described in this volume (Chapter 7 and Section 9.6). To illustrate this process, and to capture at least partially its dynamic character, we will focus on norms such as the following:

∧ ⇒ ∨¬ d ∈G Belb (A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A)) (37)

Formula (37) says that agent b believes that, under a certain condition A, and for all possible courses of events, it will be obligatory for any agent d to do B until this is performed by d or until A holds. This norm is an example of a norm of conduct whose bindingness is conditioned by the performance of the type of action set forth in the norm itself. In this volume, concrete norms are generated by means of the standard mechanism of subsumption. Let us see a norm like this at work with an exam- 422 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT ple. Notice that, in addition to what we stated in Section 1, we have to assume the following property:

⇒ → ⇒ Belx (A B) (Belx A Belx B) (38)

Suppose we have a norm such as

∧ ∧ ⇒ d,r ∈G Belb ((well-off (d) needy (r)) A (Od Doesd aided (r)U ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬ (Doesd aided (r)) well-off (d) needy (r))) (39)

A specific agent b believes that well-off people ought to aid needy people. Suppose that b knows that d is well-off and r is needy:

∧ Knowb (well-off (d) needy (r)) (40)

On the basis of (6), we will have

∧ Bela (well-off (d) needy (r)) (41) from which, thanks to (38) and detachment for ‘⇒’, we may infer

∨ ¬ ∨ ¬ Belb A (Od Doesd aided (r) U (Doesd aided (r) well-off (d) needy (r))) (42) namely, the agent b believes that it is obligatory for d to aid r. Of course, as soon as d aids r—or as soon as r is no longer needy, or d is no longer well- off—such an obligation, according to (39), will no longer hold.6 Now to the proliferation of norms via competence norms. In the spirit of this volume (Sections 7.3 and 9.6), a competence norm believed by an agent b may be represented as follows:

∧ ⇒ ∨ ¬ ⇒ Belb ( l,d ∈G (Procl (A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A)) ⇒ ⇒ ∨ ¬ (A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A))))) (43)

Here, proclamation is meant to capture l’s act of issuing a certain directive. On the basis of (43) and according to the analysis developed in this volume, l is empowered or has the authority to issue directives. Since this last is the content of agent b’s belief, if we have

6 If we had make this fully explicit we would have to express within the language state transitions and time instants. For these details, see Schild 2000. APPENDIX 423

∧ ⇒ ∨ ¬ Knowb ( l,d ∈G Procl (A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A)))) (44) we will also have

∧ ⇒ ∨ ¬ Belb ( l,d ∈G Procl (A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A)))) (45) which implies

∧ ⇒ ∨ ¬ Belb ( d ∈G A A (Od Doesd B U (Doesd B A))) (46)

As expected, (46) is nothing but a norm in the personal normative system of b. BIBLIOGRAPHYBIBLIOGRAPHY 425

Compiled by Antonino Rotolo

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Abidance (efficaciousness of a norm). See Autonomy 242–6, 372, 374, 386 Norms and behaviour. Behaviour. See Norms and behaviour. Acceptance 87, 96, 100, 160, 162–3, 166, 169–70, 176–8, 181, 254–6. Cf. Norms as Behaviourism 400–1, 404 beliefs. Belief. See Norms as beliefs. Agent. See Micro-macro. Cf. Person (person- Binding force. See Norms as beliefs. ality). Biological instinct. See Nature. Aisa. See Fate. Brain. See Neurosciences. American legal realism. See Legal realism. Bureaucracy. See Social control. Amor fati. See Fate. Byzantine jurists. See Jurists. Analytical emasculation (from norms to pro- Canonists. See Jurists. positions). See Analytical Philosophy. Capacity (competence). See Types and to- Analytical jurisprudence. See Legal positiv- kens. ism. Catholodoxia (universalisability of norms). Analytical paradigm. See Analytical philoso- See Norms as beliefs, and also Social con- phy. trol. Character structure. See Micro-macro. Analytical philosophy 87, 187–90, 390–2, Charisma. See Interference in the motives of 394, 397–8, 400, 402, 404. See also Para- behaviour. digm. Civil law. See Law. Analytical emasculation (from norms to propositions) 187, 189–90, 389 Cognitive science XIX, XXI, XXII, 16, 89, Analytical paradigm 389–406 97, 169, 302, 316, 318–20, 322–3, 360, 370–4, 381–2, 384, 395, 397, 400, 404–6, Anomia. See Norms as beliefs. 427. Cf. Neurosciences. Anthropology 64, 256–8, 269–94, 357–64 Commands. See Language, and also Norms. Anticipations 190. Cf. Language, Types and Common law. See Law. tokens. Communism. See Totalitarianism. Competence (capacity). See Types and to- Anxiety 249–60 kens. Consciousness of death XIX, XXXIII, Competence norms. See Norms, and also 4, 30, 37, 72, 83, 96, 103–4, 210, 247– Norms as beliefs. 62, 264–6, 286, 360–1, 370 Conative effects. See Voluntarism. Conceptual jurisprudence. See Jurists. Apophantic sentences. See Language. Conditionality of the content of a norm. See Norms. Artificial Intelligence (AI) XVI, XXVIII, Confirming others. See Significant others. 261, 264, 357, 371–4, 379–84, 394, 406, Conformism. See Norms and behaviour. 430, 433 Conscience. See Generalised other. Multi-agent systems (MAS) XXVI, 297, Consciousness. See Anxiety, Neurosciences. 356, 374, 381, 395, 436 Consciousness of death. See Anxiety. Constitution (constitutional norms). See Authority. See Interference in the motives of Norms. behaviour. Constitutive rules. See Types and tokens. 440 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Construction of social reality. See Culture. Dualism XXIII, 1, 13, 22, 48, 72, 87–8, Content of norms. See Norms. 249, 270, 334, 340–1, 344–5, 348–9, 365–6, 402 Convention XXXI, 47, 57, 71–3, 175–6, 178, 180, 183–5, 246, 290, 357–8, 363, Duty-holders. See Norms as beliefs (Deon- 372, 380, 407, 433 tia), and also Normative subjective positions, Reality that is (Referents of a Cosmic order. See Nature. norm). Cultural products. See Culture. Effectiveness XXVII, XXX, 5, 15, 25, 33, Culture XXI, XXVI, XXVIII, 7, 17, 23, 67, 53, 83, 85, 87, 96, 105–6, 109–13, 123–4, 85, 88–90, 104, 106–7, 127, 188, 200–1, 126, 133, 137, 140–2, 145, 156–8, 166, 211, 232–3, 242–3, 249, 257, 259, 269– 168–9, 171, 173, 175, 197, 199, 201–2, 70, 272–8, 281, 284–5, 289, 293, 333, 204–5, 213, 218, 222, 236, 238, 242–3, 338, 358–61, 363–4, 366, 369, 371–2, 261, 264–6, 283–4, 393, 414. Cf. Law, 377, 379, 385, 388, 390, 397, 408–9, 433. Norms and behaviour. See also Nature. Construction of social reality 357, 365, Efficaciousness of a norm (abidance, being a 367, 436 nomic practising duty-holder). See Cultural products 406–11 Norms and behaviour. Nature and culture 355, 362, 365, 407 Eidos. See Ratio. Social construction of reality 95, 357, Epigones. See Paradigm. 365, 367–8, 426 Eunomia 270, 283, 293 Custom. See Norms and behaviour, and also Law. Exousia (being believed to be a right- Customary law. See Law, and also Norms holder). See Norms as beliefs. and behaviour. Facts, acts, and transactions. See Operative Declarations of will. See Operative facts. facts. Deontia (being believed to be a duty-hol- Fanaticism (enthusiasm). See Norms as be- der). See Norms as beliefs. liefs. Deontic sentences. See Language. Fascism. See Totalitarianism. Deontological versus teleological. See Norms as beliefs. Fate XXVI, 126, 197, 232, 248–67, 355, Derivative norms. See Norms as beliefs. 367 Descriptions. See Language. Aisa 249–50, 262–4 Deviance. See Norms and behaviour, and Amor fati 254–5 also Effectiveness. Heimarmene 249–50, 260 Moira 249–50, 259–67, 292 Dike¯ 11, 70–2, 76, 185, 219–20, 235, 249– 50, 255, 259, 269–75, 279–96, 307, 333, Forgery of a norm. See Matrix (authentic- 355, 428, 430 ity). Forma. See Ratio. Dikedoxia. See Norms as beliefs, and also Formalisation of the theory of norms as be- Social control. liefs. See Norms as beliefs. Directives. See Language. Foundations of law. See Law. Dogmas. See Norms as beliefs, and also So- cial control. Generalised other XXVI, 127, 135, 198, Domination. See Law. 277, 356–7, 368, 374, 384, 389 Doxia (being a believer, existence of a norm, Conscience 5, 57–8, 65, 73, 202, 240, internal point of view). See Norms as be- 248, 255, 279, 306, 371, 383, 387–8, liefs, and also Acceptance. 407 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 441

German legal positivism. See Legal positiv- Interference in the motives of behaviour ism. XXIII, 129, 197. See also Language, To- Glossators. See Jurists. talitarianism. Authority (modifies, in concurrence with God 53–5, 61–2, 65, 68, 72–8, 81, 96, 111, language, the internalised reality that 119, 123–6, 157, 215–6, 218, 222, 250, ought to be) XXII, 8, 46, 50–1, 81, 257, 259, 263–4, 284, 286, 299, 305–6, 126–7, 133, 140–1, 165, 167, 189, 199, 315, 318–9, 325–30, 338, 371. Cf. 202–7, 234–5, 239–46, 271, 275, 282, Voluntarism. 290, 306, 313–4, 377, 387, 404, 422 Influence (affects, in concurrence with Good XXVII, 6, 30, 60, 74, 77–8, 94, 97, language, the motives of behaviour) 116, 119–20, 123, 133, 137, 150, 165, 42, 85, 88, 96, 144, 157, 158, 165, 189, 179, 188, 202–3, 213, 215, 232, 239, 242, 198–200, 202–5, 213–4, 225, 235–41, 250, 261, 265, 270, 294, 296, 304, 306– 243, 256, 335, 381, 390–3, 436 11, 334, 337, 362, 393–5, 397, 409, 419, Power (overwhelms, in concurrence with 425–6, 431, 435. Cf. Motives of human language, the motives of behaviour) behaviour. XXV, 4, 6, 8, 42, 49–50, 53–5, 65, 70– 1, 74–8, 87–8, 99, 107, 132, 139, 140– Great-grandmother of positive human law. 2, 156–9, 161, 165, 167–9, 172, 180, See Matrix (authenticity). 183–4, 188–9, 196, 199, 200–5, 207, 209, 222–3, 234–7, 239–43, 255, 281, Group XXIX, 4, 51, 88, 98, 109, 111, 115, 291, 296–7, 301–2, 304–6, 308–10, 135–7, 142–3, 158–60, 166, 170, 176–80, 316, 318–20, 322–3, 329, 377, 409, 199, 201, 205, 214–5, 218–9, 223–4, 429 231–2, 236–9, 243, 254, 282, 355–6, 369, Suggestion and Charisma (bypass, in 377, 389, 404, 416, 419 concurrence with language, the mo- Habit. See Norms and behaviour. tives of behaviour) 88, 133–4, 198– Heimarmene¯. See Fate. 201, 241 Heresy. See Norms as beliefs, and also Social Internalisation XXIII, XXIV, XXV, control. XXVII, 28, 70, 90, 95–6, 100, 117–20, Heterodoxia. See Norms as beliefs, and also 127, 134–5, 137–8, 142, 144, 151, 157, Social control. 160–6, 169–71, 173, 177–8, 180–3, 198– Heteronomy. See Law. 9, 202, 209, 211, 213, 277, 299, 336, 355–7, 359–60, 368, 371–3, 378–80, 383, Hypocrisy 112, 166, 172. Cf. Norms and be- 385, 387–94, 397–401, 403–6 haviour. Is. See Reality that is. Illative effects. See Language. Is-events. See Reality that is, and also Opera- Indices. See Language, and also Anticipa- tive facts, Sources of law. tions. Is-outcomes of Is-events (of Is-activities). Individual, or individualised, norm. See See Reality that is. Normative subjective positions. Jesuits, behaviour of. See Norms and behav- Influence. See Interference in the motives of iour. behaviour. Judge-made law. See Law, and also Social Institutions. See Micro-macro. control. Integration between norms and validly en- Judges (courts). See Social control. Cf. Real- acted directives. See Norms as beliefs, ity that ought to be (What is subjectively and also Interference in the motives of be- right). haviour, Normative production (normative causality), Types and tokens. Jurists XV, XXVIII, XXIX, 3–5, 7, 16, 23, Intellectus. See Ratio. 25, 28, 47–8, 87, 102–3, 109, 117, 125, Interests. See Motives of human behaviour 134, 150, 156, 205, 238–9, 249, 333, 337, (causae agendi). 408, 411 442 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Byzantine jurists 338 69–70, 83, 87, 96, 111, 124, 126, 132– Canonists 82 7, 139, 141, 165, 173, 175, 199, 203, Conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjuri- 205, 244–5, 274, 290, 309, 318, 393, sprudenz) 173, 338 396 Glossators 53, 409 Deontic sentences XVI, 10, 11, 13–5, 18– Legal doctrine XIX, XXI, XXII, 9, 22, 25, 97, 100, 129, 194, 241, 266, XXXIII, 2, 22, 24, 26–7, 32, 36–7, 39, 416, 419, 427, 429–31, 434, 436–7 45–6, 64, 85, 119, 141, 144, 152, 173, Descriptions 52, 87, 91, 96, 101–3, 105, 204, 211, 214, 223, 236–7, 266, 274, 202, 241, 358, 362–3, 365, 393, 395, 280, 303, 341, 391–2, 434 415, 436 Legal historicism (Historische Rechts- Directives 13, 18, 20, 88, 104–5, 123, schule) 407 125–7, 133, 145–52, 155, 161–3, 169, Pandectism (Pandektenwissenschaft) 171, 188–99, 201–6, 236–9, 241–2, 173, 410 244–6, 277, 281, 284, 296, 388, 422, Roman jurists 410 435 Scientia juris XIX, XXI, XXII, Illative effects 151, 190–5, 197 XXXIII, 141, 204, 223, 236–7, 266 Indices XXXIII, 190–8, 215, 273, 279, 287, 290–1, 337, 364 Jus XVI, XVII, XIX, XXI, XXII, XXIV, Language and motives of behaviour XXVIII, XXXIII, 4, 7, 11, 48, 51, 53, 58, 187–207 60, 64, 68–9, 75–8, 80–1, 98, 121, 138, Language that affects the motives of be- 141, 153–4, 185, 204, 216, 221, 223, haviour (influence) 202–5 236–7, 242, 260, 266, 282, 290, 295–331, Language that bypasses the motives of 333, 338, 355, 408–9, 429, 432–3, 436–7. behaviour (suggestion, charisma) See also Justitia. 198–201 Language that modifies the internalised Justice XVI, 60, 71–2, 76, 79–81, 85, 136, reality that ought to be (authority) 143–4, 210, 219–22, 236, 260, 269, 271– 205–7 4, 278, 281, 283–7, 289–91, 296–322, Language that overwhelms the motives 334, 391, 429–30, 432–3, 435 of behaviour (power) 201–2 Neustic 14–5, 19, 194 Justitia XXXIII, 79, 81, 221, 284, 296–7, Parole 368 299–314, 318, 320–1, 355. See also Jus. Phrastic 14–5, 19, 194 Justitia legalis (the justice of norms) Proposition XXV, 187–9, 194, 241, 389, 303, 306–11, 313 414, 419 Voluntas (justitia est constans et per- Propositional content 100, 188–9, 194, petua voluntas jus suum cuique tri- 196 buens) 260, 301–3, 305, 307, 315–6 Representations 13–4, 96, 105, 137–8, 189, 194, 237, 271, 365, 367, 369, Justitia legalis (the justice of norms). See 416–7, 429 Justitia. Semantic effects 194–7 Koran. See Matrix (authenticity). Symbols 95, 190–8, 256, 259, 275–6, Lag. See Law. 281, 289, 360, 362, 364, 375–8, 385, 413, 427 Language XIX, XXIII, XXXII, 5, 9, 43, 46, 68, 71, 80, 82, 106–7, 117, 121–2, 166, Law XVI, XVII, XXI, XXIV, XXVII, 170, 183, 233, 243, 272, 278, 280, 333, XVIII, XXIX, XXXIII, 2, 8, 14, 16, 20– 339, 343, 361, 366, 390–2, 398, 403, 1, 26–33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 48, 50–5, 57– 409–10, 433. See also Interference in the 65, 69, 71, 73–5, 77–8, 80–2, 91–2, 98, motives of behaviour. 102, 115, 117, 119–21, 125, 129, 132, Apophantic sentences 13–5, 17–8, 22, 134–5, 141–3, 154, 157–8, 160, 166, 26–7, 33, 135, 191, 193–5, 241 170, 174, 176–9, 181–2, 184–5, 190, Commands 3, 49–51, 53–4, 59–60, 63, 199–200, 202–4, 207, 215–9, 227, 230, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 443

261, 270–1, 275, 281–2, 287–9, 295–6, Legal historicism. See Jurists. 304, 306–11, 313, 315, 318, 330–1, 335– 6, 340, 342, 344–51, 360–2, 364, 370, Legal positivism 48, 58, 132, 143, 174, 182, 377, 381, 390–4, 396–7, 406, 410–1, 187, 393, 407 419, 429–34, 436–7. See also Culture, Analytical jurisprudence 5, 87, 173, Effectiveness, Interference in the motives 199, 334 of behaviour, Language, Reality that is German legal positivism XXIV, 4–5, 8, (Is-outcomes of Is-activities), Social con- 47–55, 85, 87, 211, 338 trol, What is right. Civil law XIX, XXIII, XXX, 3–7, 9, 11, Legal realism XXV, 172 15, 17, 22, 24–5, 36–7, 39, 41, 43, 45– American legal realism 133, 142 7, 85–6, 106–7, 109, 123, 138, 149, Scandinavian legal realism 5, 88, 131–44 151–2, 155, 161, 173, 188, 210, 238, 266, 269, 274, 303, 333, 337–8, 341, Legal relations. See Normative subjective po- 409, 427 sitions. Common law XX, 5–7, 15, 36, 43, 86, 173, 183, 333–4, 338–9, 341, 343, 428 Lex XXIV, 45, 54, 63, 70, 81, 121, 265, Customary law XXII, 44–5, 280, 358, 282, 296, 303–5, 307–8, 312, 317, 319– 407–8 20, 323. See also Norms. Domination 76, 139, 235–6, 240–3, 246, Lex aeterna 299, 315, 318, 321–2, 330–1 383 Lex humana 59–61, 322 Foundations of law XIX, XXII, XXIII, Lex naturalis 59–61, 299, 306, 321–2 49, 67, 70, 72, 233, 265 Materialism XXVI, XXVII, 366, 373, 400– Heteronomy 242–6, 257, 372 3, 406 Judge-made law XXII, 236 Lag 5 Matrix (authenticity) 4, 57–82, 198, 216, Law as cultural reality 357–62, 406–11 261, 284, 306, 379, 386, 407. See also Law in books 168, 232–3, 235–7 Norms. Law in force (an ambiguous intertwining Forgery of a norm XXIV, 59–61, 318 of normativeness and organised po- Great-grandmother of positive human wer) XXV, 88, 93, 110, 140, 144, 156, law 69 164, 180, 198, 209–46, 382, 408–9 Matrix of normativeness XXIV, 57–9, Legal directives 147–9, 150, 161, 163, 237 61–5, 69–80, 270, 295 No law without norms XXV, 23, 131– Matrix of the Koran 66–8 42, 175, 180 Mother of all battles (Umm al-Hurub or Norms are not enough XXV, 139, 187, Umm al-Maarik) 66–7 189–207 Mother of the Book (Umm al-Kita¯b) Organised power, or force XXV, 76, 88, 66–8 107, 133, 165, 168, 172, 180, 201, Orthogonal norms and straight rules 61 206, 209–14, 218–22, 232–43, 250, Presupposed basic norm 48, 63, 65, 69– 252–3, 263, 385, 409 70, 121–2, 133, 139, 142, 152, 156–7, Statutory law XXII, 41, 44–6, 72, 159, 162, 173, 334 162–3, 168, 171, 183, 319–21, 407–8 Rule of recognition 139–42, 144, 152, Texts of law XV, 46, 87, 127, 145, 147– 157–75, 177, 180–1, 183–4, 218 52, 155, 161–3, 169, 188–9, 194, 205– 7, 237–9, 242, 246 Metanoia (normative revolution). See Norms as beliefs. Law as cultural reality. See Law. Metonymic validity of legal directives and Law in books. See Law, and also Types and texts of law. See Types and tokens, and tokens. also Law. Law in force. See Law. Legal directives. See Law. Micro-macro 366, 373–91. See also Culture. Legal doctrine. See Jurists. Agent XXII, XXV, XXVI, 21–2, 26, 444 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

135, 198, 227–30, 233, 298, 300, 302, 163, 165–6, 189, 196–7, 199, 202–3, 325, 356–7, 359, 368–74, 376, 380–5, 206, 210, 212, 214, 218, 225–33, 236, 395, 413, 415, 417–22, 429, 436 244, 246, 259, 277, 280, 282, 298, Character structure 356–7, 374–6, 378– 301–2, 304, 308–9, 311, 321–3, 326, 80, 385 339, 344, 347–8, 352, 370, 372, 382, Institutions XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, 389, 395, 402, 408 XXVIII, 81, 159, 241, 260, 279, 341, Norms 94–6 355, 364, 367, 375–9, 381, 384, 414, Values XX, XXII, 37, 63, 87–8, 92–6, 426, 429 109, 112–3, 129, 150, 157, 189, 197, Social structure XV, 159, 166, 241, 356– 199, 201–3, 206, 218, 226–32, 273, 7, 374–81, 384–5, 429 279, 296, 360, 367, 376–7, 386–7, Socialisation 95, 117, 119–20, 124, 198, 403, 410, 432 240, 357, 368–71, 383 Multi-agent systems (MAS). See Artificial Moira. See Fate. intelligence (AI).

Monism XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, 1, 83, 87, Myth XXVI, 200, 247, 249–60, 265–6, 270, 365–6, 401–3, 406 399, 433 Mop-up work. See Paradigm. Natural-law theories XXIV, 4–5, 8, 47–55, 59, 62–3, 65, 69, 72, 85, 87, 120–1, 138, Morality XVII, XX, XXII, XXIII, XXV, 6, 187, 244, 334, 394. Cf. Nature. 46, 49–50, 54, 58, 67, 71, 74–5, 77, 88, 129, 131, 133–4, 136, 156, 174–85, 202, 213, 222, 243, 256–8, 279–82, 284, 292– Nature XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXVIII, 2–5, 3, 296–9, 301–2, 307, 312, 316–7, 321, 8, 47, 50–1, 53–5, 57–61, 63, 65, 69–81, 339, 346, 367, 369, 383, 387–8, 390, 83, 85, 87, 90, 94, 96, 99–100, 120–1, 394–7, 407, 410, 429–30, 432, 434. See 129, 131, 134, 138, 153, 160, 169–70, also Norms as beliefs. 174, 177, 182, 185, 187, 191, 195, 210, 216, 218, 233, 244, 246, 256, 260, 265, Mother of all battles (Umm al-Hurub or 269–70, 273, 277–8, 284, 292, 299, 303, Umm al-Maarik). See Matrix (authentic- 307, 317–8, 325, 334, 338, 356, 360, ity). 363–4, 366–7, 373, 394, 398, 401–2, 406, Mother of the Book (Umm al-Kita¯b). See 408–11, 427–30, 432–3. See also Culture, Matrix (authenticity). Matrix (authenticity), Reality that ought to be, What is right. Motives of human behaviour (causae agendi) Nature and culture 355, 362, 365, 407 XXIII, XXV, XXX, 5, 33, 83, 85–7, 91, Nature as biological instinct 62, 73, 75–7 97, 99, 103, 110, 126, 135, 139, 152, 177– Nature as divine and human reason 52, 9, 187–207, 211, 213, 314, 359, 361–2, 62, 73, 77–8, 316, 319, 323, 396 369, 383–5, 396, 401, 404, 419–20. See Nature as the cosmic order 62, 73, 78–80 also Culture, Norms and behaviour, Nature as the will of God 62, 72–5 Norms as beliefs, Person (personality). State of nature 48–51 Interests XV, 58, 85, 88, 92–6, 98, 100, 109, 111–3, 115, 137, 157, 164, 189, Nazism. See Totalitarianism. 197, 199, 201–3, 206, 218, 223, 226– Needs. See Motives of human behaviour 31, 234, 236–9, 243, 256, 270, 273, (causae agendi). 285, 289, 338, 343, 344–5, 347, 356, 360, 363, 380, 405 Neurosciences 382, 388–9, 397 Needs XXI, XXIV, XXVIII, XXXII, 9, Brain XXIV, XXVII, 13, 23, 67, 88, 21, 27–8, 38–40, 49, 60, 88–90, 92–6, 90–1, 98, 115–6, 118–20, 127–8, 134–5, 102, 109, 112–3, 115, 117–9, 121, 138, 141, 151, 155–7, 159–61, 164, 167, 125, 133, 138, 144, 149, 153, 157, 171, 189–92, 197– 200, 206, 211, 242, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 445

245, 249, 257, 259, 273, 275–7, 357–9, 140, 143, 150, 154, 174, 176, 179, 361–2, 364–6, 369, 372–3, 379–80, 181, 210–1, 217, 228, 232, 234, 240, 383, 390, 392–4, 396, 400–6, 408, 427, 246, 273–5, 288–90, 295, 301, 337–8, 436 341–3, 349, 351, 410, 416, 425, 428, Consciousness 22, 24, 27, 37, 55, 59, 89, 435 92, 94, 97, 100, 134–6, 138, 172, 181, 191, 198, 212–3, 217, 249, 251–2, Normative will. See Voluntarism. 254, 256, 276, 301, 305, 312, 316, Normatively obligatory, permitted, or for- 322, 336, 359, 365–7, 369, 379–80, bidden types of action. See Types and to- 383, 387, 401–7, 409–10, 427–8, 436 kens. Obsessive-compulsive disorders 383, Normativeness XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, 396 XXVII, 33, 47–8, 53, 57–65, 69–80, 85, 87–8, 133, 139, 142, 156, 158, 160, 162, Neustic. See Language. 165, 168, 172–85, 202, 209–46, 259–60, No law without norms. See Law. 270, 284, 292, 295–6, 333, 341, 355–7, Nomia (being a believing duty-holder, be- 380–1, 390–1, 393, 395–6, 401. See also ing-in-force of a norm). See Norms as be- Matrix (authenticity), Morality, Norms as liefs. beliefs. Nonconformism. See Norms and behaviour. Normative language. See Norms. Normativism XXIV, XXV, 11, 47–8, 51, 54– 5, 57, 87, 131–2, 134, 139, 144, 153, 156, Normative production (normative causality), 172–3, 176, 178, 180, 182, 187–8, 209–14, the chain of 22–34, 154. See also Inter- 240, 337–8, 342–4, 356, 374, 380 ference in the motives of behaviour, Law, Norms as beliefs, Operative facts, Reality Norms XVI, XVII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, that ought to be (Ought-effects), Sources XXVI, XXVII, XXX, 2–6, 13–4, 16–23, of law, Types and tokens (Validity as a 25–42, 44–9, 52–3, 57–60, 63–7, 72–9, pineal gland). 83, 86–8, 92, 94–5, 97–100, 105–13, Sovereign normative will 47–55 131–3, 136–8, 144, 153–4, 156–73, 175, Typicality (abstractness and generality) 178, 180–1, 187–90, 197–200, 202–3, of law XXIII, 15–7, 22, 29, 32, 35, 209, 214, 216, 219, 222–33, 235–6, 238– 86, 148, 233, 350–3 9, 241, 243, 249–51, 257–60, 262–4, 267, 270, 277, 279–92, 296, 303–13, 315, Normative social control. See Social control. 317–23, 330, 333–5, 339, 341–7, 349–55, 357, 360, 362, 368–70, 372, 374, 377, Normative subjective positions. See also 379–83, 387–9, 391–2, 396, 401–5, 408, Norms as beliefs, Reality that ought to be 413–4, 416–20, 423, 432, 434, 436–7. See (What is subjectively right). also Lex, Matrix (authenticity), Norma- Individual, or individualised, norm 70, tive production (normative causality), 128, 349–53 Norms as beliefs, Reality that ought to be Legal relations 4, 11, 40, 42, 86, 410 (What is objectively right). Obligations (or duties) 4–6, 8–11, 22–3, Competence norms 50–1, 69–70, 103– 25, 27, 29, 35, 37, 39–42, 50, 60–1, 4, 116–7, 122–8, 139–41, 145–6, 148– 69, 86–8, 91, 101–3, 105–14, 118–21, 52, 155, 158–9, 161–2, 165, 167, 169, 124, 129, 132, 134–40, 145–7, 150–1, 171–2, 189, 205–7, 217, 242, 245–6, 154, 158–61, 163–8, 171–2, 176–9, 422 181, 183–4, 203–6, 215, 218–23, Conditionality of the content of a norm 225–32, 240, 242, 244, 258, 266, 280, (conditioning type of circumstance 288, 296, 312, 334–7, 339, 341–3, and conditioned obligatory, permit- 346–52, 396, 413–4, 416–8, 422, 426– ted, or forbidden type of action) 7– 7, 430 11, 39, 61–2, 90, 101–5, 115, 123, Rights 4–6, 8–11, 22–3, 29, 35, 37, 39– 167–8, 204, 215, 220, 266, 280, 287, 42, 49–50, 54, 77, 81, 86, 121, 132, 415 446 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Constitution (constitutional norms) 15, 114, 149, 154, 192, 199, 221, 238–9, 247, 54, 70, 90, 132, 139–42, 159, 165–6, 256, 277, 281, 283, 292, 346, 360–2, 364, 183–5, 218, 237, 337, 359, 367, 409– 368–71, 377, 380, 384–5, 388, 393, 395, 10, 425, 427–9, 435 397, 401, 404, 410, 413–23, 426. See also Normative language 134–5, 183 Culture, Fate, Interference in the motives Norms of conduct 51, 69–70, 116–28, of behaviour, Motives of human behaviour 145–7, 158–9, 162, 172, 206, 210–1, (causae agendi), Normative production 217, 244–5, 265–6, 421 (normative causality), Norms and behav- Norms versus commands 133–7 iour, Person (personality), Reality that ought to be. Norms and behaviour XXVII, 10–1, 17, Anomia (being a nonbelieving duty- 24–5, 40, 88–9, 120, 147, 170, 188, 269, holder, not being-in-force of a norm) 292, 306–7, 372, 398, 400. See also 108–10, 112–3, 229, 231, 241, 282, Norms as beliefs. 416–21 Conformism (being an anomic practising Binding force 3, 5–7, 20, 48–50, 53–5, duty-holder) 112–3, 115, 165, 175, 57–9, 61–2, 65, 69–70, 73, 75, 77–8, 226, 238, 405, 420–1 87, 97–9, 101–5, 111, 115–6, 120–4, Custom XXII, 41–2, 44–5, 47, 58, 71, 126–7, 132, 134, 138, 141, 151, 155– 79, 81, 92–3, 97–8, 110, 112–3, 138, 61, 164, 167–73, 175, 181–4, 205, 175, 183, 200, 203, 256, 258, 279–81, 215, 244–5, 259, 280, 296, 303–5, 283–4, 286, 288–9, 320–1, 364, 418–9 309, 318, 370, 372, 396, 408, 416, 418 Deviance (inefficaciousness of a norm, be- Catholodoxia (universalisability of ing a nomic non-practising duty-hol- norms) 135–6, 165, 214–8, 225 der) 94, 109–13, 138, 164, 199, 206, Deontia (being believed to be a duty- 218–9, 226–7, 241–2, 416, 418, 420 holder) 8, 11, 86, 101–3, 105–14, Efficaciousness of a norm (abidance, be- 118–20, 124, 134, 136, 138–40, 145– ing a nomic practising duty-holder) 7, 151, 164, 171, 203, 206, 215, 218– 33, 92, 109–13, 124, 138, 154, 164, 20, 222–32, 242, 244, 258, 312, 350, 201, 399, 418, 420 352, 416–8 Habit 71, 83, 90–2, 96, 98, 110–3, 137– Deontological versus teleological 72, 8, 173, 301, 303–5, 312–3, 316, 406 87, 203–4, 296, 382, 396 Jesuits, behaviour of 109–12, 172, 239– Derivative norms 115–22, 124, 126–8, 40, 420–1 150–2, 159, 161–4, 167, 169, 171, Nonconformism (being an anomic non- 205–6, 242, 244–6 practising duty-holder) 112–3, 164, Dikedoxia 136–7, 164, 214–20, 222, 219, 241–2 225–6, 265–6 Pharisees, behaviour of 112, 258 Dogmas 204, 214–8, 399, 435 Practice XXXII, 4, 15, 26, 32, 41, 45, Doxia (being a believer, existence of a 59, 63–4, 71, 90–2, 98, 104–6, 109– norm, internal point of view) 93– 15, 123, 125, 132, 134, 138–9, 141–2, 101, 103–4, 108–13, 115–9, 121, 124, 145–6, 158, 162–3, 165–6, 171, 173, 126–8, 134–40, 150–2, 155–6, 159, 175–8, 181–3, 194, 197–8, 202–6, 161–4, 166–9, 171–2, 181, 189, 204– 210, 214, 218–9, 226–33, 236, 238, 6, 209, 211, 214–20, 222–33, 236, 244–5, 259, 266, 272, 277, 279, 320, 240, 242, 244–5, 257–8, 280, 282, 361, 371, 392, 403, 418, 420 349, 369–70, 383, 398, 400, 402, 405, Whited sepulchres, behaviour of 109– 416–8, 420–2 12, 166, 172, 239–40 Exousia (being believed to be a right- holder) 8, 11, 86, 101–2, 105–8, Norms are not enough. See Law. 118–9, 145, 223–32, 258, 295, 312, 350, 352, 416–8 Norms as beliefs XXII, XXIII, XXIV, Fanaticism (enthusiasm) 222, 240, 396 XXIX, XXX, 9–10, 13–5, 17, 19, 25–30, Formalisation of the theory of norms as 33, 36, 39, 41, 45, 63, 66, 83, 88, 90, 97– beliefs 413-23 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 447

Heresy 164–5, 214–8, 222, 269, 271–2 (birth, modification, or extinction of Heterodoxia 164–5, 214–8, 225 norms). See Reality that ought to be, and Integration between norms and validly also Sources of law. enacted directives 205–7 Ought-effects in what is subjectively right Metanoia (normative revolution) 368, (birth, modification, or extinction of nor- 370–1 mative subjective positions). See Reality Nomia (being a believing duty-holder, that ought to be, and also Normative sub- being-in-force of a norm) 108–11, jective positions. 124, 134, 138–40, 156, 164, 171, 203– Pandectism. See Jurists. 4, 206, 209, 226–7, 242, 244, 280, 355, 418 Paradigm XX, 156, 245, 281, 334, 389–91, Orthodoxia 165, 214–8, 222, 225 397, 399–400, 406. See also Analytical Paradoxia 164–5, 214–8 philosophy. Parent norms 118–9, 127–8, 155, 159, 217 Epigones 199, 398 Primitive norms 119–20, 122, 126–7, Mop-up work 398 152, 155, 159, 198, 206, 209, 280, 369–70 Paradoxia. See Norms as beliefs, and also So- Proliferation by subsumption and infer- cial control. ence 23, 115–28, 150–2, 155, 157, Parent norms. See Norms as beliefs. 159, 161, 164–5, 169, 171, 206, 217, Parole. See Language. 244–5, 421–3 Proliferation from competence norms Person (personality) XV, XXV, XXIX, 123–8 XXX, 6–9, 13, 21, 26, 30, 37, 40, 45, 49, Proliferation from norms of conduct 57, 71, 74, 88–95, 97–102, 104–6, 108– 117–23 11, 113, 115–8, 120, 125, 127, 132–3, Systems, dynamic and static 117–23 135–6, 140, 143, 145–8, 151, 154, 161–2, 166–7, 189, 191, 193–4, 196, 198–9, 202, Norms of conduct. See Norms, and also 205, 210, 212–3, 219–21, 232, 241–3, Norms as beliefs. 245–6, 253, 260–1, 264, 266, 269, 271, Norms versus commands. See Norms. 277, 285–8, 292, 295, 297–8, 305, 308, Obligations (or duties). See Normative sub- 311–2, 335, 352, 355, 357–61, 363, 366, jective positions. 368–70, 375–81, 383–9, 396–7, 399, 403, Obsessive-compulsive disorders. See Neuro- 416, 419. Cf. Culture. sciences. Officials. See Social control. Pharisees, behaviour of. See Norms and behaviour. Operative facts XXIV. Phrastic. See Language. Declarations of will 24, 35–42, 44, 47, Power. See Interference in the motives of be- 49–51, 69–70, 119, 154 haviour, and also Social control. Facts, acts, and transactions 24, 30, 35– Practice. See Norms and behaviour, and also 42, 47, 49–51, 53–55, 69–70, 119, Effectiveness. 242–4, 246, 435 Presupposed basic norm. See Matrix (au- Promises 17, 48–51, 53, 69, 121, 128, thenticity). 154, 201, 242–6, 257 Primitive norms. See Norms as beliefs. Proliferation by subsumption and inference. Organised power, or force. See Law, and See Norms as beliefs, and also Normative also Interference in the motives of behav- production (normative causality). iour, Social control. Proliferation from competence norms. See Orthodoxia. See Norms as beliefs, and also Norms as beliefs, and also Normative pro- Social control. duction (normative causality). Orthogonal norms. See Matrix (authenticity). Proliferation from norms of conduct. See Ought. See Reality that ought to be. Norms as beliefs, and also Normative pro- Ought-effects in what is objectively right duction (normative causality). 448 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Promises. See Operative facts. XXIII, XXVII, 10–1, 25–32, 40, 44, Proposition. See Language. 60, 63, 71, 74, 93, 104–6, 111, 135, Propositional content. See Language. 147–8, 160, 175, 182–5, 193, 227, Prudence. See Reason. 239, 241, 259, 264–6, 275, 292–4, 385

Psyche XXVII, 2, 5, 16, 67–8, 87, 96, 98, Reality that ought to be XIX, XXIV, XXVI, 125, 134–5, 138, 143, 149, 156–7, 160, 3–5, 13, 32, 34, 53, 58, 69–70, 73, 75–6, 190, 206, 209, 211, 213–5, 239, 241, 247, 83, 117, 126–8, 131, 150, 152–3, 156, 249–50, 253, 255–6, 261, 272, 276, 283, 161, 173, 187, 198, 202, 205, 209, 216–7, 286, 297, 320–9, 334, 355–6, 360, 365–6, 245, 249–67, 270, 277, 280, 306, 355–6, 370, 373–82, 387–90, 392–4, 397, 399– 366, 368–9, 372, 384, 410. See also Nor- 406, 415, 418, 427–9, 433, 436 mative subjective positions, Norms, What is right. Ratio XVI, XVII, XXVIII, 60–1, 81, 121, Ought-effects in what is objectively right 296–9, 303–5, 307, 315–31, 433, 436. See (birth, modification, or extinction of also Types and tokens. norms) 24, 32–47, 51, 64, 149, 151 Eidos 16, 26, 272 Ought-effects in what is subjectively Forma 16, 306, 322–3, 325–7 right (birth, modification, or extinc- Intellectus 302, 316–8, 323, 326 tion of normative subjective posi- Ratio as type 295–331, 355 tions) 24, 30, 35, 37–41, 47, 106–7, Species 15–7, 82, 177, 182, 190, 201, 258 256, 308–11, 314, 319–21, 326–7, What is objectively right (the top layer of 357, 363–4, 427 the reality that ought to be: norms and their content) XXIII, 5–11, 22– 4, 28–9, 33, 35, 39–48, 50–1, 54, 57, Ratio as type. See Ratio. 59–62, 64, 67, 74, 77–8, 86, 97, 101– 5, 115–6, 132, 134–5, 149, 151, 155, Rational choice principle XXIV, 52, 74, 77, 219–20, 222, 233, 235, 241, 255, 269, 266, 372, 380, 382, 384, 394–5 271, 279–95, 312, 333–4, 337, 340–4, 347–53, 409 Reality that is 3–8, 13, 22, 24, 33, 37, 39, What is subjectively right (the bottom 41–2, 45, 48, 51, 53, 65, 69, 85–6, 88, layer of the reality that ought to be: 107, 116, 118–23, 151, 154–5, 233, 235, normative subjective positions) XX, 251, 253, 258, 260, 280, 341, 343, 350–3, XXIII, 3–11, 22–4, 28–30, 33, 35–43, 366–7. See also Norms and behaviour, 47–8, 50, 60–1, 63, 85–6, 88, 101–3, Operative facts, Sources of law, Types and 105–14, 118–20, 123–4, 129, 132, tokens. 134–40, 142, 145–8, 151, 154, 160, Is-events that cause Ought-effects in 164, 171, 176, 178–9, 185, 200, what is objectively right (sources of 203–4, 206, 212, 215, 218–23, 225– law, right tokens) 35, 41–7 33, 235, 242–4, 258, 266, 269, 279– Is-events that cause Ought-effects in 96, 301, 304, 312, 324, 333–7, 339, what is subjectively right (operative 341–4, 347–53, 377, 396, 404, 416–8, facts, right tokens, wrong tokens) 35– 427 9, 47 Is-outcomes of Is-events (of Is-activities) Reason XVI, XXIV, XXVII, XXVIII, 46, 149, 163 XXXII, 6, 10–1, 14, 17, 25–7, 33, 38, 43– Referents of a norm (actual states of af- 4, 50–2, 59–62, 71, 73, 77–8, 81, 89, 91– fairs or events) 9, 31, 105–8, 232, 3, 95, 111, 121, 125–6, 131, 137, 142–3, 349 149, 151, 159, 166, 170, 175–8, 181, 185, Right tokens (valid and invalid) 28–9, 213, 220, 229–31, 235, 241, 246, 249, 35–6, 38, 40, 71, 74, 76, 106, 220–1, 276, 278, 298–9, 302–4, 308, 315, 325, 275, 281, 283, 290, 292–4, 305 329–30, 341, 358, 362, 369, 373, 378, Wrong tokens (valid and invalid) 380, 395–8, 400, 408–9, 417, 419–20, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 449

427, 430, 432, 435. See also Nature, Ra- Judges (courts) XXII, 58, 61, 70, 81, 93, tio. 141–4, 162, 166, 169, 171–2, 175, Prudence 97, 180, 210, 264, 293, 296–7, 181, 183–4, 187, 205, 210, 217, 219, 305, 312–4, 316–7, 319–23, 328, 341– 223, 230, 232–41, 271, 274, 282–3, 9 291, 312–4, 324, 351, 387, 392, 408 Synderesis 284, 296, 316–8, 323 Normative social control on believers 214–8, 225 Reductionism XXVI, XXVII, 11, 87, 142, Normative social control on duty-holders 173, 199, 337, 341–5, 349–52, 356, 359, 218, 225 366, 400–3 Officials 67, 100, 115, 142, 144, 148, 157, 161, 165–7, 169, 171–3, 175, Referents of a norm (actual states of affairs 178, 181, 183–4, 210–2, 214–5, 219– or events). See Reality that is, and also 20, 236, 238, 392 Norms as beliefs, Types and tokens. Social structure. See Micro-macro. Regula 62–3, 121, 303–4, 313, 315, 317–8, Socialisation. See Micro-macro. 320–1, 323 Sources of law XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, Representations. See Language. XXIV, XXX, 24, 29, 35–55, 57–9, 62–5, Right-holders. See Norms as beliefs (Exou- 119, 151, 166, 232, 238, 393. See also Re- sia), and also Normative subjective posi- ality that is (Is-events), Reality that ought tions, Reality that is (Referents of a to be (Ought-effects). norm). Sources of law as Ought-effects in what Right tokens (valid and invalid). See Reality is objectively right in the reality that that is, and also Types and tokens. ought to be 43 Rights. See Normative subjective positions, Sources of law as valid Is-events 35, 41, and also Reality that ought to be. 43, 47 Role XXV, XXX, 24, 43, 47, 72, 88, 94, Sovereign normative will. See Normative pro- 115, 131–2, 144, 157, 172, 176–7, 188, duction (normative causality) and also 198, 205, 209–10, 213, 235, 239, 256, Voluntarism. 264, 266, 272, 276, 292, 296, 299, 343, Species. See Ratio. 355, 362, 366, 370, 372, 374–9, 381, State of nature. See Nature. 384–5, 387–9, 392, 395, 401, 403 Statutory law. See Law. Suggestion. See Interference in the motives Roman jurists. See Jurists. of behaviour. Rule of recognition. See Matrix (authentic- Symbols. See Language. ity). Synderesis. See Reason. Scandinavian legal realism. See Legal real- Systems, dynamic and static. See Norms as ism. beliefs. Scientia juris. See Jurists. Texts of law. See Law. Semantic effects. See Language.

Significant others 165, 202–4, 214–5, 357, Themis 249–50, 270–1, 282–3, 289–90 384, 387, 389. See also Generalised other. Confirming others XXIII, XXV, XXVI, Tokens. See Types and tokens. 247, 355–6, 374, 386 Totalitarianism 200, 383. See also Interfer- Social construction of reality. See Culture. ence in the motives of behaviour (Sugges- tion and charisma). Social control 5, 110, 136–7, 201–2, 213, 221, Communism 202, 371 385. See also Law, Norms as beliefs. Fascism 44, 371 Bureaucracy XXVIII, 205, 236, 241, 246 Nazism 180, 202, 395 450 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Type of action. See Types and tokens. 220, 226–7, 233, 235, 239, 241–2, Type of circumstance. See Types and tokens. 244–6, 259, 262, 266, 274, 280, 309, Types. See Types and tokens. 318–9, 343, 352–3, 362, 366, 392

Types and tokens XXXIII, 10, 13–22, 105– Typicality (abstractness and generality) of 8, 129, 138, 166–72, 225, 272, 295–6, law. See Normative production (normative 299, 305, 307, 310–1, 315, 320–3, 326– causality) and also Law, Types and tokens. 31, 355, 365, 385, 414. See also Ratio. Universalisation. See Norms as beliefs Competence (capacity) 21–2, 24, 42, (Catholodoxia). 50–1, 69–70, 103–4, 113–4, 116–7, Validity. See Types and tokens. 122–8, 139–41, 145–52, 154–5, 158– Values. See Motives of human behaviour 9, 161–2, 165–7, 169, 171–2, 184, (causae agendi). 189, 191–4, 205–7, 210, 217, 239, 242, 245–6, 249, 260, 278, 314, 357, Voluntarism (will-theories) XXIV, 26, 48–9, 369, 371, 374, 378, 422, 436 51–3, 55, 57, 74-5, 125, 131–3, 173, 187. Metonymic validity of legal directives See also Legal positivism. and texts of law 147–9 Conative effects XXV, 135–8, 189–97, Normatively obligatory, permitted, or 201, 204–6 forbidden types of action 9, 11, 13– Normative will 47, 50, 75 5, 17, 19, 26, 28–30, 33, 39, 61–3, 86, Will of God 62, 72–4 97–8, 101–3, 115, 145, 147, 281, 283, 303 Voluntas. See Justitia. Tokens XXIII, 2, 13–33, 35–41, 44–5, What is objectively right. See Reality that 47–8, 65, 86–7, 89, 91–2, 94, 97–9, ought to be and also Norms, What is 101, 103–7, 115–28, 131, 136–7, 145– right. 55, 163, 167, 169, 171, 187, 190–3, 197, 206, 215–7, 220–1, 235, 241, What is right XIX, XXIII, XXVI, XXIX, 257, 279–80, 286, 324, 352–3, 358–9, 6–7, 11, 43, 57–61, 64, 71, 94, 98, 107, 362–4, 366, 369, 405, 419, 421 134–7, 140–1, 143, 200, 204–5, 211, Type of action 16, 69, 86, 89–94, 96–9, 219–22, 242, 259–60, 270–353, 355, 373, 101–6, 115–16, 120–7, 145–7, 151, 388, 417–8, 435. See also Dike¯, Jus, Real- 171, 197, 202–6, 214–5, 217–20, 222, ity that ought to be. 226–31, 245, 266, 280–1, 283, 287, What is right by law 59, 70, 72–3, 76, 405, 415–6, 419–21 269, 406–11 Type of circumstance XVI, 16, 21, 40, What is right by nature XXIV, 4–5, 8, 69, 86, 89–94, 96–9, 101–7, 115–28, 47–55, 58–9, 62–3, 65, 69–70, 72–8, 145–52, 154–5, 161–2, 167, 169, 171, 80–1, 85, 87, 120–1, 138, 187, 244, 202–6, 217–20, 226–7, 239, 244, 251, 269–70, 307, 334, 338, 394, 406–8, 262–4, 266, 280–1, 283, 287–8, 325, 411, 428 352–3, 356, 359, 363, 371–5, 378–9, 381–2, 384, 395, 404–5, 413, 415–7, What is right by law. See What is right. 419, 426, 436 What is right by nature. See What is right. Types are constitutive, rules are regula- What is subjectively right. See Reality that tive 13, 16–22, 33, 147, 151, 167, ought to be and also Normative subjective 169, 362–3, 366 positions, Norms, What is right. Validity as a pineal gland 13, 24, 35, 47, 86 Whited sepulchres, behaviour of. See Norms Validity as a token’s congruence with a and behaviour. type 13–17, 19–44, 46–7, 50–1, 59, Will of God. See Voluntarism and also Na- 61, 63–5, 69–71, 83, 86–7, 91–4, 96– ture. 9, 101–7, 115–28, 132–7, 140–1, 144– Wrong tokens (valid and invalid). See Real- 73, 181, 183, 189, 199, 205–6, 216–8, ity that is and also Types and tokens. INDEXINDEX OF OF NAMES NAMES 451

Aarnio, A. 434 Ayer, A. J. 391 Abbagnano, N. 435 Azara, A. 433 Abbott, T. K. 432 Abelard, P. (Petrus Abaelardus) 81–2, Bacon, F. 373, 426 110–1, 425 Baldus de Ubaldis 16 Abraham 123–6 Bally, C. 436 Accursius 4 Banchich, T. M. 75 Acheron 265 Bankowski, Z. 435 Achilles 263–4, 288, 290, 426 Barberis, M. 174 Adam 250 Bartolus of Sassoferrato 5 Aegisthus 265 Battaglia, F. 9, 426 Aeneas 263–4 Bausani, A. 68, 432 Aeschylus 265, 272 Bekker, I. 425 Agamemnon 288, 290 Bell, J. XX Aland, K. 431 Beltramo, M. 431 Alecto 265 Belvedere, A. 187 Alexander, J. C. 356, 359, 425 Bench-Capon, T. J. M. 429 Alexy, R. 223, 337, 425, 435 Bennett, M. R. 404, 426 Alice 116–7, 426 Bentham, J. 5, 87, 173 Anderson, A. B. 432 Benveniste, É. 270–1, 295, 426 Antigone 71–3, 79, 261, 436 Berger, P. L. 365, 367, 369, 381, 426 Antilochus 291 Bergler, S. (Stephanus Berglerus Transilva- Antinous 293 nus) 261–3, 265, 282, 290–2, 426 Antiphon 70 Bergman, I. 255, 426 Apollo 263–4 Berolzheimer, F. 52, 426 Aquinas, T. (St. Thomas Aquinas) XXIV, Bertolini, M. 433–4 XXVI, XXXIII, 11, 16, 59–61, 63, 66, Beseler, G. 5 70, 76–7, 100, 121, 185, 221–2, 284, Betti, E. 5 295–333, 355, 362, 425 Binder, J. 5 Arangio-Ruiz, V. 435 Binmore, K. 382 Arberry, A. J. 67–8, 432 Biondi Khan, C.-A. XIX Ardigò, R. 407, 425 Black, M. 431 Aristotle 16, 71–2, 100, 185, 284, 297, 301, Blau, P. M. 359 304–5, 312, 319, 425 Blumer, H. 381 Artosi, A. XIV, XV, XXIX, XXX, 13, 266, Bobbio, N. XXI, XXIX, 144, 187, 426, 413, 426 434 Astraea 270 Boethius (Anicius Manlius Severinus Boe- Athene (Athena) 264, 292 thius) 16, 328, 426 Atlas 48 Bonazzi, T. 371, 426 Atreus 265, 290 Boström, C. J. 335 Atropos 261 Boudon, R. 359 Augustine (St. Augustine) XXIV, 59, 76, Broad, C. D. 129, 131–2, 134, 136–7, 140, 100, 299, 306, 318, 326, 330, 426 145, 426, 429–30 Austin, J. 5, 87, 134, 142, 173, 175, 199, Broersen, J. 356, 426 334 Brooks, J. L. 120, 426 Austin, J. L. 17, 391–2, 426 Brown, M. A. 429–30, 436 452 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Buddha (Siddha¯rtha Gautama) 259 Crick, F. 403, 427 Bulloch, P. A. 430 Croce, B. 59, 427 Croesus 257 Caesar (Caius Julius Caesar) 13 Cronos (Kronos) 263 Calboli Montefusco, L. 428 Cross, R. XX Calcidius 73, 78–81, 426 Callicles 70, 76 Dante (Dante Alighieri) 259 Calypso 262 Dardanus 263 Cantarella, E. 275, 289, 426 Daskalopulu, A. 429 Carcaterra, G. 187 Dastani, M. 356, 426 Carmo, J. 413, 430, 436 Davidson, D. 435 Carnap, R. 391 De Capitani, F. 426 Carnelutti, F. 87, 426 De Franchis, F. 6, 427 Carroll, L. (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) De Mauro, T. 436 117, 426 Deacon, T. W. 190, 364, 403, 406, 427 Cassano, G. B. 436 Del Vecchio, G. 57–8, 61, 428 Castelfranchi, C. XXVI, 356, 371, 373–4, Delgrande, J. P. 413, 418, 427–8 377–8, 380–4, 388, 395, 405, 427 Dennett, D. C. 400 Catania, A. 187 Dicey, A. V. 183–4, 428 Celano, B. 174 Diciotti, E. 174 Celsus (Publius Iuventius Celsus) 91 Diels, H. A. 428 Cevenini, C. XXIX Dike 270, 430 Chalmers, D. J. 401, 427 Dimakis, P. D. 426 Chiassoni, P. 174 Diogenes Laërtius 190, 428 Chisholm, R. M. XI, XII, XV, 219, 262–7, Don Álvaro 259, 436 426, 427 Drant, T. 338, 428 Churchland, P. S. 393, 427 Dummett, M. 435 Churchland, P. M. 393, 427 Dutton, M. 435 Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero) XXIV, 58– Dworkin, R. M. XX, XXV, XXIX, 7, 131, 61, 64, 68, 77, 295, 427 139, 149, 173–82, 393, 405, 428 Clarke, A. C. 258, 427 Clotho 261 Cole, G. D. H. 435 Edelman, G. M. 362, 364–5, 403, 406, 428 Cole, M. 381 Einsenmann, C. 432 Cole, T. 272, 430 Eirene 270 Coleman, J. 142, 174, 427 Electra 432 Coleman, J. S. 359 Elwes, R. H. M. 77, 436 Colli, G. 434 Emerson, E. A. 414, 428 Collins, R. 359 Emmy von N. 198 Colombo, S. 425, 428, 431 Endicott, T. A. O. 174 Conte, A. G. 18, 187, 427 Engels, F. XXIII Conte, R. XXVI, 356, 371, 373–4, 377–8, Engisch, K. 24, 428 380–4, 388, 395, 405, 427 Engle, G. XX Cook, W. W. 430–1 Erinyes (see also Eumenides, Furies) 220, Cooley, C. H. 356, 374, 427 264–5, 270 Cooper, J. M. 425, 435 Errera, A. XXX, 53 Corbin, A. L. 142–3, 430–1 Eula, E. 433 Corcoran, J. 437 Eumaeus 293 Costa, G. XXIX Eumenides (see also Erinyes, Furies) 265 Cotta, S. 87, 427 Eunomia 270 Craig, E. 435 Euripides 432 Cratylus 71, 435 Evelyn-White, H. G. 430 Creon 72 Evita (Eva Duarte de Perón) 200 INDEX OF NAMES 453

Facchini, F. 259, 363, 428 Grotius (Hugo, or Huigh, or Hugeianus De Fairclough, H. R. 431 Groot) XXIV, 48–9, 51, 53, 57, 66, 69– Faralli, C. XXVIII, 5, 392, 428 70, 77–8, 153–4, 245, 334, 429 Fassò, G. XXI, 52–3, 75, 78, 80, 82, 338, Guarino, A. 53, 429 428 Guastini, R. 24, 87, 174, 187–8, 429 Feigl, H. 391 Ferrajoli, L. 187 Haakonssen, K. XXIX Figulus (Publius Nigidius Figulus) 71 Hacker, P. M. S. 404, 426 Finnis, J. M. 296, 428 Hades 264–5 Fisher, W. W. 142, 428 Haferkamp, H. 359 Fornero, G. 435 Hägerström, A. A. T. X, XXV, XXVI, 88, Forrester, I. S. 429 129, 131–44, 160, 165, 170, 172, 175, Fortunatianus (Consultus Fortunatianus) 178, 181, 199, 209, 211, 215, 218, 220–1, 80, 428 335, 380, 388, 392–3, 401, 403, 426, Franco, E. XXIX 428–30, 434 Freese, J. H. 425 Halpern, J. Y. 414, 428 Freud, S. 198, 355, 374, 428 Hare, R. M. 14, 215, 218, 391, 395–6, 430 Friedman, L. M. XXIX Hart, H. L. A. X, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, 65, Fries, M. 430 100, 131–44, 152, 157–85, 199, 209, 215, Fuller, L. L. XXIII, 58, 428 218, 336, 380, 388, 391–3, 404–5, 427, Furies (see also Erinyes, Eumenides) 265 430, 433, 435 Hartney, M. 340, 432 Gabriel (the Archangel) 67 Hartshorne, C. 434 Gaea 265 Hassemer, W. 16, 430 Gagarin, M. 70, 272, 276, 285, 288–9, 428–9 Hattenhauer, H. 436 Gagnér, S. 81, 429, 437 Havelock, E. A. XII, 200–1, 260, 264, 269– Gaius, 427 94, 355, 364, 429–30 Galletti, M. XXIX, XXX Heck, P. 338 Gallino, L. 89–90, 93–4, 109, 111, 200, Hector 262 202–3, 205, 219, 236–7, 240, 243, 360, Hegel, G. W. F. XXXI, 6, 343, 430 367, 369–70, 429 Heidegger, M. 248, 252–6, 355, 385, 430 Garfinkel, H. 381 Helenus 262 Gatti, V. 425, 431 Hempel, C. G. 400 Gavazzi, G. 44, 187, 429 Hendel, C. W. 431 Gelati, G. 413, 429 Heracles 48 Gellius, Aulus 71, 80, 429 Heraclitus 220, 277 Gerstein, D. 359 Hermann, K. F. 428 Gerth, H. XXVI, 135, 214, 241, 355–7, Hermes 262, 265 371, 374–8, 380–1, 384–9, 429 Herodotus 257, 272, 274, 430 Gianformaggio, L. 187 Herrestad, H. 413, 417, 430 Giddens, A. 367, 429 Hertius, J. N. 435 Gierke, O. F. 131 Hesiod 257, 261, 265, 272, 274–7, 289, Giesen, B. 359, 425 358, 430–1 Gill, C. 272, 429 Hett, W. S. 425 Girgenti, G. 426, 435 Hicks, R. D. 428 Gislon, M. 265, 429 Hill, D. E. 434 Glaucus 255 Hilpinen, R. 431 Godley, A. D. 430 Himma, K. E. 174 Goren, S. L. 429 Hippias 70 Gorgias 70, 76, 222, 435 Hirzel, R. 285, 430 Gough, J. W. 433 Hitler, A. 200 Governatori, G. 356, 413, 429 Hobbes, T. 49 Gregor, M. 57, 432 Hoffmeister, J. 430 454 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Hohfeld, W. N. 223, 416, 430–1 Knox, T. M. 430 Holland, T. E. 131 Kotkavirta, J. 96, 433 Homer 11, 200, 235, 247, 249, 255, 257, Kraft, V. 391 261–3, 265, 269–94, 399, 426, 429, 431, Kranz, W. 428 433–4 Krogh, C. 413, 416–7, 430, 432 Hondrich, K. O. 359 Krueger, P. 427–8, 431 Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) Kubrick, S. 258, 432 XXVIII, 292, 338, 428, 431 Kuhn, T. S. 397–8, 433 Horae 270 Kunkel, W. 5 Horwitz, M. J. 142, 428 Kurzweil, E. 359 Huang, Z. 356, 426 Kuttner, S. 81, 433 Hulstijn, J. 356, 426 Hume, D. 96, 431 La Torre, M. 174 Humpty Dumpty 116–7 Lachesis 261 Husserl, E. 95–6, 431 Lagerspetz, E. 96, 368, 433 Hutchinson, D. S. 425, 435–6 Lahure, C. 433 Land, J. P. N. 437 Ikaheimo, H. 96, 433 Larenz, K. 17, 24, 433 Ilgen, H.-M. 429 Lazzaro, G. 16, 118, 187, 433 Inwood, B. 60 Leiter, B. 174 Isaac 123–5 Lelli, F. XXIX, XXX Isidore (St. Isidore of Seville) 300–1, 319– Lenin, V. (Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov) 200 21, 323, 431 Lentini, L. 435 Leo XIII, Pope (Vincenzo Gioacchino Pec- Janko, R. 275, 431 ci) 324 Jellinek, G. 131 Leontiev, A. N. 381 Jesus (Jesus of Nazareth) 91, 104, 112, 216, Lewis, D. K. 368, 394, 400, 433 370 Lindahl, L. 223, 416–7, 433 John (St. John, the Evangelist) 91 Lindemann, G. 429 Jones, A. J. L. 416 Lindenberg, S. 359 Jori, M. 174, 187, 435 Lindsay, W. M. 431 Judas, 111 Lisska, A. J. XXIV, XXXIII, 75, 222, 295, Juliet 18–9 299 Justinian (Flavius Justinianus) 53, 75, 81, 91, Litschewski Paulson, B. 33, 337, 340, 344, 154, 216, 260, 265, 318, 338, 427–8, 431 432, 434 Llewellyn, K. 437 Kaila, E. 391 Locke, J. 42, 49, 433 Kalinowski, G. 87, 431 Lombardi Vallauri, L. 222, 395, 433 Kanger, S. 223, 416–7, 431 Lomiento, L. 430 Kant, I. 16, 57, 88, 97, 222, 296, 396, 431–2 Lomuscio, A. 429 Kaufmann, A. 13, 24, 432 Longo, G. E. 431 Kells, J. H. 291, 432 Losano, M. G. 432 Kelsen, H. XIII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, 1–3, Luce, R. D. 382 8, 11, 18, 46, 48, 54, 57, 59, 63, 65, 69– Luckmann, T. 365, 367, 369, 381, 426 70, 85, 87, 121–2, 133–4, 138–9, 142, Luhmann, N. XXIII, 218, 359 149, 152–3, 156–7, 159–60, 162, 172–3, Luke (St. Luke, the Evangelist) 66 182–3, 187–8, 249, 333–53, 355, 432 Lundstedt, A. V. 143, 211, 433 Kelsey, F. W. 153 Luria, A. R. 381 Keres 265 Luzzati, C. 174 Kersten, F. 431 Keyes, C. W. 427 MacAskill, E. 66, 433 Kierkegaard, S. A. 250–2, 355, 385, 432 MacCormick, D. N. XX, 151, 173, 392, 433 Knight, M. 336–7, 340–1, 432, 435 Machiavelli, N. 172 INDEX OF NAMES 455

MacIntyre, A. 272, 433 Nicolini, L. 433–4 Macquarrie, J. 254, 430 Nietzsche, F. W. V, 254–5, 434 Magee, B. 399–400, 433 Niger, S. XXIX Makinson, D. 416 Night 261, 265, 270 Malinowski, B. K. 247, 249, 256–8, 355, 433 Nugent, T. 433 Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) 200 Nute, D. 413, 415, 429, 434 Marenbon, J. 80–1, 111 Margoliouth, G. 432 Oceanus 261 Marmor, A. 174 Ockham, William of 74–5, 78, 434 Martinus (Martinus Gosia) 16 Odysseus 262, 264, 282, 287–8, 290, 292–3 Marx, K. XXIII, 355–6 Oedipus 436 Matthew (St. Matthew, the Evangelist) 83, Ogden, C. K. 400 104, 112, 147, 257 Olivecrona, K. X, XXV, XXVI, XXIX, 49– Meacham, J. A. 381 50, 52, 54, 81, 88, 131–44, 170, 172, 175, Mead, G. H. 135, 356, 374, 388, 433 178, 181, 199–200, 209–14, 377, 380, Medine, P. E. 428 388, 392–3, 429–30, 434 Megaera 265 Oppenheim, F. E. 394, 434 Menelaus 262, 290–1 Orestes 265 Merryman, J. H. 431 Otto, W. F. 257, 261, 265, 270, 434 Messineo, F. 38, 433 Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso) 111, 434 Metzger, B. M. 431 Oxenstierna, G. 335 Meurling, H. 335 Meyer, J.-J. C. 413, 433 Padovani, A. XXIX, 4–5, 16, 53 Miller, F. D. Jr. XIX, 72, 75, 288, 295 Palazzi, R. 265, 429 Miller, P. 371, 433 Palmirani, M. XXIX Mills, C. W. XXVI, 135, 214, 241, 355–7, Pancheri, P. 436 371, 374–8, 380–1, 384–9, 429, 433 Paolucci, M. 429 Minerva 292 Parmenides 26, 435 Modestinus (Herennius Modestinus) 265, Parry, M. 270, 280 318 Parsons, T. 355–6 Moirai 260–1, 264–6 Pascal, B. 112, 434 Moldt, D. 429 Patroclus 263 Mommsen, T. 428 Pattaro, E. XV, XIX, XXX, XXXIII, 5, 85, Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat) 123, 131–2, 134, 138, 141, 144, 160, 233–5, 385, 433, 435 187–8, 191, 220, 334–5, 343, 366, 391–2, Montinari, M. 434 403, 428, 434 Montuschi, D. XXIX, XXX Paul (St. Paul, the Apostle) 313, 370 Moore, G. E. 129, 391 Paulson, S. L. 33, 337, 340, 344, 432, 434 Moreschini, C. 78–9, 433–4 Payer, P. J. 81, 425 Morris, C. W. 433 Pazzagli, A. 436 Morris, I. 275, 434 Peczenik, A. XIX, XX, XXII, XXIX, 7, 24, Muhammad (Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn 41, 61, 141, 143, 204, 236, 407 ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib ibn Peirce, C. S. 13, 16, 83, 96, 190, 434 Hashim) 67 Peleus 263–4 Münch, R. 359, 425 Pelino, E. XXIX Muratori, L. A. XV Pelletier, J. 419, 428 Murphy, L. 174 Penelope 292–3 Murray, A. T. 282, 290–2, 431 Pennington, K. XXX, 53 Mussolini, B. 200 Pericles 279 Perón, J. 200 Naess, A. 391 Perri, P. XXIX, XXX Nestor 293 Perry, S. R. 174, 433 Nicholson, J. 120, 149 Persephone 265, 286 456 TREATISE, 1 - THE LAW AND THE RIGHT

Petersen, L. 432 Riedlinger, A. 436 Petraz˙ycky, L. 4 Riegel, K. F. 381 Phalén, A. 335 Riley, P. 77–8, 233 Philemon 429 Ringhofer, K. 432 Piave, F. M. 259 Rivers, J. 337, 339–40, 425, 435 Pieri, B. XXIX Robinson, E. 254, 430 Pintore, A. 187, 435 Rodwell, J. M. 67–8, 432 Pirrie, A. 435 Rolfe, J. C. 429 Pisistratus 292 Romano, S. 341, 435 Placentinus 16 Romeo 18–9 Plato XXXII, 16, 26, 70–1, 73, 76, 78–80, Ronchetti, E. XXIX 222, 257, 260, 271–5, 277–8, 284–5, 327, Rorty, R. 435 362, 425–6, 430, 433, 435 Rosenfeld, I. 403 Plotinus 299 Ross, A. 18, 88, 143–4, 148, 239–40, 380, Polynices 71–3 388, 391–3, 428, 434–5 Polyphemus 264 Ross, W. D. XVII, 6, 61, 435, 437 Popper, K. R. 241, 391, 435 Rossi, R. 436 Pörn, I. 416–7 Rotolo, A. XIV, XVI, XIX, XXIV, XXIX, Porphyry 16–7, 426, 435 XXX, XXXIII, 13, 41, 43, 356, 413, 429 Poseidon 262–4 Rottleuthner, H. XIX, XXII, XXIII, Postema, G. J. XXIX, 143, 174, 392 XXIV, XXIX, 49, 67, 70, 72, 151, 233, Pound, R. 52, 168, 435 265, 356 Prakken, H. 413, 415, 435 Rousseau, J.-J. 49, 218, 242–3, 246, 257, Priam 263 385, 433, 435 Prichard, J. V. 433 Roversi, C. XXIX, XXX, 324 Protagoras 70, 222, 435 Rubens, P. P. 404 Proteus 262 Rumble, W. E. Jr. 142, 436 Puchta, G. F. 408 Russell, B. A. W. V, XXVI, 129, 241, 365– Pufendorf, S. 51, 54–5, 77, 435 6, 390–1, 395–400, 403, 436 Pugliese, G. 295, 435 Ryle, G. 390–1, 400, 436 Putnam, H. 400 Saavedra, Á. de 259 Quine, W. V. O. XIII, XXVI, XXVII, 389, Saddam Hussein (Saddam Hussein al- 397–400, 403, 435 Tikriti) 66–7 Salmond, J. W. 131, 199 Rackham, H. 425 Sandars, T. C. 431 Raiffa, H. 382 Sanders, H. A. 83, 96 Ramelli, I. 433–4 Sandin, R. T. 426, 430 Rasmusen, E. 382 Santos, F. 413, 436 Ravizza, L. 436 Sarpedon 255 Rawls, J. 284, 435 Sartor, G. XIV, XVI, XIX, XX, XXII, Raz, J. 92–3, 173–4, 427, 430, 435 XXIX, XXX, 13, 39, 41, 72, 87, 97, 100, Redondo, C. 174, 435 125, 223, 266, 356, 372, 413, 417, 429 Reed, T. A. 142, 428 Saussure, F. de 368, 436 Reeves, J. S. 426 Savigny, F. C. 237, 407–9, 411, 436 Reid, C. J. Jr 295 Scarpelli, U. 187 Rembrandt (Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Schegloff, E. A. 359, 381 Rijn) 404 Schelling, F. W. J. 16 Resnick, L. B. 381 Schild, K. 414, 422, 436 Restaino, F. 390–1, 435 Schlick, M. 391 Rhys, E. 67, 432 Schneider, G. 425, 431 Ricci, A. M. XXIX, XXX Schopenhauer, A. 406, 436 Richards, I. A. 400 Schuhmann, K. 431 INDEX OF NAMES 457

Schultzer, B. 392, 436 Tribonian (Tribonianus) 338 Scorza, G. XXIX Tura, F. XXIX, XXX Scott, J. B. 429 Twining, W. 142, 437 Scott, S. P. 427 Scribner, S. 381, 427 Ullmann, W. 81, 437 Searle, J. R. XIII, XXVI, XXVII, 18–9, 89, Ullmann-Margalit, E. 380, 394, 437 96, 211, 323, 364–7, 389, 397–8, 400–6, Ulpian (Domitius Ulpianus) 75–6, 154, 436 260, 427 Séchehaye, A. 436 Uranus 265 Sejnowski, T. J. 393, 427 Valente, F. XXIX, XXX Sergot, M. 416 Van der Hoek, W. 413, 433 Shakespeare, W. 18–9 Van der Torre, L. 356, 426 Shapiro, S. J. 174 Van Vloten, J. 437 Shiner, R. A. XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIX, Verdi, G. F. F. 259 XXX, 41, 236 Verza, A. XXIX, XXX Shorey, P. XXXII, 425, 435 Vida, S. XIV, XVI, XXIX, XXX, 13, 61, Smelser, N. J. 359, 425 266, 413, 437 Smeraldi, E. 383, 436 Villa, V. 174 Socrates 26, 79–80, 117, 272 Villey, M. 295, 437 Soffritti, O. 425, 431 Volpe, G. XXIX, XXX, 224, 397 Solon 272, 279 Volterra, V. 436 Sophocles 71–3, 79, 261, 436 von Wright, G. H. 13, 391, 434, 437 Spaak, T. 123, 436 Vygotsky, L. S. 381 Spinoza, B. 76–7, 295, 436–7 Stalley, R. F. 16, 222 Waldron, J. 174 Stammler, R. 131 Walter, R. 432 Stavropoulos, N. 174 Waszink, J. H. 426 Stein, P. XXIX, XXX, 75 Watson, A. 428 Stirling, S. 435 Weber, M. XXIII, 200, 355–6 Storr, F. 436 Wedberg, A. 335–6, 341, 432, 437 Strangas, J. 426 Weinberger, O. 434 Strawson, P. F. 391 Weiss, P. 434 Suchman, L. A. 381 Wikgren, A. 431 Sullivan, H. S. 374, 437 Winch, P. 392 Summers, R. S. XX, 142, 437 Windscheid, B. 38, 437 Winkels, R. 429 Tarantino, A. 428 Wippler, R. 359 Tarello, G. 187 Wise, E. M. 431 Tarski, A. XIX, 437 Wittgenstein, L. J. J. 336, 390–2, 404 Tegen, E. 335 Wolff, C. 120–1, 437 Telang, K. T. 426 Wolff, H. J. 291, 437 Theagenes of Rhegium 277 Woodger, J. H. 437 Themis 270, 430 Woodruff, P. 70, 276, 288–9, 429 Thetis 261 Wróblewski, J. 131 Thibaut, A. F. J. 436 Wyduckel, D. 434 Thomann, M. 437 Thomas, R. 425 Xenophanes 277 Thomte, R. 432 Yu, B. 429 Tierney, B. 75 Timaeus 73, 78–80, 426, 435 Zeus 72, 261, 263, 265, 270, 289–90, 293 Tisiphone 265 Zipursky, B. C. 174 Tona, U. XXIX Zitelmann, E. 39, 437 Tononi, G. 362, 406, 428 Zucchini, G. 428 BIBLIOGRAPHYBIBLIOGRAPHY 185

The works of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx are quoted from: Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975ff. (and from the German edition: Marx-Engels-Werke, Berlin: Dietz, 1963ff.).

Note that in the text quotations from the Old Testament are taken from The New English Bi- ble. Cambridge: Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press, 1970; the quotations from The New Testament are from the King James Bible of 1611.

Note that in the text quotations from the Koran are from The Bounteous Koran. London: Macmillan, 1986.

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acceptance 15–6, 18–21 efficacy 5, 60–1, 73, 152–3, 162–3, 168 actor / observer 7, 12–9 etatism 24, 124 administrative law 129 ethno-methodology 173ff. altruism 72, 84ff., 132 ethical sentimentalism 77 anthropology 17, 20, 70ff., 74, 89, 120–1 ethics 76ff. ape-law 17 ethology 70 authority 21 evolutionary psychology 81 autonomy of law 110ff., 158–9, 182 expectations (cognitive / normative) 23, autopoiesis 3, 164ff. 30, 164 explanation 4, 161, 181ff. basis / superstructure 106ff., 113ff. Begriffsjurisprudenz 57 fact-norm-sequence 10, 22, 70–1, 114–5, bellum iustum 47, 175 119, 137, 151, 155–6, 183 biology 70ff. facts of law 22, 137, 157 family law 130 Christian doctrine 45ff., 100 feedback 112, 182 chronology 34, 42, 157 Freirechtsbewegung (free law movement) church and imperium 48 57, 173 citizenship 135, 184 functions of law 2, 9, 27–30, 168, 170–1 climate 62ff., 68–9, 179 future of the law 115ff. code 168 coercion theory 9–10 Generative Grammar 80 cognition 81ff. Gewalt 145ff. cognitive theory 75ff. Grundnorm 2, 161–2 cognitivism 76 common law 110, 158 hermeneutical point of view 14–5, 18 competence 79 historical foundations 155–9 concept of law 7–12 human rights 4, 56–7, 75ff., 104, 155, 169 conflict resolution 29 constitutive function 29–30, 74f., 182 ideal (idea) of law 11–2 contract 106, 126, 130ff., 156 ideology 32, 57, 151 convention 5, 10, 21–2, 120–1, 156 imperative theory 9–10, 26 courts 38, 106, 143–4, 168 incest taboo 70 crime 134 informal / formal 24 cultural foundations 157 institutional facts 29 custom 21–2, 120–1, 147–8, 151, 156 integration (social) 121–2, 126ff., 133ff. customary law 24 internal / external point of view 12–9, 119 internal foundations 161ff. declarative function 28 Is and Ought 23, 59, 162, 164, 181 definition of law 8ff., 12, 26, 139ff., 166 Islam (Islamic Law) 50–7 development of law (evolution of law) 3–5, ius talionis 42 156ff., 168 dimensions of a legal order 27, 182 Jewish law 43ff. domination 11 judge 24, 58, 143 justice 11–2, 45, 88, 101, 104, 117–8, 121 Economic Analysis of Law 23, 118–9 justification / explanation 83, 92ff., 100, 181 economic foundations 57, 64, 88–119, 133, 157 khadi justice 55–6 200 TREATISE, 2 - FOUNDATIONS OF LAW law and politics 144–5 ratio / voluntas 49, 182 law and power / Gewalt 145ff. rationality, stages of 48, 54–7, 120, 156 law and state 143–4 realism 7–8, 19ff., 23ff., 119 law in the books / law in action 7, 23, 54 Rechtsstaat 4, 144, 169–70 law-related facts 25–6, 162 Rechtstatsachen (legal facts) 137 legal pluralism 24, 137, 143, 150 recognition 8, 11 legal staff 21, 27 recognition theory 8–9, 140–1 legality 57, 154, 170 regularities 10, 14, 17, 21, 71 legitimation / legitimacy 28, 146–7, 154–5 religion 42ff., 63–4, 121–2, 133, 177ff., limitations of human rights 90 181, 183 limitation of political power 28–9 revenge, cf. vengeance living law 137–8, 157 revolution 108, 115ff., 163 Roman law 48, 109–10 market society 128, 135 rule of law 4, 104ff., 143, 170 marxist-leninist theory of law 8–9, 29 rule of recognition 2–3, 24 mind 79ff. rules / regularities 10, 20ff., 71, 121 mental faculties 79 mentalism 78ff. secularization 4, 48, 50–5, 57, 103, 177ff. mentalist theory of ethics and law 78ff. sharia 50ff. monopoly of force 3–4, 42, 154 slavery 61–2, 104 moral faculty 81ff. social contract 38, 103–4, 106, 127, 148, moral judgement 76ff. 181, 183 morality and law 3, 20, 21–2, 79, 120ff. social control 28 morality of aspiration / morality of duty 179 social Darwinism 67 myth, mythology 32–3, 100, 177, 181, 183 societal foundations 136–43 socio-biology 71ff., 81 natural foundations 57ff. solidarity 97ff. natural law theories 100ff., 120, 181 sovereignty 152, 183 nature 45, 82, 183–4 state of nature 23, 101–2, 148 Nazi law 66–7, 72, 152, 178, 184 statement of rule / statement about a rule 16 non-cognitivism 76 status naturalis / status civilis 38, 100ff. norm 1–2, 164 structure 9, 164ff., 169 normative / cognitive, cf. expectations system 164ff. normative / factual 24 normativism 7–8 theory of law 8ff., 10, 26 transformation, transition 4, 100ff., 106, obedience (norm conforming behavior, norm 148, 154, 163 compliance) 3, 9–11, 18, 147–8, 163–4 Turkey 53–4, 146, 153 Oresteia 33–39 Universal Grammar 80 penal law 126, 133ff. validity 8, 23–4, 120 performance 79 vengeance 34–5, 42ff., 46 political foundations 143–55 violence 145ff., 148ff. power 145ff., 150ff. Volksgeist 66–7, 138–9 primary and secondary norms 3, 23 private law 130ff. welfare state 135–6 INDEXINDEX OF OF NAMES NAMES 201

Abner 44 Buhr, M. 8, 191 Abraham 41, 42, 45, 50, 50 (n. 25) Bultmann, R. 178 Adam 50 Burleigh, M. 178 (n. 3), 186 Aegisthus 33, 34 Aërope 33 Cain 42, 43 Aeschylus 33, 33 (n. 4), 38 (n. 6), 39, 185 Calabresi, G. 119 (n. 124), 186 Agamben, A. 150, 186 Cassandra 34 Agamemnon 33, 34, 35, 194 Chiba, M. 137 (n. 142), 186 Ahdar, R. J. 42, 185 Chisholm, R. M. 2 (n. 2), 186 Alexy, R. 83 (n. 79), 91 (n. 97), 120, 155, Chomsky, N. 75 (n. 58), 79 (n. 67), 80, 80 185, 195 (n. 68), 81 (n. 74), 92 (n. 99), 95 (n. 104), Ammann, L. 52, 185 186, 189 Antigone 40, 41, 42, 177, 196 Christ, Jesus 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, Apollo 33, 35, 36, 37 72, 100 (n. 112) Aquinas, Th.; St. Thomas Aquinas 42, 45, Cicero 175 47, 49, 50, 50 (n. 23), 76 (n. 59), 175, 185 Clarke, M. 121 (n. 126), 186 Archangel Gabriel 42, 51 Clytaemnestra 33, 34, 35 Arendt, H. 145 (n. 149), 155, 155 (n. 160), Coase, R. H. 119 (n. 124), 186 185 Commons, J. R. 115, 186 Aristotle 42, 45, 47, 49, 56, 177 Cotta, S. 58, 186 Arnauld, A. von 26, 185 Cotterrell, R. 4, 121 (n. 126), 133 (n. 138), Atatürk, M. K. 53 186 Athena 33, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41 Coulson, N. J. 50 (n. 24), 186 Atreus 33, 34 Creon 40, 41 Augustine; Augustinus 45, 47, 49, 175, 185 Cudworth, R. 82 (n. 75), 186 Austin, J. 9, 79 (n. 66), 185 Ayer, A. J. 76 (n. 60), 185 Damaris 40 Daniels, N. 93 (n. 101), 186, 187, 189, 194 Baeumler, A. 32 Darwin, C. 67, 81 Bagnall, G. 26, 185 David, King David 44 Baier, K. 91, 185 Dawkins, R. 73, 186 Baurmann, M. 120, 185 de Bruyn, O. 39 (n. 8), 186 Baxi, U. 126 (n. 131), 185, 196 Derrida, J. 118 (n. 123), 146, 146 (n. 151), Becker, G. S. 73, 185 147, 147 (nn. 152, 153), 148, 148 (n. Beda 34 (n. 5) 155), 149, 150, 150 (n. 156), 186 Benjamin, W. 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, Diamond, J. 69, 187 185 Dimmel, N. 136, 187 Berman, H. J. 48, 186 Dionysos Areopagita 40 Bierling, E. R. 141, 186 Dodds, M. 58, 187 Bierwisch, M. 80 (n. 71), 186 Dreier, R. 11 (n. 3), 120, 187, 196 Bismarck, O. von 151 Durkheim, É. 31 (n. 1), 58, 68, 120, 121, Bitterli, U. 102 (n. 115), 186 121 (n. 126), 122, 123, 123 (n. 127), 124, Black, D. 182, 186 124 (nn. 128, 129), 125, 126, 126 (n. Bloch, J. 111, 187, 188 131), 127, 127 (n. 132), 128, 128 (n. Blumenberg, H. 32 (n. 2), 186 134), 129, 130, 130 (n. 136), 131, 132, Bourdieu, P. 166 (n. 4), 186 132 (n. 137), 133, 133 (nn. 138, 140), Buchanan, J. M. 103, 186 134, 135, 136, 139, 142, 156, 161, 169, 202 TREATISE, 2 - FOUNDATIONS OF LAW

170, 173, 178, 185, 186, 187, 189, 192, (n. 66), 92 (n. 98), 120, 154, 155, 157, 196 170, 178, 189 Dworkin, R. 2, 93 (n. 101), 187 Hades 40 Dwyer, S. 80 (n. 71), 187 Haemon 40, 41 Hall, L. G. H. 39 (n. 8), 189 Ehrlich, E. 22, 24, 26, 27, 68, 69, 69 (n. 48), Hansen, R. 155 (n. 161), 189 136, 137, 137 (n. 143, 144), 138, 139, Hardt, M. 4, 189 140, 141, 141 (nn. 146, 147), 142, 143, Hare, R. M. 91 (n. 97), 93 (n. 101), 189 146, 150, 157, 162 (n. 2), 164 (n. 3), 165, Harman, G. 80 (n. 71), 189 166 (n. 6), 183, 187, 191, 195 Hart, H. L. A. 2, 2 (n. 2), 3, 12, 12 (n. 5), Elster, J. 106 (n. 119), 187 13, 13 (n. 6), 14, 15, 15 (nn. 10, 11, 12), Engels, F. XI, 53 (n. 26), 67, 103, 106, 107, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 71, 79 (n. 66), 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 114 (n. 92 (n. 98), 154, 156, 170, 171, 189, 192 122), 115, 116, 117, 153, 155, 156, 157, Hartmann, N. 166 (n. 5), 189 183, 185, 187, 188, 192, 193 Hauser, M. D. 80 (n. 71), 81 (n. 74), 189 Ephialtes 39, 39 (n. 8), 189, 192 Haushofer, K. 67 Erinyes 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43 Hegel, G. W. F. XII, 41, 48 (n. 18), 65, 66, Eteocles 40 66 (nn. 44, 45), 67, 76 (n. 59), 107, 148, Euripides 33 (n. 3) 179, 184, 189 Evans, R. J. 175, 188 Helena 34 Helmholz, R. 1 (n. 1), 190 Fagan, B. 69, 188 Henoch 50 Feuerbach, L. 67, 179, 188 Herder, J. G. 65, 190 Fikentscher, W. 56 (n. 29), 188 Hippodameia 33 Fish, S. 3, 173, 173 (n. 1), 188 Hitler, A. 178 (n. 3) Fitch, W. T. 81 (n. 74), 189 Hobbes, T. 64, 86, 89, 100, 101, 101 (nn. Flashar, H. 39 (n. 8), 188 113, 114), 102 (n. 115), 103, 105, 106, Foucault, M. 150, 151, 188 153, 164, 177 (n. 1), 190, 192 Frankena, W. 81 (n. 72), 82 (n. 75), 188 Hof, H. 70 (n. 51), 190 Frege, F. L. G. 92 (n. 100) Höffe, O. 77 (n. 61), 190 Fuller, L. L. 31 (n. 1), 69 (n. 50), 161, 164, Hohfeld, W. 83 (n. 79), 190 169, 170, 179, 180, 188, 189 Holmes, O. W. 7, 26, 190 Gadamer, H-G. 158, 175, 181, 189 Honneth, A. 151, 190 Galanter, M. 137 (n. 142), 189 Huber, W. 49, 190 Gebhart, W. 121 (n. 126), 133 (nn. 138, Hud 50 140), 189 Humboldt, W. von 89, 97, 97 (n. 108), 98, Gehlen, A. 74, 89, 89 (n. 90), 189 98 (n. 109), 190 Geiger, T. 14, 18 (n. 15), 20, 22, 71, 71 (n. Hume, D. 59, 65, 65 (n. 43), 95, 95 (n. 53), 120 (n. 125), 121, 133 (n. 138), 137, 106), 96, 181, 190 156, 183, 189 Hunt, A. 150, 190 Gelasius I (Pope) 48 Huntington, E. 69 (n. 49), 190 George I (of England) 102 (n. 115) Hutcheson, F. 82 (n. 75), 86 (n. 83), 96 (n. Gewirth, A. 77 (n. 61), 189 107), 188, 190 Glacken, C. 69 (n. 49), 189 Goethe, W. 146 (n. 150) Ibn Khaldun 177 Goodrich, P. 32, 189 Ibn Sina 177 Gratian 48, 175 Ismael 50 (n. 25) Griffiths, J. 137 (n. 142), 189 Isokrates 39 Gruter, M. 70 (n. 51), 189 Gundling, N. H. 155 Jackendoff, R. 80 (nn. 70, 71), 83 (n. 79), 190 Habakuk 151 Jacob 50 Habermas, J. 3, 12, 12 (n. 4), 78 (n. 65), 79 Jebb, R. 40 (n. 11), 185 INDEX OF NAMES 203

Jellinek, G. 22 Luther 47 Jephtah 44 Lyotard, J. F. 83 (n. 78), 192 Job 41 Johansen, B. 56 (n. 30), 190 MacCormick, N. D. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 25, John the Baptist 50 29, 192 Joseph 50 MacLeod, C. W. 39 (n. 8), 192 Jung, C. G. 32 Macpherson, C. B. 101, 192 Mahlmann, M. IX, XII, 17, 71 (n. 54), 75, Kant, I. 11, 12, 23, 75, 76 (n. 59), 79 (n. 79 (n. 65), 80 (n. 71), 81 (n. 74), 82 (n. 66), 82 (n. 76), 85, 86 (n. 83), 87, 89, 75), 87 (n. 85), 89 (n. 90), 92 (n. 98), 93 106, 123, 164, 177, 187, 190, 191 (n. 101), 192 Kelsen, H. 2, 9 (n. 1), 15, 23, 26, 31 (n. 1), Maine, H. S. 156 139, 143, 144, 144 (n. 148), 152 (n. 157), Makdisi, J. 50 (n. 24), 192 161, 162, 162 (nn. 1, 2), 163, 164, 166, Makdisi, M. 50 (n. 24), 192 166 (n. 6), 167, 179, 180, 191, 195 Malthus, T. 73 Kjellén, R. 67 Mammeri-Latzel, M. 72 (n. 55), 192 Klages, L. 32 Mandeville, B. 96 (n. 107) Klaus, G. 8, 191 Marr, J. L. 39 (n. 8), 192 Knox, B. M. W. 39 (n. 8), 191 Marra, R. 121 (n. 126), 192 Kohl, K.-H. 102 (n. 115), 191 Marx, K. XI, 8, 22, 29, 32, 53 (n. 26), 67, Kohlberg, L. 78 (n. 65), 121, 191, 197 103, 106, 107, 108, 108 (n. 120), 109, Kölbel, R. 173, 174, 175, 194 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 114 (n. 122), Korff, W. 133, 191 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 125 (n. Kornhauser, L. A. 29, 119, 191, 194 130), 126, 133, 137, 149, 150, 151, 152, Krawietz, W. 9, 11, 191, 195 153, 157, 179, 182, 183, 185, 187, 188, Kriele, M. 3, 191 192, 193, 194, 195, 196 Kriesel, K. M. 61, 191 Mauss, M. 127, 193 Kritz, N. J. 106 (n. 119), 191 McAdams, A. J. 106 (n. 119), 193 Krygier, M. 106 (n. 119), 191 Meier, C. 33 (n. 4), 39 (n. 8), 193 Melanchton 47 Lambert, E. 139, 191 Menelaos 34 Landau, P. 1 (n. 1), 190 Mercier, R. 62, 193 Landes, D. 69, 191 Merkel, A. 161 Larenz, K. 67 (n. 46), 191 Merkel, W. 105, 193 Latacz, J. 39 (n. 8), 191 Merquiol, A. 61, 194 Launhardt, A. 173, 174, 175, 194 Merry, S. E. 137 (n. 142), 194 Lautmann, R. 14 (n. 8), 21, 191, 192 Mikhail, J. 75 (n. 58), 80 (n. 71), 85 (n. 82), Leda 34 86 (n. 84), 93 (n. 101), 192, 194 Lempert, R. 158 (n. 162), 192 Miller, J. C. 24 (n. 19), 38 (n. 7), 126 (n. Lenin, V. (Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov) 8, 29, 131), 196 116 Milton, J. 39 (n. 9) Lessing, G. E. 65, 192 Misztal, B. 106 (n. 119), 194 Levine, F. J. 121, 196 Mnookin, R. H. 29, 194 Levinson, S. 173, 192 Montaigne, M. 102 (n. 115), 146, 146 (n. Lévy-Bruhl, L. 127, 192 151), 147, 147 (nn. 152, 154), 194 Linant de Bellefonds, Y. 50 (n. 24), 192 Montesquieu, C-L. de Secondat (baron de) Linz, J. 105 (n. 118), 192 58, 58 (n. 33), 59, 60, 60 (n. 35), 61, 61 (n. Locke, J. 79, 101, 102 (n. 115), 104, 192 36), 62, 62 (nn. 37, 38, 39), 63, 64, 64 (n. Lorberbaum, M. 43 (n. 14), 197 41), 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 69 (n. 48), 73 (n. Luhmann, N. 3, 9, 23, 26, 26 (n. 21), 29, 30, 56), 100, 101 (n. 113), 102, 102 (n. 115), 31 (n. 1), 120, 143, 144, 156, 157, 158, 161, 177, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191, 194 159, 161, 164, 165, 166, 166 (n. 4), 167, Moore, G. E. 84 (n. 81), 92 (n. 100), 194 167 (n. 7), 168, 169, 170, 179, 180, 192 Morlok, M. 173, 174, 175, 194 204 TREATISE, 2 - FOUNDATIONS OF LAW

Moses 43, 44, 50, 52 Renner, K. (Dr. Josef Karner) 124 (n. 129), Mozart, W. A. 97 195 Muhammad 50, 51, 52 Roberts, S. 137 (n. 142), 195 Rodinson, M. 56, 195 Nagel, T. 50 (n. 24), 194 Röhl, K. F. 130, 167 (n. 7), 195 Nagel. Th. 93 (n. 101), 194 Rorty, R. 77, 77 (nn. 61, 62), 78, 78 (n. 64), Negri, A. 4, 189 99, 99 (n. 110), 195 Nelken, D. 26 (n. 21), 194 Rosenberg, A. 32 Nestle, W. 177, 194 Ross, A. 13 Nicolai, W. 39 (n. 8), 194 Ross, W. D. 91 (n. 96), 195 Nietzsche, F. 74, 74 (n. 57), 89, 89 (n. 89), Rottleuthner, H. IX, 70 (n. 51), 75 (n. 58), 177 (n. 1), 194 110, 153, 162 (n. 2), 195 Noah 45, 49 Rousseau, J.-J. 65, 127, 177 (n. 1), 187, 196 Nozick, R. 104, 194 Rückert, J. 158 (n. 162), 196

Offe, C. 106 (n. 119), 194 Salih 50 Ogburn, W. F. 115 Saul 44 Oinomaos 33 Savigny, F. C. von 66, 155, 155 (n. 161), 196 Olivecrona, K. 26, 196 Schacht, J. 50 (n. 24), 196 Opp, K. D. 18 (n. 16), 194 Schäfer, H. M. 1 (n. 1), 3 (n. 3), 196 Oquendo, Á. R. 155, 194 Schiller, F. 146 (n. 150) Orestes 33, 33 (n. 3), 34, 35, 36, 37 Schlick, M. 84 (n. 80), 96 (n. 107), 196 Ost, F. 26, 194 Schmitt, C. 150, 178, 196 Schrader, W. H. 82 (n. 75), 196 Parsons, T. 23, 129 Schwartz, R. D. 24 (n. 19), 38 (n.7), 126 (n. Pascal, B. 146, 147, 147 (nn. 153, 154), 148 131), 196 (n. 155), 151, 156, 194 Shaftesbury, A. A. Cooper (3rd Earl of) 82 Pasˇukanis, E. 116, 117, 194 (n. 75), 196 Pattaro, E. XII, 29 Skinner, B. F. 89, 89 (n. 91), 196 Paul, St. Paul 39, 40, 45, 46, 47 Solon 38 Pelops 33, 37 Sophocles 38, 40, 196 Perikles 38, 39 Sorel, G. 32 Piaget, J. 68 (n. 75), 121, 194 Sorrentino, C. 80 (n. 71), 194 Pinker, S. 80 (n. 70), 194 Sosa, E., 2 (n. 2) 196 Plato 45, 47, 76 (n. 59), 93, 94 (n. 102), Spaemann, R. 77 (n. 61), 196 173, 174, 177, 194 Spelke, E. 80 (n. 71), 194 Podlecki, A. J. 39 (n. 8), 194 Spencer, H. 127, 128, 129, 130 Pogany, I. 106 (n. 119), 194 Spinoza, B. 146, 195, 196 Polyneikes 40 Stalin, I. V. (Joseph Vissarionovich Popkin, R. 94 (n. 103), 95 (n. 104), 195 Djugashvili) 113 (n. 121), 116, 196 Posner, R. 119 (n. 124), 195 Stepan, A. 105 (n. 118), 192 Postema, G. J. 2, 2 (n. 2), 195 Stevenson, C. L. 76 (n. 60), 77 (n. 63), 196 Pribán, J. 105, 106 (n. 119), 195 Stich, S. 80 (n. 71), 196 Pseudo-Dionysos Areopagita 40 (n. 10) Storr, F. 40 (n. 11), 185 Suárez, F. (SJ) 102 Radin, M. 26 (n. 22), 195 Summers, R. S. 170 (n. 10), 196 Raiser, T. 10, 11, 195 Swinburne 33 (n. 4) Ratzel, F. 67 Rawls, J. 77 (n. 61), 80 (n. 71), 93 (101), 97 Tamanaha, B. Z. 137 (n. 142), 196 (n. 108), 104, 104 (n. 117), 187, 189, 194, Tantalos 33, 34 195 Tapp, J. L. 121, 196 Raz, J. 15, 16, 19, 25, 189, 195 Teubner, G. 137 (n. 142), 138, 169, 192, Reichenbach, H. 76, 76 (n. 60), 195 194, 197 INDEX OF NAMES 205

Thyestes 33, 34 Weber, M. XI, 10, 10 (n. 2), 11, 11 (n. 2), Tugendhat, E. 77 (n. 61), 197 14, 21, 22, 22 (n. 18), 23, 27, 28, 45, 48, Tyler, T. R. 3, 197 50, 52, 54, 55, 55 (n. 28), 56, 56 (n. 30), Tyndareos 134 57, 57 (n. 32), 69, 99, 105, 120, 143, 154, 156, 157, 158, 161, 174, 185, 197 Ulysses 41 Welwei, K.-W. 39 (n. 8), 197 Ussher, J. (Bishop) 34 (n. 5) Wickham, G. 150, 190 Van Hoecke, M. 26 (n. 21), 197 Williams, B. 93 (n. 101), 197 Van Seters, J. 43 (n. 13), 197 Wilson, E. O. 71, 197 Vespasian 39 Wilson, T. P. 173, 174, 197 Vico, G. B. 179 Wittfogel, K. A. 69, 69 (n. 50) Vitoria, F. de (OP) 102 Wolf, E. 38 (n. 6), 197 Von Chamisso, A. 146 (n. 159) Wolf, U. 87 (n. 86), 197 Von Rohr, A. 71, 195 Von Schwerin, M. G. 151 Young, J. 106 (n. 119), 195 Wallace, R. W. 39 (n. 8), 197 Zeus 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41 Walzer, M. 43 (n. 14), 77 (n. 61), 197 Zimmering, R. 32, 197 BIBLIOGRAPHYBIBLIOGRAPHY 231

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abrogative power of legislation 14, 37–9, “contextual” 219–23, 228–9 68–9, 77–81, 140 distinguished from “deep” 219–20, Abu Dhabi Arbitration (International) 211 229 acceptance of law 46, 116, 208–9, 215 de jure and de facto distinguished 221 acquiescence, in international law 207–8, epistemic and normative distinguished 215 220 act-based sources of law 152 interpretive 225–6 ACTV v Australia (Australia) 131–2 legal 225–9 AGWA v Armstrong (Australia) 42 normal justification thesis 221 Alberta Act (Canada) 127 of ancient manuscripts 223–5, 226–7, Alberta Human Rights Act (Alberta, 229 Canada) 130 personal 227 mediation under the Act 109–11 political 221, 229 distinguished from labour arbitration 110–11 Bank of Montreal v Abbott (Canada) 108 power of mediator 110 Bank of Nova Scotia v Elsaesser (Canada) provisions summarized 109–10 107 Alberta Human Rights Commission 131 Bates v Arizona (U.S.) 16 powers under Alberta Human Rights Act bindingness, of legal sources 109–10 erga omnes 170–2, 174, 175, 178–9 Allgemeine Staatslehre 156–7 inter partes 170–2, 175 Alternative Dispute Resolution British North America Act (Canada) 121, forms distinguished 104–5 133, 135 analogy preamble to 135–9 in international law 212–13 Bryant v Foot (U.K.) 73, 77 in municipal law 30–1 BTC v Gourley (U.K.) 43 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (International) 207–8 Canada Act (U.K.) 121 Anns v Merton (U.K.) 53 Canada Post v CPAA (Canada) 96 Arbitration 86–103 Canadian Bill of Rights 120, 124 in international law 201 case (legal), defined 31–2 arrêts de règlement 174–5 Cassell v Broome (U.K.) 45 art Cattle v Stockton (U.K.) 48 institutional theory of 222 certainty, legal 10–11, 15, 59, 61, 67, 70, interpretation of 225–6, 229 72, 92, 95, 102, 136, 195 not subjective 225 Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada) atypical sources of law 161 1, 13, 19, 120, 124, 126, 129–31, 134–5 Atlas Tiles v Briers (Australia) 43 charter or bill of rights 5, 25 audi alteram partem 123 distinguished from constitution 119–20 Austin, J. Cheney v Conn (U.K.) 18 on parliamentary sovereignty 19, 38–9 civil law tradition 5, 63, 153–5 theory of custom 77–81, 183 codification 9–10 theory of delegation 85, 112 in civil law 155–9 theory of international law 195 coherence 4 authority 5, 10, 12, 18, 20, 35, 39, 41–2, 47, collation, of manuscripts 224, 226 67–8, 74, 76, 83, 85–6, 89, 94, 98–101, comity, judicial 27, 43–5, 52, 55 104–5, 110, 113, 116, 122, 193, 219–29 common law 31, 138 242 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW common law tradition 63 in Germany 163 Complete Book (of legal decisions) 28–9, 37 in South Africa 129 consolidation 10–12 constitutional revision 160, 162–3 consent constitutionalism 118–19 in international law 197–8, 208–9, 214–15 in Canada 136–8 in municipal law 8, 20 in France 156 constitution in Germany 156–7, 160–1 as foundational law 128 in Italy 164–6 as fundamental law 128 in USA 166–7 as meta-source of law 162–3 constitutionalisation 154–8 as self-validating 115–17 contextually sufficient justification 3–4, 7, as supreme law 125–7, 132–8 26, 94, 103, 197, 219, 229 conventions of 122–4, 133, 137 contracts distinguished from charter or bill of as source of law 168–72 rights 119–20 collective 171–2 flexible and rigid distinguished 122, Corte di Cassazione, Italian 175, 176 125, 159–61 Criminal Code (Canada) 129 in civil law 159–67 Critical Legal Studies 24, 227 institutional design of 124–7 Critical Race Theory 24 material and formal distinguished 146, Crouch v Crédit Foncier (U.K.) 67 165 Cullen v Trappell (Australia) 43 octroyée 157 custom 1, 3–5, 22, 38, 63–84, 127, 138, of Australia 119, 131–2 140, 201 of Canada 119–22, 125 as a part of the legal system 8, 184–5 patriation of 121, 123–4 as continuous 71 unwritten principles of 132–8 as derived from the authority of the as fundamental law 132–8 people 180–1 “text-emergent” and “free- as exceptional 69–70 standing” distinguished 139 as from time immemorial 70, 205 of France 156–7, 162, 188 as limited 69–70 of Germany 125, 160–1, 163, 188 as recognised by judges 80–1, 183–4 of Italy 160, 163, 164–5, 166 as requiring opinio juris 71, 181–2 of New Zealand 119 as susceptible of legal regulation 182–3 of South Africa 125, 129, 214 Austin’s theory of 77–8 of United Kingdom 119, 125, 132–9 criticized 78–81 of United States 119, 122, 125 certainty of 72 “reading in” provisions of 129–31 consistency of 72 “thick” sense of 117 constitutional custom 122–4, 186–7 “thin” sense of 7, 19, 115–17, 128 conventional custom 67–8, 187 applied to international law 197–8, general custom 65–6 217 history of 63–5 unwritten and written contrasted 123, in civil law 179–87 135–6 secundum legem 185–6 usages of 123, 206 praeter legem 185–6 Constitution Act 1867 (Canada) see British contra legem 185–6 North America Act in municipal and international law Constitution Act 1982 (Canada) 119, 121– contrasted 204–6 2, 125, 127, 133, 135 local custom 64–67 Constitutional Court peaceable enjoyment of 71 in France 129 reasonableness of 72–7, 79, 83 in Italy 163, 165 relation to legislation 39, 68–9, 77–8, 81 sentenze additive and sentenze relation to precedent 68–9, 77–8, 80–4 sostitutive 178–9 validity of 77–84 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 243 customary international law 63, 198–201, equity, equitable principles 1, 3–5, 86, 108, 204–10, 212, 216 111, 139, 201, 213 customary process of 209–10, 216 estoppel distinguished from norms of 209–10, in international law 211–12 214–15 in labour arbitration 90–5 usages in 206 EC/EU law 188–9 competences of 188, 190 Davis v Johnson (CA, U.K.) 44 decisions 189 Davis v Johnson (HL, U.K.) 34, 45 directives 189, 191 decodification 161 national implementation of 189–93 deconstitutionalisation 165–6 recommendations 189 deep justification 3–4, 26, 94, 103, 219, 229 regulations 189, 191 delegation 1, 5, 8, 22, 38, 85–113 European Charter of Fundamental Rights as subordinate to legislation 85–6 193 defined 85 European Commission 188–9 labour arbitration as source of law 86– European Constitution 193 103 European Convention on Human Rights mediation as source of law 103–12 120 status as source of law ambiguous 112– European Council of Ministers 188–9 13 European Court of Justice 189, 191, 192, democracy, democratic politics 9, 11, 22–5, 199 118–19, 137–8, 140 European Parliament 188–9 derivation 38, 68–9, 77–8, 85–6 European Treaty distinguished from abrogation 38, 78 of Amsterdam 188, 189 determinatio 23–4 of Paris 187 dialogue of Rome 187 between legislature and courts 126–7 of Maastricht 188, 189, 190, 191 Dickason v U of Alberta (Canada) 111 of Nice 188 direct source of law 4 Single European Act 187 discretion 46–8, 51, 56, 71, 74–7, 79, 81–2, European Union 9, 188–9, 196, 200, 202 85–6, 104, 210, 209 expressio unius exclusio alterius 131, 211 having and exercising distinguished 75–6 of human rights mediator 110–11 fact-based sources of law 152 of labour arbitrator 93–7 Farm Credit Corp v Dimmock (Canada) 108 strong and weak distinguished 75–6 feminist legal theory 24 distinguishing (a precedent) 34–5 foundational law 128, 202 tame and strong view contrasted 35 freedom of commercial expression 15–18 dogmatics, legal 1 freedom of political communication 131–2, Donoghue v Stevenson (U.K.) 53–5 139–40 Duport Steel v Sirs (U.K.) 44–6 fundamental law 133–4, 139 Dworkin, R. defender of judicial review 24 Gagnon v R (Canada) 13 Hercules the judge 11 game theory 197 on integrity as legal value 4, 60 generalizations on legal principles 28, 164, 210 constructed 54–6 on precedent 29 entrenched 55–6 enactment vs. gravitational force 46– general principles 7, 55 in international law 210–15 on strong and weak discretion 47, 75–6 of municipal law 211 on the limits of law 116 Geneva Protocol 1925 203 Genocide Convention 1948 203 economic loss (pure) 47–8, 53–4, 59–60 Glickman v Wileman (U.S.) 16–17 Edelstein v Schuler (U.K.) 67 Goodwin v Roberts (U.K.) 67 244 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW

Hague Conventions 1899, 1907 203 judicial decision Halifax (City) v Halifax IAFF (Canada) 96 as source of law 172–3 Hammerton v Honey (U.K.) 71–2 cognitive character of 173 Hart, H. L. A. 221 constitutive character of 173 contrasts legal and pre-legal 7, 63–4 judicial independence 134–6 criticism of Austin 39, 78–9 judicial review 20–1, 24–5, 119–20, 134 internal aspect of rules 45–6, 71, 205–7 as dialogue 126–7 on acceptance of law 8, 215 centralized and decentralized on international law 195–6 distinguished 125 on judicial discretion 46–9, 51, 76 preventive and repressive powers scorer’s discretion 97–8 distinguished 129 on legal realism 24–5 jus vs. lex 8, 221 on sources of law 117, 147–8 jus cogens 213–15 rule of adjudication 147 as supported by customary process rule of change 147 214–15 social rule theory of law 45–6, 71, 79– justice, circumstances of 22 80, 205–7 justiciability as applied to precedent 46–9 in international law 211 ultimate rule of recognition 79, 116–17, of unwritten constitutional principles 128, 147–8 132–8 Havana Railways (U.K.) 41 Hedley Byrne v Heller (U.K.) 53–4, 59–60 Kelsen, H. hierarchy among sources of law 152–3, basic norm, theory of 117, 185 160, 162, 166–7 on sources of law 145–7 axiological hierarchy 153 constitution 146 formal hierarchy 152–3 custom 184–5 logical hierarchy 153 legal transaction 169–70 material hierarchy 152–3 judicial decision 172–4 Historical School 155–6, 169, 181 historical sources of law 1, 117, 124 labour arbitration 3 Home Office v Dorset Yacht (U.K.) 53 arbitration tribunals and courts House of Commons Disqualification Act distinguished 89 (U.K.) 125 as source of law 86–103 Human Rights Act (U.K.) 19, 120 virtues of 88–9 Labour Relations Code (Alberta, Canada) 86–9, 96, 99 Income Tax Act (Canada) 13 Lange v ABC (Australia) 132 inner morality, of law 213 Langer v Commonwealth (Australia) 132 institutionalized normative system 2, 64, law 219, 221–3, 228 as ambiguous institution 25 International Court of Justice 195–6, 108– as autonomous institution 64 201, 203, 207–9, 216 as different from morality 2, 7 International Criminal Court 195 as system of exclusionary reasons 57–8 international law 3–5, 63, 195–207 coordinating function of 187, 195 International Law Commission 200–1 facilitating function of 112, 168, 195, 197 International Labour Organization 216 pre-philosophical and philosophical international legal order accounts distinguished 141 as legal institution 215–17 Lawrence v Hitch (U.K.) 77 interpretation legal transaction (Rechtsgeschäft) of statutes 4, 12–14, 131, 136, 201, 211 as source of law 168–72 legislation 1, 4–5, 7–26, 111, 125, 136, 201 Johnson v Clark (U.K.) 76–7 as linking contextual and deep JTI-MacDonald v Canada (Canada) 17 justification 26 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 245

as source of law 7–26, 127, 158–9 obiter dictum 36 as takings rights seriously 25 opinio juris et necessitatis constitutional review of 18, 20–1, 125, as “subjective” or “psychological” 181, 160, 163, 178–9, 192–3 187, 208–9 contrasted with adjudication 15–18 in continental legal doctrine 181–2 contrasted with precedent 14, 37–9, 52 in customary international law 205–10, kinds of 9 212 in civil law 153–67 in municipal customary law 71 supremacy of, in continental legal subjective aspect as “shared dogmatics 154-8 understanding” 209–10, 212 legitimacy, political 23, 31, 136, 197, 221 as to norm and as to process 209 London Street Tramways v LCC (U.K.) 34 Organization of American States 200 mechanical jurisprudence 56 pacta sunt servanda 201–3 mediation 3, 86 Pandektenrecht, doctrine of 156, 169 as source of law 103–122 parliamentary privilege 132–4 in international law 201 parliamentary sovereignty 9, 18–21, 26, under Acts regulating professions 111–12 37–9, 122, 126 under Alberta Human Rights Act 109–11 finality argument for 20–1, 26 under Saskatchewan Farm Security Act history of 19 105–8 trust argument for 20–1, 26 Mercer v Denne (U.K.) 83 particularistic decision-making 28–9, 60–1, Miliangos v Frank (QB, U.K.) 41 94–5, 108 Miliangos v Frank (HL, U.K.) 45 Patriation Reference case (Canada) 124 Mills v Colchester (U.K.) 71 per incuriam 35 Miron v Trudel (Canada) 130 persistent objector, rights of 198, 206 municipal law 197, 204–5 pluralism general principles of 211 and the sources of law 161, 165–7, 193–4 politics, circumstances of 22–3 Nationwide News v Wills (Australia) 131–2 positive law 8 natural justice 92, 95, 123, 211 positivism, legal 1, 8, 22–3, 79, 116, 141, natural language 12, 23 210, 213, 220–1 natural law 8, 210, 213, 220 exclusive and inclusive distinguished natural law theory 22–4, 141, 221 147 necessity, logical 40, 50–1 power 152 nec vi nec clam nec precario 71 Practice Statement (House of Lords 1966) NEGMA v Waind (Australia) 42 34, 44–5, 52, 58–9 nemo judex in causa sua 123, 128 Precedent 1, 4, 9, 12, 27–61, 79, 125, 127, New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova 136, 139, 201 Scotia (Canada) 121, 123, 133–5 as case-by-case reasoning 30 New Zealand Bill of Rights 119–20, 124 as content-independent mode of Noble v Durrell (U.K.) 70 reasoning 28 Normanton v Giles (U.K.) 40 as forward-looking 29–30, 53, 81 norms, variety of 2 bare notion defined 27 norms, in continental legal doctrine 152–3, binding precedent 81, 95–6, 228 164, 166–7 contrasted with persuasive precedent of competence 152–3 32–3, 176–8 on the organization of the state 164 contrasted with “example” 55, 177–8 “programmatic” 164 examples given 34 North American Free Trade Agreement not logical necessity 40, 51–2 202–3 comity theory criticized 43–5, 52, 55 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases distinguishing a precedent 14, 34–5 (International) 203, 205–6 enactment force of 46, 55 246 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW

exemplar force of 55 on authority 155, 158, 220–1 gravitational force of 46, 48, 55 on constitutions 115–16, 118 in civil law 31, 33, 174–9, 199 on distinguishing precedents 35 in common and civil law contrasted on institutionalized normative systems 174–7 2, 219 in international law 33, 97, 199 on primary norm-applying institutions justification of 59–61 20–1 natural model of 29, 61 sources thesis 1, 22, 144 opposed to argument from analogy 30–1 realism, legal 24, 41, 148–50, 183, 220, 227 opposed to particularistic decision- Re BC Telephone and FTWBC (Canada) making 28–9 100–1 opposed to reasoning from experience 29 Re Brewers’ Warehousing and persuasive precedent 175–6 IUBFCMYSDDWA (Canada) 90–1 contrasted with binding precedent Re Eastern Provincial and IAMAW (Canada) 32–3, 175–8, 228 93 in civil law 33, 97, 175–8 Re HLRABC (Nanaimo Regional) and HEU in labour arbitration 96–103 (Canada) 101–2 ratio decidendi 36–7, 46–7, 52–3, 57, 59 Re HLRABC (Royal Columbian) and HEU contrasted with obiter dictum 36 (Canada) 101–2 relationship to legislation 37–9 Re International Nickel Co. of Canada 101 rule-sceptics’ account criticized 41–3, Re Manitoba Language Rights (Canada) 129 48, 54–5 Re MFCWU v Safeway (MB CA, Canada) retroactive character of 27–30, 178 89, 91, 96 ruleness of 28–9, 55–6, 59 Re MFCWU v Safeway (SCC, Canada) 91, social rule theory criticized 45–9 96 strong Burkean theory of 58 Re Pharma Plus and UFCW (Canada) 92–4 two-level justification for 61 Re Royal Jubilee and HEU (Canada) 101–2 Wittgensteinian rule-following account Rechtsstaat, doctrine of 153–8 defended 49–56 res judicata 35 préclusion, see estoppel in international law 211–12 predictability, legal 149 in labour arbitration 90–6, 113 primary sources of law 153 Restatements of U.S. law 11–12 principles Re UEW and Standard Coil (Canada) 96 as optimization commands 164 Re United Steelworkers and Canadian contrasted with policies 128, 164, 211, Industries (Canada) 99–100 213 Re Valdi Foods and UFCW (Canada) 91–2 prospective overruling 178 Re Windermere Lodge and HEU (Canada) Provincial Judges case (Canada) 134–6, 139 101–2 rights quasi-institutionalized sources of law 2 fundamental 159–60, 192–3 Quebec Secession case (Canada) 136–40 inviolable 163, 188, 192–3 Quinn v Leathem (U.K.) 35 RJR-MacDonald v Canada (QueSC Canada) 17 R v Drybones (Canada) 120 RJR-MacDonald v Canada (SCC Canada) R v Fine (Canada) 110 16–18 R v Knuller (U.K.) 40 Robert’s Rules of Order 123 R v Morgentaler (Canada) 129 Rosetown CU v Jensen (Canada) 107 R v Oakes (Canada) 126 Ross, A. ratio decidendi 36–8, 46, 52–3, 57, 59, 80 on sources of law 148–50 as exclusionary reason 57–9 custom 149 Raz, J. legislation 148–9 exclusionary reasons, theory of 57–9 precedent 149 objections to 58–9 Rubin v Coors (U.S.) 15 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 247 rule of law, the 14, 137, 157 in labour arbitration 95–103, 113 rules vertical and horizontal operation abstractness and generality (civil law) distinguished 33–4 155–6, 158 State Practice 205–6 and allocation of power 11, 21 statute 9–10 contrasted with principles 164, 211 kinds of 10 enabling and disabling distinguished Statute of International Court of Justice 166–7 Article 38 198–201, 210–12, 215 of recognition 76, 79, 116–17, 128, 133, Article 59 198–9 147 strictly institutionalized source of law 2 not in international law 197–9 working definition of opaque vs. transparent to justification applied to constitutions 140–1 28–9, 94–5 applied to custom 83–4 rule-based decision-making 28–9 applied to delegation 86, 97, 103, as sub-optimal 60–1 112–13 rule-scepticism 41–3, 48 applied to international law 215–17 applied to legislation 7 Sara de Richford’s Case (U.K.) 65 applied to precedent 33 Saskatchewan Farm Security Act stated in full 3 (Saskatchewan, Canada) 105–8 subordinate legislation see delegation power of mediator under Act 107–8 subordination provisions summarized 105–7 by derivation 38, 68–9, 77–8, 81–2 Schachter v R (Canada) 130 by power of abrogation 38, 68–9, 77–8, Schauer, F. 81–2 bare notion of precedent 27 distinguished from derivation 38, 78, on constitutions 116 81–2 on constructing rules of precedent 29– Supreme Court Act (Canada) 122 30, 54–6 supreme law 19, 21, 118, 125–6, 133–4, on exclusionary reasons 58 138, 140 on forms of decision-making 28–9, 60– possible limits on 126 1, 94 on rules and allocation of power 11 tacit orders 39, 78–80 Schorsch Meier v Hennin (U.K.) 41 Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Shaw v DPP (U.K.) 40 (Australia) 132 secondary sources of law 153 Tobacco Act (Canada) 18 separation of powers, doctrine of 156, 175 Tobacco Products Control Act (Canada) Simpson v Wells (U.K.) 70 16, 18 social construction, of reality 228–9 travaux préparatoires 200 sources extra ordinem 151, 175 treaties 198–9, 201–4, 216 sources for the validity of law 144 contract, traité contracts 201–3 sources for the cognition of law 144 law-making, traité-loi 203–4 sources of lawmaking 144, 151–3 provisional definition 201 sovereignty relation to customary international law of the people 159 209–10 of the state 159 Tribunal Supremo, Spanish 175 Spartan Steel v Martin (U.K.) 47–8 Stanley v Georgia (U.S.) 54 stare decisis 27–61 United Nations 195, 200, 203, 206, 216 as normative practice 32 U.S. v Orito (U.S.) 54 as requiring courts to reach unjust U.S. v Reidel (U.S.) 54 decisions 56 U.S. v 37 Photographs (U.S.) 54 misleadingness of this idea 56–61 U.S. v 12 200' Reels (U.S.) 54 contrasted with res judicata 35, 96 U.S. v United Foods (U.S.) 16 248 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW validity, legal 1, 4, 136, 144–50, 197, 201, agreement in form of life, judgment and 222 opinion distinguished 49–50 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties on obeying a rule as a practice 49, 52 1969 213–14 on rule and application 50 Viro v R (Australia) 42 on rule and necessity 50–1 voluntarism, in international law 196–8, working definition, see strictly 209–10, 212–15 institutionalized source of law Vriend v Alberta (Canada) 130 World Trade Organization 195–6, 199, 216 World War II 160 Welfare State 161 Wyld v Silver (U.K.) 71 Whitman v American Trucking (U.S.) 122 Wilson v Willes (U.K.) 72 Young v Bristol Aeroplane (U.K.) 34, 44–6, Wittgenstein, L. 53 INDEXINDEX OF OF NAMES NAMES 249

Aarnio, A. 179, 231, 239 Byers, M. 196, 197, 205, 206, 207, 209, 20 Alexander, L. 8, 29, 56, 61, 116, 127, 215, (n. 5), 210, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 232 231 Alexy, R. 1, 30, 161, 163, 164 (n. 20), 179, Caminker, E. 32, 60, 232 231 Carré de Malberg, R. 157, 232 Allan, T. R. S. 141, 231 Castiglione, D. 166, 192, 194, 231 Allen, C. K. 1, 2, 9, 18, 19, 22, 32, 41, 42, Celano, B. 179, 232 43, 44, 48, 65, 67, 69, 69 (n. 4), 70, 71, Chrétien, J. 227 72, 72 (n. 7), 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, Clark, D. 31, 236 83, 85, 86, 180 (n. 30), 231 Coca Payeras, M. 175, 232 Aquinas, T. 23, 23 (n. 8), 231 Collier, C. 52, 232 Aristotle 223, 224 Cooke, D. 227 Atiyah, P. S. 1, 13, 231 Craig, P. 188, 189, 232 Austin, J. 19, 38, 39, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, Crombez, C. 189, 232 85, 112, 183, 195, 195 (n. 1), 198, 231 Cross, R. 4, 12, 13, 31, 32, 36, 38, 39, 57, 68, 71, 75, 77, 81, 82, 110, 232 Bache, I. 188, 233 Bale, G. 42, 231 D’Amato, A. 181, 185, 232 Barbera, A. 156, 231 Daintith, T. 172, 232 Barile, P. 164, 165, 231 Danto, A. 227 Bayefsky, A. 127, 231 David, R. 175, 232 Bell, J. 4, 12, 13, 232 De Búrca, G. 188, 189, 191, 232 Bellamy, R. 192, 194, 231 De Otto, I. 161, 232 Betti, E. 170, 231 Degan, V. 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, Beyleveld, D. 1, 231 212, 213, 214, 232 Bickel, A. 127, 231 Derham, D. 1, 2, 10, 11, 65, 69 (n. 3), 71, Bin, R. 166, 231 76, 236 Bix, B. 51 (n. 9), 231 Dias, R. W. M. 18, 35, 44, 66, 71, 74, 76, Blackshield, A. R. 42, 231 82, 83, 232 Blackstone, Sir W. 65, 69 Dicey, A. V. 9, 19, 122, 123, 125, 127, 158, Bobbio, N. 144, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 232 185, 231 Donoghue, S. 53, 54, 55, 139, 232 Böckenförde, E. W. 156, 231 Dworkin, R. 1, 4, 11, 24, 29 (n. 2), 46, 47, Bongiovanni, G. 143, 163, 164, 164 (n. 20), 55, 59, 76, 116, 163, 164 (n. 20), 210, 210 165, 165 (n. 21), 166, 167, 232 (n. 6), 233 Brandom, R. 187, 232 Bratman, M. 209 (n. 5), 232 Edwards, R. 19, 233 Brewer, S. 30, 232 Eichenberger, K. 158, 233 Bronaugh, R. 28, 28 (n. 1), 33, 37, 232 Einstein, A. 227 Brownlie, I. 185, 17, 199, 200, 201, Elliott, M. 24 (n. 10), 233 202, 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 212, Engle, G. 4, 12, 13, 232 214, 232 Esposito, C. 187, 233 Brownsword, R. 1, 231 Evans, J. 32, 233 Bryce, J. 122, 232 Bulygin, E. 173, 232 Fairhust, J. 188, 238 Burke, E. 58, 59 Feldthusen, B. 48 (n. 8), 53, 60, 233 Bushell, A. 127, 234 Finnis, J. 1, 8 (n. 1), 23, 24, 24 (n. 9), 233 250 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW

Fioravanti, M. 165, 165 (n. 21), 166, 233 Hogg, P. 13, 120 (n. 4), 121, 123, 124, 126, Fitzgerald, P. 8, 10, 11, 14, 65, 66, 67, 68, 126 (n. 6), 127, 234 71, 75, 77, 116, 233 Holmes, S. 166, 234 Forsthoff, F. 161 (n. 13), 233 Horowitz, D. 15 (n. 3), 234 Freeman, S. 24, 233 Hume, D. 22, 234 Fridman, G. H. L. 67, 233 Hurley, S. 28, 234 Friedman, L. 181, 233 Fuller, L. 213, 233 Irti, N. 161, 234

Jackson, P. 97 (n. 7), 234 Gaja, G. 190, 191, 233 Janis, M.W. 185, 234 Galgano, F. 168, 170, 176 (n. 26), 233 Jauffret-Spinosi, C. 175, 232 Gall, G. 1, 34, 233 Jellinek, G. 156, 158, 234 Galligan, B. 132, 233 Jinks, D. 196, 216, 234 Gardbaum, S. 115, 233 Jolowicz, H. 1, 63, 65, 67, 69 (n. 3), 70, 71, Gavazzi, G. 148, 233 83, 84, 234 George, S. 188, 233 Glenn, P. 33, 233 Kael, P. 227 Goldsmith, J. 197, 233 Kapteyn, P. J. G. 188, 189, 234 Goldstein, L. 52, 233 Kelly, J. 127, 134, 234, 235 Goldsworthy, J. 18, 19, 20, 21, 233 Kelsen, H. 117, 143, 144 (n. 2), 145, 146, Goodhart, A. L. 31, 32, 37, 233 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 160, 164, 165, Goodman, R. 196, 216, 234 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 179, Gorla, G. 175, 176 (n. 26), 234 181, 184, 185, 235 Goss, J. 104, 105, 234 Kontou, N. 183, 185, 235 Gozzi, G. 161, 167, 234 Kornhauser, L. 53, 235 Grotius, H. 199 Kötz, H. 154, 168, 239 Guastini, R. 143, 144, 145 (n. 3), 150, Kriele, M. 157, 175, 179, 235 151, 152, 152 (n. 6), 153, 159, 160, Kronman, A. 60, 235 160 (n. 11), 161, 162, 162 (n. 16), 163, 163 (n. 17), 163 (n. 18), 164, 164 (n. 19), La Torre, M. 193, 194, 235 165 (n. 22), 170, 173, 173 (n. 25), 175, Laband, P. 156, 158, 235 176 (n. 26), 178, 179, 185, 186, 187, 188, Larenz, K. 176, 180, 235 189, 190, 191, 191 (n. 31), 192, 234 Laruelle, A. 189, 235 Guest, A. G. 30, 234 Leavis, F.R. 227 Lee, H.P. 132, 235 Habermas, J. 167 (n. 23), 234 Levenbook, B. 55, 235 Haley, J. 31, 236 Lobban, M. 32, 64 Harrington, J. 120, 234 Luban, D. 60, 235 Harris, D. J. 195, 196, 201, 202, 205, 206, Luberto, M. 143 (n. 1), 144, 147, 169, 172, 207, 211, 214, 234 235 Harris, J. W. 31, 32, 36, 38, 39, 57, 68, 71, 75, 81, 82, 232 MacCormick, N. D. 1, 4, 13, 31 (n. 3), 36, Hart, H. L. A. 1, 7, 8, 25, 39, 45, 46, 147, 150, 175, 193, 222 (n. 5), 235 46 (n. 7), 47, 48, 51, 64, 71, 76, 78, 79, Manfredi, C. 127, 235 97, 116, 117, 128, 143, 145, 147, Manigk, A. 168, 235 147 (n. 4), 148, 150, 195, 196, 205, 206, Marinelli, V. 175, 176, 176 (n. 26), 235 207, 207 (n. 3), 215, 221, 234 Marshall, G. 123, 124, 236 Hartley, T. 1, 10, 234 Mavroidis, P. 196, 199, 236 Henkin, L. 118, 234 Mayer, O. 156, 236 Hiebert, J. 134, 234 Mazzarese, T. 173, 236 Hillier, T. 199, 200, 202, 206, 207, 208, McCrudden, C. 33, 115, 236 211, 234 Merryman, J. 31, 63, 134, 175, 236 INDEX OF NAMES 251

Mezzanotte, C. 165, 236 Riley, P. 199 Miers, D. 27, 32, 238 Rinella, A. 151, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, Milsom, S. 64, 65, 66, 70 (n. 5), 236 162, 163 (n. 18), 170, 172, 178 (n. 28), Modugno, F. 151, 160, 161, 179, 180, 181, 179, 185, 188, 191, 236 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 236 Roselli, F. 178, 237 Moore, M. 29 (n. 2), 236 Ross, A. 143, 144 (n. 2), 145, 148, 149, Morison, W. 78, 80, 236 150, 153, 163 (n. 17), 179, 182, 237 Morrone, A. 143 (n. 1), 161 (n. 14), 236 Ross, W. D. 223, 224, 226, 237 Mortati, C. 165, 236 Rotolo, A. IX, XI, 5, 143, 152 (n. 6), 237 Mtshaulana, P. 125, 129, 236 Rottleuthner, H. XI, 2, 117 (n. 2), 144 Rotunda, R. 122, 236 Nochlin, L. 227 Ruiter, D. W. 152 (n. 6), 237 Nowak, J. 122, 236 Nugent, N. 188, 236 Sacco, R. 156, 237 Salmond, Sir J. 8, 10, 11, 14, 66, 68, 71, 74, Ouyang, G. 208 (n. 4), 236 75, 77, 233 Sartor, G. XI, 4, 113 (n. 1), 173, 175, 177, Paladin, L. 159, 159 (n. 10), 161, 170, 172, 179, 187, 237 178, 179, 185, 186, 189, 236 Savigny, F von. 155, 170, 181, 237 Palmeter, D. 196, 199, 236 Schauer, F. 11, 27, 28, 29, 30, 54, 55, 56, Parisi, F. 183, 187, 236 58, 60, 94, 116, 237 Paton, G.W. 1, 2, 10, 11, 65, 69 (n. 3), 71, Schmitt, C. 156, 237 76, 236 Scognamiglio, R. 170, 237 Pattaro, E. XI, 10, 143 (n. 1), 144, 151, Shackleton, M. 188, 236 183, 185, 236 Shapiro, S. 209 (n. 5), 237 Patterson, D. 51 (n. 9), 236 Shaw, J. 188, 237 Peczenik, A. XI, 1, 3, 4, 13, 150, 179, 183, Sherwin, E. 8, 116, 215, 231 184, 219, 236 Shiner, R. IX, 8, 11, 15 (n. 4), 16, 22, 25, Pegoraro, L. 151, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 29 (n. 2), 46 (n. 7), 51 (n. 9), 58, 116 162, 163 (n. 18), 170, 172, 178 (n. 28), (n. 1), 128 (n. 7), 141, 143, 143 (n. 1), 179, 185, 188, 191, 236 145, 150, 151, 154, 158, 178, 183, 201, Perry, S. 58, 59, 236 207 (n. 3), 208 (n. 4), 210, 220 (n. 2), 221 Peters, C. 56, 60, 236 (n. 4), 222, 225 (n. 8), 236, 237 Peterson, J. 188, 236 Simplicius 226 Pizzorusso, A. 151, 172, 175, 176 (n. 26), Simpson, A. W. B. 35, 52, 238 178, 179, 185, 236 Soper, P. 1, 238 Plato 223 Sorrentino, F. 152, 153, 159, 161, 178, 179, Pocock, J. G. A. 227 180, 182, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, Posner, E. 197, 233 192, 193, 238 Postema, G. XI, 30, 31, 32, 60, 237 Spaak, T. 152, 152 (n. 6), 238 Prechal, S. 191, 237 Stein, P. 154, 238 Preuss, U. K. 166, 167, 193, 194, 237 Stone, J. 19, 115, 116, 238 Puchta, F. 155 Stone, M. W. F. 199 Suárez, F. 199 Radbruch, G. 161, 237 Summers, R. S. 1, 4, 13, 31 (n. 3), 175, 177, Ramsay, I. 15, 15 (n. 3), 237 231, 235, 238 Rawls, J. 22, 237 Raz, J. 1, 2, 20, 21, 22 (n. 6), 35, 57, 58, 59, 115, 116, 118, 144, 147 (n. 4), 155, 158, Tarello, G. 154, 155, 238 219 (n. 1), 220, 221, 237 Taruffo, M. 175, 177, 238 Reposo, L. 162, 236 Ten, C. L. 157, 238 Rescigno, G. U. 161 (n. 14), 237 Tesauro, G. 189, 191, 238 Rickett, C. 52, 237 Themistius 226 252 TREATISE, 3 - SOURCES OF LAW

Thomas, M. 125, 129, 236 Watson, A. 155, 180, 181, 182, 183, 239 Thornton, A. see Bushell, A. Weatherill, J. 96 (n. 10), 97, 98, 239 Trudeau, P. E. 121 Weinberger, O. 222 (n. 5), 235 Tully, J. 118, 238 Wieacker, F. 156, 239 Turpin, C. 115, 123, 238 Windscheid, B. 168, 239 Twining, W. 27, 32, 238 Winston, K. 41, 239 Winterton, G. C. 18, 19, 239 Valenze, F. 143 (n. 1) Wisdom, J. 30, 222, 239 Vanderlinden, J. 154, 238 Wittgenstein, L. 49, 50, 51, 51 (n. 9), 52, Vida, S. 143 (n. 1), 235 53, 236, 239 Vincenzi, C. 188, 238 Wróblewski, J. 150, 150 (n. 27), 239

Waldron, J. 9, 12, 15 (n. 3), 18, 20, 21, 22, Zagrebelsky, G. 145, 146, 154, 156, 157, 23, 24, 25, 154, 238 158, 161, 161 (n. 13), 162, 163, Walker, N. 115, 238 163 (n. 17), 166, 170, 171, 172, 178, 184, Walters, M. 123, 128, 133, 137, 138, 139, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 239 238 Zitelmann, E. 168, 239 Waluchow, W. J. 1, 75, 76, 147 (n. 4), 239 Zolo, D. 159, 239 Wasserstrom, R. 59, 239 Zweigert, K. 154, 168, 239 BIBLIOGRAPHYBIBLIOGRAPHY 181

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Abstraction 1–2, 3, 11–3, 31–4, 39–41, 45, Conceptual 3–6, 8–11, 11–3, 17–9, 24–5, 49–50, 50–1, 53–5, 55–7, 57–8, 59–60, 26–7, 38–9, 39–41, 41–2, 42–3, 43–5, 65–8, 76–7, 79–80, 83–5, 109–10, 115–7, 49–50, 50–1, 65–8, 73–5, 76–7, 78–9, 118–9, 123–5, 129–33, 133–6, 137–9, 81–3, 86–7, 87–90, 94–5, 96–8, 100–1, 139–40, 151–2, 160–2, 167 112–3, 140–3, 143–4, 154–6, 156–8, 162– Administrative law 28–9, 31–4 3, 163–5, 174–6 All-things-considered 87–90, 109–10, 152– jurisprudence 11–3, 24–5, 42–3, 65–8, 3, 154–6, 169–70, 170–8 76–7, 160–2 Analogy 8–11, 17–9, 20, 20–4, 24–5, 50–1, scheme 163–5, 174–6 65–8, 69–70, 73–5, 115–7, 123–5, 140–3, Constraint satisfaction 140–3 147–9, 174–6 “Constructive legal science” 1–2 Analytical 1–2, 3–6, 8–11, 11–3, 13–4, 31– Contractarianism 61–3, 72–3, 75, 77–8, 4, 39–41, 41–2, 42–3, 59–60, 65–8, 75, 79–80, 102–4, 104–5, 105–7, 119–20 76–7, 79–80, 81–3, 83–5, 100–1, 121–3, Contracts 3–6, 6–8, 17–9, 34, 34–5, 35–8, 125–7, 149–51, 170–4 43–8, 51–2, 52–3, 92–4, 115–7, 152–3, Apex norm, see Grundnorm 162–3 Application area of a rule 20, 20–4 Controversial 8–11, 20–4, 31–4, 42–3, Applicability of a rule 94–5, 95, 112–3, 121–3 46–7, 47–8, 53–5, 55–7, 57–8, 59–60, Assumptions in contracts 6–8, 31–4, 45–6, 68–9, 73, 76–7, 78–9, 79–80, 83–5, 47–8, 115–7, 162–3 87–90, 95, 96–8, 102, 102–4, 107–9, Authority, authority reasons 6–8, 14–5, 15– 111–2, 129–33, 133–6, 151–2, 153–4, 7, 17, 20, 24–5, 25–6, 26–7, 57–8, 87–90, 167, 169–70, 170–4 92–4, 115–7, 133–6, 163–5 Convention, social 45, 73–5, 87–90, 96–8, 129–33, 133–6, 167–9, 170–4, 176–7, Balancing, see weighing 177–8, 179–80 Correctness, claim to 86–7 Causation 6–8, 31–4, 34, 35–8, 50–1, 51–2, Criteria of law 90–2, 92–4, 94–5 53–5, 59–60, 69–70, 72–3, 115–7, 127–9 Critical legal theory 8–11, 65–8, 69–70 Circular 143–4, 170–4, 174–6, 176–7 Critical positivism 96–8 Cognitivism 167, 169–70, 177–8 Culpa, see negligence Coherent, coherence 1, 3–6, 6–8, 17, 19– 20, 20–4, 27–8, 34–5, 38–9, 43–5, 49–50, Deductivism 20–4, 75, 77–8 50–1, 51–2, 71–2, 76–7, 78–9, 79–80, Deep structure 24–5, 96–8, 115–7, 133–6, 81–3, 83–5, 85–6, 99–100, 105–7, 111–2, 147–9, 170–4 112–3, 115–65, 167–9, 169–70, 170–4, Defeasible 11–3, 13–4, 15–7, 20, 24–5, 26– 177–8, 179–80 7, 43–5, 50–1, 61–3, 87–90, 90–2, 94–5, Coherentism 79–80, 139–40, 144–6 115–27, 127–9, 129–33, 139–40, 144–6, Communitarian 8–11, 38–9, 105–7 147–9, 156–8, 160–2, 179–80 Concepts 3–6, 8–11, 11–3, 14–5, 15–7, 24– Democracy 6–8, 31–4, 75, 92–4, 111–2, 5, 31–4, 34–5, 42–3, 45–6, 57–8, 65–8, 137–9, 153–4 71–2, 73–5, 81–3, 83–5, 105–7, 112–3, Desuetudo 20, 125–7 115–7, 127–9, 129–33, 137–9, 146–7, Detached legal statements 87–90, 95–6, 152–3, 158–63, 167–9, 169–70, 174–6, 99–100, 100–1 179–80 intermediate 39–41, 160–2 Economics, see law and economics value open 127–9, 158–60 Emotion 73–5, 149–51 and system 162–3 Environmental law 6–8 194 TREATISE, 4 - SCIENTIA JURIS

Epistemic norms 8–11 Janus’s face of legal doctrine 3–6, 11–3 Equilibrium (reflective) 43–5, 53–5, 115–7, Judgment, faculty of 118–9 127–37, 137–9, 140–3, 143–4, 144–6, Jurisprudence, see legal theory 158–60, 160–2, 162–3, 167, 179–80 Juristic encyclopaedias 11–3 Everything 50–1, 79–80, 143–4, 144–6 Justice 3–6, 6–8, 20–4, 27–8, 35–8, 43–5, Expert 6–8, 8–11, 53–5, 69–70 47–8, 48–9, 49–50, 50–1, 51–2, 52–3, Exceptions 6–8, 13–4, 20–4, 38–9, 39–41, 53–5, 55–7, 77–8, 81–3, 86–7, 92–4, 96– 50–1, 69–70, 87–90, 90–2, 94–5, 115–7, 8, 99–100, 105–7, 107–9, 115–7, 118–9, 121–3, 125–7, 127–9, 133–6, 137–9 127–9, 129–33, 133–6, 137–9, 149–58, Exclusionary reasons 87–90 163–5, 170–4, 179–80 Explanation 3–6, 24–5, 78–9, 105–7, 140– commutative 43–5, 51–2 3, 149–51 corrective 35–8, 43–5, 49–50, 50–1, 53–5 distributive 43–5, 53–5 Fables 129–3 in different legal roles 156–8 Façade 3–6, 69–70, 123–5 Justification 3, 3–6, 6–8, 8–11, 13–4, 14–5, Falsification 129–3, 133–6 15–7, 20–4, 27–8, 31–4, 34–5, 35–8, 38– Fashion 11–3, 24–5, 52–3, 73, 75, 76–7, 9, 45, 45–6, 48–9, 49–50, 50–1, 51–2, 52– 81–3, 96–8, 174–6 3, 53–5, 55–7, 57–8, 59–60, 61–3, 69–70, Formalism in the law 41–2, 46–7, 49–50, 71–2, 79–80, 81–3, 87–90, 90–2, 95, 96– 69–70, 137–9, 158–60 8, 99–100, 102, 104–5, 115–7, 123–5, Foundationalism, foundationalist 75, 77–8, 127–9, 133–6, 137–49, 149–51, 162–3, 139–40, 144–6, 154–6 167, 167–9, 169–70, 170–4, 179–80 Foundherentism 139–40 contextually sufficient 79–80, 87–90, Framework 6–8, 8–11, 11–3, 34, 46–7, 79– 115–7 80, 104–5, 107–9, 152–3, 153–4, 160–2, context of 3–6 167, 170–4 profound, deep 8–11, 13–4, 42–3, 79– Fused statements de lege lata 3–6, 81–3, 80, 81–3, 87–90, 95, 96–8, 102, 107– 100–1, 133–6 9, 115–7, 127–9 Kaldor-Hicks criterion 43–5 Global reason 78–9 Knowledge 3, 3–6, 11–3, 13–4, 24–5, 28–9, Grundnorm 87–90, 90–2, 137–9 50–1, 55–7, 71–2, 76–7, 79–80, 85–6, 90–2, 95, 96–8, 102–4, 104–5, 105–7, Holistic 20–4, 78–9, 83–5, 118–9, 119–20, 111–2, 123–5, 127–9, 129–33, 136–7, 144–6, 146–7, 149–51, 154–6, 158–60, 137–49, 149–51, 153–4, 156–8, 158–60, 162–3 163–5, 169–70, 170–4, 176–7, 179–80 Human rights 6–8, 15–7, 28–9, 31–4, 35–8, Law and economics 45–6, 61–3 61–3, 83–5, 109–10, 112–3, 129–33 Layers of law 26–7, 96–8, 170–4 Leap (and transformation) 90–2, 174–6 Ideal, idealization 3–6, 8–11, 15–7, 50–1, Legal culture 13–4, 96–8, 109–10, 115–7, 61–3, 85–6, 86–7, 102–4, 104–5, 107–9, 127–9, 147–9, 170–4 109–10, 111–2, 152–3, 153–4, 154–6, “Legal dogmatics” 1–2 156–8, 160–2, 170–4, 176–7, 177–8 Legal Positivism 81–3, 87–95, 95–101, 102, Indeterminacy 27–8, 65–8, 69–70, 72–3, 115–7, 160–2, 170–4 73–5, 123–5, 125–7, 160–2, 179–80 Legal Realism 14–5, 24–5, 46–7, 61–3, 69– Individualism 38–9, 75, 77–8, 105–7 70, 71–2, 73–5, 76–7, 81–3, 83–5, 85–6, Influence of juristic theories 6–8, 53–5, 87–90, 90–2, 115–7, 169–70, 170–4 71–2, 73–5, 105–7 Legal roles 8–11, 156–8 Interest, jurisprudence of 11–3, 24–5, 65–8 Legal theory, Jurisprudence 1–2, 3, 8–11, Intuitions 43–5, 45–6, 53–5, 61–3, 102–4, 11–3, 26–7, 27–8, 31–4, 69–70, 73–5, 133–6, 167–9, 170–4 76–7, 79–80, 81–3, 86–7, 95, 96–8, 100– Irrationality, irrationalism 68–9, 69–70, 1, 102, 111–2, 118–9, 119–20, 147–9, 136–7 163–5 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 195

Legitimacy, legitimate, legitimation 3–6, Paradigm 20–4, 39–41, 59–60, 78–9, 79– 13–4, 14–5, 50–1, 69–70, 78–9, 83–5, 95, 80, 129–33, 133–6, 144–6, 147–9, 167 105–7, 111–2, 115–7, 147–9, 153–4, 156– Pareto criterion 43–5 8, 170–4 Passion for reason 118–9, 167–9, 169–70 Liberal 38–9, 43–5, 72–3, 85–6, 127–9, Platitudes 35–8, 76–7, 127–9, 129–33, 151–2, 158–60 133–6, 149–51, 167, 179–80 Linguistic turn 65–8 Pluralism 35–8, 45–6, 65–8, 73, 75, 96–8, Local 11–3, 24–5, 48–9, 50–1, 51–2, 65–8, 107–12, 129–33, 156–8, 163–5, 179–80 75, 76–7, 78–9, 105–7, 144–6, 154–6, Politics, political 3–6, 6–8, 11–3, 14–5, 17– 156–8, 163–5, 179–80 9, 24–5, 31–4, 34, 38–9, 42–3, 43–5, 45– 6, 50–1, 52–3, 61–3, 65–8, 69–70, 71–2, Meta-theory 8–11, 78–9, 102–4, 139–40, 73–5, 75, 77–8, 81–3, 83–5, 95, 105–7, 144–6, 167–9, 169–70, 170–4 111–2, 127–9, 147–9, 153–4, 156–8, 163– Middle level 31–4, 59–60, 69–70, 129–33, 5, 179–80 133–6, 179–80 Prima facie 13–4, 51–2, 95–6, 129–33, 169– Modern, modernist 6–8, 11–3, 35–8, 61–3, 70 65–8, 73, 75, 78–9, 81–3, 83–5, 87–90, see also: pro tanto 96–8, 105–7, 115–7, 137–9, 170–4, 174– Principles 3–6, 6–8, 13–4, 17–9, 20–4, 31– 6, 177–8, 179–80 4, 34, 34–5, 35–8, 38–9, 39–41, 45, 46–7, Motivation 8–11, 26–7, 76–7, 81–3, 87–90, 47–8, 50–1, 51–2, 53–5, 55–7, 59–60, 104–5, 170–4, 177–8 61–3, 65–8, 69–70, 72–3, 76–7, 77–8, Multicoherence 144–6, 149–51 78–9, 83–5, 95–6, 96–8, 102–4, 104–5, Narration, narrative 75, 140–3, 147–9, 109–10, 115–7, 118–9, 121–3, 123–5, 170–4 127–9, 133–6, 137–9, 140–3, 147–9, 151– Natural law 3–6, 6–8, 8–11, 43–5, 57–8, 2, 152–3, 153–4, 154–6, 160–2, 167–9, 65–8, 76–7, 81–3, 83–7, 87–90, 92–4, 170–4, 179–80 96–8, 102, 102–4, 154–6, 169–70, 170–4 Pro tanto 13–4, 15–7, 17, 20, 50–1, 87–90, Nature of things 24–5, 152–3, 162–3 121–3, 129–33, 154–6, 163–5, 169–70 Necessary connection 81–3, 83–5, 85–6, Procedural 8–11, 28–9, 31–4, 86–7, 121–3, 86–7 153–4 Negligence 6–8, 20–4, 31–4, 35–8, 47–8, Property, ownership 31–4, 34, 35–8, 38– 48–9, 50–1, 51–2, 52–3, 53–5, 55–7, 57– 43, 50–1, 53–5, 65–8, 79–80, 105–7, 8, 58–9, 59–60, 69–70, 79–80, 133–6 115–7, 143–4, 160–2, 174–6 Nonmonotonic 79–80, 90–2, 125–7 Normative, normativity 3–6, 11–3, 34–5, Ratio decidendi 11–3, 17–9, 25–6 35–8, 39–41, 42–3, 43–5, 45, 50–1, 53–5, Rational, rationalist 1, 3–6, 17, 20–4, 61–3, 55–7, 57–8, 61–3, 65–8, 68–9, 72–3, 73, 68–9, 69–70, 72–3, 76–7, 78–9, 81–3, 73–5, 75, 76–7, 77–8, 79–80, 81–3, 83–5, 83–5, 86–7, 95–6, 102, 102–4, 104–5, 85–6, 87–90, 92–4, 95, 95–6, 96–8, 100– 105–7, 107–9, 109–10, 111–2, 118–9, 1, 102, 102–4, 104–5, 105–7, 107–9, 112– 119–20, 125–7, 129–33, 136–7, 139–40, 3, 115–7, 127–9, 129–33, 133–6, 137–9, 147–9, 149–51, 151–2, 152–3, 153–4, 139–40, 144–6, 149–51, 152–3, 156–8, 162–3, 169–70, 170–4, 174–6, 177–8, 158–60, 160–2, 162–3, 163–5, 167, 167– 179–80 9, 169–70, 170–4, 177–8, 179–80 Reasons 1–2, 13–4, 14–5, 15–7, 17, 17–9, quote-unquote (inverted comas) 72–3, 20, 20–4, 24–5, 26–7, 43–5, 53–5, 81–3, 81–3, 87–90, 115–7 87–90, 99–100, 102, 104–5, 105–7, 107– 9, 115–27, 127–9, 129–33, 133–6, 140–3, Orthodox 55–7, 85–6, 127–9, 151–2 143–4, 146–7, 149–51, 151–2, 154–6, Ownership, see Property 158–60, 162–3, 163–5, 167–9 Outweighable 13–4, 115–7 decisive 121–3 contributing 115–7, 121–3 Pacta sunt servanda 6–8, 51–2, 152–3 Reasoning norms 13–4, 20–4, 115–7, 123– Palsgraf case 49–50 5, 147–9 196 TREATISE, 4 - SCIENTIA JURIS

Recommendation 1–2, 3–6, 15–7, 99–100 Standard 8–11, 11–3, 13–4, 14–5, 27–8, Reduction, reductionism 59–60, 69–70, 75, 28–9, 47–8, 52–3, 55–7, 69–70, 76–7, 76–7, 77–8, 90–2, 170–4, 174–6, 176–7 105–7, 107–9, 111–2, 119–20, 127–9, Reduction in statutory interpretation 20 133–6, 140–3, 146–7, 147–9, 149–51, Reflective equilibrium: see equilibrium 153–4, 154–6, 167–9, 169–70 Relative, relativism 8–11, 11–3, 51–2, 75, Supervene, supervenience, supervenient 107–9, 109–10, 111–2, 125–7, 167, 169– 129–33, 174–6 70, 170–4, 174–6, 179–80 Suum 83–5 Relevance, relevant 1–2, 13–4, 17–9, 19– System, systematizing 1–2, 3, 3–6, 8–11, 20, 20–4, 24–5, 31–4, 39–41, 43–5, 53–5, 11–3, 13–4, 17–9, 19–20, 20–4, 24–5, 100–1, 105–7, 111–2, 115–7, 123–5, 127– 26–7, 27–8, 31–4, 78–9, 83–5, 85–6, 86– 9, 133–6, 139–40, 144–6, 149–51, 162–3, 7, 87–90, 90–2, 92–4, 115–7, 119–20, 167–9, 170–4, 174–6, 176–7 123–5, 127–9, 137–49, 149–51, 151–2, Reliance 3–6, 27–8, 31–4, 45, 46–7, 47–8 154–6, 156–8, 158–60, 160–2, 162–3, Research program 11–3, 81–3, 129–33, 163–5, 169–70, 170–4, 174–6, 176–7, 133–6, 147–9 179–80 Resemblance 20–4, 31–4, 73–5, 96–8, 129– of doctrinal systems 38–9 33, 149–51, 158–60 of private law: inner and outer 34–5 Rhetoric 6–8, 8–11, 38–9, 105–7, 125–7 Right answer 95–6, 96–8, 107–9, 109–10, Teleological 3–6, 8–11, 17–9, 24–5, 34–5, 111–2, 169–70 47–8, 65–8, 158–60 Rule of law 28–9, 31–4, 65–8, 99–100, Theories 3, 3–6, 6–8, 8–11, 13–4, 20–4, 137–9, 149–51, 154–6 31–4, 34, 38–43, 43–8, 48–55, 55–60, Rule-following 69–70, 123–5 61–3, 65–75, 76–80, 83–7, 87–95, 95– 101, 102–7, 107–12, 115–27, 127–37, Sceptic, sceptical, scepticism 57–8, 68–9, 137–49, 149–58, 158–63, 163–5, 169–70, 69–70, 75, 77–8, 102, 105–7, 123–5, 170–8, 179–80 139–40, 144–6, 162–3 see: middle level Scientific, unscientific 3–6, 8–11, 11–3, Tradition 20–4, 65–8, 147–9 28–9, 39–41, 65–8, 71–2, 73–5, 119–20, Transformation, see leap 129–33, 133–6, 144–6, 147–9, 174–6, 179–80 Utilitarian 8–11, 51–2, 57–8, 61–3, 73, 102, Sedimentation 96–8 102–4, 104–5, 129–33, 139–40, 152–3 Segment 50–1, 76–7, 100–1, 127–9, 144–6, 156–8, 179–80 Sisyphus 78–9, 102, 144–6, 146–7 Vagueness, see indeterminacy Society-centred moral theory 102, 105–7, Valid law 1, 8–11, 13–4, 20–4, 35–8, 45, 111–2, 112–3, 167–9 47–8, 71–2, 73, 76–7, 77–8, 81–3, 83–7, Soft law 6–8, 15–7 87–95, 95–101, 102–7, 112–3, 174–6, Sources of the law 8–11, 13–4, 14–7, 26–7, 176–7 31–4, 41–2, 65–8, 90–2, 92–4, 115–7, 127–9, 129–33, 133–6, 147–9, 154–6, Weak theories 79–80, 81–3, 85–6, 87–90, 156–8, 162–3, 163–5, 170–4, 179–80 102–4, 104–5, 107–9, 129–33 Speaking and doing in legal doctrine 3–6, Weighing 13–4, 15–7, 20, 24–5, 31–4, 38– 77–8 9, 45–6, 49–50, 61–3, 75, 87–90, 99–100, Stability, stable 6–8, 11–3, 17–9, 31–4, 34– 107–9, 109–10, 112–3, 115–27, 127–9, 5, 59–60, 96–8, 125–7, 129–33, 133–6, 133–6, 139–40, 146–7, 151–2, 152–3, 137–9, 140–3, 147–9, 179–80 154–6, 160–2, 163–5, 169–70 INDEXINDEX OF OF NAMES NAMES 197

Agell, A. 2, 120, 181 Brockmöller, A. 12, 159, 183 Aarnio, A. XIII, 33, 40, 42, 42 (n. 10), 91 Brudner, A. 38, 39, 51, 56, 57, 105 (n. 16), (n. 6), 95, 96, 104 (n. 13), 110, 112, 120, 128, 183 134, 143, 152, 181, 190 Bulygin, E. 87, 93, 181, 183 Agge, I. 15 (n. 8) Burton, S. 46, 183 Alexander, L. 56, 59, 181 Bydlinski, F. 34, 35, 36, 37, 8, 183 Alexy, R. XIII, 19 (n. 12), 33, 86, 87, 91 (n. 6), 117, 118, 119, 153, 153 (nn. 14, 15) Calabresi, G. 48 Anderson, B. 3, 181 Canaris, K. W. 159 (n. 19), 161, 186 Andersson, H. 54, 181 Cardozo, B. N. 50 Andrews, W. (Justice) 50 Carnap, R. 175 Aquinas, Th. (St.) 44, 83, 86, 160 Cartwright, N. 80, 131, 183 Aristotle 10, 23, 38, 44, 83, 85, 160, 181 Castañeda, H-N. 76, 174, 183 Artosi, A. 167, 181 Chisholm, R. M. 139, 183 Atienza, M. 96, 122, 181 Christensen, A. 132, 183 Aubert, V. 6 (n. 2), 181 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 83 Augustine (St.) 83 Coase, R. H. 61 (n. 14) Augustus 6 Coleman, J. L. 11, 45, 50, 51, 181, 182, Austin, J. 82 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 192 Ayer, A. J. 69 Collins, H. 45, 183 Copp, D. 106, 107, 109, 111, 136, 168, Ban´kowski, Z. XIII, 24, 118, 148, 182, 192 169, 183 Barnett, R. E. 46, 182 Cudd, A. E. 103 (n. 11), 183 Barry, B. 151 (n. 12) Bell, D. 105 (n. 15), 109, 182, 191 Dahlman, C. XIII, 53, 99, 101, 109, 136, Bender, J. W. 110, 182 158, 183 Benson, P. VI, 41, 42, 44, 182 Dalberg-Larsen, J. 134 (n. 6), 183 Bentham, J. 38, 82, 102 Dancy, J. 70, 118, 125, 183 Berger, P. 95, 182 Daniels, N. 128, 183 Bergholtz, G. 3, 124, 137, 182, 185, 191 Darwin, C. 74, 129 Berlin, I. 110, 111, 182, 187 Davidson, D. 82 (n. 1), 144 Berndt, J. F. 143, 182 Dickson, J. 70, 125, 147, 157 (n. 17), 164, Bester, A. 12 183 Biernat, T. 15, 182 Doublet, D. R. 143, 182 Bindreiter, U. XIII, 90, 182 Dreier, R. 5, 31, 31 (n. 1), 32, 69, 120, 160, Bix, B. H. 86, 182 160 (n. 21), 183 Bjarup, J. 72 (n. 1), 82, 170 (n. 2), 182 Duff, R. A. 55, 56, 184 Björne, L. 6, 6 (n. 3), 40 (n. 8), 182 Duhem, P. 129 Blackburn, S. 109 Dworkin, R. 11, 28, 95, 103, 107, 108, 108 Blackstone, W. 34 (n. 17), 122, 138, 139, 151 (n. 12), 172, Blanshard, B. 141, 182 173, 184, 187 Block, N. 176, 182 BonJour, L. 80, 140, 140 (n. 8), 182 Eckhoff, T. 15, 184, 190 Bracker, S. 141, 183 Ehrlich, E. 66 Bracton, H. 23 Einstein, A. 130 Brandom, R. B. 22 (n. 1), 163, 183 Ekelöf, P. O. 24, 35, 47, 123, 160 (n. 22), Brewer, S. 23, 183 184 198 TREATISE, 4 - SCIENTIA JURIS

Elster, J. 4 (n. 1), 184 Himma, K. E. 70, 88 (n. 5), 96 (n. 9), 185 Eng, S. XIII, 1, 5, 100, 101, 160 (n. 22), Hitler, A. 93 168, 184 Hobbes, T. 38, 84, 85, 85 (n. 4) Engisch, K. 22 (n. 20), 184 Hohfeld, W. N. 41 (n. 9), 42 (n. 10), 43 Ewald, F. 97 Horwich, P. 167 Ewing, A. C. 141, 184 Hume, D. 38, 59, 68, 69, 161, 178, 185 Hunter, D. 24, 185 Farley, A. M. 126, 184 Hurka, T. 133 (n. 5), 156, 185 Finnis, J. M. 84, 85, 86, 95 (n. 8), 184 Fodor, J. 175 Jackson, B. 141, 173, 185 Foucault, M. 97 Jansen, N. 151, 186 Frändberg, Å. 10, 21 (n. 18), 82 (n. 2), 184 Jareborg, N. 57, 59, 186 Freeman, K. 126, 184 Jerusalem, F. W. 25, 186 Fried, C. 45, 184 Jescheck, H-H. 58, 59, 60, 186 Fuller, L. 33, 86, 150, 184 Kagan, S. 13, 186 Gaius 6 Kaldor, N. 45, 194 Gallie, W. B. 158, 184 Kamm, F. M. 65, 186 Gardner, J. 129, 184 Kanger, S. 42 (n. 10) Gauthier, D. 104 (n. 14) Kant, I. 10, 45, 49, 52, 61 (n. 15), 72, 75, Genghis Khan 87 78, 84, 85, 102, 104 (n. 14), 105, 111, Gény, F. 66 118, 120, 131, 133, 140, 152, 160 George, R. P. 96 (n. 5), 184 Kantorowicz, H. 66 Goodin, R. 151 (n. 12) Kaufmann, A. 21, 186, 190 Goodman, N. 174, 184 Kelsen, H. 89, 90, 93, 99, 102, 138, 139, Gordley, C. J. 44, 184 182, 186, 188 Gordon, T. F. 125, 184 Khomeini 87 Graver, H. P. 164, 184 Kimel, D. 44, 186 Grotius, H. 38, 84 Klatt, M. 163, 186 Gustafsson, H. 145 (n. 10), 164, 184 Koriath, H. 60, 186 Gutmann, A. 152, 154, 184 Kronman, A. T. 28, 44, 186 Krygier, M. 148, 186 Haack, S. 80, 140, 142, 185 Kuhn, T. S. 130, 134, 143, 147, 186 Habermas, J. 95, 97, 98, 104 (n. 14), 153, Kutz, C. 56, 186 153 (nn. 15, 16), 185 Hage, J. C. XIII, 68, 80, 112, 122, 125, Laband, P. 97 141, 147, 170, 177, 178, 185, 188 Lagerspetz, E. 176, 176 (n. 3), 186 Hägerström, A. 69, 71, 72, 72 (n. 1), 76, Lakatos, I. 130, 143, 148, 186 77, 182, 185 Lamont, J. 151, 186 Hand, L. (Justice) 48, 48 (n. 12), 53 Landes, W. M. 54, 186 Hare, R. M. 104 (n. 12, n. 14), 185 Lang, W. 82 (n. 3), 186 Harman, G. 108, 109, 185 Larenz, K. 11, 25, 60, 66, 158 (n. 18), 159, Harsanyi, J. C. 103, 185 159 (n. 19), 161, 186 Hart, H. L. A. 9, 11, 55, 65, 82, 88 (n. 5), Lehrberg, B. 35, 47, 47 (n. 11), 162, 186 93, 115, 149, 185 Lehrer, K. 80, 141, 144, 145, 145 (n. 9), Hayek, F. A. 33, 185 182, 186 Heck, P. 13, 66, 185 Lind, J. 26, 187 Hedenius, I. 72, 101, 185 Lindahl, L. XIII, 40 (n. 7), 42 (n. 10), 118, Hegel, G. W. F. 7, 10, 38, 51, 56, 60, 65, 161, 187, 188 85, 102, 105, 144, 159, 160, 183, 185 Llewellyn, K. N. 123, 187 Hellner, J. 4, 21, 46, 51, 52, 65, 185 Locke, J. XIII, 34, 38, 84, 85, 85 (n. 4) Henry VII of England 87 Lodder, A. 126, 187 Hicks, J. 45, 194 Lövdén, L. E. 8 (n. 4) INDEX OF NAMES 199

Lucas, J. R. 94, 151, 187 167 (n. 1), 168, 169, 170, 173, 177, 178, Luckmann, T. 95, 182 181, 182, 183, 185, 187, 188, 189, 192 Luhmann, N. 70, 149, 187 Perelman, C. 104 (n. 13), 127, 131, 188 Perry, S. R. 48, 49, 51 (n. 23), 88, 188 MacCallum, G. C. 44, 187 Peterson, C. 5, 189, 190, 191 MacCormick, D. N. 1, 3, 11, 15, 18, 25, 25 Petraz˙ycki, L. 74, 170, 188, 189 (n. 22), 27, 28 (n. 23), 124, 138, 150, 181, Pettit, P. 107, 189 187, 192 Philip II of Spain 87 Mackie, J. L. 108, 187 Pigou, A. C. 48 Macklem, T. 119, 184 Pinochet 87 Malt, G-F. 15, 187 Plato 38, 163 Manero, J. Ruiz 96, 122, 181 Pojman, L. P. 151 (n. 12), 189 Marmor, A. 86, 88 (n. 5), 96 (n. 9), 125, Pol Pot 93 187, 191 Polanyi, M. 148, 189 Marx, K. 38, 67, 68 Pollock, J. L. 20, 119, 189 Maurer, H. 33, 34, 187 Popper, K. R. 3, 10, 129, 130, 130 (n. 4), McNaughton, D. 68, 187 133, 143, 189 Mill, J. S. 38, 56 Posner, R. A. 48, 48 (n. 12), 53, 54, 61, 62 Miller, D. 132, 184, 187 (n. 14), 61, 86, 136, 186, 189 Modestinus 6 Postema, G. J. 10, 23, 28, 125, 189 Möller, E. 47 (n. 11) Pound, R. 67 Mommers, L. 171, 187 Prakken, H. 125, 184, 185, 189 Moore, M. 59, 75 (n. 2), 86, 88, 95 (n. 8), 187 Puchta, G. F. 13, 65, 97 Mulhall, S. 105 (n. 15), 187 Pufendorf, S. 38, 84, 85 Müller, F. 70, 187 Putnam, H. 175, 191

Nagel, E. 111, 187 Quine, W. V. O. 82 (n. 1), 141, 144, 174, Nagel, T. 151 (n. 12) 175, 189 Navarro, P. E. 94, 187 Rabin, R. L. 50, 189 Nergelius, J. 26, 33, 187 Rabinowicz, W. XIII, 13, 118, 142, 144, Neurath, O. 175 170, 189 Nicander, H. 38 (n. 4), 187 Radbruch, G. 160, 178, 189 Noll, G. 70, 188 Raisch, P. 18, 189 Nowak, K. 33, 188 Rawls, J. 38, 102, 103, 104, 105, 105 Nozick, R. 38, 102, 104, 132 (n. 15), 111, 120, 127, 128, 133 (n. 5), 141, 151 (n. 12), 153, 154, 156, 159, 160, Odelstad, J. 40 (n. 7), 118, 161, 187, 188 189 Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 104 (n. 13), 127, 188 Raz, J. 15 (n. 7), 65, 70, 88, 89, 93, 95, 96, Olivecrona, K. 72, 77, 84, 93, 103 (n. 11), 99, 124, 125, 163, 164, 189 120, 170, 188 Reichenbach, H. 129, 190 Ost, F. 73, 185 Reidhav, D. XIII, 61, 103, 190 Rescher, N. 78, 79, 105, 141, 152, 190 Papinian 6 Richardson, M. 43, 190 Pareto, V. 45, 194 Rolf, B. 148, 190 Parfit, D. 151 (n. 12) Rorty, R. 82 (n. 1) Pattaro, E. XIII, 15, 73, 74, 170, 188 Ross, A. 15 (n. 7), 20, 27, 40, 69, 72, 93, 120, Paulson, S. L. 90, 186 151, 160, 160 (n. 22), 161, 170, 188, 190 Paulus 6 Rousseau, J. J. 38 Peczenik, A. XI, XIII, 5, 9, 12, 13, 25, 25 Roxin, C. 60, 190 (n. 6), 26, 27, 25, 32 (n. 2), 33, 52, 54, 55, 65, 68, 74, 79, 88, 91, 92, 92 (n. 6), 93, Sandström, M. 5, 190 110, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 132, 133, Sartor, G. XIII, 83, 107, 121, 125, 145, 144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 153 (n. 15), 155, 146, 150, 174, 184, 185, 189, 190 200 TREATISE, 4 - SCIENTIA JURIS

Savigny, F. C. 5, 18, 19 (n. 17), 65, 97, 134, Tranöy, K. E. 129 (n. 3), 191 138, 159, 190 Trebilcock, M. J. 45, 183, 191 Scanlon, T. M. 80, 104, 104 (nn. 12, 13, Tuori, K. VII, XIII, 96, 97, 98, 116, 136, 14), 105, 190 147, 173, 191 Schauer, F. 28, 88, 190 Schmidt, F. 15, 124, 185, 190 Ulpian, Ulpianus 6, 88 Searle, J. R. 80, 174, 176, 190 Ussing, H. 47 (n. 11), 190 Sellars, W. 82 (n. 1) Shapiro, S. J. 96 (n. 9), 181, 182, 183, 184, Van Hoecke, M. 12 (n. 5), 73, 185 185, 186, 187, 190, 191 Verdross, A. 86, 191 Shiner, R. 15, 27, 28, 88, 190 Verheij, B. 116, 125, 191 Simmonds, N. E. 41 (n. 9), 190 Von Heck, P. 13, 66, 185 Sintonen, M. XIII, 78, 190 Von Jhering, R. 13, 65 Smith, A. 38 Von Kirchmann, J. H. 73, 186 Smith, M. 68, 109, 131, 190 Von Kries, J. 53 Smith, S. A. 45, 190 Von Kutschera, F. 143 Sosa, E. 175, 191 Von Wright, G. H. 167, 181, 191 Spector, H. M. 61, 62, 168, 188, 191 Stegmüller, W. 143, 191 Stoll, H. 54, 191 Wagner, H. 95, 191 Stone, M. 125, 191 Waldron, J. 38, 191 Strömberg, T. 103 (n. 11), 176 (n. 3), 191 Walzer, M. 152, 184, 191 Suber, P. 78, 191 Wasserstrom, R. A. 3, 27 Summers, R. S. 1, 11, 15, 15 (n. 6), 18, 25, Wedberg, A. 40, 92, 160 (n. 22), 191 25 (n. 22), 27, 28 (n. 23), 46, 47, 124, Weigend, T. 58, 59, 60, 186 134, 139, 150, 187, 191 Weinrib, E. J. VI, 49, 50, 51, 85, 189, 191 Sunstein, C. R. 70, 191 Wilhelm, W. 95, 159 (n. 20), 191 Svensson, O. 44, 191 Williams, B. 70, 125, 192 Swanton, C. 44, 128, 158, 191 Windscheid, B. 45, 47, 65, 192 Swift, A. 105 (n. 15) Wittgenstein, L. 70, 82 (n. 1), 125, 159, 162, 192 Tarski, A. 167 Wolenski, J. XIII, 144, 192 Taylor, C. 110, 191 Wróblewski, J. 9, 18, 18 (n. 1), 134, 170, Thagard, P. 80, 137, 141, 142, 145, 146, 188, 192 149, 191 Thompson, D. 154, 184 Zahle, H. 164, 192 Thomson, J. J. 108, 109, 185 Zetterquist, O. 85 (n. 4), 192 Toepel, F. 60, 191 Zipursky, B. 34, 192 Toulmin, S. 127, 129 (n. 3), 191 Zitting, S. 49, 192 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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13 act in the law see Rechtsgeshaft¨ 13 action 55 abstract 21 ≡ 55 behavioural 439 155 characterisation of 439–40 ↑ 221 behavioural 439 ↓ 221 productive 439 ∈ 224 description 445 ⊆ 224 as a proposition and as a term 445 ⊂ 224 as proposition and terms 445–6 ∪ 224 atomic 445 ⊆ 224 designator 445 [ 406 in a social context 247–52 ] 406 logic of 442–5 ⇑ 501 logical analysis of 440–5 660 negative 448 ⇒ 672 omissive 448 ¬ 742 operators 440–2 power see power, action- a fortiori 223 productive 440 additive 224 proﬁle 248, 252 and values 758 proposition 445 bidirectional 225 sentence 445 dimensional 233 ActionPower 579 subtractive 225 admissibility AbsoluteOblRight 515 of an argument see argument, admissi- abstract bility of action see action, abstract adoption action-power see power, action-, ab- policy stract source-based 336 enabling power see power, enabling, substantive 336–8 abstract teleological 337 instruction see action, instruction worthiness 88 plan see plan, abstract agent AbstractPower 581 cognitive 8 AbstractEnablingPower 582 concerns of see concern, of an agent acceptability reactive 7 of an argument see argument, accept- agreement 609 ability of analogical reasoning acceptance and case-based reasoning see case- policy 291 based reasoning, and analogical collective adoption of 291–4 reasoning accrual anancastic of reasons 234–40 822 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

proposition see proposition, anancastic see logic, autoepistemic rule see rule, anancastic autonomy AND 408 contractual see contract, and autonomy Antigone 136–44 proclamative 626 approach to problem-solving axiology anticipatory 395 and priority 710 practical 396 reactive 396 background 741 responsive 396 balancing teleological 396 and weighing see weighing, and balanc- argument 670 ing acceptability of 698–701 behavioural admissibility of 698, 701–2 action see action, behavioural based upon premise set 675 instruction see instruction, behavioural characteristic function over 704 policy 34 collision of 679–82 behaviourism 8 defeasible 696 belief 12 defeat see defeat, of arguments common 252 defensible 703 normative 93, 100–5, 292 inferential 670 of a community 343 justified 696, 702–3 priority see priority, beliefs justified I 704 revision justified II 707 and priorities see priority, and belief logic 695 revision meta-level 678–9 Believes 482 notion of 670 binary overruled 696, 703 factor see factor, binary proof of 706, 707 binding rebutting collision of 681 goal 94 self-defeating 718, 721 instruction see instruction, binding semantics and proof theory 697–8 intention see intention, binding set preference 94 conflict-free 698 Binding 604 status of 695–7, 703 bindingness 88, 338–9, 385 argumentation and convergence 345–6 legal and meta-syllogism 604–6 inferential 669 and optimal law 368–71 procedural models of 325–9 and political conflict 368–77 assurance and rationality 344–5 and sanctions see sanction, and assur- and unacceptable law 371–7 ance cognitive 93–6, 108 dilemmas see dilemma, assurance definitions and grounds of 357–61 attack 682 legal 331 attempt legal and moral 378–9 of a proclamation see proclamation, at- of a mental state 88 tempted proposition 380–1 audience reasoning about 343–4 of legal and moral arguments 279 source-based 344 authority teleological 344 and delegation 165–6 textual 641 autoepistemic logic bivalence 489 bounded INDEX OF SUBJECTS 823

cogniser see cogniser, bounded instruction see instruction, cognitive rationality see rationality, bounded justifiability see justifiability, cognitive Brings 441 optimality 106–12 burden 531 collective 283 burden of proof 77 constitutivity of see constitutivity, Buridan’s ass 197, 495 of cognitive optimality issues in legal reasoning 490 plural 283 psychology see psychology, cognitive case cognitive state 10, 48 and theory-construction see theory- collective 268–70 construction, and cases optimality of 277 background 741 participability of 278 explanation and justification of 738– rational adoption of 274–7 40 of a collective 273 explanation of 752 plural 274 in common and civil law 735–7 plural, optimality of 278 Cato 761, 765, 773 coherence 126 causality of practical theories 126–7 and imputation 564 of theories and normative conditionals see norma- metrics 783–4 tive conditional, and causality collective circumstance adoption of a situation see situation, circum- of acceptance policies see accep- stance of tance, policy, collective adoption of citation adoption of multiagent plans see plan, of a case 744 multiagent, collective adoption clause and plural optimality see optimality, normative 293 collective and plural closed-world assumption 496 cognitive state see cognitive state, col- closure lective of normative systems 493 intention see intention, collective rule 493 intentionality see intentionality, collec- most-liberal 494 tive cogniser legal intentionality see intentionality, bounded 109 legal, collective optimal 109 optimality see optimality, collective unbounded 109 rationality see rationality, collective cognition reasoning see reasoning, collective and reasoning see reasoning, and cog- collective-concerned nition reasoning see reasoning, collective- critical 19 concerned epistemic 11 collective-directed epistemic and practical 11–6 concern see concern, collective-directed explicit 7–16 reasoning see reasoning, collective- implicit 3–7, 42–4 directed practical XXV, 11, 14, 16–40 collectivistic collective 321 value see value, collectivistic relativisation of 117–9 collision 62 cognitive and evaluation 689–92 bindingness see bindingness, cognitive and preference see preference, and col- delegation see delegation, cognitive lision duty 88 824 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

of arguments see argument, collision of generalisation see generalisation, of partial priority- see priority, collision, conditioned reflexes partial specialisation see specialisation, of rebutting 64–5, 679, 682 conditioned reflexes total priority- see priority, collision, to- conditioning tal operant 5–7 undercutting 65–6, 679, 682–5 conjecture 81 undercutting collision between argu- and heuresis see heuresis, and conjec- ments 681 tures combinatorial explosion 83 conjunction 408 command 37–8 connectives and reasons see reason, and commands propositional 407–9 as declaration of intention 37 conscience commitment 18, 31–2 and legal intuition 134 in a dialogue 310 consensus common and cognition 109–12 belief see belief, common and rational participation see partici- knowledge see belief, knowledge pation, rational, and consensus communal theory of truth see truth, consensus the- cognition see cognition, communal ory of comparative evaluation see evaluation, constant comparative logical 423 complement 449 constitutionalism 374–7 completeness constitutive of the law 488–97 rule see rule, constitutive con-node 705 constitutivity conative of cognitive optimality 106–13 state 14, 17–8 context doxification of see doxification, of justification of see justification, context conative states of concern of discovery 84 collective-directed 242–3 of justification 84 of an agent 241–7, 267–8 contract 591–3, 609–10 other-directed 241 and autonomy 591–3 self-directed 241 freedom of 592, 626 conclusion 13, 49 from status to 591 justified 752 interpretation of 595 prima facie see prima facie, conclusion contractual autonomy see contract, free- pro tanto see pro tanto, conclusion dom of status of 703 contradiction subconclusion 13, 49 and incompatibility see incompatibil- conditional ity, and contradiction instruction see instruction, conditional contraposition 546 material 409 convention 262 most-specific 567 cooperation 248 normative 521–75 coordination 267–81 transitivity of 417 and prioritisation 353–5 conditioned dilemmas see dilemma, coordination reflexes see reflexes, conditioned game see game, coordination and learning see learning, and con- counterargument 682 ditioned reflexes counterexample 762–5 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 825

as-on-point 762 temporal interruption 570 trumping 762 deferment COUNTS-AS 574 rational 61 counts-as 551 delegation and normative conditionals see norma- and authority see authority, and dele- tive conditionals, and counting as gation and representation 625 cognitive 161, 163–4 and time 574–5 concept of 162–3 event 575 coordination-based 163 state 574 and authority 172 Creon 136–44 effort-based 163 critical qualification-based 163 cognition see cognition, critical and authority 171 thinking and rationalisation see ratio- deliberation 284 nalisation, and critical thinking deliberative democracy see democracy, de- custom 654 liberative as a source of law 653–5 democracy deliberative 323 decision theory 24 deontic declaration of intention see intention, dec- contingency laration of principle of 474 deduction emergence see emergence, deontic critiques against 398–401 initiation see initiation, deontic defences of 401–3 logic 453–4 in legal reasoning 393–8 old system of 474 defeasibility 59 standard 474 and legal procedures 79–80 negation 479–81 and probability 73–5 paradoxes 475 external 696 propositions in law and morality 75–81 categorical 471 in legal language 77 personally-general 471 internal 696 status 453 of legal concepts 78–9 and speech acts 464 rationale of 59–62 termination see termination, deontic defeasible depoliticisation 324 ratiocination see ratiocination, defeasi- desire 17 ble doxification of 92 defeat 62, 198, 685, 687 epistemic 27–9 derived 688 instrumental 22–3 notion of 686–8 to know 27–9 of arguments 685–94 detached prima-facie 699 point of view see point of view, de- strict 699 tached reciprocal 196 detachment 13 strict 66, 198, 687 in legal reasoning 381–5 defeater 63 determination defeating schema (introduction) normative 524–6 doxastic meta-undercut 130 and conditionals see normative con- inapplicable specification 684 ditional, and normative determina- inapplicable syllogism 683 tion meta-undercut 129 deterministic teleological defeat 72 826 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

plan see plan, deterministic dimensional value 769 reasoning see reasoning, deterministic leftward 769 dialectical leftward outcome 232 games 306 sets of, comparative strength 232 protocol 305 with double direction 182 formal 306 dimensional formal and informal 305 support 232 system 304–7 direction of fit characterisation of 307–8 word-to-world 594 description and design of 305 disability 586 function of 307 Disability 586 structure 308–15 discourse 670 dialectics discovery computational 327 context of 401 descriptive 305 justification of see discovery, context of formal 305 disjunction 408 theory based 751–3 distinguishing 542, 762–5 unilateral 80 and downplaying 778–83 dialogue 304–7 downplaying distinction 775–8 -shift 317 theory-based 755–6 and cognition 320–5 docility 270 and deliberative democracy 320–5 doctrine and procedure 318–20 as a source of law 656–7 and truth see truth, and dialogue Does 440 combination of 315–7 Does∗ 450 information-seeking 313–4, 319 dominant negotiation 314, 319 choice 255 persuasion 310–3, 318 Done∗ 450 advantages 316 double contingency 251–2 practical inquiry 314 downplaying reconciliation 315, 320 and distinguishing see distinguishing, shifts 315–7 and downplaying dilemma doxastification see doxification assurance 264–6 doxification 87–99 coordination 260–1 of cognitive instructions see instruc- prisoner’s 253–6 tion, doxification of cognitive structured situations 256–7 of conative states 92–3 dimension 182 doxified -based inference 231–3 conditional intention see intention, rightward outcome 231 doxified conditional and factors see factor, and dimensions desire see desire, doxification of and priorities see priority, and dimen- intention see intention, doxification of sions liking see liking, doxification of and standards 186–7 may-intention see intention, doxified and values 767–8 may- description of 768 planning see planning, doxified dimensional outcome 769 practical reasoning see reasoning, dox- leftward 769 ified practical rightward 769 shall-intention see intention, doxified dimensional position 769 shall- dimensional spectrum 768 duty INDEX OF SUBJECTS 827

Hohfeldian notion of 511 rule see rule, exclusionary other-directed 509 expectation sentence in form of judgment 101 common 339 expected utility 24 efficacy experiment of proclamations see proclamation, ef- and truth see truth, and experiment ficacy of explanandum 394 emergence 552 explanans 394 non-deontic 540, 662 explanation deontic 550 of a case see case, explanation of event 550, 573 explanatory power 759 event- external and representation 625 justification see justification, internal normative 572–4 state 572, 573 Facult 464 enabling fact power see power, enabling brute 663 EnablingPower 582 extinctive 532 endorsement impeditive 532 absolute 663 institutional 663 relative 663 operative 527 endoxa 78, 282, 312 factor 181–94 enumerative -based priority see priority, factor- induction see induction, enumerative based epistemic abstract 774 desire see desire, epistemic and dimensions 182–3, 765–73 rationality see rationality, epistemic and outcome 177 reasoning see reasoning, epistemic and practical inference 190–1 state 12 and principles 183–6 equilibrium and priorities see priority, and factors Nash see Nash-equilibrium and propensity 177–8 evaluation and teleology 178–80 comparative background 741 simplified 158–61 based-reasoning see reasoning, factor- of colliding arguments see collision, based and evaluation binary 182 of outcomes 153–4 description 742 of plans see plan, evaluation dimensional 182 event hierarchy 774–5 emergence see emergence, event in case-based reasoning 189–90 event calculus 570 in legislation 187–9 evolution 4 ordering over sets of factors see order- and social learning 269 ing, over sets of factors exception reasoning with 177–91 and priorities see priority, of exceptions scalable 182 explicit 77 facultative 462–4 rule 207 FAILED 727 exceptionality family resemblance 191 and priority 709 fluent 433 exclusionary FON axiom 457 reason see reason, exclusionary FORANY 423 right see right, exclusionary Forb 456 828 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

forbidden 458 hypothesis 12 forbiddenness 458 hypothetical FORSOME 423 imperative see imperative, hypothetical foundations of rationality see rationality, foundations of identification with a group 382 game IF-THEN 409 assurance 265 iff 408 coordination 260, 281, 347 imitation 7 dialectical 306 immunity 586 theory 252 Immunity 586 gaps imperative 32 of the law 488–97 hypothetical 29, 531 general technical 29, 531 intention see intention, general implicature 443 generalisation implicit of conditioned reflexes 5 cognition see cognition, implicit generality and reasoning see reasoning, and content- 526 implicit cognition personal 526 knowledge see knowledge, implicit of deontic propositions see deontic, imputation propositions, personally-general and causality see causality, and imputa- generation 441, 524 tion generic inapplicability normative power see power, normative, and undercutting see undercutting, generic and inapplicability GenericPower 578 incompatibility 64–5 goal 17, 48, 94 and contradiction 682 binding see goal, preference individualistic instrumental 22–3 value see value, individualistic good 92 induction sufficently 19 enumerative 59 grammar 9 ineffective Grundnorm 360, 630 proclamation see proclamation, ineffective happens 446 ineffectiveness happens at time 434 of a proclamation see proclamation, in- hermeneutical effective point of view see point of view, inference hermeneutical conclusive and defeasible heuresis 81–5 combination 732–4 and conjectures 81–2 perceptual 59 and ratiocination 83–5 temporal persistence 60 hierarchy inferential and priority see priority, by superiority meaning see meaning, inferential Hohfeldian concepts information-seeking obligational set 510–3 dialogue see dialogue, information- potestative set 585–7 seeking Hohfeldian positions see Hohfeldian con- initiates 567 cepts initiation holds at time 434 deontic 549 Hypo 761, 762 non-deontic 550, 662 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 829 inquiry invalidity and truth see truth, and inquiry of a proclamation see proclamation, in- institution valid and bounded rationality see rational- IS NORMATIVELY DETERMINED 524 ity, bounded, and institutions instruction 17, 32–5, 48, 94 judicial behavioural 34–5 syllogism see syllogism, judicial binding 95 jump 59, 230, 745 cognitive 34–5, 96 justice conditional 21, 33, 521 restaurative 320 doxification of cognitive 96–9 justifiability doxified conditional 100 cognitive 107, 108, 326 general 33 inferential 106, 326, 669, 697, 698 may 39–40 formal characterisation 703–4 standing 30 proof 704–27 temporalised 32 semantics of 698–704 instrumental rational 107 desire see desire, instrumental justifiable 106 goal see goal, instrumental justification intellectualism 41 context of 401 intention 17–8, 31–5 external 401 binding 100 first-level 677 collective 39 internal 401, 677 declaration of 589 doxification of 92 know-how 29 doxified may-intention 101–2 knowledge and permittedness 101 common 270 doxified shall- 100–1 explicit 8 general 38–9 implicit 7, 8 may 39–40, 458 other-directed 17, 35–8 language reflexivity of 36 Chomsky on 9–11 self-directed 17, 35 learning 4–7 intentional and conditioned reflexes 5 state 48 social intentional stance see stance, intentional through imitation 7 intentionality 49 legal collective 270 validity see validity, legal legal 298–301 legal concepts Interessenjurisprudenz 499 defeasibility of see defeasibility, of legal interest 499 concepts internal intermediate 553–63 justification see justification, internal cognitive function of 558–63 interpretant 646 Ross’s theory of 553–7 binding 646 legal pluralism interpretation 646 logic for 659–67 of proclamations see proclamation, in- legal procedures terpretation of defeasibility of see defeasibility, and le- intuition gal procedures legal 134 legal reasoning intuitionistic logic see logic, intuitionistic and deduction see deduction, in legal reasoning 830 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

and legal process 340–2 see reasoning, monotonic and non- and logic see logic, and legal reasoning monotonic pluralist 659 motivation social impact of 339–40 external 248–51 legal transaction see Rechtsgeschaft¨ must legislator and relative necessity 529 prerogative of 371 lexicographic order Nash-equilibrium 255 over values 160 multiple 260 liking 17 naturalistic doxiﬁcation of 92 value see value, naturalistic linguistic competence 9 negation 408 logic by failure 727 ﬁrst-order classical 405 negative logic see logic, negative and legal reasoning 389–93 negotiation and truth preservation 420–1 dialogue see dialogue, negotiation autoepistemic 70, 496 on the common interest 322 deontic see deontic, logic space 314 for pluralism see pluralism, logic for noema 47 intuitionistic 437 NON 408 multi-valued 437 non-deontic negative 79 emergence see emergence, non-deontic positive 79 initiation see initiation, non-deontic predicate 421–37 termination see termination, non- and time see time, and predicate deontic logic non-deterministic programming 727 plan see plan, non-deterministic propositional 405–21 reasoning see reasoning, non- inference rules 413–7 deterministic relevance 437 non-monotonic logical reasoning see reasoning, monotonic validity see validity, logical and non-monotonic logical omniscience 54 non-provability 727–32 non-retroactivity see retroactivity may noright 512 instruction see instruction, may NoRight 512 intention see intention, may norm 294 meaning normalisation inferential 558 Allen’s technique of 407, 409–13 memory normative inference from 59 belief see belief, normative mental clause see clause, normative organ 9–11 emergence see emergence, normative policy 34 proposition see proposition, normative meta-level argument see argument, meta- sentence see sentence, normative level speech act see speech act, normative meta-reasoning see reasoning, meta- state of affairs see state of affairs, nor- meta-syllogism see syllogism, meta- mative modal logic see logic, modal syllogism see syllogism, normative monotonic normative conditional operator 703 and causality 524–6 reasoning and constitutive rules 551–3 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 831

and counts-as connections 551–3 collective and plural 277–81 and determination 524–6 plural 277 and inferences 534–48 OR 408 and time 566–74 ordering antecedent of 523 over sets of factors 739 cognitive function of 521–3 over sets of values 739 consequent of 523 other-directed general 526–33 concern see concern, other-directed inferences inapplicable to 544–8 intention see intention, other-directed Kelsen’s view of 563–6 ought-to-be negation of 532–3 in Kelsen’s theory 564 negation of general 533 OUTWEIGHS 688 specific and general 523–4 types of 549–53 p-node see pro-node normative system paradox static and dynamic 630 Chisholm’s 477 contrary to duty 477 objectivity 131, 132 of epistemic obligation 476 Obl 454 of the Good Samaritan 476 obligation 454–5, 464 of the liar 714 and permission Ross’s logical relationships 466 of derived obligation 475 beneficiary 503 of self-amending constitution 713– directed 503–7 27 elementary Pareto efficiency 155–6 negative 455 participability 278 positive 455 of a collective cognitive state see cogni- non-other-directed 503 tive state, collective, participability other-directed 503–5 of paternalistic 503 participation positive and negative 455 as a coordination game 281–2 obligatoriness 95, 454 gamble of 279–81, 384, 563 obligatory 100, 454 in a future state of mind 284–5 OblRight 507 in legal beliefs 342–3 omission 447–51 intrinsic value of 285–6 Omits 450 rational Omitted 449 and consent 282–4 ontology paternalism see obligation, paternalistic of normative state of affairs see state of per absurdum affairs, normative, ontology of reasoning see reasoning, per absurdum onus 531 percept 12 openness perception 42 of normative systems 493 cognitive model of 8 operant perceptual conditioning see conditioning, operant inference see inference, perceptual optimal permission 458–62, 464, 481 cogniser see cogniser, optimal doxified may-intention see intention, law doxified may-intention, and per- and bindingness 368–71 mittedness optimality and obligation see obligation, and per- cognitive 88 mission collective 277 and power see power, and permission 832 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

as ignorance 481–4 postcondition 13 as non-derivability 484–8 posteriority exception-theory of 470 and priority see priority, by posteriority logic of 467–71 potestative obligation and prohibition, connec- right 583 tions 459–64 PotestativeRight 583 other-directed 505–6 power 508, 577–87 positive and negative 459 action- 579–81 strong 493 abstract 581 weak 493 and permission 583–5 permissive right see right, permissive enabling 581–3 permitted 481 abstract 582 PermRight 513 generic 577–9 perspective judicial plural 298 and proclamative power see procla- persuasion mative power, and judicial powers dialogue see dialogue, persuasion normative 577 plan 18, 23 proclamative see proclamative, power abstract 21 right 583 deterministic 24 practical evaluation 23–7 cognition see cognition, practical multiagent inquiry see dialogue, practical inquiry collective adoption of 289–91 rationality see reasoning, practical non-deterministic 24 reasoning see reasoning, practical planning 23 theory see theory, practical and social action 247 coherence of see coherence, of prac- doxiﬁed 89 tical theories multi-agent 35 practition 36 subplanning 21–3 precedent 738 pleading guilty 319 and salience 261 plural as a source of law 655–6 cognitive state see cognitive state, plu- precondition 13 ral token 528 perspective see perspective, plural type 527 pluralism predicate legal see legal pluralism logical 422 PNF axiom 466 predicate logic see logic, predicate poiesis 439 preference 17 point of view and collision 66–8 detached 380 arbitrary and value-based 756–8 hermeneutical 380 based reasoning see reasoning, Pos 585 preference-based positive logic see logic, positive between reasons 690 positivism binding see binding, preference and legal bindingness 363–4 over rules 739 enactment- 465 premise exclusive 367 major 50 inclusive 383 minor 50 and legal bindingness 365–6 of an argument 674 practice- 364 set 671 and legal bindingness 364 presumption 77 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 833

and undercutting see undercutting, accusatorial 318, 319 and presumptions inquisitorial 319 prima facie Procl 593 conclusion 60 proclamation 589–611 principle 183, 185, 186 and attempts 595–6 and factors see factor, and principles and intentions 594–5 prioritisation attempted 595 and coordination see coordination, and content of 607–8 prioritisation effectiveness 608 priority 198 efficacy of 637–40 and belief revision 217–21 ineffectiveness 609 and dimensions 225–33 interpretation of 646–50 and factors 221–5 invalidity 609 beliefs 197–9 notion of 593–6 by axiology 209, 710 of sentences and propositions 640–53 by exceptionality 709 rules 596–8 by posteriority 201, 215, 709, 711 content-general 596 by specificity 709 voidability 609 by superiority 199, 215, 709 voidness 609 collision proclamative power 581, 613–35, 637 partial 218 and judicial powers 633–5 total 218 and public powers 627–35 defeat see defeat, priority concerning obligations 617–8 factor-based 211–2 concerning permissions 618–9 meta- 215–7 conferral 621–3 multiple 212–5 inferential role 614–7 of exceptions 207–8 kinds of 617–21 ordering 212–5 limitations of 626–7 rule notion of 613–4 general 214–7 textual 645 meta- 215–7 to command 619–20 source-based 199–200 to renounce a power 620–1 specificity-based 202–5 profile time-based 200–1 action- see action, profile value-based 208–10 prohibition 456–8, 464 prisoner’s dilemma see dilemma, pris- and obligation 457–8 oner’s proof 707 privilege 511 tree 705 Privilege 511 propensity pro tanto and factors see factor, and propensity conclusion 60 logical function of 180–1 pro-node 705 proposition 47 probability 73–5 anancastic 530 and defeasibility see defeasibility, and atomic 406 probability normative 93, 293 calculus 73 Alchourron´ and Bulygin’s concept subjective 73 of 93 problem-solving binding 293 approach to see approach to problem- purpose of 499–502 solving propositional logic see logic, propositional process protocol 834 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

communication 262 and legal bindingness 365 prototype 191 reason 13, 49, 168, 235, 680 psychology accrual of see accrual, of reasons cognitive 8–10 and commands 172–3 public powers complete 184 and proclamative power see proclama- contributory tive power, and public powers and factors 185 purpose exclusionary 167–9, 176 of a normative proposition see propo- and delegation 170–6 sition, normative, purpose of explanatory 11 guiding 11 quantification idea of 131 substitutional see substitutional, quan- merging and adding 236–40 tification subreason 13, 49, 184, 235, 680 quantifier decisive 690 existential 424 reasonableness 156, 161 logical 423 reasoning 42 deterministic 83 ratio decidendi 735 and cognition 41–5 construction of 738 and implicit cognition 42–5 endorsement of 655 and meta-reasoning 128–30 ratiocination 47–55 case-based 735–49, 751–89 and heuresis see heuresis, and ratioci- and analogical reasoning 737 nation and theory-construction 737 defeasible 60 distinguishing see distinguishing rationalisation 335 emphasise strengths 765 and critical thinking 123–4 show weaknesses not fatal 765 in legal reasoning 124–5 collective 286–9 in practical reasoning 121–3 collective-concerned 244–7 rationality 3, 10–1 conclusive 55 bounded 19, 145–76 defeasible 55 and institutions 146–7 doxified practical 90 and limitation in teleology 151–3 epistemic 11–4 and teleology 150–1 factor-based 738 collective 270–4 failures of 41–2 descriptive and ideal 131 instance 50 descriptive view of 131 meta- 128–30 epistemic 13 monotonic and non-monotonic 57–8 foundations of non-deterministic 83 externalistic 15 per absurdum 160 internalistic 15 planar 127–8 ideal 131 practical 14–5 limitations of 146–7 preference-based 66–8, 195–240 limits of 133–5 reflective 127–8 of a collective 270 vicarious 284, 380, 725 optimal 108 reasoning schema 13, 49–53 particularised and universal 131–3 adoption 53–5 practical XXV, 3, 15 combined 425 substantive and procedural 147–50 conclusive 55 universality of 131 conditioned necessity of 54 realism defeasible 55 and cognitive dissonance 106 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 835

formal 49 name 49 reasoning schema (introduction) normative detachment 534 additive a fortiori 224 normative specification 535 AND elimination (1) 414 normative syllogism 535 AND elimination (2) 414 OG-obligation generic-making 475 AND introduction 413 OP-Permissibility of obligatory ac- Aristotelian syllogism 428 tion 459 Aristotelian syllogism in modern OR elimination (1) 415 form 428 OR elimination (2) 416 bidirectional a fortiori 225 OR introduction 414 Binding-elimination 604 persistent convergence 348 collective-concerned plural desire-adoption 245 desire-adoption 286 teleology 245 intention-detachment 286 want-adoption 245 plan-adoption 286 conclusive syllogism 57, 426 power application 614 conjunctive syllogism 429 present teleological convergence 349 de-doxification 90 propensity formation 179 decisive subreason 690 relativisation 666 defeasible syllogism 57 relativised detachment 666 desire adoption 18 relativised syllogism 666 desiring action-profile 248 source-based bindingness 344 detachment 13 SPA-Success of productive ac- m detachment (IF ...THEN elimina- tions 444 tion) 416 subtractive a fortiori 225 dimensional a fortiori (outweigh- syllogism 50, 53 ing) 233 technical imperative 30 disjunction introduction 53 teleological bindingness 344, 658 disjuntive syllogism 430 teleological inference 19 double-negation elimination 415 temporal persistence 570 executing cognitive intention 35 temporalised normative syllogism 571 FORANY elimination (specifica- textual bindingness 642 tion) 424 want adoption 20 FORSOME introduction 425 rebutting 64–5 general-power application 615 collision see collision, rebutting m IF ...THEN introduction 417 reciprocal 196 instrumental desire 23 Rechtsgeschaft¨ 589–91 instrumental desire to know 28 Rechtsinstitut 561 intention detachment 33 reconciliation intention individualisation 38 dialogue see dialogue, reconciliation intention specification 34 reflective equilibrium 124, 126 introspection (self-awareness) 127 reflexes JBA-junction of behavioural ac- conditioned 3, 5–7 tion 442 fixed 3–5 JO-junction of obligation 455 reflexivity of JPA-junction of productive action 443 intention see intention, reflexivity of meta-syllogism 52 Reflexwirkungen 500 meta-syllogism (naive version) 599 reinforcer meta-syllogism with proclama- negative 5 tions 606 positive 5 modus tollens 417 reinstatement 68–72, 692–4, 707 836 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

relativisation salience 261–4 of practical cognition see cognition, sanction practical, relativisation of and assurance 294–7 reliance 162 satisficing representation 623–6 and maximising 146 and agency 624 scalable and mandate 623 factor see factor, scalable authority 623 self-directed republicanism 299 concern see concern, self-directed retroactivity 525, 723 intention see intention, self-directed right sense or rightness 135 absolute and relative 514–6 sentence 48 right bindingness of 641–5 absolute 515 normative 293 benefit theory of 508–10 sharing exclusionary 516–7 legal rules see rule, sharing legal Hohfeldian notion of 511 situatedness 646 inalienable 619 situation 484 obligational 507–10 circumstance of 484 permissive 513–4 situation calculus 570 protected 514 social power- see power, right learning see learning, social robotics soft law 657 Asimov’s laws of 212 Sollen 564 rule 195, 290 source non-deontic 99, 291 -based priority see priority, source- and subsumption rules 540 based inapplicability of 682 of law 653–9 adoptability of 338–9 general notion 657–9 adoption of 335–6 specialisation 5 anancastic 530 of conditioned reflexes 5 and teleology 166–7 specificity commitment 310 -based priority see priority, specificity- constitutive 98–9, 552 based and normative conditionals see nor- and priority see priority, by specificity mative conditional, and constitu- check 205–6 tive rules speech act 48 construction of 745–6 normative 293 deontic 98 intention of the issuer 293 exception- see exception, rule stance exclusionary 210, 516 intentional 340, 582 locution 310 toward collectives 272 personally-general 568 teleological 499 principal 207 standard 186 priority- see priority, rule guiding 187 regulative 98 standing sharing legal 346–53 instruction see instruction, standing structural 310 plan see plan, standing subsumption- see subsumption, rule state temporally-general 568 conative see conative, state termination 310 emergence see emergence, state- INDEX OF SUBJECTS 837

mental 47 and bounded rationality see rational- state of affairs ity, bounded, and teleology normative 99, 102–5 and factors see factors, and teleology ontology of 118–9 and rules see rule, and teleology supervenience of 114–6 temporal statistical inertia syllogism see syllogism, statistical law of 569 status, from status to contract see contract, persistence 436, 569 from status to term strategic logical 422 dilemmas see dilemma, strategic terminates 567 framework 252 termination strategy 29 non-deontic 550 strict deontic 549, see deontic, termination defeat see defeat, strict textual proclamative power see proclama- subargument 676 tive power, textual m notion of 676–7 THEN 409 n subconclusion see conclusion, subconclu- THEN 526 sion theory subjection 586 -based dialectics see dialectics, theory Subjection 586 based subplanning see planning, subplanning and explanation of cases 752–3 subreason see reason, subreason coherence of decisive 690 metrics see coherence, of theories, substitutional quantification 598–601 metrics subsumption 537–44 consistency of 759 and factors 771 construction 543 rule 540 evaluation 758–61 sufficently good see good, sufficently explanatory power of 759 superiority legal and priority see priority, by superiority flat 773 supervenience stratified 773 of normative state of affairs see state of practical 125–6, 306, 735 affairs, normative, supervenience safety of 760 syllogism 50 simplicity of 759 Aristotelian practical 51 theory constructor 744 chains of 536–7 theory constructor (introduction) judicial 50, 52, 536 abduct rule-pref. 747 meta- 52–3, 597, 599–606, 631, 633 arbitrary rule-pref. 748 and bindingness see bindingness, arbitrary value-pref. 748 and meta-syllogism generalisation 746 normative 51–3, 425–30 rule from factors 745 statistical 59 rule-pref. from value-pref. 748 syntax specialisation 746 compositional 408 value-pref. from rule-pref. 748 value-pref. from value inclusion 758 Tatbestand see precondition, type theory-construction 735, 740–9 Tatsache see precondition, token and analogy 789 technical and case-based reasoning see rea- imperative see imperative, technical soning, case-based, and theory- teleological stance see stance, teleological construction teleology 838 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

and case-history 788 and presumptions 71 and cases 738–40 collision see collision, undercutting and social evolution 785–7 unless background of 741–4 clause 77 construct preferences 746–9 construct rules 745–6 valid include cases 744–5, 754–5 legally 385 include factors 744–5 validity 338–9, 385 threat 249 axiological 332 time deﬁnition of 332 -based priority see priority, time-based legal 331 and predicate logic 430–7 puzzle of 331–3, 385–6 applicability duration 722 logical 56 creation 722 and truth preservation 56 ToBring 446 operative 332 ToDo 446 systemic 332 ToDo ∗ 450 systemic-operative 332 topos 312, 399 value 92, 94 tragedy of the commons 258–9 -based priority see priority, value-based transpersonal and dimensions see dimension, and value see value, transpersonal values trust 162 collectivistic 301 core 162 comparison of values 785 truth hierarchy 739 and dialogue 109–13 impact 209 and experiment 113 individualistic 301 and inquiry 109–12 naturalistic 301 conditions 407 ordering over sets of values see order- consensus theory of 109–12 ing, over sets of values deﬂationary or minimalist theory transpersonal 301 of 602 variable disquotational theory of 601 logical 423 preservation 56 vicarious reasoning see reasoning, vicari- and logic see logic, and truth preser- ous vation voidability truth and reconciliation committees 320 of a proclamation see proclamation, turn voidable linguistic 112–3 voidness mentalistic 112–3 of a proclamation see proclamation, type 205 void

unbounded Wallenstein 172–3 cogniser see cogniser, unbounded want 18, 20 undercutting 65–6, 682 weighing and inapplicability 682 and balancing 156–8 and practical reasoning 72–3 wishful thinking 15 INDEX OF NAMES

Aarnio, A. 135, 392 Bierling, E. R. 614 Ackermann, W. 405 Bing, J. 539 al Hibri, A. 453 Bix, B. H. 331 Alberti, M. 453 Blackburn, S. 119, 602, 603 Alchourron,´ C. E. 75, 93, 218, 294, 392–4, Bobbio, N. 490, 496 401, 419, 421, 454, 485, 490, 493 Bobbitt, P. 134, 652, 653 Aleven, V. 761, 765, 775 Bochereau, L. 737 Alexy, R. 78, 111, 126, 155, 159, 184, 246, Boekenoogen 543 283, 289, 306, 314, 331, 332, 377, 392, 436, Boella, G. 457 453, 464, 469, 511, 536, 672, 673 Boer, A. 207 Allen, L. E. 407, 409, 419, 437, 511, 577, Bohman, J. 323 729 Bondarenko, A. 669 Alpa, G. 185 Bongiovanni, G. 374, 562 Amsterdam, A. G. 10 BonJour, L. 88 Anderson, A. R. 419, 456 Boole, G. 405 Anderson, T. 197 Bosscher, D. 207 Aquinas, T. 76, 114 Bourcier, D. 6, 737 Aqvist,˚ L. 453, 476 Bourgine, P. 737 Arendt, H. 321, 439 Braithwaite, J. 320 Aristotle 29, 41, 51, 76, 79, 117, 282, 439, Branting, L. K. 393, 542, 736 453 Bratman, M. 23 Artikis, A. 3 Breuker, J. 207 Artosi, A. 453, 577 Brewer, S. 788 Ashley, K. D. 182, 228, 742, 761, 765, 775 Brewka, G. 57 Asimov, I. 212, 213, 640 Brinz, A. 584 Atienza, M. 185, 392, 788 Brooks, R. A. 41 Audi, R. 134 Bruner, J. 10 Austin, J. 249 Bruninghaus, S. 761 Austin, J. L. 37 Bulygin, E. 93, 294, 360, 392, 471, 485, 490, Axelrod, R. 110 493 Azzoni, G. 37, 530 Buridan, J. 61

Baird, D. G. 252 Calabresi, G. 563 Balzer, W. 252 Carcaterra, G. 524, 552 Barberis, M. 270 Carmo, J. 453 Becker, O. 453 Carnap, R. 82, 485 Belnap, N. 419, 441, 442 Castaneda,˜ H.-N. 36, 47, 477, 478 Bench-Capon, T. J. M. 182, 226, 228, 327, Castelfranchi, C. 31, 36, 112, 162 735, 741, 761, 783, 784 Catania, A. 359 Bentham, J. 38, 508, 627 Cavalla, F. 312 Bergbohm, K. 377 Chellas, B. F. 453, 454 Berlin, I. 300 Chisholm, R. M. 75, 88, 477 Berman, D. H. 741, 742 Chomsky, N. 9, 10, 112, 128 Biagioli, C. 543 Chorley, A. 761 840 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

Christodoulidis, E. A. 317 Ferrajoli, L. 374, 375, 436, 536 Churchill, W. 289 Feteris, E. 392 Churchland, P. M. 112 Finnis, J. M. 243, 331, 349 Clark, K. L. 70, 496 Fish, S. 390 Clergue, G. 6 Fletcher, G. P. 175, 563 Cohen, J. 197, 271, 291 Fodor, J. 50 Cohen, M. D. 110 Frege, G. 405, 422 Cohen, P. R. 31 Fukuyama, F. 162 Coleman, J. L. 113, 119, 363, 365 Fuller, L. L. 332, 340, 341, 346, 373, 509 Constant, B. 299 Conte, A. G. 37, 490, 530, 552, 714 Gadamer, H. 289 Conte, R. 112 Galgano, F. 378, 590 Copi, I. 405 Galilei, G. 113, 235 Cory, H. 422, 543, 727 Gambetta, D. 162 Cotta, S. 114 Gardenfors,¨ P. 75, 217, 218 Cresswell, M. J. 453 Gardner, A. v. d. L. 393 Cruz, J. 12, 15, 63, 65, 88, 112, 128, 132 Gaus, G. F. 286 Gauthier, D. P. 257 D’Agostino, F. 114, 286 Gavanelli, M. 453 Damasio, A. 41, 43 Geffner, H. 205, 548 Dawkins, R. 114 Gelati, J. 552, 577, 614, 665 Dayal, S. 543 Geldard, T. 327 Delgrande, J. P. 205 Geny,´ F. 228 Den Hartog, G. 349 Georgeff, M. P. 127 Dennett, D. C. 5, 43, 48, 114, 272, 340, 341 Gerard,´ P. 390 Devlin, P. 504, 595, 647 Gerner, R. H. 252 Di Lucia, P. 37 Gewirth, A. 111 Dick, P. 17 Gianformaggio, L. 392 Dilthey, W. 11 Gilbert, M. 261, 271, 286 Donohue, J. J. 501 Gilligan, C. 167 Dostoyevsky, F. 45 Giuliani, A. 390 Dretske, F. 272 Godel,¨ K. 405 Dung, P. M. 669, 682, 698, 701, 703 Golding, M. 392, 436, 489, 536 Dunin-Keplicz, B. 270 Goldman, A. 441, 524 Dworkin, R. M. 82, 113, 183, 184, 187, 243, Goodhart, A. L. 788 273, 331, 363, 374, 384, 489, 562, 603 Goodrich, P. 390 Gordon, T. F. 75, 80, 207, 314, 324, 325, Eckhoff, T. 188 327, 393, 543, 548, 669, 747 Eco, U. 646 Gorla, G. 378 Edelman, G. M. 84 Governatori, G. 552, 577, 614, 665, 669 van Eemeren, F. H. 306 Gray, G. 412 Einstein, A. XXV, 112 Greenawalt, K. 647 Elgesem, D. 577 Gregory, R. L. 9 Elster, J. 197 Grice, P. 37, 443, 460, 594 Eng, S. 347 Grootendorst, R. 306 van Engers, T. M. 543 Gross, R. 9 Engisch, K. 525, 543 Grosz, B. 35 Esser, J. 543 Grotius, H. 114, 526, 578 Guastini, R. 294 Falcone, R. 36, 162 Gunther,¨ K. 79 Falzea, A. 524 Faralli, C. 106 Haack, S. XXV, 11, 12, 16, 75, 84, 127, 437, INDEX OF NAMES 841

599, 759 Kanger, S. 442 Habermas, J. 111, 112, 152, 282, 300, 304, Kant, I. 15, 16, 209, 263, 285, 456 369, 507 Karacapilidis, N. 324, 327 Hafner, C. D. 741, 742 Kaufmann, A. 192, 377, 542 Haft, F. 85, 390 Kelsen, H. 38, 100, 294, 360, 374, 490, 508, Hage, J. C. 11, 126, 175, 181, 234, 327, 393, 509, 518, 564, 566, 582, 593, 614, 628, 630, 445, 548, 669 631 Hagerstr¨ om¨ 101, 106 Kennedy, D. 562 Haggard, T. R. 530 van de Kerchove, M. 390 Hamblin, C. 304–6 King, M. L. 384 Hammond, P. 422, 543, 727 von Kirchmann, J. H. 384 Hansson, B. 474 von Kleist, H. 172 Hare, R. 166, 246 Klug, U. 428, 436 Hart, H. L. A. 76, 191, 243, 332, 333, 342, Knuttila, S. 453 365, 469, 489, 504, 508, 509 Koch, H.-J. 392, 436 Hassemer, W. 192 Konolige, K. 127 Haugeland, J. C. 48 Kotz,¨ H. 590, 596, 610, 623, 624 Hayek, F. A. 7, 45, 269, 321, 374 Kowalski, R. A. 207, 422, 434, 543, 548, Heck, P. 135, 499 570, 669, 727 Held, V. 167 Krabbe, E. 305, 308, 310, 315 Hempel, C. G. 81, 82, 394, 751 Kraus, S. 35 Henckaerts, J.-M. 654 Kriele, M. 371, 542 Hernandez Marın,´ R. 102, 434, 536, 568, Kripke, S. 485 723 Kriwaczek, F. 422, 543, 727 Herrestad, H. 441, 503, 508 Krogh, C. 503 al Hibri, A. 453 Hilbert, D. 405 La Torre, M. 518 Himma, K. E. 365 Lachmeyer, F. 392 Hobbes, T. 257 Laertius, D. 483 Hodges, W. 56, 405 Lagerspetz, E. 252 Hofstadter, D. 788 Lamma, E. 453 Hohfeld, W. N. 510, 527, 552, 585 Larenz, K. 192, 527, 594 Holmes, O. W. 125, 197, 209, 382, 398, 399 Lazzaro, G. 652 Holyoak, K. 788 Leenes, R. E. 327, 729 Horovitz, J. 392 van Leeuwen, C. 9 Horty, J. F. 117, 205, 692 Lehrer, K. 12 Horwich, P. 599, 602 Leibniz, G. W. 389 Hughes, G. E. 453 Leiter, B. 113, 119 Hume, D. 16, 134, 280, 295, 340 Leith, P. 383 Hunter, D. 6 Leng, P. 327 Lesmo, L. 457 Jackson, J. B. 390 Levesque, H. J. 31, 496 Jackson, J. D. 314 Levi, E. 736 Jeffrey, R. 24 Levitt, S. D. 501 von Jhering, R. 500, 508, 509, 563, 627 Lewis, D. K. 260–2 Johnson, P. 543 Liebermann, M. D. 42 Jones, A. J. 453, 454, 552, 577, 665 Lindahl, L. 511, 559, 563, 584, 613, 614 Jorgensen,¨ S. 420 Llewellyn, K. 125 Jori, M. 359, 397 Lloyd, J. W. 671 Lodder, A. R. 325, 327, 393 Kalinowski, G. 437, 453 Lombardi Vallauri, L. 134, 279, 384, 657 Kamm, F. M. 507, 508 Lorenz, K. 306 842 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

Lorenzen, P. 306 Norvig, P. 74 Losano, M. 127 Nozick, R. 17, 134, 185, 243, 507 Loui, R. P. 205, 327, 548, 669, 697 Ludlow, P. E. 49 Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 65, 78, 279, 289, 306, Luhmann, N. 75, 147, 152, 160, 251, 270, 390, 395, 396 340, 507, 543 Olivecrona, K. 106 Opalek, K. 493 MacCormick, D. N. 75, 124, 160, 331, 380, Osborne, M. 252 392, 436, 509, 536, 788 Ost, F. 390 MacIntyre, A. 289 MacKenzie, J. D. 306 Palombella, G. 507 Mackie, J. L. 103, 263 Parsons, T. 252 Maher, M. J. 669 Pattaro, E. 27, 100, 101, 106, 135, 185, 294, Mahlmann, A. 134 331, 384, 386, 439, 528, 552, 654 Maine, H. S. 591 Patterson, D. 10, 103 Makinson, D. 75, 218, 511, 577 Pavcnik,ˇ M. 392 Malamed, A. D. 563 Pavlakos, G. 103 Mally, E. 453 Pearl, G. 205, 548 Malraux, A. 536 Peczenik, A. 16, 59, 60, 78, 111, 126, 127, Mariani, P. 543 134, 135, 197, 208, 230, 299, 325, 331, 347, Marmor, A. 367 373, 392, 402, 441, 562, 647, 738, 745 Marr, D. 8 Peirce, C. S. 109, 646, 747 Martino, A. 421 Perelman, C. 65, 78, 279, 289, 306, 390, Matteucci, N. 376 395, 396, 399, 400, 403, 652 Mazzarese, T. 453, 493 Perloff, M. 441, 442 McCarthy, J. 433, 570 Perry, S. R. 175 McCarty, L. T. 192, 437, 454, 670, 737, 789 Pettit, P. 11, 273, 296, 299, 300, 320, 324 McIllwain, C. H. 376 Philipps, L. 6, 437 Mello, P. 453 Picker, R. C. 252 Memmo, D. 163 Pigliaru, A. 660 Mendelson, E. 405 Pinker, S. 9 Merkl, D. 6 Pintore, A. 103, 562 Mervis, C. 191 Pitt, J. 3 Meyer, J.-J. C. 442, 453, 457, 478 Pollock, F. 590 Miers, D. 181, 187, 398, 736, 788 Pollock, J. L. 3, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 43, Mill, J. S. 79, 88, 321, 379, 504 49, 54, 59, 61–3, 65, 67, 68, 75, 87, 88, 103, Millikan, R. G. 10 112, 128, 132, 135, 197, 203, 235, 236, 683 Moore, G. E. 366 Poole, D. L. 205 Moore, M. S. 103, 113, 365 Popper, K. R. 4, 45, 81, 84, 85, 333 Moore, R. C. 70, 496 Porn,¨ I. 441, 442, 454 Morison, J. 324, 383 Posner, R. A. 11, 82, 160, 390 Morrone, A. 161 Postema, G. 286, 340, 343 Muratori, L. A. 384 Pound, R. 186 Prakken, H. 67, 197, 205, 214, 218, 221, Nagel, T. 16 225, 325, 327, 329, 393, 548, 669, 682, 689, Nash, J. F. 255 697, 699, 701, 709, 721, 727, 729, 734, 758, Nerhot, P. 788 782, 785 Neumann, U. 392 Newman, D. 324 Quadri, G. 163 Nietzsche, F. 45 Quine, W. 422, 434 Nino, C. S. 324, 360, 507 Norman, J. 697 Radbruch, G. 301, 332, 333, 369, 377, 379 INDEX OF NAMES 843

Raiffa, H. 314 Schweighofer, E. 6 Ramsey, F. P. 602 Searle, J. R. 37, 99, 119, 270, 551, 574, 592, Rao, A. S. 127 594, 607, 663 Rawls, J. 124, 242, 286, 300, 507 Selznick, P. 300 Raz, J. 11, 167, 168, 170, 185, 243, 380 Sen, A. 243, 265, 324 Reed, C. 329 Sergot, M. J. 3, 422, 434, 448, 511, 543, 552, Rehg, W. E. 323 570, 577, 665, 727 Reichenbach, H. 84 Shakespeare, W. 196 Reinach, A. 524 Shiner, R. 175, 331, 374, 654, 736 Reiter, R. 496 Shoham, Y. 524 Rescher, N. 80, 111, 132, 283, 306, 369, 545 Sieckmann, J.-R. 185 Richards, R. C. M. 448 Simari, G. R. 205, 669 Ridley, M. 10 Simon, H. A. 133, 145–7, 152, 181, 270, 382 Rissland, E. L. 182, 226, 228, 741, 761, 789 Singh, S. 110 Rodig,¨ J. 392, 401, 436 Skalak, D. 789 Rodota,` S. 185 Skinner, B. 5 Romano, S. 660 Soeteman, A. 392 Rosch, E. 191 Soper, P. 164 Ross, A. 218, 475, 478, 511, 553, 557, 590, Sophocles 136, 140, 141 614, 713 Stein, P. 313, 400 Ross, W. D. 76, 134 Stranieri, A. 6, 737 Roth, B. 783 Struck, G. 400 Rotolo, A. 552, 577, 593, 614, 639, 665, 735, Sunstein, C. R. 125, 183, 324, 397, 788 788 Susskind, R. 543 Rottleuthner, H. 114, 136, 340, 360, 373, 380 Tammelo, I. 392, 421, 436 Rubinstein, A. 147, 252 Tarello, G. 392, 652 Ruiz Manero, J. 185 Tarski, A. 405 Russell, B. 403, 405 Taruffo, M. 197, 392 Russell, S. J. 74 Thagard, P. 41, 127, 153, 560, 759, 783, 788 Rußman,¨ H. 392, 436 Thomasius, C. 456, 503 Thomason, R. 117 Sadri, F. 207, 422, 543, 727 Tiscornia, D. 543 Sainsbury, M. 56, 405 Toni, F. 669 Salmond, J. W. 624 Tonnies,¨ F. 242 Sandars, T. C. 430 Tononi, G. 84 Sartor, G. 6, 67, 71, 75, 163, 182, 207, 214, Torroni, P. 453 218, 221, 225, 226, 228, 272, 327, 434, 453, Toulmin, S. 400 544, 552, 568, 577, 614, 645, 665, 669, 682, Touretzky, D. S. 117, 205 689, 697, 699, 701, 709, 721, 723, 727, 734, Tugendhat, E. 111 735, 758, 783–6 Tuomela, R. 252, 271, 286, 321 Sartori, G. 376 Tutu, D. M. 320 Sartre, J. P. 157, 196 Tuzet, G. 747 Sauber, P. 714 Twining, W. 181, 187, 197, 398, 736, 788 von Savigny, F. C. 85, 379, 561, 610 Saxon, C. S. 419, 437, 511, 577, 729 Ullman-Margalit, E. 252, 256, 257, 260 Scanlon, T. M. 111 Unger, R. 562 Scarpelli, U. 362 Urbinas, S. 324 Schauer, F. 175, 397 Schelling, T. 261 van de Kerchove, M. 390 Schiller, F. 172, 173 van Eemeren, F. H. 306 Schooler, J. W. 41 van Engers, T. M. 543 844 TREATISE, 5 - LEGAL REASONING

Van Eynde, L. 390 Wieringa, R. J. 453, 478 van Leeuwen, C. 9 Williams, G. 363 Vandervecken, D. 119, 592, 594, 607 Williams, J. 624 Verbrugge, R. 270 Wilson, E. O. 269 Verheij, B. 327 Wilson, T. D. 41 Verza, A. 243 Windscheid, B. 589 Vida, S. 524 Winiwarter, W. 6 Viehweg, T. 390, 399 Winkels, R. 207 Villa, V. 365 Winter, S. L. 10 Viola, F. 349 Wisdom, J. 181 Volpe, G. 602 Wittgenstein, L. 191 von Jhering, R. 500, 508, 509, 563, 627 Wolenski, J. 493 von Kirchmann, J. H. 384 Wooldridge, M. 3, 22, 32, 252 von Kleist, H. 172 von Wright, G. H. 11, 439, 442, 448, 449, von Savigny, F. C. 85, 379, 561, 610 453, 474, 480, 481, 493, 530 von Wright, G. H. 11, 439, 442, 448, 449, Wroblewski,´ J. 50, 135, 332, 392, 652 453, 474, 480, 481, 493, 530 Vreeswijk, G. A. W. 669 Yoshino, H. 436, 605 Waldron, J. 283, 325, 369, 375, 507 Walton, D. N. 305, 306, 308, 310, 315, 329, Zaccaria, G. 349, 543 390 Zagrebelsky, G. 374, 653 Waluchow, W. J. 365 Zakaria, F. 324 Weber, M. 11, 192, 396 Zeleznikow, J. 6, 737 Wedberg, A. 559 Zitelmann, E. 490, 524 Weinberger, O. 294, 331, 392, 632 Zweigert, K. 590, 596, 610, 623, 624